A Report from the Office of Evaluation


(July 2002 – May 2003)

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Acknowledgement

Three evaluation teams visited the region in July 2002, November/December 2002 and April/May 2003 respectively. This document was prepared by the team leader on the basis of the mission’s work in the field.

On behalf of the team, the author wishes to extend thanks to all those who facilitated the team’s work in the field and in Headquarters.

Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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## Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tr>
<td>ALITE</td>
<td>Augmented Logistics Intervention Team for Emergencies.</td>
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<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action</td>
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<td>CANGO</td>
<td>Coordinating Assembly of NGOs (in Swaziland)</td>
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<td>CAP</td>
<td>Consolidated Appeal Process</td>
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<tr>
<td>CFSAM</td>
<td>Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission</td>
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<td>CHF</td>
<td>Swiss francs</td>
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<td>CHS</td>
<td>Community and Household Surveillance System</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLC</td>
<td>Cash in Lieu of Commodities</td>
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<tr>
<td>CO</td>
<td>Country Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMPAS</td>
<td>Commodity Tracking System (WFP)</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Country Programme</td>
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<td>CRS</td>
<td>Catholic Relief Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSB</td>
<td>Corn Soya Blend</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDU</td>
<td>Delivery duty unpaid (i.e. deliveries by suppliers)</td>
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<td>DFID</td>
<td>Department for International Development (UK)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DSC</td>
<td>Direct Support Costs</td>
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<td>EB</td>
<td>Executive Board (WFP)</td>
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<td>ECTW</td>
<td>Enhanced Commitments to Women (WFP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDP</td>
<td>Extended Delivery Point</td>
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<tr>
<td>EMOP</td>
<td>Emergency Operation</td>
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<td>ERC</td>
<td>Emergency Relief Coordinator</td>
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<td>ERR</td>
<td>Emergency Response Roster</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>FEWSNET</td>
<td>Famine Early Warning Systems network</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFW</td>
<td>Food for work</td>
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<tr>
<td>FITTEST</td>
<td>Fast IT and Telecommunications emergency and support team</td>
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<td>FTP</td>
<td>Final Distribution Point</td>
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<td>GFD</td>
<td>General food distributions (GFD),</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMB</td>
<td>Grain Marketing Board</td>
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<tr>
<td>GMO</td>
<td>Genetically modified organisms (also: GM).</td>
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<td>GTZ</td>
<td>German Corporation for International Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>HEA</td>
<td>Household Economy Analysis</td>
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<td>HR</td>
<td>Human Resources Department (WFP)</td>
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<td>IASCGWG</td>
<td>Inter-agency standing committee – working group</td>
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<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and communications technology division (WFP)</td>
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<td>IFRC</td>
<td>International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Immediate Response Account (WFP)</td>
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<td>ISC</td>
<td>Indirect Support Costs</td>
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<td>JPO</td>
<td>Junior Professional Officer</td>
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<td>LoU</td>
<td>Letter of Understanding</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTSCH</td>
<td>Land-side transport, storage and handling</td>
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<td>LWF</td>
<td>Lutheran World Federation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NEPAD</td>
<td>The New Partnership for Africa’s Development</td>
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<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non Governmental Organization</td>
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<td>NRU</td>
<td>Nutrition Rehabilitation Unit</td>
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<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODI</td>
<td>Overseas Development Institute (United Kingdom)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODJ</td>
<td>WFP Regional Bureau for Southern Africa (based in Johannesburg)</td>
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<td>ODK</td>
<td>WFP Regional Bureau for Eastern and Central Africa (based in Kampala)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ODOC</td>
<td>Other Direct Operational Costs</td>
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<tr>
<td>OHA</td>
<td>Office of Humanitarian Affairs (WFP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>OTL</td>
<td>Surface Transport Service (WFP; formerly the Logistics Service)</td>
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<td>OTS</td>
<td>Shipping Service (WFP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PLWHA</td>
<td>People Living With HIV/AIDS</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation</td>
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<td>PRSP</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>RB</td>
<td>Regional Bureau (WFP)</td>
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<td>RBM</td>
<td>Results-Based Management</td>
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<td>ReLogS</td>
<td>Regional Logistics Unit (WFP)</td>
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<td>RIACSO</td>
<td>Regional Inter-Agency Co-ordination and Support Office</td>
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<td>RIV</td>
<td>Relief and Information Validation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSA</td>
<td>Republic of South Africa</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTE</td>
<td>Real-Time Evaluation</td>
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<tr>
<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern African Development Community</td>
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<td>SBA</td>
<td>Stand-by Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCF/UK</td>
<td>Save the Children Fund (United Kingdom)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SF/TP</td>
<td>Supplementary feeding/therapeutic feeding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Special Operation (WFP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>SWOT</td>
<td>Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>TDY</td>
<td>Temporary Duty Assignment</td>
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<tr>
<td>TORs</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>Joint United Nations programme on HIV/AIDS</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNDP</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNFPA</td>
<td>United Nations Fund for Population Activities</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNIMIX</td>
<td>A type of blended food, produced locally</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNRC</td>
<td>United Nations Resident Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNV</td>
<td>United Nations Volunteer</td>
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<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAC</td>
<td>Vulnerability Assessment Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>VAM</td>
<td>Vulnerability Assessment Mapping</td>
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<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>WINGS</td>
<td>WFP Information network global system</td>
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<td>WVI</td>
<td>World Vision International</td>
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8.1 The new EMOP

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Annex 2: Resources charts
Annex 3: Ration levels
Annex 4: Chronicle of EMOP 10200; July 2002 to June 2003
Annex 5: A comparison with the 1992-93 emergency operation
Annex 6: Country outlines
Preface

The following report reflects observations and recommendations of the Real Time Evaluation (RTE) mission that visited the six countries covered by the southern Africa regional emergency operation (Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe) and the Regional Bureau during three missions from July 2002 to May 2003. The summary and key recommendations are being submitted to the Executive Board (EB) in October 2003 at its third regular session.

To get a fuller chronological picture of events, the report should be read in conjunction with the Chronicle (Annex 4) since some of the findings are time-bound. This was, indeed, the unique feature of the RTE – the possibility of highlighting lessons from particular moments in the evolution of a highly complex operation.

1. Introduction

1.1 Regional EMOP 10200 – Southern Africa Crisis Response

Emergency Operation (EMOP) 10200 – Southern Africa Crisis Response - foresaw the provision of 992,459 tons of commodities over a nine months period, from 1 July 2002 to 31 March 2003, to feed 10,255,850 people, at a total cost to WFP of US$507 million, including a food cost of US$193 million (38 percent). US$ 5 million was released from WFP’s Immediate Response Account (IRA) at the beginning of the EMOP. Initially approved for nine months (1 July 2002 – 31 March 2003), the operation was extended by three months to 30 June 2003 (with a budget revision approved by the Executive Director in March 2003) that saw an increase in food costs but no additional tonnage1. Zimbabwe was the largest operation of the six countries, accounting for almost half of all projected WFP resource deliveries.

While there were country-specific variations, three time periods capturing seasonal trends were foreseen for the EMOP: July-August 2002 (post harvest, requiring less food assistance), September-November (field preparation and planting), and December-March 2003 (critical period when food stocks would be depleted, prices would be high, and food and other humanitarian needs would be greatest).

The EMOP took into account planned food aid from NGO sources. In particular, the ‘C-SAFE’ NGO consortium, comprising CARE, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and World Vision, was to implement a coordinated three year ‘developmental relief’ programme in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe, with 160,000 tons (from a US government grant of US$114 million) in the first year. In the event, this programme did not start until early 2003 and therefore could not fill the additional food gap in the manner foreseen in the early calculations of the WFP/FAO Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM).

The EMOP objectives were:

- to prevent severe food shortages at household level that could lead to the deterioration of nutritional status and starvation;
- to safeguard the nutritional well being of vulnerable segments of the population such as People Living With HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), children, pregnant and lactating women, and the elderly;
- to preserve productive and human assets;
- to prevent distress migration from affected rural areas to urban centres and neighbouring countries.

1 Due to savings in transport costs the total WFP costs were revised downwards by US$ 1,077,070 (new figure US$512,630,533). Despite the fact that the tonnage remained the same, food costs were revised upwards by US$18,572,297 (new figure US$216,799,70) due to increased commodity prices, and the higher costs of a complete food basket distributed to people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA).
The following report examines the performance and impact of the EMOP against targets and objectives. In terms of staff time and committed resources this was one of the most comprehensive evaluations ever undertaken by WFP. The ‘real time’ evaluation methodology represents a new departure for WFP.

1.2 Real Time Evaluation – a new approach.

WFP’s efforts to find appropriate ways of evaluating humanitarian relief operations as they unfold have included the recent development of ‘real time’ evaluation, an approach that aims at reviewing and capturing important lessons at several stages of a particular response. WFP’s first RTE was applied during the southern Africa emergency operation of 2002-03.

A four/five-person team was deployed for three missions over the EMOP period, coinciding with three phases of the project cycle: 13-30 July 2002 (inception period), 18 November-20 December 2002 (the start of the most intensive implementation phase) and 28 April-17 May (the closing stages of the first EMOP, preparation for new EMOP). The RTE had the following objectives:

- To promote corporate learning about preparedness, design and implementation of emergency operations;
- To assess the relevance of WFP’s response to the southern Africa humanitarian crisis, its progress in achieving its objectives (i.e. results) and any gaps or unintended outcomes;
- To measure the effectiveness and efficiency of the mode of implementation, and the appropriateness and application of operational policies, guidelines and support.

A generic Terms of Reference was drafted in June 2002 (Annex 1) and for each mission a brief ‘note for the record’ was discussed with the new WFP Regional Bureau for Southern Africa (ODJ), based in Johannesburg, regarding the topics and emphasis to be given in the Interim Reports. Each mission presented verbal and written reports on findings that were circulated and commented upon by both ODJ and country offices.²

Though for the most part standard evaluative methods were used, the unique features of the RTE were (a) the possibility of presenting immediate feedback and observations to country, regional and headquarters staff, (b) the support of self-evaluation by WFP teams on the ground, and (c) the possibility of evaluating a complex operation at different stages and thus producing more informed and better overall evaluation results. An internal review will be undertaken to assess the efficacy, methods and timing of the RTE as a potential model for future use.

1.3 Methodology

Team composition

On the first mission only Zambia and Malawi were visited; thereafter, all six countries were visited. The core team composition for all three missions included a socio-economist/team leader (independent consultant), a nutritionist (independent consultant) and a needs assessment specialist (WFP staff member). In addition, two separate logistics specialists (independent consultants) were engaged for the second and third missions. On the third mission, the Chief Evaluation Officer (evaluation manager) acted as a full team member for the entire mission. On the first two missions the OEDE evaluation managers were present only during part of the mission (the evaluation manager having changed after the first mission).

² The first two missions produced an Aide Memoire and a full Interim Report circulated and commented upon by ODJ and country offices. The third mission produced only an Aide Memoire, again circulated.
Methodology

a) A review of existing WFP literature, project briefings, etc, as well as a wider search on relevant non-WFP (literature).
b) One-to-one discussions with all key Country Office (CO) and ODI staff.
c) Detailed discussions and a selection of project field trips with a wide selection of WFP partners, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
d) Port and Extended Delivery Point (EDP) visits, and discussions with key logistics staff, as well as with the Regional Logistics Unit staff.
e) Discussions regionally and at country level with key donors, UN agency representatives and government officials.
f) Focus group discussions with beneficiaries at Final Distribution Points (FTPs) in each country. This included observing distribution methods, discussions with distributions committees, and on-site briefings from the NGOs concerned.
g) Discussions with local provincial/district government authorities and visits with them to project sites, including food for work (FFW) projects, general food distributions (GFD), school feeding, day-care centres, etc.
h) Household visits – at least two at each FDP visited (in most countries) – where in-depth semi-structured interviews with beneficiaries were undertaken. In addition, an ad hoc ‘sentinel site’ study was undertaken in Malawi and Zambia where the family was visited on subsequent missions for an update on progress and an insight into the impact of the operation.
i) A final SWOT analysis with four of the six WFP country teams on the third mission; a round-table opportunity for self-evaluation.

A total of thirteen weeks was spent in the field, including Johannesburg. Constraints included flight schedules (return flights via Johannesburg for many country trips), in-country road travel access and distances, and time constraints in visiting remoter areas. However, the great advantage of the RTE was being able to visit project sites as they were in full operation and with key staff still present.

2. Context of the crisis

2.1 Early signs of crisis

The first signs of an evolving humanitarian emergency in Southern Africa came in January-February 2001, when heavy rainfall across the region caused water-logging of fields and displacement of farming families, notably in southern Malawi, central Mozambique, Swaziland and northern Zambia, where 380,000 people were displaced. Early projections of a good harvest, following the bumper crop of 2000, were immediately revised downward. A large production deficit was also forecast in Zimbabwe, because of a 40% fall in the area planted as a consequence of farm seizures under the ‘fast-track land resettlement’ programme. In July 2001, the FAO post-harvest crop assessments concluded that maize production was 23% down across the region.

By September-October 2001, signs of distress were being reported in several countries: empty granaries, escalating food prices, rising malnutrition rates. Rural areas experienced the most severe food shortages and the sharpest increases in food prices. Smallholder families were worst affected, except in Zimbabwe where retrenched farm workers were most vulnerable. The early months of 2002 – the so-called annual ‘hungry season’ – saw several hundred hunger-related deaths reported in Malawi, and reports of famine were broadcast by the world’s media. Following another poor harvest in mid-2002, the number of people considered to be ‘at risk’ by WFP had risen to an estimated 16 million by December 2002.

There is widespread agreement that production failure in Southern Africa was not the sole cause of the food security crisis. Partial rain failures and other climatic shocks were contributing factors, but the crisis would not have been so severe without policy and governance failures. The depth and extent of food insecurity in the region in 2002/03 is all the more remarkable given that climatic events were less severe
than those of a decade earlier (which led to the 1992/93 emergency response), both meteorologically and with respect to crop losses.

The countries range in population size, from 2 million (Lesotho) to 18.3 million (Mozambique); they vary in level of urbanization, from relatively high (Zambia and Zimbabwe) to low (Malawi and Mozambique); and they are at different levels of development, with Swaziland and Zimbabwe at one end and Malawi and Mozambique at the other. Zambia and Zimbabwe (with large urban populations) and Malawi (with a small urban population) have all used policy measures to ensure a cheap and regular supply of maize for urban populations.

The six countries had generally benefited from relatively sustained periods of peace and stability in the last decade. This was soon to change, as environmental, political and economic shocks threatened to erode development efforts. The contributing factors were many and varied from country to country. Principle among them were the volatile mix of drought, floods, disruptions to commercial farming, the absence of effective food security and governance policies, depletion of strategic grain reserves, poor economic performance, foreign exchange shortages and delays in the timely importation of maize. The complex interaction between these dynamics was to dramatically reduce both availability of, and market access to, cereals throughout the region.

2.2 Policies, governance and accountability

General trends

A thorough analysis of the roots of the current crisis would look not only at crop failures and declining purchasing power of poor households, but also at wider political, economic and health trends, including:

- **Growth failures, rising poverty and declining migration options** that diminished economic activity. Economic slowdown and macroeconomic problems have meant urban and industrial jobs have not been created in step with the growth of the workforce, leading to unemployment and declining real wages. Retrenchment in regional employment has further exacerbated the lack of cash income.

- **Politics and governance factors**, at regional, national and local levels. The unpredictable involvement of the state in input supply, production, storage, domestic and international trade, and price control sent confused messages to producers and private sector traders. Two key issues were rapid land redistribution (Zimbabwe) and the sale of strategic grain reserves (Malawi). More generally, the multiplication of diverse economic activities was suppressed. The key to rising farm productivity is urban and non-farm economic growth, not farm output alone. The emerging policy framework, including Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), tends to favour sectoral targets in areas like education, health or rural roads, but not necessarily the diversified nature of livelihoods. Private farmers have increasingly withdrawn from the market.

- **HIV/AIDS rates** are the highest in the world with as many as five million of the total regional adult population of 26 million being infected. The social and demographic consequences of this rising pandemic cannot be underestimated.

**Government policies under review**

Declarations of disaster and/or requests for emergency assistance were issued by all six countries included in the EMOP. Given that drought and other types of natural disaster are recurring phenomena in Southern Africa, most Governments already had disaster management and co-ordination structures/mechanisms in place and made efforts to further strengthen these in consultation with key stakeholders at both national and sub-regional levels. In June 2002, participants at the UN Consultation on Humanitarian Needs in Southern Africa called upon SADC and affected Member States to take all possible measures both to facilitate the delivery of relief aid and to minimise the levels of food aid
required through external assistance. Particular emphasis was given to promoting the role of the private sector and enabling commercial imports.

The World Summit on Sustainable Development (held in Johannesburg from 26 August - 4 September 2002) was an opportunity for SADC ministers to review the current food crisis in the light of sustainable development objectives. Applauding the important humanitarian role played by WFP and others, the meeting nevertheless concerned itself with placing the crisis in a wider economic and developmental context. It noted, for instance, that on average 68 percent of the population in SADC countries live below the poverty line, this figure having increased over the last five years. Already fragile levels of household food security are exacerbated by the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and environmental and agricultural factors cannot be ignored. An estimated 500 million hectares of land are affected by soil degradation, including as much as 65 percent of agricultural land. Combined with inequitable land distribution, poor farming methods and unfavourable land tenure and ownership systems, this has led to declining productivity. The food crisis may have been initially triggered by external shocks, but it came as no surprise in countries suffering socio-economic decline over many years.

**Debt burdens**

Perhaps most important of all, though, are the economic factors that threaten the viability of farming in the region. The southern Africa crisis has been an opportunity for governments and advocacy groups to remind the world that high debt burdens and unequal trade have weakened effective responses to food insecurity. International finance institutions continue to champion trade liberalisation - with its emphasis on export and foreign exchange-oriented trade – in stark contrast to the heavy subsidies enjoyed by US and EU farm producers. Most African farmers in the region face a decline in the real price of all primary commodities.

Structural adjustment programmes mean the de facto elimination of marketing boards in favour of private buyers (the notable exception being Zimbabwe). Now, in addition to enduring direct exposure to international market fluctuations, farmers are often unsure when private buyers will next appear, and are thus forced to sell cheaply to the first trader. Also, many remote areas remain unserviced by private traders, who prefer to buy from a few large farmers near good roads.

**NEPAD**

In October 2001, African leaders launched the New Economic Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), a pledge to tackle impoverishment through the reform of continental institutions of political governance and economic management. NEPAD calls for the privatisation of social services, a further shift towards export oriented economic growth, and public private partnerships to increase the efficiency with which scarce resources are used. As an investment model, it projects an annual 7 percent growth rate in African countries driven by further aid and investment inflows. The thinking is that Africa's integration into the global economy will alleviate widespread poverty, because Africans will be able to work in export industries, and thus buy food.

Details of NEPAD are beyond the remit of this report. It is worth noting, however, that while it promotes new forms of credit, NEPAD offers few solutions to existing debt burdens. It has been criticised as a top-down approach, the consultation for which involved very few African civil society institutions.

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3 ‘Call to Action by the SADC Health Ministers on the Famine in the Region’, position paper circulated at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 30 August 2002.
4 See, for example, Oxfam Briefing Paper 23: Crisis in Southern Africa.
For WFP’s longer-term engagement in the region it is important to review current economic policy in the light of initiatives such as NEPAD. WFP and its donors have already started discussions on appropriate post-emergency strategies that will emerge later in 2003.

**Zimbabwe, the hub of the crisis**

The complexities of the crisis in Zimbabwe were to have an adverse affect on the region as whole well beyond the EMOP phase. Here the catastrophic proportions of the food crisis, where half of the population of 11.8 million increasingly depended on food aid for survival, were due in large part to economically damaging government policies. Zimbabwe produced only a quarter of its maize needs in the 2002 growing season and needed to import 1.7 –1.8 million tons of cereals in total to offset disaster. Food aid calculations amounting to 486,000 mt between September 2002 and March 2003 were based on the assumption that the Grain Marketing Board (GMB) monopoly imports would make up much of the shortfall: this assumption was severely tested. The shortage of foreign exchange hampers the government’s efforts to import food. Agricultural exports in a good year would contribute around 45 percent of the country’s foreign exchange earnings. Other crucial imports such as fuel, essential drugs, spare parts and raw materials are much reduced by the foreign currency problem.

Traditionally most of Zimbabwe’s basic foods – maize, millets and sorghum – has been produced by communal farmers\(^6\) and small-scale commercial farmers. In mid-2002, large scale commercial farmers numbered some 6 000. These, and the 17 000 small scale commercial farmers, provided about 40 per cent of total basic food needs.\(^7\) In adverse weather conditions, large scale commercial farmers could produce 5 to 10 times the yields of smaller farmers. Disrupted by violence and illegal occupation, the sector was by 2002 virtually closed for domestic production. Meanwhile, the drought has severely reduced crop yields in the southern and western parts of the country.

Zimbabwe is well behind the rest of the region in terms of diversifying crops. This is not only a matter of farming habits; it also points to a lack of seeds, tools, draught power and knowledge of alternative practices. Resettled people, for instance, with as much as 25 hectares/family at their disposal, may cultivate only one hectare.

The government was adamantly against the importation of food by the private sector. Through the GMB it re-introduced its monopoly over purchase and distribution of maize and wheat, with price controls over virtually all food products. The price controls were themselves increasingly meaningless since the authorities were using the official prices for non-existent commodities like maize meal and cooking oil to merely cushion the inflation rate. The official exchange rate was pegged at Zimbabwe dollars (Z$) 55 to the US dollar since 2000; the parallel market rate was about Z$1500 in the last quarter of 2002, with inflation for food commodities running at an all-time high of 220 percent in December.

There were continuous reports of widespread political favouritism and intimidation accompanying food aid delivered through government channels. Due to closer monitoring and the use of independent distributors, this did not affect WFP deliveries to the same extent. However, donors still pressed for independent verification and monitoring. USAID helped fund a new Relief and Information Validation Unit (RIV) within the UN Relief and Recovery Unit (the office of the Humanitarian Coordinator); the latter also led an independent enquiry into the issue of politicisation\(^8\). In an effort to save foreign exchange, the Zimbabwe government weighs donor contributions against its own minimal requirements to close the food gap.

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\(^6\) Communal farmers are traditional small farmers who reside in and till lands owned by the community under the guardianship of the state. These areas were previously called tribal trust lands under the colonial period.


\(^8\) ‘Examining the current issues and practices in regard to the politicization of food in Zimbabwe’, unpublished consultancy report, RRU Harare, April 2003.
Inflation and food prices within the region

Many of the problems in Zimbabwe were due to simple unavailability of basic foodstuffs on the shelves or in the local market, even when the salaried classes could potentially afford it. Elsewhere in the region, the links between food crisis and chronic poverty were more dramatic. There were, for example, no shortages of food products on the market in Lesotho, yet two-thirds of the population live below the poverty line and half are classified as destitute. Purchased cereals comprise 75 percent of annual food needs for Lesotho's poor, and over 70 percent of the households classified ‘very poor’ in Lesotho had no cereals in reserve.\(^9\) Rapidly escalating prices and vanishing incomes were a lethal combination. The people of Lesotho could not afford to buy the food that was available. It was a similar story in Malawi and Zambia.

A useful innovation was ODJ’s employment of an economist on its regional team to follow economic trends and to explain why certain phenomena occur. According to his analysis, in contrast to Zimbabwe, overall inflation rates in Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia declined in 2002 relative to the previous three years to an average of 20 percent. However, given that economies are largely based on agriculture, inflationary trends for food commodities vary with the agricultural cycle. In the closing months of 2002 there was an upward swing. The rise in consumer prices of staple foods such as maize grain, maize products and cereals was due not only to scarcity, but also, in the cases of Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia, to a steady depreciation of the local currency against the South Africa Rand and western currencies.

Economic patterns in the region follow an inexorable logic: the fortunes of one country will immediately impact upon its closest trading partner. The fluctuations of the South African currency were a case in point. The dependency on the Republic of South Africa (RSA) for imports in a normal year varies from country to country. The percentage of imports from the RSA are: Lesotho 90%, Swaziland and Zambia 80%, Mozambique 50% and Zimbabwe 30%. An appreciation of the SA Rand means the relative depreciation of other currencies in the region. This may boost regional exports to South Africa, but it also makes imports from South Africa more expensive, and further fuels inflation.

Key policy issues pertaining to food security in the region

ODJ’s Implementation Strategy recognised that long term food security in the region would depend on the following improvements:

- **An appropriate balance between cash and food crop production.** All countries have increased cash crop production (tobacco, sugarcane, coffee, tea, macadamia nuts, cotton, *inter alia*) in recent years. While it is quite possible for a country that relies mostly on cash crops to be food secure, most countries suffered soaring prices of basic commodities for two main reasons: (a) five of the six counties are landlocked, which leads to high import parity prices; and (b) global markets for cash crops have been extremely volatile, leading to vulnerability in national purchasing power. A cash crop strategy only works if prices are relatively stable, the import market is predictable and household purchasing power is sufficient to meet basic needs.

- **A change in land tenure laws.** In several of the countries large estates take a significant percentage of the most fertile land, typically dedicated to cash crop production that does little to assist the rural poor (except for estate labourers).

- **Promotion of crop diversification.** Maize is the dominant cereal crop in each of the countries, in some cases accounting for 85% of cereals. Maize is not a drought resistant crop, however, and can suffer complete losses with only a few weeks’ dry spell during the tassling period (which happened in some

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places in 2001). Other coarse grains such as millet and sorghum, and tubers such as cassava, sweet potatoes and yams, are much more drought resistant and can be promoted as part of a food security policy.

- **Maintaining strategic grain reserves.** A lesson from the 1992-3 emergency is that well stocked grain reserves should be maintained in each of these countries to provide immediate cereals to destitute households in times of crisis, and to balance local markets and price fluctuations.

### 2.3 Regional trends in nutrition

The threat of famine was highlighted early on, but at no point in the EMOP period did this become reality (though, as we have seen, this was an issue in 2001/2 in Malawi). Nevertheless, the population in the six countries suffers from high levels of chronic food insecurity and malnutrition. Data compiled at the beginning of the EMOP (1997-2001 figures, see Table 1) indicate that 26.5 to 53.0 percent of children under five years of age were affected by chronic malnutrition (stunting). According to WHO classifications, such prevalence is considered medium to very high and reflects a poor to critical situation. Prevalence of severe stunting varies from 9.4 and 24.4 percent. Underweight affects between 9.6 and 26.1 percent of the under fives – again a medium to high prevalence, reflecting a poor to serious situation, whereas average wasting rates are in an acceptable range (1.2 to 7.9 percent). No systematic data are available to analyse the nutritional status of adults.

#### Table 1: Prevalence of malnutrition in six countries in the Southern African region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Acute Malnutrition (weight/height)</th>
<th>Chronic Malnutrition (height/age)</th>
<th>Underweight (weight/age)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>global severe</td>
<td>global severe</td>
<td>global severe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho¹</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>45.4</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi²</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>49.0</td>
<td>25.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique³</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>35.9</td>
<td>26.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland⁴</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>28.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia⁵</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>53.0</td>
<td>25.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe⁶</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>13.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. EMICS 2000 (preliminary report)  4. MICS 2000
2. DHS 2000 and Micronutrient Survey 2001  5. MICS 1999
3. DHS 1997  6. DHS 1999


A review of existing nutritional data available in the six countries through a variety of surveys conducted by UNICEF¹¹ comes to the conclusions that

- Malawi and Mozambique maintain unacceptably high rates of underweight;
- Alarming levels of acute malnutrition in certain pockets of Mozambique were identified in December 2002;
- the slow national trend of improvements in the nutritional status during the 1990s ceased (except for Lesotho), and Zimbabwe and Zambia showed a deterioration in 2001-2003;
- national averages hide large sub-national differences in malnutrition trends;
- A greater number of underweight children were found in high HIV/AIDS prevalence districts. In Lesotho, it was worse among child orphans;

This situation reflects a high degree of poverty and general deprivation over a longer period which is caused by a number of contributing factors, including inadequate food consumption, high prevalence of diseases (including HIV/AIDS), insufficient food production (aggravated by climatic shocks), insufficient access to food, inappropriate use and utilisation of food, and insufficient health service delivery. The 2001/2003 acute food crises added to these problems and overstretched usual coping mechanisms. However, the relative importance of the different factors (food, health, care and framework conditions) varies and still has to be analysed at national and even sub-national level. Sustained and long term policies, strategies and projects/programmes are needed to address these nutritional and development problems.

It is difficult to regroup detailed information about micronutrient deficiencies in the six countries except for Malawi. The national micronutrient survey in Malawi\(^\text{12}\) demonstrated that micronutrient malnutrition is a serious problem in Malawi with pre-school children as the most vulnerable group. Vitamin A deficiency is of public health concern in preschool children, women of childbearing age and in school aged children. There is a severe anaemia problem in pre-school children, a moderate problem in women and school children and a mild problem in men. Data on iodine deficiency disorders are not yet available.

Such problems cannot be addressed in a sustainable way by large scale general food distributions alone. A medium to long term development strategy addressing the structural causes of the problems is needed. The transition from a large scale EMOP to a PRRO will require greater conceptual clarity and WFP will need to demonstrate its comparative advantage, particularly with respect to economies of scale, in recovery and safety net programmes.

**Recommendations:**

- In situations such as southern Africa, general food distributions should be limited to well defined periods, recognising that the structural causes of food insecurity and malnutrition will require a longer term perspective. The challenges ahead include identifying the comparative advantages of food aid in the context of a chronic depletion of food security for many thousands of families. What is WFP’s comparative advantage in addressing this? In particular, the ‘new variant’ crisis of HIV/AIDS challenges the veracity of existing WFP programme categories and donor funding mechanisms.

- Notwithstanding the limits of food aid in the development context, greater efforts need to be made in integrating food security and nutritional considerations in, for example, the framework of the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) process and sector wide approaches.

**2.4 HIV/AIDS**

The EMOP is implemented in countries which have the highest prevalence of HIV/AIDS in the world, ranging from 15% of the adult population in Malawi to some 33% in Swaziland and Zimbabwe. UNAIDS estimates that as many as five million out of a total adult population of 26 million are HIV-positive in the six SADC countries covered by the EMOP. A further 600,000 children are said to carry the virus and there are some four million HIV/AIDS orphans. In households where the disease has claimed lives, UNAIDS figures show that agricultural production has fallen by as much as 60%.

There is little experience of how to address the HIV/AIDS pandemic in the context of a large-scale food emergency. WFP has taken an active role in improving the understanding of the role of HIV/AIDS in the current food crises, and has adapted emergency response mechanisms to this specific situation. The links are threefold:

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• HIV/AIDS is one of the contributing factors and structural causes of the current food crises. The infection weakens and endangers the coping capacity of individuals and households due to reduced labour forces and increased costs for treatment, which reduces food production and income generation, and increases poverty.
• People affected by crop failure may adopt coping mechanisms which present higher risks of infection, e.g., migration and prostitution.
• Hunger and insufficient provision of energy and nutrients reduces the immune competence of human bodies, and thus accelerate the outbreak of AIDS related infections and AIDS itself.

The RIACSO/UNAIDS consultation on HIV/AIDS and the Southern Africa Humanitarian Crisis held in November 2002 in Johannesburg, highlighted the key role of the disease in the context of the crisis and the need for integrated responses, effective co-ordination and further resources.

The fact that many people do not know about a potential infection, and that stigmatisation of infected people is still widespread, limits specific targeting of people living with HIV/AIDS and their affected families for food aid interventions. Information on HIV prevalence is still patchy and stigmatisation prevents close examination of the caseload. WFP has responded immediately to viable projects such as home-care assistance, but this is a drop in the ocean compared to the scale of the problem. In later sections of the report, we further examine what WFP has been able to do.

3. Regional EMOP 10200: preparedness and scaling up

3.1. Bridging EMOPs

Prior to November 2001, WFP was present in five of the six countries. There was no office in Swaziland and Zimbabwe was only a small procurement office. In Malawi and Mozambique, there had been short-term flood EMOPs in 2001. An October mission from the Regional Bureau in Kampala (ODK) concluded that individual EMOPs were appropriate at the time, with a watching brief maintained by the Mozambique cluster office (Box 1). Fifteen donors provided 139,000 tons to these bridging EMOPs (cumulative contributions of some $66.3 million by end of June 2002) and they were 50% resourced before being absorbed by Regional EMOP 10200.

The WFP Zambia office began emergency operations in December and the Zimbabwe EMOP was launched in November 2001. By mid-July 2002, a total of five Country Offices, one Satellite Office (Swaziland), and twenty three sub-offices were operational in six countries. WFP’s monitoring capacity was also boosted considerably in July through the hiring of dozens of food aid monitors. Out of regional total of 523 international and national staff, 75 were monitors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOX 1 - Emergency operations in place prior to the Regional EMOP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The following is a brief overview of WFP country emergency activities prior to the launch of Regional EMOP 10200 on 1st July 2002 which subsumed all existing EMOPs into the largest regional emergency programme in WFP’s history.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Zimbabwe.</strong> WFP operated only a Procurement Office for local purchase (Zimbabwe had been a net exporter of grain) until November 2001 when an EMOP was launched in response to early signs of a national food shortage. From February until the first week of July 2002, WFP distributed 16,310 tons of food aid to some 550,000 beneficiaries.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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13 In Mozambique the EMOP was extended from January-April 2002 prior to introducing a bridging EMOP.
Malawi - WFP implemented an emergency operation for recovery from the 2000-2001 floods, reaching some 210,000 beneficiaries in seven districts with 8,822 tons of food between April 2001 and February 2002. An additional EMOP from March until July 2002 reached 255,000 persons with 11,375 tons of food. Another 20,000 tons were received for distribution in July and August.

Lesotho - From February to May, WFP distributed 874 tons of food aid to 36,000 beneficiaries under the Country Programme (CP). Food commodities were also purchased in June and July under a bridging EMOP. These would now be distributed under the Regional EMOP.

Mozambique - WFP had an emergency operation for recovery from the previous years’ floods and had been implementing FFW programmes reaching 250,000 beneficiaries. In January 2002 a new EMOP was approved, with four new districts identified in Tete province. A further bridging 3-month EMOP was approved in May that was subsequently subsumed within the regional EMOP from July.

Swaziland - WFP had been monitoring the food security situation from its Maputo office, having closed its Swaziland office in 1996.

Zambia - An emergency operation was established in December 2001 following signs of food insecurity caused by flooding and drought. The first food distributions took place in January 2002, and by the end of May WFP had distributed 18,900 tons of food aid targeting 848,000 beneficiaries.

By March 2002 senior ODK management realised that the cluster office arrangement in Mozambique was insufficient for the pending crisis and that a rapid scaling up was necessary. Meanwhile, the IASC-WG held in Rome from 13-14 March 2002 requested the ODK Regional Director to initiate a process of coordination at regional level – she was thus designated regional coordinator for humanitarian response and would work closely with the United Nations Resident Coordinators (UNRCs) in each country.

Within WFP, several swift management changes, reported to the May 2002 Executive Board, were made. New Country Directors were posted in Malawi and Zimbabwe and temporary duty staff from the Kampala-based Bureau for East and Southern Africa and other regions were brought in to strengthen country offices. The timing was problematic: many persons from WFP’s emergency roster were already in Afghanistan and offices in the Great Lakes were already overstretched. Lessons in this respect are important: the coincidence of two or more international crises leaves WFP vulnerable to critical staff shortages, a point further developed below.

3.2 Special Operation (SO) 10204

In May 2002 WFP launched a Special Operation (10204) for a ‘Regional Management and Logistics Coordination Structure’ (total cost US$3,445,153) which was to support the upcoming Regional EMOP as well as provide regional logistics and an initial regional coordination focal point for all UN agencies and NGOs. The mandate of the Management and Coordination Unit was soon to go beyond just WFP’s EMOP, so funding was sought through the SO and not through direct support costs of the EMOP. US$1 million was released from the Immediate Response Account (IRA).

3.3 The Regional Logistics Unit (ReLogS).

Crucially, it was also decided to optimise existing infrastructures, transport and logistics through coordinating the operation through regional structures. Building on past experience gained with the SADC/WFP Logistics Advisory Centre during the 1992/93 drought emergency operation, WFP’s Regional Logistics Unit (ReLogS) incorporated a Liaison Cell within SADC’s Food and Natural Resources Unit (FANR) in Harare that supported ReLogS in the coordination of regional transport and logistics. The ReLogS website - updated daily with pipeline information, country specific situation
3.4 Inter-agency response and build up

Special Alert

In February 2002 FAO issued a Special Alert on Southern Africa, indicating that the aggregate output of maize for the sub-region was one-quarter lower than in 2000 and that prices of maize had increased several fold in the past three months. Access to food by large sections of the population was already becoming critical and the political and economic climate in general seemed certain to make the situation worse. The unfolding crisis was still being dealt with on an individual country basis, with little overt recognition at this stage among national governments, SADC bodies and donors that a regional ‘complex humanitarian emergency’ may develop. Yet, the jigsaw of accumulative factors were already apparent - a volatile mix of drought, floods, disruptions to commercial farming, the absence of effective food security and governance policies, depletion of strategic grain reserves, poor economic performance, foreign exchange shortages and delays in the timely importation of maize. Dramatic HIV/AIDS rates in the sub-region continue to contribute towards household food insecurity and will have a lasting effect on development indicators.

Inter-Agency Standing Committee

The March 2002 Inter-Agency Standing Committee Working Group meeting (IASC-WG) recognised the need for a more pro-active interagency engagement in addressing the emerging crisis, stressing that the response would involve food and non-food elements. Although the Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions (CFSAM) would form the backbone of assessments in each country, it was equally important to complement these with assessments of complementary non-food needs. The follow-up IASC-WG meeting of June 6-7, held (uniquely) in Johannesburg was co-chaired by WFP and the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) and involved government representatives from all six countries in the sub-region, SADC, UN, Red Cross, NGOs and donors. At this meeting, summary results were given of the following assessments:

- The six country FAO/WFP Joint Crop and Food Supply Assessments;
- A broader SADC region food security assessment from FEWSNET, drawing on data also provided by SADC Regional Early Warning System;
- Save the Children (UK) vulnerability assessments carried out in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe using the Household Economy Analysis (HEA) methodology;
- Summaries of various government assessments and recently launched appeals based on nationally accumulated data.

Significantly, the June 6-7 IASC meeting also began to draw out some policy implications for a regional approach to the crisis. Although SADC has no direct authority over national governments’ policies, it does have a responsibility for highlighting those region-wide factors which may result from the crisis. Some key questions raised were:

- Is regional management of a strategic grain reserve appropriate and how could this be managed?
- How can the private sector be encouraged to play a responsible role in food provision at regional level?
- To what extent is it likely that food shortages will result in population movements, either internally or externally, and what implications does this have for contingency planning?
- Can there be a common policy on border trade and tariffs to facilitate the swift delivery of humanitarian aid across the various countries?
• How can donors and national governments work together to ensure that the structural deficiencies which provoked the crisis are dealt with through long term strategic interventions focussing on poverty reduction and sustainable food security, especially in marginal areas where vulnerability is so acute?

ECOSOC

The mid-July ECOSOC Humanitarian segment was an opportunity for individual UN agencies to launch a special appeal for Southern Africa – OCHA’s ‘Regional Humanitarian Assistance Strategy’ (not a CAP, but similar\(^\text{14}\)). Totalling some US$611 million, it included agriculture, shelter, water & sanitation and health components. The mission was informed from several sources that this regional document was poorly coordinated at first, with information from the various sectoral partners coming late. It should be noted, however, that the decision to launch a Southern Africa crisis document at ECOSOC was only taken at the 6-7 June 2002 IASC meeting in Johannesburg. This left only three weeks for the preparation of inputs (deadline 1\(^\text{st}\) July). As some Country Teams had not yet completed multi-sectoral needs assessments, there was inevitably a slow response. In Malawi in July, the mission attended a UN inter-agency meeting where, with the exception of WFP and UNICEF, the focus had not shifted from regular development mode to that of an emergency.

Response to OCHA Appeal

The initial response to the OCHA Appeal for non-food items was extremely low\(^\text{15}\), and it was not until late July that FAO launched its own major appeal. Although food aid through WFP accounted for 90 percent of the Appeal, as has often been stated elsewhere in the world, the 10 percent non-food component makes a marked difference with respect not only to the effectiveness of the food assistance provided, but also to moving more rapidly towards a transitional post-emergency phase when a more sustainable food security strategy is needed.

To facilitate response efforts to the crisis, OCHA in June proposed the creation of the Southern Africa Humanitarian Information Management Service (SAHIMS), an inter-agency information and data clearing house. OCHA would appoint a Regional Disaster Response Advisor in Johannesburg - this office would become a Regional Support Office, housed within the WFP office to support the WFP Regional Director in her assigned inter-agency coordination and facilitation role. The OCHA unit would be initially complemented by colleagues from FAO, the IFRC and UNICEF, and later by UNAIDS, UNDP, UNFPA and WHO. Initially, WFP was shouldering much of the information analysis/dissemination roles which should fall under OCHA’s mandate.

By the end of June 2003, approximately 82% of the USD $656 million requested in the revised 2002 Regional Consolidated Appeal (CAP) had been funded.

In Section 5 we further examine the role played by WFP in helping coordinate the inter-agency response and the strengths and weaknesses that were to emerge from the various structures introduced.

3.5 Malawi early warning: some observations

In Malawi the structural as well as climatic crisis was to some extent a precursor to subsequent regional events. It was also here that SCF-UK first raised the alarm, reminding donors, the government and WFP

\(^\text{14}\) There were simultaneous CAPs launched for Lesotho, Malawi, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe, each for July 2002-June 2003.

\(^\text{15}\) As of 12 August 2002, a grand total of 21.26% of the Appeal had been met, the majority of which has come from the WFP food element. UNICEF and UNDP had yet to receive any contributions, and WHO had received only 12%.
of their inadequate early warning and response capacity to date. WFP Malawi had until then focussed primarily on its small development programme, though there had been a short-term flood EMOP in 2001. Box 2 gives an outline of WFP’s scale up in the Malawi office.

The February 2002 food crisis in which at least several hundred people died of hunger exposed weaknesses in the international community’s ability to respond to early disaster signals. SCF-UK had reported indicators of stress as far back as October 2001 and in December had reported global malnutrition rates of 10.2 percent in one district (Mchinji) and 6.6 percent in Salima. Discussions were already underway between WFP and EU in January for 15,000 tons of maize for the EMOP, pending approval in Rome.

Meanwhile, the false assumption that roots and tubers production would partly offset the 2001 maize shortfall led to complacency among donors. At the end of 2001, the Strategic Grain Reserve was sold amidst accusations of corruption and ill-conceived IMF policies, the ramifications of which were to preoccupy donors for several months hence. Crucially, the government, with an eye to a third term in office, did not declare an emergency until February 2002. Given the three month lead time necessary for importing food stocks – and the fact that the national grain reserves were almost zero – the response was inevitably late.

Box 2 - Positive changes in the Malawi country office

The mission learned from several donors (DFID, USAID, EU) and NGOs that in early 2002, WFP Malawi had been criticised for its slow response to the food crisis. The staffing profile of the Malawi CO was guided by a small scale Country Programme, not tuned towards a large scale EMOP. Problems of visibility, capacity and its failure to take a lead in coordinating food aid responses led donors to seek alternatives. NGOs were encouraged to form a consortium as an alternative channel for food aid delivery. USAID in April pledged 210,000 tons for the region, only a third of which would be received by WFP. Since the appointment of new CD in April and the posting of new highly experienced staff, however, WFP Malawi made impressive improvements in terms not only of its operational capacity and lead role in the emergency response, but also in terms of the high regard it now had among all stakeholders in the country. WFP and the NGO Consortium, led by CARE, worked well together and a single WFP pipeline – promoted by USAID and now accepted by all stakeholders – contrasted with the dual pipeline planned elsewhere in the region.

The Malawi story highlights some problems with respect to WFP’s early warning capacity. The VAM officer was not replaced (due to budget constraints) from June 2001 onwards, although in October a dual VAM-information officer post was created on a temporary basis. Meanwhile, the data on Malawi was not updated or retained once the VAM officer left.

In the event, it was SCF-UK who raised an early alarm in September 2001 which triggered the WFP response and the drafting of an EMOP. This EMOP was submitted in December but initially rejected on the grounds of a poorly presented rationale. The story was complicated by the less than alarming picture presented by FEWSNET. In fact, it was macro-economic issues and political problems that were to

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16 A fuller analysis is contained in Stephen Devereux, “The Malawi Famine of 2002”: Causes, Consequences and Policy Lessons”, May 2002 (IDS), a report commissioned by ActionAid. Although details of WFP’s response are not contained in the report, several mentions are made, including the statement “Curiously, all the government ministries and donor agencies that would normally take responsibility for collecting and disseminating (early warning information) – the Ministry of Health, UNICEF, WHO, WFP and FEWS – have chosen to stay silent about the scale of mortality in this famine, perhaps because these deaths might be seen as a failure of these institutions to prevent the famine”. The mission has no comment on the contended validity of this statement, wishing rather to point out the prevailing opinion, confirmed by several field interviews.
ultimately make the difference; in the absence of regular price monitoring – and the fact that the government itself had not yet raised the alarm – the analysis of an emerging crisis was absent. Laying the blame for this fully at WFP’s door is inappropriate; the broader question concerns the adequacy of the VAM set-up, rapid personnel turnover and the extent to which WFP should invest in local capacity or in the rapid deployment of expertise from headquarters. These are, as yet, unresolved issues.

3.6 EMOP preparation

The mission notes the high quality of the EMOP document and the swift manner in which it was put together. One important innovation was in bringing various Rome divisions (Logistics, VAM and Policy staff) together in Johannesburg for an ‘EMOP weekend’ to cut down the consultation time lag. A waiver was also negotiated to ensure that no delays were created by running the EMOP through the WINGS system. Meanwhile, the ‘rolling document’ idea was discussed with donors, with a commitment to issue a regularly updated Implementation Strategy as a clearer picture of needs emerged in the coming months. Two such Strategies were subsequently produced (July/August and December 2002). As advocacy documents and updates these were very useful. The mission noted, however, that their value was more as an overview regional document, rather than a working document at country levels; the latter would have required greater specific contextual analysis with more frequent updates.

Given the depressing socio-economic outlook for many countries - and the operational, targeting and beneficiary selection complexities of the EMOP - it is unlikely that the EMOP objectives of “preserving productive and human assets” and “saving livelihoods” would be achieved through the food aid programme alone, particularly where poverty levels were pervasive, as in Malawi and Zambia. Here, the less ambitious, if no less important, goal of simply saving lives and maintaining a status quo is, in the mission’s view, adequate.

4. EMOP Performance

4.1 Innovations

The regional EMOP was an opportunity for ODJ and the country offices to develop new approaches to uniquely complex and often unexpected events. In capturing lessons learned from the response, it is important to highlight particular achievements in respect of:

- The role played by WFP’s Executive Director as the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Humanitarian Needs in Southern Africa in high level advocacy, resource mobilization and coordination. This has been particularly evident in negotiations over Genetically Modified Organisms (GMO) issues and in ensuring a unified response from donors and specialised agencies.

- Under the leadership of the ODJ Regional Director, new models of inter-agency coordination, notably the Regional Inter-Agency Coordination and Support Office (RIACSO), were instigated.

- A new focus on the links between food security, malnutrition and the HIV/AIDS crisis. Approaches developed in the context of the EMOP should help set standards for future interventions.

- The preparation of two Implementation Strategies (IS) (July and December 2002) that helped clarify operational decisions, identify regional and country specific issues, improve transparency of the operation and provide guidelines for WFP COs and partners. The IS was a key updated advocacy, policy and guidance document for the EMOP as it evolved.

- The regional logistics apparatus that included contingency planning, new funding (two SOs) and regional dispatches of food from five entry points in the region.
• The effective response to the GMO issue that challenged WFP’s regional logistics, procurement and resource mobilisation expertise in finding new funds, milling facilities and sources of local non-GM maize.

• The continuing investment in the VAC assessment methodologies and the broad levels of consensus thus achieved, albeit with reservations from some major donors (EU).

• ODJ’s recruitment of a regional economist to keep abreast of macro and micro-economic indicators as well as market trends.

4.2. Summary facts and figures

Performance against targets

As with many other WFP operations, significant EMOP ‘slippage’ occurred. Distribution performance rose from 25 to 77 percent from July 2002 to March 2003 (the end of the original EMOP phase); yet by December 2002, only 271,051 tons (43 percent) was achieved against a target of 680,391 tons.

Distribution shortfalls point to two variables: first, the logistics and operational problems facing certain countries, particularly the GMO issue and lack of implementing partners in some countries; second (and perhaps more importantly), the lengthy time lag (typically 3-5 months) between the confirmation of donor pledges and when food actually reaches beneficiaries. With cash contributions for local and regional procurement, the lead-time can be reduced to 1-3 months, something that proved an advantage to this EMOP.

Table 2: Regional tonnage distribution against targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>MTs distributed</th>
<th>Coverage in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>79,640</td>
<td>19,913</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>79,640</td>
<td>21,252</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>110,871</td>
<td>38,905</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>110,871</td>
<td>56,907</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>110,871</td>
<td>60,204</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>129,084</td>
<td>68,666</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>114,740</td>
<td>106,125</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>144,569</td>
<td>116,125</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>162,321</td>
<td>125,041</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>125,587</td>
<td>99,997</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>112,546</td>
<td>40,551</td>
<td>36%*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>99,505</td>
<td>38,610</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,380,245</td>
<td>792,296</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The drop in May was intentional due to an improved harvest.
At the individual country level, full food pipelines were not established for all four commodities (cereals, pulses, vegetable oil and micro-nutrient fortified blended foods) until late 2002/early 2003. Even then, it was not unusual for there to be breaks in the pipeline for certain commodities. It proved impossible to provide the full balanced food basket to beneficiaries for most of the operation, though actual calorie and protein intake (including from other sources) were not measured.

July to November 2002 saw only 45 percent of the targeted beneficiaries reached, compared with a much-improved 85 percent for the ‘lean’ months of December to March. Only Malawi reached nearly 100 percent of its target up to November. The corresponding rates for the other five countries were: Swaziland 75 percent, Zambia 45 percent, Mozambique 40 percent, Lesotho 35 percent and Zimbabwe 30 percent. One should, of course, be cautious of beneficiary figures alone - in some cases rations were halved in December. This, and local post-distribution sharing within communities, meant that per capita calorie and protein intakes were below target.

Table 3: Regional beneficiary coverage against targets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Beneficiaries</th>
<th>% Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>6,111,000</td>
<td>1,975,501</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>6,111,000</td>
<td>1,802,228</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>8,577,000</td>
<td>3,164,251</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>8,577,000</td>
<td>4,642,429</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>8,577,000</td>
<td>5,448,034</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>9,913,000</td>
<td>6,166,772</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>9,007,706</td>
<td>8,771,251</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>11,105,400</td>
<td>9,754,356</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>11,800,400</td>
<td>10,187,446</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>8,900,000</td>
<td>9,200,016</td>
<td>103%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>7,900,000</td>
<td>4,781,291</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>6,200,000</td>
<td>3,544,316</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
In Mozambique, where relatively higher malnutrition levels were noted, only 33% tonnage targets were reached until November, and not until March 2003 was the target above 60%. There were complex reasons: lack of partners in the worst-hit districts, access problems, and the fact that the majority of food was distributed through FFW (some 1,200 projects) which overstretched NGO capacities and, as WFP noted, was not self-selecting of the most vulnerable. WFP made efforts to increase the level of general food distributions, though was again confounded by an imbalance in the food basket, with few pulses available in the first months. Undoubtedly, the poor spread of complementary non-food assistance in many of the worst-hit ‘hotspots’ was a contributing factor to malnutrition. The mission appreciates the complexity of the situation facing the Mozambique CO and feels that the early identification of the problem should have been matched by a greater percentage of the regional allocation of food favouring Mozambique in the first six months of the operation.

By the end of March 2003 almost a quarter of pledged commodities of a 90% funded pipeline (in tonnage terms) were undistributed. Fortuitously, this was to improve the continuity of assistance in the new EMOP from July 2003, providing a carry-over stock of over 200,000 tons; but meanwhile, what difference did such slippage make to the populations in question?

**Performance against objectives**

The answer partly lies in the analysis of objectives. Reports of starvation in some areas of Malawi in early 2002 were the only significant severe indications of system failure in the region. However, as we have seen, an increase in malnutrition was noted in some isolated districts in Mozambique where WFP partners could not initially be identified and where road access was traditionally poor. There were no indications of unusual prevalence of micro-nutrient deficiencies. A reasonable assumption is that during the EMOP period WFP’s response, even with the shortfalls, helped avert more extreme consequences.

A further difficulty in evaluating performance against objectives was the lack of quantitative data available for the whole EMOP period, and the inability to measure progress against indicators in a usable logframe.

The picture is different when livelihoods more generally are examined. Although no baseline information was available and no quantitative evaluation could be conducted, qualitative evidence suggests that the EMOP only partly met its livelihood objectives. There was evidence of asset depletion in Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, where food aid deliveries were below target in the early months. By contrast, there were fewer reports of asset depletion in Malawi where emergency response was more timely. The
impact of food aid is, of course, subject to an ‘attribution gap’, and only now is a picture of people’s coping strategies being drawn.

There were no reports of distress migration, and school drop-out rates have been kept in check, especially where school feeding has been underway.

5. Inter-agency cooperation

5.1 Regional structures

WFP was instrumental in bringing together stakeholders under the RIACSO (Regional Inter-Agency Coordination and Support Office) umbrella, formally launched on 14 October. RIACSO provided support to the national efforts in addressing the Southern African crisis and ensured cohesion of the effort at a regional level. In addition, RIACSO supported the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy for Humanitarian Needs in Southern Africa, Mr. James Morris (WFP Executive Director), in his mandate to raise awareness of the situation, its underlying causes and to provide recommendations on how to strengthen the humanitarian response and mobilize donor support for the affected countries.

By mid-November FAO, IFRC, OCHA, UNAIDS, UNICEF, UNDP and WHO were represented on RIACSO. The fact that WFP provides space (literally and metaphorically) for close coordination means that individual agencies are now challenged to meet the non-food imperatives of the emergency. RIACSO as a ‘light hand’ coordination structure worked well at regional level. Many UN agencies formally had regional representatives elsewhere, but by November they all had liaison/representation on RIACSO. By April 2003 it was still not clear how this will be institutionalised beyond the current emergency.

OCHA had humanitarian affairs officers in Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe, each reporting to the UN Resident Coordinator (Zimbabwe was the only country with a Humanitarian Coordinator as such). The UNRC/HC network was not entirely satisfactory in terms of coordination since each reported through the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) via IASC, and not through the ODJ Regional Coordinator in her role as representative of the Special Envoy. What this meant in practice was that some UNRCs were not ‘up to speed’ in the first six months of the emergency, particularly in their advocacy and coordination roles.

Although the Government of Mozambique did not declare a national emergency, the needs faced by Mozambique were included in the regional humanitarian strategy reflecting the government’s contingency plan for natural disasters. The UN Country Team supported the government in its efforts to mitigate the drought, focusing on the sectors identified in the regional humanitarian strategy.

OCHA’s SAHIMS information website/network was online only in the closing two months of the EMOP and its utility was yet to be tested. It still needed strengthening, with a clear indication of added value above what was already available. The analysis of data would be key to this.

5.2 NGO Consortium in Malawi

In Malawi, WFP worked through a consortium of 12 NGOs, formed at the beginning of the emergency through an initiative by USAID. Under the leadership of CARE these NGOs took up a co-coordinating role in the different districts under the EMOP. All 12 NGOs had individual MoUs with WFP defining their roles and responsibilities.

The consortium has a number of advantages which facilitate project implementation:

- It promoted common standards and guidelines for the operation.
- It ensured a stronger position with the government and potential donors.
• Communication and co-ordination was easier, exchange of information was quicker.
• Competition among NGOs was reduced because of participatory decision making processes.
• Advocacy efforts were stronger when supported by big groups of important partners.
• The working groups of the consortium facilitated thematic discussions and programming.
• Donors and WFP favoured the model because it facilitated their coordination and collaboration efforts.

Some disadvantages of the consortium included:

• The process of creating the consortium and agreeing on working principles and guidelines was sometimes quite time consuming.
• The consortium was sometimes seen as a ‘closed shop’. Non-members of the consortium (often local NGOs) complained that they are not always accepted as partners and thus lacked access to WFP food aid resources.
• The concept of coordinating NGOs at district level, which would in turn cooperate with other often smaller local NGOs and build their capacities, did not work on a large enough scale due to lack of resources for capacity building at NGO level, lack of interest of the bigger/stronger NGOs and the lack of formal commitment and agreements.

6. Programme themes

6.1 Assessment

Were needs overestimated?

The mission believes that the needs assessments underlying the southern Africa EMOP were for the most part sound and credible. The SADC-led rolling VAC assessments were a unique example of a highly coordinated and collaborative process that involved most agencies with proven expertise in conducting emergency needs assessments (ODI study), and most stakeholders widely quoted the results. The results seemed to prove the assessments right: nearly 100 percent of the required food aid was actually resourced and there is wide consensus among donors and most agencies that the EMOP contributed towards keeping in check the risk of starvation.

Nevertheless, there have been critics. Some have claimed that that needs were overestimated or that formal assessments were not central to donor decision making. Others point to low anthropometric indicators in mid-2002 and the absence of starvation or low admission figures in therapeutic feeding centres as evidence for a non-existing problem (MSF France). Yet, nutrition indicators a few months after the harvest will not capture the risk of starvation during the hungry season; nor would they have taken into account the mitigating effects of a well-resourced and timely relief intervention.

A more serious criticism of needs assessments points at government food imports in Malawi that could not be sold at the fixed support price. The anticipated food gap for Malawi included some 250,000 tons of commercial import requirements. The Government decided to procure these amounts but was only able to sell 50,000 tons. It is now evident that imports through informal cross-border trade have been underestimated. Both northern Mozambique and southern Tanzania supplied cheaper regional surplus food, possible at a magnitude of between 100,000 and 200,000 tons.

Another factor in Malawi was low expectations. Guided by rather poor relief resources success rates in the past the government may have underestimated the level of food aid donations that were actually received. With some 210,000 tons of food aid deliveries (90 percent of the requested amount) a precautionary build up of government contingency reserves became ineffective.
A degree of overestimation of the food gap may also have happened in other countries in southern Africa. Although data on commercial imports are less than complete, it appears that probably none of the six countries imported as much as diagnosed in the initial Crop and Food Supply Assessment mission (see box). In three countries this may in part be explained by initially wrong population figures. Extrapolations of needs were based on incorrect census data that only later were corrected by the Governments of Zimbabwe (minus two million people) and Zambia (minus one million people). In the case of Lesotho estimates are complicated by a high share of ‘floating population’ (job migrants).

Another reason for potential assessment errors relates to the estimated food production. In several countries it was reported that the Ministry of Agriculture’s capacity to produce good crop forecasts has been deteriorating since many aid projects have been phased out. Data tended to be particularly weak for non-cereal crops such as cassava.

**Box 3 - FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions (CFSAM)**

CFSAMs combine a macro analysis of national food supply and demand with analysis of the most food insecure populations and areas. CFSAMs are typically fielded in response to a potential food availability crisis.

The national cereal balance sheets (sometimes including major non-cereal foods such as tubers or livestock) comprise estimates for:

- **Domestic availability**
  - Opening stocks
  - Production
- **Total utilization**
  - Food use (observed normal year consumption levels)
  - Other uses (Seed, feed, losses, exports)
  - Closing stocks
- **Import requirements**
  - Commercial imports (Private, Government, informal)
  - Food aid

Assessing the food situation of the most affected populations and areas involves:

- Gaining an understanding of the impact of the potential food crisis at the household level for different population groups and areas
- Analysing underlying causes of vulnerability and coping capacities
- Calculating number of people requiring food aid, quantity required and duration
- Assessing logistics and programme delivery options and constraints

Increased consumption of non-cereal and wild foods is an important element in household coping strategies, the extent of which is not easy to predict. Good assessments of households’ and communities’ self-help capacities are difficult to achieve without good baseline information and vulnerability profiles prior to the crisis. Also market based solutions such as provision of food at subsidized prices require a good ex-ante understanding of food insecurity and poverty levels in order to judge the share of households with sufficient purchasing power to access food through these channels.

Estimating food aid requirements depends critically on the objectives of the proposed emergency intervention. A humanitarian response aimed at saving lives will require significantly less food than an aid intervention that seeks to preserve livelihoods. The WFP EMOP had both objectives. While it appears that the former objective was achieved throughout the region (although there have been reports of starvation deaths in one or two difficult to access border districts in Mozambique), there is some evidence that protecting livelihoods was not fully realized in countries such as Mozambique, Zambia and Zimbabwe. In these countries considerable slippage in the provision of food aid occurred during the first
months of the relief operation, mainly due to the GMO issue (with the possible exception of Mozambique) and also because of an initial shortage of implementation partners in some of the countries.

Concerns have been expressed over un-assessed needs in remote rural as well as urban areas. The reported cases of starvation in the above mentioned districts in Mozambique hint at a problem in this regard, although capturing the dynamic cross-border relationship with neighbouring crisis-hit Zimbabwe would have required a consistent food security and nutrition surveillance system rather than occasional assessments.

While there is evidence that the need for government imports (or release of foreign exchange for commercial imports) has been overestimated in at least some instances, this does not seem to be the case for the assessed need for targeted food aid. There were no reports of targeted food rations finding their way onto the market. All food distributed by aid agencies seems to have been consumed within the targeted communities and households. Any concern about overestimation might at best relate to the difference between assessed needs for food aid and actual quantities distributed during the crisis period. Around twenty percent of contributions arrived too late and will be carried over into targeted recovery programmes in countries such as Malawi and Zambia and in continued relief assistance in countries like Zimbabwe.

**Assessment process**

The FAO/WFP-led Crop and Food Supply Assessment Missions (CFSAMs) were fielded during the main harvest season in April/May 2002 in anticipation of an impending food crisis. Erratic weather patterns between December 2001 and May 2002 threatened to significantly reduce the harvest in the region as compared to the previous year and the 5-year average. The CFSAMs found that there would be a cereal deficit of 4 million tons until March 2003. Approximately 1.2 million tons of emergency cereal food aid would be required for 12.8 million vulnerable people. There was a high degree of consensus with these findings because the USAID-funded FEWSnet, SCF-UK and other NGOs, several donors as well as national Governments and SADC were all active contributors to the CFSAM. The regional EMOP was prepared on the basis of this assessment.

The use of the CFSAM methodology (instead of a in theory more desirable multi-sectoral assessment approach as now envisaged for the CAP process) is likely to have influenced the initial focus (predominantly food aid) and duration (up to next harvest) of the crisis intervention. It should be noted, however, that the food aid dominated relief intervention developed a remarkable momentum that led to an ever increasing understanding and commitment towards addressing the underlying causes of vulnerability in Southern Africa, in particular HIV/AIDS.

**VAC rolling assessments**

The process of regionally coordinated rolling assessments was led by the Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources section (FANR) within SADC and had capacity building as well as harmonization objectives. The newly created Regional Vulnerability Assessment Committee (RVAC) brought together governments and international agencies renowned as experts in the field of assessments. The organizations were FEWSnet, SCF-UK, CARE, FAO, UNICEF, WFP and IFRC. This multi-agency group provided technical assistance to national VACs in the gathering and analysis of data. Lessons learned on how things could be done better in the future are listed in the Box 4.

The ‘rolling assessment’ approach that followed the CFSAM involved three assessments in August 2002, November 2002 and April/May 2003. The first VAC re-assessed estimated needs in light of new events and informed refined targeting. The methods applied were household surveys in four countries and the more qualitative food economy approach in Mozambique and Swaziland. The ‘Regional Emergency Food Security Assessment Report’ revised the number of people in need of assistance upward to 14.4 million, without, however, changing the tonnage figure.
The VAC assessment in November was based on household surveys in Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia, a food economy approach in Swaziland and a participatory focus group and key informant approach in Mozambique and Zimbabwe. The target beneficiary number was increased to 15.2 million, again without changing the level of food resources.

The third VAC in April/May 2003 aimed at providing an up-date on the household food security situation in the new crop year as well as preliminary forecasts for food aid requirements. In one country, Malawi, the VAC assessment shifted towards providing revised food security baselines derived from SCF-UK’s food economy approach.

WFP found it increasingly difficult to be represented at VACs and CFSAM with sufficiently qualified staff who was able to articulate WFP’s concerns and mandate vis-à-vis the partners or, where needed, play a leading role in the assessment. In at least two of the six countries VAC assessments were less useful for WFP programme decision making.

**Box 4 - Lessons learned from the SADC-led regional VAC approach**

- There was not enough time for planning – including adapting some data collection instruments to local conditions – and analysis has taken too long as national capacities were lacking
- The objectives of the assessment process evolved over time: food security and nutrition information were collected together in the first round, but separately in the second and then, for example in Mozambique, again together in the third round.
- There is need for more effective and continuous consultation, and dedicated coordinators
- A ‘tool kit’ of analytical approaches should be provided from which national VACs can choose, but attention must be given to quality control and ensuring comparability across countries
- Make greater use of and develop national expertise, and reinforce links with other regional technical bodies
- Keep assessments focused, and balance the information needs of donors, the humanitarian community and national governments
- Clearly specify the information to be collected in field surveys and that should be obtained from other information systems
- Give close attention to logistical arrangements including communications and the disbursement of funds for the assessment
- Establish arrangements for the overall coordination of an inter-sectoral humanitarian information system (which is beyond the responsibility of the VACs)
- Establish a code of conduct/protocols on the use and quotation of VAC reports in press briefings and other public information activities
- Formalize institutional arrangements to strengthen partnerships, foster commitment and enhance links to decision-making on response

*Source: WFP-Partner Consultation on Emergency Needs Assessments, Rome, May 2003*

**Costs and benefits of the assessments**

The estimated cost of some one million US dollars for the three rounds of assessment missions represent some 0.2 percent of the food relief intervention costs. These costs appear justified considering the positive impact on resource mobilization, programming and capacity building recognized in all UN reports to date.

Advocacy and resource mobilization have been helped by a generally high level of consensus over numbers and relief needs. With respect to programming, already small adjustments in targeting food aid...
(greater geographic accuracy, greater clarity on the various household vulnerability profiles) has redirected millions of dollars worth of food. For example, the August VAC assessment led to a significant adjustment of district food allocations in several countries (as compared to the original allocation based on the April/May CFSAM assessments). Repeated assessments may even lead to a reduction in the level of assistance needed if, for example, ex-post harvest assessments are higher than ex-ante.

The VAC assessments have made an unprecedented contribution to building up assessment and food security analysis capacities in the six participating SADC member states. This capacity is seen as a great asset for planning and implementing longer-term food security strategies. National VACs in most countries were hitherto inactive bodies.

**Some problems with reaching consensus**

Throughout the VAC process reaching a consensus was a challenge. While the first (August) VAC assessment was based on an agreed common regional approach and (food security) focus that enhanced comparability of assessment results across countries, this consensus was already difficult to maintain for the second VAC round and eventually failed (in the case of Malawi) during the third VAC assessment. Besides inevitable differences in opinion over the relative merits of alternative methodological approaches (e.g. quantitative household surveys vs. qualitative food economy assessments), concerns over a potential bias towards food aid and the methodological preferences of the organization that has the most substantial donor funding, there are two lines of potentially conflicting interests and purposes that make the joint assessment approach a challenge:

*Baseline vs. emergency needs information.* Although all VAC partners appreciated the value of information on the current needs situation and its immediate utility for programme adjustments and improved targeting, there was an increasing interest in shifting the focus of the rolling assessments towards gathering baseline data for longer-term poverty alleviation and development strategies. Conducting three detailed needs assessments in a timeframe of nine months was considered costly in retrospect. However, simply adding one purpose to the other might have overloaded the assessment agenda. Some VAC partners also felt that baseline information gathering should be undertaken in a ‘normal’ year and not during the crisis.

*Food security vs. multi-sectoral focus.* A similar handling of trade-offs is required regarding the desire to turn the rolling assessment into a ‘comprehensive multi-sectoral’ instrument. While the first VAC assessment tried to highlight the linkages between food security and related issues such as HIV/AIDS and nutrition, various UN agencies felt the need for using the second and third rounds to obtain comprehensive information for each sector in order to meet their specific information requirements. However, issues of institutional coordination (within SADC, the FANR Regional VAC has only a mandate for leadership in food security analysis) and utility for meeting WFP’s core mandate (response to food crisis) have emerged.

**Integrating nutrition and food security assessments**

Although there is no nutritional surveillance system in the region that can provide up-to-date information about the nutritional status of populations vulnerable to chronic and acute food shortages, there have been a series of nutritional surveys conducted by different agencies in several countries.

Integration of nutrition and food security assessments has been a recurrent concern. Assessments carried out in isolation make it more difficult to identify the food and non-food causes of malnutrition. Throughout the VAC rolling assessment process WFP has been trying to include nutrition-related measurements into the various assessments. In some countries this was achieved (Malawi and Zimbabwe) but some methodological criticism arose. Collaboration with UNICEF on integrating nutrition and food security assessment tended to be difficult also because of differences in views regarding the ‘timeliness vs. quality’ trade off.
However, in Mozambique UNICEF conducted a statistically representative nutrition survey. The third VAC used the same platform for a survey of 5,500 households that combined food security and nutrition assessment components. Questions about various income sources and a 24 hour dietary recall also lend themselves to drawing conclusions on the effectiveness of emergency food distributions.

**Linking assessment and monitoring/evaluation**

The first RTE pointed out the potential for synergy between the rolling assessment and the plans for impact monitoring. Key needs indicators that triggered the relief assistance were also the indicators for measuring the success of the intervention. VAC assessment team members were considered best suited and qualified for carrying out impact surveys, either in addition to the rolling assessment or in conjunction. Greater integration of humanitarian information required in needs assessments, food security monitoring, evaluation, baselines and early warning is beneficial due to its reinforcing linkages (see Box 5).

WFP’s envisaged “Results Based Management” will feature prominently the two indicators promoted by the USAID-sponsored SMART (Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions) initiative: mortality and under-5 malnutrition rates. There will be no choice than tracking these key indicators from the baseline to the needs assessment and to the evaluation of programme performance.

Developing food security baselines and vulnerability profiles in areas and for populations frequently exposed to shocks will also go a long way in disentangling chronic and transitory food insecurity. Emergency needs assessments are normally not well suited to quickly reconstruct the normal situation of people affected by disaster.

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**BOX 5 - Backward and forward linkages in needs assessments**

**Baseline**
(describes populations, livelihoods, nutritional status, risk and coping capacities; Link: defines the content of early warning systems)

**Early Warning**
(monitors vulnerability indicators such as agro-meteorological data and selected socio-economic data; Link: triggers needs assessments)

**Needs Assessment**
(defines the nature, dimension and duration of the problem and identifies the most affected groups and options for emergency response; Link: provides data for programme design and targeting)

**Monitoring**
(tracks whether emergency response outputs are achieved and the target population reached; Link: prerequisite for evaluation)

**Evaluation**
(assess whether the emergency response achieves the intended results and lessons learned; Link: Updates the baseline information)
Recommendations:
- Review CFSAM methodology with a view to strengthening the assessment of anticipated imports (government, commercial, informal border trade), replacing crop with food balance sheets (that include major tubers etc.), and establishing per capita food requirements (usual consumption vs. norm);
- Facilitate disentangling of chronic and transitory food insecurity through increased baseline studies in areas and for populations exposed to recurrent shocks;
- Develop guidance for credible and timely WFP emergency needs assessments that meet minimum standards in sampling, livelihood and market analysis, and non-food responses as an alternative to food aid;
- Arrange for some independent funding for needs assessments so that these do not automatically require a food relief intervention for covering their costs and review trigger mechanisms for fielding an assessment;
- Build more staff capacity for WFP to play a competent or leading role in needs assessments;
- Make staff with VAM/needs assessment skills a standard element of Emergency Response Teams;
- Develop modules and training strategies for mainstreaming of nutrition assessments in ENA and VAM;
- Facilitate Results-Based Management by ensuring synergies in humanitarian information management through backward linkages between needs assessment, early warning and food security baselines and forward linkages between needs assessment, monitoring and evaluation;
- Continue work with SADC and national VACs to invest in reliable and timely emergency needs assessments;
- Develop arrangements for facilitating partnerships in assessments and pre-assessment consultations among agencies and donors.

6.2 Targeting

Targeting methods used

To ensure effective targeting of the most needy populations four targeting approaches were used:

(a) geographic targeting of the most vulnerable areas, especially when resourcing delays required prioritisation of relief assistance to ‘hunger hotspots’;
(b) temporal targeting, paying special attention to the seasonality of hunger and involving a staged build up of beneficiary coverage;
(c) household targeting based on vulnerability profiles and food security indicators; and
(d) activity targeting of groups with unique or specific needs. Specific targeted activities included school feeding, supplementary feeding for children and mothers, special rations for HIV/AIDS affected families and Food-For-Work. The relative share of activity targeting compared to general food distributions ranged from very high (>80%) in Mozambique to very low (<20% in Zimbabwe).

While targeting relief assistance to the most needy households and individuals is the ideal and generally expected by donors, concerns arose over time that an excessive focus on household targeting can become ineffective (due to redistribution), wasteful of implementation partner staff resources and go against the culture of communities. Moreover, in some countries it seems to have contributed to a situation where the exclusion error (share of eligible beneficiaries not reached by the relief programme) was significantly higher than the inclusion error (percent of relief assistance provided to beneficiaries who did not meet the assistance criteria).
Targeting implications of assessment methodology

Any targeting of food aid starts with the assessment of needs. But the applied assessment methodologies have implications for the targeting strategy.

The CFSAM methodology is predominantly about national food gaps due to crop failure. The focus is on transitory food availability shortfalls that constitute an ‘emergency’. Taking into consideration anticipated production levels plus commercial and government imports, the requirement for a targeted food aid intervention is estimated.

The VAC methodology, by contrast, estimates the need for targeted food aid on basis of a household food security analysis. By factoring in subsistence production plus income that permits food purchases, a household food gap is estimated that is to be covered with food assistance. The aggregated household food gaps represent the national food assistance requirements. The VAC methodology thus captures both transitory problems of food availability plus chronic problems of inadequate food access.

The targeting implications of a combination of national food gap and household food security analysis, coupled with the notion of individual reference rations are significant. In order to stay within the amount of calculated transitory food aid requirements, a relatively small number of ‘most needy’ households are targeted to receive full monthly rations whereas other needy households are entirely excluded. Such an approach is often unacceptable to the beneficiary communities where village level redistribution and rotation of ration cards has frequently been observed, for example in Malawi. In other places emphasis on geographic targeting (and thus resources available for a higher percentage of households in the area) may prevent such redistribution but then again compromises an equal response to the food aid needs of all food insecure households in a country.

A greater spread of food assistance to more needy households might be a pragmatic answer, but this would undermine the strategy of providing a full monthly (‘reference’) ration. The ‘breadth versus depth dilemma’ has dogged the targeting strategy from the outset and is not easily resolved, given insufficient resources for meeting both transitory and chronic food needs.

Furthermore, translating the VAC up-dates on targeting priorities and overall food aid requirements into programme action has presented a challenge. Limitations in NGOs’ capacities as well as differing
priorities of village/district committees and redistributions at village level make quick adjustments to a revised needs analysis difficult. Even the intended discrete stages of increase in beneficiary numbers (6 million as of July, 8.5 million as of September and 10 million as of December) could only be used as reference points. Scaling up and down of assistance has been much more a gradual than a step change process. The actual beneficiary numbers steadily rose from just under 2 million in July 2002 to a peak of over 10 million in March 2003.

It is evident that WFP gave much thought to the best targeting approach. For example, a special study conducted by the WFP Malawi office reassured the management about the strategy adopted by suggesting, for instance, that even some degree of redistribution of food aid within a community should be tolerable as it enhances the social fabric among villagers. Geographic targeting and priority focus on the ‘hotspots of food insecurity’ can be justified through programme effectiveness considerations.

Nevertheless, there may be value in revisiting some aspects of the targeting approach. The notion of providing a full monthly reference ration to a limited number of most needy households may not be appropriate in a context of widespread need. Moreover, WFP’s understanding of the number of people in need of food assistance would benefit from a comprehensive review of the FAO/WFP CFSAM methodology at the corporate level as this should shed more light on the intricate inter-relationship between macro analysis of food shortfalls and micro analysis of household food insecurity.

**Field level targeting and final distribution**

Targeting criteria for the identification of beneficiaries at district/village level were set by the EMOP steering/coordination bodies in line with and guided by the vulnerability profiles identified by the VAC food security assessments. Free food distributions were typically for vulnerable households - elderly, orphans, families having adopted orphans, disabled, chronically ill, under-fives and child-headed households.

According to government policies in Lesotho and Zambia, households with able bodies in districts affected by crop failures should be targeted under food-for-work schemes. However, due to insufficient large scale working schemes, complementary funds and implementation capacity actual opportunities to carry out food-for-work activities was limited, and free distribution was extended to these people.

Village committees were formed around all Final Distribution Points (FDPs) to facilitate beneficiary selection and support the monthly distributions of food aid. The representation of women in these committees - a condition in the creation – varied between 30 and 50 percent in most cases. Members of the committees were selected by the community. The effectiveness of these committees varied depending on the support and/or training they receive from the implementing NGO and the degree of interference by local politicians.

At the outset of the relief operation community leaders determined the selection of beneficiaries and compilation of beneficiary lists in a number of cases. In Lesotho, initial lists were provided by the Government through its Disaster Management Authority. Over time, NGOs in co-operation with the distribution committees and/or the whole community ensured verification (sometimes several rounds) to improve initial lists in line with distribution guidelines. Such guidelines were not available at the corporate level. Most WFP Country Offices had to adapt manuals and instructions used in earlier emergency operations. A good example was used in the Zimbabwe office where the guidelines provided practical instructions on:

- principles such as registration, trust, flexibility and clarity
- process and stages in targeting and food distribution
- roles of stakeholders in targeting, distribution and monitoring
- logistics and monthly distribution plans
- monitoring and reporting
**Targeting evaluation, Malawi**

A WFP targeting evaluation was conducted in Malawi in November 2002. Key findings (also common to other countries) include:

- WFP food aid is consumed by food insecure households in the targeted villages;
- communities have developed mechanisms to ‘manage’ available food aid in response to the crises;
- Beneficiaries consider up to two thirds of all households falling in the categories of ultra and very poor. This is in contrast to the 30% that are actually targeted in most communities;
- Food aid is shared with relatives and the wider communities to meet social obligations, values and customs. Communities accept as reasonable and just that some benefits also reach the chief.

The RTE itself conducted a small sentinel site case study in Malawi in order to better understand the effectiveness of the relief operation and its targeting success (see Box 6). The case study illustrates the limitations of household level targeting but is reassuring about the overall usefulness of the emergency food aid programme.

**Accountability**

Increasing pressure by local politicians and non-beneficiaries to influence the targeting process was apparent in several countries. Measures taken by Country Offices and Implementation Partners to ensure proper implementation according to targeting guidelines included: continuous sensitisation of beneficiaries and local leaders/decision makers, strengthening of food distribution committees (including change of committee members if necessary), verification of beneficiary lists with community support and media campaigns.

There was good coordination among relevant stakeholders, especially at the district level (district relief committees, district civil protection committee) in most countries. NGOs acknowledged that WFP helped strengthen the collaboration between government/district authorities and NGOs.

Security of NGO staff and food items during dispatch and distribution has been an issue in some locations. It further complicated the emergency response especially in more remote areas.

Different strategies were adopted by NGOs in organizing the distribution of food rations to individual recipients. Either standardised scooping measures were used for individual rations, or households were grouped and instructed to distribute whole bags or tins among themselves according to their entitlement. Because rations varied according to availability of certain food commodities, beneficiaries may not always have known their exact entitlement. However, continuous monitoring and information sharing by NGOs helped to ensure transparency of the distribution process.

Generally, food aid reached and was consumed by the intended beneficiaries. The mission observed continuous field presence and monitoring by WFP and IPs to refine and adapt distribution systems where necessary.

**Politicisation of food in Zimbabwe**

An enormous investment in WFP staff time and energy was necessary in Zimbabwe to address the issue of politicisation of food aid. This was not helped by the conflation, often by the international press, of WFP and NGO “food aid” per se with GMB subsidies, erratic and highly visible government handouts and political rallies around food distributions. WFP has consistently argued that, notwithstanding occasional incidents swiftly dealt with, they and their partners had for the most part avoided either beneficiary lists drawn along party lines or other forms of manipulated targeting. Yet, despite these efforts, accumulated anecdotal evidence combined with donor scepticism led almost to a ‘guilty until proven innocent’ charge against food distributions across the board.
In April, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Unit (the office of the Humanitarian Coordinator) commissioned a consultant's report on politicisation. One of it's conclusions was that "(in WFP operations) there is likelihood of politicisation at the registration level within the village and implementing partners have not been able to adequately verify that politicisation is not taking place at that level. Some NGOs, due to the scale of operations have tended to be lax in ensuring that registration is properly done. There are no outsiders taking part at the village level and there are no systems of verification. Verification of registers at public meetings is generally inadequate as those already left out are unlikely to come to these meetings anyway. The Humanitarian Coordinator needs to persuade WFP, implementing partners and donors to accept the idea of joint committees for all the humanitarian effort at all levels. This approach will ensure that monitoring becomes a joint effort." The report then goes on to promote the idea of an independent Relief and Information Validation Unit (RIV).

Some form of independent monitoring of the WFP and other NGO operations was strongly advocated by two of the three main donors - USAID and EU – with the third (DFID) being unopposed to the notion. Although WFP was not averse to the idea, it pointed out that under the global terms of its agreements with donors monitoring and transparent reporting were inbuilt elements of its mandate. More importantly, there was a danger that any verification exercise attached to the WFP programme might in itself 'politicise' the process by incurring the wrath of local and/or national government authorities already highly sensitive to foreign scrutiny.

The Relief and Information Validation Unit (RIV) was established with USAID funds in the RRU in early 2003. Its mandate originally included provincial coordination, but verification and transparency of targeting procedures was always going to be its main purpose. Unfortunately, due to the poor briefing and knowledge of some of the consultants, WFP felt that this was purely an extractive process taking valuable staff time.

There remain differing views over the value of the RIV and WFP’s response to it. One lesson emerges: in a heightened political atmosphere such as Zimbabwe, additional verification exercises, if required by donors, should be encouraged, and where weaknesses exist, WFP should assist in bolstering the capacity of inter-agency efforts such as the RIV.

**Box 6 - Targeting the household of Ms. Ambu. A sentinel site case study**

Ambu is an elderly widow who lives with two of her daughters, their children and an orphaned grandchild in a small village in Ntcheu district, Malawi. Three of Ambu's children died in their 20s, probably of AIDS. Rose, a daughter in her early twenties (she does not know her age), is often sick and weak. Her husband left her many years ago. Dorothy, the other daughter has a husband and four children, but the husband is lazy and likes to drink. The MCH card of a two-year old grandchild shows a curve approaching the lower cut-off point for normal growth.

The Real Time Evaluation visited Ms. Ambu’s household three times during the crisis period. During the first house visit on 20 July most family members appear weak. Although the surrounding of the clay house is swept clean, her field is in a depressing state. She had grown some maize but the harvest was poor and she ate much of it while it was green. By June her own production was eaten up. She managed to get food (normally for one meal a day) through begging from villagers, gifts from a third daughter who is married to a teacher and from occasional daily work of Rose with a farmer in the village who grows tobacco.

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17 ‘Examining the current issues and practices in regard to politicization of food aid in Zimbabwe’, UNDP-RRU, April 2003.
Now Ambu has been selected as beneficiary in the first round of the EMOP distribution. The implementing NGO Africare manages an orderly distribution, based on beneficiary lists prepared by the village committees in line with selection criteria giving priority to households with orphans etc. Ambu receives a 50 kg bag of maize. She should also receive pulses and CSB but donations are not available. The maize should last for 2 months if two meals are eaten and 2½ months if only one meal is eaten. Ambu thinks that she was selected as beneficiary by the village chief. Of the 22 households selected Ambu thinks that only 4 may be less deserving. The fact that Ambu received a food ration worries her to some extent. People may think of favours exchanged with the chief.

At the time of the second RTE visit on 6 December all family members are there and look a bit healthier. Even Dorothy’s husband is around. Rose had found work in a nearby village for about one month and was paid in maize meal. Ambu received the DFID-sponsored seed “starter package”. She planted maize but is now waiting for rain. The growth chart for the grand daughter shows regular growth. Ambu’s household eats currently two meals of maize meal with leaves from the Baobab tree. Asked whether she received this month’s food aid ration Ambu says yes. In reality she did not. She dropped off the list of beneficiaries. The village chief explains that he had to rotate ration cards, which he keeps. Cards for 22 eligible households out of a total of 130 households in the village are far too few to meet the needs of the poorest households. Apparently Ambu only received a monthly ration in July and September.

At the time of the third RTE visit on 10 May 2003 Ambu’s name is back on the register of eligible households. But she did not get the monthly food ration. Only once, in March, did she receive a bag with 25 kg of maize. Africare staff explains that Ambu’s ration has been regularly picked up by a boy that had been identified as her representative. Ambu’s family is complete although Rose has been sick and weak again. Rose’s six-year old daughter has dropped out of school because she lost her school book. Rose needs 10 Kwatcha (12 US cents) to buy a new one. The school is not part of the small school feeding programme that WFP started in Malawi. Actually, part of the school cannot even be used. A hail storm in January destroyed the roof. Classes had to be stopped for one month because of water logging. Also the crop harvest in this area has been largely destroyed by water logging. A third year of crop failure.

Ambu’s field looks hopeless again. However, somewhat more work opportunities exist and the price of maize has come down to 10 Kwacha per kilo compared to 17 in July. Despite the crop loss the overall situation in the area seem to have improved, for the moment. The group village headman says that there are now far fewer cases of disease and death. At the beginning of 2002 (when maize prices went to 30 Kwacha per kilogram and beyond) there were almost daily funerals among the 3,500 people under his traditional authority.

**Recommendations:**

- Review food ration levels in light of a better understanding of communities’ social support mechanisms, coping capacities of households including their ability to meet part of the food requirements by changing consumption patterns (famine foods) and limitations of the “right to food” notion.
- Review FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment methodology to shed more light on the intricate inter-relationship between macro analysis of food shortfalls and micro analysis of household food insecurity.
- Provide corporate policy and operational guidance on targeting and distribution strategies
- WFP to budget for and ensure training of Implementing Partner planning and management of community level targeting and distribution.
- Review the lessons learned from the independent verification exercise launched by the RRU.
6.3 Monitoring and Evaluation

Initial monitoring arrangements

The first RTE Interim Report (August 2002) stressed the importance of putting in place systematic reporting and data collection in all six countries, recognising that systems to do so were not in place at the outset of the EMOP. Although the project document included a logical framework, a review of risks and assumptions and a clear strategy for performance monitoring, the actual establishment of M&E arrangements was slow and largely based on locally available tools and practices of uneven quality. No standard reporting formats had been developed, and such formats were not readily available from WFP Rome. There was no explicit budget line for M&E in the EMOP, other than provision made for consultancies.

Management attention in the early months of the operation was understandably directed to implementation issues, needs assessments, logistics and staffing. However, it was soon noted that Country Offices were not producing the desired standard reporting information. Dedicated, though non-specialist, staff were assigned to M&E.

In the early months, individual Country Offices used existing M&E tools and reporting formats that had been developed either for country-specific (bridging) EMOPs, for WFP regular projects or were compiled by NGO partners. Thus, M&E approaches and data collection varied greatly from one country to another.

Tens of field monitors recruited by WFP filled in a variety of forms but rarely was this information systematically processed and analysed. In most instances the role of field monitors was to troubleshoot, based on narrative field trip reports. Their contribution to data collection was a sometimes rather frustrating experience as they rarely got feedback and the further use of data was not clear. Neither were most of WFP’s Implementing Partners able to produce timely and systematic reports.

Improvements

A first move towards better monitoring of the EMOP was the Regional Bureau’s design and circulation of a ‘monthly consolidated output report’ format introduced in draft form in August 2002, but applied from September/October onwards. This includes basic output information for both general distribution and targeted activities on:

- Food aid recipients and beneficiaries, by gender, by age group, by district – actual vs. planned
- Data on food management committees and their composition by gender
- Food rations and total quantities distributed by district – actual vs. planned

The new format has made a notable difference to the presentation and analysis of regional performance and has enabled ODJ to give feedback on data quality and timeliness. Country Offices took 3-4 months to adjust or scale up their reporting efforts and revise data collection formats, especially in terms of adding data columns on gender and age group of beneficiaries.

Some six months after start of the operation all countries had achieved an adequate degree of data accuracy. This has been a challenge because of greatly varying capacities by WFP’s implementing partners. Initially WFP’s Commodity Tracking information (COMPAS) was frequently used as a means to check the basic validity of distribution data reported by Implementation Partners.
**Process and outcome data**

Country Offices also made efforts to gather and report on process and outcome data for the relief intervention. In Malawi this was done in close partnership with the NGO consortium; elsewhere, Country Offices re-worked earlier formats and approaches or tried to design M&E instruments from scratch.

Some Country Office staff commented that M&E guidelines issued by WFP HQs have been useful at a conceptual level (in defining terms and outlining broad strategies – a training primer), but have been less useful as a template to be adapted to country contexts. Particularly when dealing with new and less experienced implementing NGOs, a step-by-step procedural guide is required, otherwise WFP M&E staff expend a great deal of their time in producing a ‘home product’. (Note: Recently issued corporate guidance for emergencies does now provide some of this step-by-step guidance and standard formats).

Country Offices with more pro-active (part-time) M&E staff developed the following tools and information categories. Most of this information was designed to be collected on a monthly basis by WFP field monitors and/or Implementation Partners.

**Distribution Monitoring**
- Distribution Process
- Exit survey

**Post-Distribution Monitoring**
- Household (HH) questionnaire (targeting efficiency, use of food aid ration, participation in and knowledge about targeting criteria)
- Community Interview (fairness of distribution and participation)

**Food Security Monitoring**
- Food availability and price monitoring at village level, incl. daily wage rate and livestock/food barter ratio (monthly)
- Food availability, consumption and coping information at the household level (quarterly)

**Too much unused data**

Generally, the requirements for data management, analysis and feedback were not fully understood. Frequently, M&E plans were too ambitious and involved extensive data collection without adequate assurance of quality (training), analysis and timely dissemination of the information. Often little feedback was provided to NGOs on their monitoring reports.

There was also a tendency to collect regular (monthly) data from as many project sites as possible. In Malawi data were gathered from 600,000 beneficiary households. The information was not yet processed when the EMOP came to an end. Throughout the region an imbalance was observed between data gathering and timely processing and analysis. More use could have been made of ad hoc studies or sample surveys. For example, a study on targeting effectiveness initiated in Malawi provided timely management information that until then could not have been deduced from standard reporting formats.

Generally, much of the monitoring and evaluation efforts came far too late to be of use for managers in adjusting approaches to the EMOP. WFP staff in the region have recommended that the ERR roster should include M&E specialists to ensure adequate basic systems from the outset of the operation.

**Evaluation arrangements**

A few months into the operation WFP started to prepare the ground for assessing the impact of the relief intervention. A consultant visited the region to design a ‘sentinel sites’ monitoring system. Already at the time of the second RTE visit (Nov/Dec) concerns were expressed that the proposed approach was rather sophisticated and may not adequately reflect technical capacities in the recipient countries. Also the long
time frame of the effort would mean that it was unlikely that any information would become available before the end of the current EMOP.

In parallel and reflecting its strong commitment to strengthening monitoring and evaluation of the relief operation, ODJ arranged for an ad-hoc “impact evaluation” that would produce timely basic information on the effects of the project at the micro, meso and macro level. A team of two external consultants with professional counterparts in each of the six countries conducted a questionnaire survey in a few districts and with a limited number of households. Focal group, key informant interviews and secondary data analysis provided additional information for the evaluation of meso and macro level effects. By the time of the third RTE mission the impact evaluation report was not yet available.

**New regional M&E framework**

In February 2003, ODJ, using extra-budgetary German grant (GTZ) funding, recruited the services of a specialist consultant to develop an M&E strategy for the region. The EMOP was used as entry point for the design of indicators, instruments, organizational arrangements and partnerships although it was too late for the relief operation to apply the new approach during the first year.

The regional M&E framework distinguishes three main elements: Output Monitoring, Post Distribution Monitoring and a Community and Household Surveillance system (CHS). The latter supersedes the earlier efforts in the region to develop a sentinel sites monitoring system and will be implemented in partnership with the C-SAFE NGO consortium.

The following indicators will be used to track and report on the progress of WFP projects in the region:
- Output monitoring: How many people are receiving food rations etc.
- Post-distribution monitoring (PDM): Targeting efficiency, use of food, beneficiary satisfaction
- Community and Household Surveillance (CHS): food sources, food frequency, dietary intake, consumption patterns, school attendance, sales of assets, distress migration, school enrolment

The new corporate Results-Based Management (RBM) strategic approach incorporates the two indicators promoted by the USAID-sponsored SMART initiative: mortality and under-5 malnutrition rates. Insofar collecting as these data is the mandate of UNICEF, arrangements over their collection needs to be negotiated at corporate levels.

**Linking M&E with assessments**

Throughout the RTE the mission suggested linking M&E efforts with the rolling assessment capacity (VAC) already established in each country. Key needs indicators that triggered the relief assistance are also the indicators for measuring the success of the intervention. In addition, VAC assessment team members are adequately qualified for carrying out impact surveys, either in addition to or (preferably) in conjunction with the rolling assessment, especially the final VAC round.

The critical information to be collected in order to judge whether the WFP intervention meets its objectives and is justified includes:
- Who receives the food (to answer the targeting issue of inclusion and exclusion error)
- What is done with the food (to assess the effect on dietary intake, intra-household distribution, redistribution within community, sale/barter)
- What difference does the food make to the recipient household (to answer whether the objectives of preventing severe food shortages at the household level, preserving productive physical and human assets - e.g. school drop out - and preventing distress migration are being met)

The rolling assessment already covered part of this information. The key additional effort would then have been to compare project food distribution records with findings at the village level. A plausible case could than be made that the observed food security status was influenced by the emergency operation.
The case for attributing a stabilized food security situation to the food intervention would be strengthened if any major change in other aspects affecting household food security (critical assumptions such as disease outbreak or adverse economic and policy developments) were included in the analysis.

The newly developed M&E framework for the Southern Africa region now envisages the following links with VAC assessments:

- VAC identifies problems and CHS monitors progress in addressing these problems, using common indicator sets.
- VAC data will be used to provide contextual information for interpretation of trends identified in the monitoring process.
- CHS reports can be instrumental in the preparation of VAC assessments and highlight issues requiring assessments.

**Results and baseline**

Systematic evidence for the positive impact of the EMOP is difficult without a specific baseline survey. The issue of baseline data was addressed on basis of secondary data and VAC findings. The basic reference point was to avoid any severe deterioration in the status quo for key indicators such as household food access, nutritional status of vulnerable groups, school enrolment and distress migration.

For the most part, the situation did not deteriorate as was feared after the poor harvest in early 2002. However, a difficulty with the status quo as the baseline arises when the effects of HIV/AIDS contribute to a continuous deterioration in life expectancy and poverty levels. The baseline slides. Mortality due to AIDS is more than 1,300 deaths per day, a result that actually dwarfs the threat to lives due to drought and natural disasters. The casualties of this crisis are predominantly the productive age groups. This will necessarily lead to a wave of ‘secondary casualties’ among elderly and children even after the direct effects of the current emergency have been dealt with.

**Recommendations:**

- WFP should find ways to ensure that M&E design is more realistic. The balance between data gathering, data cleaning/processing and data analysis needs to change. Less data should be collected but analysis and use should be more timely;
- Corporate guidance on M&E should include practical modules, step by step advice and standard forms for easy adaptation to local requirements. Especially WFP standard systems for reporting on food aid beneficiaries and food distributed by district and/or implementation partner should be readily available;
- Specialist M&E staff should be dispatched from to outset of a new EMOP;
- M&E should have dedicated funding and an explicit and detailed budget line in the EMOP/PRRO document;
- M&E functions of field monitors should be better defined. Some 50 percent of the time should be available for assuring quality of output reports and for conducting Post Distribution Monitoring;
- M&E information systems should link to other information tools such as rolling assessments, early warning systems, food security and nutrition surveillance.

**6.4 Implementation**

**Some corporate issues**

NGO capacity emerged as a major theme running through much of the debate over implementation constraints. This is not unique to southern Africa; it is a corporate WFP issue that calls attention to:

(a) different perceptions of what constitutes a ‘partnership’;
(b) the ever more sophisticated demands on monitoring and reporting ‘results’ that can rarely be matched by capacities on the ground; and
(c) the operational reality that WFP works with who is present, and that often there is little choice.

Capacity building is, of course, a long-term endeavour. Many NGOs in southern Africa, especially local NGOs, had relatively little emergency backgrounds, being primarily community-level development partners. Rapidly scaling up to an emergency of this proportion has entailed a lot of shortcuts and compromises. To avoid this in future, WFP will need to invest in field and management training beyond what is currently available.

**Specific Findings**

Throughout the region, the timely identification of suitable partners was a major determinant of the amount of food distributed. Registration of beneficiaries was a one-off process, being dependent on local government collaboration and NGO staff on the ground. Further delays occurred when either large increases of numbers were noted, or complaints were investigated regarding who was on the list. Four to six weeks could pass between registration and actual distribution (due to setting up of Extended Delivery Points, etc).

In **Zimbabwe**, NGO capacity was constrained in the first six months in two respects: firstly, the actual number of IPs being available and registered by the government; secondly, the varied ability, geographic scope and experience of NGO partners. By November, 10 IPs\(^{18}\) had been assigned districts, with an additional two\(^{19}\) only very recently approved by government and yet to be assigned operational areas. The 12 working agencies were to cover all 57 districts in Zimbabwe, including 9 districts under the C-SAFE (NGO pipeline) scheme\(^{20}\). WFP’s 48 districts came ‘on-line’ as follows: October, 28; November, 35; December, 44; and in January, the full 48.

In **Mozambique**, capacity and resource constraints had, by December, limited WFP’s coverage to only 45 percent of the original 440,000 beneficiaries. In retrospect, it can be said that the Country Office’s planning process had been ambitious, given lack of NGOs in some provinces, difficulties of access due to poor infrastructure and the long distances and dispersed populations. The 1,200 small FFW projects were over-extending NGO capacity and a decision was made to move more rapidly into general distribution. The ranking of districts (with an emphasis on the top 28 ‘hot spots’) was important for identifying priorities, but the food allocation per district (based on population in need) remained theoretical. The reality was that the amount of food distributed depended on which IP was there, their physical access, transport and storage capacity. For example in Gaza province, Massangena (1\(^{st}\) on ‘hot spot’ list) and Chicalacuala (12\(^{th}\)) had only in November come ‘online’ when a new IP (Samaritan’s Purse) was identified. The two worst-hit provinces – Tete and Gaza – were the least accessible and therefore least covered by NGOs. By late December, there were still three of the 28 districts not served due to lack of partners.

Communication and delivery problems created some friction in WFP-NGO relations. The slow arrival of food, compounded by milling delays meant that CARE, for instance, began demanding food in the EDP prior to commencement of the next FFW phase (having received food more than one month after the completion of the last phase in August).

\(^{18}\) Christian Care, ORAP, CARE, World Vision International (WVI), HelpAge, Plan International, Concern, Catholic Relief Services (CRS), Goal and the Lutheran World Federation (LWF).

\(^{19}\) Aide Contre la Faim (ACF) and Help International.

\(^{20}\) It was not until the end of November that the C-SAFE agreement was signed, and NGOs had yet to register beneficiaries in these nine districts. Meanwhile, figures submitted to WFP suggest that NGOs had distributed 6,700 tons of cereals from March-November 2002.
Discussions were underway between WFP and the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID) for funding local NGO capacity but no clear proposals were submitted by December. WFP did have a 30 percent advance down payment facility (not taken by CARE or World Vision International, but accepted by Samaritan’s Purse), but this was not complemented with additional training.

In Swaziland, NGO capacity issues were particularly stark during the first six months of the emergency operation, but significant improvements were made from early 2003 onwards. Prior to the EMOP, NGOs had distributed government and donor food without any clearly defined modality, and were not used to WFP requirements. The CANGO Consortium, itself having a Letter of Understanding (LoU) with WFP, coordinated activities undertaken by the 7 implementing partners (each having a separate LoU). But WFP over-estimated their abilities to meet new requirements and scale-up. Only two NGOs – World Vision International and the Swaziland Red Cross – received financial and international staff support as a result of the WFP contract. NGOs lacked knowledge of the WFP Global MoU with parent agencies – all Swaziland NGOs were indigenous. In the first two months, the role of WFP monitors was misunderstood, with accusations of ‘policing’. Meanwhile, indicative examples of the problems encountered by WFP in Swaziland included:

- the ‘over-registration’ of beneficiaries (i.e. NGOs registering greater numbers than the CFSAM due to an expectation of additional resources through the NGO pipeline that did not transpire);
- CARITAS in October, when faced with three times the number of beneficiaries at the distribution site, shared the food with all present. This points to the strong cultural attitude that sees food as “from the King” and for all to share.
- WVI did not complete the first month (August) of distribution until the third week of September;
- Correctly sized scoops had, by December, still not been acquired by some NGOs, and rations were thus only measured approximately.
- Late submission of distribution reports by several NGOs.
- NGO attendance at training workshops organised by WFP to explain distribution modalities was poor.

In Malawi, the JEFAP (Joint Emergency Food Aid Programme) Consortium (‘Malawi model’) proved extremely useful in coordinating NGO planning and distribution. WFP and its partners benefited from the role played by the ALNAP Learning Support Office in Malawi in facilitating regional workshops for the JEFAP members, airing concerns and finding common solutions. The model of a coordinating/lead NGO at district level helping to build the capacity of smaller implementers still needed strengthening. No formal agreements to undertake this task existed, and the capacity/time constraints of the lead agency precluded serious capacity building.

**Issues for WFP**

A more concerted effort is required to assess NGO capacities at the outset of a large-scale EMOP and during implementation. In some cases, the internal constraints of NGOs to deliver and report on food distributions were realised 2-3 months into the operation. In other cases, this was realised from the start, but the reality is that NGO availability is often supply-led – i.e. the choice of which partner to use is limited. Emergency management capacity does not develop rapidly in an environment where there has been no humanitarian assistance for several years, like in Swaziland. International NGOs are usually stronger than national NGOs, and a ‘sub-contracting’ agreement with an international NGO could involve at least some element of capacity building and/or backstopping.

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21 The Learning Support Office (LSO) is a pilot initiative of the London-based Active Learning Network of Aid Practitioners (ALNAP), of which WFP is an active member, through the Office of Evaluation.
Although ODOC funds were available to address capacity constraints, COs tended to treat these as an available ‘grants’ subject to the submission of proposals from NGOs. In some cases, precisely the lack of NGO experience meant that the proposals were weak. ODJ pointed out that the start up of the operation could have been facilitated with the availability of WFP Standard formats that could just have been tailored to meet each country’s needs, (for example beneficiary registration forms, ration cards, etc.). This would have helped avoid a number of programme corrective measures that imposed themselves later on the implementation.

Capacity constraints, however, are not just on technical issues such as information provision. In future, corporate guidance and tools will be needed in two respects: first, in ensuring that COs know how to rapidly appraise NGO capacity and training needs; second, that COs are given a range of options (funds, training, external inputs) for addressing these weaknesses both in the short and longer term. Some challenges will be structural (management, strategic planning, organisational development), others practical (equipment, staff numbers, knowledge of WFP requirements).

Using existing best practice, and where indigenous training capacity exists (for example, through a lead NGO or through a consortium) training packages appropriate to field realities and adapted to country contexts should be developed. This should not, however, be simply a question of handing packages to WFP programme officers. The development and delivering of this training requires special skills, and a good programme officer does not necessarily have the knowledge to develop training. Neither, indeed, does s/he have the time. The story of the EMOP in its first three months was one of over-stretched and under-resourced Country Offices and Regional Bureau.

One option is to use external consultants familiar with WFP programme requirements for rapid in-country training, with at least one regional and one national WFP staff member responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of the training in subsequent months. It would be important to have up-front money available for such deployment.

Debates over the relative value of direct distribution by WFP were retrospective and, by then, irrelevant given the scale-up this would entail for WFP. Direct distribution was undertaken in one district of Lesotho. Most COs agreed that in the absence of a corporate direction to do otherwise, the government or NGO option must be pursued irrespective of inherent weaknesses.

**Recommendations:**

- Fundamental NGO capacity constraints among the limited number of partners available to WFP in this and other emergencies should be addressed as a matter of urgency. Corporate guidance and tools are required in two respects: first, in ensuring that COs know how to rapidly appraise NGO capacity and training needs; second, that COs are given a range of options (funds, training, external inputs) for addressing these weaknesses both in the short and longer term.
- Rapid training may be required for partners not used to WFP requirements and procedures; this should be provided by external consultants familiar with WFP programme requirements for rapid in-country training, with at least one regional and one national WFP staff member responsible for evaluating the effectiveness of the training in subsequent months. It would be important to have up-front money available for such deployment.

6.5 Food basket, nutrition

**Reference rations**

A reference ration of 400g of cereals, 60g of pulses, 20g of oil and 100g of blended fortified food (e.g. corn soya blend, CSB) was formulated at the beginning of the EMOP. This ration was based on the standard ration proposed in the relevant guidelines adapted for a higher activity level and the high HIV/AIDS prevalence in the southern African region. A separate benchmark was introduced for the cold
winter months in Lesotho. The reference ration represented the food aid items which were most suitable to cover the average quantitative and qualitative nutritional requirements of a population entirely dependent on food aid for their daily diet.

The revised Implementation Strategy (December 2002) presented two options to adapt the reference ration to the difficulties of mobilising large amounts of blended food in a timely manner. One option was to partly replace the blended food by pulses and oil, the other to partly replace CSB by cereals. (see Tables 4 and 5 for more details on the quantities of food and nutritional value of the reference ration). However, from the nutritional point of view these adaptations remained only second best solutions.

The reference rations and the two options would provide between 2,186 and 2,198 kcal, between 62 and 66g protein (representing 11.2-12% energy), and between 40 and 43g fat (representing 16.2-17.8% energy). Depending on the amount of blended food, significant quantities of essential vitamins and minerals would also be provided through the proposed reference ration. See Annex 3 for details of the reference rations and planned rations for general food distribution.

The proposed reference ration and the adaptations were appropriate and in line with WFP and international guidelines. In the absence of international guidelines for adapting general rations at population level for high HIV/AIDS prevalence, an average increase of 100 Kcal (5%) and 6 g of protein (10%) and the emphasis on the diversified food basket (including blended food items), compared to an average reference ration used in normal circumstances, seems to be reasonable in the context of EMOP 10200.

Planned versus reference rations

Planned ration sizes and composition at country level in some cases varied from the reference ration. The ration was adjusted in light of estimated availability of food at beneficiaries’ households, commodity availability, and logistical constraints. Recognising a very limited availability of complementary commodities at household level, the reference ration became the planned ration in four of the six countries at the peak of the crises (December 2002 to March 2003). For operational reasons, Mozambique and Lesotho had a slightly different planned ration during the period December 2002 – March 2003. These planned rations were again adapted to the pipeline situation and country specific considerations for the period January – February and March – April 2003 (see Tables 4 and 5 for more details on the quantities of food and nutritional value of the planned rations).

The different planned rations were established in a consultative process between the regional bureau and the country offices (COs). COs have formulated a number of prioritisation strategies to adapt to insufficient resources and pipeline/logistical constraints based on information available through the VAC process. These include prioritisation of districts and/or areas within districts with high degree of food insecurity, malnutrition and/or HIV/AIDS, distribution of food rations to a limited number of families or members within families, and the definition of planned rations which are smaller than the reference ration. Although such mechanisms have specific advantages and disadvantages, they are appropriate to ensure that the most needy population still has access to nutritious food in quantities which still make a difference during the most critical periods. In such situations, ration levels and malnutrition levels have to be carefully monitored to be able to take corrective actions if needed. Such monitoring activities were ensured through monthly reports that regularly provided information about ration levels and were analyzed by ODJ staff during the first months of the EMOP, and different nutritional surveys.

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Table 4: Energy, protein and fat content of the reference rations and planned rations for general food distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reference ration *</th>
<th>Kcal</th>
<th>Protein (g)</th>
<th>Protein (energy %)</th>
<th>Fat (g)</th>
<th>Fat (energy %)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reference ration</td>
<td>2,198</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned rations (July – December 2002) **</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>1,580</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>18.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>1,554</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>35</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2,139</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>2,176</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>2,158</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference ration, Option 1 (reduced CSB, compensated by pulses and oil) *</td>
<td>2,186</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>11.9</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>17.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference ration, Option 2 (reduced CSB, compensated by cereals) *</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned rations (December 2002 – March 2003) *</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia, Swaziland</td>
<td>2,188</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>11.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>61</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>17.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned rations (January – February 2003) ***</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>13.1</td>
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<td>10.3</td>
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<tr>
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<td>2,139</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>10.3</td>
<td>25</td>
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<tr>
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<td>71</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned rations (March – April 2003) ***</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
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<td>54</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>37</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Zambia</td>
<td>1,968</td>
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<td>12.4</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>2,139</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>19.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho **</td>
<td>2,176</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>11.1</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>2,318</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Implementation Strategy, December 2002
** Own calculations (using WFP Food Basket Calculator)
*** Information provided by ODJ (May 2003)

During the EMOP, the reference and planned rations respectively were only realised to a degree. Resource and logistical constraints led to shortfalls in nutritional quality and quantity. In no country was the optimal daily food ration met consistently over time. The lowest level of food rations was observed in Zambia during the 2nd half of 2002 (due to the GMO issue). In addition, important in-country variations of ration levels had to be observed. For example, in Lesotho in March 2003, the distribution of maize varied in different regions between 189 and 611g, the distribution of pulses between 33 and 61g, and the distribution of oil between 2 and 37g per person per day.

Regular information about the quantities and qualities of food rations distributed was available at sub-national level. This was the result of standardised monitoring formats, which put emphasis on these figures. However, the nutritional value of the rations was only analysed at regional level. Retrospectively this was not a problem, because no major nutritional problems arose.

The contribution of the food aid rations to the fulfilment of average energy requirements as determined by the reference ration varied from 40-98%, that of protein from 38-82% and that of fat from 24-112%. Compared to the planning figures the distribution performance varied from 38-126% for energy requirements, from 35-111% for protein and from 23-114% for fat.

Even in cases where higher levels of requirements were met, they often have been achieved by cereals alone or a very high dominance of cereals (e.g. Zimbabwe and Zambia at the beginning of the programme), which affects the quality of the food basket.

**Dilemmas**

This reflected a general dilemma of this operation, and indeed of WFP’s operations in general. When resource figures are still low, a decision has to be made whether to go for quantity or quality of the food basket when first cash contributions arrive. At the beginning of the operation, an informed decision was made to go for quantity first and prioritise the purchase of maize. This may be questioned from the nutritional point of view, but it is reasonable from the overall programming perspective. A balanced diet, however, can only be achieved through a more diversified food basket with higher levels of pulses, oil and CSB. ODJ constantly advocated for nutritional quality and was able to provide increasing amounts of higher quality food later in the operation, which coincided with the peak of the crisis.

This situation also begs the question as to whether the reference ration as formulated – and the explicit endeavour to address the additional nutrition needs of a high HIV/AIDS prevalence population – is, in fact, feasible. In spite of WFP’s best efforts, resource constraints, compounded by poor overall geographical coverage and the inevitable inclusion/exclusion errors of an operation of this scale, highlight the difficulty of matching the practice of an emergency operation to the requirements of the population.

**Fortification**

The fortification of maize in the milling process – an opportunity provided and taken by WFP and donors due to the rejection of GMO cereal grains – has significantly improved the provision of micronutrients. During the period July 2002 to April 2003 a total of 70,322 tons of maize meal was fortified, and a total of 12,000 tons fortified maize meal purchased commercially form millers. A process of thorough review of fortification alternatives was launched by ODJ. The selected fortification protocol23 follows the new South Africa law and was endorsed by UNICEF and WHO. ODJ calculated that – depending on the consumption level and the age specific nutrient requirements – the fortification provides between 30 and 100 percent of the Recommended Dietary Allowances (RDA) at the anticipated consumption level.

Due to the rejection of GMO food in Zambia sorghum and bulgur wheat was introduced into the food aid basket. Whereas sorghum is a commodity quite well known at least in parts of the country, bulgur wheat was a new product for the target group. The beneficiaries were sensitised and got guidance on how to use these commodities through information and demonstration activities. The two commodities were well accepted and even appreciated by the recipients because of the variety of dishes which can be prepared especially with sorghum.

**Nutritional surveillance**

There was no nutritional surveillance system in place in the region that could present continuous, systematic and representative information about the nutritional status of the population affected by acute and chronic food and nutritional insecurity. Surveillance systems previously run by governments in the region were no longer functional. The set-up of new systems would have needed time and resources. Efforts to analyse the nutritional status of the affected population and collect new data on the nutrition situation in the six countries during the emergency thus focused on the co-ordination and quality

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23 Fortificants per Kilo of Maize Meal: Vitamin A 2083 RE, Vit B1 2.19 mg, Vit B2 1.7 mg, Vit B6 3.13 mg, Niacin 25 mg, Folic Acid 1.43 mg, Iron 35 mg and Zinc 15 mg (WFP: Implementation Strategy update as of 5 December 2002, p. 21)
assurance of various surveys. Some countries (such as Mozambique) conducted nutrition surveys during the 2002/03 VAC exercises.

A series of ad hoc and co-ordinated nutritional surveys were conducted by different stakeholders in several countries throughout the operation. These surveys were – with very few exceptions – in accordance with internationally recognised methodologies. The Malawian example shows that it was possible to synchronise district surveys to generate a data set across three quarters which allowed for a good overview of the nutritional status in targeted districts over the period of the EMOP. However, such an exercise is time consuming and expensive in terms of financial and human resources.

The amalgamation of nutritional and food security data under VAC was achieved in some countries but not in others, and was not regular throughout the VAC process. Methodological considerations favoured the above described approach of collecting data through a series of representative quantitative surveys rather than the VAC assessment which used a more qualitative approach.

Different stakeholders – including WFP – are now involved in the development of a surveillance system lead by UNICEF. The system currently proposed would provide regular and representative data in a timely manner. The necessary budget, however, still has to be elaborated and compared to costs of the current system of surveys. The challenge, though, will be in finding sustained funds for a nutritional surveillance system to become integral and predictable, rather than a one-off event. A thorough analysis of the experience with previously existing system is needed in order to plan and implement a relevant system and increase the chances of sustainability.

**Data from existing surveillance**

Available data suggested that global acute wasting rates were and are not, over all, alarming. This may be partly due to the food distributions, although it is not possible to prove a direct causal relationship with the available data. Results of recent surveys (year 2002 and early 2003) available at the time of the evaluation indicated the following global acute malnutrition rates (weight/height < -2 SD):

- an average figure of 3.3% in Lesotho (varying between 1.7- 6% among the districts);
- between 0.8 and 19% in Malawi, (a relatively high prevalence rate in Salima District in Malawi was found in March 2002 - the end of the ‘hungry season’. Since then, malnutrition rates have decreased, and vary between 0.9-4.6%);
- between 4 and 11.2% in Mozambique;
- 7.3% in one region in Swaziland;
- between 2.9 and 7.2% in Zambia; and
- between 0.7 and 18.2% in Zimbabwe in May 2002 (data from the February 2003 survey had not yet been published in May 2003 due to disagreements of the Government with preliminary results).

Although these global acute malnutrition rates are not alarming, rates of severe acute malnutrition (weight/height < -3 SD and/or nutritional oedema) are quite high in some districts (up to 5.2 in one district in Malawi). Further analysis at country level (WFP COs in collaboration with Ministries of Health, UNICEF and other stakeholders) is needed to identify the causes of this situation including the effect of HIV/AIDS.

24 Paradoxically, the lack of comparative baseline or universal data forestalls any assertion that food aid has prevented a decline in nutritional status. The converse, of course, is also true: there is no proof that it hasn’t.


26 Save the Children UK survey; data presented in UNICEF: Final Consolidated Report of First round of District Nutrition and Mortality Surveys in Malawi. September 2002
During the EMOP period, there was no indication of unusual prevalence and incidence of micronutrient deficiencies, including pellagra. However, systematic micronutrient surveys are not conducted in the six countries and problems will be visible only in advanced clinical stages.

**Lessons**

- The reference ration and even the adapted planned rations have not been met during EMOP 10200. However, this is not unusual for WFP’s operations. The reasons include resource constraints, long lead time between donors’ in-kind contributions and actual availability for distribution at village level, logistical problems and capacities of partners.
- As in many other operations, it was not possible to solve the dilemma between quantity and quality of the distributed rations, especially at the beginning of the operation. Only after about four to five months did the quality and diversity of the distributed rations improve.
- More detailed – and if available data permits – comparative analysis and experience exchange is needed to better understand why wasting levels remained relatively low and within more or less ‘normal’ ranges, despite the fact that food distributions remained well below targets;
- The need for high quality nutritional data requires greater efforts, ensured either through a series of surveys when crises arise (as was done in Malawi during the current crises) or through an institutionalised regular nutritional surveillance system.

**Recommendations:**

- The concept of a high nutritional value reference rations should be maintained. Advocacy towards governments and donors should continue to stress the need for a balanced food basket for populations highly dependent on food aid for their daily diets and highly infected/affected by HIV/AIDS.
- Consideration should be given to better linking nutritional data and the data made available through the planned community & household surveillance system (CHS).

### 6.6 HIV/AIDS approaches

Current provisions under the regional EMOP include a variety of innovative activities to improve awareness creation, advocacy, prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS. WFP staff at all levels took a leading role in advocating and putting the HIV/AIDS issue high on the agenda of regional and country level crisis responses. The joint mission of the Special Envoy for Humanitarian Needs in Southern Africa and the Special Envoy for HIV/AIDS in Africa to four countries in the region in January 2003 provided an excellent opportunity to focus on the specific HIV/AIDS related character of the crises and the need for adapted and multi-sectoral interventions.

The reference food aid ration for general food distribution takes into consideration the increased energy and nutrient requirements of People Living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA). However, insufficient resources available under the EMOP, especially the insufficient provision of fortified blended food, did not allow these additional requirements to be covered within the first six months of the operation.

HIV/AIDS was increasingly integrated in the assessment process. The December VAC assessment in Zambia, for example, integrated specific HIV/AIDS related indicators and questions in the household surveys. They looked at numbers of chronically ill family members, adults who died during the last year and orphans in the household. Findings from the August VAC assessment in Zimbabwe and the December VAC assessments in Malawi and Zambia were used for a detailed analysis to study the relationship between HIV/AIDS proxy variables and food security indicators. Results suggest, not surprisingly, that HIV/AIDS has had a very negative influence on food security in the context of the

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recent emergency. Support to consumption, to productivity enhancement and to household and community safety net approaches is needed to deal with the crisis.

**Some specific activities**

HIV/AIDS education campaigns were started at general distribution sites in Malawi and Zambia in order to highlight the role of AIDS as a critical factor to vulnerability. Local theatre groups presented short plays with music and dancing to beneficiaries waiting for their ration. In Zambia, a video van was used for the same purpose. The mission stresses the importance of building on and expanding these activities at distribution sites.

Opportunities to integrate food aid interventions into a broader approach of community home based care have been piloted under the WFP Country Programme in Malawi and, in the EMOP, through support to community schools in Zambia. These specific activities are still at an early stage and on a very limited scale. A number of targeting and programming issues have arisen, requiring closer consultation with partners. More HIV/AIDS related activities are planned in all countries under the second year of the regional EMOP.

A handout on ‘Food and HIV/AIDS’ is included in the training on ‘Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in Humanitarian Crisis in Southern Africa’.

The disproportional response to food requests over other sectoral needs within the regional CAP may have over-stressed the role of food in addressing HIV/AIDS. Food aid can act as a catalyst in, for example, changing work patterns and in bolstering nutritional requirements, but its impact as a stand-alone intervention, as WFP has constantly stressed, is untested and undoubtably insufficient.

**Lessons**

- HIV/AIDS is one of the key factors in the origin of the food crisis in Southern Africa, and seriously affects the degree of vulnerability and the chances for recovery of the infected and affected individuals, families and communities. All future food security and nutrition interventions will need to give priority consideration to this.
- Innovative ideas and new partnerships are much needed to address the nutritional and other challenges of the HIV/AIDS. Food aid can play a role in care and mitigation and can provide opportunities for other type of interventions, but it is only one of many essential components of a preventive and curative programme.

**Recommendations:**

- Given the difficulties in addressing the HIV/AIDS problems through general distributions, further activities to strengthen targeted HIV/AIDS related food security interventions through food aid should actively be encouraged in all WFP programmes. Implementing partners should be approached to develop such activities/projects using food aid as one component in and integrated approach.
- ODJ should carefully analyse and document the different country experiences under the regional EMOP related to HIV/AIDS. Dos and Don’ts as well as HIV/AIDS programme specific issues should be made available within the organisation and to partners, thus helping corporate and international learning.

**6.7 Complementary assistance**

Efforts were made to include specific population groups in a diversified programme, even though the relative number of such specific project activities compared to general distribution was small.
Country projects: some examples

In Lesotho, targeted activities included: (a) an emergency school feeding programme as an expansion of the Country Programme activities was envisaged for 110,000 school children. The project started in two of the planned six districts before the winter school holidays, and in a further three districts in February/March after training of the responsible persons in the schools and provision of resources; (b) initial plans were made to undertake special feeding programmes for under-fives in collaboration with UNICEF. In the event, co-operation in this programme was limited to the transportation of 365 tons of UNIMIX blended food for a supplementary feeding programme for some 50,000 children in two districts, which is supposed to end in August 2003.

In Malawi, targeted activities included: (a) support to therapeutic feeding for severely malnourished children (including food to support their caretakers); (b) supplementary feeding for under-five children, expectant and nursing mothers; and (c) emergency school feeding in selected districts.

The school feeding programme covered primary schools in five most affected districts (as identified by the CFSAM) was set up in November 2002, including training of teachers and preparation of distribution plans. The actual implementation for an estimated number of 110,000 pupils in 145 schools began with the new term in December.

The SF/TP programme in Malawi started just as the Ministry of Health was introducing a new implementation strategy with support from various stakeholders, including WFP. Intensive co-ordination between implementing partners at field level was needed to avoid overlapping and inconsistent interventions (particularly as the old system was still in place). Different SF/TP programmes with supplementary pipelines (C-SAFE, COGURD) have been under preparation for several months awaiting approval. Food aid provided through WFP covers all Nutrition Rehabilitation Units (NRUs) and 62 supplementary feeding centres (including outreach). Support to training and supervision was introduced with the new protocols, which took quite some time. In May 2003 training was still on-going.

In Mozambique, the distribution of a fortified food supplement was planned to support up to 100,000 vulnerable people within the target population (children, expectant and nursing women, elderly and the sick). The intervention approach is still to be developed based on assessed need and could include HIV/AIDS activities and selective feeding programmes. By December 2002, this activity had not started due to lack of resources, including CSB.

Zambia was the only WFP office to launch a sizable urban programme. This included the targeting of 45,000 people in Lusaka - assistance to families and institutions that support AIDS orphans and children, mainly from rural HIV/AIDS affected families, seeking care and support with urban relatives. This number was increased to 97,000 after the 2nd VAC assessment. The planned ration and the strategy was based on the same approach used in the framework of the Country Programme. In December, a lot of preparatory steps were taken and a project proposal was prepared by Concern International on behalf of a group of NGOs to “improve the livelihood security of people affected by HIV/AIDS in the district of Lusaka by halting capital erosion and helping to reverse the trend”. This proposal was again revised. Finally a support programme to community schools in Lusaka was approved, which started only in January 2003. In April a total of 27,700 children (14,970 girls and 12,800 boys) received a school ration in 64 community schools and drop in centres, and 8,680 households received a household ration. New schools expressed interest to participate. School enrolment has significantly increased, challenging the physical and educational capacities of the schools.

In Zimbabwe the provision of CSB was introduced into the EMOP for either targeted activities or inclusion in the general ration in areas highly affected by HIV/AIDS for a total of 1 million beneficiaries. In December 2002, these activities had not started due to lack of resources, including CSB.
Constraints

ODJ gave advice to the COs in solving technical questions in the formulation and implementation of specific targeted activities as requested. A nutritionist from HQ, who participated in the development of the sentinel site approach, visited three of the six countries, and supported the country staff on nutritional considerations and targeted interventions.

As can be seen from the above listing, there have been major delays and constraints in the implementation of the targeted activities. Challenges in these types of programmes include:

- finding competent and experienced partners and more qualified staff;
- finding staff (including WFP staff) with sufficient technical/thematic qualifications and experience in participatory project cycle management;
- overcoming the lack of adequate operational guidelines;
- sufficient time for planning (including collection of the relevant data), identification and capacity assessment of implementing partners, and preparation of the targeted activities;
- a revision of old Supplementary Feeding/Therapeutic Feeding protocols and new guidelines and training for government and NGO staff, as in the case of Malawi;
- a recognition that the preparation, implementation and M&E of these additional EMOP activities adds to the workload of CO staff and needs additional human and financial resources (including non-food inputs) as well as additional technical knowledge and experience.

Efforts to integrate and increase complementary activities as part of the EMOP portfolio are commendable, but the relative balance compared to general food distribution was still low at the end of EMOP 10200. The emergency had absorbed most staff and commodity resources to these latter programmes. Launching diverse complementary activities for only a few months and without sufficient resources can be inappropriate. Activities that started halfway through the operation rarely met their targets. The transition to protracted assistance will require the enhancement of these activities to create new livelihood opportunities, to be later integrated into a PRRO and, eventually, Country Programmes.

The new EMOP envisages expanding these programmes. While reducing the overall beneficiary numbers in targeted general food distributions, the number of beneficiaries in food for work and food for training activities, in nutrition and mother and child health, in supplementary feeding programmes, in HIV/AIDS activities and in support to orphans and vulnerable children is planned to increase to 2,313,900 beneficiaries in the six countries. Some countries plan to launch into four different types of complementary programmes. These targets may be over-ambitious since the above constraints are likely to persist.

Recommendations:

- Targeted complementary activities should be started in the context of emergency operations only if they can build on WFP country experience;
- Additional human and financial resources should be made available to scale-up the activities and to ensure quality;
- The experience gained under EMOP 10200 for such activities should be better documented and taken into consideration when expanding these programmes. Consolidation and quality improvement of existing programmes should receive priority over expansion. The diversity of activities should be limited;
- The necessary technical and methodological experience, guidance and capacity building of WFP staff and IPs must be ensured simultaneously with the launch and/or expansion of the complementary activities.
6.8 Gender issues

Mainstreaming

Gender issues were mainstreamed in the documentation of the regional EMOP and its country and supporting components. The regional gender advisor prepared a written input to the EMOP document during its preparation, including an overview of the situation, country specifics, government policies and guiding principles for the implementation. Nevertheless, it would have benefited from a gender specific analysis of vulnerability, access to food, food habits/taboo and control over resources (especially food) at household level.

These aspects should also have been considered during the rolling assessments, and incorporated into the monitoring activities of WFP and implementing partners in order to improve the target group analysis and the fulfilment of WFP’s (Enhanced) Commitments to Women\(^{28}\) (ECTW).

Though the NGO MoUs in all countries reflected WFP’s Commitments to Women, they were not systematically followed up during the implementation. The majority of NGO field staff in Malawi and Zambia, for instance, was men. Beneficiary selection was often done without or with very little participation of women. Women’s representation in food management committees was far below the objective of 50% membership and 30% executive roles. And even if they were represented, they often did not play an active role in the decision making of the group. The necessary sensitisation of IPs, authorities and target groups was not effective enough to achieve the set targets of female participation in and contribution to decision making about food aid.

Registration formats at FDP level did not allow for the collection and analysis of essential gender disaggregated data, especially at the beginning of the operation. For example, although the register in Malawi contained a column on the sex of the household head and the sex of the children under the age of five years, no information about the sex of all the beneficiaries in the household (Commitment to Women IV) or the sex of the person who collects the food ration (Commitment to Women I) was registered. This points to the need for corporate guidance on what kind of data has to be collected in a gender-disaggregated manner and what the respective registration forms should look like.

WFP identified many of the above problems early in the EMOP, but the reality of having to work through at least three layers of authority, each steeped in traditional practices – partners, community groups, then distribution committees – is often beyond the capacity of an already overstretched staff.

Positive improvements

This said, there were some positive examples of improved gender considerations including:

- Regular gender disaggregated collection and reporting of beneficiary figures, and figures about the composition of food distribution committees in the monthly reports after October 2002;
- Gender specific analysis of VAC data. For example, in the August VAC assessment in Zambia, one third of the households in the sample were female-headed. They were identified as particularly poor, having fewer assets compared to male-headed households. Community wealth ranking classified 45% of female-headed households as very poor compared to 25% of male headed households. The coping strategies also vary between the two sexes.
- Promotion of more female participation in the operation through the establishment of Women’s Relief Committees in Swaziland, which played a central role in the management of food distributions. Similar Committees were to be established in Zambia and sensitisation and training

\(^{28}\)“Enhanced” is put in brackets because the Enhanced Commitments to Women (ECW) were not in place at the beginning of the operation, but are the relevant reference at later stages.
of IPs was conducted in May 2003 accordingly. IPs seemed to be convinced of the idea, but foresaw a number of practical problems. It is questionable whether the end of an operation, when the future activities and areas of interventions have not yet been decided, is the right moment to introduce such significant changes. It should also be noted that the establishment of the Women’s Relief Committees appeared to be based on the initiative of one person only rather than a corporate approach.

WFP staff felt that more practical corporate guidance and support would have been welcome to address gender issues and implement the Enhanced Commitments to Women. The guidelines currently under preparation perhaps should be complemented by toolkits and materials, such as how to encourage and ensure the formation of gender balanced relief committees.

WFP female staff are well represented at different levels in country programmes and in the regional bureau.

**Training on prevention of sexual exploitation**

Aid agencies in southern Africa have embarked on a comprehensive training scheme to educate employees to avoid child and adult sexual abuse. The educational scheme for both local and international staff is spearheaded by an inter-agency task force consisting of UNICEF, Save the Children (SC-UK) and WFP. The motivating factor was the reported sexual abuse of children by aid workers in West Africa investigated in early 2002. With the worsening of the AIDS pandemic, child-headed households and grandmothers are sometimes the only remnants of entire families and are highly vulnerable to abuse, with no-one to offer protection and guidance.

WFP, UNICEF and SC-UK have jointly developed training modules for managers, implementers (food aid monitors, warehouse employees), community leaders, truck drivers and commercial transport managers. The training also focuses on HIV/AIDS prevention through personal risk and responsibility training.

This collaborative inter-agency training programme was highly appreciated, relevant and effective, reaching intended target groups. There were a few management problems at the beginning, but generally the process went smoothly and should be replicated elsewhere. Over 4,000 participants (80 percent of those targeted) were trained in six countries from November 2002 to April 2003. To avoid it being simply a one-off event with presumably limited impact, repeat training and extension of training to communities as well as follow-up of training is needed.

**Lessons**

- Gender specific planning, programming and implementation of WFP’s projects (including affirmative actions for women) need to be strengthened, if gender issues and the Enhanced Commitments to Women are to be realised from the outset of an EMOP.
- Corporate guidance and practical instruments/tools are needed to make operational WFP’s new Gender Policy and the Enhanced Commitments to Women.
- Training and sensitisation on the prevention of sexual exploitation is a necessary and accepted activity in the context of food aid operations.

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Recommendations:

- A detailed gender specific situation analysis, which would serve as a baseline for evaluation at later stages, should be included in future EMOP documents.
- WFP’s Enhanced Commitments to Women should be monitored for systematic implementation in all emergencies through WFP staff, as well as Implementing Partners.
- The project budget should reflect (a) systematic training of NGOs, (b) sensitisation of communities and decision makers, (c) hiring of more female staff and (d) systematic follow-up and supervision.
- Training programmes on the prevention of sexual exploitation in the context of food aid distributions should be programmed within all future WFP operations – taking the South African experience into account. Adequate human and financial resources for this will be required.
- Ensure that NGOs selected can guarantee outreach to beneficiary women and have female staff available at all levels.
- Implement ECW IV relevant to all emergency operations; e.g. ration cards are in women’s name, beneficiary selection is done with full participation of women, women are fully represented in food management committees, and the committees are constituted of 50% women in leadership positions.

7. Support mechanisms

7.1 Logistics

Thanks to preparatory planning and WFP’s institutional experience of southern Africa WFP had a sound grasp of the all aspects of logistics and were aware of the weaknesses of the system. Globally appropriate logistics policies and guidelines, detailed in the OTL Transport Manual and established in preparatory visits by Chief of OTL and Contingency Planning Scenarios were in place but the small numbers of existing staff were not specifically trained to use these in an emergency response. WFP therefore had to rely on bringing in experienced staff very early on.

Logistics Capacity Assessments (LCAs) were in place or undertaken quickly for all countries however a major factor missing from overall logistics assessments was information on commercial government imports pipelines. These were particularly important in the case of Malawi (later rectified in a joint EU/WFP initiative) and Zimbabwe where the GMB import programme has remained unclear.

The establishment of a management and logistics centre in Johannesburg brought a welcome degree of cohesion into a complicated operation. WFP had a very clear picture and understanding of the overall logistics infrastructure, understood from the beginning the likely weaknesses and attempted continually to deal with them in a practical and realistic manner.

The logistics operation took full advantage of the strength of the commercial structure in southern Africa outsourcing through a variety of commercial companies the handling at the ports, management of deliveries on the South African rail network, management of transhipment points and EDPs. IPs were also contracted by COs to manage FDPs and to make secondary deliveries. WFP regional logistics contracted directly all the overland road transport and rail from Mozambique ports and CO logistics contracted the internal transport from the first point of entry in the country to the EDPs. Deliveries from Dar es Salaam were organised by WFP Tanzania.

This should in theory have left the Regional Logistics Office (ReLogS) to concentrate on overall coordination and decision making. However, the response to the GM issue was an extensive local purchase operation in South Africa in effect turning ReLogS into a hands-on logistics operation, despatching from silo locations, dealing with milling, bagging and procedural requirements.

The slow build of delivery was not principally due to a lack of commodities or to a lack of port capacity or overland transport but rather to minimum staffing levels, the GM issue, the transfer to local purchases,
milling, the procedural requirements of the countries involved and an early lack of IPs. By January 2003 these constraints were largely overcome.

**DDU**

It remains an open question whether WFP should have retreated from DDU deliveries, (deliveries by suppliers) in the case of local purchases to do it themselves, particularly given the staffing constraints. The Malawi government bought all of its commercial maize on DDU terms and in general it arrived before WFP’s deliveries. The mission felt that DDU deliveries for smaller cargoes could have been a practical way to relieve pressure on logistics staff, allowing them to concentrate on the larger cargoes.

Even for the larger cargoes, given the strength of the commercial infrastructure in southern Africa, it is debateable whether the policy should have been to absolutely exclude DDU delivery. An alternative strategy might have been to concentrate on making DDU deliveries work. Under -performance by suppliers in the early months may have been better addressed by strict performance requirements and penalties rather than WFP taking on the problems itself. Under DDU arrangements the supplier and the Country Office would have liaised directly over import documentation and the inspection arrangements for Zimbabwe may have been dealt with more smoothly and quickly. There was a technical issue over takeover certificates, relating to COMPAS which could be relatively easily solved. The key to delivery on time of the locally procured maize may have been in constructing tender documents and contracts that obliged and penalised the suppliers. Local procurement contracts were largely with a limited number of suppliers.

In kind donations were handled in the normal way but were massively disrupted by the GM issue, forcing the removal of stocks from Zambia, the diversion of GM maize to silos in Durban and Dar es Salaam and an interruption in supplies whilst the switch to local procurement was put in place.

**Staff deployment**

The issue of the timing of staff deployment dominates all others in its impact on the effectiveness of the logistics response. The hard work of HR staff was compromised by the fact that the corporate framework established by HR for employment is not appropriate to the efficient and cost effective staffing of a major emergency. This matter is dealt with elsewhere in the report. Here, however, we comment on how it affected the logistics operation. There was no office in Johannesburg and it took time to find the right people although a recruitment company was used to hire professionals on short term arrangements, some of whom stayed with WFP. Only one WFP consultant was brought in for logistics, one for communications and one for LTSH on TDY. This was less than skeleton staff for a major emergency.

**Regional Logistics**

Through a strategy of outsourcing, Service Agreements were entered into in October to the end of March and the successful ones were extended to the end of June. For example, one company handled port operations in both Mozambique and South Africa, arranging discharge, stevedoring, storage etc. All rail was handled by one company and road transport was contracted to brokers and forwarding agents. The latter has been the least successful arrangement with a loss of control and higher prices than dealing directly with transporters. New road transport arrangements will be directly with those transporters who own their own trucks.

Approximately 51% of cargo was moved by rail with the balance by road. The difficulty of forward planning with steadily available cargo and the weaknesses of loading and offloading capacities made rail delivery more problematic than the more flexible road deliveries. An exception was delivery from a number of silos in South Africa on the same rail line. However, rail costs began overtaking road costs. Rail was the only option Zimbabwe would accept for GM deliveries.
**Zimbabwe logistics**

Zimbabwe did not know how much or by what corridor the Grain Management Board (GMB) was importing maize so could not coordinate with commercial imports. It is unclear how much delays in transport to Zimbabwe were a result of competition for similar vehicles with the GMB whose import programme was between 450,000 and 800,000 tons. It is also unclear how much was distributed or remained in stock, though it is believed that a significant amount remained in stock.

There were modest carryovers of stock from the previous EMOP. The first six months were characterised by low distribution levels of 15% target in July rising to 45% of target in December. This was not principally due to a lack of IPs for distribution. In response to the GM issue an arrangement was negotiated with the GMB for a swap of 17,500mt of GM maize for the same amount of non-GM in Zimbabwe – an agreement signed at the end of September 2002 - but the GMB then backed out. US GM milling started in Bulawayo in mid-October and soon after that in South Africa too. The maize meal was distributed direct from mills to EDPS. Meanwhile Zimbabwe was receiving and distributing US maize meal, a loan of maize from Tanzania and some regional purchases.

With IP arrangements in place the ability to distribute outstripped supply by December. A combination of teething problems with delivery from silos, bagging and documentation conspired to limit deliveries from South Africa. At the same time, beneficiary numbers were increased. December was the low point for logistics in the region. However, from January to March an average of over 90% of target was reached.

The complexity and size of the operation was a severe challenge for COMPAS and some offices have had to resort to manual records in order to track commodity movement. This has been one of the most problematic areas of logistics with country offices claiming that there was insufficient information on commodity movements and, at times, considerable confusion.

**Malawi Logistics**

Malawi was the most successful logistics operation in terms of tonnage moved against targets, averaging 75% from July to March. Malawi did have the advantage of being able to borrow 30,000mt from the Strategic Grain Reserve in a coordinated response with the EU who were the principal donor to the Reserve.

The Malawi NGO consortium functioned well from the beginning of the EMOP. WFP was virtually the only importer of humanitarian assistance in an arrangement with the IPs to whom WFP also made secondary transport deliveries using the IFRC trucks and commercial transporters.

WFP Malawi chose to manage secondary transport due to the very limited availability in the country of the right type of transport. In mid-2003 the pressure on limited availability eased and WFP Malawi began to move out of secondary transport.

WFP’s close relationship with the EU and the Strategic Grain Reserve had the additional advantage of allowing a close coordination between the humanitarian pipeline and the commercial pipeline. This was particularly important logistically as both were sharing limited corridors from the ports of Beira and Nacala.

WFP’s SO for Nacala brought in four additional locomotives and rolling stock in November which augmented the capacity of the rail line, although only 50% of the additional cargo moved was WFP cargo. The part of the SO which was intended to make temporary repairs to a vulnerable section of the track was not so successful, getting under way only in May 2003, although the staff involved in its preparation were able to help out during the many wash outs that occurred during the rains.
When WFP ran into road transport capacity difficulties in September and October, WFP in Beira adopted a system of dedicated transporters that worked effectively, but must have had an effect on road transport prices on this corridor.

Commercial importers, who ran into difficulties over government contracting, were eventually obliged to reship cargo from Nacala and in some cases sell to WFP from Beira for other destinations.

In order to respond to the GM issue and to take the pressure off Nacala and Beira in October and November WFP diverted a number of shipments to Tanzania for later movement into northern Malawi.

**Zambia logistics**

The GM issue was finally resolved in October 2002 and the decision was made to return 15,000 tons of GM maize. Subsequently the government objected to a well know SA maize condition called ‘Crazy Top’ which at the time a portion of the South Africa donation was allocated to Zambia. This has led to speculation that the objections may be partly due to internal commercial pressures not to import maize either from the US or South Africa, preferring local sources or Tanzania where there are strong commercial ties. There were complaints in early 2003 that WFP imports were affecting market prices—this may have been true in the urban areas.

**Maize purchases**

Whereas ten years ago there was considerable resistance to yellow maize WFP bought 50% yellow maize in this operation with no adverse comment although none was supplied to Zambia. WFP purchased wholly from South Africa-based traders. These traders supplied from various origins although it was mainly South Africa, China and Brazil. The latter two were the only other international sources of non-GM maize. Argentina, a major producer which would normally be a source, was considered GM.

Generally South Africa Grade 1 or Grade 2 were purchased. Quality issues arose over some Chinese and US maize which were largely unfounded. Purchases were also made in Tanzania and Mozambique. Mozambique maize tended to be of a higher moisture content.

WFP was not in a position itself to ask for international tenders as it bought generally in small lots as a deliberate policy not to influence the market, and international deliveries would anyway take too long to deliver. This clearly had cost implications but WFP was able to make early delivery criteria for selection. Only the EU provided funding on a scale appropriate to international procurement and they anyway insisted on regional purchases, even though they may be more expensive.

The initial arrangements for maize delivery under the bridging EMOPs had suppliers delivering to WFP warehouses but in October, November and December they were regularly under performing on delivery. WFP thus changed to delivery at the end of the bagging line in January 2003 and then to ex silo. Together with the establishment of a commercial bagging operation at Messina this greatly improved delivery timings but may not have been the most effective strategy.

**Bureaucratic and transport delays**

The delays caused in obtaining import documentation and phyto-sanitary certificates held up despatches by two to three weeks for Zimbabwe. In Zimbabwe’s case the process was further delayed as the inspectors who had to check cargo at the port or silo now had to travel by road instead of air. It is worth noting that the delay in processing paperwork cannot be entirely blamed on government procedures as, for example, a shortage of transport in WFP offices in the early months added time to the process.

Bulk purchases had to be bagged and any already bagged maize had to be re-bagged. The South Africa silos were built for bulk handling and had limited bagging capacity. To increase the volume of maize
leaving the mills contracts were arranged so that a number of silos were used at the same time. Bagging facilities away from the silos were set up at Messina. Thus, maize could be flexibly drawn from the silos in bags or in bulk.

Some SA maize, particularly yellow, is GM. As it may not be separated in a silo, the whole silo is then considered GM.

Despite bringing it to the attention of SADC, it was not possible to obtain blanket import permits, streamline border customs formalities or in general arrange for simplified documentation and procedures. The presence of WFP staff to oversee border formalities did, however, make a difference and staff at some customs posts extended their hours of operation.

There was some success in waiving the third country rule which individual countries use to limit transport within their borders to their own transporters, but none in waiving transit taxes.

**Milling**

The milling operation milled both US and South African GM maize and worked in parallel with the local purchase operation from South Africa. At the same time that milling took place the milled product was fortified. South African mills were brought out of mothballs to mill the GM maize but not without difficulty as the US maize is of a different quality to South African maize and a mill has to be set up to handle either white or yellow.

In South Africa mills retain 25% “chop” (i.e. bran, or side product) for animal feed, but this became uneconomic for the mills as the price of maize and feed dropped. In Zimbabwe, the Bulawayo mills only retaining 8% and making a milling charge, resulting in a meal with a shorter shelf life. There is now 1,500 tons of chop in Bulawayo that, although it has been milled, the Zimbabwe government insists cannot be used for animal feed and must be destroyed or buried.

In Zimbabwe all milling was done in Bulawayo where National Milling were able to dedicate a mill with a capacity of 12,000 tons/month. Milling did not take place elsewhere in Zimbabwe, although the capacity existed, because of the insistence of the authorities that the total capacity of any one mill had to be fully utilised.

Zambia did not take any GM product, milled or whole. Malawi arranged milling in-country but was only obliged to mill US maize.

**Communications**

An experienced ICT manager was brought in July and has remained throughout the operation. The ICT operation was quick to start installing voice and email across the region backing up landlines with radio. The region then had an impressive and effective ICT operation providing voice for general communications and security, email and the communications equipment needed for WINGS and COMPAS. The operation used a blend of available WFP staff and the commercial strength in the region.

FITTEST was called in, responded very quickly with competent staff, and installed equipment, trained locally hired staff and contracted local commercial companies. Equipment was initially purchased by the Kampala office and some was brought from Mozambique. It took only two days to install WINGS in the Johannesburg office. Indeed, WINGS was in place, the commercial operator providing the basic firewall for the installation of secure communications. COMPAS was installed in all major locations.

The FITTEST staff could only stay for three or four weeks and had to leave on other assignments and although they returned it was still not for long enough and continuity was lost. Some installations may
have been put in too quickly and there were different views on how to install a vehicle with the result that some installations were not as robust as others.

There simply was not enough staff to provide ICT throughout the region in a reasonably short time. For example it took three months before the Zimbabwe office was in reasonable communications shape, in their case sharing the UNDP satellite. No new equipment was immediately available. Although local purchases went well, it still took a couple of months from ordering to delivery and ready for installation. COMPAS was still not in all locations by the time of the third mission’s visit, in May 2003. Some IP warehouses in Zimbabwe were using COMPAS but did not have the equipment to transmit it over radio.

Initially Zambia and Zimbabwe used the UNDP satellite system but this was considered an unsatisfactory arrangement by country offices and anyway could not handle WINGS. V-Sats were then installed in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Malawi did not have sufficient bandwidth on its V-sat to run WINGS at a reasonable speed and seemed to have generally missed out on ICT support to logistics. Here, COMPAS installations were not in place until January:, neither were generators for warehouses to provide light and run the computers during the frequent power cuts in February.

The volume of COMPAS traffic quickly overwhelmed the Durban port operation that was initially left to WFP’s handling agent using a single computer and secretary. A WFP office with a server, allowing more than one data entry clerk to enter data at a time, had to be installed.

Management information and coordination

Managers were given overall commodity pipeline information but this often raised expectations of delivery that were not fulfilled. A weakness in pipeline information was that WFP’s Shipping Service (OTS) was not chartering US vessels and regional logistics often were only informed of shipments once they were afloat.30

Regular meetings were held for regional logistics staff that were focussed and well informed. Coordination also extended upwards to regional bodies - for example the SADC logistics meeting in Harare in Sept 2002 which included representatives of government revenue bodies, immigration, customs, railway and transport associations.

The ReLogS web site is an excellent innovation, updated daily with pipeline information, country specific situation reports, port operation and other relevant logistics and programme information. This includes an updated port and corridor monthly planning matrix.

Pipeline management

A lot of effort has gone into pipeline management in country offices but this has been frustrated by poor formal commodity information flow. Informal links between staff across the region were vital in the exchange of information. CDs naturally took an intense interest in their pipeline but it was not always clear whether pipeline staff reported to programming or logistics. Perhaps it would be appropriate in an operation of this type for logistics to take the lead in calling meetings with programming, procurement and others to ensure that pipeline management is under constant review.

LTSH

The regional operation established an average regional LTSH based on individual country LTSH rates. The average rate was applied to any LTSH call forward over the average and the actual country rate was

30 Chartering of vessels for US food aid shipments through WFP was being done by the US authorities themselves.
applied to all others. There was therefore a fund of unspent LTSH that the regional operation could not call forward.

**Demurrage**

A major effort was made in December to meet country office demands for cargo. Unfortunately this resulted in a huge build up of wagons at Beit Bridge just before the Christmas and New Year holidays and a resulting demurrage bill that was still being sorted out in April 2003.

**The IFRC/Norwegian trucks**

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) launched a revised Southern Africa Food Insecurity Appeal in July 2002, seeking 89 million CHF to assist 1.3 million beneficiaries for 12 months and to enter into a Partnership Agreement with WFP to provide a Transport Support Package (TSP) to the WFP regional operation. This involved the setting-up and operating a fleet of 210 vehicles (M6 trucks).

Putting into service the IFRC fleet has been a significant achievement on the part of the joint WFP/IFRC partnership considering the numerous obstacles encountered between landing at Durban and positioning in Lesotho, Malawi and Zambia. Initial problems included:

- the need to rail the majority of the fleet from Durban to Lusaka because the South African Road Transport Authorities were reluctant to allow these left hand drive trucks to transit South African roads.
- the need to establish maintenance bases in each country and recruit and train some 200+ drivers. Drivers were recruited by the IFRC fleet managers, but the task of registering and plating the vehicles fell on the WFP COs.

A ‘real-time’ evaluation of the truck operation was undertaken by IFRC themselves in the first two weeks of November. The report was fairly positive, but it did raise some concerns over the non-use of these trucks by some WFP country offices. By November, the trucks were operational only in Lesotho. The key points raised by the evaluators were:

- Proper administrative and management structures were not in place prior to the deployment of the trucks. A joint WFP/IFRC ‘Country Operational Agreement’ should have laid out respective roles, responsibilities and reporting lines. These issues were, through a TSP Reference Document prepared by the field coordinator, only becoming clear in December.
- WFP and IFRC were equally responsible for poor communications between their headquarters and field operations, resulting in lack of understanding of the TSP agreement, poor coordination and some delays.
- The Malawi office saw no reason to use the trucks since operating costs would have been up to three times that of commercial transport. They were reluctant to cancel existing commercial contracts before they were sure that the TSP would function properly.
- The added value of the 10 long-haul trucks sent to Zimbabwe was questioned for similar reasons. Indeed, the trucks were old and not really suitable for the terrain. Their only benefit would have been in providing flexibility for rapid in-country deployment between trans-shipment points and EDPs, if ever needed.

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31 Real-Time Evaluation Report, Southern Africa Food Security Operation, IFRC, Geneva, 15 November 2002. Some of the key points were reiterated in a covering letter sent to the Executive Director by the Secretary-General of the Norwegian Red Cross, 28th November, 2002.
The 116 trucks allocated for Zambia were not needed since the pipeline in November was almost empty following the GM ban. These trucks were re-assigned to the Zambian Red Cross. It thus took nearly three months before the first vehicles commenced actual operations. The trucks were, however, subsequently available in Malawi and Zambia where they played a useful role in pre-positioning food before the onset of the major rains. Malawi, initially reluctant to use the trucks, actually ended up using them more than any other CO. They also proved useful in the more remote and mountainous areas of Lesotho.

A good deal of the success of the operation must be attributed to the strategy of outsourcing the principal elements of the operation. The IFRC provided experienced management, hired local technicians and sub-contracted the maintenance, the fuel supply and the employment of drivers. In contrast to WFP trucking operations in previous emergencies, WFP was relieved of the burden of management and could concentrate on tasking. As WFP was paying the bill it can be argued that it should have had a role in determining the price paid for the main sub-contracting operations.

It would be interesting to see the cost of the operation, although comparison with commercial operators will not be easy as this type of capacity simply does not exist on the normal transport market and many commercial transporters are not willing to have their trucks used on rough and remote terrain.

The subcontracting of drivers led to some confusion in the early stages as to who was giving instructions to the drivers and there were some questions as to the cost-effectiveness of some of the maintenance contracts entered into by IFRC with a variety of service providers.

Lessons

WFP staff across the operation has put in a huge amount of effort and initiative to effectively deliver a massive amount of food in one of WFP’s biggest emergency operations. Credit must be given to the staff involved.

- At the beginning of an operation Procurement and Logistics need a strategy for purchase and delivery translated into detailed contractual arrangements. The regional office should consider using DDU delivery at least for the smaller cargoes up to 2,000mt and for the non-maize purchases. Continued ex-silo delivery for the larger quantities of maize can be justified but essentially all cargo delivery arrangements should have the option of whatever delivery terms are the most appropriate.

- In the early stages of an emergency the scale of the problem and the design of the response have to be matched by adequate numbers of staff available for appropriate periods. An interim answer may be to remove the time constraints on temporary deployment and consultants, subject to available funding. There should be greater involvement of senior staff in Rome at the beginning of a major emergency to ensure that staffing and support systems are in place in time.

- Some of WFP’s corporate systems (for example, HR contracts, COMPAS and WINGS) appear to insufficiently adapted to a volatile emergency operation requiring quick and flexible responses.

- WINGS is now being installed across the region and there is a perception that more ‘disconnects’ will emerge. WFP has a range of sophisticated tools for the management of finance, personnel and commodities which are so demanding in staff and equipment that with current staffing levels they cannot be put in place quickly. When they are in place their rigidity does not allow them the flexibility to deal with the normal volatility of emergency operations. The result is staff engaged in endlessly ‘catching up’ on backlogs.

- Planning targets were optimistic, overland delivery built up slowly and pipeline management and commodity control were not able to provide a clear picture to country offices. The expectations of
country offices were often disappointed, leading to mounting criticism of the regional logistics office. The criticism may have been operationally understandable but in the circumstances unfair.

- The comprehensive outsourcing of the overland and EDP logistics operation was an excellent strategy given the strength of southern African commercial operations.
- The contracting of NGOs as Implementing Partners operating FDPs and contracting secondary transport gave mixed results with the larger international NGOs generally performing at a higher level than many of their smaller counterparts.
- The transition to local purchase operations in response to the GM problem was impressively effective, with close, but not close enough, collaboration between logistics and the local purchase operation resulting in one of WFP’s biggest local purchase operations ever. The transparency, accountability and cost of WFP’s operation were in stark contrast to the government import programmes in the region.

**Recommendations:**

- The human and technical requirements for installation, operation and links of WINGS and COMPAS need to be analysed anew. The objective would be to ensure that they can be installed rapidly and they function well enough to meet the operational demands on them that have already been identified.
- The whole system for the provision of non-food items should be overhauled, not just in terms of physical ordering and delivery but also the staffing support and financial mechanisms that are required.

### 7.2 Food procurement

This was the largest local and regional purchase operation in WFP’s recent history. The regional and Country Office procurement units worked well, but staffing was insufficient for the new circumstances. Originally anticipated at 15 percent of all commodities delivered, the GMO issue raised regional purchases under EMOP 10200 to some 332,000 tons (US$63 million) by mid-June 2003, of which over 280,000 tons was from South Africa. A further 121,000 tons was internationally purchased. Purchases were usually made in small lots, as a deliberate policy not to adversely affect the market. However, the cost of South African maize was sometimes high: up to $195 a ton in late 2002. The depreciation of the rand against the US dollar was the biggest factor behind price rises.

**Table 5 - Summary of WFP purchases for the southern Africa Emergency Operation, July 2002 to June 2003.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Tons (rounded)</th>
<th>Value in US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Argentina</td>
<td>Vegetable oil</td>
<td>4,620</td>
<td>3,094,594</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>14,297</td>
<td>2,409,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>Pulses</td>
<td>20,986</td>
<td>5,457,593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
<td>Maize, beans</td>
<td>63,063</td>
<td>12,629,592</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Pulses (peas)</td>
<td>2,378</td>
<td>589,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Vegetable oil</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>286,157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myanmar</td>
<td>Pulses</td>
<td>2,115</td>
<td>602,775</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>Dried skimmed milk</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>42,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>Pulses</td>
<td>1,063</td>
<td>282,164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>12,392</td>
<td>2,152,867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total int. purchases</td>
<td></td>
<td>121,405</td>
<td>27,546,026</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

32 In metric tons net (one metric ton = 1,000 kgs).
### b) Regional and local purchases.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>Commodities</th>
<th>Tons (rounded)</th>
<th>Value in US$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>Maize meal</td>
<td>3,903</td>
<td>879,633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>Pulses, likuni phala, sugar</td>
<td>7,519</td>
<td>1,916,894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>Maize, pulses</td>
<td>3,627</td>
<td>875,545</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>Maize, maize meal, Blended food, oil.</td>
<td>281,194</td>
<td>49,863,794</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>Pulses</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>107,590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>Maize, pulses</td>
<td>24,081</td>
<td>5,168,229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>Maize, blended food</td>
<td>13,828</td>
<td>4,342,999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total of regional and local purchases</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>334,417</strong></td>
<td><strong>63,154,684</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand total of all purchases by WFP for southern Africa</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>455,822</strong></td>
<td><strong>90,700,710</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the contracting of food purchases was very professional and effective, the office was not able to put sufficient time and effort into non-food purchases. There was a lack of clarity over available funding; for example, Zimbabwe only received its full allocation of vehicles at the end of the EMOP, and Malawi’s temporary storage tents, ordered for pre-positioning before the rains, took five months to deliver.

### 7.3 Finance

Under WFP budgeting systems, cash for an emergency operation is classified under five main categories, namely:

1. **Cash in lieu of commodities (CLC).** This is cash provided by donors for local, regional or international food purchases. It can normally facilitate early delivery of food (lead times for deliveries can be reduced to 1-3 months, instead of a usual 4-6 months lead time for commodities provided in-kind by donors) and gives greater flexibility in terms of types of commodities, filling gaps in the pipeline etc. CLC funds increased significantly during the course of the EMOP, as more dependence was placed on WFP purchases, mainly as a result of problems arising from the GMO issue.

2. **Cash for land-side transport, storage and handling (LTSH),** which are funds provided to transport food overland from the port of discharge to inland countries and cash provided for internal transport, storage and handling (ITSH) within the recipient country. Under the original EMOP 10200 budget, the LTSH was calculated at US$156 million, or some 31% of the overall original EMOP budget of US$507 million.

3. **Other direct operational costs (ODOC)**[^34], which includes funds for milling and fortification of cereals, capacity building of implementing partners (primarily NGOs), vehicles, equipment etc. The original ODOC commitment was some US$23.7 million (4.6% of the EMOP budget), but was increased by US$12 million in the March 2003 budget revision, to US$35.8 million (rounded).

4. **Direct support costs (DSC)** which cover WFP’s own direct operational costs in support of the EMOP – e.g. staff, travel, office expenses, communications etc. The original DSC budget was US$31.3 million (7% of direct operational costs and 6.1% of the overall EMOP budget), but this

[^33]: For EMOP 10200, the period July 2002 to 24 June 2003.
[^34]: “Other” direct operational costs are additional to direct operational costs (DOC). The latter comprise commodity, external transport and LTSH costs – i.e. the “core” operational costs.
was increased by some US$12.2 million to US$43.5 million under the budget revision of March 2003.

v). Indirect support costs (ISC). These are a standard 7.8% “overhead charge” on all WFP operations and support the Programme’s core operating costs, under the PSA budget. The ISC for the original EMOP budget was US$36.7 million, representing a significant source of PSA income for the Programme during the biennium.

The sections on procurement and logistics cover the issues of use of CLC and LTSH funds. This section concentrates on the use of ODOC and DSC funds.

ODOC

In general, there were no problems in the release and availability of ODOC funds for this operation. In fact, as noted above, the ODOC provision under the EMOP budget was revised upwards by about 50% (or some US$12 million) due to the need, among other things, to accommodate a number of directed pledges (totaling over US$9 million) for maize milling/fortification, implementation partner capacity building and specific non-food items from a number of donors (e.g. Canada, ECHO, Ireland, Sweden and Switzerland). At the time of the mission’s last RTE visit there were remaining funds available under ODOC, yet to be programmed.

The funds available under ODOC for implementing partner (IP) capacity building proved to be particularly useful, although it is felt that the Regional Bureau and Country Offices could have been more pro-active, in some instances, in assisting implementing partners in the preparation of funding proposals, so that the funds could have been committed earlier in the operation.

The Regional Bureau in Johannesburg estimated that about US$5 million of un-committed ODOC funds might still be available for commitment at the end of the extended EMOP period, i.e. 30 June 2003. This would be about 14% of the revised total ODOC budget.

DSC

Cash flow under DSC has been more problematic. WFP Headquarters Office of Budget (OEDB) was able to make available two DSC advances\(^35\) of US$5 and US$2.5 million to help start operations. These US$7.5 million advances were equivalent to almost three months of the commitment levels during the first six months of the operation. DSC cash flow problems began to arise towards the end of the first quarter of 2003, however.

The Regional Bureau’s DSC summary sheet shows DSC income totalling US$16.4 million as at December 2002 and commitments at the same date of US$12.9 million, indicating a positive cash balance at that time of US$3.5 million (equal to about a month and a half of the commitment level at the time). By the end of March 2003, however, the commitment level, at some US$18.9 million began to exceed the income level of US$18.3 million and the operation began to experience a cash flow problem, which was projected to persist until July 2003, when cumulative income and commitment levels were projected to again be more or less in balance, at around US$26.8 million. Future commitments were based on planned staff cuts, with DSC commitments falling from some US$2 million a month during the first quarter of 2003 to a projected US$1.5 million a month from May 2003 onwards.

\(^35\) Naturally, DSC advances have to be re-paid as DSC funds come in, as part of donor pledges, so an advance may shift a cash flow problem to a later stage of an operation, especially if funds are used at a higher rate earlier in an operation, due to high start-up costs.
The DSC cash flow problems may be linked to four underlying problems, namely:

- A number of non-traditional (including developing country) donors did not provide DSC funds with their commodity donations.

- Slow release of DSC funds in WINGS. This release depended on either (i) in the case of in-kind shipments, the Bill of Lading being released into the system or (ii) in the case of WFP regional/local purchases, there being a confirmation of the arrival of purchased goods at destination (goods receipt). In both cases, there can be a significant delay of several months between confirmation of a pledge and availability of DSC funds for commitment.

- The unilateral reversal by WFP Headquarters of some US$1 million of staff costs related to thirteen senior field staff from the PSA budget to the EMOP DSC budget, for the last six months of 2002. This impacted on the February 2003 DSC cash flow situation.36

- Earlier donations carried a DSC rate of US$31 per ton, not the adjusted higher EMOP DSC rate, introduced in the early 2003 budget revision.

WFP Headquarters has recognized the problem of LTSH, ODOC and DSC funds transfers and a working group on business practices is addressing the issue of the “trigger” for LTSH, ODOC and DSC fund transfers. One of the recommendations resulting from the Resources Utilization Review and Reduction of Balances initiatives is that the transfer of LTSH, ODOC and DSC to the cumulative funds be triggered earlier in the overall resource consumption process. The transfers will be done at the commodity Shipping Instruction (SI) or Purchase Order (PO) stage, instead of at the recording of the Bill of Lading stage for international shipments/purchases or the goods receipt stage for local/regional purchases. At the time of writing, the change had been agreed in principle and the impact of the change was being tested in the test environment of WINGS.37

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**Box 7 – COMPAS and WINGS**

As stated elsewhere in the text, there were problems in the usage of the COMPAS (commodity tracking system) and WINGS. Here we indicate some of the problems as they related to the logistics division.

Under the arrangements for shipment of US commodities the arrival of a vessel was often announced when the ship was on the high seas, giving very little time for the system to record a shipping instruction (SI) in WINGS. Operationally the US shipments gave WFP the flexibility to divert vessels and change country destinations up to the last minute. However from a systems point of view this created major problems. Changing the destination of an SI in WINGS can only be done in Rome and takes the reversal of a multitude of entries.

If, due to the diversion of a vessel or late notice, an SI is not available on the arrival of a vessel, the data cannot be entered into the system to start tracking. Sometimes SIs were not available until weeks after ship’s arrival. A dummy SI could temporarily solve the problem but what would then be needed is the enormous task of the re-entry of all the waybills when the proper SI is known. It is thus no longer allowed.

If a cargo has actually been moved before the SI is available, then a backlog of data entry builds up and data entry capacity is rapidly overwhelmed by the arrival of new shipments. Data entry in these circumstances is hugely labour intensive.

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36 WFP HQ can make commitments against the DSC budget without the prior approval of the RB.
37 This will provide ODOC and DSC funds in a timely manner to Regional Bureaux and Country Offices, but there are concerns that it could release significant amounts of LTSH funds before the major part is needed by RBs and COs – i.e. several months before the arrival of foodstuffs at the ports of destination.
If the data is entered on time it then has to be transmitted to the destination of the cargo. For example, data sent from Beira has to be received and retransmitted (replicated) in Maputo, Rome and Lusaka before it can arrive in Livingstone. In each location this involves a manual process, which may only be done once a day, and in Rome the more complex process can take up to three days. This example could take seven days with the result that the cargo arrives in Livingstone before the information that it has been despatched.

WINGS was not geared for the ex silo delivery of local procurement as the usual triggers for entry were not there. This in turn delayed the payment of transporters.

Initiating tracking in COMPAS for local procurement was done by collecting the data of a number of silos, sending it to Johannesburg and then transmitting it to Rome.

There are numerous other problems which impact on the efficiency of the COMPAS system. Chief among them are:

(a) In southern Africa road transporters often transferred loads to different trucks, to take advantage of differing axle load regulations. That results in changed waybill information at destination that was very cumbersome to manage.

(b) It is relatively easy to make an erroneous entry but very difficult to correct, often this can only be done in Rome. This can result in the multiple entries for single transporters, vehicles and FDPs for example because of differences in the spelling of the entry.

(c) The recruitment and training of data entry operators takes time.

(d) The setting up of the communications base for COMPAS also takes time given the stretched resources of FITTEST.

(e) Port operations tend not to be neat and tidy and the issuance of Superintendents reports, losses and damages etc tend to be slow, getting the Commodity Tracking System (CTS) off to a slow start.

(f) The mission concludes that, while the inherent rigidity of the COMPAS system presented difficulties, there was also a management failure to implement corporate policy in setting up adequate documentation methods before COMPAS installation. So that the same problems do not recur in future emergencies, urgent attention must be given to a thorough review of the system.

7.4 Resources mobilisation

Upon approval of the Regional Emergency Operation, all on-going country specific EMOPs related to the crisis were suspended, with stocks and funds being carried over to the regional operation and new contributions being solicited under the new regional EMOP only. The Regional Office in Johannesburg (ODJ), supported by the Resources Mobilization Department and the Communications Office in WFP Headquarters, devoted considerable efforts to advocacy and resources mobilization. This included extensive trips by the Regional Director to donor capitals around the world, as well as to countries in the region, the holding of regular briefing meetings in Johannesburg, Rome and other locations, the preparation by ODJ staff and others of extensive and frequently up-dated briefing materials etc. The role of the WFP Executive Director as Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Humanitarian Needs in Southern Africa contributed considerably to the profile of the humanitarian operation, bringing attention particularly to non-food needs as well as the food needs of the region, including a special focus on the HIV-AIDS crisis.

As will be seen from Annex 2 of this report (Resources charts), donor response to the appeal (in US dollar terms) rose gradually from 22% of the target at end of the first month, July 2002, to 37% by end of the first three months (September), to 62% at the end of December and to 77% by the end of March 2003, which was the original termination date of the EMOP. Tonnage figures were usually several percentage points higher, reflecting the relative weight of lower-value cereals in the overall...
contributions. For example, by end June 2003, after the extension of the EMOP by a further three
months, the appeal had been 86% covered in dollar terms, but 97% covered in tonnage terms.38

The response of some donors appeared to be cautious in the early months, possibly in part because they
were anticipating that the traditional major donor to WFP would provide significant amounts of in-kind
foodstuffs, particularly cereals, and were waiting to see how their contributions might fit into the overall
food pipeline. In the event, the problems faced with genetically modified organisms (GMOs) affected
acceptance of US maize (either outright or in whole grain form) in a number of countries, as mentioned
elsewhere in this report, and the whole food aid supply scenario had to be re-thought, with a greater
reliance on cash for local, regional and international food purchases (with almost 400,000 tons of food
being purchased by WFP using CLC funds).

At the aggregate level contributions to the operation totalled just over 700,000 tons by December 2002,
against a distribution target of some 621,000 tons. Actual cumulative distributions in the six countries,
however, were only some 266,000 tons by the end of the first six months of the EMOP in December
2002 (two-thirds of the way through the original nine months EMOP period), or some 43% of the
distribution target. By the end of the original EMOP phase, in March 2003, the tonnage contributions
from donors were 892,000 tons, but distributions were 613,000 tons, or 62% of the original EMOP
target.39 These figures illustrate not just the logistics and operational problems being faced in certain
countries, but, more importantly, the fact that there is a lengthy time lag between the announcement and
confirmation of donor pledges and the time it takes to actually deliver food in-country.

At the individual country level, the food pipelines were not fully established for all four commodities
(cereals, pulses, vegetable oil and micro-nutrient fortified blended foods) until either late 2002 or early
2003. As may be expected, the pipeline situation improved over time, as the operation stabilised and
pipeline, logistics and other issues were sorted out.

A notable feature of this operation is the number of donors who contributed. By end May 2003, over
forty donors had contributed to emergency operation.40 These included a number of non-traditional
donors, such as Algeria, Andorra, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, the Nelson Mandela
Foundation, Oman, Qatar, South Africa etc.41 For some of the non-traditional donors, creative solutions
had to be found to generate associated costs on contributions, as not all non-traditional donors provided
full cost recovery. At the time of writing, solutions for some of the donations were still being
developed.42

Two Special Operations (SOs) were approved to support the emergency interventions. A Special
Operation (no. 10204) for the WFP Regional Management Response Coordination Unit was approved by
the Executive Director on 28 May 2002 for a total cost of some US$3.4 million and an amount of US$1
million was allocated from the IRA to support the SO in the initial stage. This SO was intended

38 The UN Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) loaned US$20 million to the WFP emergency operation in
2002. At mid-2003, US$7.7 million was still outstanding on the loan.
39 All figures in this section are rounded – in tonnage figures to the nearest thousand tons and in percentage figures
to the nearest whole percentage point.
40 The top five donors to the EMOP provided 77% of the resources – the USA, the European Commission, the
United Kingdom, Japan and South Africa.
41 Algeria provided 21,000 tons of in-kind rice; South Africa provided funds for the local purchase, in South Africa,
of 100,000 tons of maize.
42 At the time of writing associated costs were being negotiated for the large contribution from South Africa. The
government had made a cash transfer to WFP in the local currency (the SA Rand) and, due to a significant
appreciation of the Rand against the US dollar and a fall in local maize prices, spare funds should be available to
cover some of the associated non-food costs, including DSC.
primarily to support the setting up of the regional office in Johannesburg, particularly focussing on logistics. Three donors contributed US$2.9 million to the SO (55% of the target).43

A second Special Operation (no. 10224) was approved later in 2002 to rehabilitate a 77 kilometre stretch of the railway line from the Mozambican port of Nacala to Malawi and to provide additional leased locomotives for the line. This SO was fully funded by two donors.44 The rationale for the SO was that the Nacala railway line was a vital link for the transport of large amounts of food aid into southern and central Malawi, providing a lower cost alternative to road haulage. The line was extensively used by the Malawi government’s National Food Reserve Agency (NFRA) and WFP during the first one year EMOP.45

7.5 Public Information

Print, radio and television media were very effectively managed by WFP; with good PR staff in place, WFP ‘led’ the story. Indeed, the enormous investment in staff time on advocacy at all levels, including the media, has kept WFP at the forefront of the international response, and may prove to have been a decisive factor in assuring appropriate resource levels for the broader humanitarian response as well as WFP’s own requirements.

A team of four full-time PI officers was in place by the second quarter of the EMOP, three funded under the EMOP until May 2003. ‘Peak’ stories were facilitated greatly by the Special Envoy missions and the press tended to cover food aid stories on the back of political news, such as that from Zimbabwe.

7.6 Human Resources

WFP’s largest emergency operation in recent years required a very rapid gearing up of staffing capacity in the region and in country offices. The Regional Bureau in Johannesburg (ODJ) had to be started from scratch, initially using out-posted staff from the Eastern and Central Africa Regional Bureau in Kampala (ODK). One office – Swaziland – also had to be re-opened (this time as a satellite office of the Maputo office, not a full Country Office), having closed several years before, while all country offices had to be seriously strengthened staff-wise, particularly Zimbabwe, which had been a regional procurement office, with no in-country programme. Zimbabwe was the largest of the six countries in the region, in terms of operational size, accounting for almost half of all projected EMOP resources deliveries (46%).

The first RTE mission, in July 2002, noted severe staff shortages in the initial stages of the operation. It proved difficult to secure the services of WFP international staff for several countries in the region and the task was made more difficult by the fact that a limited professional cadre had to try to find the time to train locally recruited staff and guide consultants, while tackling their own heavy work load.

It seems that the Human Resources Division (HR) was not closely involved in the preparation of the EMOP document and that there was no close discussion or negotiation between the Operations Department (OD) and HR on appropriate staffing levels and how these might be covered, through different staffing scenarios. This needs to be improved in future large-scale emergency operations.

**Temporary staff**

Most international staffing was initially filled through out-posted staff, staff on short-term temporary duty (TDY) status, and consultants. The Human Resources Division issued Vacancy Announcements in

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43 The donors to SO 10204 were Canada, the USA and the United Kingdom.
44 The two donors to SO 10224 for the Nacala rail line were the Canada and the United Kingdom.
45 Due to significantly reduced food import needs to Malawi during the 2003-04 crop year, it is planned that Nacala port will not be used under the next EMOP phase. As a consequence, the lease of locomotives was discontinued at end May 2003 and the repair and maintenance programme will be concluded by the end of 2003.
July 2002 that listed a total of 72 international professional officer positions, mostly at the P2 to P4 level. Positions were filled on a progressive basis through re-assigments, but sometimes internal candidates were not accepted by Country Directors (due to lack of suitable qualifications or experience). Being the mid-year period, a number of staff who might have applied for posts had just been re-assigned to a new duty station and they were not willing to move again, while other staff members, particularly those with families, were deterred from applying for vacancies due to the short-term nature of the EMOP.

In view of the slow process of re-assignment of the Programme’s own professional staff, consultants started to be used to fill some of the critical staffing gaps and by November 2002 about 50 consultants had been hired region-wide. While some consultants were initially hired on a short-term basis, some Country Directors preferred to retain consultants once they had gained experience in the country, rather than pursue the re-assignment option. In practice, consultants with food aid experience are a practical and pragmatic solution to meeting critical staffing needs in short-term emergency operations, provided that experienced WFP field managers are available to provide appropriate guidance and support.46

Stand-by agreement (SBA) staff, mainly Danish and Swiss, has been helpful, particularly for logistics operations. The SBA staff was initially managed out of Headquarters by the ALITE team, but the Regional Bureau became more involved as the operation progressed. At the time of the real time evaluation mission’s last visit, in May 2003, there were ten SBA staff members working for the EMOP.

Soon after the emergency operation started, during the third quarter of 2002, an “operation UNV” was launched to recruit United Nations Volunteers. In total, eleven UNVs were assigned to the Country Offices of the region.47 The UNV recruitment process was relatively fast and efficient, with UNV Headquarters in Bonn, Germany, being very cooperative. The Regional Bureau conducted telephone interviews of short-listed candidates for all Country Offices requesting UNVs. Most UNVs are on twelve months’ assignments, to August 2003, and some will be released at that time. Other direct operational costs (ODOC) funds may be used for UNVs.

**Emergency Response Roster**

The second RTE mission examined in some detail the current arrangements under the Emergency Response Roster (ERR) in Rome. As of mid-December, the ERR had approximately 100 staff on the roster who had undergone the two week Emergency Response Training (ERT) and another 40 yet to undergo the training. The majority of the staff on the ERR are P3 level and below, there being only some 20 staff who are P4 and above.48 Staff can volunteer for rapid re-assignment for new emergencies, being available for one to three months’ assignment at 24-72 hours notice. Although staff should not be deployed more than once during a year, some staff are deployed repeatedly, putting more pressure on releasing managers, who may not be able to back-fill their posts during their absence. In some cases, staff stayed longer than the period they were released for, creating further reluctance among managers to release staff in the first place.

46 As an illustration, the regional office in Johannesburg had 27 international professional WFP staff in place at the end of April 2003 (including two JPOs), plus 14 consultants (of whom 2 were working in procurement and 6 in logistics). Thus, about a third of professional staff was comprised of consultants. As the operation phased down, the number of consultants was being decreased and was expected to drop from 14 to 7 by the end of May 2003. Consultants often present a more flexible staffing option and can be released as longer-term WFP staff is re-assigned or as support cost funding levels decline.

47 The breakdown is: two for Lesotho, one for Swaziland, seven for Zambia and one for Zimbabwe. Some County Offices already had UNVs in place for their development programmes and were able to use them to assist with the emergency operations.

48 All the P4 and above staff who applied for the ERR were selected.
By December 2002, 22 staff from the ERR had been deployed to ODJ, including 4 from ODK and 8 whose release from existing duties was arranged by OHA. By December 2002, at least 4 of the ERR staff had transferred permanently to the region at the end of their TDY.

ERR is sometimes used for other purposes than intended. In ODJ, as well as in other regions, ERR staff has sometimes filled assignments that did not need staff trained in core emergency work. For ODJ staffing requirements, coordination between the various units has not always been efficient. The Human Resources Division (HR) deals with re-assignments and temporary duty staff, the Office of Humanitarian Affairs (OHA) with roster deployments and ALITE with standby agreements.

**Stress**

The first and second RTE missions (in July and November/December 2002) observed a high degree of prolonged stress among WFP staff, exacerbated by urgency of the work, inadequate staffing levels and composition, and security concerns. Although security awareness and stress management support has been given⁴⁹, there remains a degree of scepticism as to how much external workshops designed for stress management can help in practice. Informal peer support may often be the best approach. As the operation stabilised, stress levels were reduced and the last RTE mission, in May 2003, noted a significantly decreased level of stress.

**Overall staff numbers**

At the time of the visit of the last RTE mission, around 900 staff of all categories (international and national, including consultants) was engaged in the regional emergency operation, including some 80 in the ODJ office.⁵⁰ Most of the staff were being funded from the emergency operation’s Direct Support Costs (DSC) budget, with only a limited number (about ten in the ODJ office) being funded from the Programme’s core PSA budget.

**National staff**

National staff were a critical component in the overall success of the operation. Both the Regional Bureau in Johannesburg and all the six Country Offices had to staff up rapidly, including national staff.

For the Regional Bureau in Johannesburg, a local recruitment agency, the Millennium Agency, was used initially to provide national staff. The Agency established individual contracts with the staff member and then issued a contract to WFP for each staff member. The Agency’s salaries were based on local market rates, which were generally somewhat higher than the established UNDP rates, partly to compensate for the short-term nature of the contracts.⁵¹

By November/December 2002 ODJ was moving towards direct hire. Newspaper advertisements attracted considerable numbers of candidates and the screening process proved to be very time-consuming for the limited number of HR staff in the Regional Bureau.⁵² Although Special Service

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⁴⁹ For example, after the fatal shooting of a recently recruited WFP national staff member in the Johannesburg office during an armed robbery in August 2002.

⁵⁰ The breakdown for ODJ (most in Johannesburg, with a few in the Durban port operations office) was 27 international professional staff, 4 national professional staff, 35 national General Service staff and 14 consultants (May 2003). Overall, the ODJ region employs some 1,500 staff, including those in Angola (340), Namibia, Madagascar and Tanzania.

⁵¹ UNDP salary scales in the Republic of South Africa were increased by about 25% from January 2003, however, following a salary scale review.

⁵² In January 2003, many people who had been working with the Millennium Agency were recruited by WFP. Generally, the Agency’s staff proved to be very competent. At the same time, the overall quality of national staff applying for posts in Johannesburg is improving, according to the management.
Agreement (SSA) contracts were used initially for these staff, Service Contracts, for up to six months, are now being used. The latter make provision for sick leave and annual leave.53

At the Country Office level national staff has been important in all areas of the emergency work, but particularly as field monitors. Young graduates are often employed and their enthusiasm usually makes up for their lack of experience, though it can be problematic for more experienced staff to find the time for training.

**Recommendations:**

- A rationalization of staff recruitment processes is required for emergencies. One HQ team should be responsible for staffing of large-scale EMOPs, including the ERR roster, temporary duty staff, stand-by agreements, internationally-recruited consultants and re-assignments. The Human Resources Division should be more closely involved in design of large-scale emergency operations and basic document preparation in future.

- The Deputy Executive Director (Operations) and/or Chief of Staff/OED may have to take a more active role in roster deployments, ensuring that managers provide full justification for not releasing staff when the need is acute.

- To complement the ERR, a roster of external consultants, including recently retired experienced WFP staff and senior programme persons with a good knowledge of WFP, should be established.54

- A mechanism should be put in place to try to capture corporate lessons and learning from outgoing staff before they leave the operation. Staff should be invited to write comprehensive hand-over notes and their own SWOT analysis pertaining to their area of expertise.55 This could be useful for an eventual “self-evaluation” exercise of the whole operation or as input to a real time evaluation.

8. Conclusions

WFP’s coherent response to the southern Africa emergency included some major new departures, both programmatically (especially with respect to HIV/AIDS and inter-agency coordination) and logistically (response to GMO issues, regional procurement). In expressing reservations on some issues, the RTE does not wish to underplay the enormous personal dedication, expertise and innovation that went into making the EMOP a notable success in many respects and one from which important lessons will be derived.

The six-country regional EMOP was in response to a food crisis induced by a combination of drought, economic decline, rising HIV/AIDS prevalence and issues of governance. Responses to the food crisis in Malawi in early 2002 were inadequate, but the subsequent scaling up WFP’s operation coincided with the timely establishment of a regional logistics apparatus and, in October, a full regional bureau. The regional team responded well to the exceptional circumstances of the GMO issue, unprecedented levels of local procurement, the necessity to mill large quantities of maize, and new challenges presented by the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

A combination of pipeline shortages, logistical challenges and lack of implementation capacity led to EMOP ‘slippage’, with almost a quarter of total food pledges being carried forward to the new EMOP in

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53 Service Contracts are usually for twelve months and can be renewed annually, with no obligatory break in service. Medical coverage is currently not provided (May 2003), but a circa. 12% salary allowance is made for personal medical insurance to be arranged by the staff member. ODJ is trying to get medical coverage for national staff that will include HIV/AIDS coverage, through an arrangement with UNDP/New York.

54 This may be especially important in coming years, as it is understood, from a recent statement from the Human Resources Division (HR) that approx. 60% of existing WFP longer-term international professional staff at the P5 and D1 levels is expected to retire within the next seven years, by 2010.

55 SWOT = Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats.
July 2003, after an extension in time of three months of the original EMOP phase. A full complement of food items was rarely achieved and average regional distributions were below 55% of target until after December, though no appreciable increase in acute malnutrition was noted. The exception was some areas of Mozambique where resource levels, access and NGO capacity prevented adequate coverage. NGO partner constraints were a recurring theme that requires corporate attention.

There were problems over the quick dispatch of appropriate staff numbers and skills for the EMOP. The field level establishment of COMPAS and WINGS systems needs improving, especially for emergencies. The inter-agency vulnerability assessment committees in southern Africa provided useful ‘rolling assessments’, but baseline information and comprehensive nutritional surveillance was lacking. M&E systems at the outset of an EMOP need strengthening. Complementary targeted programmes, especially important in the transitional post-emergency phase and in addressing chronic issues such as HIV/AIDS, need greater capacity and resources.

This was one of the best resourced EMOPs in recent years. The success was in no small part due to the role of the Special Envoy, the opening of the RIACSO office, the WFP regional office and OCHA regional presence that together greatly increased the level of regional overview and analysis of the crisis. However, the level of input from UN agencies was not consistent across the region and the emphasis on, and proportionally greater funding for food aid, will have lessened the overall impact of the various interventions. Low levels of funding support given for non-food items, in particular support for emergency health services and nation wide nutrition surveillance, needs to be addressed. In the recovery stages, it will be necessary now to develop stronger links between CAPs, PRSPs, VAC assessments and other national and regional plans.

The emphasis placed on links between HIV/AIDS and food security and gender inequalities provided an opportunity to lobby for new approaches to be adopted in reaction to what, for many, defines a ‘new emergency paradigm’.

The assessments undertaken during the EMOP period were of great value in informing all interested parties on the status of the food security situation in each country affected. The VAC developed a productive engagement between its principal collaborators and the need to obtain rapid results in order to improve targeting of desperately needed food aid strongly influenced the way assessments were conducted. Institutionally, this needs to be further strengthened.

WFP’s response was timely, efficient and cohesive. Confirming its effectiveness will depend on greater investments in impact analysis, including the collection of baseline data. Most agencies are now looking beyond food aid interventions to alternatives that will protect and develop livelihoods, and also take account of a wider range of factors including HIV/AIDS and information on vulnerable children and young people. Consequently, future assessments need a different focus if they are to play an important role in developing long-term national and regional approaches to the crisis.

8.1 The new EMOP

The new southern Africa Regional Emergency Operation (EMOP) was launched on 2 July 2003. The operation aimed to reach up to 6.5 million people until June 2004 in the same six countries. While the majority of the regional caseload would be supported through family rations provided in a targeted manner, particularly vulnerable individuals would be reached through their participation in a variety of safety net activities. WFP would continue to address residual cases of acute food needs with an emphasis on Mozambique and Zimbabwe.

The net food aid requirements, excluding an anticipated carry over stock from the last EMOP of approximately 214,000 tons, have been calculated at 538,257 tons. While these carry-over stocks are considerable, the majority of these commodities are still at origin or in transit and will not be available
for distribution in country until later in 2003. WFP is seeking cash resources for regional procurement of commodities to pre-empt possible distribution shortfalls in September 2003.

The forthcoming marketing season is likely to see an even greater availability of cereals. South Africa is expecting surpluses of at least 2.2 million tons of maize, which could cover the EMOP cereal requirements of southern Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, and Zimbabwe. Zambia and Malawi are also projecting sufficient maize availability for WFP to meet their EMOP needs of maize from local purchases. Limited quantities of maize could also be purchased in northern Mozambique. In fact, subject to the availability of cash resources from donors, the entire cereal needs for the EMOP could in principle be purchased regionally.
Annexes
ANNEX 1 - TERMS OF REFERENCE

for the “Real-Time” Evaluation of WFP’s Response to the Southern Africa Crisis
July 2002 to August 2003

INTRODUCTION

“Real-time” evaluation (RTE) supports organizational learning, identifies key ingredients of a successful emergency response and achieves greater accountability for emergency operations. In this respect it is no different from standard evaluation practice. However, the distinguishing feature of an RTE is that, in contrast to ex post evaluation exercises, it is conducted during implementation. RTE examines an operation at a number of points during the project cycle: at the very early inception phase, usually within six weeks of the start up of the operation; at mid-term; and again in the final phase. This avoids the time lag when evaluative judgements are for the most part received in a post-operational period when many key players have departed and when information collection depends more heavily on selective historical documentation rather than actual observation.

The ultimate benefit of applying RTE to WFP’s emergency operations is to reach summative conclusions regarding the intervention’s relevance, design and progress towards achieving its stated objectives. This includes any gaps or unintended outcomes, the effectiveness and efficiency of the mode of implementation, and the appropriateness and application of operational guidelines and policies. However, insofar as RTE builds in a formative phase prior to reaching any final judgments, it can directly support the implementation process by providing timely (i.e. real-time) feedback and evaluative inputs to WFP management, staff and donors. These might then be the basis for corrective action. RTE also helps build a lasting description or chronicle of the intervention, which can later be used as a model for identifying lessons and good practice.

This real-time evaluation of WFP’s response to the Southern Africa crisis will be the first exercise of its kind within WFP and is expected to yield valuable insights into the workings of the operation as well as substantial and lasting learning benefits for the organization as a whole.  

BACKGROUND TO THE RESPONSE

The EMOP 10200/Southern Africa Crisis Response was designed to respond to the severe food crisis that six countries (Zimbabwe, Zambia, Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho and Malawi) in the southern African region are currently facing. It was based on the FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessments Missions (CFSAMs) that concluded that approximately 1.2 million tonnes of emergency cereal food aid would be required between April 2002 and March 2003 to assist 12.8 million vulnerable people in the 6 countries. The EMOP is to cover 10,255,850 beneficiaries in nine months (July 2001-March 2002) through a variety of food aid activities of the total cost of US$ 507,273,091 of which food costs are US$ 193,154,209. WFP will cover 67% of the food aid cereal needs identified in the CFSAM reports amounting to a total of 809,463 Mt.

The objectives of the EMOP are as follows:

- Prevent severe food shortages at household level that could lead to the deterioration of nutritional status and starvation;

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56 RTE has already been successfully piloted by UNHCR on several occasions, most notably during the recent Afghanistan crisis. The feedback from UNHCR so far has been that RTE has proven to be an extremely useful tool, which is much appreciated by donors, management and field staff alike.
• Safeguard the nutritional well being of vulnerable segments of the population such as People living with AIDS (PLWHA), children, expectant and nursing women, and the elderly;
• Preserve productive and human assets;
• Prevent distress migration from affected areas to urban centres and neighbouring countries;

Additionally, WFP’s Immediate Response Account (IRA) released US$ 5 million to be used for start-up costs, and a Special Operation (SO) for a WFP Regional Management Coordination Unit for a total cost of US$ 3,445,153 was approved. An additional US$ 1 million from IRA has been approved for this SO57.

EVALUATION OBJECTIVES

The objectives of the evaluation are to:

• assess the relevance of WFP’s response to the Southern Africa humanitarian crisis, its progress in achieving its objectives (i.e. results) and any gaps or unintended outcomes;
• measure the effectiveness and efficiency of the mode of implementation, and the appropriateness and application of operational policies, guidelines and support;
• assess the phasing down mechanisms/transition into PRRO.
• assess the cohesion or complementarity with other operations in the region.

The evaluation will provide:

• an opportunity for staff and management to review and reflect as the operation evolves, rather than in retrospect.
• timely feedback to the operation;
• general lessons on strengthening WFP’s emergency preparedness and response;
• a chronicle of the evolution and workings of WFP’s response; and accountability to WFP management, donors and to the WFP Executive Board
• reflections on the overall usefulness of real-time evaluations as a management and evaluation instrument within WFP.

KEY ISSUES

The global TORs guiding the RTE define the major parameters and core questions which the evaluation seeks to answer in its final report to the Executive Board. These questions remain fairly generic, but are consistent with standard approaches to programme implementation evaluation. As the relevance and importance of specified issues will vary from visit to visit, specific TOR will be prepared for each of the three proposed field visits shortly prior to each mission. This will allow for an element of flexibility to shift the evaluation’s focus in response to changing circumstances on the ground.

The list of key issues follows the logic of a project cycle, i.e. inquiry in the origin and context of the crisis followed by review of WFP’s preparedness measures, the needs assessment and appeals process, emergency response planning and management and finally evaluation of results and drawing of lessons.

A. Context and origins of emergency

• How did the emergency arise and how is it evolving?
• Distinguishing characteristics of the context and nature of the response.
• What political factors affect events and the implementation of the response and how have these changed over time?

57 Source: EMOP 10200
B. Emergency preparedness, needs assessment and appeals process

- **PREPAREDNESS**: How well prepared was WFP to respond? What baseline information existed (Vulnerability Profiles, LCA, Baseline Surveys)? What Early Warning systems were in place, what was their performance? Did Contingency Planning exist? Is WFP prepared to meet increasing or changing needs?

- **EMERGENCY NEEDS ASSESSMENT**: How were the food aid needs of the at-risk population and particular groups been assessed and are they being adequately re-assessed? Has vulnerability been adequately defined and mapped? What information was used for targeting? Was it gender-disaggregated, addressing the special needs of pregnant and nursing women and children?

- **ADVOCACY/APPEAL PROCESS**: How timely and effectively have needs been communicated to donors? How appropriate were the chosen modalities? How was the communications strategy developed? What problems were experienced in winning acceptance and approval of WFP’s response mechanisms amongst the various stakeholders, and how were these solved?

C. Emergency Response Planning

- **DESIGN**: How was the emergency response linked to pre-existing programmes in each of the countries concerned? Is the rationale and targeting of WFP assistance clear and sound, and how well do stated objectives reflect the specific nature of this emergency? Are the assumptions reasonable and have the risks been identified and addressed? Are the response activities appropriate for meeting stated objectives? How were assessed needs translated into objectives and by whom? Which special needs of women and children are being addressed and is the packaging, timing and security of food distribution sufficiently cognisant of gender variables and needs? Have gender focal teams or women been involved in operation design? Are there clear indicators for an exit strategy?

- **OPERATIONAL PLANNING**: Do the design documents and implementation plans provide the framework and tools needed for the efficient and effective implementation of the operation? What is changing/has changed in the operation and is this sufficiently reflected in the planning design? On what basis are adaptations from the original design being made? How are such changes approved?

D. Implementation

- **GUIDELINES, POLICIES AND APPROACHES**: How are operational guidelines and policy directives being interpreted and implemented (for example, are WFP’s Commitments to Women and Environment practical in this context)? Are the operational guidelines realistic and what are the inconsistencies or gaps in guidance? What approaches or models are being used and with what efficiency and effect? Could these be enhanced or should alternatives be tried?

- **SUPPORT SYSTEMS**: What is the added value of the regional approach? Are the management and coordination functions appropriate to the regional response? Have the roles of the Country Offices, the Regional Bureau and HQs been appropriately defined? Is the budget adequate to support the operation? Is the staffing of the operation appropriate? What is the percentage of female staff at all levels? How have staffing needs and requirements evolved over time? Are adequate systems in place including management information systems and security arrangements? What other internal factors, formal or informal, support or impinge upon implementation?

- **PARTNERSHIPS**: How well are implementing partners performing, and what is WFP doing to enhance their capacity? How transparent is their food distribution and how are beneficiaries selected? What is their capacity for scaling up in a crisis situation, and what has WFP done to strengthen this
capacity? What are the perceptions of the different stakeholders, including beneficiaries, of WFP’s objectives and performance? Are the number and nature of Implementation Partners adequate and appropriate for implementing the range of activities? Are WFP’s policies and priorities reflected in the MOU’s with Partners, are they aware of WFP’s gender policies?

- **COORDINATION**: How well is assistance being coordinated between humanitarian agencies and organisations and what contribution is WFP making? What efforts are agencies making to coordinate the phasing down and transition to non-crisis operation? Is the CAP process effective and timely? Were sufficient non-food resources required and pledged to complete programmed actions?

### E. Results

- **MONITORING AND EVALUATION ARRANGEMENTS**: Is the monitoring and reporting system effective and responsive to management and evaluation needs? Is there adequate baseline information? Are the indicators for tracking progress appropriate? Are there gender sensitive monitoring indicators? Who participates in monitoring missions?

- **EVALUATION FINDINGS**: How are objectives met (activities to outputs to purpose and including required versus actual distributions to beneficiaries for each operational component)? To what extent are we able to measure impact beyond standard inputs and outputs (and are there unintended positive or negative impacts)? Is food aid being efficiently and effectively targeted and what are the inclusion/exclusion errors? Was WFP’s response timely? To what extent is standardized implementation appropriate over time and across different geographical areas? What indicators determine the change/transition of approaches over time? How effective have particular mechanisms for the delivery of assistance and achievement of subsidiary objectives proved in practice (e.g. FFW, general distribution, etc.)? Has the operation been implemented at reasonable cost? How are internal WFP factors affecting results, including logistic support and the predictability and regularity of resources and flexibility of the budget? How are external factors affecting results e.g. humanitarian access?

### TIMING & OUTPUTS

The evaluation will commence immediately upon approval of the regional EMOP and run through until the end of the first regional EMOP. Its findings are not, however, confined to the EMOP alone but to all aspects of the regional response.

1. **Formative Phase (8 July 2002 thru 20 February 2003)**

The main emphasis during the formative phase of the RTE will be on providing opportunity for dialogue and reflection on the operation that, if necessary, could lead to remedial action. This will be combined with an emphasis on process and should include an analysis of the internal dynamics of the operation in order to create a lasting description of how the programme works. It is anticipated that this will be an area in which more can be learned about what works and what does not than would be the case if a ‘standard’ evaluation approach were used. The main concern will be on using findings and results to improve the programme as it unfolds. There will be a heavy emphasis on providing feedback with regards to what is working, what needs improvement and how it can be improved. The audience for the early results will be internal WFP staff and management. There may also be an opportunity to share them with a wider circle if agreed.

The team leader and the WFP staff member will spend the first week in Rome (8-12 July) undertaking interviews with key WFP staff involved in the development of the operation. Meetings with a sample of donors may also be undertaken. The TOR for the first field visit will also be finalised in collaboration with ODK and interested HQ units. OEDE and team members will attend the weekly task force meeting as appropriate.
Initial Field Visit to Regional Operations (12 July to 1 August 2002):

The evaluation team would make a first visit to the region to directly observe the start up and co-ordination of the regional emergency. Key issues will be the design of the emergency response, the quality of the needs assessment, and management and co-ordination processes. The initial visit will include South Africa, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outputs:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Debriefing of ODK management in Johannesburg based on a 5-8 pages Aide de Memoire. COs will participate via teleconference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Analysis, report writing and dissemination of “real-time findings” from first visit (1 August 2002 thru 30 October 2002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 20 page first interim report</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Debriefing in Rome</td>
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</table>

Second Field Visit to Regional Operations (17 November-22 December)

Based on feedback received from the presentation and dissemination of the first round of real-time results, the Team Leader and the Evaluation Manager together prepare the sub-TOR for the second interim field mission.

As the RTE progresses through its formative phase and the operation becomes more stable, the evaluation emphasis gradually shifts towards a focus on accountability, effectiveness and results. The emphasis will be placed on actions supporting enhanced effectiveness and providing inputs to the next phase of the regional response. At this interim stage, the findings may support decision-making on the management of the operation, ensure effectiveness in relation to stated objectives and provide further programme design modifications as appropriate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outputs:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Debriefing of ODK management and staff based on a 5-8 pages Aide-memoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Analysis, report writing and dissemination of “real-time findings” from second visit (November-December 2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Immediate Debriefing of WFP Management and Staff in Rome (late December)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 20 page second interim report</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Summative Phase: (February 2003 thru July 2003)

The RTE then moves into its summative phase that focuses more on results and comes up with findings and lessons about the intervention’s overall effectiveness at achieving its objectives. There is greater emphasis on causality derived from a more detailed analysis of process. The focus shifts to a consideration of those specific conditions which were either favourable or unfavourable to the implementation process and outcomes.

Third Field Mission to Regional Operations (28 April to 20 May 2003)

Based on feedback received from the presentation and dissemination of the first two rounds of real-time results, the Team Leader and the Evaluation Manager together prepare the sub-TOR for the final field mission.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outputs:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Debriefing of ODK management and staff based on an Aide Memoire (indicative length: 12 pages).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Final phase (May-August 2003)

This stage of the evaluation focuses on the debriefing from the final field mission, and the preparation of the final and summary evaluation reports, based on the present Terms of Reference and the findings from the three missions and the two interim mission reports from the first and second missions.

The final (full technical) report and the Executive Board summary report are prepared by the Team leader, with inputs from the team members, by the end of June. The final (full technical) report should be maximum 100 pages in length, including all annexes.

The EB summary report should be maximum 5000 words in length (approx. 12 pages) and may include one or two brief annexes of no more than one page each (e.g. tables comparing targeted resource levels and distributions to actual resource levels, deliveries and distributions etc)

The internal deadline for submitting the EB summary report to REC for final editing and translation is 08 August 2003. The deadline for OEDE to finalize the full technical report is early September 2003.

 Outputs:
- Initial de-briefing of WFP management and staff in Rome (19-20 May 2003).
- Fuller de-briefing involving the team leader, to discuss the drafts of the full and summary reports and to review the pilot RTE process (3 days sometime in early July 2003, in Rome).
- Full Evaluation Report (maximum 100 pages, including all annexes and chronology). Deadline for first draft is end June 2003.
- Submission of EB Evaluation Summary Report (max. 5000 words) for EB3, to be held in October 2003. Deadline for first draft is end June 2003.
ANNEX 2 - RESOURCES CHARTS
Annex 2 - Resources Charts

Confirmed contributions to EMOP 10200 expressed in % of total value

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>% of appeal in dollars</th>
<th>% of appeal in tonnage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>97%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Confirmed contributions and distribution under EMOP 10200

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Contributions in MT</th>
<th>Distribution Target in MT</th>
<th>Distribution in MT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>265 950</td>
<td>79 640</td>
<td>19 913</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>304 727</td>
<td>159 280</td>
<td>41 163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>365 904</td>
<td>270 151</td>
<td>80 068</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>559 066</td>
<td>381 022</td>
<td>136 975</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>637 371</td>
<td>491 893</td>
<td>197 179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>706 448</td>
<td>620 977</td>
<td>265 845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>741 780</td>
<td>735 717</td>
<td>371 970</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>892 091</td>
<td>880 286</td>
<td>488 095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>892 091</td>
<td>1 042 607</td>
<td>613 138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>893 140</td>
<td>1 168 195</td>
<td>713 263</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>968 901</td>
<td>1 280 741</td>
<td>753 814</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>978 901</td>
<td>1 380 246</td>
<td>792 424</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*As of 31.12.02 100-110,000 MT in-kind contributions were currently in port, transit or in country.
254, 000 MT had been regionally procured (of which 143,000 MT was already in transit or in country. The rest had not yet been dispatched 250,000 MT had reached the beneficiaries.
*IA lead time of up to 5 months for inkind contributions should be considered

### Planned and actual distribution under EMOP 10200

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>Tonnes distributed</th>
<th>Coverage in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>79 640</td>
<td>19 913</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>79 640</td>
<td>21 252</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September</td>
<td>110 871</td>
<td>38 905</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>110 871</td>
<td>56 907</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>110 871</td>
<td>60 334</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>129 084</td>
<td>68 666</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>114 740</td>
<td>106 125</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>144 569</td>
<td>116 125</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>162 321</td>
<td>125 041</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>125 587</td>
<td>99 997</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>112 546</td>
<td>40 551</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>99 505</td>
<td>38 610</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1 380 245</td>
<td>792 426</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

![Graph showing confirmed contributions and actual distribution under EMOP 10200](image)
Distribution at regional level expressed in beneficiaries and tonnage

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Month</th>
<th>Target</th>
<th>MTs distributed</th>
<th>Coverage in %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>79 640</td>
<td>19 913</td>
<td>25%</td>
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<tr>
<td>August</td>
<td>79 640</td>
<td>21 252</td>
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<td>110 871</td>
<td>38 905</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October</td>
<td>110 871</td>
<td>56 907</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November</td>
<td>110 871</td>
<td>60 204</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>129 084</td>
<td>68 666</td>
<td>53%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January</td>
<td>114 740</td>
<td>106 123</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February</td>
<td>144 569</td>
<td>116 125</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>162 321</td>
<td>125 041</td>
<td>77%</td>
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<td>June</td>
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![Graph 1: Distribution at regional level expressed in tonnage](image1)

![Graph 2: Distribution at regional level expressed in beneficiaries](image2)
### Lesotho

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### Malawi

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### Mozambique

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### Swaziland

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### Zambia

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### Zimbabwe

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### Swaziland

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<td>June</td>
<td>14 310</td>
<td>6 828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>213 254</td>
<td>127 329</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annex 3: Reference rations and planned rations for general food distribution

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Cereal grain</th>
<th>Cereal meal</th>
<th>Pulses</th>
<th>Oil</th>
<th>Corn-soya blend (CSB)</th>
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<tr>
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<td>400</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>400</td>
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<tr>
<td>(reduced CSB, compensated by</td>
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<tr>
<td>pulses and oil) ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Reference ration, Option 2</td>
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<td>(reduced CSB, compensated by</td>
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<td>cereals) ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planned rations (July –</td>
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<td>December 2002) *</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>334</td>
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<td>Zambia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho **</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>25</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planned rations (December 2002</td>
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<td>– March 2003) ***</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe, Malawi, Zambia,</td>
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<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planned rations (January –</td>
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<td>February 2003) ****</td>
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<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>333</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>13</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Swaziland</td>
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<td>Planned rations (March – April</td>
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<td>2003) ****</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>Zambia</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
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<td>500</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* EMOP document  
** Ration was raised to 2,400 kcal (+ 50g cereal meal and + 5 g oil) for the winter months (July and August)  
*** Implementation Strategy, December 2002  
**** Rations adjusted to pipeline projections and practicability of distribution, i.e. whole distribution units per families. Information provided by ODJ (May 2003)  
# 60g pulses to be distributed in the most affected regions in the south
Annex 4 - Chronicle

EMOP 10200; July 2002 to June 2003
Annex 4 - Chronicle for EMOP 10200, July 2002-June 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessments and EW</th>
<th>Political developments</th>
<th>WFP and other major donor events, decisions and actions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>July 2002</strong></td>
<td><strong>Month</strong></td>
<td><strong>Category</strong></td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>-See June for CFSAM results. The first round of the rolling vulnerability assessments undertaken by the Regional Vulnerability Assessment Committee (VAC) coordinated by SADC was initiated in all 6 countries. A report is expected by the end of August. The results will be used for targeting, as well as for revising requirements.</td>
<td>-The GMO issue begins to pose serious concerns operationally and policy-wise. CoS have been asked to refrain from making statements until WFP position is clear. It is pre-empted that the issue will get a lot of press during the WSSD taking place at the end of July. -At this stage (31 July) it is a non-issue in Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland. Zimbabwe will accept and possibly mill the grain. In Mozambique 4,544 tons of yellow maize remains in silos as the Government requests that it be milled before distribution, and Zambia is still discussing the issue. -SADC will focus on a “never again” strategy for medium and long-term recovery.</td>
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<td>-EMOP 10200 worth USD 507 million to fund approx. 1 million MT to feed 10.2 million people until March 2003 was launched 1.7.02. According to CFSAM the amount of people at risk will peak at 12.8 million from December-March. WFP warns that numbers are likely to increase. -A rolling implementation strategy is attached to the EMOP. The initial strategy is to preposition food in anticipation of the peak period of distribution and the rainy season in October. The overall strategy is based on one month need + two months stock + one month on the high seas -ODJ informs that during the emergency, the UN agencies will be responsible for the humanitarian response, while SADC will take leadership in facilitating policy decisions that will expedite the response -WFP’s ED, Mr. Morris is appointed Special Envoy for the humanitarian crisis in southern Africa on the 18 July. He will travel to the region in September.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>August 2002</strong></td>
<td>-The VAC assessment missions have finalized and a report is expected mid September. Early indications show that the number of people in need is higher than first anticipated -According to SADC, the chance that el Nino will affect the region during the remainder of 2002 and into 2003 has risen to 90%.</td>
<td>-WHO DG Brundtland stated that there is no evidence of a health risk from eating GM foods, and southern African countries should consider accepting the food aid. Lesotho, Malawi and Swaziland accept, Mozambique accepts if milled to avoid cross pollination, and will allow transhipment, -Zimbabwe is still discussing the issue, and Zambia has indicated that it wants to further review the issue as there are concerns about the potential health and environmental impacts. WFP has written a letter to the Vice President alerting the GoZam. that WFP cannot meet basic nutritional requirements without the Maize. -SADC has held meetings to urge Gvt. to reach a common decision on the GMO issue. -All distribution to NGOs has been suspended as of 16 August. For refugees, GRZ has agreed in writing that the existing stocks will be milled.</td>
</tr>
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<td>-As of 28.8 the WFP funding is only 25 % of requirements. There is a total regional shortfall of 75,884 MT against requirements for the months of Sept-Nov. FAO urged donors to pledge more food and funds. -The overall pipeline is fairly healthy, and is expected to cover the needs until November. CSB and oil pipeline will be boosted in a near future by confirmed contributions, and pulses, DSM and sugar are being procured using CERF funds. Hardly any prepositioning has been possible. -Most cash contributions have been used to procure food regionally. -WFP met with USA Rice and USA Dry Bean Council to highlight the need to include pulses in the food basket to avert the risk of Pellagra, and to increase the protein in the diets of those living with HIV/AIDS. 25,000 tons of pulses will be required beginning of September. -Security situation is deteriorating with various incidents of assaults and armed robbery in one case resulting in death of a WFP national staff member in Johannesburg. WFP has dispatched two security officers to South Africa and counselling is being offered to staff. -WFP, UNICEF, and SCF-UK are providing training on protection of women and Children from sexual exploitation and abuse in the context of the humanitarian response to the crisis in southern Africa.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Category</td>
<td>Assessments and EW</td>
<td>Political developments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>September 2002</strong></td>
<td>-The VAC assessments were presented on the 16th of September in Harare and they confirm the need for urgent action beyond that of current level, in order to avoid a humanitarian disaster in the next seven months before the main harvest April/May 2003. The number of people affected was revised upwards from 12.8 million to 14.4 million. Zimbabwe stands out as the worst affected country. -Key EW indicators show that planting seeds are generally available in the region, but access is difficult due to low purchasing power and high prices. This will affect the crop output during the next harvest.</td>
<td>Status on the GMO issue is that Swaziland accepts, Lesotho, Malawi &amp; Mozambique accepts provided it is milled and, Zimbabwe will accept the GM into the country, but will quarantine it and exchange it for non-GM white maize to be distributed by WFP. Zambia has not changed position. There have been incidents of looting of NGO stores containing GM grain in the Southern Province of Zambia. -Various media reports indicate that WFP should remove all GM maize from the country. However, WFP has not officially received instructions. -WFP is estimating that milling capacity for food aid entering the region would be about 50,000MT per month and funding possibilities are explored. - A two day SADC regional logistics coordination meeting was held in Harare on the 23 of Sept. to discuss differing road tolls, bureaucratic procedures for cross-border truck movement and limited rail capacity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>October 2002</strong></td>
<td>-A weak to moderate El Niño is expected to persist throughout the 2002/3 cropping season. The first half of the season expects normal to above rainfall in the northern, eastern and southern parts of the region, and below normal in the central parts. The second half is expected to experience normal to below rainfall in the south and normal to above in the north</td>
<td>-On 29.10 the GoZam announced its decision not to accept GM food, and requested that all GM foods be removed from the country. WFP is proceeding with plans to remove and reallocate 15,000MT of GM food currently in Zambia. -Milling is accepted and initiated in Malawi, but it is proving difficult, as no donor seems to be willing to assist in financing it. -More incidents of looting have been reported in Zambia, Zimbabwe and Lesotho. -On 27.9 an MoU between Zimbabwe and WFP to swap 17 500 MT of yellow maize for the same amount of white maize was signed.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Assessments and EW**

- Lack of seeds, fertilizers and other agricultural inputs are expected to seriously damage an already critical food security situation. The latest assessment shows that in Zambia and Malawi more than 70% of the households do not have cereal seeds, while in Zimbabwe, more than 94% of farmers are without seeds. Estimates for crop yields are being lowered throughout the region by 10% to 40%.

- First shipment from a US NGO is to arrive in the region 15.11. Logistical arrangements are not clear, and could put pressure on current logistical capacity, and lead to increased prices.

- EU is accusing the ruling party in Zimbabwe of using food aid as a political weapon against opposition supporters.

- WFP and FAO are warning that donor response to appeals for agricultural inputs has not been sufficient and will affect the outcomes of the current planting season.

- HIV/AIDS has severely undermined the coping and recovery capacities of the region. Dependency on humanitarian assistance beyond March 2003 is therefore likely.

- A WFP consultant will be assisting the Country Offices to design and develop a sentinel site monitoring process for the Regional EMOP.

**Political developments**

- The US Ambassador to the UN food agencies urged Zimbabwe to relax on the import restrictions on GM food. He also called for greater monitoring of WFP food distributions.

- SADC hosted a 2-day consultative conference on the current institutional reform of SADC, and how the organization would further support poverty reduction and integration in the region. UN, donors and representatives of civil society were also present. Numerous interventions called for a greater consideration of HIV/AIDS were made.

- SADC/VAC met with key UN agencies and IPs to review the lessons learned from the first round of rolling assessments.

- EU is accusing the ruling party in Zimbabwe of using food aid as a political weapon against opposition supporters.

- The Gvt. of Zimbabwe has informed WFP that the agency would no longer be allowed to import GMO maize grain, even if milled locally before distribution. WFP continues to hold discussions with the GVT to resolve the matter. Mozambique will mill its own food at a rate of 100MT pr. day. No change in Zambia’s, Lesotho’s and Swaziland’s positions.

- SADC and EU held a ministerial meeting on 7-8 to discuss the current crisis and ways for the two bodies to cooperate. They failed to reach an agreement on Zimbabwe, putting in jeopardy next summit planned for the beginning of 2003.

- SADC consultative forum financed by USAID planned for early December might be cancelled as USAID, objects to Zimbabwe’s participation.

**WFP and other major donor events, decisions and actions**

- First shipment from a US NGO is to arrive in the region 15.11. Logistical arrangements are not clear, and could put pressure on current logistical capacity, and lead to increased prices.

- UN agencies are in the process of updating the Consolidated Appeals based on the most recent assessments and changes in the situation. The Appeals will be presented at the Global Launch on 19.11.

- Based on a regional logistic meeting held 29-30 of October, the Regional Logistics office is revising their strategy document.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Assessments and EW</th>
<th>Political developments</th>
<th>WFP and other major donor events, decisions and actions</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 2002</td>
<td>The SADC Food Security Network expressed concern over how the 2002/03 crop season has begun. Lesotho has had sufficient rain, but planting seeds have been scarce. Rain in Malawi and Zambia came late and many poor households have not had access to seeds. In Zimbabwe the rains became scarce after a good start, but again access to seeds is very limited. Mozambique has had relatively good rain and access to seeds in the north, but rainfall in the south and part of the centre has been below normal. Swaziland is very dry and already considering to declare a national disaster for the summer crop. Prices of food have gone up in all six countries. - A set of sentinel sites was identified. The data collection tools are still to be developed.</td>
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<td>As of 30.12 the WFP funding is 62% of total requirements. This represents 71% of total required tonnage. There remains a shortfall of US$ 200 million. - WFP is scaling up to cover the needs increased based on the VAC assessments and trying to overcome the bottlenecks produced by the GMO issue. All pipelines will be met for this month, but WFP foresees broken pipelines from January.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Zambia’s Home Affairs Minister was killed in a car accident on the 7th of Dec. He was leading an anti-corruption campaign and foul play is possible. This could increase instability.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Prices of food have gone up in all six countries.</td>
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<td>- Micronutrient premix was purchased from Roche South Africa and dispatched to all countries with milling activities. Prior to this dispatch, some quantities of maize have been milled without fortification or with use of a premix formerly used by WFP in local maize meal purchases. In Malawi, not all mills are in a position to add the premix due to lack of required equipment.</td>
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<td>- A set of sentinel sites was identified. The data collection tools are still to be developed.</td>
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<td>- The US Government announced that it granted 3 NGOs US$100 million to carry out emergency relief operations in Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe.</td>
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<td>- RIACSO has been able to generate significant media attention for the southern African crisis counting a BBC radio special, BBC world service interview and a BBC documentary “Following the grain from the American farmer to a village in Zambia”.</td>
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<td>- 64 of the 118 IFRC trucks allocated to Zambia will be operational in the field. The remaining will be ready by mid January.</td>
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<td>- WFP is currently undergoing a budget revision process for EMOP 10200, after which revised requirements for food aid over the period January - June will be available.</td>
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<td>- WFP will soon be piloting USAIDs SMART initiative in southern Africa and Angola EMOPS, that track indicators such as crude mortality rate and child malnutrition rate.</td>
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### January 2003

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessments and EW</th>
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<tr>
<td>- The VAC assessments undertaken in December show an increase in number of vulnerable people of just under a million, of which half are in Zimbabwe. The regional cereal gap of 3.3 million MT estimated by the Joint WFP/FAO Crop assessments (CFSAM) in May 2002, has been reduced by more than 50% through formal commercial and food aid imports as of December. If all import plans are achieved the gap would be filled by March 31 2003.</td>
<td>- Migrants from Zimbabwe are arriving in South Africa. Approx. 1000 people are deported each month.</td>
<td>As of 31.1 the WFP funding is 66% of total requirements. This represents 75% of total required tonnage. There remains a shortfall of US$ 173 million.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Acute malnutrition seems to have been staved off, but needs close monitoring</td>
<td>- Food riots erupted at the GMB in Zimbabwe over the distribution of maize meal. The commodity is now only available on the parallel markets, where the costs are 4 times the official prize</td>
<td>- The UN SE for Southern Africa completed a two week mission to the region. He was accompanied by high level representatives from SADC, and other UN agencies. Among major findings were that HIV/AIDS is the most fundamental underlying cause to the crisis. The number of food insecure people is increasing due to HIV/AIDS, and more emphasis should be put on ensuring the nutritional value of the rations as that will enhance the immune system of PLWA. WFP should contribute to capacity replacement and replenishment through school feeding/gardening programmes. The full report can be found on <a href="http://www.wfprelogs.org">www.wfprelogs.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Resilience to another poor season has decreased due to coping strategies becoming less available or effective after successive years of stress.</td>
<td>- Allegations in the Zimbabwean media that regionally purchased maize being distributed by WFP was contaminated. Further inquiry showed that the reports were unsubstantiated</td>
<td>- The US pledges $10 billion toward the fight against HIV/AIDS in southern Africa.</td>
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<tr>
<td>- This year’s cereal harvest is predicted to be well below normal due to unfavourable rains, limited agricultural inputs and certain governmental policies that inhibit production. The current food crisis will most likely continue beyond current consumption year.</td>
<td>- Food continues to be looted from the WFP warehouses. On 25 January 139 MT (WFP and non-WFP food) were carried away by a crowd of 3,000-5,000 people.</td>
<td>- WFP held a Regional Strategic Planning Meeting to identify priorities for 2003. The main thrusts are to integrate HIV/AIDS into all programmes in the region, increase scope and effectiveness of education support programmes and strengthen capacity for crisis prevention and management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Tropical depression Delfina hit the coast of Nampula and northern Zambezia in early January causing some flooding and major damage to infrastructure. WFP provided emergency food aid with a Government funded helicopter to some isolated areas of Nampula.</td>
<td></td>
<td>- An extension of the EMOP covering April-June has been submitted to the PRC. The total WFP cost has been revised upwards with USD 25,310,950 (new figure 539,018,562) the beneficiaries with another 2,928,150 (new figure: 13,184,000) and the tonnage downwards with -770 MT (new figure: 996,238). Also the SO 10204 funding the Regional Management Coordination Unit has been extended until June 30 revising the budget upwards by USD1.8 million from USD 3.4 to USD 5.2 million</td>
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<td>- WFP is setting up a Community and Household surveillance system (CHS) based on sentinel sites, to monitor output and outcome indicators.</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 2003</td>
<td>Seasonal rains have been below normal in many of the same areas affected by last year's prolonged dry spells. Most of Zimbabwe, southern and central Mozambique parts of Southern Zambia and Malawi and northern South Africa have been particularly affected by below normal rains. However, preliminary production forecasts say that national maize production is expected to be better than last season, and in Zambia, Malawi and Lesotho above or very close to long term average production levels are expected. However, household access to food is likely to remain a problem. Zimbabwe, though better than last year, will barely reach 50% of normal production levels and Mozambique is likely to have very low production levels in the south but better than last year in the north. It appears that humanitarian food aid distributions within Zimbabwe will need to be continued at a high level. Despite the FEWS NET's food security warning from the 28 February, the Gvt. of Mozambique continues to sustain that the situation does not warrant an appeal for international assistance Based on their experience from recent major floods (2000-2001).</td>
<td>An indication of maize imports based on preliminary crop forecasts suggest a regional surplus of 779,000 MT of maize compared to 1.5 million MT deficit last year. To fully replenish strategic reserves, the region will need to import close to one million MT this year compared to a requirement of 3.2 million MT last year. The “National Economic Revival Programme” brokered between Gvt. and private sector in Zimbabwe is offering exporters a more competitive exchange rate to increase incentives.</td>
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<td>Fuel prizes were raised nearly 100% in Zimbabwe and inflation is reaching 208%.</td>
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- On the 3-5 March, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Zambia were hit by Cyclone Japhet that damaged infrastructure, housing, land and crops and close to 100,000 people were affected regionally. Especially Mozambique that was just recovering from Cyclone Delfina was hit hard. In the aftermath of the Cyclone heavy rains fell in the area. Malawi is also at risk.

- FEWSnet has predicted a food deficit of over a million MT for Zimbabwe this year. Two thirds of the country is expected to remain food insecure in 2003, leaving households in all farming sectors dependent on food aid and purchases of unreliable supplies from the state owned GMB.

- The Gvt. of Zimbabwe has refused to allow a joint Gvt./UN national survey on vulnerability to take place in former commercial farming areas. This is a major impediment in gaining access to areas where most of the former commercial farm workers are living. -El niño forecasts indicate that conditions will continue to weaken through April, although affected areas may experience impact the next 2-3 months. Forecasts for May-October indicate normal weather conditions.

- Field testing of a draft distribution monitoring (PDM) questionnaire and Community Household Surveillance (CHS) tools is being carried out in Zambia, and will soon be tested in Lesotho and Swaziland.

- Fuel prices in the region are set to increase further, which is likely to have a negative impact on the price of commodities and transport.

- Conclusions from a fact finding mission conducted by the Gvt. of Malawi regarding biotechnology and GMO, was that while it has great potential, it requires regulatory frameworks, an investment in capacity building and research.

- The Gvt. of Mozambique has recommended the rejection of US GM maize meal that has been redirected from Zambia, because as a member of SADC, it will not accept food that has been rejected from another member state. This does not constitute an official refusal, but it has delayed the dispatch of the food to the country. WFP and USAID Mozambique are following the matter closely, and WFP continues discussions with Gvt. In Zambia all GMO food has now been returned form the field to Lusaka.

- Mozambique is not able to mill at the expected rate, as one of the two main mills is not producing.

- Dispatches of GMO from Zambia to Malawi and Zimbabwe are ongoing. To date 12,500 MT have been dispatched.

- No new contributions have been recorded during the month of March, thus the operation continues to be 77% funded.

- The budget revision of the EMOP submitted in January was approved on 20 March, but due to savings in transport costs, the total WFP costs has been revised downwards with USD 1,077,070 (new figure 512,630,533). The food costs have been revised upwards with USD 18,572,297 (new figure 216,799,70) due to increased commodity prices, and the higher costs of adjustments of the rations in favour of non cereal commodities as required based on the latest VAC assessment.

- WFP is currently assessing the food security situation in drought-hit Maputo province following news reports of deaths from malnutrition and hunger.

- Transport of WFP food to 30,000 beneficiaries in parts of the Central Province, Zimbabwe was delayed due to bridges being swept away by heavy rain.

- C-SAFE that received over 100 million from the US Gvt. for food distributions in Southern Africa, has so far dispatched close to 2,000 MT of food to Zimbabwe.

- WFP and the Joint Emergency Food Assistance Programme (JEFAP) NGOs in Malawi met on 14 March for a workshop on the EMOP phase-out strategy. It was agreed that in April/May the beneficiaries’ coverage would be reduced according to the harvest output.

- As a result of the floods, water has entered the WFP warehouse in the Sofala Province in Mozambique, which as holding approx. 200MT of EMOP food + contingency stocks. Action is being taken to avoid further damages to the stockpiles.

- Norway and UK have contributed with USD 1 million and 6.5 million respectively in support of the associated costs for the South African donation of 100,000 MT of Maize. The distribution was scheduled to begin 28 March.

- WFP completed its emergency airlift operation to Machanga District in Southern Sofala Province on 23 March. The district was cut of by the flooding of the Save river as a result of the cyclone Japhet. A total of 109 MT of food was transported to five isolated localities providing 4,000 people with a 2 months food ration. After road transport had been re-established an additional 400 MT were distributed to 24,000 people.
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<th>March 2003 (Cont.)</th>
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<td><strong>Assessments and EW</strong></td>
<td><strong>Political developments</strong></td>
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<td>- The next round of rolling assessments led by SADC, and covered by the EMOP, will be starting in late April. A planning meeting was held 3-9 March. The objective was to consult the 13 SADC members on an agreement designed to build capacity and institutionalise vulnerability assessments in the region. SADC welcomed a multisectoral approach, and indicated that support from the non-food UN agencies would be needed during the entire process.</td>
<td>- The cereal pipeline is looking healthy. Insignificant shortfalls are expected in Zimbabwe, while Zambia is expected to meet 70% of the April requirements. Zimbabwe will experience a shortfall of 40% in pulses, and Swaziland about 50%. Due to increased needs in April, Mozambique will experience a 40% shortfall of CSB. The remaining countries are fully covered in April.</td>
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<td>- The funding situation remains the same as the new contributions this month are too insignificant to change the overall picture.</td>
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<td>- The Special Envoy hosted a meeting with other heads of agencies in Rome on the 8-9 April to discuss the approach to the HIV/AIDS and food security crisis in southern Africa. The result was a paper recommending improved efforts in surveillance and community based action. Immediate action points were identified for emergency needs and long term needs. The paper was endorsed by IASC in its meeting in Paris on 24 April.</td>
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<td>- DFID has closed down its crisis unit in Johannesburg and has established a longer term presence dealing with food security in the local office in Pretoria in order to prepare for medium term response.</td>
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<td>- In Lesotho WFP and UNICEF have embarked on a joint venture to assist 50,000 malnourished children under 5 through provision of a fortified and enriched corn/Soya blend (UNIMIX).</td>
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<td>- The ODJ M&amp;E unit continues to test PDM questionnaires in Zambia, Swaziland and Lesotho. The objective is to provide clearer understanding of the utilization patterns of the relief food, targeting efficiency and satisfaction derived from the beneficiaries of food aid. The pilot implementation is scheduled to begin in May.</td>
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<td>- UNICEF, WFP, WHO and NGOs (among them CSAFE) met to discuss how to establish nutrition monitoring systems in order to complement existing vulnerability assessment systems and the proposed WFP/CSAFE community and household surveillance system.</td>
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<td>- WFP and Mozambique Disaster Management Institute agreed that the number of beneficiaries is likely to increase from July onwards due to the poor outlook of the current crop. FEWS net issued a renewed food Security warning for Zambia on 31 March, despite the positive crop prospects. This is due to unequal access to food, and erratic weather patterns in some districts. For the same reasons pockets of severe food insecurity are likely to remain in Zimbabwe and Malawi despite the improved forecasts as compared to last year. FEWS net’s positive forecast of maize yield in Zimbabwe is being questioned by other organizations. It is hoped that the CFSAM that started 22 April will clarify this. Preliminary crop estimates indicate that WFP can reduce the number of beneficiaries in Swaziland.</td>
<td>- On 7.4 2003 the African food Crisis was discussed in the Security Council. The positive response to the food crisis was highlighted. In particular it was pointed out that acute malnutrition rates of children under five are no longer rising. Concern was expressed about the situation in Zimbabwe, specifically regarding politicization of food assistance and Govt. policy failure prolonging the need for food assistance.</td>
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<td>- The opposition (MDC) in Zimbabwe won two by-elections after having organized a successful protest against the situation in the country.</td>
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<td>- The Zimbabwean congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) supported by MDC organized a stay away in protest of the fuel prizes that increased 200% again this month. The stay away lasted three days and was backed by close to 70% of the workforce. The government declared the strike illegal and arrested a number of ZCTU leaders. Inflation is now 228%</td>
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| - The VAC assessments will take place from 13-30 April, in 6 countries and the findings will be ready by 26 June. The mission will take a multisectoral approach looking at household food security, HIV/AIDS issues, health, education, and child protection, water and sanitation.  
- The findings of the ongoing CFSAM are expected to be ready end of May. | - Persistent reports from NGOs in Zimbabwe that the GMB food is not reaching parts of the population due to erratic deliveries and sales., e.g. Matabeleland has not received any GMB food since July last year.  
- The MDC in Zimbabwe has called for a week of pro-democracy marches during the first week of June. The Government has announced that it will crush any demonstration that leads to destruction of property or threatens national security. Inflation rates are now 269%  
- Zambia has stopped the import of fresh maize stock and opted to buy the commodity locally following predictions of a good harvest by the national Farmers union.  
- Australia decided to close its offices of its overseas aid programme in Zimbabwe on 2 May.  
- SADC released a report on the 7th of May suggesting new approaches to improve food security in the region. It recommends a three-pronged strategy through humanitarian assistance, programming and government policy, focusing on consumption side support, productivity enhancement and household and community safety nets. | - The school feeding baseline survey has been completed in 122 schools in 8 districts in Malawi. Beneficiary data collection has been entered for 150,000 households. The database will provide inputs to beneficiary profiles and contribute to the identification of potential areas of vulnerability. |

### May 2003

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| - According to preliminary results from the VAC and CFSAM missions, crop forecasts are generally better this year than last, but there are still emergency needs among the vulnerable populations. Overall food needs are thus likely to drop in the coming year, though concerns remain for Zimbabwe, where the production is expected to fall below requirements for the third consecutive year. In Mozambique, the harvest is expected to fail in the south, and despite a production above normal in the northern districts, the food is not expected to be moved south, due to lack of infrastructure and consequently very high transport costs. It is anticipated that WFP’s assistance to Mozambique will increase in the coming year.  
- The Government of Zimbabwe has rejected the latest VAC analysis and accuses the ZIMVAC team for painting an overly negative picture of the food security situation in the country.  
- South Africa is forecasting a four million MT surplus in its maize harvest for this season, resulting in a drop in prices. | - As of the 26 May funding is 84% of total requirements in dollars through 30.6. This represents 97% of total required tonnage. There remains a shortfall of US$ 80,310 808.  
- Subsequent to IASC’s endorsement of the Special Envoy’s paper last month, UN agencies have initiated the preparation of an updated Regional Assistance Plan for the period July 2003 to March 2004 – The current consolidated appeal ends in June. Country teams across the region are working to prepare new appeals that will present the donor community with agency’s strategies and needs by early July.  
- WFP has completed a series of district level meetings with beneficiaries and community authorities regarding the decrease in WFP assistance over the next three months during the harvest season.  
- UNICEF has initiated nutrition surveillance in 42 clinics in Swaziland  
- WFP is working with UNCHR to prepare the repatriation of Angolan refugees from Zambia, DRC and Namibia scheduled to begin in June. WFP will provide food for the reintegration package through UNHCR’s implementing partners and is pre-positioning food for this operation. There are an estimated 400,000 Angolan refugees in neighbouring countries.  
- WFP did not distribute food in Zimbabwe this month due to the harvest. A single ration will be distributed in June to about 1.33 million people. Meanwhile WFP and NGO partners are verifying beneficiary lists and conducting training. The Government has made an official request to WFP to continue food aid for the 2003/04 agricultural season.  
- The school feeding baseline study of 206 primary schools was completed in Lesotho. The findings will assist in formulating future school feeding programmes for WFP’s 2004/07 country Programme. | |
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<td>May 2003 (Cont.)</td>
<td>- A regional stakeholders meeting will be held in Johannesburg on 11-12 June, which will review needs and required responses based on the results of the VAC and CFSAM. The meeting will be facilitated by SADC.</td>
<td>- In August 2003 75 ARGOS satellite-transmitting devices will be installed by WFP in schools with school feeding programmes in Malawi. The monitoring system device will permit an authorised and trained supervisor to directly input monthly data, which will be transmitted to WFP and other authorized officials for analysis. The device will capture monitoring information such as school attendance and enrolment figures, commodity levels and ration size.</td>
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<td>June 2003</td>
<td>- Findings of the recent FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission (CFSAM) indicate that the cereal harvest at a regional level is better than last year, but with marked variations at national and sub-national level, specially notable in the southern districts of Mozambique and Zimbabwe, where poor production and lack of movement of produce from the more productive zones have left the population with little access to food. Zimbabwe has produced barely enough to meet 40% of its needs, leaving 5.5 million people in need of food aid. This represents half of the region’s food deficit. In Mozambique 949,000 people will need food aid. Overall regional cereal production increased from 5.4 million MT in 2001/2002 to 6.3 million MT this year, enough to cover two thirds of its needs. FAO and WFP estimate that 2.4 million MT need to be imported into the 6 countries over the next year, as opposed to over 3 million MT last year. Commercial imports are expected to cover 1.1 million MT of this. However, the key issues remain physical and economic access to food for certain segments of the population.</td>
<td>- The GMB of Zimbabwe has failed to pay for the transport of Government imported wheat and maize now stuck in the ports of Mozambique and South Africa.</td>
<td>- As of 27 June funding is 85% of total requirements through 30 June for EMOP 10200. This represents 97% of total required tonnage. There remains a shortfall of approx. US$74,000. Of the system wide Consolidated Appeal of US$ 656 million around 74% has been funded. The major shortfall was in the response to the social service sectors where only 31% of requirements were met.</td>
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<td>- Zimbabwe will allow private businesses with foreign currency to import their own fuel to ease a serious shortage crippling the country’s transport and industry.</td>
<td>- WFP and FAO have formally approved ODJs new EMOP 10290 covering the same 6 countries as the previous EMOP, aiming to reach 6.5 million people until June 2004 at an overall cost of US$ 308 million. The food requirements for the duration of this EMOP, excluding a carry over stock from EMOP 10200 of approx. 214,000 MT have been calculated at 538,257 MT. While the carry over stocks are considerable, the majority of these cannot be expected in country until late 2003. As a result, WFP is urgently seeking cash resources for regional procurement of commodities. Under EMOP 10200 WFP purchased nearly 400,000 MT of food in southern Africa and it is anticipated that this year, the region will have enough surplus to cover the EMOP cereal requirements.</td>
<td>- In Zimbabwe farm invasions continue. It is likely that UN and IOM will provide relief assistance to the displaced farm workers once an assessment can be made.</td>
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<td>- WFP has installed the first Post Distribution Monitoring database programme in Lesotho. Training in data capturing, analysis and transfer to ODJ was conducted. Currently hard copy questionnaires will be used, but subsequent to further training hand held computers will be used. Collected data will focus on WFP commodity utilization and satisfaction at the household level.</td>
<td>- All UN country teams are currently preparing their contributions for the Consolidated Appeal Process for the period of July 2003-4. RIACSO and OCHA are also working on their regional analysis and strategic overview. The official launch date is 24 July.</td>
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<td>June 2003 (Cont.)</td>
<td>-According to a recent review by UNICEF of a series of nutrition surveys in the six crisis affected countries, the improvements in underweight among children, seen in the early nineties, are stagnating and/or reversing, and the rate of deterioration seems worse in the urban/peri urban areas. Especially Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique, were found to have “unacceptably” high rates of malnutrition.</td>
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Annex 5  - A comparison with the 1992-93 emergency: early warning

All countries in the southern Africa region periodically experience droughts in parts of their territories. As most of the staple food crops cultivated in the region are grown under conditions of seasonal rain-fed agriculture, the timing of rainfall is as critical as its volume. The drought which affected the 1991-92 crop season (impacting on food availability in 1992-93) was the worst for several decades both in terms of timing and volume of rain. A decade later, the timing of the rain in the previous planting season was the most critical factor.

**Early warning and response**

For the emergency of the early nineties, first signals of crop failure in the region had been given as early as December 1991. This was from several sources, including the bulletins issued by the national early warning units in the affected countries, FAO, USAID missions and NGOs working in rural areas. The SADC Early Warning System, comprising the national level Early Warning Units and the Harare-based regional unit, gave the first reliable indications of the probable quantitative implications of the drought in their March 1992 bulletins. At the global level, FAO/GIEWS was monitoring the situation continuously. The origins of the 1992-93 emergency operation were in the poor harvest of 1991 and the adverse growing conditions for the 1992 harvest. The emergency was over by June 1993, however, as adequate rainfall led to a more than doubling of the harvest of the previous year in the SADC countries.

A decade later, the warning signals were not as clearly appreciated initially. In February 2002, FAO issued a Special Alert on Southern Africa, indicating that the aggregate output of maize for the sub-region was one quarter lower than in 2000 and that prices of maize had increased several fold in the previous three months, undermining access to food for large sections of the population. At that time, the unfolding crisis was still being dealt with on an individual country basis. The combination of accumulative factors was already apparent – a mix of drought, floods, disruptions to commercial farming, the absence of effective food security policies, depletion of strategic grain reserves, poor economic performance, foreign exchange shortages and delays in the timely commercial importation of maize. Dramatic HIV/AIDS rates in the sub-region contributed towards household food insecurity.

The 1993 evaluation mission queried whether it was necessary for FAO/WFP missions to have been sent to make additional crop and food supply needs assessments. They felt that the external missions made a second guess based on the same data already available and used by the national early warning units. These additional missions and the fact that WFP assistance was delayed until finalization of the DHA/SADC appeal process may have lost six to eight critical weeks in mobilizing food aid for the region, although some donors did react before the appeal was issued.

For the 2002-03 emergency operation, WFP had a number of small bridging operations, approved on a country-by-country basis, but these were only about 50% resourced by mid-2002. An earlier regional response might have been possible, had the warning signals been better appreciated at an earlier date. Since the projected cereals shortfalls in most countries were not as dramatic in 2002-03 as in 1992-93, however, there was higher cereals availability in most countries during the recent emergency.

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58 This section draws from the full report of the WFP Evaluation Mission of October/November 1993, for information relating to the 1992-93 emergency operation and the preceding drought.
59 Following the 2002-03 drought relief operation, a further year of emergency food aid is being organized, due to continuing food supply problems in the six countries affected, compounded by the impact of the HIV/AIDS crisis.
60 The cereal production estimates as a percent of consumption requirements were generally dramatically lower in 1992/93, with some countries (e.g. Mozambique and Zimbabwe) having figures below 20% and none of the five (out of nine) main affected countries having estimates over 40%.
61 DHA = UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (predecessor to OCHA).
Assessment of needs

In April 1992, findings of the crop and food supply missions were summarised in the joint FAO/WFP Alert no. 227. The aggregate cereal import requirements for the 10 SADC countries for the next crop year were estimated at 6.1 million metric tons (MMT), mostly of maize, compared with less than 2 MMT in a normal year. As South Africa (a traditional supplier of maize to the sub-region) was also suffering from drought, it was evident that all imports would have to be obtained from overseas. Overall food aid requirements were estimated at 4 MMT, including programme (2.5 MMT) and emergency (1.5 MMT) food aid. Difficulties in identifying people requiring assistance were encountered in all countries, however, due to the absence of accepted criteria for targeting or capacity to apply the criteria when they existed.

The 1993 evaluation mission noted that the assessment of needs made in March/April 1992 related to the full period of the emergency, whereas the bulk of the food aid arrived only after the first few months of the emergency had passed. They argued that, even if the assessment of needs was correct for the full 12 months of the emergency, it was too large a quantity for the actual period (seven months) during which food was effectively available for distribution to the affected countries.

With regard to the 2002-03 emergency, FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment missions (CFSAMs) were conducted during the main harvest season of April and May 2002. The CFSAMs determined that there would be a 4 million ton cereal deficit, of which 1.2 million tons of emergency cereal food aid would be required between April 2002 and March 2003 to assist 12.8 million vulnerable people. Thus, overall, the 2002-03 cereals import and food aid requirement estimates were significantly lower than those of 1992-93.

In the 2002-03 emergency operation there was also a significant slippage in distributions, as noted elsewhere in this report, and, out of 992,459 tons of food aid approved under EMOP 10200 in June 2002, 213,905 tons (22%) were estimated to be still available for distribution at the end of the extended 12 months period of the emergency operation, at end June 2003. These carry-forward stocks reduced the gross requirements for the new one year emergency operation (2003-04) from 752,162 tons to a net amount of 538,257 tons.

Role of commercial food imports

The 1993 evaluation mission made a point that serious consideration needed to be given to the option between financial assistance for commercial imports and grant food aid. They felt that the definition of beneficiaries for food aid should be limited to subsistence farmers facing crop shortfalls and landless labourers dependent on farm work for their existence, whereas non-subsistence (e.g. cash crop) farmers and the urban populations should be covered by ensuring that sufficient food is available to purchase through normal market channels. The 1993 mission also felt that “vulnerable groups” should be covered through on-going, rather than exceptional, interventions and noted that the introduction of supplementary

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62 There was no GMO issue at that time, to complicate maize import origins.
63 The 1993 mission also noted that “political interference was allowed to play an extremely negative role in the targeting process in Zimbabwe”. This remained a problem a decade later. For the 2002-03 emergency much more attention was given to trying to target those most in need of food aid, with Malawi being a particularly good example.
64 Distributions at the end of the original nine months EMOP period (i.e. end March 2003) were only 62% of the original EMOP commitment level.
65 Two emergency funding facilities were created in the early 1990s and were available for the most recent emergency operation in southern Africa, namely the OCHA-managed Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) from which WFP borrowed US$20 million and WFP’s own Immediate Response Account (IRA) from which US$5 million was made available for the core EMOP.
feeding programmes for a short-term emergency had faced significant implementation problems, besides complicating logistics arrangements considerably.66

During the UN Consultation on Humanitarian Needs in Southern Africa, convened in Johannesburg in June 2002, and co-chaired by WFP and OCHA, the primary responsibility of Governments for promoting the food security of their populations was stressed. Participants called upon SADC and affected Member States to take all possible measures both to facilitate the delivery of relief aid and to minimise the levels of food aid required through external assistance. Promoting the role of the private sector and enabling commercial imports were cited as particularly important.

Coordination

The 1992-93 operation was organized as an ‘umbrella’ operation of nine individual country emergency operations. The WFP Country Director in Harare was designated as the Regional Emergency Coordinator for Transport and Food Aid Logistics. He also became the WFP coordinator for the Regional Logistics Advisory Centre (LAC) in Harare.67 The LAC established a valuable database which helped donors, agents and recipient governments with information on the status of all drought-related shipments. Weekly shipping bulletins were issued. In September 1992, LAC also began the publication of a monthly information bulletin, summarizing drought-related issues of concern to the sub-region, including alternative routes, if ports or corridors were congested. The LAC corridor costing matrix was particularly appreciated.68

For the 2002-03 emergency operation, a regional approach (one EMOP for all six countries) was adopted, in the hope that this would increase flexibility in moving foodstuffs between countries, according to operational requirements. Initially using out-posted core staff from the Regional Bureau in Kampala (ODK), in mid-2002 it was decided to establish a new Regional Bureau in Johannesburg (ODJ) to cover the six countries of the emergency, plus four others. This arrangement permitted a broader focus on programming and monitoring issues, than had been possible under the 1992-93 arrangements, besides again providing an important logistics coordination approach.69

Programming issues

As noted above, the 1993 evaluation mission felt that “an effort should have been made to avoid making a complex problem even more difficult to solve”, for instance by avoiding including in a drought emergency any special groups identified for programmes not directly related to the drought. The mission felt that the institution of completely new (short-term) programmes for supplementary feeding during a drought emergency operation only tended to strain the logistics capacity and staff resources in the affected country, without significant nutritional benefit for the targeted children. Even in countries with a great deal of information (e.g. Zambia) it proved difficult to judge the success of such interventions. We note later in this report that the same problems have arisen in 2002/3.

The 1993 evaluation mission also noted the significant variation in food baskets and ration levels between the nine separate EMOPs and the lack of clarity in some of the Letters of Understanding signed

66 In the 1992-93 period there were considerable World Bank concessional funding and other financial facilities available to fund commercial food imports, particularly in Zambia and Zimbabwe. Also, some donors provided aid for non-food imports (e.g. fuel oil for Zimbabwe) thus releasing scarce foreign exchange for food imports.
67 A Logistics Advisory Unit (LAU) was established in May 1992 by WFP in the Spoornet building in Johannesburg and was linked to LAC to provide essential information on port and corridor utilization.
68 Financial needs for the LAC were over-estimated, however. Of the US$24.3 million donated through WFP for the LAC, only US$13.8 million (57%) were spent or committed by September 1993.
69 Regional procurement was also an important function of ODJ in 2002-03. Local/regional procurement had been very limited in the 1992-93 operation, due to lack of regional supplies.
with the governments, some of which were poorly written. In general, these problems have been avoided in 2002-03, with a stronger regional programming intervention.

Undoubtedly, the establishment of a Regional Bureau in Johannesburg in mid-2002 permitted greater programme coherence and the possibility for enhanced quality control of basic documents. The Implementation Plans were a good innovation, to facilitate actual programme implementation after the approval of the regional EMOP.

**Monitoring**

The 1993 evaluation mission noted that, while monitoring up to Extended Delivery Points (EDPs) was adequate, monitoring beyond those points was haphazard at best. This appeared to be the weakest area of the relief operation. False economies, in terms of staffing numbers, and recruitment delays had a distinctly adverse effect on the operation.

During the 2002-03 operation serious attention was given to trying to develop region-wide minimum monitoring standards and proformas. WFP field staff members and implementing partners were made aware of the importance of end-use monitoring. Also, overall staffing of the 2002-03 emergency operation was better, particularly for programme staff.

Some comparative data of the two operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1992-93 (EMOPs 5052-60)</th>
<th>2002-03 (EMOP 10200)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Value of WFP food</td>
<td>US$154,370,827*</td>
<td>US$193,154,209**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total value of EMOP(s)</td>
<td>US$356,835,848*</td>
<td>US$507,273,091**</td>
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<td>WFP tonnage commitment</td>
<td>711,824***</td>
<td>992,459</td>
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<td>Tonnage distributed</td>
<td>709,451****</td>
<td>753,816*****</td>
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<tr>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
<td>7.8 million</td>
<td>10.26 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duration</td>
<td>12 months, from July 1992</td>
<td>9 months, from July 2002, extended to 12 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coverage</td>
<td>Nine countries</td>
<td>Six countries</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Revised figures.
**Original EMOP figures; does not include two Special Operations.
*** Increased to 845,392 tons during the course of the emergency.
**** For whole 1992-93 emergency operations period.
***** To May 2003.
Annex 6  - Country outlines

Lesotho

Country background

Lesotho’s position as an enclave of the Republic of South Africa (RSA) makes it dependent on its neighbour for access to seaports and transport links. Lesotho is no longer self-sufficient in foodstuffs and is increasingly dependent on the RSA for cereal imports, even in normal years. Arable land has decreased to less than 10% of total land area, compared to 13% in the 1960s. The three year yield average per hectare of maize has fallen from 1.2 tons in 1975 to 0.6 tons in 1995. (The RSA achieves some 2.5 tons per hectare). Although more than half of the working population is subsistence farmers, agriculture’s share of GDP has dropped from 31% in 1980 to 16% in 1997.70

While the last census, in 1996, estimated the population at 1.96 million (with a 2.1% annual growth rate in the decade up to that date), this may have overestimated the number of people actually living in Lesotho, as there is thought to be a significant floating population, who move regularly between Lesotho and the RSA. The rising mortality from an estimated 31% adult HIV infection rate is starting to have an impact on population size. While 83% of the population is still considered rural, 70% live in the densely populated western lowlands, while large parts of the eastern mountain areas are sparsely populated. The national unemployment rate is estimated at around 40%.

Negative factors in Lesotho’s development in recent years have been:

- The large retrenchment of Basotho mineworkers from the RSA; numbers have fallen by about half in the past decade; many families were dependent on remittances for survival.
- The political violence of 1998, which led to severe economic disruption.
- The end of the economic boom, which resulted from the massive Lesotho Highlands Water Project (LHWP) and its related construction work.
- The HIV/AIDS pandemic, which appears to be spreading largely unchecked amongst the sexually active adult population, particularly young adults.

With regard to nutritional levels, while stunting rates (height for age) remain high nationally, at around 33%, wasting rates for under-fives are relatively low, at 3.3%. Double orphans (i.e. loss of both parents), however, were found to be twice as malnourished as other children.

Overview of the WFP emergency operation in Lesotho

Under the original nine months EMOP document Lesotho was to receive 64,089 tons of commodities (maize meal, pulses and oil) out of a regional total of 992,459 tons (or some 6%), with a concentration on general distributions and emergency school feeding (to complement school feeding being carried out by the government and under the WFP development activity). The cereals component was estimated at 50,000 tons of the 64,089 tons food aid – equivalent to some 14% of the national cereal requirement for the crop/marketing year. The population to be covered by WFP emergency feeding was a peak figure of 445,000 during the lean season, or some 20 percent of the current estimated population of 2.2 million.

During the original nine months period of the EMOP (July 2002 to March 2003), WFP/Lesotho distributed only 41 percent of the targeted tonnage (i.e. some 24,691 tons, compared to a target of some 60,178 tons), however. The reduced achievement level is partly due to a slow startup in the first three months (July-September).

Challenges during implementation

Assessment methodologies need review. In Lesotho there was a significant discrepancy between the May 2002 FAO/WFP CFSAM local production figures and later Government of Lesotho (GOL) figures, which were appreciably higher. For this reason, the April 2003 FAO/WFP CFSAM was cautious before releasing figures and awaited the outcome of the May 2003 LVAC.

The Country Office adopted an optimistic assessment of the capacity to implement activities and deliver foodstuffs, despite evident capacity and pipeline constraints. A major problem has been the pipeline weakness, as the operation was living “hand to mouth” with very limited stocks at the Extended Delivery Points. This is due in large part to the need to mill whole maize into maize meal (in mills in Lesotho or the RSA) and the one month allowance that needs to be made between the delivery of maize and its conversion into maize meal.

The operation has been constrained by an overall capacity problem at all levels – Country Office, government counterparts71 and NGO implementing partners. While the Country Office was able to gradually built up its capacity at the field level, largely through the recruitment of UNVs and national officers, the fact that most of these were new and inexperienced in WFP policies and procedures meant that they needed appreciable training and guidance.

A major issue has been how to target those who have specific needs (e.g. HIV/AIDS sufferers) who have been unable to meet their food requirements. For this, there should have been stronger support from the regional office, ODJ, with vulnerability assessment mapping (VAM), in order to identify the “hot spots” that justify continued WFP emergency intervention, through a system of mapping overlays. To date (May 2003), practical support from ODJ in the area of VAM has been limited.

While Food for Work appeared to have strong government support at the theoretical level, there was less support at the practical level and attempts at FFW in Lesotho under the EMOP have been very limited in scope.72 Concerns about not “making work” to justify food ration distributions, about weak or non-existent technical supervisory support and about sustainability are all valid. Although FFW was undertaken fairly successfully for more than two decades under WFP’s development programme, much of the institutional memory of this type of activity now appears to have been lost.

For several decades, also, WFP and CRS ran an extensive collaborative food aid programme in Lesotho in support of government and church-run maternal child health clinics, distributing blended foods, fortified cereals and vegetable oil. This programme was halted a decade ago and the institutional memory of these activities has faded. Although some MCH activities have started under the emergency, it could be questionable to re-start such a programme on a more extensive and longer-term basis.

In Lesotho, there is no coordinated NGO response to the emergency (as in Malawi). NGO presence in the country was depleted after the 1998 political upheavals and has not yet recovered.73 Nevertheless, WFP has been able to enter into partnership for the EMOP with four international NGOs (Catholic Relief Services, Dorcas Aid International, the Salvation Army and World Vision International), as well as with the Lesotho Red Cross, Christian Health Association of Lesotho (CHAL) and the Ministry of Education.

71 The main counterparts are the Disaster Management Authority (DMA) for overall policy and programming issues, the Food Management Unit (FMU) for logistics and some line Ministries for specific programmes, in particular the Ministry of Education for the emergency school feeding activity.

72 The government’s Disaster Management Authority (DMA) believes that “food for work” is a valid activity for the forthcoming “recovery” stage, as it would help to avoid dependence on free food hand-outs. FFW may face problems, however, due to shortage of labour in some villages, where the populations have been severely affected by HIV/AIDS.

73 There are now few international NGOs in Lesotho, but many national NGOs, most with a low capacity.
Following a slow start up, by May 2003 most NGOs were functioning reasonably well in terms of food distribution. Reporting on their operations is problematic, however, and the CO faces problems in getting the weekly IP reports on time. Three Implementing Partners (World Vision International, CRS and the Lesotho Red Cross) felt that the WFP reimbursement to cover their post-FDP distribution costs was too low, at US$22.50 per ton. All three stated that they have to use other donor funding to support the WFP operations. A review of the IP distribution costs should be undertaken.

WFP has field officers at six of the EDPs (or “sub-stations”). Basic output monitoring is undertaken, although not extensively. Field officers and monitors undertake both distribution and post-distribution monitoring (PDM), including visits to villages to interview selected households. Standardized PDM forms were being introduced by ODJ during May 2003. The CO would appreciate more assistance from ODJ with monitoring system enhancement and field staff training. A trial run of the proposed “sentinel site” (Community and Household Surveillance - CHS) system was undertaken in Lesotho in early 2003. The CO had concerns about the amount of resources needed to introduce such a system on a nationwide basis and about its sustainability. It is clear that it is being introduced too late to benefit the first year EMOP, but should benefit the second year EMOP and eventual PRRO.

External food procurement (where necessary) and transport is arranged by ODJ. All in-kind food for Lesotho arrives through the port of Durban. Food is delivered by WFP directly to the ten EDPs, of which seven are in the lowlands and three in the mountains. The government’s long established Food Management Unit (FMU) is responsible for handling and storage at the EDPs, as a government counter-part contribution to the emergency operation. The FMU also arranges transport from EDPs to final distribution points (FDPs), of which there are 179 nationwide. WFP reimburses the FMU US$21 per ton for delivery from the EDPs to FDPs.

FMU’s efficiency has not been as good as it should have been during the emergency. Apart from delays caused by WFP’s pipeline and milling problems, some of the blame for delayed and erratic deliveries must be laid at the door of the FMU, which has sometimes been slow in delivery from EDPs to FDPs and has been poor in reporting accurately on stock levels at the various EDPs. Given that the FMU has been established without interruption for over thirty years, since the late 1960s, under one name or another, this is disappointing. According to IPs, trucks are sometimes not loaded on time and arrive late at distribution points, thus obliging villagers to travel home late in the day or to return the following day for their rations. The FMU has retained its efficiency in warehouse management, however.

The introduction of the COMPAS system met with significant problems and a large backlog of documents and payments built up. Training was not given until early 2003. COMPAS was expected to be operational for FDP distribution reports only by end May 2003, due to late installation of the FDP component and a backlog of data entry.

Some NGOs complained about the problems caused by lack of radio communications and significant loss of staff time. For instance, if trucks do not arrive at a distribution point, IP staff may have to travel considerable distances to the nearest landline phone to check on their whereabouts. The FMU also has inadequate communications, despite their having been established for over three decades. If WFP is considering a longer-term PRRO in Lesotho, more investment in a sound communications system for itself and its operating partners should be made, as it would lead to considerable improvements in operational efficiency and cost-savings.

74 CRS only started its general food distribution operations (in Maseru Rural district) in March 2003 and had to start “from scratch”, with associated significant teething problems.
75 The recent strengthening of the South African Rand/Lesotho Maloti (which are on a par) against the US dollar has had an impact on the reimbursement rate, as local expenditures are now comparatively higher in dollar terms.
76 The late 2002/early 2003 appreciation in the value of the South African Rand (to which the Lesotho currency is tied) must have had a negative impact on the FMU’s costs, due to the dollar-based WFP reimbursement rate.
Malawi

Background

After 30 years of authoritarian rule under President Banda, which did not achieve significant and broad based economic development, the new government introduced an economic reform agenda in 1994. However, government and civil society in Malawi face challenges on several fronts. Among them are rapid population growth, HIV/AIDS, limited natural resources and resource degradation. Also, high levels of inequality have resulted from years of elitist development strategies, aggravated by the effects of recurring droughts.

Malawi’s economy is largely based on agriculture. This sector accounts for more than 90% of the country’s export earnings (tobacco, tea, cotton, coffee and sugar), 45% of GDP and supports 90% of the population. Subsistence agriculture is still the main source of income for the rural household. However, the major source of cash income for Malawian households is wage income, although participation in the cash economy by the poor is limited.

After a period of good economic policies between 1995 and 1997, the pace of reform has decelerated in recent years, expenditure control has weakened, and agricultural prospects have become mixed. Control of inflation and high interest rates has been insufficient. The recent drought also adversely affected the economy. As a consequence, Malawi remains heavily dependent on foreign aid.

Poverty is widespread, deep and severe in Malawi. Data from the 1998 Integrated Household Survey suggested that 65% of the population (about 6.3 million people) were poor, and 29% living in extreme poverty. The fact that the richest 20% of the population consumed 46% of total goods and services while the poorest 20% consumed only 6% points to significant inequalities in wealth and poverty.

Consumption is also unequally distributed between rural and urban areas (Gini coefficient of 0.37 in rural as opposed to 0.52 in urban areas). Social and human capital, as well as income indicators, is very poor. Main causes of poverty are the limited access to land, low education, poor health status, limited off-farm employment and lack of access to credit. The Malawian Poverty Reduction Strategy is based on three pillars, - broad-based growth, human capital development, and four types of safety nets (targeted input programme, public works, targeted nutrition programme and direct welfare transfers).

Updated HIV/AIDS figures indicate, that 15% of women and men aged 15 to 49 were infected at the end of 2001. Women are disproportionately affected: 440,000 out of 780,000 infected adults are women (56 percent). 65,000 children (0 – 15 years) are infected. The estimated number of AIDS orphans was 470,000 at the end of 2001. Important geographical differences can be observed in the HIV/AIDS prevalence between districts. The most affected district is Blantyre with an HIV/AIDS prevalence of 38.5%, the least affected Ntchisi with 9.6%.

Inequalities between women and men are still pronounced. In 1998 Malawi ranked 136 in the gender-related development index (GDI) among 143 countries, compared to a rank 121 among 137 countries some years ago.

FAO estimates that 33% of the Malawian population was undernourished in 1998-2000 as compared to 49% in 1990-92. As a result of food insecurity in the above described context, chronic malnutrition rates are extremely high. In 2001, 53% of children under five were stunted (23% severely so). 31% of under-fives were underweight (8.1% severely), and 4.7% were wasted. Infant and under-five mortality are at 104 and 189 deaths per 1,000 live births respectively. These figures reflect the structural and long-term dimensions of the crisis in Malawi.

Overview of EMOP

At the end of February 2002, the Government of Malawi declared a state of national disaster. A FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment Mission characterised the acute food security situation in 2001/2002 as follows: i) the total maize production of 1,539,000 million tons was 10% below the poor harvest of the previous year mainly due to erratic rainfall with long dry spells; ii) the import requirements of 485,000 tons was to be met by commercial imports, and food aid; iii) about 3.2 million people were seriously affected by reduced food availability and purchasing power and were in need of emergency food assistance; and iv) emergency provision of agricultural inputs was needed to support farmers for winter cultivation and the next agricultural season.

Some food crisis related deaths in early 2002 was considered a product of a complex combination of bad weather conditions (floods and drought) and inadequate policies in the context of high underlying vulnerability factors that overstretched poor Malawians’ coping strategies. These coping strategies included *ganyu* (casual farm labour), sale of charcoal, fishing and weaving as well as reducing the level of daily consumption, thefts of other’s food, sales of livestock and pre-mature harvesting which were all intensified during the crisis compared to normal livelihood activities.

The July-August VAC assessment updated the cereal production figures and calculations of food deficit. It indicated a dramatic rise in local maize prices which only recently began to stabilise, and slightly adjusted the number of people in need to 3,250,000 at the peak of the crisis. The most seriously affected areas were the Central region (50%), followed by the Southern Region (41%). The Northern Region was less affected (10%).

The Malawian EMOP under the regional EMOP 10200 addressed the crisis through a relief programme targeted to the most affected districts and areas within the districts, and complementary activities in the field of emergency school feeding and nutrition/mother and child health (MCH) programmes. The two latter programmes – as well as the HIV/AIDS programme which was accommodated under the EMOP later – are linked to the Malawian country programme, which comprises similar activities.

The EMOP was supposed reach up to 2.1 million people through targeted general food distributions at the beginning, and up to 3.1 million at the peak of the crisis in December 2002 – March 2003, up to 385,700 beneficiaries in the nutrition/MCH programme and up to 160,000 pupils under the emergency school feeding. The following table presents the different reviews of beneficiary figures and the related number of beneficiaries.

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### Beneficiary figures EMOP 12000 in Malawi

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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>GFD * Women</th>
<th>GFD * Men</th>
<th>Nutrition/MCH ** Women</th>
<th>Nutrition/MCH ** Men</th>
<th>School feeding** Women</th>
<th>School feeding** Men</th>
<th>School feeding** Total</th>
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<td>EMOP document</td>
<td>1,629,250</td>
<td>1,559,150</td>
<td>3,188,000</td>
<td>254,500</td>
<td>131,200</td>
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</table>

* at the peak (March 2003)
** per month
*** additional 54,600 beneficiaries were planned to be reached through a HIV/AIDS component.

These reference figures were regularly adapted taking into consideration the resources and pipeline situation of the regional operation and decreasing needs after the harvest. Subsequently new targets were fixed.

The complementary activities in Malawi targeted and reached the following beneficiaries:

- School feeding in targeted food insecure areas targeted 160,000 pupils in eight districts and reached a total 67,485 pupils (33,068 girls and 34,417 boys) in April 2003, down from 159,235 (79,200 girls and 60,035 boys) in January, when the emergency school feeding started.
- The supplementary and therapeutic feeding – a longstanding programme under the development and country programme in Malawi – targeted 139,000 moderately and severely malnourished children under five, malnourished pregnant and lactating women and the caretakers of the severely malnourished children at the peak of the crisis. In April, WFP supported all 94 NRUs and 62 supplementary feeding centres (including outreach) across the country. In April, a total of 43,455 beneficiaries (31,350 women/girls and 12,105 boys) were reached through this nutrition/mother and child health (MCH) programme.
- The current programme on HIV/AIDS, which is part of the country programme activities, reaches 7,500 households in four districts. Food aid is one component in a broader community based care approach, which is implemented through NGOs bases on community volunteers for infected and affected households and individuals.

### Achievements and challenges during implementation

With respect to the EMOP objectives achievements are illustrated by the following:

- Nutrition surveys indicate normal, relatively low levels of child malnutrition (below 10 percent wasting prevalence among under fives). The occurrence of pellagra – a risk discussed at the beginning of the EMOP, when complementary food items were insufficient in the distributed ration – was avoided.
- Distress sale of household assets as reported in 2001/2002 was not observed in 2003. Prices of livestock (goats and chicken) were reported back to normal after having fallen to less than half and sometimes one fifth of this prices one year earlier. Fewer thefts of food were observed in communities.
- No evidence of unusual school dropouts occurred. Attendance during the hungry season in WFP-assisted schools reached 80 percent, which was significantly above normal levels. An SCF/UK study on children’s perception of the crisis illustrates the beneficial psychological effect on children in villages that received food aid and thus provided an “healthy environment”.

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79 Figures reported in the monthly reports are dispatch figures, not actual distribution figures.
No signs of distress migration as seen a year earlier when people moved to the cassava growing areas and the estate sector to find means of survival,

the food aid provided under the EMOP allowed poor farmers to spend more time in their fields instead of seeking daily labour income and reduced the need to consume green maize. This contributed to a better harvest in 2003.

WFP managed high distribution target achievements from the very beginning. Only during the rainy season some decline in delivery performance had to be observed due to inaccessibility of some areas and insufficient possibilities for pre-positioning. A maximum of 2.88 million beneficiaries received more than 200,000 tons of food between July 2002 and April 2003. Peak distribution was in February and March 2003 when some 33,000 tons were moved and distributed monthly.

The logistic challenge to supply a land-locked country with unusual high quantities of food was well mastered. The IFRC fleet of 50 trucks contributed to the high delivery rate, especially in school in remote areas. These are FDPs with relatively small quantities where commercial transporters are reluctant to go.

WFP made a significant contribution to the good functioning of the NGO consortium through open, transparent and partnership-oriented attitude and behaviour. WFP staff’s competence and commitment (“sense of urgency” and service orientation) was emphasized by NGO IPs. The NGO consortium of 10 major partners under the leadership of CARE helped timely delivery and outreach in all districts.

The consortium and the government disaster coordinating body were the key to good coordination among relevant stakeholders, which was effective especially at district level (district relief committees, district civil protection committees). WFP was credited for strengthening the collaboration between government/district authorities and NGOs.

Better resourcing compared to previous emergencies in Malawi was attributed to the regional EMOP approach and the intense advocacy. Easy reallocation of consignments between countries contributed to almost 100 percent funding of the EMOP. This also meant that NGOs could adequately be refunded allowing them to concentrate on implementation without having to divert efforts to resource mobilization.

WFP pursued a proactive planning of the transition phase. Already in March 2003 a concept paper on a food based safety net programme was shared with donors. Letters of intent for future collaboration during a transition phase were signed with all current IPs. Targeted general distribution was phased out through reduction to half rations for all beneficiaries in April, to one quarter in May and to no distribution in June.

Challenges of the EMOP included:

- Needs assessments underestimated the role of informal cross-boarder imports and the role of the regional food economy. Parallel assessment efforts (Targeted Input Programme, VAC, CFSAM) were not well linked and synergies not achieved. The VAC process in Malawi is not likely to produce timely information about (emergency) food aid needs. It is now dominated by SCF/UK with a focus on developing new food economy zones, training of some 15 staff in food economy assessments and development of livelihood baselines.

- Existing WFP guidelines, e.g. school feeding, were perceived as insufficiently operational for quick implementation in a given country context, esp. in emergencies. Manuals and guidelines which are more operational were requested. The lack of standard reporting forms and hands on M&E guidelines at the beginning of the operation led to significant efforts and time spent by country staff on forms and development of procedures. These are, however, tasks, which should be fulfilled at corporate rather than CO level. Similar observations were made for the lack of an operational policy and corporate guidance for negotiations with NGOs on implementation cost budgeting.
• After initial sensitisation through NGOs, some community and political leaders mobilised against the criteria and approach of the JEFAP. Through broad based inter-personnel communication of WFP and IP staff and mass media campaigns (radio and flyers) good community participation could be achieved.

• Targeting: Effective targeting is the key to success of a large scale emergency operation. An evaluation of the targeting efforts in Malawi confirmed that i) WFP food aid is consumed by food insecure households in the targeted villages, ii) communities have developed mechanisms to ‘manage’ available food aid in response to the crises, iii) beneficiaries consider up to two third of all households falling in the categories of ultra and very poor, and recognise that current needs exceeds available resources, iv) food aid is shared with relatives and the wider communities to meet social obligations, values and customs, and v) communities accept as reasonable and just that some benefits also reach the chief.

• Communication problems between programming and logistics, transporters and warehoused, and IPs led to delayed distributions and burden to IPs and beneficiaries.

• The role and responsibilities of sub-offices was not very well defined. WFP staff and IPs often were not clear about lines of communication and lines of command. More thorough analysis of the need and the role/authority of sub-offices, especially in a small country like Malawi would have been necessary.

• Although IPs congratulated WFP Malawi for its excellent team, improvements are needed in the areas of finance, M&E and VAM. These functions were not always well performed. The reassignment process for WFP staff tends to be too long.

• Donors in Malawi are reluctant to finance more development oriented and longer-term food aid based food security interventions. WFP has not yet achieve a convincing concept and role in a food-based safety net approach.

Specific challenges of the complementary activities included:

• The CO made commendable efforts to integrate more development oriented complementary activities. Experience from the country programme helped to set up the emergency school feeding programme. However, it still took about five months before the targeted schools were identified and assessed, the teachers trained, the parents’ groups established, the equipment and the food in place. The start of this process very early in the EMOP allowed for a beginning of the school feeding activities at field level at the most critical period of the year.

• The nutrition/MCH programme faced the same technical problems as the country programme at the beginning, e.g. indicator used for identification of malnourished children, feeding protocols, follow-up of beneficiaries, monitoring and reporting. A consolidation of beneficiary figures was necessary at the beginning of the programme and needs regular update. The review of the feeding protocols and important capacity building efforts had been launched and still continue. NGO play a major role in ensuring the quality of the programme. However, it will take some time until the improved approach will get ground at field level. Close follow-up and supervision are needed for the programme to be effective.

• The targeted HIV/AIDS food aid intervention is new in Malawi. It was planned under the country programme and finally accommodated under the EMOP. The programme is still at pilot stage with some major challenges ahead, such as targeting and assurance of non-food care components.

The future programme

The April 2003 FAO/WFP CFSAM highlights that maize production (accounting for 95 percent of total cereal production) is expected to reach 1.9 million mt, increase by 22 percent over the last year’s final harvest estimate. The overall food supply should be adequate. Some pockets, however, have experienced crop failures for the third consecutive year. An estimated 131,500 people will require food assistance from July onwards, increasing to about 400,000 people in January, requiring a total on 30,600 mt of cereals. This food aid quantity should be procured locally.

Access to adequate food is again the major food security problem for a significant part of the population in Malawi. Households affected by chronic poverty and destitution, HIV/AIDS and crop failure are in need of assistance.

WFP plans to target a total of 192,000 beneficiaries through food for work/food for training, 133,250 through nutrition/MCH, 175,000 through school feeding and 220,000 through HIV/AIDS programmes. These components continue and significantly scale-up the existing complementary activities under EMOP 10200. No free relief food assistance is envisaged, 69 percent of the expenditure of the new EMOP in Malawi is planned to be spent on human resource development (40 percent on HIV/AIDS, 20 percent on primary schools and 9 percent on MCH), and 31 percent on food for work. Minimum packages of support should be ensured in collaboration with co-operating and implementing partners.

The Malawian case should be taken as an example for developing and piloting a food-based safety net approach. The new PRSP, positive donor attitudes towards safety net concepts in the framework of PRSP, the lack of broad-based experience with safety nets, and WFP’s well-accepted current role in the country provide excellent framework conditions for such an innovative programme.

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Mozambique

In 2001/02 Mozambique drought caused serious crop losses in the south of the country with around one third of the expected harvest being lost in that region. In most of the north, however, harvests were good, so good that as much as 200,000 tons of maize are estimated to have been exported informally to Malawi. It is too expensive to ship grains from the north to the south because of the poor roads infrastructure. Food availability in the southern districts and a few in centre-interior was very low in 2002. To make matters worse these are areas that were hit badly by the floods of 2000, from which households made only a slow recovery.

By early 2003, some 650,000 persons in southern and some central districts were in need of food assistance. In addition to the 53,000 tons of food aid delivered under the EMOP by late 2002, another 31,000 tons were needed through to March 2003. Yet, this relates to just 3% of the population. Of the six countries in the EMOP Mozambique is the least badly affected, though pockets of malnutrition have been some of the worst in the region.

Background

Almost 70% of the population is considered to live below a poverty line of just US$0.40 a day. Geographically, poverty correlates with isolation, with areas of low population density, and with the inland districts of parts of the centre and much of the south of the country. However, there are smaller numbers and concentrations of poverty in the densely inhabited coastal regions, on the trade corridors and in the cities. The south has been hard hit by the loss of opportunities to migrate to South Africa, the area formerly having been for almost a century a major supplier of male migrant labour to the mining and urban economy of South Africa. This has limited livelihood opportunities for the people living in the semi-arid areas in the south and centre of the country.

The rural non-farm economy and the urban economy of manufacturing and services are little developed. Most Mozambicans depend on farming for their livelihoods and their own food supply for at least half of their consumption needs. Outside of some small areas of irrigated land, or that under commercial estates and plantations, farmers operate smallholdings manually, or with some ox traction, under low input-low output systems that depend on the rains. With only small areas tilled and low yields, smallholder food supplies are limited and vulnerable to bad weather.

Mozambique has a highly dispersed population – about 5/sq.km – and the huge travel distances compromised the quality and coverage of the VAC assessments. However, the December 2002 VAC showed the number of people in need had increased by about 11% since July of that year. The revised VAC estimate indicated a total of 654,865 people would require assistance until the next harvest. Over a third of the affected population was in Maputo, Gaza and Inhambane. Households were suffering from the cumulative effects of HIV and drought. HIV prevalence is estimated to be 13% nationally with the 16.8% in the central region for the 15 – 49 year age group. Overall acute malnutrition (wasting) in children 6-59 months is 6.4%, being highest in Gaza (11.2%) and Maputo (8%). Chronic malnutrition (stunting) was found to be 37.9% overall, ranging from 31.9% (Gaza) to 42% (Tete). Only 37.2% of the households interviewed had access to safe water and 7.4% reported having to spend more time to get water.

EMOP performance

The EMOP target figure of 440,000 beneficiaries per month was lower than the VAC figures. The CFSAM figure in June 2002 was 515,000 of which WFP assumed responsibility for 65% (440,000) under the assumption that NGOs would cover the remainder. The September VAC figure was raised to 590,000, and again to 655,000 in December. But the reality was that WFP distributed 100% of the food that it received, in spite of the fact that this was less than 50% of the target figure.
WFP worked in 37 districts with 6 sub-offices (one of which, in the north, was only for the Country Programme). By December 2002, 43 partners were identified; 80% (60% in food volume) of these were national NGOs or local administrations. They were, however, unevenly spread in the country and some areas of priority were not adequately covered. Capacity building with 43 IPs was an overwhelming, if not impossible, task for WFP (see above section).

General food distribution accounted for a only 15% of the total EMOP, with 85% going to FFW. This was not imposed, but the WFP programme attempted to link with the government’s plan of action for the mitigation of drought. The rationale was that this was a protracted emergency, cyclical in nature (though exacerbated by HIV/AIDS), and affecting populations whose major requirement was infrastructural and economic insurance against natural disasters. WFP’s emergency programme ran parallel (in time and geographically) to the Food-for-Development programme under the CP and the EMOP also enabled the expansion of school feeding to areas of concern.

The difficulties in the FFW continuum were, however, lack of complementary inputs and the fact that FFW was not always self-targeting of the most vulnerable populations. The MADER (Ministry of Agriculture) programme was quite sophisticated (it included a high level of technical assistance) but for most of the EMOP simple road and canal clearance projects were undertaken. Some NGO partners were able to combine this with a wider community planning and capacity building programme.

Elsewhere in this report we have commented on two central issues to the WFP Mozambique response: constraints brought about by NGO capacity and coverage, and why it was that acute malnutrition rates increased in some areas of the country and whether WFP’s response was appropriate to this new reality.

**Issues raised by NGO partners**

- NGOs (especially in Inhambane province) had to hire vehicles, but the costs were not covered by LTSH. Although the sharing of fixed costs with WFP was later introduced, the lesson is that in such circumstances sufficient funds for vehicles should be made available early on in an emergency, and not dependent on tonnages forthcoming at that stage;
- In some cases there were long delays (up to 3 months) in paying the food for the FFW undertaken. This happened in October-December when asset depletion was increasing. Also, the rotation of FFW recipients meant that only one month of food per family was the norm; then the same family might not receive until after a gap of four months. As a short-term food safety net this may have been acceptable; in the context of the EMOP where asset depletion was to be at least prevented, it is not.
- Delays in food arrivals also meant that some water conservation projects were late to be implemented, thus defeating their purpose.
- The imbalance in food commodity provision (i.e. often no pulses or oil arrived on time at the EDP, and a second trip to the FTP was not affordable under the LTSH agreements) apparently increased the amount of local market sales of maize as people sought to acquire other foodstuffs.
- Some of the VAC findings did not take into account existing NGO knowledge since several of these agencies were not contacted during the exercises.
Swaziland

Country background

The Kingdom of Swaziland is classified as an LIFDC, with a Human Development Index rank of 113. The GDP per capita (PPP US$) is $3,987, but masks a highly skewed income distribution, with 66% of the population (of about one million) estimated to be living under the official poverty line of US$10 per month. The number of orphaned children in Swaziland is estimated to be 40-50,000 and is mainly due to the rampant HIV/AIDS pandemic. The infant mortality rate per 1,000 live births is estimated to be 62 and that for under-fives 90. Agriculture contributes some 10% of GDP. Swaziland has been affected by declining employment and remittances from South Africa.

Regarding nutrition, stunting amongst under-fives (low height for age compared to the standard) was estimated at 32.2%, but wasting (low weight for height compared to the standard) at only 1.4% in April 2003.

In 2002, erratic weather for a third consecutive year, including a prolonged dry spell, severely affected crops. Production was 18% below the previous year’s harvest and 37% below the average of the previous five years. The total cereal import requirement in the 2002-03 crop year was estimated at 111,000 tons, over two times as much as the previous year.

Overview of the WFP emergency operation in Swaziland

Swaziland is the smallest of the six countries covered under the regional EMOP, in terms of both geographical and population size (approx. one million people). WFP activities in Swaziland are focused on general distributions, which started for 144,000 and rose to 290,000 people (down to 152,000 people in the mid-year 2003 post-harvest period) in the drought-affected areas of the eastern lowveld and central part of the country. There was also a school feeding programme for 25,000 children in 80 primary schools in two drought-affected districts, as well as assistance to community care for highly vulnerable children (12,500 children at approx. 100 neighborhood care points). Finally, WFP provided CSB to 11,000 pregnant and lactating women at pre- and post-natal clinics.

The total originally proposed tonnage was 26,166 MTN, comprised of 17,589 tons of maize, 2,659 tons of pulses, 986 tons of vegetable oil and 4,932 tons of corn-soya blend. It is notable that whole maize is currently distributed in Swaziland, there being no government prohibition. This facilitates delivery, as no time lags need to be allowed for milling.

Food distributions increased from 1,524 tons in August 2002 to a peak of 4,041 tons in January 2003. Total food distributions during the nine months period of the first phase of the regional EMOP (July 2002 to March 2003) were 21,142 tons, or some 77% of the revised target. Given recurrent pipeline problems for certain commodities, this was a good achievement.

Challenges during implementation

Given that there was no existing WFP presence in Swaziland, the office had to start from a zero base, with consequent need to secure office space, transfer staff, recruit staff etc. The office set-up was reasonably rapid, however, with a team coming from Maputo and another IT/TC team from Johannesburg. COMPAS has been established since September and is now operational at two sites in the country.

A new Emergency Coordinator (EC – i.e. head of office) arrived in March 2003 – the third EC since the operation started, the previous two having been short-term consultants. The new EC is a longer-term WFP staff member. Hopefully, this marked the beginning of a period of more stability in staffing. Although the Regional Bureau (RB) has been supportive, the core staff had not made many visits –
although there had been missions to support training, press/advocacy issues and M&E. Some CO staff members felt that the RB did not adopt a coordinated approach in their requests for information and data. This put extra pressure on CO staff to prepare reports for different parts of ODJ in different ways.  

National staff was recruited fairly expeditiously, but some are recent University graduates with no prior work experience and, at times, this may cause problems when they are working with possibly more experienced NGO field staff. As DSC budgets are being cut and international staff numbers possibly reduced, the planned training of national staff in WFP policies, procedures and systems assumes a greater importance.

At the start of the operation in mid-2002, some of the Implementing Partners were weak, with no recent experience in food aid operations. From early 2003, there was a period of consolidation, with serious attention being given to strengthening the capacity of the IPs, both through provision of office and warehouse equipment (plus bicycles and motorbikes) and, more importantly, training in targeting, reporting and monitoring.

WFP currently works with seven NGOs in Swaziland as the main implementing partners, namely: African Cooperative Action Trust (ACAT), Swaziland Red Cross Society, Caritas/Swaziland, Lutheran Development Service (LDS), Save the Children Fund, Swaziland Farmers Development Federation (SFDF) and World Vision.

It would be interesting if the CO could write up a post-operational assessment of the capacity of the various NGOs, noting their strong and weak points. Perhaps ODJ could consider devising a standardized format, so that comparisons could be made between countries. An annual NGO performance appraisal form (for internal use only) could also be considered. If kept on the corporate archives in ODJ, these appraisals could be useful for future reference, if WFP needs to engage in a new emergency operation in the future.

Post-distribution monitoring (PDM) was being done with WFP’s own staff. WFP has seven field-based food aid monitors who conduct distribution monitoring at distribution sites and post-distribution monitoring at household level. Swaziland is now part of the regional PDM system that has been developed by ODJ. The WFP food monitors will use the systematized, quantitative PDM questionnaire forms to conduct monthly household visits to randomly-selected beneficiary and non-beneficiary households in different operational areas. The system aims to collect information especially on the beneficiary use of and access to food aid.

Swaziland will be part of the regional Community and Household Surveillance (CHS) system – i.e. “sentinel sites”. It was expected that this would start in June 2003. In May 2003, WFP/Mbabane was in the process of identifying national partners and confirming the CHS sites, of which there will be about a dozen nationwide.

In the initial period, ODJ made sufficient resources available to the CO. 83 Since the Swaziland satellite office reports to the Maputo CO, the Maputo office does the pipeline planning for Swaziland. The CO hoped to be able to build up a three months’ stock at the central warehouses/EDPs as the operation stabilized. Pipeline breaks and a lack of certain commodities occurred. For instance, first supplies of corn-soya blend (CSB) were not received until January 2003, two-thirds of the way through the original EMOP time period.

82 In terms of regular reporting, there are daily “bullet points”, weekly situation reports (SITREPs), monthly distribution reports and Standardized Project Reports (SPRs). There is also a considerable amount of “ad hoc” reporting, following specific requests for information and data.

83 When the EMOP began in July 2002, Mozambique loaned food to Swaziland (maize, pulses and vegoil).
Overland transport from the ports of Maputo (60% of receipts for Swaziland) and Durban was originally arranged by ODJ Logistics Section using South African transporters, but food was delayed initially in Maputo port. On-forwarding from Maputo is now arranged by the Maputo logistics office and is working better. ODJ continues to handle Durban arrivals. There have also been delays in the arrival of purchased commodities.

In-kind foodstuffs arrive by road or rail from Maputo port or by road from Durban, while some regional purchases may arrive by road from South Africa. These are delivered to central warehouses, from where WFP arranges transport to the eleven EDPs, using private transporters. The EDPs are managed by the NGOs, who arrange onward transport to the 179 final distribution points. WFP is negotiating a larger central warehouse in order to try to store up to three months’ food supply centrally for the new EMOP. Finding reliable local transporters for transport from the central warehouses to the EDPs has been a problem. Most of the large, reliable transporters in Swaziland are operating regionally, mostly involved in the transport of Swaziland’s main export crop, sugar.

Two NGOs met by the third RTE mission (ACAT and SCF) stated that the current reimbursement rate for transport from EDPs to FDPs and subsequent distribution costs (at US$35 per ton) was too low, given the recent appreciation of the Rand/local currency against the US dollar. For the Letter of Understanding (LOU) for the next EMOP, they would like to see reimbursement based on the local currency, as their expenditures are in this currency.

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84 Maputo port has now been privatized, since April 2003.
Zambia

Background

Zambia is one of the poorest countries in the world. Despite decades of political stability it ranked 143 out of 161 countries in the UNDP human development index in 2001. The country was cited as the only country in the world with a lower ranking than in 1975. About 86 percent of 10.3 million Zambians live below the poverty line. Rural poverty is higher than poverty in urban areas and poverty is increasing compared to 1996, when about 69 percent of the population were classified as poor. Zambia has qualified for debt relief under the HIPC initiative and is currently preparing its PRSP.

Zambia has abundant agricultural and natural resources, but the economy is heavily dependant on copper, cobalt and zinc mining. Metal exports account for about 75 percent of the country’s income from foreign exchange. With the steady decline in the international prices in the mining sector, the economic situation of the country worsened over many years.

Agriculture contributes 15 percent to the GDP, but only 15 percent of arable land is cultivated. As the commercial farm sector is limited in size, most of the food production still comes from small farmers. Farming is dependent on rainfall and traditional technologies. Productivity is affected by chronic problems of access to markets and services. Several years of drought and some flooding have seriously reduced the coping capacities of families and communities. Livestock was severely diminished by diseases over the past few years.

HIV/AIDS is a serious problem in Zambia. Updated HIV/AIDS figures indicate, that over 21 percent of women and men aged 15 to 49 were infected at the end of 2001, with 59% of adults affected being women. 150,000 children (0 – 15 years) are infected and the estimated number of AIDS orphans was 570,000 at the end of 2001.

Gender is a critical issue. The UNDP gender-related development index (GDI) places Zambia in the lower tier of scored countries. The level has declined over the past two years.

FAO estimates that 50 percent of the Zambian population was undernourished in 1998-2000 (up from 45 percent in 1990-92). As a result of food insecurity in a context of poverty, macroeconomic decline and high prevalence of diseases (including HIV/AIDS), chronic malnutrition rates are extremely high (53.0 percent of under five children are stunted, with 27.8 severely stunted), infant mortality worsened from 108 per 1,000 to 112 per thousand between 1992 and 1996, and life expectancy decreased to 37 years (52 in 1980). This reflects the structural and long-term dimension of the crisis in Zambia.

Government programmes to address these problems have been constrained by i) disappointing economic growth (with some improvements in the past two years), ii) the HIV/AIDS pandemic and iii) political leadership with insufficient financial resources to deal with the crippling national debts and the problems of the citizens.

Overview of the EMOP86

On 29 May 2002, the Government of Zambia declared the food shortage a national disaster. A FAO/WFP Crop and Food Supply Assessment mission characterised the acute food security situation in 2001/2002 as follows87: i) five out of nine provinces of the country experienced a sharp reduction in yields and production of cereals, ii) the estimated harvest of maize, Zambia’s main staple, reached 606,000 tons in 2002, and was 24 percent below the 2001 harvest and 42 percent lower than the 2000 “normal” harvest; iii) an estimated 2.329 million Zambians were seriously affected and in need of international emergency food aid because of exhausted coping mechanisms after two consecutive reduced harvests; iv) the Southern Province was worst affected with an estimated 60 percent of the population in need of relief food aid; v) support for seeds and tools was needed to re-launch agricultural production.

Two VAC assessment missions in August and December 2002 updated the cereal production figures, and adjusted the number of people in need of food aid to 2.77 million for the period December to March. The more detailed analysis at household level revealed that i) Southern, Western and Lusaka Provinces were the worst affected, ii) seed supply was a problem in many households, iii) there is a relationship between areas with a high percentage of chronically ill and a high percentage of population in need of food assistance, iv) maize prices continued to increase (thus further impeding access to food for all consumers), and v) rainfall was poor at the beginning of the season.

The Zambian EMOP under the regional EMOP 10200 addressed the crisis through targeted general distribution of food, food for work activities and support to orphans and vulnerable children. The two latter components are related to the country programme, i.e., food for work in the field of conservation farming and support to orphans and vulnerable children in community schools and drop-in centres. Whereas general distribution and food for work activities are targeted to rural areas, the OVC component exclusively concentrates on Lusaka.

The EMOP was supposed to reach up to 2,800,000 million beneficiaries through targeted general food distribution and food for work, and up to 98,400 OVC at the peak of the crisis as identified by the VAC assessment. The following table presents the different reviews of beneficiary figures and the number of beneficiaries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Beneficiary figures EMOP 12000 in Zambia</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GFD/FFW</strong>*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>OVC</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Women</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMOP document</td>
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<tr>
<td>Implement/n strategy 12/02</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget revision Early 2003</td>
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</tbody>
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* at the peak (March 2003)
** per month

These reference figures were regularly adapted taking into consideration the resourcing and pipeline situation of the regional operation and decreasing needs after the harvest. New targets were thus fixed regularly.

86 EMOP document; EMOP implementations strategies and other project documents
Complementary activities (support to OVCs) reached 14,970 girls and 12,800 boys (total 27,700 children) in 64 community schools and drop-in centres in April 2003. This corresponds to coverage of 62, 28 and 21 percent respectively (depending on the different budgeted figures). In addition, 8,680 households received a family ration.

The EMOP was part of a wider humanitarian assistance response with programmes of the Government of Zambia, donors, WFP and NGOs.

Achievements and challenges

The Zambia CO had to manage an emergency operation under very difficult circumstances. After a period of scaling up under the bridging EMOP, the system was in place and prepared to further scale up in July (with beneficiary figures reaching nearly 800,000, i.e., more than 90% of the target), when the Government of Zambia decided in August 2002 to suspend all GM imports and GM distributions. This has tremendous effects on the operation at beneficiary, implementing partner and WFP level. A final decision was pending until end of October when the Government confirmed the decision after Zambian scientists had reviewed the issue.

Beneficiary figures dropped to 230,000 (27%) in August and only increased again to significant coverage in November 2002. In December 2002, pipeline and logistical problem again led to a drop in beneficiary figures. An important programme of the Government provided substantial quantities of cereals, however, which were distributed in the frame of a tripartite agreement with WFP and DFID. Beneficiary figures increased at the beginning of 2003. This situation led to a further stretching of coping mechanisms such as decrease in the number of meals, reduced expenditures on non food items, increased consumption of (sometimes poisonous) wild food, beyond normal livestock sales and borrowing of money. Teachers reported higher than normal school drop-outs. These are mechanisms which also are detrimental to food security in the medium and long run. However, available data suggest that there was no major increase in wasting rates among children.

At implementing partner and WFP level, the GMO issue led to frustration with the emergency response, discontent, lack of security for planning of food distributions, and lack of funds to maintain the system. Instead of having to scale up gradually, an enormous effort had to be made in a very short period at the end of the year, when non GM food was made available in significant amounts.

Logistics had to face many challenges, esp.

- Insufficient or inconsistent information about the pipeline due to problems with CTS and communication;
- Removal of GMO food and its transport to neighbouring countries – at a time, when non food GMO started to arrive and quite significant amount of government food also had to move to the affected districts;
- As no pre-positioning was possible, beneficiaries in some district could not receive regular distributions, esp. during the rainy season. The IFRC fleet made a significant contribution to improved deliveries to FDPs under difficult circumstances.

Apart from the GMO and logistical issue, major challenges of the EMOP in Zambia included:

- WFP capacities: WFP Zambia had to scale up from a relatively small country programme and a long established refugee programme. New staff was hired which had to be trained. New sub-offices were created and old expanded respectively, again with new staff. Although a lot of capable staff was recruited, not all positions could be filled as required, e.g. lack of international

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88These were the first months for which consistent data was presented in a monthly report.
finance officer, insufficient programming staff at sub-office level. Staff turn-over further complicated the situation and endangered achieving a consistent and continuous programme.

- Partner capacities: WFP Zambia was collaborating with a total of 13 implementing partners, some of them international NGOs others national, all with more or less experience in emergencies. The quality of implementation varied with different partners. Training, co-ordination meetings and regular co-operation and supervision at field level were used to improve on programme implementation. However, difficulties persisted, e.g., in the timely submission of reports and consolidation of accounts.

- Food distribution committees: Food distribution committees existed as part of the usual government disaster mitigation structure at village level. However, they were inactive and/or used to operate under less rigorous programmes. New committee members had to be recruited including more women. These committees had to be oriented and trained to fulfil the intended roles and responsibilities. Some committees did not adequately serve their population and had to be changed. The set-up of viable village structures takes time and an absorbs important human capacities.

- Targeting: Geographical targeting was done on the basis of the VAC assessment results and was generally accepted. The identification of beneficiaries at village level was done by the food distribution committees, facilitated by the IPs. Problems of inclusion and exclusion at village level led to sometimes several rounds of verification to establish a list of beneficiaries which follow the given targeting criteria. Not all IPs made the same effort and followed a rigorous approach in verifying beneficiary lists.

- Difficulties to scale food for work activities up to a significant level. The figures provided in the monthly reports only reflect part of the situation, e.g. CARE regularly reported beneficiaries under food for work because they intended to do so, and actually did in some district for a limited period in time. Major constraints were capacity and experience of partners, availability of non-food ingredients into such activities, the possibilities of identifying meaningful work on a huge scale, competition for labour during the agricultural season, etc.

- Phasing out of general food distribution: The Zambian approach of gradually reducing the number of beneficiaries while maintaining the ration level was not well received and accepted by the beneficiaries. Discussion at village level and with IP indicated that beneficiaries would have preferred the approach chosen in Malawi, i.e., reducing the ration while maintaining the number of beneficiaries.

Specific challenges of the OVC programme included:

- Identification of a viable concept and competent partners: While some activities were already implemented under the country programme, an early assessment of possibilities to scale up showed that few competent partners could deal with significant numbers of beneficiaries to scale up. Finally an international NGO was identified which serves as an umbrella for several local NGOs which receive capacity building and supervision through the umbrella NGO. The proposed concept of an integrated support project had to be revised several times and adapted to the short duration of the EMOP, the implementation capacity and available resources.

- Logistics: The OVC component has to deal with many FDPs with small quantities in remote urban places. Transporters are unwilling to go to such places at reasonable prices.

- Quality of community schools: The food rations serve as a pull factor which attracts children to seek for education. However, the community schools are often quite small and run by modest means and staff with limited capacities. Some of them were even not registered with the responsible government body which ensures minimum standards of these schools. Schools receive capacity building through the umbrella NGO. An advisory board for the OVC component was created which regularly deals with problems arising during implementation.
The future programme

The recent FAO/WFP CFSAM reports a substantial recovery of the cereal production in Zambia in 2003. Estimated production of maize has almost doubled and is about 28 percent above the average of the last five years. However, localised pockets of poor harvest due to erratic rain and flooding can be observed, especially in eight districts in the Southern Province. Households in these areas will require food and seed assistance.

In addition to this localised household food availability problem, access to adequate food remains the major problem in Zambia due to the chronic poverty in both rural and urban areas, successive years of deficit production and the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

WFP plans to target a total of 430,000 under the new EMOP for a period of one year. 150,000 beneficiaries are supposed to be reached through targeted food distribution/vulnerable group feeding, 150,000 through food for work, and 180,000 orphans and vulnerable children under a safety net approach through community schools and walk-in centres for street children as a continuation and extension of the activities under EMOP 10200. 33 percent of the expenditure of the new EMOP in Zambia is planned to be spent on free relief food assistance, 40 percent on human resource development and 27 percent on food for work.

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Zimbabwe

Background

Until 2000 the agricultural sector in Zimbabwe provided over half of the country’s total employment and 15% of GDP. It also generated 40% of the country’s foreign exchange and the bulk of the manufacturing sector raw materials. However, the last three years have seen an overall decline in the economy of about 13% due to high negative interest rates, an overvalued currency and the government’s land resettlement programme. The unemployment rate now stands at over 70%. Macro-economic decline has been exacerbated by the government’s fiscal strategy of maintaining a dual exchange rate; the free market value of the Zimbabwe dollar (Z$) varied between 850-950 Z$ to the US$1 in the last year, with a government sanctioned value of only $55 Z$ to US$1 until April 2003. This reduces the capacity of the government to afford foreign imports, and the inflation rate averaged 140% during the EMOP period.

Zimbabwe was once the breadbasket of Southern Africa. The cereal market is monopolised by the government through its Grain Marketing Board (GMB). The GMB has implemented a total grain and seed subsidisation policy, with heavy subsidies on staple food and seed grain. Commercial importation of maize and wheat grain by private organisations not connected to the GMB has been illegal – a policy that effectively denies the country a viable private sector in grain importation.

Zimbabwe has seen the largest drop in cereal production in the region, with the 2002 production of 748,818 tons being 39% down from 2001 and 69% down from 1999/00. This resulted in a domestic cereal gap of 1.6 million tons over a total domestic requirement of 2.4 million for the period April 2002 to March 2003. The Government pledged to import one million tons of cereals during this period (thus bringing the humanitarian requirement in Zimbabwe to 600,000 tons). It claimed to have imported 490,000 from June to November 2002, but WFP was unable to obtain confirmation of this or the government strategy for distribution.

Nutrition indices

A UNICEF survey undertaken in May 2002 showed global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence in under-fives at 6.4%. However, when broken down further, the data shows a prevalence of GAM of up to 18.2% in some areas and alarming levels of wasting in those aged 36-59 months at 41.6% nationally. Severe acute malnutrition (SAM) figures in under-fives varied from 0.7 to 2.5% nationally. This suggests pockets of high food insecurity. The VAC survey undertaken in August 2002 showed a worsening of these figures to GAM in under-fives at 7.3% nationally, indicating deterioration in food security since May 2002, and pointing to a worsening trend as the hungry season approached.

Acute malnutrition in Zimbabwe compounds pre-existing chronic malnutrition estimated by UNICEF in May 2002 at 33% in under fives and worsening to 41.3% in the VAC in August. The acute chronic situation was of concern as it was likely to push those with minimal energy reserves into a worsening spiral of malnutrition and disease.

90 In October 2002 maize was costing US$265 US a ton commercially as opposed to a government subsidized sales price equivalent to $40 US a ton. Such sales were evidently unsustainable.
91 This figure is in line with the Demographic and Health Survey in 1999 showing GAM at 6.0%. This figure points to the need for targeted supplementary feeding programmes.
Food security

Food insecurity results from a combination of climatic factors, substantial decline in the macro-economy, alterations in the patterns of national food production due to ‘fast track’ land reform and accompanying instability. Up to 50% of Zimbabwe’s population are threatened with hunger. The VAC showed 4.5 Million people (33% of the population) required some form of food assistance in 2002, increasing to 6.7 million people (50% of the population) from December onwards. The longer-term implications of Zimbabwe’s land reform policy and the subsequent reduction in agricultural output would cause the crisis to continue long after the March 2003 harvest.

The most affected people were those living in the chronically food deficit rural areas in the south, west and extreme north, the urban poor who are entirely dependent on the market to meet food needs, and commercial farm worker families displaced due to the land reform process. For the poorest, purchasing power was low, but for many (including those not yet on the beneficiary lists) the issue was supply rather than affordability. There were increasing reports of GMB subsidised food, if available at all, being re-sold at highly inflated prices, with some being illegally exported, especially along border areas.

HIV / AIDS was declared a national emergency in May 2002. The food deficit worsens the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and vice versa. There is a national prevalence of more than 34% in the adult population with an estimated 1.8 million people infected with over 800,000 HIV/ AIDS orphans.

Approximately 70% of Zimbabwean households live below the poverty line and employ multiple coping strategies including the selling of assets, especially livestock, cash for work, petty trade, gold mining/ panning and strategies that increase the risk of HIV infection. Of concern was the likelihood that as households cut food consumption children are removed from school in order raise extra cash with small jobs, as well as to save on school fees. The August VAC showed that 18% of households had removed children from school in the two months leading up to the VAC.

The government has been reluctant to acknowledge the increasing numbers of former commercial farm workers who were excluded from the land reform process. They number over 1.5 million; some are IDPs, many remain on the farms. Hitherto, these people were excluded from District Authority (hence, WFP) beneficiary lists. USAID, DFID and several NGOs lobbying for their inclusion, worried about the heavy preponderance towards communal areas (WFP’s areas of concern). WFP was still hesitant to single these out as a special category, given the political ramifications.

EMOP performance

From July to December 2002 actual EMOP distributions against targets were from only 15% rising to 45%. Broadly speaking, from August-October there was more food than NGO capacity to distribute it; by November the reverse was true – pipeline constraints, compounded by the GMO issue, meant shortages for the increasing number of NGOs and districts now ‘on-line’. There was not, however, an under-performance of actual distribution plans formulated at the beginning of each month; for the most part, these planning figures were met.

Very little of the total food tonnages was oil or pulses, these being available in suitable quantities only in late November. The Implementation Strategy had indicated a reference ration (GFD) of 334g maize, 60g pulses and 20g oil per person/day. To compensate for the shortages of other food commodities, the CO was advised to increase the cereal ration to 460g from July-October. However, in December a ration

92 Since the reform programme was initiated in July 2000, over 5000 of the 6000 commercial farms have been issued with notices or repossessed.
93 The Save the Children household economy survey, conducted as part of the SADC VAC in May 2002, showed that displaced farm workers who are very poor were likely to access only 25-40% of their minimum food needs.
reduction of 50% (5kg/person/month) was necessary for those who have already received food in previous months, with the full ration (10kg/person/month) going only to ‘new’ districts.

Thus, just as the full ration of pulses and oil became available, the cereal ration was reduced for the majority of beneficiaries. It begs the question as to whether the reference ration as formulated – and the explicit endeavour to address the additional nutrition needs of a high HIV/AIDS prevalence population – was ever going to be tenable. In spite of WFP’s best efforts, resource constraints, compounded by poor overall geographical coverage and the inevitable inclusion/exclusion errors of an operation of this scale, highlight the difficulty of matching theory to practice.

**NGO Capacity**

In the first five months of the operation, NGO capacity was constrained in two respects: firstly, the actual number of IPs being available and registered by the government; secondly, the varied ability, geographic scope and experience of NGO partners. By November, ten IPs had been assigned districts, with an additional two only very recently approved by government and yet to be assigned operational areas. The process of registering beneficiaries (the responsibility of IPs) was necessarily slow in some cases, being dependent on local government collaboration and NGO staff on the ground. Four to six weeks could pass between registration and actual distribution (due to setting up of EDPs, calling forth resources, etc). Registration was a one-off process, but further delays have sometimes occurred when either large increases of numbers were noted, or complaints are investigated regarding who is on the list.

The 12 working agencies covered 57 districts in total, including 9 districts under the C-SAFE (NGO pipeline) scheme. WFP’s 48 districts have come ‘on-line’ as follows: October, 28; November, 35; December 44; and in January, the full 48.

**Pipeline constraints**

The milling of GM maize in Bulawayo yielded about 12,000 tons/month (about 400 tons a day since mid-October 2002). On 28 November 2002 the Zimbabwe government confirmed that the Bulawayo milling should cease immediately and that GM maize could not enter the country un-milled. This decision was later reversed, but for the time being WFP had only one option - to mill in South Africa. This had several implications:

- The consignment of 60,000 tons in port in Durban and Maputo (in November) could only be milled at approximately 12,000 tons/month in South Africa. Taking into account the extraction rates, this would take until at least June to distribute;
- Many mills in South Africa were still ‘mothballed’ and millers needed a guarantee of sufficient quantities for them to invest in re-opening;
- The shelf-life of milled maize is short, so the operation is hand-to-mouth. Pre-positioning for the rains was thus out of the question.

**Food ration**

The WFP food basket comprises 1564 kcal for general distribution and 1944kcal for the most vulnerable (children, pregnant / lactating women and the elderly). These fell below the Sphere minimum standards of 2100kcal/day, something that was noted with concern by, among others, DFID, Christian Care, ORAP, CARE, WVI, HelpAge, Plan International, Concern, CRS, Goal, LWF.

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94 Christian Care, ORAP, CARE, WVI, HelpAge, Plan International, Concern, CRS, Goal, LWF.
95 ACF, Help International.
96 It was not until the end of November that the C-SAFE agreement was signed, and NGOs had yet to register beneficiaries in these 9 districts. Meanwhile, figures submitted to WFP suggest that NGOs have distributed 6,700 mt cereal from March-November 2002, with an expectation of 30-40,000 mt between December and March 2003.
97 Including cereals, pulses (60gr) and oil (20gr)
Apart from occasional (and small) consignments of oil, maize was the only food basket commodity from July-November 2002. For the first four months of the EMOP, the daily reference ration was 460g/person. The CO was told to drop this to 400g in November, given the expectation of CSB in the food basket. However, the CSB did not materialise. Pipeline shortfalls were to reduce the cereal ration by half for most districts in December; however, oil and CSB were in stock for a full ration, and a reduced ration of pulses was also available.

WFP had discussions with NGOs over matching rations. Several NGOs supplied through Euronaid insisted that their donors required a 500g/person/day ration – and in some cases these were the same donors to WFP! Although NGOs operated in different districts, tensions could ensue if neighbouring wards receive different rations.

Summary strengths and weaknesses of programme

**Strengths**

- Programming and targeting guidelines were good; the investment in VAC paid off in terms of what was done on the ground; the community based targeting methods successfully bypassed political party lines;
- The programme expansion from 4 to 20 districts in 6 months was made possible through a strong and enthusiastic national staff;
- The role of the Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) was important for creating humanitarian space. Food aid coordination meetings are almost the only forum where donors and government sit together. But the RRU office in general was not strong: several donors complained of poor information and coordination;
- WFP played a central role in the food aid coordination group meetings, and its sub-groups – SFP, health;
- The Executive Director’s role as Special Envoy maintained pressure on the government to the advantage of the programme as a whole;
- The setting up of five sub-offices was a good exercise in decentralisation.
- The lack of an effective MoU with the government worked to the advantage of WFP in that it was able to work in any district without restriction;
- The successful negotiation of bilateral funds from DFID and ECHO.

**Weaknesses**

- Having to constantly explain and reassure donors about politicisation of food aid – this was an enormous drain on staff time, but might also be regarded as a strength since WFP was able to prove its relative independence and detachment from political manipulation; credential problems for journalists meant that the issue was not adequately covered;
- The high staff turnover, particularly the TDY process, at the beginning of the operation gave a poor impression to donors and partners;
- Programme input from ODJ was not as good as it could have been – no substantial time was taken in visiting the country.
- The de-linking of ODOC funds from food arrivals in-country (i.e. availability of regional funds) was not known to the CO;
- The procurement of non-food items was very slow. Only in April 2003 was the full complement of vehicles received (thus compromising monitoring, for example). Some of the vehicle types were not requested, spare parts could not be obtained for them, and they were poor off-road performers. The CO regretted the fact that non-food procurement had to be done through Johannesburg; a

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95 This includes 100g of Corn Soya Blend (CSB)
A dedicated procurement officer in Zimbabwe would have perhaps been more appropriate. A related problem was the lack of information on ODOC and DSC funds available to the CO;

- Monitoring of the regional pipeline was difficult, with information on food movement and purchases not easy to decipher. Again, this reflected badly on partner relations with, in some cases, very strong criticism of WFP from NGOs;

- A general feeling that standardisation within the regional approach did not account for existing in-depth country understanding and context. The Prevention of Sexual Abuse training programme did not take account of what the CO had already done, having been faced with food politicisation and the necessity to design, for example, a context-specific M&E system.

- Government information on imports, aid distributions, etc was very difficult to come by, yet these were crucial to the programme. In retrospect, the CO now feels that the MoU with the government (only revised in March 2003, since 1995) should have included a clause relating to information provision;

- The lack of experience with the COMPAS system (covered elsewhere in this report) resulted in late payments to NGOs and the threat of withdrawal from the programme by some.