



World Food Programme

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# **A Report from the Office of Evaluation**

*Full Report of the Evaluation of  
AFGHANISTAN PRRO 10233*

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# Acknowledgement

The evaluation team visited Afghanistan from 16 May to 7 June 2004. This document was prepared by the mission team leader on the basis of the mission's work in the field.

On behalf of the team, the author wishes to extend thanks to all those who facilitated the team's work in the field and in Headquarters.

Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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# Acronyms

AAD	AfghanAid
ACORD	Afghanistan Country Office Recording Database
AEZ	Agro-ecological Zone
AFA	Afghani currency (1 Afghani = USD 0.02)
AO	Area Office
ARGOS	A satellite-based data monitoring system for remote area schools
Ashara	Community self-help labour
CDC	Community Development Council
CFW	Cash-for-Work
CLS	Collecte Localisation Satellites (Toulouse, France)
CO	Country Office
CSB	Corn-soybean blend
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DoE	Department of Education (Provincial)
DoH	Department of Health (Provincial)
EMIS	Education Management Information System
EMOP	Emergency Operation
FAO	UN Food and Agriculture Organization
FFE	Food-for-Education
FFT	Food-for-Training
FFW	Food-for-Work
FoodAC	Food-for-Asset-Creation
FTSS	Food for Teacher Salary Supplement
FTT	Food for Teacher Training
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ /acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
ICRC	International Council of Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IF-TB	Institutional Feeding for Tuberculosis Treatment
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IP	Implementing Partner
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MAAH	Ministry of Agriculture and Animal Husbandry
<i>manteqa</i>	A cluster of villages [customary Afghan social and territorial unit]
MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MoE	Ministry of Education
MoH	Ministry of Health
MoP	Ministry of Planning
MRRD	Ministry of Rural Reconstruction and Development
MSF	Médecins sans Frontières
MT	Metric tons
NAC	Norwegian Agricultural Committee
NDF	National Development Framework



NEEP	National Emergency Employment Programme (World Bank financed)
NFE	Non-formal Education
NRVA	National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment
NSP	National Solidarity Programme (World Bank financed)
OEDE	Office of Executive Director – Evaluation
OEDP	Office of Executive Director – Programming
OP	Operational Plan
PAC	Project Approval Committee
PCU	Project Coordination Unit (FFE, in MoE)
PDM	Post-distribution Monitoring
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
PRROdoc	PRRO 10233 Project Design Document
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
RV	Rural Vulnerable
SCF	School Feeding
Shura	Traditional local government council
Shura-e manteqa	Traditional local government council for a cluster of villages
SO	Sub-Office
SP	(WFP) Strategic Priority
TAP	Transitional Action Plan
TB	Tuberculosis
TISA	Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan
UNAMA	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
UNDAF	United Nations Development Assistance Framework
UNDCP	UN Drug Control Programme
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UN-HABITAT	United Nations Agency for Human Settlements Programme
UNHCR	UN High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Fund for Children
UNODC	UN Office on Drugs and Crime
UNOPS	United Nations Office of Project Services
UV	Urban Vulnerable
VAM	Vulnerability Assessment and Mapping
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization
WSB	Wheat-soybean blend



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## Executive Summary

The evaluation team found that WFP Afghanistan is doing a commendable job in implementing WFP's mandate in the country despite the security situation that has worsened since the PRRO was designed at the end of 2002. The operation has a number of strengths such as strong synergy between project design and government priorities, effective logistics and pipeline management, and creative and innovative project design, especially in activities related to nutrition. Based on interviews with partners and beneficiaries, there was general satisfaction with WFP assistance in Afghanistan.

In line with WFP's shift to Result Based Management, the evaluation team looked at the operation's results at both output and outcome level. However, due to a weak monitoring system it was difficult to get reliable data on beneficiary numbers and on any results at outcome level. The evaluation team based its findings on triangulation between the CO's own monitoring data, interviews with WFP's key partners, relevant studies and interviews with beneficiaries.

The evaluation team found that the PRRO's relief objectives were not fully met because, in reaction to government and donor criticism of food aid, free food distributions were reduced and FFW was spread so thinly that the average household received only enough to support a family for 45 days, regardless of the food gap. It was exacerbated by a "once-size-fits-all" FFW approach that paid insufficient attention to differences between districts with acute or very high food insecurity and those with moderate food insecurity as assessed by VAM. In most cases, the food assistance was insufficient to have a lasting impact on the livelihoods of those who received it.

Recovery objectives were partially met through a combination of food-for-education, food-for-training and FFW. However, effectiveness of school feeding was reduced by unreliable biscuit supply. Performance on asset creation was highly satisfactory in Badakhshan, where WFP has supported FFW for over a decade and has established long-standing relationships with competent implementing partners who mobilized adequate resources for non-food inputs. In provinces that did not have previous experience with asset-oriented FFW, the quality and sustainability of works is less satisfactory.

The corporate question for WFP to consider is whether the objectives were realistic in view of programme design and resources available.

In its second year of implementation, the PRRO should concentrate its efforts on ensuring greater effectiveness at outcome level of FFW, FFT, FFE, rural vulnerable and food fortification. Assistance to the urban vulnerable needs to be rethought as the changed socio-economic environment has made the women's bakeries a less-effective instrument to address urban vulnerability. Free food for IDPs in camps should continue. Finally the Country Office



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should improve the linkage between assessment, programming, and monitoring (especially of outcomes) in order to improve programme effectiveness.





## **1. EVALUATION SCOPE AND METHOD**

This report synthesizes the findings of an external evaluation of the Afghanistan Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 10233 on behalf of WFP's Office of Evaluation (OEDE). The purpose of the evaluation was to render accountability to the Executive Board and to enable WFP to learn from experience in order to improve its operations at country and corporate level. The evaluation was carried out at mid-term in order to inform management and stakeholders about progress towards results and identify obstacles that might jeopardize achievement of results within the planned timeframe.

The main focus of the external evaluation has been to assess the PRRO's relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and connectedness. Evaluation methods included:

- Desk review of relevant documentation and analysis of ACORD<sup>1</sup> and VAM data;
- Stakeholder interviews with WFP staff, Government ministries, UN agencies, donors and implementing partners;
- Visits all WFP Area Offices (Kabul, Hirat, Kandahar, Faizabad and Mazar-i-Sharif and Sub-offices (Bamian, Jalalabad and Maimana);
- Site visits to 65 projects in 13 provinces and
- On-site interviews with beneficiaries.

## **2. CONTEXT FOR PRRO 10233**

### **2.1 Country Context**

Afghanistan has recently emerged from a 23-year crisis that included civil conflict, the downfall of the Taliban regime in November 2001, and three years of consecutive drought. Since the drought developed in 2000, WFP's response has been emergency assistance, most recently through emergency operation (EMOP) 10155.0 implemented between April 2002 and March 2003. The Transitional Islamic Government, appointed in June 2002 for 18 months, developed a National Development Framework (NDF) that calls for systematic provision of basic social services, creation of livelihoods and environmentally sustainable development. In consultation with Government, UN agencies, donors and NGOs, WFP changed its support from emergency assistance to a protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO 10233) that was designed in support of the nation-building objectives of the NDF.

The agricultural context at the time of the design of the PRRO coincided with a four-year drought, which had depleted the coping strategies of poor households in rural areas. The drought cycle was apparently interrupted in 2003 by one year of adequate rainfall, resulting in a bumper harvest in the northern half of Afghanistan, while drought persisted unbroken in the southern half of the country. In 2004, drought returned again to most of the country except at higher altitudes in the northeast. It now seems that the good season of 2003 was an aberration in an increasingly

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<sup>1</sup> Afghanistan Country Office Recording Database (ACORD).



prolonged period of drought. Shortly after the mission's return from the field in June 2004, government declared 12 of the country's 32 districts to be drought stricken.

After the new interim government was established during the second half of 2002, food aid - and relief food in particular - came under heavy criticism from both government and donors due to high levels of relief food during the emergency, food availability in markets and government preference for cash-based interventions. The central government expressed its desire to minimize food aid in order to enhance local production. According to the central government, food aid should only be distributed in food deficit areas and only where it has a comparative advantage over the other aid instruments. Also - to the extent possible - food aid should be locally procured. The PRRO was welcomed as a means of shifting from relief to recovery and of reducing free food in favour of "more sustainable food-for-work (FFW), food-for-training (FFT) and food-for-education (FFE)." However, provincial officials in the drought-stricken southern half of the country favour the continuation of food aid along side of other types of development assistance to maximize flexibility to respond to local needs.

Although Afghanistan has entered the post-conflict reconstruction phase, security has worsened since the PRRO was designed, particularly in the run-up to the 9 October elections. Currently half of Afghanistan's provinces have districts that are "no-go" for UN staff, where WFP can only operate through implementing partners (IPs). Poor security conditions have greatly increased the challenges faced by WFP in implementing projects and monitoring their results. Shortly after the evaluation mission's return to Rome, the UN system announced a moratorium on international missions to Afghanistan until after elections.

Other country context factors influencing implementation include weak capacity at Government level and limited availability of qualified staff. In addition, the large number of national NGOs and the fact that many NGOs are actually not NGOs in the strict sense presented a challenge for project implantation.

## **2.2 Design**

PRRO 10233 is the WFP's 6<sup>th</sup> project in Afghanistan since 2000 and Afghanistan's 2<sup>nd</sup> PRRO. It was preceded by PRRO 6064 - Afghanistan Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation - which ran from January 2000 to December 2001. After two years in a recovery mode (but with a series of drought-relief EMOPs running in parallel), Afghanistan reverted to emergency mode following the overthrow of the Taliban. The current project is nearly 3 times larger than the 1<sup>st</sup> PRRO and expected beneficiaries are 3.5 times more. The planned food assistance per beneficiary under PRRO 10233 is less than under the 1<sup>st</sup> PRRO but roughly in line with that of previous emergency projects.



**Table 1 - WFP Afghanistan Portfolio 2000 to 2005**

Project Number	Project Title	Start Date	End Date	Food (MT)	Cost US\$ million	Beneficiaries (million)	Average/ Beneficiary (Kg)
PRRO 10233	Food Assistance to Re-establish Livelihoods and Household Food Security in Afghanistan	01-Apr-03	31-Mar-05	619,000	338.0	9.243	67
EMOP 10155	Emergency Food Assistance to Afghanistan	01-Apr-02	31-Mar-03	544,000	115.5	9.855	55
Regional EMOP 10126	Emergency Food Assistance to Refugees and Vulnerable Populations in Afghanistan	01-Oct-01	02-Mar-02	494,000	230.0	7.500	66
EMOP 10098	Food assistance to drought victims	01-Nov-01	01-Oct-02	366,000	152.7	5.566	66
EMOP 6259.1	Food assistance to drought victims	01-Nov-01	01-Oct-02	177,000	76.6	3.810	46
EMOP 6259	Food assistance to drought victims	01-Jul-00	01-Jun-01	118,000	49.4	1.603	74
PRRO 6064	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation - Afghanistan 6064	01-Jan-00	01-Dec-01	201,850	88.1	2.574	78

Source: various project documents in WFP Afghanistan website.

The current PRRO, which at 619,000 MT (US\$338 million) is currently WFP's largest single country PRRO, assists vulnerable populations in rural and urban areas including returning refugees and IDPs, largely through returnee packages, FFW, FFT, and school feeding programmes. The overall goal of the operation is to contribute to re-establish and stabilize livelihoods and household food security. The current PRRO only began implementation in April 2003, but many of its activities have been implemented under previous projects. The current PRRO runs until March 2005.

According to WFP's Evaluation Policy all operations longer than 12 months and/or that exceed US\$50 million should be evaluated. In agreement with the Country Office it was decided that OEDE (Office of Evaluation, Rome) would carry out an independent evaluation in 2004, and submit a report to the Executive Board at its third session in October 2004.

PRRO 10233 has two components: one aimed at relief and the other at livelihood recovery. However, the relief/recovery distinction is artificial in that some activities such as FFW and FFT support relief objectives through food transfers in addition to recovery objectives. The full list of project activities is shown below:

**Relief:**

- IDP feeding in camps;
- Returnee package;
- Support for the rural vulnerable;
- Support for the urban vulnerable;
- Institutional feeding;
- Support for TB patients; and
- Supplementary feeding.

**Recovery:**

- Food for work (FFW);
- Food for education/school feeding (FFE/SCF);
- Food for teacher salary supplement (FTSS);
- Food for teacher training (FTT);
- Food for training/non-formal education (FFT/NFE); and



- Support for reintegration of demobilized soldiers (DDR)<sup>2</sup>.

The PRRO design is highly relevant to Afghan national priorities and WFP strategic priorities. Each component of PRRO has been built on the National Development Framework (NDF).

**Table 2 – Fit between Project Design, National Priorities and WFP Strategic Priorities**

National Priorities	PRRO Objective and Activity	WFP Strategic Priorities (SPs)
NDF pillar 1: Provide humanitarian assistance and build human and social capital (sustainable livelihoods)	Contribute to re-establish and stabilize livelihoods and household food security	SP 2: Protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shocks
1. Facilitate repatriation and reintegration of IDPs and refugees	Meet emergency food needs of IDPs in camps through IDP feeding Facilitate reintegration of IDPs and refugees in their the place of origin through returnee package and by providing support in places of return	SP 1: Save lives and meet emergency food needs of vulnerable groups in crisis situations
2. Focus on education, training and teacher recruitment	Increase school enrolment, attendance and reduce gender disparity in access through food-for-education Ensure an adequate supply of qualified teachers through teacher-salary-supplement Build human capital through food for training/non-formal education	SP 4: Support access to education and training and reduce gender disparities in access
3. Alleviate the prevalence of malnutrition and provide preventative health care	Support and improve nutritional and health status of vulnerable groups through supplementary feeding for malnourished children, institutional feeding and related nutrition interventions	SP 3: Support and improve nutrition and health status of children, mothers and other vulnerable people
4. Provide rural employment safety nets	Protect livelihoods of vulnerable people in crisis situations, enhance resilience to shocks and create and restoring livelihood assets through food-for-work	SP 2: Protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shocks
5. Provide a social safety net for urban vulnerability	Meet food needs and protect livelihoods of urban vulnerable through urban bakeries	

### 3. RESULTS LEVEL 1 - OUTPUTS

#### 3.1 Resourcing

The Afghanistan PRRO 10233 document approved by the WFP Executive Board in early 2003 called for a total of 618,989 MT mixed commodities over a two year period assuming distribution of some 334,625 mixed commodities in year one and 284,363 MT in year two. At the time of writing (June 2004), 315,733 MT (58 percent) have been confirmed including 201,486 MT of reprogrammed carry-over stocks from EMOP 10155<sup>3</sup>, Constituting approximately 1/3 of total PRRO requirements and almost 100 percent of year one despatches, the EMOP carry-over stocks enabled the Country Office to launch an appropriate response to food requirements in year one of the PRRO. Only the biscuit contributions fell short of requirements by some 1,700 MT, while wheat was just on target with requirement. The Resourcing situation is shown in Table 3.

<sup>2</sup> This activity was added during implementation.



Table 3 - Afghanistan PRRO 10233.0 Resourcing Situation

	Cereals	Pulses	Oil	Sugar	WSB <sup>4</sup>	Salt	Biscuits	All
<b>PRRO Commitment</b>	<b>496,551</b>	<b>12,941</b>	<b>61,697</b>	<b>1,107</b>	<b>11,750</b>	<b>2,650</b>	<b>32,292</b>	<b>618,988</b>
Contribution to date PRRO	64,243	6,173	23,144	1,006	10,049	2,135	7,496	114,246
EMOP 10155 Carry-Over	166,289	10,866	12,555	1,056	5,247	0	5,474	201,487
<b>Total PRRO (MT)</b>	<b>230,532</b>	<b>17,039</b>	<b>35,699</b>	<b>2,062</b>	<b>15,296</b>	<b>2,135</b>	<b>12,970</b>	<b>315,733</b>
<b>YEAR 1</b>								
PRRO requirement year 1 (CO Operational Plan)	233,931	9,557	25,823	1,886	14,341	1,591	14,699	301,828
<b>Available as % of Year-1 PRRO requirements (including carry-over)</b>	<b>99%</b>	<b>178%</b>	<b>138%</b>	<b>109%</b>	<b>107%</b>	<b>134%</b>	<b>88%</b>	<b>105%</b>
Despatched PRRO year 1	163,198	11,244	19,824	841	10,383	818	9,557	215,865
<b>YEAR 2</b>								
Available for 2 year PRRO (as of June 2004) <sup>5</sup>	67,334	5,795	15,875	1,221	4,913	1,317	3,413	99,868
PRRO requirement for year 2 (from CO Operational Plan)	185,306	8,192	33,646	1,122	9,278	1,356	24,231	263,131
<b>Available as % of Year-2 PRRO requirement</b>	<b>36%</b>	<b>71%</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>109%</b>	<b>53%</b>	<b>97%</b>	<b>14%</b>	<b>38%</b>
<b>OVERALL</b>								
Requirements resourced against operational plans for years 1 and 2 (%)	55%	96%	60%	69%	65%	72%	33%	<b>56%</b>
Available against overall PRRO appeal (%)	46%	132%	58%	186%	130%	81%	40%	<b>51%</b>

*Source:* Compiled by mission on basis of project document, operational plan, distribution data and interviews with Pipeline and Programme staff

While the pipeline was sufficiently resourced to meet requirements for year one, the outlook for year 2 of the PRRO was less optimistic at the time of the evaluation. With estimated arrivals and carry-over stocks from year 1, including EMOP stocks, resources were only adequate to cover food needs until midway through the second year of the PRRO and critical commodities of wheat, vegetable oil and biscuits were particularly under-resourced. However, in September 2004 the Country Office reported that “the resourcing situation for year 2 is more optimistic, as several new contributions have been confirmed, and all commodities except biscuits are now sufficient to meet requirements until the end of the year.”

To the extent possible, cash contributions received against the PRRO were utilized to procure commodities regionally through triangular purchases. In total, 77,101 MT was purchased in the Asia region, including neighbouring countries of Pakistan and Kazakhstan. Local procurement options are limited; hence only 1,200 MT of iodized salt was purchased in Afghanistan from a new plant established with support from UNICEF. In addition, just prior to the evaluation mission, the Country Office initiated a tender for 10,000 MT of locally-grown wheat to assess the feasibility of local procurement.

### 3.2 Programming

Between approval of the PRRO document and actual start up of PRRO the Country Office revised the planning figures for the first year. The planned distribution was reduced by 33,000

<sup>4</sup> Wheat soybean blend.

<sup>5</sup> The information provided by the Country Office during the evaluation mission took June 2004 as the cut off.



MT (10 percent) of total requirements while the beneficiary caseload increased by 2.3 million. Beneficiary targets for food-for-work, food-for-training, urban vulnerable and teacher training increased substantially although food distribution was reduced. Details of changes between the PRROdoc and the Operational Plan are shown in Table 4.

**Table 4 –Variance between Project Document and Operational Plan regarding Year 1 PRRO Resource Requirement (MT) and Planned Beneficiaries**

Activity	Requirement (MT)			Planned Beneficiaries		
	PRROdoc	Operational Plan	% of Prodoc	PRROdoc	Operational Plan	% of Prodoc
Urban Vulnerable (bakeries)	42,705	26,543	62%	360,000	228,230	-37%
Rural Vulnerable (10 % of FFW)	10,787	10,751	100%	180,000	305,000	69%
Institutional and Therapeutic Feeding	2,050	24,821	1211%	10,500	319,800	2946%
Supplementary Feeding	78	3,445	4417%	10,000	441,156	4312%
IDP Feeding in Camps	39,055	36,627	94%	200,000	200,000	0%
Returnee Package	35,000	37,475	107%	1,400,000	1,499,000	7%
Food-for-Work	98,685	98,362	100%	1,800,000	3,050,000	69%
Food-for-Training/Non-formal Educ.	14,469	12,060	83%	225,000	754,000	235%
School Feeding (Biscuits)	15,444	14,699	95%	660,000	727,140	10%
School Feeding Take-home (Wheat)	49,500	16,535	33%	440,000	181,807	-59%
Take-home Ration for Girls (Oil)	15,840	9,349	59%	440,000	293,200	-33%
Food-for-Teacher-Training	2,012	2,197	109%	20,000	194,168	871%
Food-for-Teacher-Salary-Supplement	9,000	8,964	100%	600,000	450,000	-25%
Other	0	0	0%	0	0	0%
<b>Grand Total:</b>	<b>334,625</b>	<b>301,828</b>	<b>90%</b>	<b>6,345,500</b>	<b>8,643,501</b>	<b>36%</b>

Source: Compiled by mission on basis of project document, operational plan and interviews with Programme staff

According to the Country Office, the sharp increase in programmed tonnage for institutional feeding is explained by the need to correct an error in the original PRRO document/annexes, which had included assistance to TB patients and their families in the text but omitted them from the food requirement tables. Likewise, the sharp increase in programmed tonnage for supplementary feeding is explained by correction of an error in the original PRROdoc, which, according to the Country Office, “calculated supplementary feeding for a period of 30 days as opposed to 365 days per year<sup>6</sup>”.

School feeding requirements for wheat were lowered in the operational plan as a result of the availability of biscuits, which led to a corresponding reduction of targets for school feeding take home rations for boys and girls. The cut-back in requirements for the Urban Vulnerable is explained by a decision taken by the Country Office to maintain same level of urban bakeries as under the EMOP, whereas the PRRO document has assumed that more bakeries would be established.

The sharp increase in planned beneficiary numbers for food-for-work and food-for-training was due to an error in calculating beneficiary numbers in the Operational Plan compared to the original PRROdoc. In the Operational Plan the Country Office erroneously took the number of monthly rations as the number of food recipients without considering that participants in some localities received project support for more than one month.

### 3.3 Pipeline and Logistics

<sup>6</sup> Both the former (30 days) and the latter (365 days) duration are at variance with international reference standards for supplementary feeding, which specify that an acceptable average length of stay should be 30-40 days per child (stays in excess of 90 days are considered to be alarming).




The majority of commodities destined for Afghanistan arrive in-kind at the port of Karachi for onward despatch by road through a southern corridor into Afghanistan. A western corridor through Iran and a northern route through Termez, Uzbekistan are used for biscuits from India because these cannot transit Pakistan. Commodities through the southern corridor are usually routed through large transshipment points in Quetta and Peshawar where they are stored until called forward by Area Offices. The evaluation chose not to focus on pipeline and logistics as the preliminary mission found the area to be relatively problem free.

### 3.4 Distribution

During the first year of the PRRO, distribution against operational plan targets was 216,516 MT (72 percent of planned tonnage). Despatches were on target from July to September and then lagged by 20 percent during the remainder of the first year. For details, see the graph on the next page.

Table 5



One reason for lower than anticipated distribution was a slow start-up in the first quarter of the PRRO, due to the need to shift from the emergency to the recovery mode. The Country Office had to establish new institutional arrangements and partnerships, develop operational guidelines and train staff and implementing partners in their use, notably for FFW, school feeding and institutional feeding. WFP's outreach to communities in need of food assistance through targeted recovery interventions was further hampered by insecurity and dearth of IPs in remote and insecure areas.

Table 6 depicts how the performance was distributed across the various activities of the PRRO.



**Table 6 – Operational Plan versus Actual Food Despatch and Beneficiaries by Activity<sup>7</sup>**

Activity	Food Despatch (MT)			Beneficiaries		
	Planned (OP)	Actual	% of Plan	Planned (OP)	Actual	% of Plan
Urban Vulnerable (bakeries)	26,543	15,049	57%	228,230	231,354	101%
Rural Vulnerable (10 % of FFW)	10,751	2,715	25%	305,000	147,606	48%
Institutional and Therapeutic Feeding	24,821	7,046	28%	319,800	114,687	36%
Supplementary Feeding	3,445	1,910	55%	441,156	44,366	10%
IDP Feeding in Camps	36,627	25,343	69%	200,000	301,861	151%
Returnee Package	37,475	14,622	39%	1,499,000	889,672	59%
Food-for-Work	98,362	78,974	80%	3,050,000	3,256,940	107%
Food-for-Training/Non-formal Education	12,060	4,044	34%	754,000	64,962	9%
School Feeding	14,699	10,763	73%	727,140	1,188,631	163%
School Feeding Take-home (Boys, Girls)	16,535	18,208	110%	181,807	160,000	88%
Take-home Ration (Girls)	9,349	2,228	24%	293,200	145,000	49%
Food-for-Teacher-Training	2,197	25	1%	194,168	850	0%
Food-for-Teacher-Salary-Supplement	8,964	7,913	88%	450,000	660,000	147%
Other <sup>8</sup>		27,703	A lot	0	n.a.	
<b>Grand Total</b>	<b>301,828</b>	<b>216,543</b>	<b>72%</b>	<b>8,643,501</b>	<b>7,205,929<sup>9</sup></b>	<b>83%</b>

Source: The distribution figures are based on despatch from WFP warehouse, because figures for actual distribution to beneficiaries are not entered into the central project database ACORD on a regular basis. All figures were provided by Programme Unit and verified with Pipeline before submission to the team. The targets are from the operational plan

With the exception of school feeding take-home rations, none of the PRRO activities fully met their targets for MT despatch. Some under-delivery is due to factors beyond WFP's control, such as: restricted movement due to insecurity, delayed start-up in related partners' programmes, untimely donor contributions, lower-than-anticipated returnee repatriations and reduced IDP caseload (for details see Table 6).

Resource allocation at design was 38 percent relief and 62 percent recovery, but resources distributed were only 28 percent to relief and 72 percent to recovery. The reasons for reduced distribution to relief components include lower than anticipated numbers of IDPs and returnees, adoption of stricter criteria for supplementary feeding and limited capacity of MoH to scale-up institutional and therapeutic feeding and support for TB patients.

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<sup>8</sup> "Other" includes mainly carry over FFW/FFT projects from EMOP 10055 and support to small scale emergencies such as floods and earthquakes during the period evaluated.

<sup>9</sup> The beneficiary figures reproduced in the table are the "definitive" figures submitted to the evaluation mission in June 2004. Revised beneficiary totals sent by the CO on 30 July 2004 could not be reflected.





Table 7 – Reasons for Under-Delivery

Activity	Reasons for Under-delivery
Urban Vulnerable (bakeries)	Bread distribution to the urban vulnerable was temporarily suspended to allow project staff to revalidate cardholder eligibility
Returnee Package	Lower than anticipated repatriations
Rural Vulnerable (10 % of FFW)	Distribution of free food to the rural vulnerable was entirely neglected in some area offices; in others, the assistance was tied to FFW, so that rural vulnerable in villages with no FFW activities received no food
Institutional and Therapeutic Feeding	Low capacity of MoH to scale-up assistance
Supplementary Feeding	Supplementary feeding was drastically reduced since August 2003 when MoH, UNICEF and WFP adopted stricter criteria and agreed to implement it only in areas with >15% acute malnutrition
IDP Feeding in Camps	Lower than anticipated IDP caseload
Returnee Package	Lower than anticipated repatriations
Food-for-Work	Delivery on FFW was low during the first quarter due to the need to develop and approve new project proposals and to convert EMOP projects to PRRO projects
Food-for-Training/Non-formal Education	Shortage of qualified implementing partners
School feeding (biscuits) School feeding take-home for boys and girls Take-home ration (oil) for girls' enrolment	Distribution under school feeding was low due to late arrival of biscuits, a pipeline break from November 2003 and suspension of take-home oil rations for girls in the absence of biscuits
Food-for-Teacher-Training	Only 1% utilized to date due to slow start-up of teacher training courses and lack of food preparation facilities at teacher training centres
Food-for-Teacher-Salary-Supplement	Over-achieved by 147% on beneficiaries in spite of a 12% reduction in tonnage by spreading assistance more thinly. Distribution is suspended in some Provinces since 2003 because numbers of teachers requested by Provincial authorities exceed numbers on central MoE payroll

### 3.5 Recipients and Beneficiaries

#### ➤ Definitions

“Recipients” are direct participants in WFP-assisted activities, whereas “beneficiaries” refer to participants plus benefiting household members for all activities involving take-home rations. For activities involving a take-home family ration<sup>10</sup>, the Country Office estimates beneficiaries by multiplying direct recipients by an average household size of 6 members. For activities such as school feeding, institutional feeding, supplementary feeding, IDP feeding and food-for-teacher-training, individual “recipients” are synonymous with “beneficiaries”. For food-for-training/non-formal education, direct recipients are multiplied by 3 to obtain beneficiaries.

#### ➤ Reasons for Caution

The Country Office’s beneficiary figures should be used with extreme caution. The mission questions the ability of the ACORD database to capture accurate beneficiary numbers, due to:

- Variance between reported and actual workers/ trainees /pupils;
- Reliance on ex-ante estimates without verifying actual numbers;
- Tendency for implementing partners to erroneously equate numbers of monthly rations distributed with numbers of direct recipients, leading to double counting of FFW beneficiaries each time they worked;
- When households received a double ration for providing a donkey at the FFW site, the donkeys were counted as additional “recipients”;

<sup>10</sup> FFW, urban vulnerable, rural vulnerable, returnee package and food-for-teacher-salary-supplement.



- Implausibly high beneficiary numbers for some FFW projects suggest that some implementing partners erroneously entered total household members in the column intended for direct FFW participants;
- Misleading assumptions about percentages of females among direct recipients of FFW and clients of urban vulnerable bakeries;
- Double-counting of IDPs and returnees who moved from one site to another; and
- Human error in counting and recording.

**Table 8 – Problems with Beneficiary Numbers**

Activity	Problems
Urban Vulnerable (bakeries)	All card holders and bakery employees are shown in ACORD as female. Mission visits confirmed that cards are traded on the market and that many bakery clients are male. Actual characteristics of bakery clients are inadequately monitored. Bakery workers in Mazar include men.
Rural Vulnerable	ACORD understates beneficiaries of rural vulnerable distributions because most Area Offices recorded them under FFW instead of recording them under rural vulnerable.
Institutional and Therapeutic Feeding	Post distribution monitoring reports suggest that in some cases reported beneficiary numbers were significantly higher than actual head-counts. In such cases, beneficiary numbers may have been inflated to get more rations.
Supplementary Feeding	No errors detected
IDP Feeding in Camps	IDPs may have been counted twice if they moved from one camp to another.
Returnee Package	Returnees were counted once when they received the returnee package en route home and again when they participated in Ogata-supported FFW for returnees in their place of origin.
Food-for-Work	Reported totals are based on aggregation of ex-ante estimates obtained by dividing quantities by rations for individual sub-projects. They do not reflect actual participation in FFW. Double counting occurred when workers who received more than one monthly ration were counted separately each time they worked. In Faryab, FFW projects issued double rations to workers who provided either a donkey or a wheelbarrow at the worksite. In such cases, the IP reported the number of direct recipients (workers) as identical with the number of food rations, without considering that 40% of the rations were issued for provision of work animals and/or tools. Some NGO implementing partners erroneously reported total family members as FFW recipients. Although women rarely participate in FFW, the majority of IPs recorded 10-15% of direct FFW recipients as female on the ex ante assumption that 10-15% of total food was to have been distributed to women-headed households unable to take part in FFW. Actual receipt of food by women was not monitored.
Food-for-Training/ Non-formal Education	No problems detected.
School Feeding	The food-for-education unit is to be commended for avoiding double counting for school feeding and teachers' salary supplement, even in cases where the same individuals benefited from WFP support for two consecutive years.
School Feeding Take-home (Boys, Girls)	
Take-home Ration (Girls)	
Food-for-Teacher-Training	
Food-for-Teacher-Salary-Supplement	

### ➤ Reported Achievements on Beneficiaries

Reported actual beneficiaries (7.2 million) were 114 percent of original PRROdoc targets but only 83 percent of the higher operational plan targets. In the face of a 36 percent increase in planned beneficiaries and a 10 percent decrease in planned quantities, beneficiary targets could only be achieved by spreading assistance more thinly. This is unfortunate, considering that the 2.3 million increase in operational plan beneficiary targets was the result of a calculation error.



When reported actual beneficiaries are compared with operational plan targets (Table 5 – above), it is evident that certain activities (namely school-feeding, food-for-teacher-salary-supplement and IDP feeding) over-achieved targets on number of beneficiaries by as much as 163 percent. Other activities were well below the planned target beneficiary coverage: namely, food-for-teacher training (<1 percent), food-for-training ( 9 percent), supplementary feeding (10 percent), institutional feeding (36 percent), rural vulnerable (48 percent), school feeding take-home ration for girls (49 percent) and returnee package (59 percent).

Comparison between beneficiaries reached and tonnage despatched by activity (Table 5 above) reveals a number of unexpected findings that further cast doubt on the validity of the data or – conversely - if accurate - on the potential impact of the assistance:

- While the original PRROdoc called for distributing an average of 55 kg per FFW beneficiary, with an increase in beneficiary numbers and a decrease in tonnage, actual despatch was reduced to 24 kg per person.
- Late start of the school feeding programme coupled with overstretched coverage in beneficiaries and early termination of support due to a biscuit pipeline break, has resulted in an average distribution of 9 kg per pupil against a planned 22 kg per pupil.

## 4. RESULTS BY ACTIVITY

### 4.1 Food-for-Work

Under a PRRO, food assistance is supposed to meet *both* the immediate food needs of the most vulnerable and enable them to restore their livelihoods<sup>11</sup>. Food-for-work (FFW) can be used for both purposes. FFW supports **relief** objectives when its main function is to transfer food to vulnerable people to protect livelihoods and fill food gaps. It supports **recovery** objectives when its aim is construction/rehabilitation of community assets.

#### ➤ Performance

During the first year of the PRRO, the Country Office under-achieved on its targets for food transfer and over-achieved on its targets for numbers of FFW beneficiaries thus spreading the assistance more thinly.

#### Box 1: Targets and Achievements on FFW during Year 1 of the PRRO

* PRROdoc target:	1,800,000 beneficiaries and 98,685 MT =	54 kg per person
* Operations plan target:	3,050,000 beneficiaries and 98,362 MT =	32 kg per person
* Actual performance:	3,256,940 beneficiaries and 78,974 MT =	24 kg per person

Although beneficiaries are reported to be 3.2 million people, the mission believes that this is an over-estimation given the problems with beneficiary counting discussed in 3.15. Many FFW projects implemented under the PRRO were surprisingly large in terms of MT allocated and numbers of participants. ACORD data show 28 FFW projects with over 8,000 participants, 14 with over 10,000 and one project with 45,503 participants. Beneficiaries of this single project

<sup>11</sup> Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO, section 4.2.5



would be 237,000 assuming an average 6-member household. The mission's visits suggest that the larger FFW projects are likely to be over-estimating participants and beneficiary numbers by nearly 50 percent.

### **Box 2 – Illustration of Beneficiary Counting Issues**

Project M/076/2003/FFW/ARP - Road Improvement in Pashtun Kot district of Faryab Province - was expected to run for two months and each participant was allowed to work eight days in each month, a total of 16 days. At a food allocation of 6.25 kg wheat/day, each participant was estimated to receive 100 kg wheat plus a proportionate amount of oil, pulses and iodised salt. On this basis, the total number of 159,552 man days converted to 9972 direct participants. Beneficiaries were obtained by multiplying participants by average household size (6), to obtain 59,832 beneficiaries, representing 42 percent of the provincial population of 141,592 persons. This fitted well with the VAM estimate of 40 percent of the local population being food insecure. The reality however is that a more likely number was 5336 participants representing 32,010 beneficiaries or 22.6 percent of the population, rather than the original estimate of 42 percent covered

The transport of road gravel from a nearby river bed to the road work site was done with donkeys provided by participants, who received an extra food ration to compensate them for providing the donkey (or wheelbarrow). By counting rations rather than people, the project overestimated the number of participants. The project attendance sheets indicated that 10,670 beneficiaries had been employed for periods of eight days. Of these, 8075 provided donkeys or wheelbarrows. They worked two periods of eight days (16 days) and received the equivalent of 32 days rations (200 kg wheat). The remaining 2595 worked 16 days and received rations for 16 days (100 kg wheat). As each worked for two eight-day periods, the actual number of participants was 5335 (4038 and 1298).

When households who bring a donkey to the worksite can obtain a double ration, this weakens the self-targeting effect of pegging the FFW ration well below the market wage rate. It tends to increase the share of total resources accruing to the middle-poor at the expense of households too poor to own a donkey.

### **➤ FFW as a Food Transfer Mechanism**

FFW's food transfer function was only partly achieved because assistance was thinly spread and because operational plan targets were only 50 percent of assessed need. The average quantity of food received through FFW per benefiting household member (24 kg) was only enough to last 45 days (at 2,100 kcs a day). A food transfer of 24 kg was appropriate for districts assessed to have moderate food insecurity (2-month food gap), marginally acceptable for districts with high food insecurity (5-month food gap) but inappropriate for districts very high to acute food insecurity (8-10 month food gap).

Effectiveness in addressing relief needs was also lowered by weak targeting. It was stipulated in the PRRO document and reaffirmed in the PRRO Guidelines that FFW would be 'limited to areas of acute and very high food insecurity where households meet less than 50 percent of caloric requirements.'



Table 8 shows (in the left-hand column) that there were around 4.3 million food insecure people nationwide, of which around 375,000 were found in districts assessed to have acute food insecurity<sup>12</sup> and 1 million in districts with very high<sup>13</sup> food insecurity. Together they account for one third (33 percent) of total food insecure population and over half (53 percent) of total assessed need. However, ACORD (verified by Programme and Pipeline before submitted to the mission team) data show that only 28 percent of FFW commodities were programmed in these districts. The table also reveals that a substantial amount of FFW activity (23 percent) was undertaken in food secure districts.

**Table 9 - Assessed Needs, Requirements and FFW Allocation by Food Security Categories**

Food Insecurity Category	2002-2003 VAM Assessment				ACORD Database		Percentage of Assessed Need Met by FFW
	Food Insecure Population (number)	% of Total Food Insecure Population	Assessed Need <sup>14</sup> (MT)	% of Total Assessed Need (MT)	FFW Programmed (MT)	% of FFW (MT)	
Acute	374,752	9%	54,827	17%	36,024	13%	38%
Very High	1,055,588	24%	117,857	36%	21,941	15%	21%
High	1,774,525	41%	123,670	38%	56,239	35%	46%
Moderate	1,131,370	26%	33,331	10%	23,416	14%	70%
Secure	0	0%	0	0%	18,717	23%	>100%
<b>Total</b>	<b>4,336,235</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>329,686</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>156,337</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>49%</b>

Source Mission calculations based on crossing VAM assessment data with ACORD programming data (see Appendix 2 for details)<sup>15</sup>

The acutely food insecure districts needed around 55,000 MT but received only 36,000 MT (or 38 percent of total needs). The very highly food insecure districts needed 118,000 MT but received only 22,000 MT (21 percent of needs). The highly food insecure districts needed 124,000 MT but received only 56,000 MT (46 percent). Districts with moderate food insecurity received 23,000 MT, which covered 70 percent of requirements. The food secure districts had no assessed need but received around 19,000 MT or about 23 percent of total FFW resources.

The Country Office's stated reasons for under-delivery of FFW to the most food insecure areas include insecurity, remoteness and shortage of potential implementing partners.

## RECOMMENDATION

**WFP should develop corporate guidance on appropriate FFW approaches for different types and levels of food insecurity. In particular, guidance is needed to identify circumstances where food transfer should take priority and circumstances where emphasis can shift to recovering livelihoods through sustainable asset creation.**

Although VAM assessments of food insecurity are also made at the level of agro-ecological zones within administrative districts, agro-ecological zones are insufficiently considered when designing and approving sub-projects. As a consequence, the mission noted a tendency to concentrate FFW interventions such as especially irrigation rehabilitation in the irrigated valley bottoms and to neglect the rainfed areas where food insecurity is greater.

<sup>12</sup> "Acute" food insecurity is defined as a situation where 80 percent of the population has a 10-month food gap

<sup>13</sup> "Very high" food insecurity is defined as a situation where 60 percent of the population has an 8-month food gap

<sup>14</sup> Assuming 475 grams of mixed food per person per day.

<sup>15</sup>



Weak village level targeting further reduces FFW's effectiveness for meeting relief objectives. The mission noted both errors of inclusion (non-poor) and errors of exclusion (many poor households not covered). The National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) survey (2004) found that 20-40 percent of sample households took part in some type of FFW (WFP-supported or not) irrespective of wealth and that members of the very poor wealth group were no more likely to be involved in FFW than those in the better-off wealth group. This finding points to substantial involvement in FFW overall, which is a considerable achievement, but indicates poor targeting of the very poor wealth group. Since the NRVA survey did not distinguish between the programmes of different FFW donors, it cannot be used to claim that WFP poverty targeting is poor. NRVA also revealed similar targeting problems with cash-for-work programmes. According to NRVA, errors of exclusion were substantially less for relief food than for FFW or cash-for-work.

Although the cash value of food rations is only ¼ of the market wage, FFW is not always self-targeting to the poorest because the local leaders select the beneficiaries. Since leaders find it difficult to exclude community members who want access to FFW (including landowners having a stake in irrigation rehabilitation), nearly everyone is eligible. Another constraint on poverty targeting is food redistribution within the community. An Oxfam evaluation of WFP-supported FFW in Bamian in 2002 under EMOP 10155 found that even when the project strictly targeted the poor, food rations were redistributed to the whole community (including the non-poor).

As in most WFP programmes, in Afghanistan there are clear tradeoffs between FFW's relief function and its asset creation function. In many cases, it may be difficult to reconcile the two in the same sub-project. FFW undertaken by WFP in Afghanistan has not been very effective either as a means of distributing food aid, or as a means of creating assets. As mechanism for food transfer its weaknesses have been low coverage/participation, short duration of assistance, and indifferent targeting. As a means of creating physical assets its weaknesses have been a generally weak connection with livelihood recovery, poor quality/durability of works, and lack of attention to equity issues, especially for irrigation rehabilitation.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

**The key to using FFW effectively is to recognise that it is a means to an end. This implies thinking more carefully about the objectives it is intended to serve and deciding which objective is most important in each setting. If the priority is food transfers in times of crisis, it is crucial to ensure adequate coverage, duration and targeting. If the priority is to protect and recover livelihood assets, more attention should be given to ensuring that the assets benefit the poor, are good quality and properly maintained.**

Due to weakness in outcome monitoring, there is no yet any systematic evidence that FFW has helped to reduce negative coping strategies such as out migration, distress sale of household assets and indebtedness, although the Oxfam evaluation cited above (para. 4.11) reports that food-for-work opportunities helped to prevent out-migration.

One of the key outcomes of FFW under a PRRO should be to reduce the proportion of household expenditure devoted to food (a key corporate indicator under Strategic Priority 2). NRVA omitted non-food expenditure, but found that food expenditure increases steadily in each



income quintile. Hence, even when food aid displaces expenditure on food staples, the money saved is likely to be used to buy higher value foods. The Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM) checklist includes two questions relevant for tracking impacts on household expenditure and assets: (“Percentage targeted household income spent on food decreased?” and “Percentage targeted households selling their assets decreased?”). These questions could potentially provide valuable information. Unfortunately, the replies are of little use because monitors have insufficient training to gather the information. Only 67 PDM reports were compiled for 817 completed projects and most monitors skipped the questions or ticked “yes/no” without any explanation.

Most employment in FFW is so short that benefits for workers and their families are likely to last only as long as the food lasts. At household level, one-time, one-month family food ration in exchange for 16 days of FFW is too little to make a long-lasting (sustainable) impact on the livelihoods of the recipients. In areas with acute and very high food insecurity, duration of work opportunities per household should be long enough to address hunger and to reduce pressures for asset depletion and distress migration.

#### ➤ **Contribution to Asset Creation**

The most popular activity under FFW has been irrigation rehabilitation, which accounted for 30 percent of sub-projects, followed by road rehabilitation (25 percent), school construction (8 percent), water supply/sanitation (7 percent) and tree planting (7 percent). Other activities supported on a small scale through FFW include “winterization” (snow clearance to keep roads open in winter), women’s income-generating activities, shelter construction by returnees, portering of food rations to remote areas, gabion making, flood control, well chlorination, hospital construction, sandbag manufacture for demining and trash collection.

There are significant regional variations in type of FFW projects. Road rehabilitation is the top priority in provinces around Kabul where roads were damaged by intermittent fighting between 1993 and late 2001. Roads and culverts also account for a high proportion of total FFW in Badakhshan because the mountainous terrain and seasonal landslide damage make communications and market access a top priority. Restoration of irrigation canals and karez<sup>16</sup> are important in the provinces serviced by Kabul (Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, and Paktiya), Kandahar (Maiwand, Khakrez) and Mazar-i-Sharif (Jawzjan and Samangan) offices, where water rather than land is the limiting resource for agriculture. FFW has been used in Bamian (Kabul office) and in the higher altitude areas of provinces such as Balkh, Faryab, Samangan and Sari Pul, serviced by Mazar office, to support seasonal employment in road work aimed at keeping the passes open throughout the winter. Afforestation and nursery activities are significant in the traditional tree crop and forest areas in the provinces around Kabul and Jalalabad.

An impressive number of physical outputs are also reported (see Table 9). However, the figures should be used with caution because they are based on planned outputs as stated in IP proposals as opposed to actual achievements. Although physical outputs are monitored through site visits, the latter information is not collated or computerized, which makes it impossible to compare planned versus actual FFW outputs. Although asset quality and completion are reported in the

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<sup>16</sup> Underground tunnels tapping into a regular flow of groundwater for irrigation and drinking water.



Weekly Monitoring Reports and Post Distribution Monitoring Reports, there is no monitoring of asset creation across projects.

According to Table 9, physical outputs to date include rehabilitation of 3,878 km of roads, 2250 km of irrigation canals, 1361 underground *karez*es, 218 water reservoirs, 14 aqueducts, 125 km of springs and 708 shallow wells. FFW was also used to construct 17 schools, 3582 latrines, 500 returnee houses and to plant 21,000 trees.

**Table 10 - Assets Created - Physical Outputs April 2003 to March 2004**

Description	Unit	Faizabad	Hirat	Kabul	Kandahar	Mazar	Total
<b>I. Rural Road Construction</b>							
Roads Constructed/Rehabilitated	km	598	320	2449	178	333	3878
Bridges built	unit	1	0	3	0	0	4
Culverts Constructed	unit	28	1	28	16	0	73
Side Ditches Cleaned	km	0	22	145	0	150	317
Path Ways (Valley Access) Built	km	0	0	60	0	0	60
<b>II. Agriculture Related Outputs</b>							
Canals Restored/rehabilitated	km	23	16	1013	533	665	2250
Karezes* Rehabilitated	unit	0	55	1043	263	0	1361
Springs De-silted	km	0	17	48	0	60	125
Drainages Rehabilitated	km	0	0	26	12	0	38
Water Reservoirs Restored	unit	0	4	28	0	186	218
Aqua-ducts/Flumes Constructed	unit	0	13	0	1	0	14
Agricultural land reclaimed	ha	0	0	22	0	0	22
<b>III. Other Outputs</b>							
School Reconstructed	unit	12	2	1	0	2	17
Returnee houses constructed	unit	0	0	0	0	500	500
Shallow Wells Dug/desilted	unit	0	387	210	0	111	708
Retaining Walls Built (rivers)	cuM	2513	140	591	0	0	3244
Latrines Constructed	unit	1936	0	1646	0	0	3582
Trees planted	tree	0	0	21,329	0	0	21,329

Source: WFP M&E Office, Kabul

### ➤ Quality and Relevance of Outputs

In a PRRO, as opposed to an EMOP, closer monitoring of activities is required to ensure technical quality, usefulness of the asset, and that intended beneficiaries are benefiting from the asset. The problem with data above on FFW outputs is that they provide no information on the **quality** of the works. Nor do they allow any assessment as to whether the projects are meeting the **real needs** of the participating communities. The field monitoring reports seen in the various AOs emphasized quantitative reporting of food distributed against days of work (the ‘food assistance’ input), rather than any qualitative interpretation of whether the outputs were meeting community needs (the ‘asset creation’ outcome). If the ‘asset creation’ outcome is to have meaning, then this aspect must be monitored with a similar degree of rigour as the distribution of food. The standard monitoring checklist used for FFW in Afghanistan includes 41 yes/no questions (the checklist part) and leaves space for narrative reporting. There is reference to the fulfilment of physical outputs. There is also reference to the quality of work, but it is just a yes/no question, although monitors are free to explain the basis for their ratings under the narrative outputs/outcomes section. The IP reports do not provide much information about quality either. The reality is that it is easy for communities and IPs





to satisfy WFP requirements and WFP is getting very little real information on the quality (and thus value) of the work completed.

The mission's impression from field visits is that asset quality is good in Badakhshan where WFP's implementing partners have long know-how in engineering as well as funds for complementary non-food inputs such as cement and gabion wire and access to earth-moving equipment such as graders, compactors and tipper trucks. Some good quality works were also seen in Karukh district, Hirat, where IPs benefited from a CARE umbrella project to upgrade their technical capacity. The umbrella project also provided complementary non-food inputs for the WFP-supported sub-projects. Asset quality tends to be less good in the other area offices, because WFP's implementing partners are still struggling to shift from "emergency" to "recovery" mode. In the regions where FFW came on-stream only at the beginning of the PRRO, the IPs have limited technical expertise in engineering and lack resources for non-food inputs and hire of earth-moving equipment. Quality and sustainability of road and canal rehabilitation works done under the EMOP in Balkh province as "food-for-asset-creation" appeared to be particularly poor.

#### ➤ **Who Uses and Benefits from the Assets?**

The Field Manual for PRRO 10233 defines FFW as the mechanism whereby vulnerable food-insecure workers receive food rations in lieu of cash wages in return for building assets for the benefit of the community. *'There must be clear indication that the project is directed at meeting the needs of the most vulnerable group in the area, with particular attention to the needs of women.'* Moreover, poor households and women are expected to reap at least an equal share of the immediate and long-term benefits from assets created at the community level.

Assets created or rehabilitated through FFW under the PRRO fall into three broad ownership categories: **community**, **private** and **state-owned**. Rehabilitation of **community assets** like feeder roads and wells is fully in line with WFP policy because such assets are likely to benefit everyone in the community including poor households and women. The rehabilitation of forests, nurseries and orchards on **state-owned land** is more complex and requires careful analysis to determine whether or not it is in line with WFP policies. When FFW is used to support **public** nurseries or tree planting on land belonging to MAAH or the Forest Department, the main beneficiary is the government, even if the recipients of the FFW are poor widows. In such cases, it is important to analyze whether the indirect benefits to communities through seedling supply and afforestation are important enough to justify the WFP support.

Rehabilitation of **private** assets such as irrigation systems is more difficult to reconcile with WFP policies because the benefits of irrigation accrue disproportionately to the owners of the land on which the rehabilitation takes place. In most regions of Afghanistan, land ownership is highly skewed, with only 20-40 percent of the households owning land and the rest working as tenants, sharecroppers or landless labourers on someone else's land.<sup>17</sup> Although tenants and sharecroppers also stand to benefit when irrigation rehabilitation contributes to higher crop production, the majority of the benefits accrue to the land owner. Tenants who supply all inputs including land preparation, seeds, fertilizer, irrigation and labour usually retain 50 percent of the harvest but in the case of sharecroppers who only provide family labour, the landlord gets 80-90 percent of the harvest and the sharecropper gets only 10-20 percent. Landless farm labourers have no direct benefit from irrigation rehabilitation except for short-term employment in FFW and the vague prospect that irrigation could increase the demand for casual farm labour.

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<sup>17</sup> See various Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit publications by Liz Alden Wiley on land tenure issues (including Bamian and Faryab).



**Roads.** Insofar as roads are public assets, everybody in the community stands to benefit to some degree. Benefits from building new roads that open up isolated areas to vehicle traffic for the first time are much higher than the benefits from rehabilitating an existing road that is rough but still passable. The benefits to restoring access when a road has been cut by a landslide or keeping the passes open during winter can also be high when the road connects several districts. The benefits to routine (annual) road maintenance are much lower. Benefits are more long-lasting when complementary non-food inputs such as gravel are available. Road engineering know-how is good in Badakhshan because the IPs and WFP have been working together since the late 1980s. Although roads in mountain areas are subject to frequent interruption by natural calamities the benefits to rehabilitation are more long lasting than for the muddy lowland roads around Balkh, Jawzjan and Faryab that seem to need new gravel nearly every year.

The greater success of WFP-funded road projects in Badakhshan highlights two issues: the length of time required creating functional community assets; and the limits as to what can be achieved. Although the PRRO has only a two-year life, it has followed a series of short emergency projects. The result is that WFP has been an ongoing source of funding and management capacity for road construction in Badakhshan for a number of years. It is not specifically the PRRO projects which have created much-needed community assets, rather it is that they are the latest in a series of projects that have run continuously over a number of years. This has fostered the build-up of appropriate skills in some competent local IPs and encouraged ongoing community participation. It also raises an issue about WFP corporate policies on roads.

Until recently Afghanistan had no donor-supported national roads project, hence in Badakhshan, nearly all roads and bridges were built with WFP support. With the exception of feeder roads terminating in a village, most of the roads constructed or rehabilitated by WFP in Badakhshan are public assets rather than community assets. WFP's policy has long been *not* to use FFW for public assets and the CO's FFW Guidelines emphasise 'community' assets. Perhaps WFP needs to review its policy.

**Irrigation.** Cleaning canals and karezes benefits everyone in the village, but it clearly benefits the landowners first, then the sharecroppers, then the agricultural labourers. It is also of very direct benefit to the owners of the kareze or canal because they are customarily responsible for maintenance and repair. The overall result is that, because of highly skewed land ownership, the assistance is very much skewed to the better off. However, there is no obvious way of getting around this – it is a limitation of the FFW modality where there are few alternatives in terms of asset rehabilitation/creation. The mission visited several sites where the work was on a single landlord's land (and in one case the WFP food monitor's private land) and the direct benefit of the assets to the workers was not obvious. Project Approval Committees (PACs) give inadequate attention to land tenure in screening proposals. MRRD is rightly opposed to using FFW for routine (annual) maintenance of canals because this tends to weaken collective self-help mechanisms (*ashara*). Formerly the landlord was expected to slaughter animals to provide food for workers to clean his canals, but today the more clever landlords are organizing NGO FFW projects to get donor resources to pay for canal cleaning.

The impact of irrigation rehabilitation on food production or food security is difficult to assess in the absence of any data on the area benefiting from irrigation in the without and with project



situation, or on changes in cropping patterns, production or yields. The mission observed that, due to drought, the water table in the karezes is so low that benefits to crops are limited.

**Nurseries, Forestry and Agriculture.** A number of sub-projects are using FFW to pay nursery or forest farm workers and to hire casual labourers to plant or protect trees on land belonging to MAAH or the Forest Department. In such cases, the FFW acts as a subsidy to MAAH or forestry department, albeit to produce goods such as tree seedlings that could be of wide public benefit – especially if planted on the hillsides for erosion control or distributed to schools and public buildings. However, an exit strategy is needed since permanent WFP salary subsidies to MAAH are neither feasible nor sustainable. The recipients of FFW on the women's nursery projects need to be periodically revalidated. In five or more years, a widow's circumstances can change, as her daughters marry and her sons grow old enough to work. Some of the afforestation projects seem technically weak, because the deep trenches dug to block off access by grazing animals are likely to cause gullies and the deep horizontal cuts dug into the hillsides are exposing the soil to erosion.

**Drinking Water.** Improved access to drinking water is a strong felt need especially in the arid South/Southeast/Southwest, where the majority of projects have involved well, cistern and kareze rehabilitation in combination with irrigation. Drinking water tends to benefit the whole community, including women and children. A surprising number of water projects have however focused on rehabilitating urban water supply systems, which – because of much higher food security – ought to be lower priority.

➤ **How much Do People Benefit?**

New road construction enables isolated villages to bring in a wider range of consumer goods and speedier and more reliable access to markets and services the outside world. The benefits from rehabilitating existing roads in other provinces are reduced travel time, higher traffic and less wear-and-tear on vehicles. The impact of irrigation rehabilitation on food production or food security is difficult to assess due to lack of data on the area benefiting from irrigation before and after the project or on changes in cropping patterns, production and yields.



### Box 3 - Outcomes of Road Construction in Badakhshan

In the far northeast corner of Afghanistan there are many small communities scattered in high valleys, often only accessible by many days of walking. Bringing in supplies or travelling out to seek medical or other assistance is a major effort for members of these communities. Building secure roads provides the opportunity to bring in a wider range of goods and speedier and more reliable access to the outside world. Before the WFP road it took 4 days to travel from Kisham to Faizabad. Today it can be done in 7 hours thanks to the road built by AfghanAid with FFW. The road rehabilitation done under the PRRO on the Faizabad - Baharak road benefits over 440,000 people in 11 districts. The new 15-km road built by Focus benefits 14 villages (1,200 households) that previously had no road access. The new 84 m bridge built by Afghan Aid with WFP support will eventually allow road access to 10 isolated districts, the farthest of which is a 15 day walk in each direction. The village voluntarily demolished 6 houses to build the road and rebuilt them with self-help labour. In total they will demolish and rebuild 25 houses and one mosque to make way for the road. This demonstrates that FFW does not undermine community self-help when the assets built with FFW are important to the whole community.

#### ➤ Efficiency

There is a trade-off between targeting efficiency and cost-effectiveness, as the acutely and highly food insecure districts tend to be more costly to reach. The steep valleys and remote areas of Badakhshan highlight difficulties which can occur when attempting to provide across-the-board assistance. Remote districts such as Darwaz in the north, Wakhan to the east and Kuran wa Munjan to the south are accessible only on foot with donkeys as transport. Distributing assistance to such areas poses major logistic problems together with long time periods and very high costs. Faizabad Area Office reported that it costs US\$0.54 per km to move food by donkey to remote mountain areas. Although the evaluation is criticizing the Country Office for under-delivery to some of the most food insecure districts, it would not have been cost-effective to concentrate resources exclusively on such areas.

The lack of security in some areas is an additional problem in Afghanistan. While it is not a particular issue in Badakhshan, it is a major problem in some other major areas of food insecurity such as the South, South-west and the Eastern Regions. In Badakhshan, the development of the winterization programme and holding of outlying food stockpiles have been sensible responses to accessing difficult areas. However, there are locations where recovery-oriented approaches such as FFW and FFE will not realistically be able to address food gaps.

With its FFW activities, WFP is not achieving an optimum relationship between cost, quality and time, and the results at output and outcome level. The main problems relate to the short duration of assistance apparently provided (an average of one month and a half), the transaction costs associated with project development, and the modest results overall in terms of the effectiveness of asset creation in relation to the livelihoods of the most food insecure.



### ➤ **Sustainability**

Government is rightly opposed to using FFW for routine (annual) maintenance of irrigation canals because it is unsustainable and tends to weaken collective self-help mechanisms (*ashara*). This also applies to routine maintenance of roads. In response, the Country Office has instructed the AOs to stop funding canal cleaning projects. Compliance is variable between area offices. Faizabad Area Office no longer accepts canal cleaning but Hirat and Kandahar still have some ongoing projects. Mazar Area Office is circumventing the restriction by supporting FFW projects that involve a one-off effort to remove the earth piled high on the side of canals, thus allowing the canal cleaning to continue on a self-help basis.

Benefits from roads are more sustainable in Badakhshan than elsewhere because they involve new construction (with cement and gravel) and communities ensure routine maintenance. Elsewhere, sustainability has been poor in the absence of cement and gravel and local maintenance. At the level of community assets, many projects not achieving sustainable outcomes due to insufficient funding for complementary non-food inputs and limited attention to building local capacity for ongoing maintenance. More attention is needed to building self-reliance to enable the communities to maintain the assets created – whether roads or canals or wells or tree plantations. In cases where FFW is going to MAAH or Forestry Department to hire labour for soil conservation, afforestation and nurseries, an exit strategy is needed since permanent salary subsidies to MAAH are neither feasible nor sustainable.

### ➤ **Comparative Advantage and Connectedness**

In the food secure provinces and districts, FFW does not always have a comparative advantage. NRVA findings regarding people's preference for FFW versus cash-for-work revealed that the preference for food instead of cash is higher among the poor and poorest than among the less poor and that food is preferred in remote areas with difficult market access, especially during the winter season when it is difficult to buy food in the market when mountain passes are blocked by snow. Among food secure households in food surplus areas and on the fringes of major cities, the preference is for cash for work. WFP should therefore take local preferences into account in planning food for work.

WFP's approach to FFW has been to rely on implementing partners to connect at the local level with the village council (*shura*), which will identify needs and negotiate priorities. It is expected that the *shura* will also assist in identifying those in greatest need as priority participants in FFW activities and the vulnerable who are unable to work and are the target for direct food assistance. The connection with the village is usually, though not always, done through the locally-based IP or a responsible government agency.



Table 11 - Preference for Food versus Cash Assistance by Wealth Group and Season

Season	MALE Wealth group	FFW	CFW	Combination of food and cash	Other	None
<b>Winter (n=5154)</b>	medium	55%	27%	18%	<1%	<1%
	poor	68%	12%	19%	<1%	<1%
	very poor	69%	12%	19%	<1%	<1%
	total	62%	20%	18%	<1%	<1%
<b>Spring (n=5154)</b>	medium	42%	38%	19%	<1%	2%
	poor	53%	25%	20%	<1%	1%
	very poor	57%	23%	19%	<1%	1%
	total	48%	31%	19%	<1%	1%
<b>Summer (n=5151)</b>	medium	16%	59%	22%	<1%	3%
	poor	20%	54%	25%	<1%	1%
	very poor	29%	47%	23%	<1%	1%
	total	19%	55%	23%	<1%	2%
<b>Fall (n=5146)</b>	medium	23%	49%	26%	1%	1%
	poor	32%	38%	29%	1%	<1%
	very poor	40%	31%	28%	1%	<1%
	total	29%	43%	27%	1%	1%

Source: NRVA,

It is important to understand the nature of Afghan society when considering the role of the local *shura* as the connection to the community. The evidence is that this approach may be too simplistic a perception of village-level social interactions. In fact, it is complex and multi-layered and in many situations, the village *shura* will not be an impartial arbiter of needs or priorities.

The notion of 'the village' is not clear in Afghan society and can be variously interpreted. Afghans generally refer to the *manteqa* as their place of living. The *manteqa* is a group of settlements of heterogeneous size that are commonly identified by the inhabitants under a single name. The *manteqa* are larger than a village and smaller than the district. They are not recognised as an administrative unit, but they represent the actual social and territorial unit of rural Afghanistan. It is at the *manteqa* level that communal structures exist (the bazaar, the school) that shape solidarity among the population<sup>18</sup>.

A recent study reports that WFP with an Afghan IP conducted a Food-for-Asset- Creation program with the *shura* of Shaheedan *manteqa* in Bamian. This *shura* was considered as a model as it had one central *shura-e manteqa* and smaller satellite *shuras* in each village or settlement. In July 2002 a joint survey was conducted with the *shura-e manteqa* and a programme of assistance to 18 villages identified. In November of the same year, it became apparent that there were actually 33 villages in the area of the *shura-e manteqa* and that 15 villages had been excluded from the previous activity, notwithstanding that some of these villages had been visited during the original survey.

Villages are rich in institutional arrangements which may not be fair or equitable<sup>19</sup>. They are based on existing social structures and their existence has to be understood and factored into

<sup>18</sup> Favre, Raphy, 2003. *loc. Cit.*

<sup>19</sup> Pain, Adam, 2004. *Understanding Village Institutions: Case studies on water management from Faryab and Saripul*. Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, Kabul, February 2004.



attempts to build or superimpose new organisational arrangements on villages<sup>20</sup>. NGOs have to be extremely careful that in their interventions they do not inadvertently play into or reinforce existing inequalities. Building permanent irrigation structures at village level while ignoring the wider dimensions of water distribution may entrench inequalities<sup>21</sup>.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

**There is scope for stronger linkages between WFP's FFW programme and government cash-based employment programmes such as National Emergency Employment Programme (NEEP) and community-based development programmes such as the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) on the other.**

**During its second year, the PRRO should field test and assess the joint WFP/NEEP proposal for combining FFW and CFW. It should also field test social mobilization procedures such as those developed by the National Solidarity Programme and related area-based approaches.**

**Technical quality of works should be enhanced by linking with competent implementing partners and by hiring in supervision from departments of agriculture, irrigation and forestry as necessary.**

**Sustainability of assets should be enhanced by building community-level commitment and maintenance capacity, either through NGO implementing partners or through MRRD's support to elected Community Development Committees.**

## **4.2 Support for Returnees**

Although this activity comes under the relief prong of the PRRO, its objective is not merely to meet returnees' emergency food needs but also to facilitate the reintegration of returned refugees and IDPs in their places of origin. The PRRO's support for returnees is highly relevant to national priorities, since the voluntary return and reintegration of refugees and IDPs into communities of origin is the main pillar of the National Development Framework.

### **➤ Effectiveness of Food Transfers to Returnees en Route**

WFP's primary form of assistance to returnees has been wheat provided at 'encashment centres' en route, the standard being 150 kg/household. This was not always effective because wheat is cheap and bulky and transport is costly. Hence it sometimes makes more sense for returnees to sell the wheat near the encashment centres and use the cash to buy wheat when they arrive in their home villages rather than pay the cost of transporting it. Since 2004, in recognition of this factor, cash is given in lieu of wheat except in food-insecure districts. The PRROdoc anticipated 1,500,000 returnees in the first year but only 889,672 (59 percent) returned. Because of the change in policy, only 14,662 MT was provided against a projection of 37,475 MT (39 percent), for an average of 100 kg per household. Quantities received were only enough to sustain a 6-member household for one month – too short for full reintegration.

### **➤ Effectiveness of Assistance Provided in Place of Return**

<sup>20</sup> Pain, Adam, 2004. *op. cit.* p.21.

<sup>21</sup> Pain, Adam, 2004. *loc. cit.*



Some returnees have had access to FFW in their areas of return. A large portion of this support is provided under phase II of the Ogata Initiative, which promotes the reintegration of IDPs and returnees into their home communities.<sup>22</sup> WFP received funds to purchase 34,000 MT of wheat when the initiative was launched by Japan in October 2002. In the first year of the PRRO WFP reportedly distributed 9,412 MT (28 percent of Ogata Initiative commodities) for the benefit of 230,300 returnees (almost 100 percent of the originally planned number of beneficiaries of approximately 231,600, spreading the assistance far more thinly than originally intended).

Of the returnees benefiting from wheat provided by WFP from encashment centres, at the time of the evaluation, approximately 26 percent appear to have had access to Ogata Initiative FFW. It seems returnees on average would have received only approximately 40 kg of wheat for Ogata Initiative FFW. Since non-returnees also participated, actual food transfers to returnees were even lower. At best this suggests FFW employment for a member of a returnee household of less than one month. Although of some benefit, this could not be expected to sustain refugees and IDPs upon their return. The Country Office countered the mission's criticism by arguing that returnees receive other types of support in addition to WFP food rations and are not excluded from non-Ogata FFW. However, not all districts having Ogata Initiative projects have regular FFW because they are food secure.

Apart from the fact that the Ogata programme supplies non-food inputs such as hand tools and head pans, the FFW approach adopted for returnees seems not to differ much between Ogata Initiative-assisted projects for returnees and non-Ogata Initiative FFW projects for resident populations. The food rations are the same and duration of the support is similar (1-2 months with workers rotating every two weeks). Both the Ogata Initiative FFW and the non-Ogata FFW focus on the same type of works – mostly routine road and canal rehabilitation. The only exceptions are the few projects that deliberately focus on rehabilitation of individual returnee assets like house rehabilitation. Ogata Initiative FFW projects have rightly adopted a non-discriminatory approach to facilitate the reintegration of IDPs into local communities by targeting returnees and food insecure segments of the host populations. While this is a commendable strategy given the aim to facilitate local reintegration, it has the effect of reducing the quantities of food assistance actually provided to the returnees.

In terms of settlement outcomes, visits to communities with high numbers of returnees presented a mixed picture. UNHCR reports a low number of returnees relocating after initial settlement, but a substantial proportion of people returned to find their houses destroyed or occupied by others resulting in land and property disputes and their inability to re-establish their livelihood. In addition, assistance with water, housing/shelter and agriculture have often been lacking. The Provincial Government in Kandahar stated that the level of assistance provided by UN to returning IDPs and refugees is insufficient to distribute the medium to long term support required to facilitate their return and the resumption of their livelihoods.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

**The Country Office should revise its guidelines for design of interventions to support reintegration of returnees in their places of origin and implementing partners should be**

<sup>22</sup> The Ogata Initiative is financed by Japan and implemented in collaboration with Government and coordinated by UNAMA. Other participating international agencies/organizations have included ICRC, UNDP, UN-HABITAT, UNHCR, UNICEF, United Nations Mine Action Center for Afghanistan, and UNOPS.





**trained in their use. The choice of activities eligible for FFW should be widened to include construction of returnee housing and water and sanitation facilities. For returnees, rotation of workers every two weeks is inappropriate. Duration of FFW per returnee household should be extended for up to three months to facilitate their reintegration. WFP and its partners should identify ways to monitor the situation of IDPs after their resettlement.**

#### 4.3 Assistance to IDPs in Camps

This activity supports WFP Strategic Priority 1 of saving lives and meeting emergency food needs of displaced persons residing in IDP camps and is highly relevant to national priorities as expressed in the NDF. In the mission's view, free food for encamped IDPs continues to be relevant as long as there are needy people in the IDP camps who lack alternative livelihood sources and who are unable to return to their places of origin.

WFP assistance during the first year of the PRRO was provided to IDPs living in established camps recognised by UNHCR, including five in the south (under the Kandahar AO) and one in the west but now phased out (under the Hirat AO). The phasing out of WFP assistance to IDPs in the west under the EMOP was considered by WFP to be a notable success. At the end of 2001, WFP supported a peak caseload of 385,000 IDPs (approximately 340,000 of which resided in Maslakh camp and the remainder in Shaidayee and Minarete camps). An IOM re-registration in August 2002 established an official estimate of only 49,000 IDPs in Maslakh. Blanket free distributions to the camps ceased on 31 March 2003 (the day before the start of the PRRO) with the closure of the WFP bakeries. At this point WFP had been feeding about 59,000 IDPs. Shaidayee and Minarete camps were gradually phased out and from February to mid-April 2003 about 13,000 IDPs departed Maslakh to villages of origin. UNHCR screened the remainder in Maslakh and WFP continued to provide food assistance to some 12,800 persons. Throughout 2003 WFP assisted IDPs from Hirat Province to return to their places of origin (some 48,300 in all). Returns from camps in the south to places of origin have been far slower due to insecurity, unsolved right-to-land issues and continued drought.<sup>23</sup>

It was estimated that 200,000 encamped IDPs would require food assistance in the first year of the PRRO (180,000 in the south and 20,000 in the west) and that this would reduce to 50,000 overall in the second year. The Country Office reports distributing commodities to 135,436 IDPs in the five camps in the south in the first year of the PRRO (75 percent of what was anticipated). This mainly reflects reduced IDP numbers but also includes 10 percent under-delivery by WFP on amounts requested by UNHCR. In the west, WFP provided 504 MT to 6,499 IDPs ( $\frac{1}{3}$  of the number anticipated) and 83 MT to 1,099 IDPs in Jalalabad, which had not been anticipated<sup>24</sup>. UNHCR expressed satisfaction with WFP's performance, reporting that the partnership has worked well and that WFP's assistance has been timely and in agreed quantities and has contributed to meeting legitimate food needs.

WFP's support is intended to contribute to two types of outcomes: an immediate one – reduced malnutrition in IDP camps – and a longer term one – reintegration of IDPs in their places of origin. Although data on the prevalence of acute malnutrition were not regularly collected

<sup>23</sup> Information sources include the PRRO Annual Report 2003 and internal (email) correspondence from the Head of Area Office from April 2003.

<sup>24</sup> ACORD reports 301,861 IDPs. The mission team was not able to verify which number was correct, but based on the partners' satisfaction with the support, it is assumed that the UNHCR number is closest to the true number, since the resulting food transfer per beneficiary (177kg) is closer to the planned figure (183kg).



during the first year of the PRRO, ad hoc surveys suggest that the nutritional outcomes for encamped IDPs in the south are not bad. A nutrition survey by MSF for Zhare Dasht IDP camp in Kandahar (March 2004) indicated insignificant acute malnutrition among under-5's<sup>25</sup>. There is no suggestion that the situation is substantially different in the other camps. With regard to longer term outcomes, WFP assistance in Hirat at the end of the EMOP and the start of the PRRO contributed to reducing the caseload at IDP camps and reintegrating over 48,000 IDPs in their places of origin. However, in the south, reintegration has been slower than anticipated, due to unresolved issues regarding returnees' access to land and water and their physical security in the places of origin.

UNHCR is currently undertaking an IDP profiling exercise to determine the willingness and requirements for the return, reintegration and relocation of the caseload of 150,000 IDPs encamped in the south. This is appropriate and a prerequisite for an exit strategy, whether reintegration or return. UNHCR and the Government believe that a large numbers of the IDPs have access to daily labour, or in the case of the 20,000 IDPs in Spin Boldak involvement in cross border trade with Pakistan. Government announced its intention to close Spin Boldak in August 2004 and to voluntarily relocate 20,000 IDPs to Zahre Dasht camp so that they can be properly assisted.

The Country Office stated in the PRRO Annual Report 2003 that in 2004 WFP will 'shift from free food distribution toward more sustainable food for work and food for training for IDPs in camps who are not able to return home.' However, the mission believes WFP should be cautious about doing so because the IDP situation in the south differs significantly from that of the Hirat area. In the south it is unlikely that meaningful (and dignified) FFW/FFT can be organised for the IDPs, almost 50 percent of whom are nomadic pastoralists who have lost their animals and whose rights to grazing land in their places of origin are hotly disputed. They feel unwelcome to return and in some locations, they fear for their physical security. Although the pastoralists have taken refuge in the south, they have no land rights in the vicinity of the IDP camps. Thus they have no stake in rehabilitating infrastructure in the areas surrounding the IDP camps (apart from the temporary employment). Moreover, there is a risk that work opportunities will be insufficient for IDPs to be able to maintain themselves, since drought conditions in the south have reduced employment opportunities in agriculture. The unstable civil security situation in the south also needs to be considered. The push from UNHCR to wind down care and maintenance does not address the real constraints for a permanent solution, namely access to land and water as well as other political and protection-related issues in areas or origin. Kandahar provincial authorities maintain that free food should be kept as an option for vulnerable areas and IDPs as one among many interventions required in the needy and insecure districts to help abate the growing civil insecurity and risk of population migration.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

**WFP should continue relief food assistance to encamped IDPs in the south but encourage UNHCR to verify the distribution lists. WFP and its partners should support the National IDP Plan to identify durable solutions to political, security, land and water issues that impede IDP return and reintegration, prior to and as a precondition for any phase-out strategies involving reduction of relief food in favour of FFW or food-for-training.**

<sup>25</sup> Severe acute malnutrition: 1.2 percent for Zhare Dasht Camp (MSF, Kandahar, March 2004) and 0.5 percent for Maslakh Camp (MSF, Herat, January 2004) expressed in percent of children falling below – 3 standard deviation of weight for height.



#### 4.4 Rural Vulnerable

This activity, which falls under the relief component of the PRRO, supports WFP Strategic Priority 1: “Save lives and meet emergency food needs of vulnerable groups in crisis situations.” Under the heading of rural vulnerable (RV) the PRRO distributed 2,715 MT to 147,000 recipients (25 percent of target), but the Country Office acknowledges that total distribution to the rural vulnerable is understated because relief food distributions to vulnerable households unable to take part in FFW are hidden in the ACORD database under FFW. The main activity was winterization campaigns in remote mountain areas. The Country Office successfully pre-positioned food stocks before snow blocked mountain passes and organized winter food distributions along with FFW.

District-level targeting of rural vulnerable resources was weak. Some of the Area Offices did not use any of their allocation and the most food insecure areas were under-resourced. Within-village targeting, on the other hand, appears to have been equitable. NRVA survey findings suggest that the poorest households were much more likely to be covered by emergency free food distributions than by FFW or cash-for-work programmes. By targeting everyone in the winter-affected communities for general food distribution, errors of exclusion were avoided and even the poorest were reached.

Where rural vulnerable support was provided, its effects were positive. Emergency relief food assistance is reported to have had a major impact on lives and livelihoods of people who received it.

##### Box 4 – Impact of Relief on Livelihoods

“Where food aid commodities have reached food insecure areas, distributions of emergency relief food assistance have saved lives, discouraged migration, protected families from further indebtedness and allowed families to delay the “desperation” marriages of young girls.” We were in a terrible cycle of our lives. We were about to move to another country. We were about to leave our village but then we received wheat from CHA/WFP which prevented us from migration. *Man, Toolak District, Ghor.* (Lautze, Sue, et al, *A Cash Famine, 1999-2002*, p39).

Nonetheless, under the PRRO, the relief objectives of activities for the rural vulnerable were only partially met due to conceptual confusion about the “rural vulnerable” leading to low overall coverage. Resources equal to 10 percent of total FFW resources were set aside in the project design as a separate budget line for the rural vulnerable, but because of conceptual confusion, most of the resources for the rural vulnerable were taken out of the budget line for FFW, leaving the majority of resources earmarked for rural vulnerable unutilized. Because the Country Office equates the rural vulnerable with the 10-15 percent of rural households headed by widows, elderly and disabled people unable to participate in FFW, it addresses their needs mainly by requiring implementing partners to distribute 10-15 percent of total FFW rations as relief assistance to community members unable to participate in FFW. This makes assistance to the rural vulnerable conditional on the existence of an ongoing FFW project. As a result, relief



needs of districts where 60 percent-80 percent of households had an assessed food gap of 8-10 months were often neglected.

Free food assistance is appropriate for chronically food insecure rural households that are unable to take part in food for work, such as widows, children, elderly and disabled people. Relief food may also be appropriate for able-bodied people in areas experiencing a transitory acute food deficit due to armed conflict or drought. Many areas of serious food deficit are not covered by rural vulnerable distributions due to insecurity and/or lack of implementing partners. Some area offices (notably Hirat) have not utilized their allocation. To date, support for the rural vulnerable has been limited to areas with an ongoing food for work project, as part of the assistance provided to the community by the implementing partner for 1-2 months, but this needs rethinking.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

**Country Office guidelines on assistance to the rural vulnerable population should be revised and implementing partners trained on the new guidelines. Area offices should be encouraged to utilize their full allocation under the RV budget line (in addition to requiring implementing partners for FFW to distribute 10 percent of total resources to households unable to participate in FFW).**

**The definition of “rural vulnerable” should be broadened to include able-bodied people in areas experiencing a transitory acute food deficit due to armed conflict or drought and not just chronically food insecure widows, elderly and disabled people.**

**In areas with acute and very high food insecurity, support for the rural vulnerable should not be conditional on the existence of an ongoing FFW project and should not be limited to 10 percent of the population. Assistance could take the form of (a) distributions in the absence of any FFW project or (b) distributions in combination with FFW (“topping up”). The latter might start before FFW can get organized and continue beyond the end of the construction period. Food assistance should be programmed in sufficient quantities for the entire duration of the food gap. If an implementing partner cannot organize enough FFW to address the full food gap, a combination of FFW and relief distributions is preferable.**

**Before programming large food transfers to a district assessed as acutely or highly food insecure, a rapid update of VAM assessments should be undertaken. Where no implementing partner is available, local implementation by *shuras* should be explored. When free food is distributed in connection with FFW the assistance should be shown in ACORD under the rural vulnerable category (as opposed to treating it as part of FFW).**

#### **4.5 Urban Vulnerable**

This activity, which is included under the relief prong of PRRO 10233, is intended to support WFP strategic priority 2: “Protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shocks.” The PRRO’s support for the Urban Vulnerable is provided through 86 bakeries that employ 897 poor women and 63 men who supply subsidized bread daily to 167,868 beneficiaries. The objective is to provide a safety net for vulnerable urban households (including families headed by widows, disabled or elderly or lacking able-bodied members) while creating job opportunities for vulnerable urban women. Bakeries receive free wheat flour and iodized salt from WFP and sell the bread at a 67 percent-83 percent subsidy. The scheme, which operates in



Kabul, Mazar-i-Sharif, Kandahar and Jalalabad, benefits 28,938 households, including 27,978 cardholders and 960 bakery workers and their families.

The bakeries may have been justified at the time of their conception, during the Taliban regime, when cities like Kabul were filled with IDPs and urban poor whose homes and means of livelihood were destroyed during the war, many of whom were widows with no means of livelihood because women were not permitted to work outside the household. WFP previously acclaimed the bakeries a success because they enabled a number of poor widows to earn an income by baking subsidized bread for distribution to large numbers of urban poor. Although PRRO design made provision to further expand them, the Country Office has rightly been cautious.

The bakery programme has been an important learning process for the country office. Initially, under the EMOP, WFP's main emphasis was on supplying subsidized bread to the urban poor as opposed to employment generation for widows. The mission, during its field visits in Mazar-i-Sharif, learned that just prior to the start-up of the PRRO, there had been 80 functioning bakeries in Mazar-i-Sharif city, most of them run by men. At the design of the PRRO, a decision was taken to support only the female-run bakeries and to phase out the male ones. It is reported that many of the old bakeries are still functioning on a commercial basis even though WFP support was withdrawn. In many cases, the former clients bring their own bread dough from home and the bakers charge a service fee for baking it on their behalf.

At the time of PRRO formulation, the women's bakeries were perceived by WFP as a success story. However, a comparative study completed in March 2004 concluded that the bakeries are currently ineffective for addressing urban vulnerability because of weak targeting and poor sustainability. Since 1999, there has been no urban assessment or baseline. Infrequent card validation contributes to weak targeting. The evaluation found that ration cards are openly traded on the market, especially in non-poor neighbourhoods. As a result of revalidation, in Kandahar, 80 percent of card holders were changed. As shown in Table 11 (below), there is no common standard among bakeries in different cities with regard to bread weight, price, subsidy, or numbers of employees and salaries.



Table 12 – Comparison of Bakery Parameters – March 2004

Parameter	Kabul	Jalalabad	Mazar	Kandahar	Total
Bakeries	34	3	35	14	86
Card holders [entitled to bread subsidy]	13,036	660	8,962	5,320	27,978
Beneficiaries [including family members]	78,216	3,960	53,772	31,920	167,868
Avg cardholders per bakery	383	220	256	380	310
Bakery workers	459	18	315	168	960
Male bakery workers [at tanoor oven]	0	0	63	0	63
Female bakery workers	459	18	252	168	897
Cardholders + workers	13,495	678	9,277	5,488	28,938
Average bread output/bakery/day (pieces)	1,920	1,200	1,280	660	
Uncooked dough (pieces)				990	990

Source: *Sustainability Study on WFP Afghanistan Women Bakery Project*, Alfred Osunsanya, (Programme Officer), Kabul Area Office, WFP, Kabul, Afghanistan, 30<sup>th</sup> March 2004

Major constraints for breaking even are high cost of firewood and rented premises. The bakeries are heavily subsidy-dependent and have limited prospects for becoming self-sustaining. After ten years of operation in some cities, the women have not yet mastered the business side of the enterprise and could not survive on the market if WFP support were withdrawn. The programme is currently under review in an effort to improve targeting, increase profitability by introducing uniform standards and eventually phase out the WFP support.

Even if targeting problems could be solved, the bakeries will remain subsidy-dependent. The mission concurs with the Country Office's view that WFP should therefore disengage itself from the women's bakeries and seek alternative ways of addressing urban vulnerability.

#### RECOMMENDATION

**WFP should disengage itself from the women's bakeries and seek alternative ways of addressing urban vulnerability through linkage with ongoing skills training and cash-based employment programmes.**

**In the second year of the PRRO the emphasis should be on transferring the necessary business skills and equipping the workers to cope with market forces. The experience in 2003 with phase-out of 60 male-run bakeries in Mazar-i-Sharif should be assessed, as the experience could provide useful lessons that could for preparing an exit strategy for WFP.**

#### 4.6 Food for Education

The objective of the food for education component is to increase access to education and reduce disparities in access. Its main thrust is school feeding (biscuits, take home wheat ration for boys and girls, and take-home oil ration for girls), but it also includes food for teacher salary supplement, food for teacher training, pilot school construction including related water supply and sanitation, school gardening and deworming of schoolchildren. This objective is highly relevant to national strategies aimed at ensuring universal access to primary education for both girls and boys. It is especially relevant considering the very low enrolment rates during the Taliban regime and the social pressures that discouraged parents from sending girls to school. Parents' main reasons for not sending children to school are shortage of schools, family commitments, early marriage, cultural constraints (for girls), employment (for boys) and high



cost of schooling (NRVA 2004). Lack of school books and teaching material and poor quality (or absenteeism) of teachers is also a concern.

## **RECOMMENDATION**

**School feeding needs to be complemented by building new schools and recruiting more female teachers in rural areas, as this is the number one constraint.**

### ➤ **School Feeding**

In 2001, WFP launched a pilot school feeding programme under the EMOP. Two approaches were tested: a take-home ration for students in 50 schools in Badakhshan (12.5 kg wheat per pupil per month) and on-site feeding with freshly-baked bread in the rest of the country. Badakhshan was selected for take-home rations because it was unfeasible to attempt to prepare and distribute bread on a daily basis in such a remote area. Take-home wheat rations were very welcome because the area has a serious wheat deficit and market access is poor. When the two approaches were evaluated, the take-home school feeding pilot in Badakhshan was the more successful of the two. The bakery-based school feeding was a failure because local physical infrastructure, community participation and management capacity were inadequate to the task. Teachers were dissatisfied because bread distribution disturbed the lessons. Parents protested that it was unacceptable to expect children to consume bread without any tea, milk or juice. At workshop held in Sept. 2002, WFP agreed to drop school feeding with bread in favor of fortified biscuits and to limit take-home rations to locations to remote and insecure areas where biscuit distribution would be unfeasible.

Under the current PRRO, WFP aimed to target 1.1 million students during academic year 2003/2004 and 1.2 million in 2004 to 2005. In 2003, WFP school feeding assisted 1.2 million schoolchildren in 2,870 schools with 8,224 MT of biscuits and 13,305 MT of wheat<sup>26</sup>. The take-home wheat, which served 118,266 students for 9 months worked well. The biscuits were more appreciated by children than take-home wheat but their supply was undependable. The Country Office responded to fluctuations in supply by lagging the start-up of distributions to avoid possible breaks later in the year. In mid-2003, there was suddenly an oversupply of biscuits whose expiry date was nearing. The Country Office responded by expanding the number of schools and by making one time distributions to a large number of students in non-targeted schools. This 'inflated' absolute beneficiary numbers and 'covered up' the fact that most children got biscuits for no more than four months out of nine. Due to a pipeline break in Nov. 2003, school feeding terminated one month in advance of the end of the 2003 school year. At the start of the 2004 school year (late March), the few remaining biscuits from 2003 were reserved for Kandahar, Hirat, Bamian and Faryab. As a result, in March 2004, only 275,866 students (97,857 girls) received school feeding (23 percent of planned numbers). In the rest of the country, start-up of biscuit distribution was delayed until mid-June.

The anticipated outcomes of school feeding are increased school enrolment, higher attendance and improved educational attainment. With regard to enrolment, there has been a massive increase in school enrolment since the overthrow of the Taliban in late-2001, but the increases

<sup>26</sup> PRRO Annual Report 2003.





are mainly a result of the changed political environment, the successful UNICEF-supported back-to-school campaign and the influx of returnees. School feeding's contribution has so far been modest. In 2003, the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS, Table 12 - below) reported 2.92 million children aged 7-13 enrolled and 2.5 million not enrolled (net enrolment 53.9 percent), with lower enrolment rates in rural (46.4 percent) than urban areas (77.4 percent) and for girls (39.6 percent) than boys (66.8 percent).

**Table 13 –Enrolment of Children Aged 7-13, 2002-2003**

	Total School Enrolment						Incremental Enrolment 2002-2003		
	Both Sexes		Girls		Boys		Both	Girls	Boys
	2002	2003	2002	2003	2002	2003			
Urban	963,309	1,107,995	396,738	464,488	566,571	643,507	144,686	67,750	76,936
Rural	1,387,605	1,811,232	377,056	558,494	1,010,549	1,252,738	423,627	181,438	242,189
National	2,352,769	2,919,227	769,543	1,022,982	1,583,226	1,896,245	566,458	253,439	313,019

Source: MICS Survey (2003)

In 2002, the corresponding figures were 2.35 million pupils enrolled (46.4 percent) and 2.7 million school-aged children not enrolled. Percentage increases in enrolment from 2002 to 2003 (Table 13 - below) averaged 16 percent nationwide, with a higher increase in rural areas than urban and for girls than boys. In 2004, enrolment was reported to have reached over 4 million, although definitive data were not yet available at the time of the evaluation mission

**Table 14 – Percentage Increase in Net Enrolment Rates 2002-2003**

	Net Enrolment Rate						Increase in Net Enrolment 2002-2003 (% of 2002)			Gender Gap in Enrolment	
	Both Sexes		Girls		Boys		Both	Girls	Boys	2002	2003
	2002	2003	2002	2003	2002	2003					
Urban	65.1	72.4	55.7	63.4	73.7	80.8	111%	114%	110%	18%	17%
Rural	38.8	46.6	22.4	30.2	53.7	61.3	120%	135%	114%	31%	31%
National	46.4	53.9	32.2	39.6	59.5	66.8	116%	123%	112%	27%	27%

Source: MICS Survey (2003)

It is too soon to assess impact on **enrolment/retention/dropouts**, since school feeding has only been implemented for one year, started after the beginning of the academic year and was discontinued after about 4 months due to a pipeline break. Although the Country Office met its targets for number of pupils covered by school feeding, it was only able to supply them biscuits for an average of 90 school days per year instead of 220 days (38 percent of the targeted amount). Although Afghanistan has made considerable progress in increasing access to primary education, the contribution of food aid to the process is unquantifiable. For certain, increased enrolment is attributable to a combination of factors. School feeding has the potential to contribute, if biscuit supply problems can be satisfactorily resolved.

NRVA surveys suggest that school **attendance** has increased significantly in all wealth groups, independently of school feeding, although the poor and very poor lag significantly behind the medium wealth group. MoE believes that daily biscuit distribution contributes to increased school attendance, especially by the poor, but hard data are currently lacking to demonstrate the correlation. In the mission's view, biscuits were effective for increasing daily **attendance** during the 3-4 months that they were available but not when distribution stopped. Since daily





attendance sheets are routinely compiled for school feeding, an opportunity exists for MoE to use the attendance sheets to track how attendance responds to biscuit distribution.

When distributed at the proper time of day, the biscuits helped to address **pupils' short term hunger**, but on-time distribution was not always achieved. All town children reported eating breakfast before coming to school but some of the poorer rural children do skip breakfast.

The entire school feeding programme is excessively dependent on a single country's donations (India) for biscuit supply. Although the main problem has been erratic supply, logistics pose additional challenges. Because Indian products cannot be transported through Pakistan, biscuits must be shipped via sea to Iran and then transported overland through the western corridor to Hirat to Kandahar or via the northern corridor through Termez, Uzbekistan to northern Afghanistan and down through the Salang Pass to Kabul and Jalalabad in the southeast. Afghanistan does not yet have the industrial capacity to make fortified biscuits but India is not the only potential supplier (WFP fortified biscuits are also produced in Bangladesh). The possibility that fortified biscuits could be made on contract in Iran, Turkey, Pakistan or even Afghanistan warrants further investigation.

### **School Feeding Take Home**

Although biscuits are preferred wherever their distribution is feasible, and children like them better than wheat, take-home wheat rations were successfully distributed in lieu of biscuits in remote mountain areas such as Badakhshan and in some physically insecure areas such as Zabul. Where school feeding take-home started on time and continued throughout the school year (Badakhshan), it contributed to increased enrolment. Monthly take-home wheat rations are a less effective tool for influencing daily school attendance than daily on-site feeding with biscuits.

In response to Headquarters queries on why it makes sense to supply take-home wheat rather than biscuits in the remote areas, four factors can be cited: (a) local preference; (b) limited storage; (c) need to pre-position of supplies prior to winter; and (d) ease of combining shipment of take-home wheat with other wheat shipments.

Badakhshan has relied on school feeding take home since the pilot started under the EMOP and it proved more successful than feeding with biscuits in other provinces supervised by the Faizabad Area Office. Although school feeding is not appropriate for addressing overall food insecurity, Badakhshan is highly wheat deficit and the wheat is very much appreciated. This consideration also applies to districts along the Pakistan border affected by civil insecurity as well as acute food insecurity. In areas where bread is in short supply, biscuits may seem a luxury.

In remote mountain areas, accessible only on foot, where snow blocks the passes for up to six months, the food (whether wheat or biscuits) would have to be distributed in large quantities, well in advance of winter. This implies making large quantities of biscuits available in early autumn in order to enable the schools to stock adequate quantities before the passes close. This has not always been feasible due to biscuit supply problems. In some cases, biscuits have arrived in Afghanistan near their expiry date, which is especially problematic for mountain areas, considering the need to pre-position them up to six months before distribution. For instance,



supplies for the start of new school year in March/April/May have to be pre-positioned by late October, as the passes close in November and do not reopen until mid-May.

Another constraint is limited storage space on the school premises. Storage is especially challenging in the case of mountain areas, where a 6-month supply needs to be pre-positioned in each site in advance of winter.

Although the logistics of distributing biscuits are similar to those of distributing wheat, initially biscuits were more time-intensive to distribute. In Hirat, during 2003, the NGO implementing partners initially attempted to distribute the biscuits to the schools on a daily or weekly basis, which proved impractical in the outlying districts. When DoE took over distribution from the IPs in 2004, the frequency of distribution decreased. Schools were expected to store the biscuits and have the school staff distribute them rather than an NGO. In the highly food insecure districts and those affected by civil insecurity, if WFP is already shipping in wheat, it might be easier to add the school feeding take-home wheat rations to the regular wheat shipment than to make a separate shipment expressly for biscuits.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

**WFP should reduce its dependency on Indian biscuits for school feeding by diversifying supply.**

**The school feeding guidelines should be updated to include criteria for deciding when to consider a take-home ration in lieu of biscuits. In remote and insecure areas where it is already distributing take-home wheat rations in lieu of biscuits it should continue to do so.**

#### ➤ **Take-Home Ration for Girls**

The objective of the take home oil ration incentive for girls is to reduce the gender gap in school enrolment. This objective is highly relevant because girls' enrolment continues to lag behind that of boys, with only 40 percent of girls enrolled compared to 67 percent for boys. The gender gap is higher in rural areas (30 percent of girls enrolled compared with 61 percent boys) than in urban areas (63 percent girls and 81 percent of boys enrolled).

Performance was well below targets during the first year of the PRRO because take-home rations for girls were linked to school feeding and their distribution stopped when the biscuit supply ran out. Overall, quantities despatched were only 24 percent of operational plan targets (see Table 6). Total beneficiary numbers reached 49 percent of target but only at the cost of spreading the assistance more thinly.

There is evidence that the take-home oil incentive contributes to increased enrolment of girls but conclusions are premature because oil distribution in 2003 began too late in the school year to have much influence on enrolment and lasted only a few months. In the 2004 school year, girls' enrolment increased substantially above 2003 levels, even though the distribution of WFP take-home rations for girls had not yet started at the time of the evaluation (June 2004). The oil incentive appears to influence parents' initial decision to enroll daughters. Once enrolled the girls' expectation of getting oil helps prevent them from dropping out. In 2004, the number of



girls in first grade in major cities (except Kandahar), is rapidly approaching that of boys, whereas in rural areas there is still a significant gap between enrolment of girls and boys.

**Take-home oil rations for girls are potentially effective for addressing gender gaps in enrolment and should therefore continue. WFP and MoE should develop a graduation strategy: in geographic areas with relatively high enrolment of both sexes, whenever girls' enrolment catches up to boys' enrolment, the food incentive for girls should be re-targeted to geographic areas where overall enrolment is low and a major gap in female enrolment continues to persist.**

### ➤ School Construction

WFP support for pilot school reconstruction using labour intensive methods under the PRRO is very relevant, considering that during the war 75 percent of school facilities were damaged and that lack of sufficient schools – especially girls' schools - in rural areas is reported to be the number one constraint for achieving universal access to primary education. The situation was exacerbated between 2001 and 2003, by a rapid increase in school enrolment, well beyond MoE's capacity to cope. The average number of students per classroom in school feeding schools increased from 53 to 97, with an average of over 2 shifts per classroom. Due to shortage of classrooms, many classes are held outdoors or in tents.

Under the PRRO, WFP assisted MoE to implement a pilot school construction programme in order to develop and test procedures for labour intensive community-based school construction using FFW. As a result, 13 schools were constructed with WFP assistance, 12 of which have already been handed over to government. In addition to school construction under FFE, at least 10 additional school rehabilitation projects were implemented under the PRRO in Badakhshan, on community initiative under the heading of FFW, some involving more than one school.

School construction in rural areas that have no school is potentially one of the most effective ways of contributing to universal access to primary education. Even rehabilitation of an existing school improves the learning environment. In Karukh district (Hirat), where classes are held in UNICEF tents, an average of 5 girls are referred to the hospital every day because they get sick in too much heat or too much cold. In Badakhshan, teachers reported that "before rehabilitating the school roof and desks, children came to school because the commanders forced them – they did not like school. Now they come voluntarily because they like to go to school."

The contribution of school construction to increased enrolment of girls has been less than anticipated. Although WFP stipulates in its contract with each community that the new schools will be used by both girls and boys, those visited near Kandahar, Hirat and Mazar-i-Sharif were only for boys. Classes for girls were either held in tents or in traditional mud buildings. WFP tried to convince the school administration to send girls to the school in a second shift – either morning or afternoon – as was successfully done in Badakhshan. In Mazar-i-Sharif, girls' parents were reluctant to send them to the new school because it is too far for small girls to walk and the location is too exposed to outsiders travelling on the road. Because of their concern for their daughters' physical safety, they prefer to send them to informal schools located in walled compounds on the outskirts of the village so that parents can keep an eye on them. For girls,



parents expressed a preference for more, smaller and simpler school facilities closer to the village.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

**Although school construction is crucial, it is not WFP's area of comparative advantage. Therefore it should be entrusted to partners able to finance the non-food inputs including engineering expertise, building materials, school furnishings and related water/sanitation facilities. FFW for labor-intensive construction should be confined to food-insecure areas and should be conditional on willingness to let girls use the schools. To ensure that facilities are suitable for use by girls, parents' view on appropriate school design and location should be sought.**

#### **➤ Food-for-Teachers**

The objective of providing a monthly ration of vegetable oil to teachers is to ensure an adequate supply of qualified teachers – both male and female. Although it is culturally acceptable for a female teacher to teach both boys and girls, parents are reluctant to allow their girls to be taught by a male teacher unless he is a respected religious leader (mullah). Therefore girls' school enrolment depends on the supply of female teachers. A major constraint for ensuring an adequate supply of qualified teachers is the very low salaries offered by MoE (around US\$35 per month) and irregular teacher attendance at school, due to the need for teachers to do other work to supplement their salaries. The supplement is provided to all government-registered teachers nationwide who are teaching on the MoE payroll either at primary, secondary or high school level.

In 2003, under Food-for-Teacher-Salary-Supplement (FTSS), 96,031 teachers were supported (28 percent women). Start-up was slow due to issues related to determining the number of teachers as well as the need to set up distribution modalities with NGOs or departments of education. In June 2004, the FTSS subsidy was temporarily suspended in several provinces pending clarification of requests from provinces that exceed numbers on the MoE payroll. A total of teachers 132,000 have applied (33 percent women) against a target of 112,000. Under the Food-for-Teacher Training (FFTT) component, start-up was very slow, and only 850 teachers were supported with 25 tons of food or 1 percent of the target of 2,197 MT for 20,000 teachers.

Although WFP vegetable oil is greatly appreciated by those teachers who receive it, its effectiveness for increasing the teacher supply has yet to be demonstrated. The main beneficiaries are teachers in provincial and district capitals who have formal contracts with MoE. Rural teachers are mostly on short term contracts and therefore excluded from benefiting.



## RECOMMENDATION

**The blanket salary supplement to all teachers is an ineffective instrument for addressing the key constraint of increasing the supply of qualified teachers in geographic areas with an acute teacher shortage (and rural areas in particular). WFP should, jointly with MoE, prepare a longer-term strategy for phasing out the blanket salary subsidy in favour of a more targeted food incentive designed to increase teacher supply in geographic areas with an acute teacher deficit. The exact nature of the teacher salary incentives would need to be worked out, but their objective should be to increase incentives for teachers (female and male) to accept postings in rural areas (especially in districts with an acute teacher shortage) and to upgrade their credentials to MoE standards.**

### ➤ School Deworming

The objective of the nationwide school deworming campaign was to address the high prevalence of soil-transmitted intestinal parasites in 6-12 year old children (35-65 percent cumulative prevalence of soil-transmitted helminths infections in eco-zones surveyed, with a peak of 26.3 percent of moderate-to-high infections in urban areas) as a result of shortcomings in hygiene related knowledge, attitude and behaviour. School deworming is highly relevant to improve the health and nutritional status of the school-aged population in and out of school (high worm load detrimental to health and growth of young children, contributes to micro-nutrient deficiencies, especially anaemia).

The initiative was well-connected with WHO, MoE, WFP and the various administrative levels in the field. It has a strong component on strengthening partner institutions. Implementation involved collaboration between MoH, MoE, WHO, WFP and UNICEF, who jointly developed a comprehensive training kit, trained 20 regional and 28 provincial master trainers from M/DoH and M/DoE as mobile training teams, and subsequently trained 152 ministerial staff and more than 8,000 teachers.

The implementation at school level combined de-worming medicine with hygiene information and awareness raising among teachers, children, and communities. Thanks to support from the Canadian 'Food Plus Initiative', the programme successfully reached around 5 million children including at least half a million school-aged children who are not enrolled in school. High coverage and low cost-per-child contributed to cost-effectiveness.

The deworming campaign has the potential to be highly effective. The reduction of prevalence will be assessed in a follow up survey, but experience from other countries shows high effectiveness in reducing soil-transmitted helminths. To achieve a long term impact on the health of the child, yearly treatment is required and should be ensured.

The activity is sustainable. As a result of the strong capacity building component, national partners are able to continue the activities with their own human resources. Additional financial resources are anticipated from WHO when support to WFP from the Canadian Food Plus Initiative ends.



### ➤ **Pilot School Gardens**

WFP, in co-operation with FAO, is implementing a school garden programme aimed at introducing “a garden based learning approach coupled with school based production, to promote essential life-skills and to contribute to improved sustainable food production.” The objective is relevant to household food security and nutrition.

FAO provides technical assistance, guidance and information/ training material, while WFP provides funding, procures tools, seeds and fertilizer, facilitates training and conducts periodic monitoring visits. The programme is to be implemented in 12 pilot schools, to be selected on the basis of strict criteria. To be eligible, a school should have suitable land for a garden, a convenient water source, a well-functioning Parent Teacher Association (PTA), an interested group of teachers and MAAH staff for technical supervision. Trainings were conducted recently and tools and seeds are still to be provided to the schools.

It is too soon to know whether the model is suitable for replication on a wider scale in Afghan conditions. Apart from issues of access to land and water for the gardens, there are issues related to time and incentives for participation. Additional workload to teachers and disruption of regular class work should be avoided. PTAs have yet to be organized and may need some kind of mobilisation and incentive. The use of the produce should be clarified and provisions made for technical backstopping beyond the 1-year implementation phase.

### **RECOMMENDATION**

**Although school gardens are generally a worthwhile activity, their feasibility, effectiveness and sustainability in the Afghan context has yet to be proven. Given the enormous limitations on MoE's and MAAH's financial and human resources, WFP would be wise to limit activities - for the time being - to urban/peri-urban areas where it can ensure close supervision, and to evaluate of the programme's feasibility and effectiveness before further expansion. The garden-based learning approach should concentrate on Vitamin C rich foods as a first priority, iron and folic acid rich foods as second priority, followed by others aiming to contribute to diversify diet and preserve the natural environment.**

### ➤ **School Water Supply and Sanitation**

School water supply and sanitation is relevant for education and health objectives. The Education Baseline Survey reported that about one third (35 percent) of the schools use creek/river/lake/dam as water source, while 42 percent have piped water or hand pump wells.

As agreed in the Letter of Understanding between the two agencies, water supply and sanitation is an area of collaboration between WFP and UNICEF. In the new schools constructed with WFP support, UNICEF is responsible for water supply and sanitation facilities but has not always been able to coordinate the timing of its inputs with those of WFP. Hence some schools were ready but the water and sanitation facilities were not yet in place, whereas in other cases (outside the FFE school construction programme) latrines were constructed even though there was no school. WFP is also testing water filters (Nerox membranes and locally made metal barrels/containers) to assist where purified water is most urgent and river water is available. The



equipment is available but its installation is delayed. Since the costly Nerox<sup>27</sup> membranes have a limited capacity and life span and can not be recycled, it is essential to evaluate their performance before ordering any more equipment. It would be advisable for the Country Office to gather information on 'slow flow sand water filters' which could be designed and installed locally, or 'ceramic-silver filter systems' which are recyclable and might be more cost-effective.

#### ➤ **Data for Policy Analysis**

To enhance MoE capacity for policy analysis related to education, under the FFE programme, a comprehensive and high-tech 'education management information system' (EMIS) is under preparation. MoE capacity to conduct comprehensive school surveys as a basis for future policy and planning decisions is also being enhanced. To enable MoE to receive FFE monitoring data from the most remote places, a satellite-based monitoring system (ARGOS) is being installed in 141 schools. The objective of generating policy analysis data from remote areas is relevant to national policy.

Although the intention is commendable, the installation as well as data transmission is cost-intensive, which hampers sustainability. The reliability of data can not be supervised, because the systems are installed in very remote places. Since the analysis of results requires access to internet, for the time being, the WFP Country and Area Offices can access the data, but the district education officials cannot<sup>28</sup>. It is too soon to assess effectiveness.

### **4.7 Food for Training /Non-formal Education**

#### ➤ **Functional Literacy**

Given Afghanistan's high illiteracy rate, literacy training is highly relevant, especially for women and girls who are over-age for primary school. UNESCO estimates that only 52 percent of men and 22 percent of women can read and write. The NRVA found literacy rates even below 10 percent for some provinces (Jawzjan, Badghis, Nimroz and Kandahar), with only 15 literate women per 100 literate men.<sup>29</sup>

The PRRO aimed to provide 12,060 MT of food assistance to 225,000 trainees, but to date only 64,962 were supported (29 percent of target) with 4,044 MT (34 percent of target). 71 percent of beneficiaries are women (against a target of 70 percent). The main activities have concerned functional literacy (48 projects), skills training (34 projects) and health and nutrition awareness (27 projects). An additional 13 projects emphasized food transfer to vulnerable groups with only limited training. Low distribution against targets is due to shortage of appropriate and qualified implementation partners, shortage of trainers and the low inherent absorptive capacity of training as a vehicle for transferring food. Food-for-training has considerable potential but is difficult to scale up, due to constraints in the supply of teachers.

Although training quality seems acceptable, there is not yet an official way of certifying achievement and there is limited evidence that food aid makes a difference. The WFP-supported

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<sup>27</sup> One membrane: filter rate 10 to 25 l per day, total capacity 2500 litres. 5 filter membranes per set. The Nerox filter removes disease causing bacteria, and cysts, heavy metal, including Arsenic, and pesticides. It has to be replaced when no water is produced any more. Costs per membrane: about US\$20, purchased in Norway.

<sup>28</sup> FP might wish to request CLS, Toulouse (France) to share the raw data with MoE either in hard copy or on CD-Rom.

<sup>29</sup> NRVA Report, Draft 1.5, May 24, 2004, pages 21-22.



courses last 6 months but WFP provides food aid for only 3 months and when the food assistance ends, most women continue to attend. MoE literacy classes that offer no food aid are equally well-attended. Currently, food-for-training has a town bias and the women attending are not the poorest or the most food insecure.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

**There is scope for extending training to the countryside and for using the food rations to attract women from poorer households. As some parents prefer to send their daughters to the informal literacy classes instead of sending them to primary school, special care needs to be taken to ensure that the informal literacy classes do not compete with public schools.**

#### ➤ **Non-Formal Training on Health and Nutrition**

Given the related problems of poor hygiene, poor health and poor nutritional status, non-formal education and training on health and nutrition topics is highly relevant for national objectives and WFP strategic priorities because it builds women's human capital while contributing to nutrition and health objectives. To date, progress has been modest. In connection with food-for-training, WFP supported 11,517 participants (76 percent women) in 27 nutrition/hygiene/health training courses many of which were held in partnership with MoH and WHO. The main participants were women and adolescent girls (76 percent female). The training's effectiveness in influencing knowledge, attitudes and practices has yet to be assessed. Integration of HIV/AIDS-related issues is too recent to assess.

#### ➤ **Vocational Skills Training**

Vocational training is relevant for asset creation if it leads to life skills that can be used to earn a living. Therefore WFP needs other partners to finance training facilities and to provide poor women graduates of training centres with seed capital for business start-up.

The PRRO distributed 2,453 MT to 9,951 beneficiaries for 34 skills training projects (average 247 kg per participant). At the centres run by the Women's Association, most of the trainees are widows who are poor, food insecure and deserving of support. Trainees learned handicrafts, tailoring, embroidery, carpet weaving, vegetable gardening and other income-generating skills.

Although a good start has been made on training, further challenges remain. The training is not yet effective in providing women with technical and business skills and graduating them to work on their own outside the training centres. In Maimana, the women in the carpet weaving section already knew how to make carpets before they came to the centre. They saw themselves as employees in the centres who were paid in food rations rather than as trainees who would graduate to employment outside. Due to the absence of a strategy aimed at building self-reliance, the poorer women have a tendency to linger at the training centres beyond the completion of training and to grow dependent on the centres for their livelihood.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**





**WFP should revise its guidelines for informal skills training and train the implementing partners in their use. Trainees at the centres should receive food assistance for an agreed time period with a definite cut-off date, after which they should “graduate” to work outside the centres. The implementing partners should focus on transferring technical/business skills to equip the trainees to generate income independently, not employ poor people on a semi-permanent basis to produce handicrafts for the centres to sell and pay them in food rations.**

#### 4.8 Nutrition and Health-related Activities

The PRRO initially aimed at reducing acute malnutrition (wasting) and improving health status through supplementary feeding for the severely malnourished and institutional feeding for hospitals, orphanages and tuberculosis patients. Although the activities were national priorities at project formulation, MoH priorities recently shifted from cities to rural areas and from hospital-based treatment to primary health care. WFP correctly identified chronic malnutrition as more serious than acute malnutrition and shifted resources from hospital-based treatment to food fortification, nutrition/health/hygiene awareness raising, water supply/sanitation and deworming (For details on nutritional aspects see Appendix 3 – Nutrition Tables). See also Appendix 5 for lessons as perceived by the Country Office and the mission’s comments.

##### ➤ Support for TB Patients

The activity is highly relevant because Afghanistan has a high prevalence rate of TB, especially among the poorest populations groups, and TB control is a high priority for Government. Afghanistan has per year about 70,000 patients, 70 percent of whom are women. Most of the infected people remain untreated in their villages with high mortality rates of about 30 percent.

The programme is implemented in 32 Provinces. The TB programme is well integrated in the government structure and supported by WHO, which provides medical treatment, technical expertise and monitoring. Every two months patients are supposed to return to the hospital for medical screening and, if required, modifications in medication. At the time of the check-up they receive a family food ration<sup>30</sup>. In 2003, WFP supported 16,785 tuberculosis patients and their families with 4,918 MT of wheat, pulses, vegetable oil, sugar, wheat-soya blend and iodised salt. If these numbers are correct, the average patient would have received only 293 kg, but should have received between 612 kg to 918 kg throughout a complete treatment.

The most successful of the various institutional feeding activities has been WFP’s support to **tuberculosis treatment**. According to hospital staff, the food incentive for TB treatment is effective in reducing the drop-out rate while increasing retention and completion, because it attracts poor rural people, enables them to stay long enough to complete the treatment, and ensures their return for follow-up visits. The programme encourages increasing numbers of people from remote areas places to seek help, enabling them to travel long distances to complete the 8-12 month treatment. The food ration also is a kind of compensation for the shortfall in income during the entire recovery phase and allows patients to take a rest. Some patients used a share of the food rations to compensate their relatives or acquaintances for offering them room and board during their visits to town for regular screening.

<sup>30</sup> 50 kg wheat, 7 kg pulses, 4l oil, 2 kg sugar, 12.5 kg of WSB and 1 kg iodised salt, 76.5 kg food commodities per months, market value 14.5US\$.



### ➤ **Institutional Feeding**

Hospital-based **institutional feeding** achieved only 36 percent of its targets due mainly to limited implementation capacity of MoH. The fact that hospital staff including janitors are eligible to benefit from food rations along side of patients appears to have led in some cases to inflation of reported numbers of hospital workers. The hospital-based feeding is less effective than the programme for TB patients because it contributes relatively little to health objectives. Moreover, it constitutes a subsidy to government that cannot be sustained in the long run. Institutional feeding at hospitals should therefore be handed over as soon as possible to MoH.

Institutional feeding at **orphanages** has not been fully effective because the food rations tend to encourage parents to place their children in orphanages. For instance, during the evaluation mission's visit to an orphanage in Badakhshan, mothers stated that "we send our boys to the orphanage because they get better care in the orphanage than we can give them home." A recent UNICEF survey revealed that 80 percent of children placed in orphanages have at least one living parent. Most children placed in orphanages are boys. Many poorer children could not be admitted to an orphanage, because upper limit was reached. UNICEF is currently developing a home-based care approach, which could be supported, once the modalities and strategy are clearly formulated. The Country Office is aware of the problem and has taken great care not to expand orphanage feeding beyond those that it already supported under the EMOP.

### ➤ **Supplementary Feeding**

In 2003, WFP provided 1,847 MT of food to 40,620 beneficiaries. Supplementary feeding was drastically reduced since August 2003 when MoH, UNICEF and WFP adopted stricter criteria and agreed to implement it only in areas with >15 percent wasting. Effectiveness has yet to be assessed.

### ➤ **Acceptance of Blended Foods**

Although the nutritional value of wheat-soybean blend (WSB) and corn-soybean blend (CSB) is highly appreciated by medical hospital staff and its potential contribution to convalescence is well understood, cooks report that WSB/CSB porridge is so poorly accepted that patients often refuse to eat it. People only know one way of preparing them - as 'porridge'. Hospitals cook the porridge much too long (2.5 hours) in the hope of improving its taste, but overcooking sharply reduces vitamin content, especially Vitamin C. WSB is misperceived as a therapeutic feeding or supplementary feeding food. If the use of WSB/CSB is to be effective, more advocacy, training and awareness raising is required, through dissemination of leaflets and posters, recipes and recipe books. CSB/WSB can be prepared pan fried, deep fried or steamed, salty or sweet, with additional ingredients such as vegetables, fruits, sesame seed or pistachios). Hospital staff and patients should attend on a mandatory basis a minimum of one 'information' session and a demonstration on the preparation. This becomes especially important for the TB patients, who have to prepare their ration at home. Even if stocks are nearing expiry date, CSB should never be distributed to the general public as a one-time, take-home ration, without adequate information on its use and preparation, as occurred in Mazar-i-Sharif AO.

### ➤ **Micro-Nutrient Deficiencies**



Efforts to address **micro-nutrient deficiencies** through flour fortification and salt iodization are highly relevant because micro-nutrient deficiencies are widespread and their prevention is a high priority for Government and WFP. The pilot programme for local fortification of wheat flour looks promising because it strengthens local capacities and helps Government to find sustainable solutions for overcoming severe micro-nutrient deficiencies. Impact could be substantial and sustainable because food fortification works through the private sector on a commercial basis.

The Programme supports the rehabilitation of 10 small-scale commercial mills in Kabul<sup>31</sup> plus 10 small scale, pilot and decentralised local milling fortification projects in the north-eastern province of Badakhshan<sup>32</sup>. The 20 mills are expected to produce 200-400MT of fortified wheat flour per day. The flour will be sold to bakers who are expected to produce enough fortified bread to feed up to 1 million people. Implementation partners include MoH, MAAH, MRRD, UNICEF, NGOs, and local millers.

Since implementation is still in the early stages, it is too soon to assess effectiveness. To enhance sustainability, WFP in collaboration with MoH encourages local millers to continue fortification on a private and commercial basis beyond the active support of WFP. Financial support will be available through WFP for the start of the programme, but a full cost recovery system through the consumer is intended. The initiatives bear certain risks, which are well known to all stakeholders: i.e. weak cost recovery<sup>33</sup>, lack of legislation for future provision of pre-mix<sup>34</sup>, unavailability of pre-mix, and poor consumer acceptance of fortified products.

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<sup>31</sup> Kabul city has about 100 large and small mills, producing about 120 MT of wheat daily, which is only 10 percent of total requirements of 1250 MT/day for a population of 2.5 to 3 million people. Most of the flour consumed is imported from Pakistan and is not fortified.

<sup>32</sup> Most of the flour in Badakhshan is milled locally, about 400 mills produce 300 to 400 MT flour per day for the entire population of 850,000 people. In Badakhshan wheat is neither imported nor fortified yet.

<sup>33</sup> The cost of fortification per MT is about US\$4 (330g pre-mix), or an additional US\$0.004 per kg or US\$0.20 per 50 kg bag.

<sup>34</sup> Nutrients added per kg of wheat (330g pre-mix per MT): Vitamins A=5000 IU, B1=5.8mg B2=4mg, B3=4.6; Iron=38mg elemental, Folic Acid=1.6mg.



## **RECOMMENDATION**

**WFP assistance for TB treatment is effective and should be continued.**

**WFP and MoH need to agree on an exit strategy for institutional feeding at hospitals. WFP should build MoH's capacity to take over responsibility for institutional feeding by the end of the PRRO.**

**For food assistance to orphanages, a sound exit strategy giving special attention to those orphans not having any parent should be developed in co-operation with Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, UNICEF and other partners.**

**As chronic malnutrition is more prevalent than acute malnutrition, the Country Office should intensify its efforts to address micro-nutrient deficiencies through food fortification, salt iodization and awareness raising. If the pilot proves successful, WFP should expand support for flour-fortification. Since WFP's approaches to appropriate food technology and effective nutrition interventions are rapidly evolving, HQs should support the Country Office technically in this area.**

## **4.9 Capacity Building**

Strategic Priority 5 of WFP is to help governments to establish and manage national food assistance programmes. Within the PRRO implemented in Afghanistan WFP has undertaken various measures to build up local capacities in connection with NRVA assessment, FFW, FFE, health and nutrition-related activities. The PRRO's slow startup in the first quarter underscores the need for capacity-building to facilitate the transition from relief to recovery. The Afghanistan experience suggests that at least 3 months lead time are needed between an EMOP and a PRRO to develop new procedures and to train implementing partners to use them.

The MRRD Capacity Building Project trained 197 staff at headquarters and in 23 provinces and provided computers and equipment. WFP also seconded VAM staff and a pastoral adviser to MRRD. In connection with FFE, WFP established a Project Coordination Unit in MoE, seconded two international and two national staff to the unit, formulated a Transitional Action Plan for gradual hand-over of FFE implementation to MoE, and trained MoE staff at central and provincial level on project management, FFE, school construction, M&E, school feeding baseline survey, deworming, English, computers, data collection and data entry. MoE seconded 13 counterparts from provincial and district level to the WFP FFE programme. In support of the school deworming campaign, MoH, MoE, WHO, UNICEF and WFP jointly developed a comprehensive training kit, trained 20 regional and 28 provincial master trainers from M/DoH and M/DoE as mobile training teams, and subsequently trained 152 ministerial staff and more than 8,000 teachers. The Project Coordination Unit is also developing a comprehensive and high-tech 'education management information system' (EMIS) in MoE and building MoE capacity to conduct comprehensive school surveys as a basis for future policy and planning decisions.

The Country Office is to be commended for its efforts to build capacity in MRRD and MoE. Capacity building in MRRD was effective enough to enable their staff to take part in NRVA assessments and to monitor sub-project implementation on Government's and WFP's behalf, especially in areas where WFP staff cannot go because of civil insecurity. Likewise, capacity building in MoE has been effective enough to enable them to manage implementation of the school feeding programme.



Capacity building for local implementing partners has made less headway in relation to supplementary feeding and urban vulnerable programmes. Weak capacity of MoH remains a challenge for scaling up of institutional feeding and support for TB patients. There is also a need for capacity building on nutrition and micro-nutrient deficiencies in particular. It is urgent to build MoH's capacity to take over key nutrition and health-related activities before the end of the PRRO.

In MoE, the Transitional Action Plan (TAP), implemented during the second year of the PRRO, supports the elaboration of an exit strategy and prepares the counterparts to gradually take over full implementation responsibility. As TAP is just starting, its effectiveness cannot yet be assessed. However, it is a well designed concept and should allow for success. WFP staff continuously needs capacity-building because of frequent turnover.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

**During the second year of the PRRO, WFP should further strengthen capacity building for partners, with priority to building local capacity to take over institutional feeding (MoH) and the women's bakeries. Capacity building in MRRD, MoE and MoH should emphasize provincial level and below. Increased support should be provided to develop and up-grade human resources in nutrition and to enhance food-based micro-nutrient interventions. Capacity building in MRRD, MoE and MoH should emphasize provincial level and below.**

## **5. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT, TARGETING AND MONITORING**

As seen from sections 3 and 4, the PRRO has a number of strengths: strong synergy between project design and government priorities in NDF; general satisfaction of partners and beneficiaries with WFP assistance; an efficient, decentralized system for project decision-making; and Country and Area office staff's openness to constructive criticism and willingness to learn from experience. Nonetheless, there is room for improvement in some areas, many of which are common to other WFP operations judging from evaluations carried out by OEDE.

### **5.1 Linkage between Vulnerability Assessment and Programming**

Impressive progress was made in risk and vulnerability assessment during the PRRO. VAM assessments progressed from an agency-driven countrywide cereal equivalent assessment strategy which was developed to rapidly determine geographical food needs to a comprehensive National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment (NRVA) implemented in close partnership with Government and a multi-donor consortium. VAM assessments now look beyond food needs to understand the underlying causes of food insecurity and vulnerability to shocks. The main shortcoming has been weak linkage between vulnerability assessment and programming.

#### **➤ Use of Vulnerability Assessment for Programming**

As shown in Table 14 below (which partially repeats information analyzed under FFW in Table 8, Para. 4.6), the districts with acute and very high food insecurity account for one third (33 percent) of the food insecure population and over half (53 percent) of the assessed food gap nationwide. The districts with high food insecurity account for 41 percent of total food insecure



people and 38 percent of assessed need. The moderately food insecure areas have 26 percent of the food insecure population but account for only 10 percent of total need.

Although the PRROdoc said that FFW would be limited to the acutely and highly food insecure districts, only 28 percent of FFW commodities were programmed in districts assessed as acutely and very highly food insecure. As a result of **under-programming**, FFW allocations met only 21 percent of total food needs in districts with very high food insecurity and 38 percent in districts with acute food insecurity. In districts with high food insecurity they met around half (46 percent) and in districts with moderate food insecurity they met 70 percent of need. The food secure districts had no assessed need but received around 19,000 MT or about 23 percent of total FFW resources.

Although the mission acknowledges that most PRRO resources are programmed on criteria other than VAM/NRVA assessments, **overall resource allocation** for all project activities – not just FFW - increases with decreasing food insecurity, both in absolute terms and as a share of total assistance, with a surprisingly high concentration of resources in districts that are food secure (44 percent of total assistance). The analysis suggests that the greatest resource gap occurred in the districts with very high food insecurity (35 percent of needs addressed), followed by the districts with acute food insecurity (60 percent of needs addressed) and those with high food insecurity (74 percent met). The resources allocated to the moderately food insecure districts were 185 percent of requirements and in the food secure districts the entire amount was in excess of requirements.

**Table 15 - Overall Food Allocation in Relation to Assessed Need by Degree of Food Insecurity**

VAM Assessment 2002/2003					ACORD Data					
Food Insecurity Category	Food Insecure Population	% of Food Insec Popul	Assessed Need <sup>35</sup> (MT)	% of Need (MT)	Food Aid Programmed: All Activities (MT)	% of Total PRRO (MT)	FFW Programmed (MT)	% of FFW (MT)	Food Needs MT	
									% Met by FFW	% Met by PRRO
Acute	374,752	9%	54,827	17%	33,152	8%	20,940	13%	38%	60%
Very High	1,055,588	24%	117,857	36%	41,766	10%	24,568	15%	21%	35%
High	1,774,525	41%	123,670	38%	91,300	22%	56,422	35%	46%	74%
Moderate	1,131,370	26%	33,331	10%	61,680	15%	23,390	14%	70%	185%
Secure	0	0%	0	0%	178,777	44%	37,742	23%	>100%	>100%
Total	4,336,235	100%	329,686	100%	406,675	100%	156,337	100%	49%	123%

Source: Mission calculations based on VAM assessment crossed with ACORD programming data (see Appendix 2 for details)

Not only should under-programming in the most acutely and very highly food insecure districts be a source of concern, but also the large quantity of resources – in excess of assessed need – programmed for the food secure and moderately food insecure districts.

Analysis also revealed a high concentration of resources around certain Area Offices and provincial capitals (examples: Kunduz district absorbed 94 percent of total resources for Kunduz province; Kabul district absorbed 84 percent of total resources for Kabul province; Mazar-i-Sharif district absorbed 66 percent of resources for Balkh province).

<sup>35</sup> Assuming 475 grams of mixed food per person per day as specified by the 2002/03 VAM assessment.



Under-programming of food transfers to districts with acute and very high food insecurity is not fully explained by civil insecurity. A number of civilly insecure provinces like Ghazni, Kandahar, Logar, Nimroz, Uruzgan and Zabul performed well on geographic targeting because the share of resources allocated to the acutely and highly food insecure districts was in line with their assessed requirements. On the other hand, in some of the provinces with relatively good civil security such as Kabul, Kunduz and Badakhshan, the mission found a very poor match between resource allocation and assessed need.

Provinces (According to Civil Security Status)	Quality of Geographic Targeting within the Province		
	Reasonably Good Match between Resources and Assessed Need	Poor Match between Resources and Assessed Need	Very Poor Match between Resources and Assessed Need
Provinces with better than average good civil security	Bamian, Ghor, Faryab	Balkh, Baghlan, Hirat, Jawzjan, Samangan, Sari Pul	Badakhshan, Kabul, Kunduz,
Provinces where poor civil security affects several districts	Farah, Ghazni, Logar, Kandahar, Nimroz, Uruzgan,	Badghis, Hilmand, Khost, Nuristan, Paktika, Paktiya, Wardak	Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman, Nangarhar, Parwan

### ➤ Timing of Vulnerability Assessments in Relation to Programming

Because the government fiscal year and the WFP annual programming cycle go from April to April while the VAM/NRVA assessment cycle goes from harvest to harvest (June to June), programming is often out of phase with changes in food availability. Some Area Offices plan the entire year's FFW allotment by mid-May, allocating resources between districts on the basis of the previous year's VAM assessment. If the bulk of annual food resources are already committed by May - one month prior to the next year's harvest - this makes it difficult adjust programming to reflect changes in vulnerability status in response to the new harvest. Since the timing of the programming cycle is difficult to change, there appears to be need for a rapid pre-harvest assessment in March to feed into the annual programming cycle. This would involve projecting the likely food security situation after the new harvest in June. There is also a need to hold back a share of annual food resources to permit reallocation between provinces and districts in case of a poor harvest.

The high degree of short-term variability in the agricultural cycle has been well highlighted by events of the past two years. The VAM report for 2002-03 was based on field data collected in July-August 2002 at a time when much of the country was still suffering the consequences of four years of drought. In the event, there were good planting rains in many areas in the 2002 autumn, followed by more rain in the crop development phase in the spring of 2003. The result was a 4.4 million ton wheat crop, 62 percent higher than the 2002 output<sup>36</sup>. The large crop did not alleviate food shortages on a national basis, as it was unevenly distributed and poor state of the domestic infrastructure was unable to redistribute the surplus production with the areas of need. Field observation in May-June 2004 suggests that the situation has reversed in the 2003-04 crop season. Having started out with surplus wheat in many areas, the prospects for the 2004 crop year are looking increasingly poor. It seems that the good season of 2003 was the aberration in an increasingly prolonged period of drought.

<sup>36</sup> Paul Dorosh, 2004. 'The Impact of Food Aid Flows on Wheat Markets in Afghanistan'. Ministry of Rural Development, Kabul. P.1.



## RECOMMENDATION

Linkage between assessment, programming and monitoring should be strengthened at all levels. A system should be established to permit comparison of planned and actual distribution with assessed food needs at district level to ensure that the food goes to the neediest.

A corporate training package should be developed on how to link assessment, programming and monitoring.

In acutely and highly food insecure districts, a combination of FFW and rural vulnerable distributions should be programmed. Duration should be longer, beneficiary turnover less frequent and food transfers higher in reflection of the longer food gap.

VAM assessments should be updated in March/April to alert programming in a timely way to expected changes in vulnerability status at the next harvest. AOs should leave 25-50 percent of FFW resources uncommitted until July to permit reallocation in case of an exceptionally good or poor year.

Food monitors should be trained in vulnerability assessment and VAM monitors in project-level monitoring. Staff of the various monitoring units should not be merged as they are not fully interchangeable.

## 5.2 Targeting

The PRRO calls for four levels of targeting: geographic (food insecure districts), agro-ecological (zones within districts), community level (villages) and household level (food insecure households within communities). The project is expected to target food insecure households in food insecure villages in food insecure agro-ecological zones of food insecure districts.

Table 16 – Targeting Levels and Responsibilities

Targeting Level	Responsibility	Evaluation Findings
Geographic (food insecure districts)	Country Office VAM assesses need by district; Program allocates resources between districts and activities	Under-delivery to districts with acute and very high food insecurity Large share of resources to secure and moderately food insecure areas
Agro-ecological zones (within districts)	Area Office (AO) and IPs	Neglected – needs more attention
Community (within districts & AEZs)	Implementing partners (IPs)	IP-driven, selection criteria not transparent
Household (within villages)	Village leaders (with IP supervision)	Errors of inclusion (non-poor participate) Errors of exclusion (many poor not covered)

There is room for improvement of geographic targeting of FFW resources to **food insecure districts** in line with the degree of food insecurity. **Within districts**, the programme needs to strike a better balance between the resources accruing to **rainfed** areas (which tend to be food insecure) and **irrigated valleys** (which tend to be more food secure). For activities other than FFW, the emphasis should be on ensuring a proper balance between resources reaching the **countryside** relative to the **provincial** and **district capitals**. The mission's field visits gave the impression that Food-for-Education, Food-for-Training and institutional feeding activities tend to disproportionately benefit towns. Most IDP/returnee reintegration programmes are concentrated in food secure areas because these attract the most returnees.





The targeting of food insecure **households** within villages needs improvement. WFP currently relies too heavily on its implementing partners, who in turn rely heavily on local leaders (*shuras*) for selecting beneficiaries. Resource allocation by the traditional leaders is influenced by dominant power relations and vested interests and, in spite of targeting efforts, social pressures often result in redistribution of food and of FFW opportunities within villages. Implementing partners therefore need closer monitoring.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

**Adequate resources should be targeted to the most food insecure districts.**

**WFP should review options for community based implementation or direct implementation in case reliable NGOs are unavailable, and/or proactively encourage national NGOs to work in the most food-insecure areas.**

**Within-district targeting should receive more attention. To ensure that the poorest parts of each district receive a fair share of resources, local counterparts who know the district should participate in PAC meetings. Within village, targeting should be closely monitored by IPs and AOs.**

### **5.3 Monitoring**

An M&E system has two main purposes: to inform project management and to feed into various reporting requirements. Project management needs data showing progress towards results in the form of planned vs. actual achievements at all levels (input, output, outcome, and - to the extent possible - impact).

Although the Country Office has made a commendable effort to develop M&E systems including ACORD for tracking of individual sub-projects, the current structure of the M&E system in Afghanistan only partially informs management about progress towards results. On the positive side, monitoring guidelines and checklists have been developed for each main activity and a results-based management framework and workplan has been developed, based on the WFP strategic priorities at corporate level, complete with a set of performance and outcome indicators for each of the main components.

However, the mission found the following weaknesses in the current system:

#### **Systems:**

- A monitoring system is in place, but it is weak on formats, thus the information becomes sporadic, and it lacks a control mechanism for follow-up;
- ACORD cannot generate planned versus actual-type data automatically and it does not contain data about results at outcome level.
- Furthermore, managers at Area Office level can not generate their own reports, but have to go to Country Office for that purpose.
- For various reasons the data are not always reliable<sup>37</sup>.
- The manual monitoring system based on checklists and summarized in various weekly, monthly and quarterly reports does not capture outcome data systematically, and does not enable managers to know whether their projects make a difference for the beneficiaries.

<sup>37</sup> Some of the shortcomings of ACORD are listed in para. 3.15.



**Skills:**

- M&E skills are generally weak at all levels, especially on outcome monitoring, and the existing “yes/no” monitoring formats do not encourage monitors to record their observations in narrative form.
- There seems to be a lack of programmatic follow up to the monitoring reports.

**Linkages with the Rest of the Operation:**

- There is a weak linkage between assessment, programming and M&E.
- The food aid monitors hardly ever monitor other indicators than the ones directly related to distribution; they do not use the opportunity to update the food security situation.
- The VAM monitors are currently not being utilised for ad hoc assessments to supplement the NRVA or to provide feedback on project implementation.

As measuring outcome data on a systematic basis is a relatively new requirement in WFP, a lot of effort needs to be put into developing staff’s thinking about results at outcome level. The Country Office and AOs are aware of the weaknesses in the system and are currently reviewing the M&E system. Corporate initiatives are currently being developed and could support the Country Office substantially. Since existing monitoring formats are currently being revised, it is important to ensure that the new format facilitates comparison of planned vs. actual achievements not only for food despatches, but also at output and outcome level, and that it contains a control mechanism for follow up. The weekly combined report format developed by Kabul Area Office seems to be good example of such a tool. It should be piloted in all Area Offices.



## **RECOMMENDATION**

**The Country Office has to agree on a monitoring system that will inform management on progress towards results at output and outcome level and a mechanism for follow up. It should eventually be electronically based for reporting purposes. OEDP should develop guidance on monitoring systems to assist Country Offices in this task.**

**Staff at all levels should undergo M&E training especially concerning outcome monitoring, and application should be included in the performance assessment of staff at all levels.**

**It is essential to find a way to systematize this information in a database (be it ACORD or a different system) in order to be able to generate reports on results at all levels. Staff should undergo M&E training, especially concerning outcome monitoring, not only at Country Office level but also at Area Office and Sub Office level, where the information is being collected. Application of outcome monitoring should be included in the performance assessment of staff at all levels.**

**The Country Office Managers need to give priority to monitoring of outcomes, as it is central to project management and reporting. They need to ensure that all staff appreciate how important it is to monitor progress toward results including outcomes, and to systematically follow up at both Area Office and Country Office levels. Compliance with this should be included in the MAPs.**

**The link between VAM, programme and M&E needs to be strengthened in order to ensure that assessments and monitoring data can feed into programming and decisions about reprogramming. The Country Office has a lot of field staff, whose potential is currently underutilised. The issue of linkage is a corporate one. The mission recommends a training package on how to link assessment, programming and M&E in order to strengthen the implementation of WFP's core mandate of feeding the hungry poor.**

## **6. FUTURE DIRECTIONS**

### **6.1 Setting Realistic Objectives**

Although the Country Office met 72 percent of its distribution targets and 82 percent of its beneficiary targets, its relief and recovery objectives were only partially met because the resources at its disposal were insufficient and spread too thinly to have a lasting impact on the livelihoods of the hungry poor. This raises the issue of whether the objectives themselves were too ambitious because the means were insufficient to achieve the ends. An average transfer of either 24 kg per family member through FFW, 18 kg for the rural vulnerable, 16 kg for returnees en route home or 7 kg for returnees in their places of origin cannot be expected to make a big difference in terms of food needs, let alone for livelihood resilience or IDP reintegration. Although the Country Office can be faulted with spreading the resources too thinly, the broader problem was the strategy/design. This raises a corporate issue because the Afghanistan PRRO targets differ little from those of previous projects or other PRROs.

The issue of realism is particularly pertinent for WFP's corporate Strategic Priority No. 2: "Protect livelihoods in crisis situations and enhance resilience to shocks." The objective sounds new but the means being pursued to achieve it (FFW, FFT) are unchanged and suffer the same limitations they have had for many years. Monitoring systems have been unhelpful in this regard and slow to adapt. They track food distribution, anticipated beneficiaries and – to a limited extent – physical outputs, but fall short of generating feedback on livelihood indicators such as



food expenditure, indebtedness, asset depletion and distress migration. Livelihood outcome monitoring tools are urgently needed to enable WFP to assess the realism of its livelihood protection and recovery objectives, and the means and resources employed to realize them.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

**WFP should assess the realism of corporate livelihood protection and recovery objectives considering the means and resources employed to realize them. It should also develop corporate guidance on interim indicators for livelihood outcome monitoring, when household food and non-food expenditure data are unavailable.**

## **6.2 Exit Strategies**

As the PRRO is scheduled to terminate at the end of March 2005, it needs to develop an exit strategy, particularly for the teachers' salary supplement and the subsidies to the women's bakeries and the food transfers to hospitals, orphanages and other institutions. The component which has made the greatest strides in this direction is the FFE component, which is in the process of creating the capacity in MoE to take over the handling of school feeding as well as school construction based on FFW. The other components need to do the same. MRRD, on the other hand, has clearly indicated that it does not wish to become an implementing ministry for FFW, but only take over assessment and monitoring-related functions.

Both WFP and MoH agree that WFP's support for hospital feeding must be phased out. In its budget submission MoH requested the funds from MoF, but it is not yet clear that it will get them. WFP should build MoH's capacity to take over responsibility for institutional feeding by the end of the PRRO.

WFP also needs to formulate exit strategies for the women's bakeries and for other project-supported enterprises that are using food rations to employ poor women in handicraft-making, tree seedling nurseries and gabion making. These enterprises are highly dependent on food aid as a means of creating employment for vulnerable groups. Abrupt withdrawal of food aid could have a negative impact on the women employed at the centres.

The issue of appropriate exit strategies for feeding of encamped IDPs is more complex. In the Hirat area, under the EMOP, reduction of relief food proved effective in motivating IDPs to return to their places of origin, but in the south it is less likely to be successful due to insecurity, unsolved right-to-land issues and continued drought. Although WFP has indicated a willingness to move away from free distributions to encamped IDPs, it should be wary of introducing FFW/T as an exit strategy because conditions in the south differ from those in Hirat.



## **RECOMMENDATION**

**The Country Office needs to develop exit strategies for the teachers' salary supplement, the subsidies to the women's bakeries, the food transfers to hospitals, orphanages and other institutions, and the use of FFW to employ vulnerable people in handicraft-making, nurseries, vegetable gardens and gabion making. In parallel, it also needs to continue and intensify its efforts build MoE's capacity to take over implementation of FFE, MoH's capacity to take over institutional feeding and MRRD's capacity to take over vulnerability assessment work and the programming, approval, monitoring and supervision of FFW.**

### **6.3 Connectedness and Partnership**

WFP Afghanistan is to be commended for its systematic effort to consult partners on PRRO design and to involve them in implementation, especially at Country Office level. Quarterly reviews of the operation are organized jointly by the Country Office and MRRD to inform partners about progress towards results. Since the beginning of the PRRO, coordination among humanitarian players – initially weak – improved. WFP took an active role in several interagency fora like the preparation of the UNDAF and Consultative Groups.

During the past year, partners' attitudes toward WFP and food aid evolved in the direction of greater mutual understanding, through joint stakeholder involvement in NRVA, government representation on project approval committees and MRRD involvement in project monitoring. Intense collaboration was achieved between WFP, UNICEF, WHO, MoE and MoH during the school deworming campaign. Strong long-term partnerships between WFP and IPs were particularly important for a successful transition from relief to recovery in Badakhshan and could be a model for other regions. Nonetheless, there is scope for further strengthening of collaboration between WFP, government, UN agencies and NGOs and for establishing closer ties with national programmes such as NSP, NEEP and area-based development programmes at provincial and district level.

At provincial level and below, a good start has been made by involving MRRD staff in vulnerability assessment, project approval committees and monitoring. In some AOs, relevant Government departments participate in Project Approval Committee (PAC) meetings. In the context of FFW activities, WFP should be more proactive in seeking closer ties with provincial and district staff of MRRD who are involved in implementing cash-for-work under the National Solidarity Programme (NSP) and the National Emergency Employment Programme (NEEP).



## RECOMMENDATION

**WFP Afghanistan should strengthen efforts to develop partnerships and mutual understanding among UN agencies, government, donors and NGOs at all levels. It should also establish closer ties with national programmes such as NSP, NEEP and area-based development programmes at provincial and district level. Jointly with NEEP, it should field test modalities for combining FFW and cash-for-work. It should also explore ways of working with NSP to combine FFW with community-based infrastructure development.**

**In areas where there is a shortage of potential implementing partners, WFP should be proactive in seeking partners willing to relocate to remote districts and explore possibilities for direct implementation by *shuras*. The experience of the Hirat Area Office with direct implementation in Ghor province should be assessed.**

**Ties with elected local government *shuras* should also be strengthened, but bearing in mind that in districts where NSP is not yet active in facilitating the democratic election of *shuras* and Community Development Councils, WFP and its implementing partners should never assume that the community is socially homogeneous. It should actively assess whether the leaders' priorities are shared by food insecure households.**

## 6.4 Enhanced Awareness of Potential Impacts of Food Aid on Production, Markets and Prices

Although the impact of food aid on agricultural incentives continues to be hotly debated in Afghanistan, the mission finds no evidence that food aid has significantly distorted agricultural production, prices or markets. Various studies carried out recently reached the same conclusion.<sup>38</sup> The only effects are highly localized and transitory. The wheat market is totally open and heavily traded. The volume of food aid entering Afghanistan is insignificant in comparison with local production and commercial wheat imports.

### ➤ Impact on Agricultural Prices and Incentives

Three well-prepared studies have examined the available supply and price data and found no overall correlation between price fluctuations and the distribution of food aid. However, they

<sup>38</sup> Dorosh, Paul, The impact of Food Aid Flows on Wheat Markets in Afghanistan 2000-03. World Bank, 2004; Fitzherbert, Anthony (2003). FAO/WFP/MAAH/MRRD Crop Output Assessment Mission – Team 3 – Baghlan, Samanghan, Kunduz & Takhar -May 5th to May 20th, 2003 - With additional observations on Badakshan. Report of the Team Leader. FAO, Kabul.; Hale, Andy D. (2002). Afghanistan food aid impact assessment, Chemonics International Inc., Washington DC; IMF (2003). Islamic State of Afghanistan: Rebuilding a Macroeconomic Framework for Reconstruction and Growth. International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, available online at <http://www.imf.org>; Maletta Hector & Raphy Favre (2003). Agriculture and food production in post-war Afghanistan. FAO, Kabul; Maletta, Hector (2002). "Wages of war, wages of peace: Food prices and unskilled labour pay in Afghanistan, 1996-2002". FAO, Kabul, available online at: [http://www.fao.org/es/ESA/wp/wp\\_en/wp03\\_03\\_en.htm](http://www.fao.org/es/ESA/wp/wp_en/wp03_03_en.htm); Molla, Daniel (2003). "Food Aid, Wheat Prices and Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan: Is there a link?" Kabul, WFP/MRRD (November); Neun, Hansjoerg (2003). Food aid and grain import impact on local cereal markets in Afghanistan - Traders Survey. Kabul, European Commission and MRRD. Preliminary report (May); FAO/WFP (2002). Crop and food supply assessment mission to Afghanistan, 2002. A special report. Rome. Available on line at <http://www.fao.org/giews> under "Special Reports"; FAO/WFP (2003). Crop and food supply assessment mission to Afghanistan, 2003. A special report. Rome. Available on line at <http://www.fao.org/giews> under "Special Reports"; Favre, Raphy (2003). Contribution to Food Aid Policy Development for Afghanistan: Wheat balance by region and province, June 2003 – June 2004. MAAH/FAO, Kabul; UNDCP (2002). Opium poppy survey 2002. United Nations International Drug Control Program, Vienna; UNODC (2003a) Afghanistan: Opium Survey 2003. United Nations International Drug Control Program, Vienna; UNODC (2003b). The Opium Economy in Afghanistan. An International Problem (2nd edition). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna



have found that there are large numbers of traders involved in the import trade who are highly responsive to market forces. As a consequence there is good correlation between import parity prices in Lahore and Peshawar and the directly linked markets of Jalalabad and Kabul. The evidence is that it is imports that drive local prices.

There is no single market for wheat and flour in Afghanistan. The difficult internal topography and the poor state of the public (roads) and private (storage) infrastructure mean that most of the major markets are oriented as much to their nearest neighbouring country as they are to internal links. As such, wheat and flour arriving from different sources may have only short-term localised effects. Wheat and flour sold on Afghan markets are not a single undifferentiated commodity. Trade is based in a number of commodities (wheat grain and wheat flour of different qualities) that are not close substitutes to one another. Certain products carry price premiums or discounts which are not reflected in the price data available.

There is no reason to conclude that poor price expectations cause farmers to reduce the area planted to wheat. Seasonal expectations (rainfall and irrigation flows) are the principal determinant of planted area, while seasonal factors are the major determinant on the quantity produced.

It is not possible to say that food aid has no effect at all. Because both major and minor markets are separated by poor roads, have high transport costs and limited storage, there can be local short-term effects from a single large distribution into an individual market. However, this can equally apply to commercial imports as to food aid.

➤ **Impact on Incentives to Grow Poppy**

Although food aid has sometimes been accused of increasing farmer incentives to grow opium poppy, there is no evidence to support the accusation.<sup>39</sup> Opium production has been through a period of significant upheaval since 1999. Drought conditions have put pressure on farmers' resources, while a production ban increased the burden for farmers carrying debt and has led to a dramatic price spike. Prices are now reverting to the long-term pattern. Farmers' incomes will fall and those who are dependent on cash incomes from opium to buy food will have noticeably less disposable income.

Farmers do not make choices between wheat and opium production based on the relative price of the two crops. While the recent high price of opium has been an incentive to increase production, there is no evidence that a relatively low or falling price for wheat is a significant disincentive to farmers in their choice to substitute opium for wheat.

The comparative earnings between alternative crops are only one element in farmers' crop choice decision making process. The issue is far more complex. The availability of resources

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<sup>39</sup> Mansfield, David. 2004. *Coping Strategies, Accumulated Wealth and Shifting Markets: The story of opium poppy production in Badakhshan 2000-2003*. Report for the Aga Khan Development Network, January 2004. pp.4-5; UNODC, *Annual Report 2003*; Sloane P H, 2002. *Alternative Livelihoods Strategy*, Food & Agriculture Organisation UN, and UN Drug Control Organisation, Kabul August 2002; Molla, Daniel. 2003. *Food Aid, Wheat Prices and Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan: Is there a link?* Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, Kabul, 2003; Sloane. P H, with ACBAR Survey Unit, 2000. *Helmand Initiative Socio-economic Study*. UN Centre for Human Settlement and Helmand Planning Group, April 2000; Mansfield, David, 1999. *Access to Labour: the role of opium in the livelihoods of itinerant harvesters working in Helmand Province, Afghanistan*. UNDCP, Strategic Study #4, Islamabad, June 1999.



(water, land and labour) is a major element in determining the crop mix, together with offsetting risk in a highly risky production environment.

Access to credit through growing opium is a significant issue in crop choice by farmers. A high proportion of farmers carry debt, in the case of some poppy growers, with an aggregate value equal to their annual gross income. The Taliban ban on opium production would have imposed a significant financial burden on farmers forced to carry forward debt and been a driver for increased planting in the 2001-02 crop season and beyond.

A significant influence on farmers' choice to grow opium has been the intense subdivision of land. Many households have holdings which are too small to provide a viable living when farmed in the traditional manner. In the absence of local opportunities for off-farm work, growing poppy and entering the poppy production casual workforce provides an economically rational choice for farm households.

The prospect of receiving food aid is one element in offsetting production risk for poor farmers. However, the PRRO food aid projects are usually of short duration and rarely distribute more than a 1-month ration to any one participant. This would be unlikely to be the principal reason why a farmer would give up his own food production in favour of growing opium and become dependent on food aid.

In summary, farmer decisions to grow poppy are driven by other considerations than food aid, such as: access to cash advances for inputs; relative profitability and risks of alternative crops; need to repay debts expressed in quantities of opium; fragmentation of holdings making poppy the only crop that produces enough income to feed a family from an average-sized farm of 2 *jeribs* (0.4 ha), and the fact that most of the wheat grown by small farmers is for own consumption with no surplus for sale and is therefore fairly unresponsive to variations in prices.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

**Although overall effects on production and farm margins are not thought to be great, two lines of action are recommended. First, careful and improved management of food aid supplies is required. As a minimum this would involve medium-term planning and the improved provision of information to the market, so that commercial imports and food aid supplies can be balanced, to reduce the risk of losses by traders and prevent high market volatility. Second, the mission recommends that the Country Office improve monitoring and analysis of project level feedback on the issue – for instance, through follow-up of weekly market data collected by VAM and investigation of the cases where food monitors did note short-term and highly localized effects of distributions on prices and markets.**

### **6.5 Food Aid and Livelihood Recovery**

In line with its commitment to Results-Based Management, WFP needs systematic feedback on how food aid affects livelihood protection and recovery. To what extent does food aid protect livelihoods by: reducing negative coping strategies such as distress sale of household assets, indebtedness and distress migration and reinforcing positive coping mechanisms such as community self-reliance and asset rehabilitation? Currently, the PRRO provides very limited feedback on these issues. The Country Office should build on existing VAM and NRVA





methods for assessing coping mechanisms by wealth group and AEZ in order to track project-induced changes in household asset depletion; debt-to-asset ratio; distress migration; dietary diversify and food and non-food expenditure. Some information is already gathered during the annual VAM/NRVA assessment, which however, only provides a baseline on the evolution of livelihood assets in the absence of project interventions. The challenge is to adapt VAM-style livelihood monitoring tools to enable project staff and IPs to track project effects on livelihood assets and outcomes.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

**The Country Office should build on existing VAM and NRVA methods for assessing coping mechanisms by wealth group and AEZ in order to track project-induced changes in household asset depletion; debt-to-asset ratio; distress migration; dietary diversify and food and non-food expenditure. Some information is already gathered during the annual VAM/NRVA assessment but is not project-specific. VAM staff posted to AOs and SOs could either assist in project-specific livelihood outcome tracking and provide on-the job coaching to transfer the skills to food monitors.**

### **6.6 Making Good on WFP Commitments to Women**

The Country Office is to be commended on its efforts to adapt the corporate gender mainstreaming strategy to Afghanistan's particular cultural context. The Country Office recognizes that certain requirements under WFP's enhanced commitments to women are culturally inappropriate in the local context (such as women's direct participation in FFW and emergency food distributions), and selectively chooses to focus on those that stand a chance of being achieved. In the Afghan context the programme rightly gave priority to: (a) closing the gender gap in education through the take-home oil incentive for girls' school enrolment; (b) empowering adult women and over-age girls through functional literacy, health and nutrition awareness raising and skills training; and (c) increasing income-generating opportunities for women in urban bakeries, handicrafts, seedling nurseries and courtyard agriculture. (For further details on women's integration in the PRRO, see Appendix 4).

Table 16 (below) examines women's participation in different project activities. Major progress was made in increasing women's participation in the project through emphasis on school feeding (40 percent female), take home ration for girls (100 percent female), food-for-teachers (28 percent women 2003; 33 percent women applicants 2004) and food for training (71 percent females), rural vulnerable (56 percent) and urban vulnerable (100 percent women).

Women's participation in FFW – as shown in the table below - is misleading. Actual physical participation of women in FFW is not above 5 percent. Figures for FFW, IDP feeding, supplementary feeding, urban vulnerable and rural vulnerable should be used with caution because they are based on ex-ante estimates from project proposals rather than actual totals. In several cases women were reported as 52 percent of recipients simply because they constitute 52 percent of the national population.

**Table 17 – Percentage Females among Direct Food Aid Recipients under PRRO 10233**

Activity	Average	Mission Observation
Capacity building	100	Only 10 women benefited
Demobilization	0	All demobilized soldiers are male
Emergency	67	Exceeds the proportion females in total population
Food for training	72	Country office is to be commended on exceeding corporate targets
Food for teacher training	35	Only 950 women have benefited so far
Food for work	18	Grossly overstates reality because the total includes the 10-15% of the rations intended for people unable to physically take part in FFW
Food for teacher salary supplement	27	Was 27% women in first year; request for second year is 33%
IDP feeding in camps	52	Estimation, based on assumption that national population is 52% female
Institutional feeding	61	Estimation based on actual sex ratio of patients
Returnee package	19	Basis for estimation is unclear
Rural vulnerable	56	Some AOs recorded 100% as female, others 52% in national population
School feeding	36	Estimation is based on actual enrolment rates
Supplementary feeding	52	Estimation, based on assumption that national population is 52% female
Urban vulnerable	100	Wrongly assumes that 100% of cardholders and employees are female

Source: Calculated by Mission from ACORD, Quick Project Reference, June 2004.

**Improving Nutritional Status of Women and Adolescent Girls.** Nearly 32,000 women benefited from supplementary feeding and 11,517 women participated in 27 projects designed to raise health, hygiene and nutrition awareness. The school deworming campaign raised health awareness of around 5 million schoolchildren and 8000 teachers. Wheat distributed to bakeries and biscuits provided under the FFE are micro-nutrient fortified and contribute the alleviation of micro-nutrient deficiencies.

**Closing Gender Gaps in Education.** In spite of impressive gains during the past two years, girls' school enrolment continues to lag behind that of boys, especially in the south. The take-home oil ration for girls is potentially an effective tool for influencing parents' initial decision to enrol their daughters and should continue. For it to be effective, distribution needs to be ensured for the entire school year (not only a part of the year). Since for logistical reasons the oil incentives for girls are only distributed where there is ongoing school feeding, it is urgent for WFP to resolve problems of biscuit supply.

**Ensure Equal Benefits to Women from Assets Created by FFW and FFT.** The Country Office is to be commended for achieving corporate targets for women's participation in FFT (70 percent women). In spite of the socio-cultural context, 71 percent of direct participants in FFT are women. Efforts to increase women's benefit from FFW, on the other hand, have met with less success. In spite of over-reporting, women's direct participation in FFW is estimated to be lower than 5 percent. Nonetheless, there are some encouraging cases where implementing partners assisted individual women or single-sex groups to work on income-generating activities in seclusion from men (nurseries, handicrafts, gardening, courtyard animals). Some of these activities such as gabion making have very low daily returns to labour. Although food monitoring reports claim that assets created through FFW benefit men and women equally, there is little evidence that the infrastructure needs and preferences of women and adolescent girls were actually analyzed by implementing partners as a basis for selecting which types of projects to implement. NRVA found that women's priorities for community infrastructure differ from those of men. The types of FFW projects undertaken to date have mostly reflected men's preferences rather than women's.



**Contribute to Women's Control of Food in Relief Food Distribution.** Women almost never participate in food distributions and rely on male relatives to collect and carry the food on behalf of the family. Collection of food by males does not appear to weaken women's voice in decisions about food. Wives prefer their husbands to do FFW instead of CFW because the wives have more control over food than they do over cash. Several PDM reports said that the distribution points were too far for women to attend. When double take-home rations of oil are issued bi-monthly, schoolgirls find 10 litres too heavy to carry. Issue of ration cards in women's name under the Urban Vulnerable programme has not prevented men from capturing the benefits when the cards are traded on the market.

**Equal Representation of Women on Food Distribution Committees.** Relative to other countries, WFP in Afghanistan has done relatively little to improve transparency in resource allocation by establishing food distribution committees. As IPs work mostly through traditional (all-male) village leaders (*shuras*) this objective has yet to be achieved. Only the new Community Development Councils organized by NSP have female representation.

**Mainstream Gender in Programming.** Gender differences are well reflected in VAM/NRVA assessments, in the FFE Baseline Survey and in monitoring checklists. ACORD data on beneficiaries is gender disaggregated (but inaccurate for FFW, rural vulnerable and urban vulnerable).

**Role of Women in Household Food Security Acknowledged.** Although women do control family food stocks, little has been done in Afghanistan to make their contribution visible.

**Gender Balance of Staff.** As under the Taliban women could not work in public offices, targets are difficult to achieve in the Afghan context. Currently, around  $\frac{1}{3}$  of international staff (including the Country Director and heads of Programme, M&E, pipeline, 1 Area Office and 1 SO) are female plus 10 percent of national staff (88 out of 906 nationals).<sup>40</sup> Under the PRRO, the Country Office recruited 12 female VAM monitors. In addition, many food monitors for the bakery programme are female but are confined to bakery work in cities (unable to travel to the countryside). The Country Office is to be commended on efforts to recruit, train and retain qualified Afghan females. Interesting adaptations were made to enable female staff to travel to countryside (e.g., hiring a male relative as a chaperone or recruiting a woman whose husband is a WFP driver so they can travel together).

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

**In the second year, the PRRO should intensify efforts to scale-up FFT/NFE, assess effectiveness of the oil take-home ration for increased enrolment, ensure adequate coverage of rural vulnerable populations, implement an exit strategy for the urban bakeries, and increase village women's representation on food distribution committees and decision-making bodies. Anomalies in beneficiary recording by sex should be corrected.**

## **6.7 The PRRO as a Category**

<sup>40</sup> Source: Bharati Sapkota, Human Resources Officer, WFP Afghanistan.



The experience of Afghanistan PRRO 10233 echoes some of the conclusions of the OEDE's cross-cutting Review of PRROs. Many PRROs have found it difficult to address relief and recovery in a single activity or to get the balance right. One of the key changes documented by the cross-cutting review associated with the PRRO's introduction has been decreased levels of general relief food distribution in favour of more targeted interventions promoting self-reliance and asset creation. This was also the case in Afghanistan, where the share of resources programmed for relief was reduced from around 40 percent in the PRROdoc to 28 percent during the first year of implementation, to the point that recovery functions appear to be compromising WFP's capability to implement its core relief functions.

Another commonality between Afghanistan and other PRROs is the general weakness in the inter-related areas of targeting, assessment, monitoring and evaluation. One of the key anticipated changes of moving from EMOPs into PRROs was the prospect for improved targeting. The problem in Afghanistan is weak linkage between assessment, programming and monitoring. Programming decisions on resource allocation between components and between provinces and districts were taken relatively independently of vulnerability assessments. The situation is exacerbated by lack of feedback from monitoring into programming.

## **6.8 WFP's Future Programme in Afghanistan**

The shift from the EMOP to a PRRO was appropriate because the Government's focus shifted from emergency to recovery and toward building the foundations for development. However, it would be an error to expect that – at the end of the PRRO – there would no longer be any need for relief. Food aid continues to be relevant for relief in crisis-affected areas. Food aid is equally relevant for supporting livelihood recovery among food insecure households in food insecure areas. The design of the new programme should reflect the lessons from the current PRRO (see Appendix 5).

It is especially important in a PRRO to get the relief/recovery balance right. A PRRO is intended to be a relief programme that supports recovery and if possible development. There is a widespread misconception in Afghanistan that a PRRO is a time-bound exit strategy for phasing out WFP's relief activities and converting its assistance to recovery. In fact, in the face of vehement criticism of free food in some quarters of government and the donor community, WFP made a commendable effort to reduce free food, to target its assistance more effectively to food deficit areas and to expand recovery activities. In the mission's view, there was so much concern about avoiding criticism for free food distribution that some of the legitimate needs of the rural vulnerable population may have been neglected. Some of these needs were supposed to be filled by national cash based programmes which started late and which face a number of the same targeting issues as WFP.

A PRRO should not be perceived as a way of phasing out relief activities in favour of recovery activities, but as a means of harnessing relief in such a way that it also contributes to livelihood recovery and lays the foundations for development. The performance of a PRRO should not be judged on the basis of its success in reducing relief in favour of recovery activities. WFP should not attempt to rely primarily on FFW and Food-for-training to address relief needs because such activities are unlikely to be manageable on the required scale.



It is essential in a PRRO to maintain flexibility to shift resources between relief activities and recovery activities depending on the country's movement in and out of crises. Therefore, in the interest of maximizing flexibility and preparedness for future events, it would be preferable for the Afghanistan Country Office to keep both relief activities and recovery activities like FFW and FFT under the PRRO, instead of the shifting recovery activities like FFW and FFT into a development-oriented Country Programme.

#### **RECOMMENDATION**

**Since relief needs persist and the future balance between relief and recovery needs is difficult to predict ex-ante, WFP would be well-advised to retain the bulk of its assistance in a follow-on PRRO to the existing PRRO.**

**In addition, WFP might wish to consider designing a development-oriented country programme whose main focus might be FFE complemented by long-term nutrition interventions and micro-nutrient fortification.**

**In its second year of implementation, the PRRO should concentrate its efforts on ensuring greater effectiveness at outcome level of FFW, FFT, FFE, rural vulnerable and food fortification. Assistance to the urban vulnerable needs to be rethought as the changed socio-economic environment has made the women's bakeries a less-effective instrument to address urban vulnerability. Relief distributions for IDPs in camps should continue. Finally the Country Office should improve the linkage between assessment, programming, and monitoring (especially of outcomes) in order to improve programme effectiveness.**



# Annexes



## **Annex 1**

### **Terms of Reference for the Evaluation of WFP's Activities in Afghanistan**

#### **A. Background**

Afghanistan has recently emerged from a 23-year crisis that included civil conflict, the downfall of the Taliban regime in November 2001, and three years of consecutive drought. Since the drought developed in 2000, WFP's response has been emergency assistance, most recently through emergency operation (EMOP) 10155.0 implemented between April-December 2002.

Afghanistan has changed significantly since the EMOP began in April 2002. The Transitional Islamic Government, elected in June 2002 for 18 months, developed a National Development Framework (NDF) that calls for systematic provision of basic social services, creation of livelihoods and environmentally sustainable development. In consultation with the Transitional Islamic Government and the actors comprising the United Nations Transitional Assistance Programme for Afghanistan (TAPA), WFP changed its support from emergency assistance to a protracted relief and recovery operation (PRRO 10233) that was designed in support of the nation-building objectives of the NDF.

The current PRRO, which is currently WFP's largest single country PRRO, assists vulnerable populations in rural and urban areas including returning refugees and IDPs, largely through returnee packages, FFW, FFT, and school feeding programmes. The overall goal of the operation is to contribute to re-establish and stabilize livelihoods and household food security. The current PRRO only began implementation in April 2003, but some of these activities have been implemented under the EMOPs since January 2000, or since the EMOPs were introduced that same year. The current PRRO runs through to March 2005.

According to WFP's Evaluation Policy, all operations longer than 12 months and/or that which exceeds US\$50 million should be evaluated. In agreement with the CO and the RB, it was decided that OEDE (Office of Evaluation, Rome) would carry out an independent evaluation in 2004, and submit a report to the Executive Board at its third session in October 2004.

#### **B. Purpose and Scope of Evaluation**

According to OEDE's policy paper the main purposes of evaluation are to render accountability to the Executive Board and to enable WFP to learn from experience at CO, RB and corporate level to improve WFP operations. The evaluation will be carried out at mid-term in order to inform management and stakeholders about progress towards results and point out any obstacles that may jeopardize the achievement of results in the planned timeframe. If relevant, the evaluation will suggest adjustments to be made to improve the current PRRO or make strategic recommendations to feed into the design of a new PRRO. The evaluation report will be submitted to WFP's executive Board EB/3 2004 for accountability purposes.

In line with WFP's commitment to Result Based Management, OEDE's policy, and repeated requests from the Executive Board, evaluations of WFP's activities should be focusing on the progress towards results achieved through the implementation of WFP activities. The results to



be measured will be both at output level i.e. quality, quantity and timeliness of food distribution, and outcome i.e. the effect expressed in change of the beneficiaries' living conditions. If the progress towards results appears to be slow, the team will try and identify the obstacles and to the extent possible suggest adjustments to be made. This will include reviewing implementation issues related to e.g. finance, procurement, logistics, staffing, security, partnerships, etc., but the main focus of the evaluation will be on identifying the effectiveness of WFP's activities in improving the living conditions of the beneficiaries.

The current PRRO has a large amount of activities and the evaluation will not be able to look at them all in depth. OEDE, CO and Government. Stakeholders agreed to assess the relevance of all components of the programme for prioritization purposes, but focus on the four largest components based on caseloads: FFW, Urban Vulnerable (the bakeries), FFE (school feeding, FFT, NFE, teachers salary supplement, etc.), support to returnees and IDPs in camps. The main focus of the evaluation is the current PRRO, but to the extent that data from earlier operations will support the findings, it will be considered as well.

Considering all of the above, the evaluation objective is:

*“To assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability and connectedness of WFP's assistance to Afghanistan”*

### **C. Evaluation criteria and related key questions**

The following questions will be asked of the programme as a whole and for each activity as appropriate:

#### **Relevance**

- Are WFP's activities relevant to needs as expressed by beneficiaries?
- Is the recovery strategy and activities relevant to national priorities as expressed in the National Development Framework (NDF) and to WFP's core mandate as expressed in the WFP policy “From Crisis to Recovery”, and other policies such as Commitments to Women? Is the PRRO supporting the national relief-recovery-development continuum? And how does it complement other international efforts directed at this? What are the experiences with the change away from free food distribution under the EMOP?
- To what extent does the PRRO align with WFP's strategic priorities in the Strategic Plan (2004-2007) approved by the EB in October 2003? And what strategic adjustments should be made in a new PRRO in order to align it with the Strategic plan?

#### **Effectiveness**

- To what extent is the operation achieving its intended **outcomes** at beneficiary level and at the level of the NDF? Or what is the likelihood that the results will be achieved during the operation? (see attached effectiveness matrix)





- To what extent have **results at output level** been met in terms of quality, quantity and timeliness? (e.g. Are the beneficiaries being reached at the right time? Are the food rations adequate? Are the targeted groups benefiting from the assets created? (see attached effectiveness matrix)- Do the **assessments** on which the strategy is based seem valid and in sync with what is considered to be the situation by other stakeholders? (How have food insecurity, vulnerability and beneficiary figures been assessed at country level, community level, and household level?), and how is it linked to programming?
- Does the **targeting** seem reasonable considering proxy poverty indicators and their assessment used by MRRD and CSO or other stakeholders? Should the support to IDPs and returnees be targeted?
- Have there been other **unintended results** or spin off effects, negative or positive, such as effects on agricultural production, prices and markets or labour market dynamics?
- What **monitoring** systems are in place for assuring programme quality? (M&E plan, capacity building of IPs, involvement of stakeholders, etc.) and how are they linked to programming?
- How effective are partnerships with other national and international actors on the ground?

### Efficiency

- Does the operation seem to be achieving an optimum relationship between cost quality and time?

### Sustainability

- What are the prospects for self reliance and continued utilization of community assets and services after WFP assisted operations have been completed?
- Is an exit strategy in place for all components?

### Connectedness

- Is the operation taking into account longer term needs and problems as identified by national stakeholders (Government., NGOs, beneficiaries)?
- What is the comparative advantage of WFP in the reconstruction of Afghanistan?
- How does WFP's efforts relate to other national (such as NEEP and NSP) and international efforts to reconstruct Afghanistan?



## **D. Method**

### **Evaluation - a learning experience**

In an effort to improve the utility and impact of OEDE's evaluations, the CO, the RB and national stakeholders will be closely involved in the exercise already from the design phase. It is assumed that if stakeholders have the possibility to ensure that their views and concerns about the operation become the driving force behind the evaluation, the findings will become more useful to them. It is hoped that the outcome of the evaluation process will be a high degree of stakeholder ownership and interest in the evaluation findings and thus an environment propitious to learning.

The draft TOR were discussed by stakeholders during the Quarterly Review held on 17-19 February 2004, and Government represented by MRRD provided WFP with written comments. Additionally, the team leader (Independent Consultant) and the evaluation manager (Office of Evaluation, WFP, Rome) spent one week in Kabul from 14-21 March interviewing stakeholders to design the evaluation mission. Present TOR are the result of this process and address interviewed stakeholders issues and concerns in general terms.

The evaluation mission taking place in May and June 2004 will begin with a briefing meeting where the team is presented to stakeholders, (Government WFP staff, national and international partners) objectives and methods are discussed and last comments to the TORs are taken into account by the team. As the key stakeholder, the Government is in the process of appointing focal points that will follow the evaluation closely during the whole process to advise the team on issues related to the national context and to learn about monitoring and evaluation processes and techniques. Additionally, they will appoint one person to join the mission team.

By the end of the mission a debriefing will be held where the main findings and possible action points will be presented to the stakeholders in the form of an oral presentation and a short Aide Mémoire. This will be an opportunity for WFP and its partners to discuss how to learn from the positive and negative experiences with the operation, to look forward, and to improve the effectiveness of the current operation. A first draft of the full report will be ready for circulation and comments approximately three weeks later. Once all interested stakeholders have had a chance to comment on the report it will be submitted to the Executive Board of WFP. A recommendation matrix will be drafted to ensure corporate response to the findings.

### **Data collection and analysis**

As already mentioned, the main focus of the evaluation is the effectiveness of WFP's operation in protecting and re-establishing livelihoods and HH food security. Attached to the TOR please find an evaluative framework that describes how OEDE intends to measure this. It identifies objectives, measurement indicators, data to be collected and from what source. Some clarifications on data availability are still being sought. As preparation proceeds the framework will be fine tuned.



Considering the resources available for evaluation in WFP, unfortunately it is not feasible to rely only on primary data. We will need to build assumptions about effectiveness on existing data collected through the operation's monitoring tools and verify it by a number of visits to randomly selected project sites. At the time of writing this selection process is underway. The operation is a highly decentralized one with six Area Offices of which some have caseloads the size of entire country programmes. This means that the evidence of the effectiveness will be found here, and two out of three weeks in country will be spent in the field visiting Area Offices and project sites.

Of course security is an issue in parts of the country, where we will not be able to go, and have to rely entirely on existing monitoring data. Ideally this data has been collected by the CO through its existing M&E system before the mission team arrives in April, and the team can dedicate its work to analysis of the data, and verification at Area Offices (AO), project sites and central levels in Kabul. In the field the evaluation team would use methods such as focus group interviews with beneficiaries, HH interviews, key informant interviews with shura leaders, teachers, implementing partners, WFP staff, NGOs, international agencies based locally, and other local stakeholders. The mission team will also interview key stakeholders in Kabul such as Government, NGOs, WFP staff, other UN agencies, etc.

#### **E. Timing**

19 February:	Quarterly Review and stakeholder consultation on the TORs
14-21 March:	OEDE design mission to Kabul
16 May-7 June:	3 week mission in Afghanistan including. briefing and debriefing of stakeholders and debriefing in Rome
21 June:	1 <sup>st</sup> draft of evaluation report submitted to OEDE
1 July:	Circulation for technical comments to all stakeholders
1. August	Final report and Submission to EB

#### **F. Selection criteria for Evaluation Team Leader**

- Evaluation skills incl. proven skills in construction of logic models and indicators
- Theoretical and proven practical skills with evaluation methods such PRA, RRA, focus group interviews, etc.
- Proven skills in facilitation and team leading
- Practical experience with food security issues and food aid in relief and recovery operations
- Prior experience with WFP
- Practical experience with relief and recovery in both post-conflict and drought related emergencies
- Afghanistan experience



**Team members (2-3 international and/or national) should have following skills combined:**

- Prior work experience in Afghanistan and understanding of national priorities, especially with regards to food security
- Theoretical background and work experience with, FFW, school feeding, income generating projects, IDPs and refugees
- Theoretical background and work experience with livelihood approaches and
- Understanding of food security and food aid issues in relief and recovery situations
- Proven practical experience with Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) and/or other participatory assessment methods
- Prior experience with WFP



## Annex 2 Mission Itinerary

### The revised itinerary for the PRRO evaluation mission in Afghanistan on 16 May to 8 June 2004 (update on 25 May)

DATE & TIME	WHOLE TEAM	TEAM 1: Evaluation Mission: Alice, Peter, Silvia, Salem WFP VAM: Zabih (Mazar), Rahimi (Maimana), Basir (Faizabad) AO Programme:	TEAM 2 a: Evaluation Mission: Jonas, Karim WFP VAM: Rabani (Hirat), Barialai (Kandahar), Raziq (Kabul), Saadat (Jalalabad) AO Programme:	TEAM 2 b: Evaluation Mission: Pernille, Bernard WFP VAM: Rabani (Hirat), Raziq (Kabul), Zakria (Bamian), Saadat (Jalalabad) AO Programme:
16 May, 15:30 to 18:00	Arrive CO, Security briefing and meeting with CD, DCD			
17 May, 08:00 to 17:00	Meetings with CO and KAO staff			
18 May, 08:00 to 18:00	Meetings with the UN agencies			
19 May, 08:00 to 18:00	Meetings with the Governments and Donors staff			
20 May, 8:00 to 17:00	10:30 Departure Kabul by plane and arrival to <b>Hirat</b> 13:00 Meeting with the HAO & Programme and over night stay in WFP guest house			



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21 May, 8:00 to 17:00		7:00 Departure by car to Injil and Karukh districts 17: 00 Arrival back to WFP <b>Hirat</b> guest house	7:00 Departure by car to Gozara and Adraskan districts 17:00 Arrival to WFP <b>Hirat</b> GH	
Saturday 22 May		Flight from Hirat to Kabul is cancelled	7:00 Departure by car to Kohsan districts 17: 00 Arrival back to Hirat and overnight stay WFP <b>Hirat</b> guest house	Flight from Hirat to Kabul is cancelled
Sunday 23 May		<b>Hirat</b>	8:00 Meeting with NGO's and visit some FFE project in the city 16:00 Arrival back to <b>Hirat</b> guest house	<b>Hirat</b>
Monday 24 May		<b>Hirat – Kabul</b> Flight	11:00 Departure Hirat by plane 13:50 Arrival <b>Kandahar</b> 14:00 to 16:00 Meetings with HAO and Programme 16:00 to 17:00 Briefing from HAO and over night stay in WFP guest house	<b>Hirat – Kabul</b> Flight
Tuesday 25 May		Kabul - <b>Faizabad</b> Flight is cancelled 12:30 Visit some women bakeries in Kabul city. Over night stay in WFP GH # 3	10:40 Departure <b>Kandahar</b> city to Panjwai district 16:00 arrival and over night stay in WFP guest house	Kabul - <b>Bamian</b> Flight: Departure 09:50am / Arrival 10:20pm Meeting with AO and partners Overnight in Bamian WFP guesthouse
Wednesday 26 May		<b>Faizabad</b> Flight: Departure 09:50am / Arrival 11:30pm Meeting with AO and partners, Split team to visit projects in city. Overnight in Faizabad WFP guesthouse	08:00 Departure WFP office to visit some projects in <b>Kandahar</b> city 16:00 Arrival back to WFP Kandahar guest house	Bamian Vehicle: Visit city and neighboring district project sites 17:00 Arrival and over night stay in WFP guest house
Thursday 27 May		<b>Faizabad</b> Flight: Departure 09:50am / Arrival 11:30pm Visit city and neighboring district project sites Overnight in Faizabad WFP guesthouse	08:00 to 10:00 Debriefing and meetings with HAO and Programme 11:30 Departure Kandahar by plane 14:00 Arrival <b>Kabul</b> and over night stay in WFP GH 3	<b>Bamian</b> Vehicle: Visit city and neighboring district project sites 17:00 Arrival and over night stay in WFP guest house



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Friday 28 May		Faizabad - <b>Taloqan/Kunduz</b> Vehicle: Departure 07:00 / arrival 17:00pm <b>Overnight in Taloqan/Kunduz? Faizabad AO to advise.</b>	08:00 Departure by car to visit some project in <b>Kabul</b> city 16:00 Arrival back to WFP GH 3	Bamian - <b>Kabul</b> Vehicle: Departure 07:00am / arrival 17:00pm Visit Ghorband district Overnight in WFP GH 3
Saturday 29 May		Taloqan/Kunduz - <b>Mazar</b> Vehicle: Departure 07:00am / arrival 17:00 pm Visit Puli Khumri and Baghlan districts Overnight in Mazar WFP/UNAMA guesthouse	10:30 Departure Kabul by plane 11:00 Arrival <b>Jalalabad</b> 11:00 to 12:00 Briefing from HSO 14:00 to 16:00 Meetings with HSO and Programme and over night stay in WFP guest house	
Sunday 30 May		<b>Mazar</b> Vehicle: Departure 07:00am / arrival 17:00pm Visit Chimtal and Charborjak districts Overnight in Mazar WFP/UNAMA guesthouse	08:00 Departure by car to visit some projects in <b>Jalalabad</b> city 16:00 Arrival back to the WFP guest house	
Monday 31 May		Mazar - <b>Andkhoy</b> Vehicle: Departure 07:00am / arrival 17:00pm Visit Shiberghan and Aqcha districts of Jawzjan <b>Overnight in (SC?) - AO to confirm</b>	10:00 to 11:00 Debriefing HSO 13:40 Departure Jalalabad by plane 14:10 Arrival <b>Kabul</b> and stay over night in WFP GH 3	
Tuesday 01 June		Andkhoy - <b>Maimana</b> Vehicle: Departure 07:00am / arrival 17:00pm Visit Dawlat Abad and Andkhoy districts Overnight at Maimana WFP guesthouse	08:00 Departure Kabul by car to visit some projects in Kabul 16:00 Arrival back to WFP GH 3	
Wednesday 02 June		<b>Maimana</b> Vehicle: Departure 07:00am / arrival 17:00pm Visit Khoja Sabzposh district and Maimana city  Overnight in Maimana WFP guesthouse	08:00 Departure Kabul to visit some projects in Kabul city 16:00 Arrival back to WFP GH	



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Thursday 03 June	Office work	Maimana - <b>Kabul</b> <i>Flight: time/flight to be confirmed by UNHAS</i> <i>- special request</i>	
Friday 04 June	14:00 to 16:00 Debriefing CD in CD's room		
Sunday 06 June	Debriefing stakeholders in the MRRD's meeting room		Mr. Jonas Lindholm departs Kabul for Islamabad
Tuesday 08 June	Depart Kabul for Islamabad	Depart Kabul for Islamabad	Depart Kabul for Islamabad





### Annex 3

#### List of Persons Met by Evaluation Mission

Date	Persons met	Institution/Organisation
16.05	Susanna Rico	WFP CD
	Michael Jones	WFP DCD
	Jolanda Hogenkamp	Head of Programme Unit
	Sungval Tunsiri	M&E Co-ordinator and Assistant to the Evaluation Team
	Reuben Simiyu	Field Security Officer
	Alessandro di Masi	Database Management
	Mark Agoya	Programme Officer
	Craig Naumann	Data Management Specialist
	Mari Folad	Field Monitor KAO, Bakeries
	Ahmad Shah Shahi	VAM, Field Manager, CO
	Andrew Pinney	UNDP, National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment Advisor
18.05	Serge Verniau	FAO Representative
	Antonio Di Leonardo	Emergency Co-ordinator (retiring)
	Tim Visser	Emergency Co-ordinator (new appointment)
	Prem N. Sharma	Senior Project Operations Officer
	David MacFarland	Administrative Officer
	Daniel Endres	Deputy Chief of Mission, UNHCR
19.05	M. Ehsan Zia	Deputy Minister Programme MRRD
	John Ashley	DFID Adviser to Minister, MRRD
	Mustafa Vaziri	Health and Nutrition Consultant
	Mahbuba Abawi	National Programme Officer, Extension Department MoA/FAO
	Craig Naumann	Data Management Specialist, WFP CO FFE Unit
	M. Qasim Qadry	Head Research Dept, MAAH
	Sayed Noorhuddin Hariq	Soil Specialist, Research Dept, MAAH
	Greg Cullen	Team Leader, ADB-funded Assistance to MAAH
	Jean-Francois Cautain	Head of Operations, European Commission Delegation to Afghanistan
	Arnand Cauchois	Agricultural Advisor
	Reza Hossaini	Senior Projects Coordinator, UNICEF
	Dr. A.S. Ghafari	Director, Education Section, UNICEF



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Date	Persons met	Institution/Organisation
	K-Christ Hirabayashi	Senior Project Officer, UNICEF
	Sam	Water and Sanitation, UNICEF
	Fitsum Assefa	Project Officer, Micro-nutrients, UNICEF
	Dr. E. Majeed	Policy Officer, Health Section, UNICEF
	Khadija A, Madady	Programme Assistant, UNICEF
	Fazlul Haque	OIC Education Sector, UNICEF
	Forough Foyouzat	Child Protection, UNICEF
	Nadia Bahboodi	Project Officer, PME section, UNICEF
20.05 etc.	Maureen Forsythe	HAO Herat
		AO Herat Staff, Programming and Field Monitoring
	Dr. Nadir Habib	AO Herat, National Programme Officer
	Devaki Shrestha	AO Herat, Programme Officer, FFE
	Gulam Rabani	AO Herat VAM Monitor
	Fahim Tabibi	AO Herat Programme Assistant FFE
	Engineer Bhorak	Programme Officer assisting DRRD Herat
	Haji Ghulam Nabi Qane	Director DAAH, Herat
	Ziauddin	Head, Planning Dept, DAAH, Herat
	A Khair Andish	Regional Director AREA, Herat
	Aminullah	Programme Officer AREA, Herat
	Ryan Blair	International Assistant, AREA, Herat
25.05	Alfred B. Osunsanya	KAO, M&E, Bakeries
	Scott Ronchini	CO VAM Officer
26.06	Joel Fernandez	Fayzabad, Acting HAO
	Khaironiso Najmetdinova	Fayzabad, Head of Programmes
	Mohammed Nazir	Fayzabad, National Programme Officer, Engineer
	Toshiko Kitahara	Fayzabad, Programme Officer – Education
	Abdullah Ahmad	Fayzabad, VAM Officer
27.05	Farman Ali	AKDN, Regional Manager
29.05	Abdul Rahim	Manager AACRP
	Ussama Osman	Mazar-i Sharif, Head of Area Office



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Date	Persons met	Institution/Organisation
	Emma Togba	Mazar-i Sharif, Programme Officer
	Wahdood Ghorbandi	Mazar-i Sharif, National Programme Officer
	Mahbooba Jabari	Mazar-i Sharif, FFE Monitor
	Ali Sina	Mazar-i Sharif, Food Aid Monitor
	Ismail Ghareeq	Mazar-i Sharif, VAM Monitor
30.05	Maulani Mohmand	Balkh, Head of DoE
	Zamina	
	Gulam Hassan	Balkh, Mazar-i Sharif, Programme Assistant, Bakeries
31.05	Mr Zumis	Balkh District Administrator
	Mr Sarojudeen	Balkh, Local head of security
	Mahmood Zaher	Balkh, Headmaster, New School
	Sultan Ali Jalih	Sherberghan, DRRD Jawzjan
	Mr. Fahim	Manager AACG, Andhkoy
01.06	Ahmad Jama	HAO Maimana
	Abdul Rahim	Maimana, IDP Camp Manager
04.06	David Mcloughlin	CO, Co-ordinator FFE PCU
05.06	Dr. Najeebullah Najeeb	Head of Public Nutrition Department, MoH
	Karim Rahimi	Famine Early Warning System Office MRRD
	Andrew Wilder	Director, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit
	Alexia Coke	Deputy Director, Research, AREU
06.06	Hasana Shakya	CO Programme Officer, Nutrition
	Daniel Molla	Food Security Adviser, MRRD (seconded by WFP)



## Annex 4

### List of Projects Visited by Evaluation Mission

#### List of Projects visited by Team A – 20/5/04-3/6/04

AO/SO/District	Project	Persons Met
Hirat city	H/025/2003/FTSS/DOE(H) (teacher salary)	DoE, teachers
Hirat Province	H/077/2003/FFT/ARAO (adult literacy)	IP, women beneficiaries, trainers (2 sites)
Karukh district	H/026/2003/FFW/AREA (kareze, cistern)	IP, leaders, beneficiaries, landowners, women, kids
	H/087/2003/FFW/SHABTACC (pilot school construction)	IP, workers, DoE, teachers, boys, girls
	H/072/2003/FTSS/DOE[H] (teacher salary)	Teachers, DoE
	H/005/2003/SCF/ARAO (school feeding)	IP staff
Hirat province	H/018/2004/IF/MOH and follow up of the CO/H/033/2003/IFTB/WHO/MOPH <sup>41</sup>	Doctor, nurse, cook, patients, storekeeper
Hirat district		
Kabul Province	K/009/2004/UV/WFP (Bakeries #5 and #7)	Bakery managers, workers, and customers
Kabul city		
Faizabad Province	F/047/2003/FFW/FOCUS (road)	IP, road site
Baharak district	F/033/2003/FTSS/DOE (teacher salary)	teachers, DoE
	F/080/2003/SCF/TH/NAC (school feeding)	Pupils, teachers, parents, DoE, IP
Baharak district	School reconstruction (roof) <sup>42</sup>	Teachers, pupils
Shohada District	School feeding + pilot school construction	Teachers, pupils
Faizabad Province	F/020/2004/FFT/FFW/DOWA (women's training centre construction and FFT)	IP, trainers, trainees, construction workers
Faizabad District	F/071/2003/FFT/DOWA (IGA training)	IP, trainers, trainees
	F/067/2003/FFW/DOWA (school bags)	IP, Trainers
	F/020/2004/FFT/FFW/DOWA (skills training)	IP, trainers
	F/066/2003/FFW/BANA (road)	IP, road site (no workers)
	F/026/2003/FFW/DOI (irrigation canal)	Inspected site/works but no people to interview
	CO/F/023/2004/IF/DOPH (hospital feeding)	IP, hospital staff, doctors, patients, cook, store keeper
	CO/F/024/2004/IF/NAC (orphanage)	IP, manager, orphans, custodians, cook
	F/019/2004/SCF/DOE (school feeding)	Teachers, DoE, pupils, Headmaster
Faizabad District	F/033/2003/FTSS/DOE	Teachers, DoE
Faizabad Province	F/015/2003/FFW/AAD (Big bridge, 26 km)	IP, workers, onlookers
Kisham District	F/022/2003/FFW/NAC (foster mum nurseries and afforestation site)	Women beneficiaries, MAAH, nursery workers
	F/011/2004/FFW/MRRD (school construction)	MRRD
Baghlan Province, Dahna-i-Gori district	F/077/2003/FFW/ABC (school construction pilot)	IP, construction workers, beneficiaries of FFW
Baghlan Province, Doshi District	F/029/2004/FFW/FOCUS (Ogata road FFW)	Ongoing construction, IP, beneficiaries, leaders, WFP field monitor
Balkh k province	M/092/2003/FFT/AAT (literacy training)	IP, teachers, women, trainees
Balkh district		

<sup>41</sup> The currently running TB programme was not in the list as confirmed by Dr. Nadir Habib

<sup>42</sup> Not identifiable in ACORD



### List of Projects visited by Team A (continued)

AO/SO/District	Project	Persons Met
Balkh Province Chahar Bolak district	M/056/2003/FFW/HRA (Pilot school construction)	Teachers, Shura, parents, pupils, IP
	M/090/2003/FFW/WARD (FFW – canal)	Saw site with WFP monitor – no people
	M/027/2003/FTSS/BAL (teachers salary supplement)	Teachers, DoE admin
	M/064/2003/SCF/RRO (take home ration for girls)	Teachers, pupils
	M/084/2003/SCF/WFP (one time biscuit distribution) and M/027/2003/FTSS/BAL	Teachers, pupils, headmaster
	M/005/2004/UV/WFP (bakeries #84, 710 & 47)	Managers, workers, customers
Jawzjan Province Aqcha district	M/030/2003/FFW/ASD	District Administrator, Local Head of Security and villager in nearby settlement
Faryab province Andkhoy district	M/025/2003/FFW/ACR	
Faryab province Shirin Taqab district	M/077/2003/FFW/AAG (road/canal work with donkeys)	IP, beneficiaries, donkeys (ongoing construction)
	M/061/2003/FTSS/AERA	Teachers, IP
	M/049/2003/SCF/AERA	IP, teachers, pupils
Faryab province Maimana city	M/004/2004/FFT/WAD (carpet making, embroidery, tailoring)	IP, women trainers, trainees, workers
	M/014/2003/IF/LSA (feeding for carpet workers)	
	M/054/2003/RRIR/IOM (refugee transit camp)	IOM – no refugees around
	M/026/2003/SCF/ACTED (biscuit distribution and take home for girls)	Teachers, DoE, pupils, traders selling food rations in market, customers
Pashtun Kot district	M/076/2003/FFW/ARP (FFW with donkeys)	Workers, IP



### List of projects Visited and Interviews by Team B, 22.5-3.6.2004

AO/SO/District	Project	Persons Met
Hirat/Adraskan	H/013/2004/FFW/ARRA	Beneficiaries, CO
Hirat	SCF	Beneficiaries, teachers, headmasters, parents
Hirat/Guzara	H/ 067/2003/FFW/AHDAA	Beneficiaries, CO, shura, Mullah, IP, Others: RRD
Kandahar	Q/20/2004/FFW/IRRA	Beneficiaries, IP, headmaster, teachers,
	Team interviews in Kandahar	MRRD, Dept. of planning, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNAMA
	Q/106+109/2003/FFW/ANCC (school construction and SCF)	Beneficiaries, IP, headmaster, teachers,
	Q/003/2004/NFE/MM	Headmaster, students, trainers, IPs
	Q/44/2003/UV/KWB (2 bakeries)	Beneficiaries, workers
Bamian	B/025/2003/FFT/CAWC (literacy)	Students, IP, CO, DoE, parents, teachers, shura,
	B/024/2003/SCF/ DoE	DoE, teachers, pupils
	B/023/2003/FTSS/DoE	DoE, teachers
	B/002/2003/FFW/ADB (nursery)	Beneficiaries, DoA
	B/022/2003/FFW/WAD (gabion)	Beneficiaries, IP (WAD)
	Other meetings Bamian	Others: PRT, UNAMA, FAO
Jalalabad	J/061/2003/FFT/AABRAR	Students, trainers, parents, IP, bakery beneficiaries Others: RRD
	J/040/2003/UV/WFP	IP, beneficiaries
	J/016/2004/FFT/RI	IP. Beneficiaries, students trainers
	J/035/2003/FFW/SADAAT	IP, beneficiaries, shura, trainers, mullahs
	J/031/2003/ FFW/WHO	IP, beneficiaries,
	J/013/2003/FFW/ARDO	IP beneficiaries

# Appendices



## Appendix 1

### Detailed Review of Resource Allocation in Relation to Assessed Need by District (PRRO 10233)

According to VAM assessments for 2002-2003, which were used to programme interventions for the first year of the PRRO, conditions of acute food insecurity (80 percent of the population is food insecure for 10 months per year) were found in 14 districts (425,000 people). Highly food insecure conditions (60 percent of the population food insecure for 8 months per year) were found in 49 districts (total population 1.6 million). Jointly these two sets of districts accounted for 10 percent of the national population. An additional 4.2 million (20 percent of the national population) people lived in 108 districts where 40 percent of the population was food insecure for 5 months per year on average. An additional 86 districts were assessed as moderately food insecure (20 percent of the population is food insecure for 2 months per year on average); the latter districts account for around 5.6 million people (27 percent of the population). The largest share of the national population (43 percent) was found in 115 districts that were food secure (8.7 million people).

Food Insecurity Category	Extent of Food Insecurity (% of District Population)	Average Food Gap (months/year)	Districts in Each Category (number)	Total Population of All Districts in Category	Share of Total National Population
Acute	80	10	14	426,428	2%
Very high	60	8	49	1,615,001	8%
High	40	5	108	4,213,973	20%
Moderate	20	2	86	5,639,148	27%
Secure	0	0	115	8,774,000	43%
Total			372	20,668,550	100%

Source: Mission calculations on the basis of VAM assessment 2002-03 and ACORD<sup>2</sup>

Currently, Country Office databases for VAM and ACORD are not linked and therefore management is not in a position to know whether or not the resources allocated to a particular district are appropriate in relation to assessed food gaps. The mission was therefore forced to construct a series of linked spreadsheets to enable it to carry out such an analysis. This involved painstakingly totalling ACORD data on MT food allocation and beneficiaries by district and activity and crossing it with VAM data on food insecure population and months of food gaps<sup>3</sup> to obtain an estimate of total assistance programmed in relation to assessed food need.





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## Assessed Needs and Food Allocation by Food Security Categories

VAM Assessment 2002/2003					ACORD Data					
Food Insecurity Category	Food Insecure Population	% of Food Insec Popul	Assessed Need <sup>43</sup> (MT)	% of Need (MT)	Total Food Aid Programmed (MT)	% of Total PRRO (MT)	Of which, FFW Programmed (MT)	% of FFW (MT)	Food Needs MT	
Acute	374,752	9%	54,827	17%	33,152	8%	20,940	13%	38%	60%
Very High	1,055,588	24%	117,857	36%	41,766	10%	24,568	15%	21%	35%
High	1,774,525	41%	123,670	38%	91,300	22%	56,422	35%	46%	74%
Moderate	1,131,370	26%	33,331	10%	61,680	15%	23,390	14%	70%	186%
Secure	0	0%	0	0%	178,777	44%	37,742	23%	>100%	>100%
Total	4,336,235	100%	329,686	100%	406,675	100%	163,062	100%	49%	123%

<sup>43</sup> Assuming 475 grams of mixed food per person per day.



**Source: Mission calculations on the basis of VAM assessment 2002-03 and ACORD<sup>44</sup>**

Resource allocation by district in relation to assessed need varies widely districts within provinces. On the whole, the match between resources programmed and assessed need is poor, but in most cases the consequences were not serious. However, there were 44 cases of serious programming gaps, including 22 cases in which programmed resources were either absent or less than 25 percent of assessed needs in districts with acute or very high food insecurity.

### Resource Allocation in Relation to Assessed Need by District

Province	Fit between Resource Allocation and Assessed Need	Details
Badakhshan	Very poor	Old Faizabad District before split into 4 districts got 61% of food resources but had only 26% of the assessed need (including new districts) Shahri Buzurg and Shighnan had 33% of need but got 9% of resources
Badghis	Poor	31% of resources to Qala-i-Now which is food secure Ab Kamari needed 48% of total resources but got only 15% Murghab had 5% of the assessed need but got 16% of resources
Baghlan	Poor	Baghlan – food secure - got 44% of total resources Pul-i-kumri – food secure – got 17% of resources Nahrin had 42% of assessed need but got only 7% of resources Firing had 36% of assessed need but got only 20% of resources
Balkh	Poor	Mazar-i-Sharif – food secure – absorbs 66% of resources Corresponding underdelivery to other needy districts
Bamian	Very good	Allocations are reasonable
Farah	Not bad	No resources to Bala Bulak (24% of need) and Bakwa (10% of need) Overdelivery to Farah – food secure – 19% and Lash Wa Juwaya
Faryab	Good	Overdelivery to Bilchiragh (34% of food, 4% of need) The other districts are reasonable
Ghazni	Good	Slight overdelivery to Jaghuri
Ghor	Good	Slight overdelivery to Chaghcharan
Hilmand	Poor	Overdelivery to Lashkar Gah – food secure - 43% of resources and Reg Underdelivery in other districts
Hirat	Poor	Food secure districts Hirat and Injil got 40% and 21% of resources Kashukhuna with 21% of assessed need, Farsi (14% of need) and Chishti Sharaf (9%) each got only 1% of food resources
Jawzjan	Poor	No resources to Faizabad with 16% of assessed need and Kwaja du Koh with 12%; underdelivery to Aqcha (40% of need, 29% of resources) Over delivery to Shiberghan (13% of need, 32% of resources, Marydyan (3% of need, 15% of resources) & Mingajik (4% of need, 16% of resources)
Kabul	Worst	Kabul – food secure – absorbed 84% of resources Underdelivery to Surobi (33% of assessed need), Paghman (23% of need) and Qarabagh (22% of need) – all three together got only 11% of food aid
Kandahar	Not too bad	Over delivery to Kandahar district – food secure – 31% of resources, Maywand and Panjway (probably due to IDPs not reflected in VAM)
Kapisa	Very poor	No resources allocated to Nirjb with 17% of needs, Mahmud Raqi and

<sup>44</sup> Slightly different totals of numbers of districts and population in each category were sent by the Country Office on 30 July 2004. The mission is not clear on which districts changed or why. Therefore it was not possible to reflect the changes in this appendix. As the changes would result in only 1 percent difference in population allocation between food insecurity categories, it would not in any way alter the mission's conclusions about geographic targeting.



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		Tagab each with 11% of needs Too many resources (54%) to Kohistan with only 18% of assessed needs
Khost	Poor	Khost (Matun) – food secure - got 49% of resources Underdelivery to Mando Zayi (32% of need, 4% of resources, Musa Khel 26% of need, 7% of food aid and Spera 15% of need, 4% of resources)
Kunar	Very Poor	Marawara with 54% of assessed need and Sir Kanay with 29% of assessed need got zero food aid Overdelivery to food secure districts (Pech 36%, of total MTs, Asadabad 23%, Chawkay 19%)
Kunduz	Worst of all	Qalay e Zal with 100% of assessed need got zero resources Kunduz district – food secure – got 94% of resources
Laghman	Very poor	Mitalaram – food secure – got 63% of resources Underdelivery – no resources - to Nangaraj (31% of need) and Dawlatshah (48% of need)
Logar	Good	All districts are reasonable
Nangarhar	Very poor	Jalalabad district – food secure – got 61% of total food aid Underdelivery to Rodat (28% of need, 5% of resources; Achin (23% of need, 6% of resources) and Chaparhar (14% of need – no resources)
Nimroz	Good	All districts reasonable apart from slight overdelivery to Zaranj (12% of need, 27% of resources)
Nuristan	Poor	Underdelivery to Mandol (58% of need, 28% of resources; Wama (20% of need, 5% of resources; Waygal (21% of need, 3% of resources) Overdelivery to Nuristan (0 need, 24% of resources) and Kamdesh (0 need, 36% of resources)
Paktika	Poor	Zaghun Shahr and Jarikhel with 65% of needs got 24% of food aid Waza khwa – food secure - got 23% Sharan – food secure – got 11% Other districts are reasonable
Paktiya	Poor	Lija Mangal with 35% of need got zero resources Jadran – food secure – got 19% Gardez with 8% of need got 20% Other districts are reasonable
Parwan	Very poor	Pansher – food secure – got 48% of resources Charikar - food secure – got 16% Hisa-i-awali, Pansher 2 and Jabulassaraj with 7+18+19% = 44% of need got zero; Salang with 9% of need got zero;
Samangan	Poor	Hazrat-i-sultan with 42% of assessed need got 7% of resources Aybak with 20% of assessed need got 4% of resources Dara-i-suf with 29% of need got 56% of resources
Sari Pul	Poor	Sayyad with 25% of assessed need got 16% of resources Balkhab with 18% of need, got 30% of resources Kohistanat with 28% of need, got 45% of resources
Takhar	Not bad	Warshaj with 100% of assessed need got 46% of resources Taluqan – food secure – got 34% Kalafgan – food secure – got 14%
Uruzgan	Not bad	Daikundi with 50% of assessed need, got 29% of food aid Other districts are reasonable
Wardak	Poor	Poor Sayyadabad with 20% of need got 51% of resources Maydanshahr – food secure – got 20% of resources Markhaz Bishud with 64% of need got only 25% of the food aid
Zabul	Not too bad	Qalat with 4% of assessed need got 27% of resources Shahjoy with 16% of need got 34% of resources Argbandab with 21% of need got zero Other districts reasonable



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## Appendix 2

### Nutrition Tables

**Table 1. Afghanistan - Summary of Malnutrition Rates from Various Studies**

Malnutrition rates		Stunting (1) (Global)	Stunting (1) (Severe)	Wasting (2) (Global)	Wasting (2) (Severe)
MoH, National Policy Paper, Nation wide		45% to 59%		6% to 10%	
ACF, Kabul	n=900 1996 n=959 2003	55.2% 44.1%	27.2 7.8%	5.1% 4.2%	0.8% 05%
MSF, Herat, Maslakh Camp, Jan. 2004	N=615			2.8%	0.5%
MSF, Kandahar, Zhare Dasht Camp, March 2004	n=54			8.3	1.2

(1) Global: <-2 z-score height for age, also referred to as stunting or chronic malnutrition

Severe: <-3 Z-score height for age

(2) Global: <-2 Z-score weight for height, also referred to as wasting or acute malnutrition

Severe: <-3 Z-score weight for height

**Table 2. Afghanistan – Infant and Child Mortality Rates**

Mortality rate	National	Urban	Rural
Infant mortality rate	115	97	121
Child mortality rate (under five)	172	142	183



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Table 3 - Food Baskets and Nutritional Value

Nutritional Content	per pers/day	Wheat	Wheatflour	Pulses	Veg Oil	Sugar	WSB	Iodised	Biscuits	Quan.	Kcal	Kcal/Pe	Market value	Market value
Kcal		330	350	340	885	400	370	0	450				of the ration	of the ration
Protein		12.3	11.5	20	0	0	20	0	12				Afhs	US \$
Fat		1.5	1.5	0.6	100	0	6	0	15					
Price per 100g		0.83	1.2	2	4.1			0.4						
<b>Activities</b>														
1 Urban Vulnerable (UV)	person/day (g)		320					5		325	1120	1120	3.9	0.1
2 Rural Vulnerable (RV)	HH/month (kg)													
100 % Ration			100	4	4		10	1		119	436000	2422	1448	29.0
75 % Ration			75	3	3		7.5	1		89.5	327000	1817	1087	21.7
50 % Ration			50	2	2		5	1		60	218000	1211	726	14.5
25 % Ration			25	1	1		2.5	1		30.5	109000	606	365	7.3
3 Institutional Feeding (IF)	person/day (g)		350	40	30	10	100	5		535	2037	2037	6.3	0.1
4 Supplementary Feeding (Su)	person/day (g)				43	28	228			299	1336	1336	1.8	0.0
5 Assistance to TB Patients	Patient/month (kg)	50		7	4	2	12.5	1		76.5	278450	1547	723.0	14.5
6 IDP Feeding	IDP/Day (g)		350	40	30	10	100	5		535	2037	2037	6.3	0.1
7 Returnee Package (RRIR)	one time assistance									0				
1 HH member		25								25	82,500		208	4.2
2 HH members	Kg/person	50								50	165000		415	8.3
3 to 4 HH members		100								100	330000		830	16.6
5 to 6 HH members		150								150	495000		1245	24.9
7 to 9 HH members		200								200	660000		1660	33.2
10 to 15 HH members		250								250	825000		2075	41.5
more than 15 HH members		300								300	990000		2490	49.8
8 Food for Work	per HH/month (kg)													
100% Ration		100		4	4			1		109	379000	2106	1078	21.6
75% Ration		75		3	3			1		82	284250	1579	810	16.2
50% Ration		50		2	2			1		55	189500	1053	541	10.8
25% Ration		25		1	1			1		28	94750	526	273	5.5
9 Food for Training (FFT)	kg													
trainee/week		12.5		0.5	0.5					13.5	47375	1128	134	2.7
trainee/month		50		2	2					54	189500	1053	537	10.7
per trainer/week		18.75		0.5	0.5					19.75	68000	1619	186	3.7
per trainer/month		75		2	2					79	272000	1511	745	14.9
10 School Feeding On-site	Child/day (g)								100	100	450	450		
11 School Feeding Take Home	Boys and Girls (g)	12.5								12.5	41250	229	104	2.1
12 School Feeding Take Home	Girls (g)				4					4	35400	197	164	3.3
13 Food fro Teacher Training	Teacher/Day (g)		350	40	30	10	100	5		535	2037	2037	6	0.1



Calculation: Prices are based on the Heart basis, sugar, CSB and biscuits not calculated!


Rations are calculated per beneficiary and day (take home: kg/number of household members (6)/30 days. Onsite feeding for respective day and beneficiary/receiver only.

Market values (AFA): Herat, May 2004:

1 kg Wheat 8.3  
1 kg Wheat flour: 10 to 12.0  
1 l Vega Oil 41  
1 kg Lentils 20  
Salt 3 to 5  
Sugar: not available  
Biscuits and CSB not calculated  
1 Sheep 3900  
1 l Diesel 16  
1 Day Daily Labour: 130

Market values (AFA): Maimana May 2004:

1 kg Wheat 8.5-8.9  
1 kg Wheat flour 10-11  
1 kg Beans 20  
1 kg Pea 20  
1 kg Lamp meat: 140  
1 kg Beef: 100  
1 kg Apple: 50  
1 kg Tangerine 30 to 50  
1 kg Potatoes: 11  
1 kg Spinach: 3  
1 kg Onion: 12 to 13  
1 kg Labour: Daily Wage: 140  
Sheep: 1 year: 3400 to 3500  
1 l Diesel: 17  
Bread: 200g, 3 .  
US \$ - Afs: 49.5  
Sugar: not available  
Teachers Salary: 35\$ to 45\$







### Nutrient Content of 100 g Biscuits Product (before baking) and Nutritional Justification

**Ration:** 100 g biscuits, produced in India, distributed at the main break of the school day (morning, or afternoon shift).

**Energy:** 450 kcal, 20 percent to 24 percent of daily energy requirement (5 to 9 years old: 1860 kcal, 10 to 14 years old: 2210 kcal), which is acceptable, and should not be reduced, if the quantity is consumable at once.

**Proteins:** 11.5 g (safe intake: 40 g)

WFP recommended intake during for half day school: minimum 16g. Boarding time about 3.5 hours (much less than half day). Calculation of coverage of protein intake by local diet is under consideration, data of NRVA may be used. More information could be obtained at later stage. However as long as 'biscuits' are the commodity offered, increase in protein content per ration may not be possible

**Fat:** 12 g

**Carbohydrates:** 75 g

**Calcium:** 100 mg as Calcium carbonate (only 7 to 14 percent of requirements, Calcium deficiencies are not reported (the population consumes milk, which is rich in Calcium, therefore considered as acceptable level)

**Iron:** 8 mg as ferrous sulphate: 29 percent to 44 percent of requirement and 112 µg (28 percent to 37 percent of requirement), The prevalence of iron deficiency anaemia in children is estimated to be about 50 percent to 70 percent. Therefore, it is advisable to look for opportunities to increase iron intake. Increase the level of iron/folic acid, may not be possible (technology problem). Iron supplementation could be considered.

**Zinc:** 5 mg as Zinc sulphate, 84 percent to 51 percent, acceptable levels.

Iodine is not mentioned in the specification, it seems to be added in the premix (98µg) and as 0.5 percent of iodised salt (30 to 60µg according to the level of Iodisation of the salt): RNI are 100 to 140. Consequently the RNI are covered, which is important, because of the high prevalence of Iodine Deficiency Disorders.

### Vitamin Content and Coverage of Recommended Nutrient Intakes (RNI) from 100g Biscuits

	Thiamine mg	Riboflavin mg	Niacin mg NE	Vit. B <sub>6</sub> mg	Folat µg DFE	Vit. B <sub>12</sub> µg	Vit. C mg	Vit. A µg RE/	Vit. D µg	Vit. E mg α-TE
Content in 100g	0.9	0.8	6.6	1.3	112	0.8	45	350	2.65	8.2
RNI 7-9y	0.9	0.9	12	1	300	4	35	500	5	7
RNI 10-18y	1.2	1.3	16	1.3	400	5	40	600	5	10
RNI coverage 7- 9y	100%	88%	55%	130%	37%	33%	77%	70%	53%	117%



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RNI 10-18y. coverage 7- 9y	75%	62%	41%	100%	28%	20%	112%	58%	53%	82%
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The traditional diet is wheat based, mainly whole grain wheat (about 450 to 500g per adult person and day).

**Vitamin C:** The prevalence of Vitamin C deficiency in the country is extraordinary high, especially during the winter months. Severe clinical symptoms were observed in more than 10 percent of the population in remote areas (MoH, 2003, Nutrition Policy). Due to the baking process the Vitamin C content is reduced by roughly 50 percent (from 112 percent to about 50 percent). Therefore, an increase in Vitamin C content may be considered, to compensate for losses during the baking process to be effective to alleviate Vitamin C deficiencies. Vitamin C supplementation during the winter months, or for two months in early spring might be considered, which would also be in line with the MoH policy. Increased Vitamin C content would also be good to enhance the absorption of iron. However, more information will be obtained from the up-coming nutrition survey.

The nutrient content calculation is based on the composition of the raw product, however, processing and baking leads to a change of nutrient composition and eventually availability. It is therefore recommended to review and analyse the nutrient composition in the raw product. Here collaboration with WFP in Bangladesh is recommended.

It is recommended to assess whether children are able to consume the full ration provided. It may be too bulky (see experience from Bangladesh, where 75g is appropriate). If children feel too full and can not finish the ration, WFP should consider reducing the amount from 100g to 75g. The latter would provide 340 kcal and 15 percent to 18 percent of energy requirements. Also the provision of micro-nutrients would decrease by 25 percent.

From the nutritional point of view, the ration size should remain, if it cannot be consumed during schooling time, leading to diversion, high substitution effect, a reduction should be considered.

The consumption of water after the biscuit consumption is essential.

Shelf life of the product: 9 month originally, recently increased to 12 months.

Ingredients are listed on the wrapper, but not in quantities. Quantities (or percentages) should be indicated as well.

Nutrient content is given for fat, protein and energy. It may be possible to indicate also the content of micro-nutrients (as a table).

Shelf life is indicated on the wrapper, but it might be desirable to add required storage conditions.



### Appendix 3

#### Progress on Enhanced Commitments to Women

Table 1 – Enhanced Commitments to Women – Mission Findings

Enhanced Commitment to Women	Evidence	Remarks
<b>Improve nutritional status of pregnant and lactating women and adolescent girls</b>	Impact of IDP, supplementary and institutional feeding cannot be assessed due to lack of nutrition data	Two IDP camp nutrition surveys by MSF find no severe wasting; supplementary feeding phased out because wasting too low to justify it
- raise health and nutrition awareness	27 FFT projects raise health/hygiene/ nutrition awareness of 15,000 women; deworming campaign raises awareness	The effectiveness of the training courses has not been assessed
<b>Close gender gap in education by 2007</b> - Take home oil ration incentive for girls' school enrolment	The take-home oil ration for girls influenced parents' initial decision to enrol girls; enrolment increased in 2004 even though oil distribution suspended	50:50 sex ratio achieved in grade 1 in Kabul and other major cities (except Kandahar); an >15% gender gap persists at higher grades in rural areas
- School feeding	Girls are 35% of direct recipients – Boys still outnumber girls almost 2 to 1	Supply of female teachers and girls' schools is a constraint on enrolment
- Food-for-teacher-salary-supplement	27% of recipients of FTSS are women In rural areas, women teachers are a minority and few are on MoE payroll (therefore ineligible for FTSS)	The blanket food for teacher salary supplement is not effective to increase the supply of qualified female teachers in rural areas
- Food-for-Teacher-Training	35% of FTT recipients are women	Performance only 1% of target
- Pilot school construction (13 schools)	4 of the 5 pilot schools visited are for boys only	For girls parents prefer schools close to the village and secluded from the road
<b>Ensure equal benefits to women from assets created by FFW and FFT</b>	Yes for FFT (71% women); no for FFW	Easier to ensure for FFT than FFW
70% of FFT to benefit women	Achieved: 71% of trainees are female	CO is to be commended
FFW to benefit women and	Women rarely participate in	ACORD data (FFW = 18%



men equally	FFW except for nursery and crafts projects	women) overstate women's actual participation
Assets created to be of equal benefit to women and men	Monitoring reports claim that the assets benefit women and men equally but no evidence that needs of women/girls were analyzed and addressed	NRVA results suggest that work undertaken to date has reflected men's preferences rather than women's
<b>Contribute to women's control of food in relief food distribution</b>	Inappropriate in the Afghan context No women collect food rations	Women prefer FFW to CFW because they control the food but not the cash
- smaller packages so that women can carry them more easily	Two 4-litre oil tins difficult for girls to carry when double rations distributed	Male relatives assist girls to carry the oil
- free food ration cards to be issued in the woman's name	Issue of ration cards in women's name is no assurance for women's control	Bread ration cards traded on the market (bought by men and the non-poor)
- food distribution points accessible to women	Some distribution points are too far for women to access them	Cultural constraint limits women collecting rations
<b>Equal representation of women on food distribution committees and other bodies</b>	Women not represented on food distribution committees and have little voice in selecting FFW activities (PDM reports)	Only the shuras and CDCs elected democratically in connection with NSP have female representation
<b>Mainstream gender in programming</b>	A start has been made	More follow-up needed
- Situation analysis	Gender differences well reflected in VAM/NRVA assessments	Country Office is to be commended
- Gender sensitive baseline	FFE baseline survey is gender sensitive Bakery study is gender sensitive	No baseline surveys for other activities
- Gender sensitive outputs	ACORD beneficiary data are gender disaggregated	ACORD data on female beneficiaries are inaccurate for FFW, UV and RV
- Monitoring checklists and guidelines	- gender issues integrated throughout	- monitoring data on gender issues are not analyzed or acted upon
<b>Role of women in HH food security acknowledged</b>	Women manage the family food stocks and money from within the compound	Women's contribution to HFS remains largely invisible
<b>Gender balance of staff</b> - 75% of food monitors to be	Difficult to achieve in Afghan context	Country Office is to be commended on efforts to



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women - reduce gender gap by 50% - retain female staff	- CD + heads of Programme, M&E, pipeline, 1 AO and 1 SO are female - 10 VAM monitors are female - female food monitors are mostly confined to bakery work in cities (unable to travel to the countryside)	recruit, train and retain qualified Afghan female staff - interesting adaptations to enable female staff to travel to countryside (hiring a male relative as a chaperone or recruiting a woman whose husband is a driver so they can travel together)
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## Appendix 4

### Review of Country Office Lessons Learnt

Lesson from Aug 2003 Programme Review <sup>45</sup>	Remarks of Evaluation Mission
1. Converting from an Emergency to a Recovery Operation takes time	Agreed – staff, IPs and participating ministries could have used more lead time for training than was provided
2. Increased cereal production in the country does not equate to adequate food security for every Afghan man, woman and child	Agreed
3. Stakeholders need to be involved in vulnerability analysis, not just WFP; women must play a key role in any vulnerability analysis; and Government needs to have ownership for the results to be fully accepted.	Agreed
4. WFP can have an important role in responding to the chronic malnutrition so prevalent in Afghanistan, not just to acute malnutrition common during emergency periods	Agreed
5. WFP should not take any implementing partners for granted	Agreed – Annual assessment of IDP performance is a sound initiative. Assessments should give more weight to targeting and outcomes relative to English language report writing
6. Interagency collaboration among UN partners is not always easy or effective	True but collaboration is reported to be improving
7. Delegation of authority to the Area Offices is more efficient and effective than centralized control	Delegation of authority to approve and implement sub-projects is appropriate. However, delegation of authority needs to be reviewed and adjusted to enable closer review by the CO on targeting, quality issues, connectedness with national policies and coordination with other programmes
8. Women can be included in many more WFP activities, if creative thinking is used and courageous steps are taken	True, but more attention needs to be paid to increasing the likelihood of sustainability of the employment created for women through bakeries, handicrafts, nurseries, etc.
9. WFP's primary business is programming food assistance to needy people; hence, most staff time and energy should be invested in ensuring that an effective programme is in place	Agreed – WFP headquarters should be more conscious of the need for CO and AO staff to devote most of their time to WFP's core work (as opposed to responding to queries from Rome)
10. The Hirat IDP camp experience has shown that WFP can take an effective lead in policy matters. WFP's Hirat Area Office took a strong leadership role in insisting that IDP camps in Hirat be closed, except for the most vulnerable displaced persons with protection problems, and that return home be facilitated for as many as possible	Yes, the Hirat experience IDP camp experience shows that WFP can take a lead in policy. The mission questions the applicability of the Hirat policy to the particular context in the south of Afghanistan.
11. Free food is not welcomed as a modality in Afghanistan for recovery activities. To the extent possible, as WFP develops new programmes, they should be tied to some type of recovery activity. But longer-term programmes should follow the model of the women's bakeries, where bread is subsidized but not given free, or of food for work or training where food is given in exchange for work done or training undertaken	The mission recognizes that free food is not welcomed by MoF and MRRD, but there continues to be a justification for free food to meet urgent food needs of IDPs in camps, widows, elderly and disabled people unable to participate in FFW or FFT and – along side of FFW and FFT - in the acutely and highly food insecure districts.
12. The Rural Vulnerable may not be as vulnerable as during the emergency [RV allocation not programmed because the AOs either "forgot," or "did not have time," or "did not perceive the need."]	The mission strongly disagrees with the reasoning that if AOs have not programmed rural vulnerable distributions they must not be needed. Neglect of relief needs of the rural vulnerable is a potentially serious shortcoming.

<sup>45</sup> Lessons (left column) extracted from *Programme Review – WFP/Afghanistan, July-August 2003*, Gretchen Bloom, Head, Programme Unit, Country Office, World Food Programme, Kabul, Afghanistan.



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13. Food resources to meet winter needs must be delivered in time and as close to the beneficiaries as possible	Agreed
14. It has proven difficult to find linkages between WFP's Food for Work activities and the MRRD's Cash for Work activities	So far, yes. Now that NEEP is operating on a wider scale collaboration should be easier.
15. Capacity building is an excellent use of WFP's cash resources	Agreed – Further capacity building is urgently needed.
16. A contingency plan is essential, because there will always be needs for emergency food assistance, even during a recovery programme	Agreed – that is why a second PRRO is advisable.