



World Food Programme

A Report from the Office of Evaluation



*Full Report of the Evaluation of the
WFP West Africa Coastal Regional
Protracted Relief and Recovery
Operation*

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Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

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Acronyms

ACF	Action Contre la Faim
ADRA	Adventist Relief Agency
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (Sierra Leone)
AFL	Armed Forces of Liberia
APC	All People's Congress (Sierra Leone)
BNCR	Bureau National pour la Coordination des Réfugiés (Guinea)
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
COMPAS	Commodity Movement Processing and Analysis System
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DSC	Direct Support Cost
EC	European Community
ECOMOG	Cease-fire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECW	Enhanced Commitments to Women
EDP	Extended Delivery Point
EMOP	Emergency operation
ESF	Emergency School Feeding
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organisation
FBM	Food Basket Monitoring
FFT	Food for Training
FFW	Food for Work
HEB	High-Energy Biscuit
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
INPFL	Independent National Front of Liberia
IRA	Immediate Response Account
ITSH	Internal Transport Storage and Handling
JAM	Joint Assessment Mission
JFAM	Joint Food Assessment Mission
IGNU	Interim Government of National Unity (Liberia)
LDC	Least developed Country
LDF	Lofa Defence Force (Liberia)
LNTG	Liberian National Transitional Government
LPC	Liberian Peace Council
LRRRC	Liberia Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission
LTSH	Landside Transport Storage and Handling
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MAP	Management and Appraisal of Performance system
MATD	Ministère de l'Administration du Territoire et de la Décentralisation (Guinea)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MCH	Mother-Child Health
MICS	Multi-Indicator Cluster Survey
MODEP	Ministry of Development and Economic Planning (Sierra Leone)
MOSS	Minimum Operating Security Standard



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MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
MPCI	Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire
MSF-B	Médecins sans frontières - Belgium
MSF-S	Médecins sans frontières - Switzerland
NaCSA	National Commission for Social Action (Sierra Leone)
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NPFL	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPP	National Patriotic Party (Liberia)
NPRC	National Provisional Ruling Council (of Sierra Leone)
OCHA	Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance
ODD	West Africa Regional Bureau in Dakar
ODOC	Other Direct Operating Cost
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PRO	Protracted Refugee and Displaced Persons Operation
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery operation
RHCSO	Regional Humanitarian Co-ordination and Support Office
RUF	Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone)
SCF (UK)	Save the Children (United Kingdom)
SENAH	Service National d'Action Humanitaire (Guinea)
SGBV	Sexual and Gender-Based Violence
SPR	Standardized Project Report
SRSG	Special Representative of the Secretary General
ULIMO	United Liberation Movement (Liberia)
UN	United Nations
UNAMSIL	United Nations Armed Mission in Sierra Leone
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UNSECORD	United Nations Security Coordination Department
VAM	Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping
WFP	World Food Programme
WINGS	WFP Information Network Global System



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1. BACKGROUND: THE EVOLUTION OF THE PROTRACTED CRISIS

1.1 Liberia

Most of the political instability and civil unrest in the West Africa coastal region for the past fifteen years can be traced back to the Liberian civil war that started in December 1989 when Charles Taylor and a small group of Liberian rebels (later to become known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia - NPFL), entered Nimba County from Côte d'Ivoire with the goal of bringing down the government of President Samuel Doe¹. President Doe, who had come to power in a 1980 coup, retaliated and the protracted Liberia conflict commenced. The Liberia conflict quickly took on a regional dimension. Civilians sought sanctuary in neighbouring countries, and armed factions linked up across national borders. Liberia continues to remain the epicenter of a conflict that has spread throughout the West Africa coastal region.

A major feature of the Liberia conflict has been the number of different armed factions and sub-factions (often consisting of large numbers of young children), loosely linked with different ethnic affiliations. These have added to the overall chaos of the situation, and hindered efforts to find peace. The main Liberian armed factions that have emerged since 1990 are outlined in chronological order in Table 1:

Table 1: The Main Political and Armed Factions in Liberia, 1990-2004

Name of Faction	Predominant Ethnic Affiliation	Remarks
AFL Armed Forces of Liberia	Krahn and Mandingo	Liberia's constituted army. Samuel Doe, an enlisted man, seized power through a coup in 1980. He continued to lead the AFL until killed in Sept. 1990. General Bowen then headed the AFL.
NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia	Gios and Manos	Led by Charles Taylor, main contestant for power in Liberia up to 1997, when Taylor won presidential elections.
INPFL Independent National Front of Liberia	Mano, Gio and Nimba	Breakaway faction from NPFL. Led by Prince Johnson.
ULIMO United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy	Krahn and Mandingo	Made up of ex-AFL members who fled the country after Doe's death. Aim to fight NPFL. ULIMO fought alongside Sierra Leonean forces in March 1991 when NPFL-backed rebels raided Sierra Leone. Following formation of the Liberian National Transitional Government (LNTG) in March 1994, ULIMO split over the issue of leadership among its main ethnic groups (ULIMO-Johnson and ULIMO-Kromah).
LDF Lofa Defence Force	Lorma and Gisi	Created and led by Francois Massaquoi in mid-1993 to halt advance of ULIMO. Massaquoi

¹ The early history of the regional crisis is drawn from the 1996 Evaluation (WFP, 1996).



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		served in the Taylor Gov't. as Minister of Youth and Sports.
LPC Liberian Council	Peace Krahn	EmergEd after Cotonou Accord in east of Liberia (not a signatory to the accord).
NPP National Party	Patriotic	The political machinery that propelled Taylor to the presidency (as a civilian) in 1997. Included some elements from INPFL.
LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy	Mainly Mandingo	Northern-based movement created as a reaction to the Taylor presidency. Includes some remnants of the ULIMO-K faction.
MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia		Main support from East and West of country. Created in part as reaction to successes of LURD against Taylor presidency.
National Transitional Government		Created as part of Accra peace talks in October 2003 as part of transition towards general elections (scheduled 2005). Comprises representatives of the three recent fighting groups - NPP, LURD and MODEL

Based on WFP (1996b).

The crisis in Liberia followed a cyclical pattern of violence giving way to efforts to establish cease-fires under fragile peace agreements (as detailed in Table 2), which have collapsed under renewed violence. The most violent episodes in Liberia occurred in 1990 (when UN agencies evacuated Monrovia), 1992, 1994, and in Monrovia itself, in 1996, 1998 and 2003 (when UN agencies were again evacuated from Liberia).

Table 2: Main Peace Agreements in Liberia, 1990 - 2004

Peace Agreement	Date	Implementation
Bomako	Nov/90	Led to creation of Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU) under Sawyer. Cease-fire.
Banjul	Dec/90	Cease-fire.
Yamoussoukro I, II, III	June-Oct/91	Political stalemate.
Yamoussoukro IV	Oct/91	NPFL and IGNU cease-fire observed until Sept/92.
Cotonou	July/93	Cease-fire signed by NPFL, ULIMO and IGNU. To be enforced by ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and monitored by the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). Process involved Transitional Government to elections. Cease-fire observed until Aug/94.
Virginia (Liberia)	March/94	Set up Liberian National Transitional Government.
"Akosombo Amendment"	Sept/94	Calls for formation of new five-member Council of State to replace IGNU. AFL, NPFL and ULIMO reaffirmed the Cotonou Agreement and aimed to give



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		factions more control of Transitional Government and to facilitate disarmament. Not welcomed by civil population. Amendment rejected by IGNU, which extends its own mandate until mid-1995.
Ghana	Dec/94	Cease-fire and installation of new transitional Government until handing over to an elected Government in Jan. 1996; cease-fire short-lived, signatories did not agree on composition and leadership of transitional Government.
Abuja Accord	Nov/95	The United Nations Observer Mission (UNOMIL) commences deployment. December 1995 heavy fighting breaks out in Tubmanburg between ULIMO and ECOMOG. April 1996, heavy fighting occurs in Monrovia between NPFL and ULIMO, with widespread looting, and severe damage to major sections of Monrovia. May 1996 ECOMOG redeployed in Monrovia and many faction fighters leave city, though ULIMO refuse to comply with agreement.
Amended Abuja Accord	Aug/96	Provides for cease-fire, disarmament and demobilization by early 1997, to be followed by elections.
Charles Taylor government installed	July/97	Despite serious cease-fire violations and incomplete disarmament process, elections take place. Taylor's National Patriotic Party wins 75 per cent of vote. In 2002 and 2003 UN imposes sanctions on Taylor, accusing him of supporting rebels in neighbouring countries. LURD and MODEL launch attacks on Government forces. In June 2003 LURD attacks Monrovia
Accra Peace Talks	June - Oct./2003	Taylor relinquishes presidency to Vice-President Blah in August, and leaves Liberia. Accra conference establishes National Transitional Government of Liberia, comprising representatives from LURD, MODEL and NPP, under presidency Charles Bryant. Elections scheduled for 2005. UNSC Resolution 1509 establishes UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

Based on WFP (1996b)

Hopes for stability increased with the election of Charles Taylor as president in 1997. Political stability however proved to be short-lived. Taylor was accused of meddling in the affairs of neighbouring countries to extend his control over illegal diamond mining activities. In May 2001, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions on the Taylor Government, renewed one year later as punishment for the Liberian leadership's alleged abuses. This drove away foreign investment and reduced donor confidence in the country. By mid-2001, Liberia had erupted once again into full-scale civil conflict.



By mid-2003, rebels from two different factions - LURD and MODEL - were attacking Taylor's army holed up in Monrovia. Many of the battles targeted the camps for displaced people on the outskirts of Monrovia, forcing thousands of people to flee further into the city in search of relief assistance and protection. The city's population tripled to more than 1.3 million. An additional stream of Liberian refugees fled into Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire.

A combination of international pressure and sustained rebel attacks finally forced Taylor to step down as President in August 2003. Peace talks that commenced in Accra in June 2003 finally established a National Transitional Government in October. UN Security Council Resolution 1509 established a multinational UN peace-keeping force to help maintain the peace and establish a secure environment to enable aid agencies to provide humanitarian relief to the civilian population.

1.2 Sierra Leone

Conflict in Sierra Leone commenced in March 1991 when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Foday Sankoh and alleged to be affiliated with the NPFL forces in Liberia, launched attacks in South-Eastern Sierra Leone in an attempt to overthrow the Government of the All People's Congress (APC), headed by former President Joseph Momoh. Over the next 10 years, civil conflict racked the country. Table 3 lists the major events in the Sierra Leone conflict:

Table 3: Key Events in the Sierra Leone Conflict

Date	Event
1989	RUF established
1991	RUF invades Sierra Leone from Liberia
1992	Coup by Valentine Strasser overthrows APC and establishes National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). War with RUF continues.
April 1995	Strasser recruits foreign mercenaries in battle with RUF
December 1993	NPRC regain control of RUF areas in the Southern and Eastern parts of the country and announce a unilateral cease-fire. Notwithstanding this, attacks on towns, villages and major highways escalate and spread throughout the country.
January 1996	NPRC overtaken by a military coup led by Brigadier Julius Maada Bio, the previous deputy chairman of the Strasser Government. Bio promises general elections.
March 1996	Tejan Kabbah elected president - RUF does not participate
June 1996	Peace talks between Kabbah and RUF begin in Abidjan
November 1996	Kabbah and Sankoh sign Abidjan Peace Treaty
March 1997	Sankoh arrested in Nigeria
May 1997	Coup by Johnny Paul Koroma establishes Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and enters into alliance with RUF. Kabbah flees to Conakry.
June 1997	ECOWAS instigates boycott against AFRC/RUF junta



December 1997	AFRC/RUF junta agrees peace treaty in Conakry, promising to hand power back to Kabbah in March 1998
February 1998	ECOMOG attacks junta headquarters in Freetown. AFRC/RUF junta falls.
March 1998	Kabbah reinstalled as president
October 1998	Sankoh condemned to death; 24 junta loyalists executed
December 1998	RUF begins new offensive
January 1999	RUF enters Freetown, with many atrocities against civilians.
February 1999	ECOMOG repulses RUF from Freetown. New peace negotiations begin in Lome.
July 1999	Kabbah and Sankoh sign Lome Peace Treaty. Sankoh released from gaol, and amnesty proclaimed for AFRC/RUF junta collaborators.
October 1999	Sankoh returns to Freetown as vice president. UNSC Resolution 1270 establishes UNAMSIL peacekeeping force. By end February 2000, 25,000 UN peacekeepers are in country.
May 2000	RUF rebels take hundreds of UN peacekeepers hostage. Sankoh flees from Freetown, but is arrested a few weeks later.
January 2002	After slow start, disarmament process reaches final stage
February 2002	Government and RUF declare civil war over.
May 2002	UNAMSIL oversees peaceful Parliamentary and Presidential elections that see Kabbah win 70 percent of vote and his Sierra Leone People's Party win 83 of the 124 Parliamentary seats.

Based on Voeten (2002)

In 2002, a fragile peace was established, which has become more secure with the deployment of UN peacekeepers and the holding of Presidential elections.

1.3 Guinea

Since 1990, Guinea has been hosting thousands of refugees fleeing the continuing violence in Liberia and Sierra Leone, but managed to avoid becoming directly involved in the conflict until early 2001. In that year, Sierra Leone (and possibly also Liberian) fighters made a series of major military incursions into the Parrot's Beak region (called "Languette" in Guinea), an area favoured by fighters as a short cut to access other parts of Sierra Leone. These attacks displaced both local populations and refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia. Guinean troops managed to re-establish control of the region by end-2001, and by end-2002 most displaced people had returned to their homes. However the security situation in border areas with Liberia and Sierra Leone remained volatile in 2004.

1.4 Côte d'Ivoire

Conflict broke out in Côte d'Ivoire in September 2002 as a result of an attempted *coup d'état*-turned-rebellion. The crisis resulted in the country being divided into roughly three political



areas: the North, controlled by rebels of the Patriotic Front of Côte d'Ivoire (MPCI), and kept under partial economic blockade by the Government; the South, which remained under Government control; and the Western zone, which is in a state of sporadic chaos with various factions fighting each other. The two main rebel movements of the West (MPIGO and MJP, both of whom are allied with MPCI) are reportedly assisted by Liberian army units, conscripted Liberian refugees, and even by elements of the Sierra Leone RUF. Liberian elements, including refugees, are also claimed to be included in a recently formed "loyalist militia" in the West called LIMA, which battles against MPIGO.

In January 2003, the Marcoussis-Linas peace accord established a French military contingent, complemented by a multinational force from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), to help maintain a fragile peace. In March 2003, the signatories of the Marcoussis accord reached consensus on the formation of a Government of National Reconciliation. However, this consensus broke down in March 2004, when the main opposition parties withdrew from the National Reconciliation Government, precipitating another round of political crises in the country.

2. THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

2.1 The Human Impact of the Conflicts

The conflict in the region, particularly in Liberia and Sierra Leone, has been accompanied by horrendous atrocities against civilians, including mass killings, mutilations, female and male rape, forced abductions, indiscriminate destruction and looting. Not surprisingly, a major feature of the crisis has been the large-scale displacement of civilians, often many times over.

Of the pre-war Liberia population of approximately 2.5 million, it is estimated that between 700,000 and 800,000 sought refuge in Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone, and up to one million others have been displaced internally, mostly to Monrovia. The cyclical nature of the violence has meant that many people have been displaced a number of times - a 1998 study for the Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) claimed that much of the civilian population of Liberia retained a flight mentality, and were ready to flee at any slight change in their immediate security (Messick, 1998).

In Sierra Leone, an estimated 1.5 million people (out of a population of four million) abandoned their homes, seeking safety in the major towns or in Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and even Liberia. The violence in Sierra Leone also forced some 125,000 Liberian refugees who had sought sanctuary in the country to flee once again - by 1996 only approximately 3,000 Liberian refugees remained in Sierra Leone, although new waves of refugees arrived as the conflict in Liberia intensified in the course of 2002/2003 - Guinea received 33,000 new refugees from Liberia between April and July, 2003.

The political instability in Côte d'Ivoire since 2002 has led to additional population movements - more than one million people have been displaced, including 95,000 people who have sought asylum in Liberia.

From the beginning of the conflict, the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone pursued a liberal "open-door" policy in providing asylum to refugees from, first, Liberia, and later Sierra Leone by permitting spontaneous settlement in local communities with few or no restrictions on refugee farming and employment. The close ethnic linkages between some



refugee groups and the host populations (particularly in the Guinea forest region and in Côte d'Ivoire) facilitated this policy. This "open-door" policy has had implications for nature and complexity of humanitarian assistance programmes, including targeting, registration, nutritional status, ration levels, distribution of humanitarian assistance and impact on the local environment.

With the establishment of peace in Sierra Leone in 2002, most Sierra Leone refugees have been repatriated - more than 52,000 have been repatriated from Guinea alone. By mid-2004, all remaining Sierra Leone refugees in Guinea, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire should be repatriated or resettled. However, in March 2004, Guinea and Sierra Leone continued to host an estimated 200,000 refugees from Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire.

2.2 The Economic Impact

As well as the immense human cost, the regional conflict has also taken a heavy economic toll. The national economies of both Liberia and Sierra Leone ground to a virtual standstill during the 1990s, and have yet to recover. In both countries, effective unemployment stands as high as 90 percent. The political turmoil in Côte d'Ivoire has had major ramifications for West African countries that were highly dependent on Côte d'Ivoire's economic performance.

It is estimated that some 75 percent of Liberia's pre-war health facilities and 50-70 percent of schools have been destroyed by the conflict or are no longer functioning. In Sierra Leone, an estimated 340,000 homes were destroyed during the war, along with most schools and health facilities. The 2003 Sierra Leone VAM study (WFP, 2003o) found a close relationship between being food secure and level of education. But education facilities in the region are generally poor. In Sierra Leone, the 2003 VAM study found that in nearly every community, the people indicated that the distance to a functioning school hampered access to primary education for rural children. The communities expressed the desire for new school buildings and furniture as well as qualified teachers. The top reasons given by community leaders as to why children did not attend school were: lack of money (75 percent), distance from school (40 percent), children being used for work at home (29 percent), lack of parental interest (24 percent) and inadequate facilities (21 percent).

Guinea and Sierra Leone rank near the bottom of UNDP's Human Development Index; because of the on-going conflict, UNDP has not measured human development in Liberia in recent years, but is certainly similarly low.

It is estimated that nine out of ten people in Liberia live on less than US\$1 per day - and half live on less than US\$0.50. According to the World Bank, over 80 percent of the Sierra Leone population lives below the poverty line and life expectancy at birth is 46 years. Sierra Leone has the highest under-5 mortality rate in the world.

2.3 The Food Security Situation

Political instability and insecurity have been and continue to be the single most important cause of hunger and food insecurity in the region. The improved political stability in Guinea and Sierra Leone since 2002 has increased the level of national food security in both countries - food production in Guinea returned to normal levels in 2002, and overall cereal self-reliance in Sierra Leone increased from 30 percent in 2001 to 60 percent in 2003. A 2003 VAM study in Sierra Leone (WFP, 2003o) found that more than 70 percent of households interviewed reported that



both children and adults had eaten two meals in the previous day, the norm among rural farming households². According to the survey palm oil was eaten daily by 80 percent of the households, followed by fish (77 percent), rice (76 percent) and vegetables (45 percent). Sixteen percent of households ate cassava (the traditional carbohydrate staple of the region) every other day.

The Sierra Leone VAM study found cassava was the most widely grown crop, followed by upland rice, groundnuts, swamp rice and oil palm. Cassava is an important 'safety net' crop throughout West Africa, although highest yields are obtained after it has grown for three years.

The study found the main constraints to agricultural production, in order of importance, were:

- Lack of sufficient seeds for planting - in 2002, only 14 percent of households used seed from their own stock for upland rice production, while for lowland rice the figure was only 9 percent.
- Insect or pest damage to crops
- Insufficient labour available
- Lack of good agricultural tools
- Lack of fertilizer
- Household debt
- Poor quality seeds for planting.

Access to food in the region is hampered by the underdeveloped market system and physical isolation. Much of the rural infrastructure is in a shambles due to the years of conflict and neglect. Most roads are in disrepair and often become impassable for months during the rainy season, leaving communities separated from markets, schools and health care (it is estimated that more than 60 percent of roads in Sierra Leone are impassable during the rainy season).

Household food security during the agricultural lean season - roughly May to September - remains precarious throughout the region. The food security of populations in border areas and areas surrounding refugee camps has sometimes been adversely affected by the transit and influx of displaced people or the protracted presence of refugees.

The last national nutrition and health survey in Guinea³ (conducted in 2002) estimated acute malnutrition⁴ and severe acute malnutrition rates (expressed in Z-Scores) as respectively 9,1 percent and 2,1 percent (Unicef, 2003). The last national nutrition survey in Liberia was in 2000, when the prevalence of wasting was assessed as 5,9 percent.

In Sierra Leone, the prevalence of wasting at a national level decreased from 9.9 percent to 5,3 percent between 2000 (MICS survey) and 2003 (WFP, 2003o). Nutrition surveys conducted in 2002 showed a significant difference between the prevalence of wasting in Kono and Kailahun, the two districts that received 80 percent of all returnees, and the other districts - rates of wasting and severe wasting in Kailahun District were respectively 14,6 percent and 1,1 percent, compared to Tonkolili District, with an acute malnutrition rate of 5,6 percent and severe acute

² The 2003 JAM (WFP/UNHCR, 2003, p.11) noted that lack of staple food was a relatively minor underlying cause of acute malnutrition in Sierra Leone.

³ *The results of the nutrition surveys consulted during the mission are compiled by country in Annex VI.*

⁴ Acute Malnutrition or Wasting is the result of a recent failure to receive adequate nutrition and may be affected by acute illness, especially diarrhoea.



malnutrition rate of 0,6 percent. The under-five mortality rates in Kono (2.71/10,000/day) and Kailahun (2.3/10,000/day) are above the alert threshold⁵.

In all three countries, acute malnutrition rates are highest among children aged 6-29 months, suggesting a major problem with local weaning practices.

The national rate of chronic malnutrition (stunting)⁶ in Guinea was 26 percent in 2002. In Sierra Leone, stunting increased from 33,8 percent to 40,5 percent between 2000 and 2003. In Liberia, the prevalence of stunting was estimated to 36,2 percent (WFP, 2003j). In both Sierra Leone and Liberia, chronic malnutrition rates are much higher than the cut-off point of 30 percent, used to indicate a severe situation in African countries.

According to Unicef (2003), approximately 52 percent of babies in Sierra Leone are born with a low birth-weight (less than 2,5 kilos). This percentage is much higher than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa (15 percent) and is a major concern in a country that has the highest under-five mortality rate in the world. In November 2003, VAM survey in Liberia, 26 percent of the mothers indicated that their children were born with birth-weights (WFP, 2003). The same survey revealed an under-five mortality rate of 1.13/10,000/day among the residents of Monrovia.

The main cause of under-five morbidity and mortality is malaria. Acute respiratory infections are the second cause of morbidity and mortality, followed by diarrhoea and intestinal parasites and diseases.

Diarrhoea and cholera are most probably related to the poor access to safe drinking water and lack of good sanitation facilities – 30 percent of the children and 25 percent of the women in the Sierra Leone VAM study had experienced at least one episode of diarrhoea in the previous two weeks (WFP, 2003o). The study showed very strong relationships between maternal and child nutrition and the use of safe drinking water and access to good sanitation. Only one-third of the households had good sanitation, and less than 30 percent of the households were using safe sources of drinking water.

The major medical problems associated with diet in the region are a high prevalence of goitre among the general population and high rates of anaemia among women and girls.

HIV/AIDS is potentially a major threat in the West Africa Coastal region, especially with the continued conflict and displacement, which contribute to sexual abuse and the spread of sexually-transmitted infections. Very little firm information is available on the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, but estimates range from 2,8 percent in Guinea to approximately 5 percent in both Sierra Leone and Liberia. Throughout the region, WFP has used food distributions to promote HIV/AIDS awareness and prevention among beneficiaries, as well as supporting awareness seminars for WFP and partner staff.

3. TERMS OF REFERENCE AND METHODOLOGY FOR THE EVALUATION

The overall Terms of Reference for the evaluation (see Annex I) were to:

⁵ 2/10,000/day

⁶ Chronic Malnutrition or Stunting is the result of an inadequate intake of food over a long period and may be exacerbated by chronic illness.



- Evaluate the PRROs' effectiveness, or achieved results, against the objectives at the outcome level, with references to the output level when necessary.
- Examine the efficiency of implementation and processes (including managerial issues) and identify potential drawbacks in achieving effectiveness.
- Establish the advantages and disadvantages of the regional approach for PRROs and indicate where the added value lies.

The original Terms of Reference also included a review of the linkages between West Africa Coastal Regional PRROs and Côte d'Ivoire regional EMOPs. Unfortunately the arrival of the mission in Abidjan coincided with major anti-Government demonstrations and political turmoil, which made field trips impossible⁷. Consequently the mission was curtailed in Côte d'Ivoire, and this part of the Terms of Reference was cancelled.

The mission spent a total of 35 days in the field, visiting five countries (for a detailed itinerary, see Annex II):

In each country, the mission held meetings with WFP professional staff and representatives from implementing partners, Government agencies, other UN agencies, donors and NGOs (see Annex III). The primary purpose of these meetings was to obtain relevant background information on the context in which the WFP operations were implemented, and to identify major issues requiring further investigation.

Because the time spent in each country was severely restricted, visits to project sites were inevitably limited. Visits to project sites focused on determining whether appropriate systems were in place to properly and effectively implement and monitor WFP-supported activities. If systems were lacking at one project site, it was reasonable to assume that they were also lacking at other sites. Focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews were conducted with beneficiaries and communities in the field, to complement observations of conditions and activities in camps and project sites.

Particular effort was made to obtain the perspective of beneficiaries, especially given the general impression of the mission that their voices have been missing from much of the analysis of their problems.

The mission gave strong emphasis on trying to obtain quantifiable data, supported by documentation, to assess the effectiveness and efficiency of WFP interventions⁸. The extent that this was feasible depended on the availability and validity of relevant studies in each country⁹. The data used are mainly secondary, drawn from reports made available by WFP, other UN agencies, NGOs and government sources¹⁰.

⁷ The mission was confined to its hotel for security reasons for more than four of the 6 days spent in Abidjan.

⁸ A draft framework was prepared by the mission (see Annex IV) as a means to assist in the identification and collection of appropriate quantifiable data. In the event, the framework was of little practical assistance. The collection of quantifiable data depended on whether appropriate studies had been conducted, or systems had been established, to collect and collate data on the effectiveness of the WFP interventions.

⁹ And whether they could be retrieved from the often chaotic office filing systems.

¹⁰ The 1996 evaluation (WFP, 1996b) noted that one of the recurring themes of that evaluation was the lack of consistent and reliable data, a failing that had been a major constraint for all aspects of the operation. The current mission concurs with this point.



Prior to the field trip, a questionnaire (see Annex V) was distributed to the Country Directors of each of the four countries visited, as well as the Country Directors of Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mali (these last three countries were included in the regional Côte d'Ivoire EMOP). Replies were received from every country apart from Mali. The information in the questionnaires complemented the field visits of the mission.

The mission found much variation from case to case, from time to time, and from country to country. This operation has been exceedingly complex from the start. The "regional picture" of the operation often gives a generalized account. On the ground, striking diversity is often more apparent. However, there are elements in common between the three countries most involved in the West Africa coastal PRRO, and this report focuses on those. However, because this mission report emphasizes the commonality of issues, it risks wrongly generalizing from unique and perhaps dated instances (for example at one time, and in one country). The 1996 evaluation noted (WFP, 1996b p.18): "Particular effort has been taken to avoid giving a wrongly generalized picture, but there remains need for caution nonetheless." This sentiment can be no better expressed.

Finally, the present mission wishes to stress in the strongest possible terms that it is entirely sympathetic to the difficulties - and indeed dangers - that WFP and other humanitarian staff face, working under exceedingly difficult circumstances. And it wishes to place on record its grateful thanks to all those who assisted the mission during the country visits.

4. SUMMARY REVIEW OF WFP'S RESPONSE, 1990 - 2004

WFP assistance to the four countries most affected by the coastal West Africa regional crisis (Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone) was initiated in early 1990 through a series of short-term country-specific emergency operations.

The unpredictability of population movements (including frequent cross-border movements) required constant adjustments to food delivery plans and distributions in order to reach the beneficiaries at their locations, and made the overall operation increasingly complex almost from the beginning. As it became apparent that the Liberia crisis was unlikely to be quickly resolved, a regional "umbrella" approach was introduced in the second half of 1990, under a regional Emergency Operation (EMOP).

This was followed by two short expansions, each recorded under one regional number, in spite of being split into various country operations to register food, cash and other resource allocations¹¹. By mid-1991, the beneficiary figure had reached over one million people. In mid-1991, a regional Protracted Refugee and Displaced Persons Operation (PRO LIR 4604.00) was approved¹², followed by seven expansions¹³. The regional approach adopted in 1990 has continued up to the present. (As well as the four main affected countries, the regional PROs/PRROs also included 4,000 Liberian refugees in Nigeria, assisted by WFP up to end-1994, and 14,000 Liberian refugees in Ghana, assisted up to 2000).

¹¹ Therefore, EMOP LIR 4453, EMOP GUI 4454, EMOP COI 4455 and EMOP SIL 4456 were the project numbers for all recording purposes.

¹² The Protracted Refugee and Displaced Persons subset (PRO) was established in 1990 in order to provide more secure food supply to longer-term refugees and displaced persons. Protracted refugee or displaced persons operations were normally established in cases where food aid continued to be required one year after an emergency erupted.

¹³ The seventh, and last, expansion under this project number was the both first Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) and the first West Africa Coastal Regional operation.



A similar regional approach was adopted in the early stages of the Sierra Leone crisis - although projects were registered under Sierra Leone, food allocations were made both within Sierra Leone and across the border to Sierra Leone refugees in Guinea. In 1999 the two regional operations (for Liberia and Sierra Leone) were combined into a single West Africa Coastal regional operation (PRRO 4604.07).

In 2000 the West Africa regional operation was renumbered (PRRO 6271). It was then renumbered again in 2001 - PRRO 10064.0 (stocks remaining from PRRO 6271 at the end of 2001 were carried over to 2002 and distributed under PRRO 10064.0). Two expansions to this last project were approved, in 2002 and 2003 respectively. In 2003 all these last three projects (PRRO 10064.0, PRRO 10064.01 and PRRO 10064.02) were active, with distributions of food from each one.

The Côte d'Ivoire EMOP was also initiated as a regional response. Côte d'Ivoire regional EMOP 10244.0 commenced in November 2002 initially for three months, but was later extended to end-January 2004. The EMOP was resourced at 65 percent. Côte d'Ivoire regional EMOP 10244.1 was jointly approved by WFP and FAO in May 2003 as a regional emergency operation, providing food assistance mostly for beneficiaries in Côte d'Ivoire, but also for returnees in Burkina Faso, Ghana and Mali. Initially covering the period May - December 2003, it was extended in time to 31 December 2004. By end-January 2004, it was resourced at 37 percent.

Table 4: WFP Assistance to Refugees and Displaced Persons in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, 1990 - 2004

Project	Planned Number of Beneficiaries	Planned Duration (days)	Date of Approved	Purpose
Côte d'Ivoire EMOP 4257	45,000	90	29/01/90	Assistance to Liberian refugees
Côte d'Ivoire EMOP 4257.01	70,000	120	12/04/90	Assistance to Liberian refugees
Guinea EMOP 4289	80,000	90	02/03/90	Assistance to Liberian refugees
Liberia EMOP 4309	67,500	180	29/03/90	Assistance to displaced people
Guinea EMOP 4289.01	100,000	90	04/07/90	Assistance to Liberian refugees
Sierra Leone EMOP 4422	20,000	90	04/07/90	Assistance to Liberian refugees
Liberia Reg. EMOP 4452	380,000	150	01/08/90	Assistance to displaced people, returnees and refugees in Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone
Liberia Reg. EMOP 4452.01	710,000	180	08/10/90	Assistance to Liberian refugees and vulnerable displaced in Liberia, Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone



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Liberia Reg. EMOP 4452.02	1,050,000	180	15/03/91	Assistance to Liberian refugees and displaced people
Liberia Reg. PRO 4604	1,350,000	365	27/05/91	Assistance to Liberian refugees and displaced people
Liberia Reg. PRO 4604.01	2,130,000	365	29/05/92	Assistance to Liberian and Sierra Leone refugees and displaced people
Liberia Reg. PRO 4604.02	2,028,000	365	04/06/93	Assistance to Liberian Sierra Leone refugees
Liberia Reg. PRO 4604.03	2,535,000	365	26/05/94	Assistance to Liberian Sierra Leone refugees
Liberia Reg. PRO 4604.04	2,556,940	365	11/1995	Assistance to Liberian Sierra Leone refugees
Sierra Leone EMOP 5767			18/03/96	Assistance to Sierra Leone displaced people
Liberia Reg. PRO 4604.05	1,074,000	365	23/10/96	Relief and rehabilitation to Liberian refugees
Sierra Leone EMOP 5767.01			22/01/97	Assistance to war-affected in Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone PRO 5802			25/03/97	Assistance to displaced people and returnees in Sierra Leone
Liberia Reg. PRO 4604.06	1,059,000	540	22/10/97	Assistance to Liberian IDPs and Liberian refugees
Guinea EMOP 6032			20/08/98	Assistance to Sierra Leone refugees
Guinea EMOP 6312	50,000	365 (later extended by 180)	23/11/00	Assistance to displaced Guineans
West Africa Coastal Reg. PRRO 4604.07	650,000	365 (later extended by 180)	14/05/99	Assistance to refugees, returnees and internally displaced in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia and Ghana
West Africa Coastal Reg. PRRO 6271.0	965,000	365	26/10/00	Assistance to refugees, returnees and internally displaced in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia



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Sierra Leone EMOP 6187	45,000	180 (later extended by 550 days)	05/00	Assistance to disarmament & demobilisation
West Africa Coastal Reg. PRRO 10064.0	740,000	365 (later extended by 365)	24/10/2001	Assistance to refugees, returnees and internally displaced in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia
West Africa Coastal Reg. PRRO 10064.01	747,540 (plus 50,000 under the contingency provision)	365 (later extended by 270)	25/10/2002	Assistance to refugees, returnees and internally displaced in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia
West Africa Coastal Reg. PRRO 10064.02	752,000 (plus 150,000 under the contingency provision)	365	14/08/2003	Assistance to refugees, returnees and internally displaced in Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia
Côte d'Ivoire Reg. EMOP 10244.0	94,000 (later increased to 175,500)	90 (later extended by 365)	31/10/02	Assistance to those affected by civil strife in Côte d'Ivoire.
Côte d'Ivoire Reg. EMOP 10244.1	863,600	240 (later extended by 365)	14/05/03	Assistance to those affected by civil strife in Côte d'Ivoire.

The rationale for a regional approach (rather than for a series of country-specific responses) was that this would facilitate the planning of WFP assistance - a single overall budget was expected to increase flexibility and allow rapid regional and local decision-making in the allocation and reallocation of food and non-food resources according to the pace and extent of population movement and to changing needs. At all times the operation has included assistance for internally displaced persons, refugees, returnees and war-affected host populations within the four most affected countries.

Initially, the WFP Country Director in Côte d'Ivoire had the responsibility to coordinate the regional food relief operation. In 2002, with the decentralisation of the Regional Bureau (ODD) to Dakar, this responsibility moved to ODD. In late 2003, a Regional Humanitarian Co-ordination and Support Office (RHCSO) was established in Abidjan to support both the West Africa Coastal Regional PRRO and the Côte d'Ivoire regional EMOP. Ten percent of the combined DSC for both the West Africa Coastal Regional PRRO and the Côte d'Ivoire Regional EMOP is allocated to pay the costs of the RHCSO.

At the country level, the WFP Country Directors are responsible for coordinating and implementing in-country relief and recovery activities.

Up until 1994, rice was the main cereal commodity distributed in the regional operations. Due to the lack of availability of rice from the major donor, bulgur wheat was introduced in Sierra Leone in June 1994 and in Liberia in 1995 (the food basket for Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire included maize meal in lieu of rice). Bulgur wheat was chosen over other commodities (e.g. maize meal) because it had been successfully used by WFP as a food-for-work commodity in



Sierra Leone before the war¹⁴. Initially, there were strong reactions to the introduction of bulgur wheat to Liberia, especially in Monrovia. However the replacement of high value rice with less valuable cereals reduced the rate of diversion and increased the security of civilian beneficiaries vis-à-vis combatants, in as much as bulgur wheat does not have the market value of rice (a pattern was observed in Liberia that civilians were frequently attacked by armed gangs immediately after food distributions). Although bulgur wheat is now more acceptable to beneficiaries, it remains a less preferred commodity compared with locally produced commodities such as rice and cassava.

Up until the mid-1990s, WFP's main focus had been on free food distribution. WFP staff were aware that a transition from relief to recovery would eventually be required. However, opportunities to undertake meaningful recovery activities were severely limited by the prevailing security situation, although various attempts were made to initiate recovery interventions wherever and whenever possible (WFP, 1996b).

In 1996, WFP undertook an evaluation of its experience with the Liberian regional PRO up to that date (WFP 1996a and 1996b). The evaluation concluded that crisis management had been the order of the day and that the immediate short-term approach had prevailed to that point. It recommended the phasing down of general food distribution, and urged WFP to identify opportunities for recovery activities. It also recommended that WFP should introduce beneficiary targeting on the basis of improved data, including data on the socio-economic status, coping mechanisms and overall local economic conditions.

General food distributions were progressively phased down following the 1996 evaluation, and by 1997 had been largely replaced by targeted food distribution programmes. Recovery components of the operation were also introduced at the same time - predating the introduction of the PRRO category by WFP in 1999, which emphasized the need to initiate a true transition to recovery activities and move away from relief food assistance (WFP, 1999)¹⁵.

By 1999, the number of Liberian refugees supported in neighbouring countries had decreased to less than half a million and repatriation programmes were commenced to encourage their return to Liberia. UNHCR also conducted household surveys in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea to measure the level of self-reliance amongst Liberian refugees.

The renewal of conflict in both Liberia and Sierra Leone in 2000 and 2001 (which continued in Liberia into late 2003), along with military incursions by some of the Liberian and Sierra Leone fighters into Guinea, curtailed the expansion of recovery activities and emphasis switched once again to the provision of relief assistance.

The improved peace and stability in Sierra Leone after 2002 gave opportunities once again to develop more extensive recovery strategies. Resumption of recovery activities in Guinea was hampered by the lack of effective implementing partners, coupled with the influx of large numbers of Liberian refugees in 2002-2003, although by end-2003/early 2004 emergency school feeding was being expanded throughout communities in border areas. However in 2003/2004

¹⁴ In November 1992 a Joint Food Needs Assessment mission noted that Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in Liberia was distributing bulgur wheat and described it as a good substitute.

¹⁵ The categorisation of recovery activities was not standard between countries or over time - supplementary feeding and nutrition interventions were previously categorized as recovery activities, whereas in the latest PRROs they are categorized as relief activities. In the latest PRROs the refugee component is also included under relief.



general food distributions still accounted for some 60 percent of WFP commodities provided under the PRRO.

In all three countries, WFP support to refugees has mainly consisted of General Food Distributions - up until 2004 only very limited efforts had been made to encourage refugees to become more self-reliant¹⁶. The latest phase of the PRRO (10064.2) gives increased emphasis to supporting self-reliance activities for refugees.

To date, there has been substantial disparity in the level of assistance provided to host populations compared to that provided to camp inhabitants. Emergency School Feeding (ESF) has been the main intervention to assist the host population, especially in Guinea in 2003/2004. Some limited short-term Food For Work (FFW) and Food For Training (FFT) has been attempted in Sierra Leone. The latest phase of the PRRO (10064.2) gives greater attention to providing support to host communities affected by the movements of refugees or displaced people.

The WFP food aid operations in the region have been supported by a series of WFP Special Operations to provide enhanced logistic capacity to the humanitarian community. In 2004, the Special Operation supported a passenger air service to all four countries - Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire – for humanitarian staff.

5. DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION OF WEST AFRICA COASTAL REGIONAL PRROs (10064.0, 10064.01, 10064.02)

Food was distributed under three different phases of the regional PRRO in 2003 - PRRO 10064.0, PRRO 10064.1 and PRRO 10064.2¹⁷.

The first of this series of PRROs (10064.0) was approved at the third Executive Board session in October 2001, initially for 12 months (January - December 2002), although delays in resourcing commodities meant that more than one third of the food budgeted for this operation (37,000 tons) was not distributed until 2003. The total approved budget was \$62.4 million, of which 85percent had been received by end 2003.

PRRO 10064.1 was approved at the Third Executive Board session in 2002, again initially for 12 months (January - December 2003), although the operation is now expected to continue until end-September 2004. The approved budget for this PRRO was \$62.5 million, and by end-2003 the PRRO had been fully resourced.

PRRO 10064.2 was officially approved at the third session of the Executive Board in 2003, again for 12 months (January - December 2004). However, exceptionally this PRRO was released in WINGS in August 2003 (i.e. prior to its approval by the Executive Board in October) to accommodate new contributions that were urgently required to meet the suddenly expanded needs caused by the extensive conflict in Liberia in the summer¹⁸. The approved budget for this PRRO was \$74.5 million, of which 40percent had been received by end-2003.

¹⁶ A 2003 study by the Guinea Government, FAO and the European Commission (FAO, 2003) found that 40 percent of refugee families in Kola camp in Guinea had access to agricultural land during the 2002–2003 planting season and produced enough rice to cover their cereal requirements for two months. Interviews and focus group discussions held with refugees during the 2003 WFP/UNHCR/donor JAM (WFP/UNHCR, 2003) suggested that the refugees themselves gave self-reliance (especially rice cultivation) top priority.

¹⁷ COMPAS reports indicate that small amounts of food were also distributed under the previous PRRO 06271.0 in 2003. The 2002 SPR for PRRO 0627.0 states that stocks were distributed under the framework of PRRO 10064.0.



5.1 Operational Purpose

Each of the three PRROs had broadly the same operational purpose:

- To save lives by providing relief assistance.
- To contribute to longer-term recovery prospects.

This was spelled out in most detail in PRRO 10064.0, as:

- To provide relief assistance to the most vulnerable victims of civil strife, new refugees and displaced people.
- To facilitate the return of refugees and displaced people to their place of origin once the situation had stabilised.
- To support their reintegration and recovery
- To facilitate the rehabilitation of the social and productive infrastructure, particularly schools.
- To improve household food security.¹⁹

In all three PRROs, relief activities were defined as:

- General food distribution
- Curative feeding, including
 - Therapeutic feeding
 - Supplementary feeding
 - Preventive MCH feeding

Recovery activities (described in the documentation as "safety nets") included the following activities:

- Emergency school feeding
- Food for Training
- Food for Work
- Food for Agriculture (seed protection)
- Institutional feeding of vulnerable groups²⁰.

In general, the project documentation was weak in terms of the specific needs of the affected populations, and how the different proposed interventions would address those needs - specific descriptions of objectives for each activity, implementation strategies, performance indicators and expected results were all lacking²¹. Only PRRO 10064.2 included a logframe analysis²².

5.2 Planned Beneficiaries Caseload and Food Requirements

¹⁸ In-kind donations typically take 6-8 months to arrive in the West Africa region. WFP utilized IRA funds through PRRO 10064.2 in the summer of 2003, most probably because this was the quickest way to ensure expeditious delivery. US contributions for PRRO 10064.2 were also received later in 2003.

¹⁹ Although not specifically mentioned in the PRRO documentation, distributions were made in 2003/2004 for disarmament and reintegration programmes in Liberia. In the SPRs, this programme seems to have been included under the General Food Distribution.

²⁰ Also support to returnees, although this was often overlooked in the PRRO documentation.

²¹ It does not help that the PRRO documentation is prepared in April/May of the year before the operation is due to commence. As a consequence, each PRRO document is in effect trying to foresee events 18 months ahead (i.e. to the December of the following year, when the operation would normally be expected to terminate). In a region as volatile as West Africa coastal, this is an almost impossible task.



The regional PRROs focused on three countries: Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone²³. Table 5 shows the planned beneficiary caseloads by country for the main types of interventions for each of the PRROs, while Table 6 shows the planned food requirements:

Table 5: Planned Beneficiary Caseloads by Country

INTERVENTION TYPE	PRRO 10064.0	PRRO 10064.1 ¹	PRRO 10064.2
Liberia			
General distribution	70,000	145,000	181,500
Curative interventions	9,000	9,000	22,600
Safety net	33,000	27,500	100,300
Sierra Leone			
General distribution	190,500	50,000	113,000
Curative interventions	33,000	26,000	9,000
Safety net	283,500	308,500	153,000
Guinea			
General distribution	180,000	90,000	95,500
Curative interventions	14,000	8,830	6,200
Safety net	22,000	49,000	71,000
Contingency provision		50,000	150,000
Total	835 000	789 430	902 100

¹ Plus 25,600 beneficiaries in Côte d'Ivoire, of whom 20,000 are General Distribution and 5,000 are safety net.

Table 6: Planned Food Requirements by Country (Metric Tons)

INTERVENTION TYPE	PRRO 10064.0 ¹	PRRO 10064.1 ¹	PRRO 10064.2
LIBERIA			
General distribution		27,448	36,768
Curative intervention		837	2,195
Safety-net		2,020	8152
Complementary rations			70 ³
Sierra Leone			
General distribution		7,112	18,845

²² The logframe was apparently done ex-poste, and thus did not influence the problem analysis and design of interventions. Within countries, programme staff have often prepared logframe analyses for specific types of activities, but decisions on the type of activities to be supported had, of course, already been taken in the preparation of the PRRO documentation, and did not develop out of the logframe analysis. Thus the approach to logframes in the region has been to justify decisions already taken, rather than to guide decisions on how best to use food aid. The thematic evaluation of the PRRO category (WFP, 2004e) noted that failure to use the logframe methodology during the design of the PRRO was a major weakness of PRROs generally.

²³ PRRO 10064.1 also included 5,000 MT (of a total 88,570 MT) for 25,600 beneficiaries in Côte d'Ivoire.



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Curative intervention		2,417	890
Safety-net		22,124	9,618
Complementary rations		107 ²	6 ³
Guinea			
General distribution		18,232	19,307
Curative intervention		746	657
Safety-net		2,480	4667
Complementary rations		25 ²	30 ³
Region			
General distribution	75 323	56,734	74,920
Curative intervention	5 537	4,048	3,742
Safety-net	24 082	27,659	22,436
Complementary rations		132 ²	106 ³
Contingency provision		10,220	22,811
Total	104 943	88 571	124 015

¹ Planned country breakdown for PRRO 10064.0 not available. The regional food requirements for the PRRO 10064.1 include 5,025 MT for Côte d'Ivoire.

² 107 MT of salt to be provided by WFP for all refugees in Sierra Leone targeted by other food pipeline agencies (WVI, CRS and CARE) and 25 MT of High Energy Biscuits (HEB) to be pre-positioned for Guinea.

³ 6 MT of salt to be provided to the other food pipeline agencies in Sierra Leone to complement their rations for 10,000 returnees and 100 MT of HEB to be pre-positioned in the region for people on the move.

Relief activities accounted for 60 percent of the total planned number of beneficiaries in PRRO 10064.0, falling to 47 percent in PRRO 10064.1 (when prospects for peace and recovery looked brightest) before increasing again to 57 percent in PRRO 10064.2²⁴. In terms of commodities, relief activities accounted for 77 percent of the planned total tonnage in PRRO 10064.0, 69 percent in PRRO 10064.1, and back to 77 percent in PRRO 10064.2.

The regional figures hide considerable country differences. Liberia accounted for less than 15 percent of the number of planned beneficiaries in PRRO 10064.0; in PRRO 10064.2 this had increased to 40 percent. Sierra Leone accounted for 61 percent of the number of planned beneficiaries in PRRO 10064.0; in PRRO 10064.2 this had fallen to 40 percent. The number of planned beneficiaries of relief assistance in Guinea halved between PRRO 10064.0 and 10064.2, while the number of planned beneficiaries of safety nets tripled²⁵.

Previously the food basket varied both by country and by type of intervention, but more recently it has been standardised across for each type of intervention²⁶, as shown in Table 7:

²⁴ Not including the contingency for 150,000 people.

²⁵ As will be discussed later, actual beneficiary numbers are considerably different to the planned numbers.

²⁶ The food basket for FFW and ESF in Guinea remained slightly different however, to remain consistent with the food basket for FFW and school feeding activities within the Guinea Country Programme.



Table 7: 2003 Food Basket by Type of Intervention

Type of intervention	Country	Total Energy (kcal/ration/day)	Type of Commodities	Quantities (g/person/day)
General distribution (full ration)	Sierra Leone Liberia Guinea	2,100	Cereals Pulses Corn Soya Blend (CSB) Vegetable Oil Salt	420 50 50 30 5
Therapeutic Feeding	Sierra Leone Liberia Guinea	725	CSB Veg. Oil Sugar	100 30 20
Supplementary Feeding & MCH	Sierra Leone Liberia Guinea	1,251	CSB Veg. Oil Sugar	250 25 20
Self-reliance and community works	Sierra Leone Liberia	Family ration - 5 persons	Cereals Veg. Oil Pulses	2,000 125 400
Self-reliance and community works	Guinea	Family ration - 5 persons	Cereals Veg. Oil Pulses	1,000 125 300
FFT	Sierra Leone Liberia	1,122	Cereals Veg. Oil Pulses	200 25 60
Emergency School Feeding	Sierra Leone	630	Cereals Veg. Oil Pulses Salt	100 20 30 5
Emergency School Feeding	Guinea Liberia	742	Cereals Veg. Oil Pulses Salt	150 10 30 5
Institutional Feeding	Sierra Leone Liberia	1,880	Cereals Veg. Oil Pulses CSB Sugar Salt	370 25 40 50 10 5

The 2001 Joint Food Assessment Mission recommended that WFP should take more pro-active measures to combat micronutrient deficiencies. Consequently, in 2002 WFP introduced iodized salt in the basic ration to combat goiter, and fortified blended food was provided to all pregnant and lactating women participating in the MCH programme as a curative and preventive measure.

In both Sierra Leone and Guinea, food commodities are delivered by WFP from the relevant ports in each country directly to Extended Delivery Points (EDPs) - in the case of refugee camps,



and in agreement with UNHCR, EDPs are usually in or close to, the refugee camps. In Liberia, because of security concerns, food is retained within the more secure warehouses in Monrovia port until taken directly to distribution sites at the time of distribution.

5.3 Planned Budget

The planned budgets for the three regional PRROs have steadily increased between 2001 and 2003 - mainly because of the increased food requirements.

Table 8: Planned Budget (million dollars)

	PRO 10064.0	PRO 10064.1	PRO 10064.2
Commodities	23.8	26.5	32.9
External Transport	10.7	8.5	11.9
LTSH ¹	13.3	9.7	13.8
ODOC	1.0	0.9	1.7
DSC	7.1	7.1	9.3
ISC ²	4.3	4.1	4.9
Total	60.4	56.8	74.5

- 1 LTSH costs also include costs paid to implementing partners to transport food and implement interventions
- 2 Calculated at 7,8 percent of total direct costs

5.4 Planned versus Actual Distributions in 2002 and 2003

Actual distributions have been consistently less than planned distributions for PRRO 10064.0 and 10064.1. One consequence of this has been the carry over of considerable amounts of commodities at what should have been the end of the PRRO period. By end-December 2002, when PRRO 10064.0 should have been completed, only 55 percent of the planned commodities had been distributed. The remaining commodities were distributed in the course of 2003, but this had a knock-on effect on PRRO 10064.1 - by end-December 2003, when this PRRO should have been completed, nearly 40 percent of commodities remained undistributed. In both cases Budget Revisions extended the PRROs.

Table 9: Planned and Actual Food Distributions, 2002 and 2003 (Metric Tons)

	PRRO 6271 ²⁷		PRRO 10064.0		PRRO 10064.1		PRRO 10064.2	
	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual	Planned	Actual
2002								
Sierra Leone	22,726	20,371	53,461	20,065	-	-	-	-

²⁷ 22,000 tons of commodities for PRRO 6271, which was officially planned to terminate in December 2001, were shipped in 2002. Later Budget Revisions extended the termination date to 31 December 2003.



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Guinea	7,307	6,748	8,831	8,831	-	-	-	-
Liberia	16,537	6,284	18,799	15,856	-	-	-	-
Total	46,570	33,403	81,091	44,752	-	-	-	-
2003								
Sierra Leone	-	-	16,826	16,826	18,233	17,962	-	123
Guinea	-	-	-	11,331	21,430	10,097	-	106
Liberia	-	-	-	8,770	30,304	17,972	-	1367
Total	-	-	16,826	36,927	74,992	46,061	-	1367

Source: SPRs (WFP 2003e, 2003f, WFP 2004, a, 2004b and 2004c) except for distribution figures for PRRO10064.2, which are based on COMPAS²⁸

The exception to this pattern is PRRO 10064.2. Distributions were made in 2003 from PRRO 10064.2 even before the Executive Board had officially approved the PRRO.

A particular feature of 2003 was the utilisation of the contingency budget that had been included in PRRO 10064.1. This in effect increased the availability of commodities by 10 percent (and more than compensated for the 7,000 tons looted from Monrovia during the summer 2003 conflict).

Given the instability of the region, it is not surprising that actual beneficiary numbers have differed considerably from the planned figures. The 2003 SPR for PRRO 10064.1 (WFP, 2004b) gives the following planned and actual beneficiary numbers by country²⁹.

Table 10: Planned Versus Actual Number of Beneficiaries by Country, 2003³⁰

Beneficiary Category	Planned Number	Actual Number	Actual compared to Planned (percent)
Sierra Leone			
Total General Distribution	73,546	114,063	155
Total Curative Feeding	26,907	25,850	96
Total Safety Nets	307,615	238,187	77
Total Beneficiaries	411,690	381,407	92.6

²⁸ COMPAS figures do not correspond to data in the Standardised Project reports for any year or any project.

²⁹ The 2003 SPR for PRRO 10064.1 amalgamates beneficiary numbers for both PRRO 10064.0 and PRRO 10064.1. While some food was distributed under PRRO 10064.2, and possibly also under PRRO 6271.0, these were relatively small amounts. Thus the SPR for PRRO 10064.1 can be considered to account for nearly all the beneficiaries reached by WFP in 2003 (although not all of the food distributed).

³⁰ In addition, 25,600 beneficiaries were planned for Côte d'Ivoire; the actual number of beneficiaries in Côte d'Ivoire assisted through PRRO 10064.1 in 2003 was 3,336.



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Guinea			
Total General Distribution	90,000	139,679	155
Total Curative Feeding	8,830	16,748	190
Total Safety Nets	12,200	57,505	471
Total Beneficiaries	128,750	217,093	169
Liberia			
Total General Distribution	145,000	212,103	146
Total Curative Feeding	11,500	6,759	59
Total Safety Nets	20,000	52,368	262
Total Beneficiaries	181,500	271,230	149
Total General Distribution Region	308,546	465,845	151
Total Curative Feeding Region	47,237	49,357	104
Total Safety Nets Region	339,815	348,060	102
Total Beneficiaries Region	721,940	869,730	120

The actual number of beneficiaries in 2003 was one fifth higher than planned. In large part this was due to the extraordinary relief requirements caused by the outbreak of severe violence in Liberia, and the increased civil unrest in Côte d'Ivoire leading to large-scale displacement of civilians. In all three countries covered by the PRROs, the number of beneficiaries of general food distributions increased by 50 percent to cope with the new flood of displaced people and refugees.

By far the major challenge to WFP in 2003 was the climax of the conflict in Liberia in the summer. All WFP international staff were evacuated from Monrovia in June 2003 because of the conflict³¹. A number of standby arrangements were put in place to enable WFP to rapidly restart relief operations when conditions allowed, including:

- Identification of 4,000 tons of food within the region available for loan and ready to be shipped or flown as soon as conditions allowed
- Chartering of a vessel to serve as office space, in which staff could work offshore from Monrovia. The vessel, ready at any moment to move in and out of Monrovia, carried high-energy biscuits that could be easily distributed to the most affected population, and contained vital information and communication technology equipment and fuel for the daily operation of the humanitarian operation.

³¹ The role of national staff, who remained in Monrovia throughout the crisis, in maintaining WFP relief interventions should be recognized



International staff finally returned to Monrovia on 10 August 2003. WFP arranged a 12-day distribution in Monrovia at the end of August, after which WFP shifted to targeted interventions in the capital in order to encourage displaced people to return to the camps in Montserrado.

6. SECURITY AND PROTECTION ISSUES

Ensuring safe access to beneficiaries has been the major problem faced by WFP operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. More than 80 percent of Liberia was inaccessible because of security problems for most of 2003. Security issues have also played a significant role in determining the location of food aid deliveries - at times security and protection issues have been far more significant than issues of food security and vulnerability in terms of delivering food assistance to beneficiaries.

Food aid has often been the only humanitarian assistance available. Ambushes of convoys on main roads have been frequent throughout the conflict, limiting the quantity of food assistance and other humanitarian aid that could be delivered to outlying areas. Attacks on humanitarian staff in the region have also occurred with depressing regularity, and a number of humanitarian staff have lost their lives.

A range of security procedures have been instituted in each country to protect WFP staff. However, not all countries in the region are fully MOSS³² compliant. Although most WFP staff have completed security awareness training, security procedures are not always properly complied with³³. Security clearances have not always been arranged prior to field visits by WFP staff. Nor are all security incidents reported, as required by WFP security procedures.

More recently, the United Nations generally has adopted far stricter security rules, which often entail considerable bureaucratic procedures. As a UN agency, WFP is obliged to follow the UN security procedures and arrangements³⁴. One effect of these strengthened UN security arrangements has been greater reliance by WFP on the implementing partners, who are not obliged to follow the strict UN security procedures (and therefore have more freedom to undertake travel), to both implement and monitor WFP operations.

Security has perforce dominated many of WFP's operational decisions. For example, WFP food is not stored near border regions. WFP tries to avoid having food in overnight transit when transporting food to distribution sites in Liberia. Food distributions in Liberia should only occur when UNMIL presence at the distribution site is confirmed³⁵.

The security reasons underlying many operational decisions have been rarely documented. As a result, these are often unknown to recent staff arrivals. A depressing feature of the current evaluation was that issues first noted by the 1996 evaluation (WFP, 1996b) were continually raised with the present mission.

³² MOSS - Minimum Operating Security Standard

³³ For example the mission noted that WFP radio procedures were not always followed during its field trips.

³⁴ It is unclear to what extent WFP itself has been able to influence decisions taken by the UN, primarily UNSECORD, given its expertise of providing humanitarian assistance in many highly insecure regions. Certainly it is true that many WFP staff chafe under the prevailing UNSECORD security procedures.

³⁵ Although of the food distributions visited by the mission in Liberia, only that in Zwedru occurred with soldiers from UNMIL present at the distribution site.



A case in point is the decision in the mid-1990s to replace rice with bulgur. The substitution of high value rice with less valuable bulgur increased the security for civilian beneficiaries - fighters had frequently harassed beneficiaries after they had received rice. However, this knowledge seems to have been lost to the current WFP staff working in the country offices in the region³⁶.

The general situation of women in the region is particularly poor. The Gender Development Index of UNDP's Human Development Report (2001) ranks the countries of the West African coastal region among the lowest in the world. In this regard, the situation of women is generally better in the refugee camps than in the surrounding communities. In Guinea, for example, where women account for 53 percent of the refugee population, women refugees have higher social status than women in the local population as a result of awareness campaigns in the camps and of support to women by UN agencies and NGOs. Guinean women outside the camps are more disadvantaged in terms of access to education, health facilities and participation in power structures and decision-making. This disparity is in large part a reflection of the fact that host communities have had significantly less access to basic social services and safety nets than camp inhabitants.

Female-headed households are common in the refugee camps in the region. Women, children and the elderly from Liberia were able to enter Guinea and Sierra Leone relatively freely, but Government authorities prohibited many able-bodied men from crossing international borders from fears that they were combatants. It is also common practice among refugees for men to repatriate ahead of their families.

WFP has given particular attention to the protection concerns of displaced women. The PRRO documentation adopts an approach that is in line with WFP's Enhanced Commitments to Women (ECW). Letters of Understanding with all implementing partners incorporate the relevant sections of the ECW to ensure that WFP's gender goals are consistently pursued. There has been an improvement in the role of women beneficiaries in programme implementation, including representation on food management committees and participation in the distribution of food rations. In Liberia, for example, camp committees are composed of more than 60 percent women. However, WFP operations in the region still fall short on most of the planned Gender Process Indicators (Table 11):

Table 11: Gender Process Indicators

Gender Process Indicator	Planned	Actual
Guinea		
Proportion of women in leadership positions in food management committees	100 %	52 %
Proportion of women receiving household food rations at distribution point in GFD	0%	48%

³⁶ As a consequence, there have been continual requests by beneficiaries, governments, NGOs, implementing partners, other UN agencies, donors, and even by WFP staff, to resume the distribution of rice.



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Proportion of household ration cards issued in the name of women in GFD	0%	60%
Sierra Leone		
Proportion of women in leadership positions in food management committees	65%	45%
Proportion of women receiving household food rations at distribution point in GFD	85%	36%
Proportion of household ration cards issued in the name of women in GFD	0%	29%
Liberia		
Proportion of women in leadership positions in food management committees	70%	70%
Proportion of women receiving household food rations at distribution point in GFD	61%	72%

Source: 2003 SPR for PRRO 10064.1 (WFP, 2004b)³⁷

Women and girls who are displaced or caught up in conflict situations face particular risks. Protection issues have always been of concern in the region, but they came to international media attention in 2002 with the publication of the UNHCR/SCF report (UNHCR/SCF, 2002) on sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) by humanitarian staff in refugee and IDP camps³⁸.

UNHCR has the lead in preventing sexual and other abuse in refugee camps, and to offer refugee women a safe and non-stigmatizing means to report cases of SGBV. As a result of increased home visits by medical NGOs and the massive sensitization campaigns throughout the camps, there has been an increase in the number of women reporting abuses.

However, the situation is less reassuring in the case of displaced people, where no UN agency has a clear mandate, and UN structures to report and act on abuse issues are weak or non-existent.

WFP has instituted a number of formal measures to address sexual abuse, including:

- All WFP PRRO staff have signed the joint United Nations Code of Conduct, the United Nations–NGO jointly developed Standards of Accountability.
- A zero-tolerance policy has been adopted, under which any WFP staff member found to be violating the Code of Conduct faces immediate dismissal.
- All WFP staff have received sensitization training and directives on the issue.
- Refresher training on SGBV is included in country office work plans.
- Additional women staff have been hired, particularly as food monitors³⁹.

³⁷ The Sierra Leone Country Office disputes the figures contained in the SPR. The Country Office states that by mid-2003 all family ration cards in refugee camps contained both the name and the photograph of both male and female household heads. With the change in the ration cards, the proportion of women receiving household food rations was in excess of 50percent.

³⁸ No one doubts that sexual abuse by humanitarian workers in the camps did occur, and that abuse in general is a significant problem in the region. However the scale of the problem as originally identified in the UNHCR/SCF report has been questioned. A series of latter studies suggested that sexual abuse may not have been as widespread as originally reported.

³⁹ Some NGO implementing partners reported that their national female staff were not prepared to undertake travel alone to more remote communities, due to concerns about their security. WFP reported that this had not been an issue for female WFP food monitors.



- WFP support has been provided to sensitization campaigns in the camps, covering human rights issues including SGBV.
- Letters of Understanding with partner NGOs require that the NGOs establish a system to prevent staff from using food rations or other resources for sexual exploitation or other abuses and for disciplinary action, including immediate termination.

Each country office has formulated (often in conjunction with the other UN agencies present in the country) an action plan to combat sexual harassment and abuse. However the value of this is uncertain, given that very few WFP staff were aware of the specifics of the plan for their country; indeed some claimed they had never even seen it.

The vast majority of WFP staff should not be expected to be, nor need to be, protection specialists. On the other hand, the work of WFP programme staff members in the region should reflect the fact that beneficiaries, particularly women and children, are at potential risk of abuse. Programme staff members should be expected to know the key protection risks faced by beneficiaries, and to know the WFP procedures to address reported (or observed) abuse⁴⁰.

Currently, that knowledge seems to be lacking. Although there is general agreement that sexual exploitation and abuse is common in West Africa, WFP as an institution appears not to know how to effectively respond⁴¹. As an organization, WFP has done little to develop appropriate tools and guidelines to enable WFP field staff (and in particular national food aid monitors, many of whom have been recently recruited, and who have received little training in WFP procedures) to appropriately deal with any abuse or protection issues they come across during their work⁴². Some WFP food aid monitors told the mission they did not report cases of gender-based violence they observed or were told about. And some international staff claimed they lacked a clear mandate, appropriate tools or clear guidance to be able to cope with protection issues in the field.

7. GENERAL IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES

7.1 Implementing Partners

⁴⁰ Adapted from UNHCR (2002) p.v.

⁴¹ The UNHCR (2002) evaluation came to the same conclusion for UNHCR.

⁴² For example, in Liberia it is unclear to which agency - UNDP, OCHA, SRSG, UNMIL - WFP food monitors could or should report situations of abuse that they come across in their daily activities among displaced people.



The effectiveness of WFP food aid depends on the effectiveness of the partners implementing the WFP intervention. The main Government counterparts with which WFP coordinates are:

Liberia: Liberia Refugee, Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (LRRRC)
Ministry of Education

Sierra Leone: Ministry of Development and Economic Planning (MODEP)
National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA)
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology

Guinea: Ministère de l'Administration du Territoire et de la Décentralisation - MATD), which operates through two structures:

- National Service for Humanitarian Action (Service National d'Action Humanitaire (SENAH)
- National Office for the Coordination of Refugees (Bureau National pour la Coordination des Réfugiés - BNCR).

The years of civil conflict have seriously weakened Government institutional capacity in each of the countries covered by the PRRO. Consequently, WFP relies on international or national NGOs to implement all food-aided activities (in the case of refugee-feeding operations, WFP relies on implementing partners paid for by UNHCR, see below). WFP contributes to meeting the implementation costs of partners through the LTSH budget at an agreed fixed rate per ton - thus partners who are responsible for small quantities of food are likely to receive smaller funds, irrespective of the actual implementation costs⁴³. The implementing partner⁴⁴ is expected to provide the required non-food and technical inputs - such as shelter, water/sanitation items, cooking kits, seeds and tools - from their own resources. In practice, this often means that the implementing partner approaches the same donors that fund WFP for additional funds to support the implementation of the WFP intervention⁴⁵.

The PRRO documentation (PRRO 10064.1, para.56) states that implementing partners are chosen "on the basis of their operational efficiency and cost effectiveness". In practice, this translated into choosing implementing partners on the basis of criteria such as availability of staff and their qualifications, availability of budget and availability of logistics capacity. (The situation has also been exacerbated by the fact that the pool of NGOs available to implement WFP activities in the countries of the region, particularly in the earlier years of the crisis, is extremely limited.) The lack of a rigorous, formal process to assess the technical, strategic and operational capacities of implementing partners prior to their engagement resulted in WFP

⁴³ It is unclear why the LTSH budget should fund the work of implementing partners. It is true that many implementing partners have responsibility for transporting food commodities (typically from the EDPs to the distribution sites), which is a legitimate cost under the LTSH budget. However much of the work of implementing partners is concerned with programme management and the provision of technical support, costs which would more normally be paid from the DSC or ODOC budget. One implication of funding implementing partners from the LTSH budget is that it makes the operational overheads budget look smaller.

⁴⁴ Despite the terminology used, in fact most "implementing partners" are just agencies contracted by WFP to implement the WFP operation.

⁴⁵ An on-going review of LTSH rates may go some way to partially resolving this issue.



contracting a number of NGOs that proved to be unsuitable for the work.⁴⁶ This severely limited the effectiveness of many WFP interventions.

An example is the December 2003 joint CRS/WFP review of MCH and supplementary feeding interventions in Liberia, which had been supported by WFP since September 2002 (WFP/CRS, 2004). The review found most of the staff of the implementing partner were not sufficiently qualified, international standards were not being respected and appropriate equipment was not provided by the partner⁴⁷. The review recommended the cessation of most of the current supplementary feeding activities. Following the review, the nutrition unit in Liberia developed rapid and simple tools to assess and monitor the performance of implementing partners for institutional feeding, therapeutic feeding and supplementary feeding. These could provide a model for similar assessment tools for other types of intervention and other countries.

In 2002, Sierra Leone undertook a technical review of the 40 implementing partners the Country Office was working with. As a result of the review, the number of partners was reduced to 24. In 2003, a similar review further reduced the number of partners to a more manageable 16⁴⁸. The technical criteria developed as part of the review process to assess the capacity of the implementing partners could form the basis for a more rigorous initial appraisal of projects proposed for WFP support, and of the relevance and technical expertise of proposed implementing partners.

The July 2002 MOU between WFP and UNHCR guides collaboration on assistance to refugees. In refugee camps in Guinea and Liberia, UNHCR has responsibility for distributing WFP commodities, working through NGO implementing partners that are jointly chosen by UNHCR and WFP (although all implementation costs are born by UNHCR)⁴⁹. This was also the situation in Sierra Leone up until 2003. However, in that year WFP assumed full responsibility for distributing food commodities to refugees in Sierra Leone, as one of the pilot test projects recommended in the 2002 WFP/UNHCR MOU⁵⁰. In this case, WFP and UNHCR jointly choose the NGO implementing partners to manage the food distributions, with WFP bearing the implementation costs.

The 2002 WFP/UNHCR MOU states (para. 3.3) that WFP and UNHCR should jointly assess the number of refugees eligible for food assistance - this should be one of the key roles of the Joint

⁴⁶ The format for project proposals from implementing partners only requests information on:

Specific objectives of the project;

Project description;

Justification of WFP assistance;

Project input;

Schedule of work.

No information is requested on needs assessment, targeting, implementation strategy, coordination with other agencies, monitoring and evaluation processes, or possible exit strategies.

⁴⁷ The 1996 evaluation (WFP, 1996b, p. 49) noted that WFP staff claimed that in spite of poor performance, it could be very difficult for political reasons to actually "sack" an NGO. The problem was heightened when WFP was working with the implementing partners of UNHCR.

⁴⁸ To some extent, WFP has been forced by circumstances to rely on implementing partners who were less than ideal. In Sierra Leone, major international NGOs with which WFP frequently partners in other countries (Care, CRS and World Vision) had their own food pipelines until 2003, and thus were not available to work with WFP as implementing partners. With the different food pipelines now amalgamated under WFP's management, these NGOs are currently working as implementing partners with WFP.

⁴⁹ Monitoring the food distribution to refugees is the mandate of WFP, although this is usually undertaken in collaboration with UNHCR.

⁵⁰ WFP assumed this responsibility in part because UNHCR in Sierra Leone experienced severe financial shortfalls in 2003.



Assessment Missions. However, WFP staff consistently felt the text of the MOU gave them little room to manoeuvre in negotiating beneficiary numbers with UNHCR.

Certainly, there is general agreement that the 2003 UNHCR registrations of refugees in Guinea (supported by the 2003 JAM) were overestimated⁵¹ - some estimates suggest that this excess may be as much as one third⁵². For example, official UNHCR figures show Lainé camp in Guinea has a registered population of 32,000 - and full rations for a population this size are provided by WFP each month. However, the work of MSF-S community health workers (who regularly visit each household), suggested that only 22,672 refugees regularly resided in the camp⁵³. Reports in 2002 indicated that many refugee households had access to more than one food ration card (WFP, 2002a)⁵⁴.

WFP has collaborated with UNICEF on nutrition monitoring, and support to supplementary and therapeutic feeding for displaced people in Liberia. Unicef has also provided educational supplies to many of the schools included in the WFP emergency school feeding programme. WFP and Unicef are supposedly collaborating on a deworming programme as part of the ESF intervention, but very little appeared to have been achieved by the time of the evaluation.

Work with FAO has focused on agricultural rehabilitation, mainly through seed protection programmes. FAO nominally has responsibility for providing the seeds (and sometimes agricultural tools), but has experienced delays in obtaining these. As a result, in Liberia WFP is making its own plans to obtain seeds. Joint studies have also been undertaken into the feasibility of strengthening self-reliance strategies for refugees, particularly in the refugee camps of Guinea, but to date these have not translated into actual programmes⁵⁵.

7.2 Monitoring

In all three countries Food Basket Monitoring (FBM), undertaken by NGO partners in conjunction with the general food distributions in camps for refugee and displaced people, is the most regular monitoring programme. The purpose of FBM is to identify any discrepancies between planned and actual distributions to beneficiaries.

Post Distribution Monitoring (PDM), which is also undertaken by NGO partners, is less intensively undertaken than FBM. The PDM investigates how camp beneficiaries utilise the commodities received through WFP general food distributions⁵⁶.

FBM recommendations tend to be directly linked with the process of food distributions (such as timing of distributions, problems with queuing, delays caused by the distribution systems used),

⁵¹ The 1996 evaluation also drew attention to the unresolved issues of registration.

⁵² Thus measuring success by output (the number of people fed), as is currently the case in the SPRs, is inappropriate if the initial targeting (i.e. camp registration) is incorrect.

⁵³ Joint UNHCR/WFP verification exercises conducted in Guinea refugee camps in June/July 2004 (i.e. after the visit of the evaluation mission) resulted in an approximately 30percent decrease in refugee numbers.

⁵⁴ In some cases, this may be for legitimate reasons, such as when families are split during flight, and then registered separately when they arrive in the camps.

⁵⁵ Delay in implementing refugee self-reliance programmes have mainly been caused by disagreement between UNHCR and WFP over whether the general ration should be reduced in conjunction with the introduction of self-reliance projects (and thus provide an incentive for participation). UNHCR has resisted this approach.

⁵⁶ The description of the objectives of the FBM and PDM in the documentation for PRRO 10064.2 is misleading and incorrect. FBM does not provide information on the numbers of malnourished children cured, and the PDM does not report admission and re-admission rates of malnourished children in therapeutic feeding and supplementary feeding centres, recovery rates or mortality rates. The respective medical NGO implementing partners provide these data in separate monthly health activity reports.



and hence are operationally easier for WFP to act upon. An example is Kola refugee camp in Guinea, where as a result of FBM reports of irregularities in the quantities distributed to beneficiaries, UNHCR and WFP designated a new implementing partner to supervise the general food distributions.

The quality of PDM reports has been unequal, depending on the NGO undertaking the monitoring. In general, PDM reports present substantial quantities of data, with little in-depth analysis of such thematic issues as the sale of food aid, coping strategies or wealth ranking among the refugees (although there has been a general improvement in the quality of the PDM reports over time). The mission surveyed PDM reports covering the last half of 2003 and early 2004: in a number of cases (though not all) the same conclusions and recommendations were repeated time after time, with only limited evidence that remedial actions had been implemented⁵⁷. In part, this may be because the issues identified in the PDM reports are more sensitive, with greater policy or political ramifications⁵⁸.

Both FBM and PDM reports are limited to general food distributions in camp situations - there are no similar regular monitoring structures in place for non-camp beneficiaries (although implementing partners do report regularly on the amounts of food distributed to beneficiaries⁵⁹). Nor is there a standard system in place to undertake impact studies to determine the effects WFP food may be having on the lives or livelihoods of beneficiaries⁶⁰.

8. EFFECTIVENESS OF WFP RELIEF INTERVENTIONS

In PRRO 10064.0, PRRO 10064.1 and PRRO 10064.2, relief activities were defined in each case as:

General food distribution

- Curative feeding programmes in camps, comprising:
 - o Therapeutic feeding, provided in government hospitals outside the camps for severely malnourished children
 - o Supplementary feeding in the camps for moderately malnourished children
 - o Preventive MCH feeding for pregnant and lactating women, which serves as a safety net.

PRRO 10064.0, PRRO 10064.1 and PRRO 10064.2 also all have the same overall objective for relief assistance: to save the lives of internal and cross-border displaced people who find themselves in food insecure situations. This is equivalent to Strategic Priority 1 of the WFP Strategic Plan (2004 - 2007).

8.1 Outputs for Relief Interventions

⁵⁷ One of the problems with the PDM reports is that often they cover a three- or four-month period. There is thus a significant time lag before remedial action can be taken. WFP Country Offices also argue that some of the recommendations in the PDM reports were such that they could not be acted upon.

⁵⁸ In the sense that they may question the working relationships between WFP and the other agencies or implementing partners.

⁵⁹ As implementing partners are paid through the LTSH budget, and payment is directly linked to the quantity of food handled, there is an incentive for implementing partners to report on the amounts of food distributed.

⁶⁰ In 2001 WFP undertook a Community Food Security Profiling in six rural case study areas in Sierra Leone, which coincided in the main WFP operational areas. Although WFP beneficiaries were included in the sample to determine overall patterns of food security, there was no assessment of the impacts of WFP assistance as such. Similarly, the 2003 VAM study included both current and ex-WFP beneficiaries, but did not determine the impact of WFP assistance in this national assessment of food security.



The outbreak of severe violence in Liberia in 2002/2003 greatly increased relief requirements in that country, which continued into 2003. This, combined with the increased civil unrest in Côte d'Ivoire, meant that in 2003 overall relief requirements in the region were 50 percent higher than the planned level, as countries in the region struggled to cope with new waves of displaced people and refugees.

Table 12: Planned Versus Actual Number of Beneficiaries by Country and Type of Activity for Relief Interventions, 2002 and 2003⁶¹

Beneficiary Category	Planned Number	Actual Number	Actual compared to Planned (percent)
2002			
Sierra Leone			
Refugees	12,853	8,981	70
IDPs	41,269	39,466	96
Returnees	7,211	7,587	105
Total General Distribution	61,333	56,034	91
Therapeutic Feeding	9,103	2,675	29
Supplementary Feeding	15,553	8,981	58
MCH	18,509	15,209	82
Total Curative Feeding	43,165	26,865	62
Guinea			
Refugees	100,000	43,260	43
IDPs	80,000		
Total General Distribution	180,000	43,260	24
Therapeutic Feeding	1,800	420	23
Supplementary Feeding	7,200	3,440	48
MCH	5,000	2,250	45
Total Curative Feeding	14,000	6,110	44
Liberia			
Refugees	35,000	27,808	80
IDPs	35,000	106,908	306
Returnees		3,534	
Total General Distribution	70,000	138,250	198
Therapeutic Feeding	2,500	1,234	49
Supplementary Feeding	6,500	4,239	65
MCH	1,590	5,290	333
Total Curative Feeding	10,590	10,763	102
2003			
Sierra Leone			
Refugees	42,500	61,547	145
IDPs	-	4,998	
Returnees	31,046	47,518	153
Total General Distribution	73,546	114,063	155
Therapeutic Feeding	3,105	1,611	52

⁶¹ In addition, 25,600 beneficiaries were planned for Côte d'Ivoire; the actual number of beneficiaries in Côte d'Ivoire assisted through PRRO 10064.1 in 2003 was 3,336.



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Supplementary Feeding	15,523	11,431	74
MCH	8,279	12,808	155
Total Curative Feeding	26,907	25,850	96
Guinea			
Refugees	90,000	139,679	155
Total General Distribution	90,000	139,679	155
Therapeutic Feeding	430	1,220	284
Supplementary Feeding	1,900	6,262	330
MCH	6,500	9,266	143
Total Curative Feeding	8,830	16,748	190
Liberia			
Refugees	25,000	19,000	76
IDPs	120,000	185,000	154t
Returnees	-	8,103	
Total General Distribution	145,000	212,103	146
Therapeutic Feeding	2,500	428	17
Supplementary Feeding	6,500	5,201	80
MCH	2,500	1,130	45
Total Curative Feeding	11,500	6,759	59

However, the number of beneficiaries of General Food Distributions should be treated with some caution, as there are strong indications that the numbers of beneficiaries actually requiring relief food aid through general food distributions has been significantly exaggerated (see below).

Curative feeding interventions do seem to have become increasingly effective in 2003, particularly in Guinea. The targeted feeding programmes in the camps are available also to mothers and children from surrounding villages, where malnutrition rates are often higher than in the camps. Participation from host communities in the camp feeding programmes was previously low because of limited outreach and the distances to the camps. However, in 2003, most of the participants in these programmes were from the host population.

8.2 Outcome Indicators of WFP Relief Interventions

The 2004-2007 Strategic Plan suggests the following performance indicators for relief interventions:

- Crude mortality rate⁶².
- Prevalence of acute malnutrition among under-5s (by gender) (assessed using weight for height).

By these criteria, WFP relief interventions in coastal West Africa have been effective. There have been no reports of deaths through starvation in the region during the period under review⁶³. The mortality rate (mainly for under-five mortality) among WFP-targeted populations is generally low and stable.

⁶²This is a negative indicator, which in effect measures the lack of success, and illustrates the problem of setting objectives such as "saving lives".

⁶³ It has been estimated (USAID, 2003) that the conflict in 2003 killed approximately 1,000 people. Earlier and more pro-active intervention by the international community might have helped to prevent some or many of these deaths



Of the three countries, food insecurity was greatest in Liberia in 2003. Ongoing conflict and insecurity meant access to more than 80 percent of Liberia was not possible for much of the year. Thus the lack of reports of starvation deaths could have more to do with the lack of witnesses and reporting rather than the lack of starvation - certainly PRRO 10064.2, written during the first half of 2003 when fighting was at its worst, expected that the nutrition situation would be most critical in the inaccessible regions. In fact, reports by the first WFP assessment staff to enter newly accessible areas of Liberia suggest that the food position was significantly better than expected⁶⁴. Hence it is reasonable to conclude that deaths from lack of food were not significant in the region during 2003.

Most quantitative data on the effectiveness of WFP relief interventions have been collected from refugee camps in Guinea and Sierra Leone⁶⁵. These data support the contention that WFP relief activities have successfully met their objectives.

Under-five mortality rates are low and stable in all the refugee camps. In Sierra Leone, the under-five mortality rate was 0.6/10,000/day in Gondama camp and 0.1/10,000/day in Jembe camp in February 2003; the under-five mortality rate was 0.3/10,000/day and 0.5/10,000/day respectively in each camp in October 2003. This compares very favourably with the under-five mortality rate of 2.71/10,000/day in Kono District and 2.3/10,000/day in Kailahun District (the two districts of Sierra Leone with the highest number of returnees).

The under-five mortality rate for the Guinea refugee camps is estimated at 0.3/10,000/day. The under-five mortality rate for Guinea as a whole is estimated at 175 per thousand live births.

The prevalence of wasting in the refugee camps of the West Africa coastal region is also lower or similar to that of the surrounding host population (although the prevalence of wasting in the refugee camps has fluctuated in line with new influxes of refugees, who typically arrive suffering from malnutrition).

For example, Kouankan camp in Guinea had wasting rate of 2,1 percent in June 2001, and 0 percent severe wasting. In March 2002, these rates had risen to 2,5 percent for wasting and 2 percent for severe wasting. These figures are better than the national rate of 9,1 percent for wasting and 2,1 percent for severe wasting.

In Sierra Leone, the prevalence of wasting in September 2002 ranged from 9,8 percent in Jembah camp to 22,2 percent in Jemmibagbo camp; the prevalence of wasting had decreased to 7,6 percent for both camps by October 2003. This compares to the prevalence of wasting at the national level of 5,3 percent in 2003.

In Liberia, nutrition surveys conducted in November 2003 among residents of Montserrado displaced person camps found acute malnutrition rates ranged from 3,4 percent (Saygbeh camp) to 7,8 percent (Wilson camp) - the prevalence of wasting among Monrovia residents was assessed as 6,9 percent (WFP, 2003i).

⁶⁴ There is generally greater potential to survive on wild food resources (including cassava) in rural areas, so long as the prevailing security situation allows people to scavenge; thus the food situation is likely to be felt most severely in urban areas, to where in fact a significant proportion of Liberia's population have fled.

⁶⁵ It is arguable whether long-running refugee operations should be included under the relief heading - refugee operations do not neatly fit within the Protracted Relief and Recovery rubric, as pointed out by the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category (WFP, 2004d).



Thus there is strong evidence that WFP General Food Distributions, combined with selective curative feeding programmes, have significantly contributed to saving lives and restoring, maintaining and improving the food security and nutritional situation of the beneficiaries (especially children under five years old and pregnant and lactating women). However some caveats should be born in mind:

- Food is only one of a number of factors influencing nutrition (clean water, appropriate sanitation arrangements, and good health care are also vital), and thus the specific role of WFP in reducing malnutrition is difficult to judge⁶⁶.
- Substantially more food has been distributed through the general food distributions to refugees in Guinea than the actual number of camp inhabitants warranted.
- General food distributions in Liberia have probably been poorly targeted in terms of need for free food relief (see section on Efficiency).
- The effectiveness of WFP curative feeding interventions depends on the effectiveness of medical NGOs implementing these programmes (and paid for by UNHCR in Guinea and Sierra Leone as part of its assistance to refugees). The success achieved in reducing malnutrition rates may have much more to do with the medical care and medicines provided by the NGO than on the provision of WFP commodities⁶⁷.

9. EFFECTIVENESS OF WFP RECOVERY INTERVENTIONS

In the PRRO category generally, designing and implementing meaningful and effective recovery activities through food aid has been the greatest challenge. The WFP thematic evaluation of the PRRO category (WFP, 2004d, para. 32) noted that typical problems with recovery activities included unrealistic resettlement targets, over-emphasis on physical rather than social assets, limited staff capacity to design and implement the recovery strategy and insufficient access to beneficiaries⁶⁸.

In the case of the West Africa coastal region, the major weakness of recovery activities has been the lack of clarity as to the specific objectives of the recovery interventions⁶⁹. This has implications for the phase out of the PRRO, or the phase-over into development interventions.

PRRO 10064.0, PRRO 10064.1 and PRRO 10064.2 all state the same overall objective for recovery assistance: to contribute to recovery efforts through activities such as:

- Emergency school feeding
- Food for Training
- Food for Work
- Food for Agriculture (seed protection)⁷⁰.

⁶⁶ The 1996 evaluation (WFP, 1996b, p.59) reached a similar conclusion: "It is extremely difficult to assess the outcome impact of food aid ... because of the multitude of interacting factors involved and the absence of a counterfactual. What does seem clear is that widespread famine in the region was avoided, and it is likely that at a time when the food economy was disrupted, food aid played an important role in increasing the absolute availability of food".

⁶⁷ Although the importance of the provision of commodities should not be minimized. Curative feeding interventions have been negatively affected by the inability of UNHCR to provide some commodities, for which they had responsibility. A number of medical NGOs requested WFP to take on this responsibility, as WFP had a better reputation for the provision of food.

⁶⁸ The 2004 thematic evaluation of the PRRO category noted that recovery activities were only partially met in 8 of the 17 cases examined (WFP, 2004d, para. 15).

⁶⁹ The 1996 evaluation noted (WFP, 1996b, p. 31): "the mission believes that it is crucial for WFP to have a clear idea about why it is delivering aid, and why it is serving particular populations", a sentiment shared by the current evaluation.

⁷⁰ Other important recovery interventions in the region, but which are not specifically mentioned in the PRRO documents, are support to returnees and support to disarmament programmes.



These activities relate primarily to Strategic Priority 2 (Protect Livelihoods in Crisis Situations and Enhance Resilience to Shocks) and Strategic Priority 4 (Support Access to Education and Reduce Gender Disparity in Access to Education and Skills Training) of the WFP Strategic Plan (2004-2007).

The problem is that these activities are not related in the PRRO documentation to specific desired outcomes (the different objectives put forward for emergency school feeding are an illustration of the current confusion - see Annex VII). Thus, it is not clear why WFP is supporting one type of activity rather than another⁷¹. Furthermore, the design of recovery interventions and their implementation have taken into only limited account of the major food security constraints identified by the various studies undertaken in the region, including by VAM⁷².

Given the paucity of programme staff within country offices, and the necessarily limited technical support available from ODD⁷³, the range of recovery activities supported in each country exceeds the ability of country offices to ensure sound project design and implementation, not to mention monitoring and assessment.

In terms of the requirements for technical backstopping in the design and implementation of food-aided interventions, there is little difference between recovery activities and activities supported under Country Programmes, except that recovery activities are typically for shorter duration, and Government capacity to implement the intervention and provide non-food inputs is usually significantly more limited. Yet Country Programme activities are normally limited to two or three different types. The West Africa coastal PRROs assume each country will include four or five different types of recovery activities (more if the curative feeding for host populations, returnee programmes and disarmament operations are also included).

9.1 Shift from Relief to Recovery

The nature of the crisis over the past 10 years has been a cyclical pattern of extreme violence, when only relief has been possible, followed by periods of calm when recovery (or at least targeted) interventions have been introduced. None of the West Africa coastal PRRO documents describe explicit criteria to signal when to shift from relief to recovery interventions, and there is no evidence that objective criteria (e.g., improved nutritional status among beneficiaries) have been used to make decisions about when and where to phase out general food distributions and introduce targeted distributions.

⁷¹ The use of the phrase "safety-nets" instead of "recovery" in the project documentation may have encouraged less rigorous analysis of the prevailing food security situation, and how best WFP assistance could address food security issues directly related to the crisis.

⁷² In Sierra Leone and Guinea, the VAM studies have been used by the Country Offices primarily to locate WFP interventions in particular parts of the respective countries, not to address specific causes of food insecurity. A 2002 food security/vulnerability study in Sierra Leone contained suggestions for the most appropriate types of intervention to pursue in different parts of the country; the Country Office then tried to identify potential implementing partners to undertake appropriate interventions to more directly address the identified prevailing food security situation, but with limited success. The lack of clear Government guidance and support and effective implementing partners have been major hindrances in all three countries to the sound design and implementation of recovery activities.

⁷³ Country Offices were appreciative of the technical support provided by ODD, but ODD has to provide technical support to 19 countries.



From Crisis to Recovery, the Executive Board document that introduced the PRRO category into WFP in 1998 (WFP, 2000) suggested the following conditions could be used to signal the shift to a recovery response:

- Food assistance is able to meet other needs (i.e. food is no longer required for survival only).
- The emergence of different target groups with different needs (food insecurity increasingly becomes linked to specific target groups who are still not in a position to rely on pre-crisis coping strategies).
- A decrease in the volume of food assistance required, combined with better targeting.
- A partial return to a functioning cash economy.
- Less reliance on external food distribution and management structures (the need for relief structures can gradually be replaced by local government and reorganized community-based structures).
- Secure working environment.
- Donor support for recovery and development.

In the case of the West Africa PRRO, only the last two of these indicators could be considered as being relevant to decisions to introduce targeted interventions, but there is no evidence that they were actually taken into consideration.

For beneficiaries living in camps, particularly refugee camps, there has been considerable discussion about the introduction of self-reliance programmes, particularly as the overall food and nutrition situation of camp inhabitants has improved⁷⁴. UNHCR has pressured WFP to introduce targeted interventions in combination with the general food distribution. WFP has resisted this, until the general food distribution ration is reduced, thus making targeted food distributions more attractive to camp inhabitants⁷⁵. PRRO 10064.2 does foresee the introduction of school feeding in refugee camps where the general food ration has been reduced to 1,830 kcal⁷⁶.

For non-camp beneficiaries there is little evidence that recovery activities have been introduced as a result of specific assessments of changes in the situation and condition of beneficiaries⁷⁷.

9.2 Outputs for Recovery Interventions

In terms of the number of beneficiaries (outputs), recovery activities were both planned to be more extensive in 2003 than in 2002, and in fact were (see Table 13):

⁷⁴ However there is lack of clarity over the purpose of self-reliance programmes for refugees. On the one hand it can help to foster pride and self-respect. But it is often also used as a means to phase-down WFP food rations. Furthermore, the self-reliance activities supported (such as agricultural development) often ignore the fact that most refugee situations aim at eventual repatriation, not integration within the host community – if “self-reliance” is too successful, refugees will have become fully established, and have little desire to repatriate.

⁷⁵ The issue was particularly highlighted in the 2003 JAM mission, in which UNHCR members stressed the need for the introduction of school feeding interventions for camp children. In Guinea, there have been a number of studies in conjunction with FAO into the introduction of food aid-supported agricultural projects for refugees.

⁷⁶ In Guinea WFP proposes to introduce a strategy of reducing the general food distribution ration in refugee camps where 75percent of the inhabitants arrived prior to at least one full agricultural season.

⁷⁷ VAM studies have been conducted in each of the three countries concerned with the PRRO in 2003/2004, and in Sierra Leone the results of the VAM study are the basis for focusing WFP PRRO interventions in specific regions of the country (with the expectation that these will phase into a Country Programme in the course of 2005). In Guinea and Sierra Leone, the VAM studies were country-wide, and focused mainly on structural food security issues. There appear to have been no recent assessments of the specific situation and condition of WFP beneficiaries in non-camp situations.



Table 13: Planned Versus Actual Number of Beneficiaries by Country and Type of Activity, Recovery Interventions 2002⁷⁸ and 2003⁷⁹

Beneficiary Category	Planned Number	Actual Number	Actual compared to Planned (percent)
2002			
Sierra Leone			
ESF	219,744	169,140	77
FFW	67,629	98,814	146
FFT	14,262	6,550	46
HIV/AIDS	3,319	3,562	107
Guinea			
FFW	17,000		
FFT	5,000		
Liberia			
ESF	20,000	3,139	16
FFW	5,000	53	1
FFT	5,000	72	1
2003			
Sierra Leone			
ESF	230,000	172,116	75
FFW	46,569	49,244	106
FFT	31,046	16,827	54
Guinea			
ESF	3,000	55,784	1,860
FFW	9,200	1,399	15
FFT		322	
Liberia			
ESF	20,000	51,968	260
FFW	-	400	

The growth in emergency school feeding in 2003 in Guinea and Liberia is particularly noteworthy. In Guinea, this expansion reflects the decision to give greater emphasis to the host communities affected by the arrival of refugees and internally displaced. Following the armed incursions into Guinea in 2001, WFP adopted an approach of providing general food assistance to communities that were hosting the largest numbers of displaced people - the intention was that, rather than providing specific assistance directly to those who had been displaced, the displaced would benefit from the assistance provided to the general community⁸⁰. Most WFP assistance for internally displaced people in Guinea was thus provided through emergency

⁷⁸ Based on 2002 SPR for PRRO 10064.0. It is assumed beneficiaries of PRRO 6271.0 are included within these numbers. (The 2002 SPR for PRRO 6217.0 states that undistributed stocks from the PRRO were distributed under the framework of PRRO 10064.0 in 2002. However the beneficiary numbers in each SPR, although similar, are slightly different.)

⁷⁹ In addition, 25,600 beneficiaries were planned for Côte d'Ivoire; the actual number of beneficiaries in Côte d'Ivoire assisted through PRRO 10064.1 in 2003 was 3,336.



school feeding in communities hosting the largest numbers of displaced people. More recently, emergency school feeding has been expanded to address the imbalance between assistance provided for refugees in Guinea and assistance for the host population⁸¹. In fact emergency school feeding has become the major intervention by WFP (and in fact, by external agencies generally) for the host communities.

The rapid expansion of emergency school feeding in Liberia in 2003/2004 is particularly remarkable. School feeding hardly existed in Liberia in 2002. The ESF programme in Liberia was only formally re-launched in November 2003, following the peace agreement. By mid-March 2004 the Liberia ESF was reaching more than 240,000 students.

The expansion of ESF in the PRRO has overshadowed the generally rather dismal performance of other types of recovery activities. It has been particularly difficult to establish effective food for work programmes in the region, in part because of social attitudes towards working for food, and also because of the serious lack of potential implementing partners with appropriate technical expertise and capacity to implement effective food for work interventions. Only Sierra Leone has had much success in implementing FFW, at least in terms of number of beneficiaries. (Given the prevailing security situation in most of Liberia in 2003, it is to be wondered that any FFW activities could be implemented there.)

In all three countries, food for training interventions have been much more difficult to implement than expected. No clear reasons for this difficulty have been put forward, although the lack of appropriate implementing partners must be a factor⁸².

The 2004 thematic evaluation of the PRRO category (WFP, 2004e, p.vi) noted that while WFP registers progress towards output targets (as in Table 13), accomplishment of recovery outcomes has been more uneven and largely undocumented due to limited information available on beneficiary outcomes, such as expanding livelihood capacity or creating sustainable assets. The current evaluation shares this concern.

9.3 Sustainability

Ideally, recovery activities should have one of two longer-term objectives:

- To enable communities to become self-supporting (and thus no longer in need of assistance)
- To enable a phase over to other types of assistance programmes (either through WFP development assistance, or assistance programmes supported by other agencies).

There is little indication that the recovery activities undertaken within the current PRROs have been designed with either of these two objectives in mind.

For example, the 2003 VAM study of Sierra Leone identified lack of seed as one of the major limiting factors to increasing farmer productivity. Seed protection programmes (food-for-

⁸⁰ This approach was not appreciated by the Government, which would have preferred direct distribution of assistance to the individual families that had been actually displaced, as WFP did for refugees, and does for displaced people in Liberia.

⁸¹ School feeding is also the main activity in the Guinea Country Programme. The ration in the development school feeding and the emergency school feeding differs both in terms of quantity and type of commodity (school feeding ration under the Country Programme is larger, and includes rice rather than maize meal). Although there is no evidence that this is currently causing tensions, it should have been avoided.

⁸² Sierra Leone undertook a study into Food-for-Training in 2003, but unfortunately a copy of the report was not available to the mission.



Agriculture) were introduced by FAO and WFP with the aim of preventing farmers consuming their seed stocks because of hunger - thus there should be a direct and measurable link between the intervention and increased planting (and hopefully, harvest). (The seed protection interventions are also the main recovery activity that provides WFP food during the hungry season, one of the main times of food insecurity in the region⁸³.) However, neither WFP nor FAO have been able to show that the seed protection programmes actually resulted in increased harvests by the beneficiary farmers⁸⁴, nor whether beneficiary farmers had become more self-supporting⁸⁵.

Similarly, there has been little analysis of the impacts of support for farm rehabilitation (or restructuring), and whether the activities have helped to establish assets that are sustainable and improve the livelihoods of beneficiaries over the longer term⁸⁶. In some cases, the same communities have continued to receive food-for-work support year after year, doing basically the same activities⁸⁷.

The 2003 JAM (WFP/UNHCR, 2003, p. 12) noted that there had been problems in returnees in Sierra Leone receiving their second round of food assistance because of a lack of clear information about the meeting points and lack of means to reach those points. Yet there is no information on the impact of this failure in terms of the ability of returnees to reintegrate and become self-reliant.

Planned interventions have often taken little account of the PRRO cycle⁸⁸. Emergency school feeding is the major recovery activity in all three countries, and is the best implemented from an operational point of view⁸⁹. However, the emergency school feeding interventions supported under the PRRO take no account of the fact that the period covered by the PRRO does not

⁸³ Schools are normally closed during this period. The heavy rains preclude large-scale food-for-work interventions (although the Liberia joint FAO-WFP-UNHCR Agricultural Programme for the 2004 agricultural season does foresee a distribution of food in part payment during the mid-hunger gap period (June-July) for agricultural work previously undertaken.

⁸⁴ A study into the effectiveness of the intervention was undertaken by WFP in 2002/2003, but the results were flawed.

⁸⁵ In Sierra Leone, local food production is estimated to have increased substantially - cereal self-sufficiency increased from 30percent in 2001 to 44percent in 2002 to 60percent in 2003. But there is no evidence that the seed protection programme played a significant role in this - the increased security situation is the most likely reason, in that farmers felt confident to increase the areas planted.

⁸⁶ Certainly the activities supported appeared to do little to address the main agricultural constraints in the region, as described in the Sierra Leone 2003 VAM study. On the basis of the VAM study, and a later 2004 study of food-for-work, these types of intervention were phased out in Sierra Leone 2004.

⁸⁷ The 2004 thematic evaluation of the PRRO category (WFP, 2004e) concluded that it was difficult to determine whether sustainable assets were created through PRROs.

⁸⁸ Not included here is the WFP support to support road rehabilitation through Food for Work in Sierra Leone, which for a number of reasons took some years before it actually commenced, and which then was unable to attract sufficient workers to complete the intervention within the time-frame envisaged. As events showed, this was an over-ambitious project, but it is only with hindsight that it is possible to say that the intervention should never have been started - lack of road access was noted as a major constraint by the Sierra Leone VAM study.

⁸⁹ Food management systems had been quickly put in place; most school administrators understand how to use the forms provided and maintain records; food storage standards at schools are acceptable (although there were problems of infestation of maize meal in Guinea); cooks are employed and school meals are being prepared; parent contributions are being used to buy additional commodities and condiments; and the food prepared at the times of the mission's visits was very tasty, and well appreciated by the children and their parents. From the educational perspective too, the interventions appear to be working well. In all the schools visited by the mission, teachers were present; most children had access to text books and work books; a check (based on a sample of the students' work books, material on the blackboards of the classrooms visited, and questions to a sample of children about their work) showed that students were receiving an education; classroom attendance rolls showed little evidence of absenteeism. However the overall purpose of emergency school feeding in the region was unclear, and so it was not possible to determine whether the intervention was appropriate or not - see Annex VII.



correspond with the academic year⁹⁰. As countries phase out of the PRRO (e.g. Sierra Leone, and perhaps Guinea), it is unlikely that development resources will be sufficient to support all the schools currently receiving food through emergency school feeding - there is thus a real danger that schools may be cut from the programme half way through the school year⁹¹. This has implications for the longer term impact of the programme.

Lack of sustainability is also an issue for the targeted curative feeding interventions in the refugee camps. Encouraging women from the surrounding villages to use camp services is part of the strategy to bridge the disparities in the social and economic situation of refugees and host communities. Because local health infrastructure is usually weak (or non-existent), a large proportion of the local communities have now become reliant on the camp facilities, especially the therapeutic feeding centres and MCH programmes. In the MSF-B therapeutic feeding centre in Gondama refugee camp in Sierra Leone, 22 of the 27 severely malnourished children treated in March 2004 were from the host community. But Governments are not in a position to maintain a similar level of services for local communities once the camps close⁹². The therapeutic feeding centre in Bo government hospital in Sierra Leone collapsed when MSF-B withdrew - despite the fact that MSF-B invested months in building local capacity prior to the withdrawal, the Government was unable to provide qualified staff, medicines, therapeutic milk or food, even with the introduction of comparatively high fees for admissions⁹³.

10. EFFICIENCY OF WFP OPERATIONS

10.1 Operational Costs

The 2004 thematic evaluation of the PRRO category (WFP, 2004e) proposed three measures of efficiency for WFP PRROs:

- Direct Operational Costs (DOC) per ton
- Direct Support Costs (management costs) per beneficiary
- LTSH rates.

Table 14 presents the evolution of each of these costs over the past four West Africa coastal PRROs (based on project budgets⁹⁴):

Table 14: Changes in Operational and Management Costs by PRRO

	PRRO	PRRO	PRRO	PRRO 10064.2
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⁹⁰ The draft Emergency School Feeding Guidelines draw attention to this issue (p.18), noting that it is highly desirable that food to schools continues until the end of the school year.

⁹¹ Schools supported through ESF in Sierra Leone were originally included in the proposed Sierra Leone Country Programme. In 2004 Guinea was exploring the feasibility of expanding the on-going Country Programme to include schools supported through ESF. In Liberia, ESF is planned to be implemented for a two-year period (i.e. the 2003/2004 and 2004/2005 school years), after which WFP will undertake a review to determine the relevance and suitability of continuing with a school feeding programme.

⁹² Closure of the camps can be expected to have a more general economic impact on the surrounding population. Although no figures appear to exist, there is no doubt that the relief operations for refugees have given a significant boost to the surrounding economy.

⁹³ A Quick Action Project (103002.0) "Integrated Mother and Child Health and Nutrition", was approved in October 2003 for 18 months (1/1/2004 - 30/6/2005) to help address the lack of local health care capacity, but with limited results to date.

⁹⁴ Actual costs would be more interesting, although DOC, DSC and LTSH costs are fixed by the project documents. In fact, this comparison may not be a good indicator of efficiency - it may tell more about WFP's approach to presenting budgets than about actual costs and actual efficiency.



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	6271	10064.0	10064.1	
DOC/ton (\$)	514	463	460	486
DSC/Planned Beneficiary (\$)	7.50	8.51	8.99	12.38 (10.32 with contingency)
DSC/Actual Beneficiary (\$)	9.25	8.17	8.13	n.a.
LTSH Rate (\$)	135	127	100	111

There has been a general increase in planned operational costs overall, with DOC and DSC significantly higher for PRRO 10064.2 than for the earlier PRROs. The difficulty with using planned budget figures is that it is unclear whether they suggest that the PRROs are becoming more or less efficient, or whether WFP budgeting has become increasing realistic, given the challenges the region poses for implementing food aid interventions (including continuing insecurity and weak technical support from Government and other agencies). Unfortunately no other reliable figures than planned budgets are available.

The operational management costs of the PRRO are paid out of the DSC. DSC costs as a proportion of total direct operational costs increased slightly, from 14,5 percent in PRRO 10064.0 to 15,5 percent in each of PRRO 10064.1 and PRRO 10064.2. But as a proportion of total commodity costs, DSC fell from 30 percent in PRRO 10064.0 to 27 percent in PRRO 10064.1 and 28 percent in PRRO 10064.2 (see Table 8). A 2002 study of general WFP DSC costs in relief operations, based on 149 EMOPS and 72 PRROs approved between 1996 and 2000, found that budgeted DSC costs for PRROs averaged 16 percent of commodity costs (in terms of actual expenditure, DSC costs averaged 15 percent of commodity costs). However, in LDC countries, budgeted DSC costs averaged 19 percent of commodity costs (and 18 percent of expenditure). In countries with a low UNDP Human Development Index, budgeted DSC costs averaged 22 percent of total commodity costs. Average budgeted DSC costs for PRROs in Duty Stations with an "E" hardship classification (the most severe) were 21 percent of total commodity costs. From this perspective, DSC costs for the regional West Africa coastal operation are high, but not way out of line from the DSC costs for similar types of operations in similar countries⁹⁵.

On the basis of the amount of budgeted DSC per planned beneficiary, the earliest PRRO (PRRO 6271) was lowest. However, when the DSC is calculated against the actual beneficiary numbers, only PRRO 10064.2 was higher.

Ten percent of the combined DSC for both the regional PRRO and the Côte d'Ivoire regional EMOP are allocated to fund the Regional Humanitarian Co-ordination and Support Office, created in September 2003. The RHCSO is intended to have a support (and not a supervisory) role, in particular to:

- Liaise with political actors and donors relevant for the concerned countries, who are physically located in, or are passing through, Abidjan
- Prepare the regional PRROs and EMOPS
- Coordinate regional air operations under the Special Operation
- Elaborate on inputs for the regional CAPs, early warning and contingency planning exercises.

⁹⁵ The DSC costs for the West Africa Coastal Region PRROs are relatively modest when compared with the DSC costs for the Great Lakes Region (36 percent of commodity costs in 2001-2003) and Angola (almost 39 percent of commodity costs in 2004)



Replies to the questionnaires distributed to the seven country offices included in the regional PRRO and the regional EMOP showed considerable ambivalence concerning the role and value of the RHCSO. Given that the RHCSO has only recently become established, and by April 2004 was still not up to its full staff, it is not fair to draw firm conclusions about the added value of the office. But it should be pointed out that country offices did make the point quite strongly that they would like to have additional technical support for programming, either in the country office itself or at the regional level, in order to improve the technical quality of the activities they are being requested to undertake⁹⁶.

The Regional Bureau (ODD) allocates the remaining DSC to country offices on the basis of assessed need⁹⁷. It is unclear what criteria are used in assessing "need" or in making the DSC allocations. Of the total 2003 allocation of DSC, Liberia received 54 percent, Sierra Leone 20 percent and Guinea 17 percent. By comparison, in terms of the planned food distributions for 2003, Liberia was allocated 35 percent of total commodities, Sierra Leone 40 percent and Guinea 25 percent. (In terms of actual food distributions in 2003, Liberia received 32 percent of commodities, Sierra Leone 42 percent and Guinea 26 percent).

At the time of the mission (April 2004) Monrovia was under UN security Phase IV while the rest of Liberia was under UN security Phase V⁹⁸. This had direct implications for the number of staff and the cost of implementing humanitarian assistance. On the other hand, the majority of food distributed in Liberia in 2003 was for relief. Relief interventions typically have lower management and programme costs than do recovery interventions. Thus the figures would seem to suggest that Sierra Leone, which both distributed more food and distributed more food for recovery interventions, should have received a higher proportion of DSC, and Liberia a lower proportion.

One of the major challenges for PRROs generally is that the DSC budget is likely to diminish substantially during the shift from relief to recovery because recovery interventions typically involve the distribution of less food than relief interventions, and thus attract less DSC. However recovery interventions usually also require significantly more technical support, both from implementing partners and from WFP programme staff - i.e. the DSC requirement is greater⁹⁹.

⁹⁶ The 1996 evaluation noted that (WFP, 1996b, p.86): "Those working in relief and development also tend to conceive of their expertise and roles as relating to one or the other." The Supplementary Field review (WFP, 2002d, p.7) also noted "the staff expertise needed during the implementation of an EMOP is quite different from that required for recovery activities". The current evaluation is in no position to comment one way or the other on this issue.

⁹⁷ This is the main discretionary role that ODD has under the regional PRRO, that it would not have under a country specific operation.

⁹⁸ In September 2004 Liberia was all security Phase IV.

⁹⁹ The 2004 thematic evaluation of the PRRO category (WFP, 2004d, para. 43) noted that "the 1999 PRRO Guidelines indicate that development of recovery programmes requires sophisticated analysis and development, but the [thematic] evaluation found this expertise has not been systematically available to WFP field offices. The problem is evident from the quality of recovery strategies. Lack of programme capacity among field staff can be inferred from the programmatic weaknesses identified by the field evaluations in recovery strategies, assessment, M&E and targeting. " The situation becomes even more serious with the shift from recovery to development, in that development resources are significantly less than resources for EMOPs and PRROs, and hence the DSC available to implement development interventions falls dramatically. One implication of this (which is likely to dominate the work of country offices in both Sierra Leone and Guinea during 2004/2005) is that country offices have to significantly reduce both international and national staff numbers as PRROs get phased out and replaced by development programmes.



Despite significantly increased food requirements, external transport costs dropped dramatically between PRRO 10064.0 and PRRO 10064.1. Between PRRO 10064.0 and PRRO 10064.2, external transport costs increased by only 10 percent despite the fact that total commodity costs increased by almost 50 percent (see Table 8).

On the basis of the planned budgets, highest costs for LTSH¹⁰⁰ were for PRRO 6271 - the earliest. LTSH has declined as a proportion of the total budget from 22 percent in PRRO 10064.0 to 18,5 percent in PRRO 10064.2.

Thus on these figures, there is evidence of improved efficiency in the PRRO, but also that more could be achieved.

10.2 Resource Mobilisation and Pipeline Management

Resource mobilization has been particularly good (see Table 15). The level of contributions against assessed needs increased from 85 percent for PRRO 10064.0 to 100 percent for PRRO 10064.1 (PRRO 10064.2 was resourced at 40 percent by end-February 2004)¹⁰¹.

Table 15: Resource Mobilisation in 2002 and 2003 (metric tons)

	Planned Distribution in 2002	Resourced in 2002		Shipped/Purchased in 2002
		In-kind	Cash	
PRRO 6271.0	-	-		22,040
PRRO 10064.0	81,091	45,475	19,966	74,448
Error! Bookmark not defined.	Planned Distribution in 2003	Resourced in 2003		Shipped/Purchased in 2003
		In-kind	Cash	
PRRO 10064.0	16,826	-	2,191	9,401
PRRO 10064.1	74,992	58,011	35,001	93,633
PRRO 10064.2	-	41,160	8,250	8,350

Source: 2003 and 2004 SPRs (WFP 2003e and 2003f, and WFP 2004a, 2004b and 2004c)

Although 17 countries have contributed to the regional PRRO since 2001, the US alone provided 63 percent of total resources in 2001, 51 percent in 2002 and 48 percent in 2003. The EC provided 21 percent of total resources in 2001, 25 percent in 2002 and 32 percent in 2003. Between them, the US and the EC have provided approximately four fifths of the total resources received over the past three years.

Pipeline management has also strengthened. There have been few pipeline breaks¹⁰². The number of regional transshipments (shipments from one country in the region to another to overcome

¹⁰⁰ LTSH costs also include costs of implementing partners, and may not be a fair comparison. As argued later, these costs may have been underestimated.

¹⁰¹ Although resourcing of PRROs in general has been high. In 2002 donors met 96 percent of total PRRO needs (WFP, 2003). In 2003 93percent of total PRRO needs was resourced (WFP, 2004).

¹⁰² Minor pipeline breaks occurred in Guinea in April 2002 and in June 2003. WFP responded by reducing the general food distribution ration. In the second half of 2003 WFP borrowed commodities from other countries in the region, and from other food pipeline agencies in Sierra Leone, to meet shortfalls in Liberia, caused by a combination of increased needs due to the conflict in Monrovia and loss of commodities looted from the port during that conflict. However there has been no systematic approach to the management of pipeline breaks. In Guinea in 2003, WFP reduced the General Food Distribution ration across the board, but maintained all beneficiaries. In similar, although more severe, situations in 1999 WFP culled beneficiaries from the distribution list.



pipeline shortfalls) halved between 2002 and 2003. However, Liberia country call forwards in the first three months of 2004 significantly exceeded prevailing distribution rates, with consequent oversupply, and some food spoilage, especially of maize meal, in the warehouse.

In the West Africa Coastal region, food aid has been the only humanitarian resource with which donors have been generous. One result of this has been that governments and other agencies look to WFP to support activities that are less appropriate for food aid, such as funding the construction of school buildings and health clinics, helping meet the salaries of teachers and health clinic staff, and so on. Thus rather than focus on those activities where food aid has a comparative advantage, WFP has sometimes been tempted into supporting less appropriate activities. As well as being a poor use of food aid, it also creates additional burdens on the limited and already stretched capacities of country office programme staff¹⁰³.

The shift from recovery to development (from PRRO to Country Programme) is likely to be significantly hampered by the prevailing gap in the level of resources provided by donors for relief and recovery and those provided for development activities¹⁰⁴. Donors have been especially hesitant in providing general development resources for the countries covered by this PRRO. Unless WFP is able to significantly improve the mobilisation of development resources for the region, the decline in resourcing levels as the PRRO is replaced by WFP development interventions will require major re-adjustments in the number of beneficiaries, the level of management and technical support that can be provided by WFP, and the types of activities supported. It is also likely to result in a refocusing of WFP activities to areas suffering structural food security problems, rather than those directly affected by the crisis¹⁰⁵.

10.3 Targeting

The most obvious sign of poor efficiency in the PRRO is the targeting of general food distributions in refugee camps in Guinea and in displaced person camps in Liberia.

For refugee numbers, WFP is basically at the mercy of UNHCR, despite the 2002 Memorandum of Understanding stressing that numbers should be jointly assessed - in practice WFP has no firm basis for assuming lower numbers than those proposed by UNHCR¹⁰⁶.

Identifying and registering displaced people is a far more difficult exercise than registering refugees, especially in Liberia where people have been forced to flee several times. The

¹⁰³ An example is the guidelines for food-for-work work norms prepared by the Liberia country office. Partly because of the technical background of the staff member assigned this responsibility, but also because of demands for particular types of food-for-work activities from Government and other agencies, the guidelines give maximum emphasis to constructing and rehabilitating buildings, activities that are not particularly appropriate for food for work.

¹⁰⁴ In 2003, donors provided only 63 percent of the resources required for WFP development programmes globally, as against 93 percent of the resources required for PRROs (WFP, 2004, Table 2)

¹⁰⁵ The VAM studies naturally play a significant role in directing WFP development interventions. The Sierra Leone VAM study suggested that the areas of the country that had been most affected by the crisis were not necessarily facing the greatest food security problems. Similarly, the Guinea VAM study focused WFP development activities in regions other than Guinea Forestiere, the area most affected by the crisis (although a planned 2004 revision of the food security map may change this). The national level of the VAM analyses is likely to have masked any specific food security problems faced by individuals who were most affected by the crisis - i.e. the people that WFP assists through EMOPs and PRROs. Thus there is a very real danger that there will not be a neat phase over of specific beneficiaries from the PRRO into the Country Programme.

¹⁰⁶ It appears that a harmonious working relationship between UNHCR and WFP, including agreement on the number of beneficiaries, depends mostly on the inter-personal relationships between the respective in-country heads of each agency. The MOU seems to have limited practical value in terms of enhancing field level co-operation.



humanitarian community as a whole has still to successfully agree on an operational definition of "displaced person".

In targeting general food distributions in Liberia, WFP has used "displacement" as the sole criteria¹⁰⁷. Each displaced person (as registered by LRRR, the concerned Government agency) in recognized "displaced person camps" receives a full free ration.

The number of actual beneficiaries in need of relief assistance in the displaced person camps in Liberia may have been significantly exaggerated. A high proportion of the maize meal distributed to Liberian IDPs as part of the general food distribution in 2004 has been sold by the beneficiaries¹⁰⁸ - the money they receive from the sale of a 50 kg bag of maize meal is only sufficient to purchase 5-6 cups of rice (approximately 1.5 kg). The evidence is that high levels of maize meal sales have been occurring for the entire first quarter of 2004. Yet there are no signs that the nutrition of the beneficiaries has been negatively affected, despite the fact that they are apparently exchanging 50 kg of cereals for 1.5 kg. This suggests that many beneficiaries of the general food distribution in Liberia are not reliant on the WFP relief assistance to meet all, or even most, of their nutrition needs¹⁰⁹.

"Displacement" by itself may not be an appropriate indicator of food vulnerability. The report of the assessment team that first visited Zwedru found no significant food security differences between people who had been displaced and the host population. Yet in line with WFP regional policy, general food distributions in Zwedru were targeted only to registered displaced people¹¹⁰.

There have been two consequences of the WFP approach to targeting general food distributions in Liberia. First, many of the inhabitants of official displaced person camps are now long-term residents - and have been receiving free food from WFP over many years¹¹¹. For them, the food ration has become an entitlement¹¹². (In this regard, the conclusion of the 1996 evaluation (WFP, 1996a) that free food distributions had been too prolonged may have relevance to the future WFP operation in Liberia¹¹³.)

Secondly, many people, including displaced people (for a number of reasons, which are not always clear) live in other types of accommodation¹¹⁴ - often precariously, and without benefit of

¹⁰⁷ WFP is not alone in this. In Liberia it has almost become a given among most agencies and NGOs that the displaced to be among the most vulnerable.

¹⁰⁸ Significant amounts of maize meal from Liberia are trucked into Guinea and other countries - as observed by the mission. How much of this originates from sales by the beneficiaries, and how much is from stocks stolen before it reaches the beneficiaries, is unclear (and large amounts of maize meal were looted from Monrovia during the summer of 2003). The SCF report makes it clear, however, that many beneficiaries do sell the maize meal they receive from the general food distribution.

¹⁰⁹ However a wise precaution would be to urgently implement a system of nutrition monitoring, to ensure that nutrition is not be negatively affected by the food aid sales.

¹¹⁰ And as discussed above, the Sierra Leone VAM study found no relationship between displacement and food insecurity.

¹¹¹ Prior to June 2003, around 100,000 displaced people were living in 6 IDP camps (and one refugee camp) in Montserrado County, and benefiting from the WFP General Food Distribution. The rebels in their attacks on Monrovia purposely targeted these camps, and most of the residents were forced to flee.

¹¹² In fact, WFP may now have very little flexibility in changing distribution systems in Liberia. The simmering level of violence in all the camps (and the large numbers of armed groups in the country generally) gives WFP very limited room to manoeuvre to improve targeting to only those in most need.

¹¹³ The WFP Liberia Country Office should be congratulated for withstanding strong pressure from donors, other agencies and NGOs to commence general free food distributions during for all Monrovia residents summer 2003.

¹¹⁴ OCHA has classified three different types of IDP accommodation in Liberia - Formal IDP camps, Irregular IDP shelters and Spontaneous Settlements. Currently only those living in Formal IDP camps are assured of receiving WFP food. Following an emergency assessment of residents in Spontaneous Settlements in January 2004, a one-shot distribution of food and non-food items was given.



humanitarian assistance, although their living conditions are usually more insecure than the inhabitants of the formal IDP camps¹¹⁵.

10.4 Institutional Memory

There is no doubt that the overall efficiency of the WFP operation has been hampered by the high levels of turnover of international staff. There are two implications of this. Firstly, staff gaps have required *ad hoc* placements, with little warning or preparation for the staff member suddenly allocated additional responsibilities. For example, some technical focal points within country offices have been appointed with little or no prior expertise in the areas for which they have had to assume responsibility.

The lack of continuity of staff also means that there has been limited development of an "institutional memory" within country offices, and thus little learning from past experiences¹¹⁶.

The development of institutional memory has been further eroded by the lack of proper documentation of operational decisions or preparation of handover notes to guide newcomers. The lack of documentation is compounded by the fact that in country offices, management of filing systems is generally weak¹¹⁷.

10.5 Impact of Security Regulations

The recent strengthening of United Nations security regulations has had significant implications for the work and workload of country office programme staff. In Liberia (which is Phase IV), the arrangement of what would in other countries be basic field trips (e.g., for monitoring purposes) now requires considerable bureaucratic and administrative follow-up in order to obtain all the necessary clearances, both within Liberia and from UN New York. Lone staff travel (even lone vehicle travel) is not permitted in large parts of Liberia - thus every field trip ties up at least two (and frequently more) WFP programme staff. As a result, field trips tend to become major activities, rather than part of the normal office routine.

One consequence of this has been a strong tendency to off-load much of the routine travel (such as monitoring) to implementing partners, who are less constrained in terms of travel and accessibility to communities. However implementing partners often have limited experience with food aid programmes, and there is evidence that monitoring has suffered¹¹⁸.

10.6 Reporting

Reporting demands on country office programme staff have been extremely heavy, seriously diverting programme staff from managing and monitoring food aid operations. Large amounts

¹¹⁵ It is unclear whether residents of Spontaneous Settlements were included in the nutrition survey of Monrovia residents undertaken in 2003. If so, this might help to explain the worse nutrition situation of Monrovia residents compared with residents of IDP camps.

¹¹⁶ Given that the present evaluation identified many of the same issues previously identified by the 1996 evaluation, it is ironic that the 1996 evaluation (WFP, 1996b, p. 54) concluded that regular evaluations could help create an institutional memory.

¹¹⁷ In two of the three countries visited by the mission, the Country Office found it extremely difficult to access files more than one year old. The Liberia country office was looted during the Monrovia fighting in the summer of 2003.

¹¹⁸ For example, food stock and control forms in some of the schools visited by the mission in Liberia were being incorrectly completed by the school authorities, despite a recent monitoring visit by the implementing partner.



of quantitative data (e.g. follow-up indicators) are collected in the field and reported in country office reports. The demand for much of these data originates from headquarters¹¹⁹.

In-country analysis of the data collected could help guide readjustments or improvements of WFP programmes, but very little of the data are analysed. As a result, there has been little apparent benefit to the WFP operations in-country from most of the data collection and reporting undertaken.

Commodity reporting remains a problem, despite the widespread use of the COMPAS system. Commodity distributions as reported in the 2003 SPRs for each PRRO bear little relationship to commodities reported in COMPAS as having been distributed by the different PRROs in 2003. COMPAS is used both as a pre-arrival tool (by headquarters) and as a commodity tracking system (by the country office and Regional Bureau) - very often the two entries are not cross-checked, with the result that data entered by the country office or Regional Bureau can differ from entries made by headquarters (which are often downloaded from WINGS).

11. THE REGIONAL APPROACH

Having a regional PRRO has had the following positive aspects:

- The regional approach has given ODD increased flexibility in pipeline management, enabling expansion or contraction¹²⁰ of food deliveries in light of changing needs within and between the different countries. However, there are limits to this flexibility, as discussed below.
- The regional approach has also given ODD increased flexibility in the allocation of the DSC budget. However, there is little evidence that ODD has used this flexibility to reallocate technical posts within the region to improve the quality of WFP interventions.
- Some regional standards have been introduced, most notably the standardisation of rations. This has increased the ability of ODD to manage the pipeline (in that fewer commodities have to be managed, and the commodities are, at least in theory, interchangeable between countries¹²¹). Standardisation of rations has also helped to prevent displaced people being attracted across international borders to access more preferred commodities (e.g. rice in some countries, bulgur in others)¹²².
- The decentralisation of ODD to Dakar has been beneficial. Country offices felt that with ODD being located physically closer to the beneficiary countries, the level and frequency of technical support provided by the regional technical advisers had increased. Locally-based donors also felt more comfortable approaching the Regional Bureau in Dakar directly with issues or concerns, whereas contact with WFP HQ would require a more formal and bureaucratic approach through the donor's capital¹²³.

¹¹⁹ All country offices, and particularly all Country Directors, claimed that excessive demands from headquarters seriously reduced the amount of time they could devote to in-country programming issues.

¹²⁰

Often overlooked, but equally important.

¹²¹ Although sometimes commodities cannot be interchanged because of donor restrictions. The maize meal is a case in point, where the donor earmarked the (cash-in-lieu of commodities) donation to Liberia - however it is unclear who took the decision that the cash should be used to purchase maize meal rather than another more appropriate cereal, such as bulgur. It is possible that the purchase had to be made in the EU, in which case bulgur would not have been a possibility.

¹²² Although the 1996 evaluation also noted (p. 26) that standardization of rations showed "a lack of understanding or recognition of the complexity of the regional emergency in its impact in different situations".

¹²³ Despite the fact that ODD is technically a part of headquarters, donors do not view it as a headquarters department, and make a clear distinction between ODD and Rome-based departments.



On the other hand, other potential advantages of a regional approach have so far been overlooked, including:

- Nearly all communication linkages have remained hierarchical, between the country office and RHCSO, ODD or WFP HQ. There has been extremely limited structured communication and information-sharing directly between country offices, even when events in one country have implications for a neighbouring country (e.g. movements of refugees).
- Country Offices have often taken the initiative in establishing standards and preparing operating procedures. But these have only occasionally been shared with the other countries of the region, even though they would have been equally applicable¹²⁴. Examples include the design of beneficiary ration cards, pro-formas for food management (especially for school feeding), operating standards for nutrition interventions, criteria to assess the technical capacity of implementing partners, FFW work norms and fleet management procedures.
- Flexibility in resource management may be more apparent than real. ODD has full control and flexibility only over the allocation of DSC. ODD has more limited control and flexibility over LTSH rates - a standard rate is applied in the PRRO documentation, based on a weighted transport cost average across the three countries, which in theory could give ODD flexibility to meet extraordinary LTSH costs (or to make special savings). Food allocations in the regional operation are only slightly less rigid than in a normal country-specific operation - once the country office has created the resource request for commodities, there is little additional flexibility available to the regional logistics officers to redirect shipments as requirements change¹²⁵.

12. RECOMMENDATIONS

12.1 For Country Offices:

- **Address more directly the causes of short-term food insecurity in the design of recovery activities.** Recovery activities should be designed (and implemented) with exit strategies already considered - either phase out of food assistance when populations have become self-reliant, or phase over to other types of assistance (including, if appropriate, WFP development assistance).
- **Recovery activities should be more focussed.** Each country office should support no more than three or four different types of recovery activities, to maximise the use of available in-country technical expertise. (Food-for-work and food-for-training activities would appear to be the most obvious candidates for reduction or elimination). The design of recovery strategies should have very clear objectives for each type of intervention, be clear on the purpose and role of food aid, identify appropriate indicators to measure success in reaching objectives, and describe monitoring and evaluation systems to measure impact. Recovery activities should be formulated to ensure their complete implementation within the planned duration of the PRRO.
- **Introduce ex-post monitoring in recovery activities to help establish the effectiveness of food assistance and draw lessons.**

¹²⁴ Where sharing has occurred, this has often been because staff have been re-assigned from one country to another in the region, and have taken their knowledge with them. Examples include the FBM reporting mechanism in Sierra Leone, adapted from that developed in Guinea, and FFW work norms in Liberia, adapted from Sierra Leone.

¹²⁵ As in the case of increased food requirements for Liberia in the summer of 2003, diverted shipments became "borrowings" from the countries the food was diverted from. As of April 2004, much of this borrowed food had still not been repaid.



- **Improve targeting of relief assistance.** Targeting should be on the basis of need for food assistance, rather than by particular socio-economic categories. Prolonged general food distribution creates dependency and the notion that free food is an entitlement. They should be replaced as soon as feasible by targeted interventions, addressed to identified food needs.
- **Strengthen support to MCH programmes.** The curative feeding programmes in the refugee camps have been extremely well appreciated by the local host population, and are filling a chronic need. However, the provision of curative feeding services through refugee camps is obviously not sustainable in the longer term. A preferable approach would be to develop an integrated community-based MCH programme within the communities surrounding the refugee camps (such as the integrated MCH project in Sierra Leone) rather than on encouraging women from the host communities to utilise camp services.
- **In-country institutional memory should be strengthened.** Preparation of complete hand over notes should be mandatory (i.e. part of the MAP) for Country Directors, Deputy Country Directors and technical focal points, prior to departure from the country (or function, in the case of technical focal points). Preparation of some sort of Annual Country Briefing Note should be part of the work plan for each country office. These Notes should include descriptions of operations, particular challenges or problems faced and how they were addressed, and the reasons behind the operational decisions taken. Country Briefing Notes should be distributed to new staff on assumption of duties (and to missions¹²⁶). Technical focal points should ensure that operational decisions are properly documented (and later reflected in the Annual Country Briefing Note). Country Directors must ensure that files (including electronic files) are properly maintained, and are accessible whenever required.
- **Improve the assessment of the technical capacity of implementing partners.** Assessment of project proposals submitted by implementing partners should include both a technical assessment of the proposal, and an assessment of the implementing partner's technical ability to effectively implement the proposal. The format for project proposals should include additional information on the needs of beneficiaries, targeting approaches, implementing strategy, monitoring and evaluation systems and exit strategy. The rapid and simple tools developed by the nutrition unit in Liberia to assess the capacity of implementing partners in curative feeding interventions provide a good example of what can be achieved.
- **Institute annual reviews of implementing partners.** Reviews should focus on the technical capacity of the implementing partners to adequately undertake the work expected from them.

12.2 For the Region

- **Strengthen regional technical support to country offices.** WFP country operations require additional technical support to ensure that WFP interventions meet acceptable standards. Introduction of new types of interventions (e.g. to address HIV/AIDS) will

¹²⁶ The briefing notes prepared by the Liberia country office for the current mission could serve as an example.



also require additional technical support. The technical support in country offices could be reinforced through the creation of a sub-regional technical team focused on issues specific to the countries covered by the PRRO. Such a team would supplement the technical assistance provided by ODD. The team could comprise some of the technical experts currently provided in countries. Additional sub-regional technical expertise might be funded through specific donor programme improvement funds, or through reallocation of DSC funds.

- **Increase the DSC component of the PRRO.** The current DSC component of the West Africa coastal PRRO is high, but not extremely so when compared to similar PRROs in similar countries. Given the prevailing security situation in the countries included in the PRRO, a strong case could be made for an increased DSC component. The evidence is that donors familiar with the region and its problems would be sympathetic to this, so long as they were assured that this would result in improved quality of WFP interventions.
- **Encourage more inter-country dissemination of information and experiences.** There is a desperate need for country offices of the PRRO to communicate with each other, sharing ideas, technical guidelines and experiences. The regional structures should encourage this inter-country communication. Quarterly technical meetings of technical focal points would help strengthen the expertise of technical staff, by allowing free discussion on respective programmes, problems and constraints encountered and lessons learnt.
- **Increase regional standardisation.** The three countries included in the PRRO are dealing with similar problems, similar population groups, and similar backgrounds. Rations were only standardised in the PRRO in 2003. Many other aspects of the operation could also be standardised across the region, including the design of ration cards, the design of food management pro formas, and criteria for assessing implementing partners. The best of the different documentation prepared *ad hoc* by country offices could provide the basis for standardised approaches.

12.3 For WFP HQ

- **Provide WFP staff with appropriate tools to enable them to deal effectively with protection and abuse issues.** At the very least, there should be clear WFP guidelines on reporting mechanisms, so that every WFP staff member knows to whom they should report issues of abuse, and what actions can be expected. As appropriate, such guidelines should be UN-system wide (WFP might even take the lead in this).
- **Revise the formula for establishing Direct Support Costs in Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations.** Ensure that sufficient technical backstopping can be provided to recovery interventions, as well as funds to cover the additional expenses of complying with overall security procedures.
- **Review the UNHCR/WFP MOU from the point of view of practical effectiveness at field level.** Particular attention is required over the issue of the number of refugees requiring food aid, and the level of food aid provided. It should be made very clear to WFP members participating in JAMs that it is their responsibility to ensure that refugee



numbers suggested by UNHCR are acceptable to WFP, and that WFP accepts responsibility for providing agreed food rations for the numbers authorised by the JAM. Adopt stronger wording during the next revision of the UNHCR/WFP MOU to emphasize WFP responsibility in assessing refugee food security, while recognising overall responsibility of UNHCR for refugee registration.

- **Ensure reporting is more effective.** WFP internal reporting procedures should be reduced and streamlined, with more emphasis given to reporting that will assist management. This is likely to mean less data collection, and more analysis. A regular review of reporting requirements initiated by headquarters may help to focus discussion. Regular quantitative reviews of the time spent by country offices on meeting reporting requirements would also be valuable.
- **Improve the formats of PRRO documentation to ensure stronger problem analysis, definition of food aid recipient needs and linkages to document objectives.** Additional information should be included on the specific needs of the populations to be assisted and how each proposed activity would address these. The PRRO documentation should also describe implementation strategies, performance indicators and expected results for each proposed activity. Logframes, including implementation strategies, performance indicators and expected results for each proposed activity, should be integral to project formulation and design, and not an add-on.
- **Improve normative guidelines for recovery activities.** In PRROs generally, recovery activities are poorly designed and implemented. Within WFP, appropriate normative guidelines for recovery activities are lacking. Some issues (such as criteria to guide the shift from relief to recovery, implementation of food for work) have hardly been addressed. For others, draft guidelines exist, but have never been finalised (e.g. emergency school feeding).
- **Establish a separate budget category for refugees.** The thematic evaluation of the PRRO category recommended a separate budget for refugees, distinct from non-refugee relief and recovery interventions. The current evaluation supports that recommendation.



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WFP (2003h): **Post Distribution Monitoring in 8 Refugee Camps in Sierra Leone**, WFP/TSU, May 2003

WFP (2003i): **Vulnerability Assessment of Monrovia and its Environment: case study of 6 urban settlements and 2 IDPs camps**, WFP/VAM, Monrovia, November 2003

WFP (2003j): **Preliminary Findings from a Food and Livelihood Security Study in 10 Vulnerable Communities and 4 IDP Camps in Monrovia**, WFP/VAM, Monrovia, May 2003.

WFP (2003k): **2002 Annual Report on Food Aid**, Monrovia, Liberia

WFP (2003l): **Guidelines/Criteria for Project Proposals Submission, WFP supported Supplementary Feeding Programmes**, Monrovia, Liberia, November 2003

WFP (2003lm): **Nutrition and Retrospective Mortality Survey, Preliminary Report: Monrovia and its environs**, Monrovia Liberia, November 2003

WFP (2003n): **Integrated Mother and Child Health and Nutrition**, Project Summary Quick Action Project 10302.0

WFP (2003o): **Rural Food Security, Livelihoods and Nutrition Survey & Household Food Security Profiles, Sierra Leone**, VAM, June 2003.

WFP (2003p): **Strategic Plan (2004 - 2007)**, WFP/EB.3/2003/4-A/1, Rome October 2003

WFP (2004a): **WFP Standardised Project Report (SPR), 2003 - West Africa Cluster -Project No. 10064.0**, Rome, 2004

WFP (2004b): **WFP Standardised Project Report (SPR), 2003 - West Africa Cluster -Project No. 10064.1**, Rome, 2004

WFP (2004c): **WFP Standardised Project Report (SPR), 2003 - West Africa Cluster -Project No. 10064.2**, Rome, 2004

WFP (2004d): **Summary report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category**, WFP/EB.1/2004/6-A, Rome, February 2004

WFP (2004e): **Full Report of the Thematic Evaluation of the PRRO Category**, Rome 2004

WFP (2004f): **Mission report, Zwedru**, WFP Assessment Unit, February 2004

WFP (2004g): **Work Norms for Infrastructure Projects**, WFP Food for Work Programme, Monrovia, 2004



WFP (2004h): ***Brief on Liberia Emergency School Feeding Intervention***, Monrovia 2004

WFP (2004i): ***Vulnerability Assessment in Bong and Margibi: case study of 3 urban settlements and 3 IDPs camps***, WFP/VAM Draft report, February 2004.

WFP (2004j): ***Annual Performance Report for 2003***, WFP/EB.A/2004/4-A

WFP/CRS (2004): ***Report of WFP and CRS Joint Monitoring MCH and SFP Programmes under CRS Safety Net Programme***, Monrovia February 2004

WFP/UNHCR (2003): ***Joint Assessment Mission for the West Africa Coastal Operation (Guinea, Sierra Leone and Liberia)***, June 2003



Annexes



Annex 1

Mission Terms of Reference

Evaluation Objectives

- Evaluate the PRROs' effectiveness¹²⁷, or achieved results, against the objectives at the outcome level, with references to the output level, when necessary. The relationship to crosscutting issues and their influence to results achievement will be examined, as well as linkages to strategic priorities, outlined in the 2004-2007 Strategic Plan;
- Examine the efficiency¹²⁸ of implementation and processes (including managerial issues) through: resource mobilisation and resource flows (including financial ones); programme, recovery and relief; beneficiary selection (including inclusion and exclusion errors); M&E, performance indicators as well as reporting mechanisms. The main purpose of this objective is to identify potential drawbacks in achieving effectiveness, and to assist in making sound recommendations;
- Establish advantages and disadvantages of the regional approach for PRROs and indicate where the added value lies; and evaluate the regional links between WAC PRROs and regional EMOPs. Establish the parameters for an effective programmatic approach in 2005 and assess the feasibility to merge both regional operations (PRRO and EMOP), including relevant considerations to synergies, partnerships and coordination.

Scope of Work

The main focus of the evaluation is to establish whether or not results were achieved, compared to stated objectives. Results¹²⁹ of the regional PRRO will be examined at the outcome level, for each relief/recovery activity type, with relevant linkages to the regional EMOP. The examination will cover some key issues related to implementation, throughout the last three years (2001 to 2003). Relevant output level results will also be examined, when directly affecting the level of outcome results. The evaluation will also establish whether both regional operations have contributed to "transforming insecure, fragile conditions into durable, stable situations (...)"¹³⁰. Crosscutting issues, namely gender, environment, protection concerns and security issues will be part of the overall analysis, as well as the assessment of strategic priorities as outlined in the 2004-2007 Strategic Plan.

This evaluation will also focus on the relevance of the strategy¹³¹, the implementation and processes efficiency, as well as on the project formulation/problem analysis and the actual level of flexibility offered by this project category over the life of the operation, not only in terms of

¹²⁷ **Effectiveness:** The extent to which the operation's objectives were achieved, or expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.

¹²⁸ **Efficiency:** A measure of how economical inputs are converted to outputs.

¹²⁹ "Orientation Guide", WFP 23 October 2003.

¹³⁰ "From Crisis to Recovery", WFP 1998.

¹³¹ "From Crisis to Recovery" (WFP/EB.A/98/4-A) as well as the PRRO Guidelines ("Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations: Guidelines for the Preparation of a PRRO", WFP February 1999) call for the preparation of a "recovery strategy" as the base on which all PRRO activities are designed.



the relief and recovery components, but also across national boundaries. Questions in relation to internally-displaced people, refugees¹³² and returnees will have to be taken into account, not so much in terms of separate PRRO components, but rather how these beneficiary groups fit into the relief and recovery components themselves, taking into account protection concerns and security issues. Procedures in terms of resourcing and programming, resource mobilisation and resource flows (including financial ones) will be examined. The efficiency, however, is only relevant when it directly affects effectiveness.

The regional approach will need some scrutiny, in order to establish its advantages and difficulties, as well as its comparative advantage in terms of existing and potential linkages between the Côte d'Ivoire Regional EMOP and the PRRO, including relevant considerations to synergies, partnerships and coordination. Various options for future regional formulation strategies should be examined, including a merge of both regional operations.

Finally, it will be useful to outline best practices and lessons learned about the use of food aid for meeting the immediate humanitarian needs and for helping to create conditions for sustained recovery and development.

Key Issues and Sub-issues

The evaluation will address the following issues and sub-issues:

1. Achieved results against the objectives:

Were stated objectives achieved? Have they been changed over time? Were they logically linked to the problem analysis and the role of food aid? Specify the percentage between relief and recovery and the degree of success for each. To what extent are the activities and outputs of the PRRO achieving the objectives? What are the linkages between the objectives of both regional operations? Has the results-based approach and performance indicators been introduced? Have any results been shown, following monitoring visits (please specify)? Have there been relevant unexpected effects? Are the objectives clear, realistic and coherent? Are the achievements clearly stated in the project document and linked to realistic means to be used? Were they realistic under the regional conditions?

2. Food security:

How have changes in livelihoods patterns, caused by the ongoing crisis, affected food security? Is there a particular pattern or timing to food insecurity? What have been common coping strategies, and how effective have they been? Assess the extent to which WFP interventions have contributed to the process of transforming insecure, fragile conditions into durable, stable situations for both men and women. Are there any particular factors (physical, social, spatial, economic, habitual, gender) that render particular groups of people more at risk of food insecurity and/or malnutrition? If so, how has WFP responded to the specific requirements of these groups? Have WFP assistance programmes by sector been designed and implemented in such a way that they have been an effective means of reducing food insecurity over the short and long term for both men and women?

3. Protection concerns and security issues:

¹³² "New text of the MOU between WFP and UNHCR", WFP 9 July 2002.



Describe the nature, pattern and scope of the prevailing security and protection issues, their implications for local food security and their influence on the WFP intervention as planned. Has access been a problem and, if so, how was the problem addressed? Is there a particular pattern, timing, logic or symbolism to security and protection abuses? What has been WFP staff role and tools available, in relation to protection concerns? What has been the effect in terms of disrupting people's livelihoods? What are the implications for the different genders? How have these issues affected the design and implementation of WFP interventions? Have the impact of exogenous factors, such as sanctions and security situation been sufficiently understood, taken into account and integrated? What actions has WFP taken to overcome security and protection problems? Are there any particular factors (physical, social, spatial, economic, habitual) that render particular groups of people more at risk and especially threatened? If so, how has WFP responded to the specific requirements of these groups? Have WFP assistance programmes by sector been designed and implemented in such a way that they help reduce people's vulnerability to attack, violation, coercion or deprivation? How have security issues affected the transition from relief to recovery? Would different types of recovery activities have been more appropriate, given the prevailing security and protection situation? How have mandated and non-mandated agencies have been coordinating their protection work? Assess the effectiveness of linkages with sister agencies, implementing partners and other stakeholders in terms of addressing security and protection issues. Describe the existing relationship between WFP, as a front-line humanitarian agency, and the agencies with clear protection mandates. How effective are current inter-agency arrangements for dealing reported cases of abuse? Any suggestions for the future?

4. Crosscutting issues:

Examine the extent to which WFP has adequately addressed cross-cutting issues (such as environment, nutrition, health and sanitation, HIV/AIDS, education) in the design and implementation of relief and recovery activities, in both the relief and recovery components. Is the PRRO document in line with the policies incorporated in "From Crisis to Recovery", the "Recurring Challenges in the Provision of Food Assistance in Complex Emergencies" and the "Commitments to Women"? Have environmental and security issues been addressed? Please specify. How do the choice of activity/intervention relate to the strategic priorities, as outlined in the 2004-2007 Strategic Plan?

5. Intervention strategy:

Is the strategy well prepared and does it convincingly set the foundation for the activities of the PRRO? Does it accurately gauge the opportunities to introduce recovery activities and challenge WFP to contribute to phasing down and to achieving sustainable solutions for the protracted crisis? Were risks to the PRRO strategy foreseen at the formulation stage (especially as regards to the recovery strategy: namely, resurgence of violence, influx of additional refugees, changing needs of target groups, loss of donor support) and have appropriate contingency plans been made? Has sufficient information been gathered at both households and community levels to decide the various recovery strategies at the formulation stage (if so, how it was reflected in project documents)? Have agencies' respective mandates been properly assessed and understood to create the necessary operational synergy in implementation (if so, explain how)? Have host governments' respective policies been integrated in designing recovery strategies and



implementation mechanisms (if so, explain how)? Have these strategies remained flexible and sensitive to rapidly changing contexts (if so, explain how)?

6. Shift from relief to recovery:

Have criteria been established to signal when to shift the intervention from relief to recovery and likewise from recovery to development? If so, are these being applied effectively? Have opportunities been identified and pursued for making the transition from relief to recovery activities (in particular, restoring livelihoods) where appropriate?

7. Documentation and arrangements:

Is there a regional/national Plan of operations? Is there any other national level documentation? Were coordination and partnerships arrangements sufficiently assessed? Which agency is responsible for what aspects (specify also between WFP and HCR, with regards to IDPs, refugees and returnees, for each country, operation and/or the region)? Are there Implementing Partners' Agreements? Do they define the roles and responsibilities clearly and coherently in relation to the project document and the task to be carried out? Are there any other local level agreements? How are the relief food distribution and recovery activities organised? What is the relative share of each one?

8. Mechanisms/systems:

Have adequate mechanisms and systems been established? Is there a clear definition of the roles and responsibilities? What are the advantages and drawbacks of the mechanisms/systems planned/established? Have proper mechanisms and systems (in relation to administration, finances, programme (including targeting criteria, beneficiary categorisation by groups, possible inclusion and exclusion errors and needs assessment methods), logistics, M&E and reporting) been created/fine tuned to carry out the intervention? How effective are these systems? Are they inter-linked? Are they well integrated and flexible enough? How were the overall managerial response and coordination arrangements? Has there been any added value to transforming long-standing refugee and IDP operations into a PRRO from an EMOP, in terms of building linkages and improving the likelihood of sustainability?

9. Resourcing and programming procedures:

Review procedures for resource mobilization, resource allocation (food, cash and non-food items) and pipeline management. Determine the extent to which current procedures helped or hindered resource mobilization/allocation as well as financial management and tracking, following changing needs within the region. Identify any significant constraints created by current WFP procedures, and common strategies adopted to overcome these.

10. Formulation:

Has the document been designed in a logical way? Is there a clear causal effect between sections? Does the project document provide a rationale for the intervention, identify target areas and groups, and define assistance modalities? Is the role of food aid clearly defined in the strategy? Is the balance between relief and recovery according to the needs? How well were the



risk factors assessed? Does it include an exit strategy? How does it interact with the Government's and other major actors' strategies? Indicate where the added value lies, both separately and as joint entities. Have regional links, between the regional PRRO and EMOP, been identified using the results-based approach? Are they addressed in national and regional documentation? Have they been changed over time? Has the impact been clearly stated?

11. Implementation:

Which mechanism/system is regional and which one is national (consider administration, resource mobilisation and resource flows (including financial ones), programme and recovery/relief, beneficiary selection, inclusion and exclusion errors, partnerships and coordination, logistics, M&E, performance indicators and reporting mechanisms)? How does the regional approach differ from the previous country-specific approach? What are its advantages and drawbacks? Specify whether or not it improved programming flexibility? Has food been programmed regionally? If not, what prevented it?

12. Co-ordination and partnerships:

Are respective roles and responsibilities (within WFP and between the latter and the Government/ stakeholders) understood, respected and constructive? What is the role/involvement of national governments in a regional operation? Have partnerships/linkages and co-ordination with the UN system, donors, NGO and civil society organisations been effective, particularly to meeting the recovery/rehabilitation objectives of the intervention? What has been the extent and nature of Country Office advocacy for the PRRO with donors and other partners, particularly HCR? What effect does having multiple and varied components within the PRRO (e.g., relief feeding and recovery FFW) have on WFP ability to successfully advocate for donor support? Were inputs from other partners supplied in sufficient quantity and at appropriate times? Were structural or procedural problems encountered? If so, what actions did WFP take to resolve these?

13. Merging or not:

What would be the advantages and difficulties of merging both regional operations? What is the favoured option and what added value would it result in (examine all possible aspects: resourcing flexibility; joint pipeline; donors' support and restrictions; contingency planning; joint needs assessment missions; consistency of approach in terms of beneficiary categorisation and selection; as well as ration scale and basket; etc.)? Does this provide sufficient grounds for a change of approach? How would it impact on administration, resource mobilisation and resource flows (including financial ones), programme and recovery/relief, beneficiary selection, partnerships and coordination, logistics, M&E, performance indicators and reporting mechanisms)?



Annex 2

Mission Itinerary, 24/2/04 – 3/4/04

Tuesday, 24th February

Arrival in Dakar

Wednesday, 25th February

Briefing, WFP/ODD Programme Support Unit

Briefing, FAO Regional Representative

Briefing, OCHA Representative, Sierra Leone (telephone conference)

Thursday, 26th February

Briefing, Regional Coordinator, WFP/RHCSO

Briefing (mission splits), WFP/ODD Regional Security Coordinator

Briefing, WFP/ODD Resources and Planning Unit

Briefing (mission splits), WFP/ODD RBM/M&E

Briefing, OCHA Regional Humanitarian Coordinator

Briefing, UNICEF

Briefing, WFP/ODD (reporting)

Briefing (mission splits), WFP/HQ VAM and WFP/ODD VAM

Friday, 27th February

Briefing, WFP/ODD Programme Support Unit

Briefing, WFP/ODD Operations Support Unit

Briefing, WFP/ODD Programme Support Unit

Briefing, WFP/ODD Programme Support Unit

Saturday, 28th February

Documentation and research



Sunday, 29th February

Documentation and research

Departure for Conakry

Monday, 1st March

Briefing, WFP Guinea

Departure for Freetown

Tuesday, 2nd March

Briefing, WFP Sierra Leone

Briefing, WFP donors (USA/ FFP, EU, UK/DFID)

Briefing (mission splits), Sierra Leone Government (MODEP, MOHS, MAFFS)

Briefing (mission splits), Monitoring & Evaluation, WFP Sierra Leone

Briefing (mission splits), Emergency School Feeding, WFP Sierra Leone

Briefing (mission splits), Sierra Leone Government (MEST)

Briefing (mission splits), Food-for-Work/Food-for-Training, WFP Sierra Leone

Briefing (mission splits), Sierra Leone Government (NACSA)

Briefing, UNHCR

Wednesday, 3rd March

Briefing, FAO

Briefing (mission splits), Food-for-Agriculture, WFP Sierra Leone

Briefing (mission splits), UNDP

Briefing, Food Pipeline Agencies (CARE, CRS)

Briefing (mission splits), UNICEF

Briefing (mission splits), WHO

Briefing (mission splits), (medical NGOs)

Thursday, 4th March



Briefing (mission splits), Nutrition and HIV/AIDS, WFP Sierra Leone

Research and documentation

Friday, 5th March

Departure for Bo

Site visits (mission splits), Bumpe B142 school

Site visits (mission splits), Largo refugee camp

Briefing (mission splits), Ministry of Education, Bo

Briefing (mission splits), NACSA, Bo

Site visit (mission splits), Gerehun refugee camp

Saturday, 6th March

Site visit, Gondama refugee camp

Site visit (mission splits), MSF-B Therapeutic Feeding Centre, Bo

Site visit (mission splits), Magbenyani Womens Development Project

Briefing (mission splits), WFP implementing partners, Bo

Return to Freetown

Sunday, 7th March

Departure for Conakry/Departure for Lungi (mission splits)

Review and documentation

Monday, 8th March

Mission reunited, Conakry

Briefing, WFP Guinea

Briefing (mission splits), UN agencies (World Bank, WHO, Unicef, UNAIDS, FAO, IOM, Unesco, OCHA, UNFPA)

Briefing (mission splits), NGOs (MSF-Ch, ICRC, ACF, Africare)

Briefing, Guinea Government (MATD, SENAH)



Briefing, UNHCR

Tuesday, 9th March

Briefing, WFP Guinea

Research, review and documentation

Wednesday, 10th March

Briefing, WFP Guinea

Research, review and documentation

Thursday, 11th March

Review and documentation

Departure for N'Zérékoré

Briefing, Governor, N'Zérékoré

Site visit (mission splits), Today's Women International Network (TWIN)

Briefing (mission splits), ACF N'Zérékoré

Briefing (mission splits), MSF-CH N'Zérékoré

Friday, 12th March

Site visit (mission splits), Kola refugee camp

Site visit (mission splits), Lainé refugee camps

Site visit, Guepe, Diecke I and Diecke II schools

Briefing, Diecke Prefecture

Site visit, Nonah refugee camp

Saturday, 13th March

Site visit (mission splits), Therapeutic Feeding Centre, N'Zérékoré hospital

Briefing (mission splits), GTZ

Briefing (mission splits), UNHCR

Briefing (mission splits), IFRC



Return to Conakry

Sunday, 14th March

Review and documentation

Monday, 15th March

Briefing (mission splits), Nutrition and HIV/AIDS, WFP Guinea

Review and documentation

Briefing (mission splits), WFP donors (Germany)

Briefing, WFP Guinea

Tuesday, 16th March

Departure for Monrovia

Briefing, WFP Liberia

Briefing, ESF Implementing Partners, WFP Liberia

Briefing, SCF-UK

Briefing, CRS

Wednesday, 17th March

Briefing (mission splits), LRRRC

Briefing (mission splits), DDRR, WFP Liberia

Briefing (mission splits), Nutrition and Gender, WFP Liberia

Briefing (mission splits), EU/ECHO

Briefing (mission splits), FFP/USAID

Briefing (mission splits), Food Distribution, WFP Liberia

Briefing (mission splits), Monitoring and Evaluation, WFP Liberia

Briefing (mission splits), UNHCR

Briefing (mission splits), Unicef

Briefing (mission splits), OCHA



Thursday, 18th March

Site visit, WFP port operations

Site visit, CDB King School, Montserrado

Site visit, Banjor Public School, Montserrado

Briefing (mission splits), Ministry of Education

Briefing (mission splits), ICRC

Site visit, VOA refugee camp

Site visit, Sawegbeh IDP camp

Friday, 19th March

Site visit, Louiza Hotel IDP Centre, Buchanan

Site visit (mission splits), Mercy Corps proposed FFW projects, Buchanan

Site visit (mission splits), Therapeutic Feeding Centre (Merlin), Buchanan Hospital

Site visit (mission splits), Institutional Feeding Centres (CRS), elderly and orphanage

Saturday, 20th March

Site visit (mission splits), Zwedru IDP distribution center

Briefing (mission splits), Zwedru local authorities

Briefing (mission splits), MSF-B, Monrovia

Briefing (mission splits), MSF-H, Monrovia

Briefing (mission splits), NGOs (MSF-B, ICRC, SCF-UK), Zwedru

Sunday, 21st March

Briefing, UNDP

Briefing, NRC

Review and documentation

Monday, 22nd March

Briefing, WFP Liberia

Documentation and research



Tuesday, 23rd March

Departure for Abidjan

Briefing, WFP Côte d'Ivoire

Wednesday, 24th March

Briefing, OCHA

Briefing (mission splits), ICRC

Briefing (mission splits), WFP donors (EU, ECHO, Switzerland,)

Confined to hotel (security): review and documentation

Thursday, 25th March

Confined to hotel (security): review and documentation

Friday, 26th March

Confined to hotel (security): review and documentation

Saturday, 27th March

Confined to hotel (security): review and documentation

Sunday, 28th March

Confined to hotel (security): review and documentation

Monday, 29th March

Preparation of Aide Memoire

Debriefing, RHCSO

Departure, Europe



Annex 3

People Met By The Mission

Dakar

WFP/ODD

Mr. Arnold Vercken, Deputy Regional Director, ODD
Mr. Gianpietro Bordignon, Senior Regional Programme Advisor and Head of Unit, PSU
Mr. Jacques Higgins, Programme Advisor, PSU
Ms Olivia Hantz, Programme Officer, PSU
Mr. Nacer Benalleg, Pipeline Officer, RPU
Mr. Daniel Vigneau, Regional Security Officer
Ms Pascale Crapouse, Programme Officer, RPU
Ms Britta Schumacher, Programme Advisor, RBM & M&E, PSU
Ms. Annalisa Conte, VAM (WFP/Rome),
Ms Margot vander Velden, Regional VAM Advisor, PSU
Mr. Martin Olhsen, Senior Logistics Officer, OSU
Ms Auriane Mortreuil, Programme Assistant

WFP Regional Humanitarian Coordination Office

Mr. Gemmo Lodesani, Humanitarian Regional Coordinator for the Cote d'Ivoire and Mano River Countries

FAO

Mr. Moustapha Niasse, Coordinator, Sub-Regional Emergency Agricultural Programme for West Africa

OCHA

Mr. Dennis Johnson, Head of Office, Guinea (telephone conference)
Mr. Hervé Ludovic De Lys, Regional Humanitarian Coordinator

UNICEF

Mr. Andy Brooks, Regional Emergency Planning Officer

Sierra Leone

WFP

Mr. Louis Imbleau, WFP Country Director
Mr. Felix Gomez, WFP Deputy Country Director
Ms Jaspal Gill, TSU Coordinator, Programme Officer
Ms Alessandra Gilotta, Emergency School Feeding Coordinator



Mr. Zainab Mansaray, Food Aid Monitor, Focal Point for FFT & Institutional Feeding
Mr. Charles Rogers, Focal Point for FFW & FFAgriculture
Ms Petra Lindberg, Therapeutic and Supplementary Feeding Programmes

WFP Donors

Ms Katharina Lauer, Regional Emergency Food for Peace Officer, Mano River Union Countries
Mr. Ian Stuart, DFID
Mr Ian Byram, Rural Development, EC

UNHCR

Mr. Musa Abiriga, Country Representative
Mr. Sunday Shorunke, Senior Programme Officer
Mr. Mahamadou Tandia, Programme Officer, Re-integration

FAO

Mr. Mohamed Farah, Country Representative
Mr Aloysius Lahai, Assistant Representative (Programme)
Ms Sarah Martelli, Emergency Coordinator, a.i.
Mr. J. A. Jalloh

WHO

Dr. Joaquim Saweka, Country Representative

UNICEF

Melrose Tucker, Nutrition Assistant Project Officer

UNDP

Mr. Bengt Ljunggren, Senior Programme Advisor
Ms Nancy Asanga, SDRR
Mr. Emmanuel Gaima, Governance Programme Specialist

Ministry of Education, Science and Technology

Honourable Alpha Tejan Wurie, Minister
Honourable Abass Collier, Deputy Minister
Mr. William Taylor, Director General (Education)
Mr. Sallieu Kamara, Programme Coordinator (Sababu Education Project)
Dr Sesay, Director, IDB Project
Mr. Alfred Fomoh, Press Officer
Mr. Paul Lappia, Deputy Director of Education South
Mr. S.B.M. Swaray, Inspector of Schools I, Bo District
Mr J.A. Kpaka, Inspector of Schools II, Bo District
Mr. P.L. Saffa, Supervisor of Schools, Bo District



National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA)

Mr. Kanja Sesay, Commissioner
Mr. Sidi Bah, Relief and Resettlement
Mr. Mualick Banugra, Director
Mr. John Ngebeh, P.M., CDP
Mr. Syl Fannah, Executive Director
Mr. Justin Bangura, Deputy Commissioner
Mr. Prince Kallzara, regional Coordinator, NaCSA South
Mr. Desmond Scott, Project Officer, Civil Works, NaCSA South

Ministry of Development and Economic Planning (MODEP)

Honourable Mohamed B. Daramy, Minister
Ms. Fatmata Wurie, Deputy Secretary
Mr. A.M. Bockarie, Department Development Secretary
Mr. S.B.E. Scott, Acting Director
Mr. Sam Jalloh, PPO
Mr. U.A. Konneh, PPO
Mr. Swalilu Jumu, AS
Mr. Eric Jumu, National NGO Coordinator
Mr. Franklyn Pabai, Principal Planning Officer
Mr. J.B. Turay, Senior Planning Officer
Mr. Abie Kamara, Planning Officer
Mr. Lahai Kain, Planning Officer
Mr. M.K. Lebbie, Planning Officer

Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Food Security (MAFFS)

Mr. B.A. Massaquoi, National External Coordinator
Mr. S.F. Carew, Agricultural Director, Livestock
Mr. Hassan Mohammed, Agricultural Director, Forestry
Mr. H.K. Tarawali, Assistant Director, LWDD
Mr. S.S. Kassibo, NGO Desk
Dr A.M. Kargbo, Director, PEMSD
Mr. Emmanuel Alieu, Agricultural Director General

Ministry of Health and Sanitation

Mr. F.S. Mustapha, Deputy Secretary
Dr Noah Conteh, Director General, Medical Services
Dr Arthur Williams, Deputy Director General, Clinical
Mr. Yayah Conteh, Donor/NGO Liaison Officer

NGOs

Mr. Brian Gleeson, Country Representative, CRS
Mr. Nicholas Weber, Country Director, CARE
Ms Tatjana Zulevic, Country Director, IMC



Mr. Solomon Kebede, Medical. Doctor, IMC
Ms Abie Beckley, GOAL
Dr Rudaba Khonder, GOAL
Mr. Stephane Doyon, MSF-F
Ms Rosanna Magoga, Medical Coordinator, MSF-B
Ms Annie Devonport, Health Coordinator, Concern
Mr Kawa, Field Coordinator, Peace Winds Japan, Kenema
Mr. Philip Moserny, Field Coordinator, World Vision International, Kenema
MSF-B

Guinea

WFP

Mr. Stefano Porretti, Country Director
Mr. Hakan Falkell, Deputy Country Director
Mr. Etienne Labande, Head, N'Zerekore sub-Office

WFP Donors

Mr. Uwe Baumgartner, Economic Affairs and Cooperation, German Embassy

UNHCR

Mr. Stefano Severe, Country Representative
Mr. Cesar Pastor-Ortega, Head of Sub-Office, N'Zerekore

FAO

Mr. Ari Ibrahim, Country Representative

WHO

Dr. Ronguiaton Diallo, national consultant

UNICEF

Mr. Marcel Rudasingwa, Representative

UNESCO

Mr Mamadou Diallo, Focal Point, BREDA

OCHA

Ms. Madelaine Makakaba, Communications Officer



UNAIDS

Mr. Damien Rwegera, Country Coordinator

UNFPA

Mr. Ivan Hermans, Representative

World Bank

Mr. Ide Gnandou, Country Manager

IOM

Mr. Pierre King, Chief of Mission

Service National D'Action Humanitaire (SENAH)

Mr. Elhadj Kaba, Chief

Ministère de l'Administration du Territoire et de la Décentralisation

Honourable Kiridy Bangoura, Minister

GTZ

Mr. Hussein Jumaine, Head of Office, N'Zerekore

Ms Sophie Perreard, Chief, School Feeding Unit

Mr. Zeze Touaro, Assistant Chief, School Feeding Unit

NGOs

Ms Emily Sloboh, Coordinator, Today's Women International Network (TWIN), N'Zerekore

N'Zerekore

Gouverneur Lamine Bangora

Prefet Morly Bondy Camara Fono

Mr. Pe Libazon Maomy, Director, Education, Diecke

Mr. Bernard Bitra, President du Comité des Réfugiés Ivoiriens, Nonah

Liberia

WFP

Mr. Justin Bagirishya, Country Director

Mr. Housainou Taal, Deputy Country Director



Mr. Steven Loegering, Field Operations Coordination
Mr. Hans Vikoler, Needs Assessment
Mr. Patrick Teixeira, Distribution and Monitoring
Mr. Boubacar Diallo, DDRR
Mr. Emmanuel Ankrah, Security Officer
Mr. Mohamed Sheikh, School Feeding
Mr. Edwin Brunner, FSLI/FFT
Ms Alison Gardiner, Nutrition, Health and HIV/AIDS
Ms Perrina Genize, Nutrition

WFP Donors

Mr. Geoffrey Rudd, Charge d’Affaires, Office of the European Commission in Liberia
Mr. Edward W. Birgells, Director, USAID
Mr. William K.C. Kawalawu Snr., Programme Assistant, ECHO

UNHCR

Mr. J.O. Moses Okello, Representative
Mr. Leon Banks, Programme Assistant
Mr. Andrew Mbogori, Senior Reintegration Office

UNICEF

Ms Angela Kearney, Representative
Mr. Samual Momanyi, Programme Coordinator

OCHA

Ms Norah Niland, Senior IDP Protection Advisor

UNDP

Ms Awa Dabo, Human Rights and Protection Officer

Liberian Refugee Repatriation and Resettlement Commission (LRRRC)

Hon. Philip B. Dwuye, Executive Director
Ms Nina Kennedy McGill, Deputy Executive Director, Administration
Mr. Abraham Browne Jr., Deputy Executive Director, Research and Statistics
Mr. James F. Youquoi Snr., Programme Officer

Ministry of Education

Dr D. Evelyn S. Kandakai, Minister
Dr Marcus Dahn, Deputy Minister for Administration
Mr Peter Ben, Deputy Minister for Planning
Mr Alfred Sune, Head, School Feeding Division



NGOs

Mr. Raymond L. Studer, Representative, CRS
Mr. Nigel Clarke, Programme Director, SCF-UK
Ms Marianne Vik, Distribution Advisor, NRC
Mr. Erling Bratheim, Project Manager, NRC
Mr. Yusuf Kaba, Executive Director, LIURD
Mr. Dennis Weh, Supervisor, UMCOR
Mr. William Jones, Program Field Coordinator, Mercy Corps
Mr. N. Simon Dradri, Programme Manager, Food Security & Livelihoods, SCF-UK
Ms Doris Basler, Head of sub-Delegation Zwedru, ICRC
Mr. Bjorn Hyden, Field Coordinator Zwedru, MSF-B

Mr. Harry T. Quiah Snr, Field Logistician Zwedru, SCF-UK
Mr. Pierre-Antoine Versini, Distribution Logistician, Premiere Urgence
Mr. Kouper Tarhonds, Commodities Manager, World Vision
Mr. Kebeh W. Jallah, Commodities Officer, World Vision
Ms Patience Paye, Project Coordinator, ESF, ADRA
Mr. Harry T. Quiah Snr, Field Logistician Zwedru, SCF-UK
Mr. Pierre-Antoine Versini, Distribution Logistician, Premiere Urgence
Mr. Kouper Tarhonds, Commodities Manager, World Vision
Mr. Kebeh W. Jallah, Commodities Officer, World Vision
Ms Patience Paye, Project Coordinator, ESF, ADRA
Mr. Jelson Keawah, IDPs Dept. Head, ADRA
Mr. A. Alfred Foboi, Programme Coordinator, LIURD
Ms Albertha Sumo, Project Manager, LWF
Mr. Julius K. Sele, Programme Development Officer, YMCA
Mr. G. Boima Barclay Jr., Head Administration & Logistics, CRS
Mr. Peter F. Briggs, Head of Programme, CRS
Mr. Justin Comeh, Senior Programme Manager, CRS
Mr. B. Cornelius Gbarpbea, Administration & Finance Buchanan, Mercy Corps
Mr. Barwain K. Zayzay, Field Officer Buchanan, Mercy Corps
Mr. James K. Massaquoi, Grand Bassa Agriculture Group (G-BAG)

Zwedru City

Mr. George C. Garwo, Acting Superintendent, Grand Gedeh County
Mr. Brown K. Bardee, Principal, TWI
Mr. Harrison Kaweoh, School Supervisor
Mr. Thomas V. Yonly
Mr. James B.S. Groto
Mr. Peter G. Boduo
Ms Annie S. Dennis, Coordinator, NAWOCOL
Ms Teresa T.G. Collins, social Worker, NAWACOL
Mr. H. Shad Sanny, Acting Principal, Zwedru High School
Mr. Sam B. Tarlue, President, Agro Service
Ms Annie N. Brown, Secretary, Ministry of Education
Ms Elizabeth Zulu, Ministry of Health



Mr. James Dweh, School Feeding Supervisor, Ministry of Education
Mr. Steven K. Dweh, School Feeding Officer, Ministry of Education
Mr. Erasmus Fluoh, Coordinator, LRRRC
Mr. James B.S. Snoh, AAAD
Mr. Thomas V. Young,
Mr. Harrison Kaweah, School Supervisor
Mr. Morais T. Waylee, Acting City Mayor
Mr. William B. Quiwea, Editor, Smile Radio
Mr. Edmond N. Garleh, Acting President (Youth)
Mr. Jeremiah Wehazander Clarke, Smile Radio
Mr. T. Gary Deam, Town Chief

Côte d'Ivoire

WFP

Ms Myrta Kaulard, Country Director
Ms Patricia Kennedy, Deputy Country Director
Ms Rosa Malango, Regional Programme Officer
Ms Jennifer Jacoby, Programme Officer
Ms Donatella Malfitano, M&E Officer
Mr Jacques Soko, Programme Officer, Education and Health
Ms Amy Martin, Programme Officer
Mr Guy Curvers, Head of Logistics
Mr Pierre-Patrick Wolfensinger, Security Officer

WFP Donors

Mr Albert Pasini, regional Co-ordinator, ECHO
Mr Frederic Varlet, Agro-economist, EU
Mr Johannes B. Kunz, Ambassador, Switzerland

OCHA

Ms Besida Tonwe, Head



Annex 4

FRAMEWORK FOR WFP PRRO EVALUATION

WFP stated objective	More appropriate objective	Primary Indicator	Possible proxy indicator	Explanations and related questions	Sources of Information
Save lives	<p>Reduce mortality rate</p> <p>Prevent increased mortality rates (from food shortage ?)</p>	<p>Change in mortality rate</p> <p>Different causes of death</p> <p>Changes in acute malnutrition rates</p>	Changes in number of malnourished children registered	<p>Causes of high mortality rates</p> <p>Negative relationship between food distribution and mortality may be most indicative</p>	<p>UN/NGO surveys</p> <p>Gov't statistics</p> <p>Health clinic stats</p>
Improve nutrition situation/maintain nutrition situation/prevent worsening malnutrition		<p>Prevalence of acute malnutrition</p> <p>Prevalence of chronic <5 malnutrition</p> <p>Status of pregnant/lactating women</p>	<p>Prevalence of parasites</p> <p>Prevalence of water/sanitation facilities</p> <p>Food distribution schedules</p>	Causes of undernutrition:	<p>UN/NGO/Gov't surveys</p> <p>Health clinic stats</p>



		Change in low birth weight rates Prevalence of micro-nutrient deficiencies Prevalence of parasites	Immunization campaigns Prevalence of HIV/AIDS		
Assist Recovery		Increase H/H access to health Increase H/H access to education Increase H/H access to income Increase H/H access to food Increase H/H purchasing power	Clinic attendance rates School enrolment rates School attendance rates School performance Increased assets Availability of employment Food price changes	Availability of health services Availability of education facilities	Clinic records School records H/H surveys Observation Market surveys H/H surveys H/H surveys



		Change in percent income spent of food	Changed diet Increased consumption of non-cereals Change in expenditure patterns Change in percent WFP resources for relief/recovery		
Increase women's participation		Women's membership of food committees Women's membership of camp/town admin	\$ spent on specific gender issues	More efficient/effective use of food aid Improved security of women Improved equity of food distribution	WFP stats.
Increase awareness of gender concerns		Knowledge of WFP policy/guidance		Implications for programme design/implementation may not be well developed	Staff surveys
Improve protection	Reduce prevalence of abuse	Change in prevalence of violations	\$ spent specifically on improved protection	Prevalence of reporting and accountability mechanisms	UN/NGO/ICRC/Gov't stats Sitreps



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	Reduce risk of abuse		Changed operating procedures	Number or severity	
WFP more efficient Org.		<p>Increased resources</p> <p>Lower DSC costs/ton</p> <p>Reduced staff needs</p> <p>Reduced lapsed time RISI-distr'n</p> <p>Reduced requirement for trans-shipments</p>	percent of assessed needs covered	Compare PRRO with global WFP	WFP stats
WFP more effective Org.		Change in av. Daily calorie consumption	Reduced donor earmarking	Increased donor confidence	
WFP more flexible Org.		Change in av. Daily calorie consumption		<p>Easier to identify where barriers to flexibility</p> <p>Standardisation of procedures/rations?</p>	



				Standardisation of vulnerability	

Notes:

1. Assess whether stated objectives were appropriate
2. Objectives may be a means to an end, rather than an end in themselves – e.g. the way gender/protection issues have been addressed
3. Assess how well cross-cutting issues (gender, protection) have been addressed in design and implementation of food intervention. Appropriate role of WFP may be to police implementing partners, rather than to implement directly.
4. Many issues are not direct WFP mandate (e.g. protection) – rather concern of all parties. But if issues are not addressed, efficient provision of WFP food aid irrelevant.
5. Do criteria exist to trigger shift from relief to recovery?
6. How do WFP intervention design, implementation, operating procedures and systems help/hinder WFP's ability to get the right food to the right people at the right time?
7. Targeting issues not yet addressed
8. Objective of recovery activities may be to provide safety nets (social safety nets) – hence effectiveness may be when not needed



Annex 5

West Africa Coastal Regional PRRO Evaluation (and Côte d'Ivoire Regional EMOP) Questionnaire

West Africa Coastal Regional PRRO Evaluation and Côte d'Ivoire Regional EMOP (Years 2001 to 2003) Questionnaire

Country office : _____

Name : _____

Date : _____

INSTRUCTIONS :

Please note that we have limited the number of questions, to allow you to express your opinion on this important evaluation and ensure that all views will receive proper attention. However, we realise the questionnaire is slightly long (11pages), while providing sufficient space for answers. Therefore, we would like to receive your contribution in about 2 weeks, by the 15 February 2004.

Note that the questionnaire will need to be partially filled out electronically, where text is requested. We recommend you using the "INSERT" function to limit great shifting of the text. Otherwise, it will be more easily done by hand, at least for other parts of the questionnaire (for lack on our part of technical computer knowledge).

Once completed, please fax to my attention : Romain Sirois, Office of Evaluation – OEDE (+39-06-6513-2833)

Thank you very much for your time and efforts put into this endeavour. We trust the evaluation exercise will help us all learn and improve WFP regional intervention to the benefit of all.

A. Objectives and results (relevance and effectiveness)
--

- ◆ What were the original objectives of the WAC PRRO and Côte d'Ivoire EMOP?
- ◆ Have objectives been changed over time and, if so, in what way?
- ◆ To what extent have the actual objectives been achieved?
- ◆ What are current performance indicators used to measure results, for each objective?
- ◆ What have been outcome level results, in relation to WFP intervention (please describe)? In terms of :



1. Number of lives saved

2. Changes in nutritional status

3. Changes in asset protection level (selling animals, tools, etc.)

4. Changes in human asset protection (education, training, etc.)

5. Changes in coping strategy support

◆ What have been outcome level unanticipated results, in relation to WFP intervention (please describe)? In terms of :

1. Number of lives saved

2. .Changes in nutritional status

3. Changes in asset protection level (selling animals, tools, etc.)

4. Changes in human asset protection (education, training, etc.)

5. Changes in coping strategy support

◆ Have there been unanticipated outcome level results, on the non-targeted populations (please describe)?

B. Intervention strategy

◆ What percentage of WFP assistance goes to relief (Specify whether in terms of tonnage, beneficiary figures, staff time, etc.)?

◆ What percentage of WFP assistance goes to recovery (Specify whether in terms of tonnage, beneficiary figures, staff time, etc.)?

◆ Which activity type goes under relief?

◆ Which activity type goes under recovery?

◆ Have criteria been established to signal when to shift activities from “relief” to “recovery”?

◆ Have criteria been established to signal when to shift activities back to “relief” (from “recovery”)?

◆ Have the PRRO and/or EMOP intervention strategy(ies) changed over time ? If so, please specify how and explain why?

◆ What were the main risks and what actions were taken to reduce these risks?

C. Co-ordination and partnerships



◆ What are the partners' particular strengths (specify which entity)?

1. Government authorities
2. Rebel forces
3. UN agencies
4. International NGOs
5. National NGOs

◆ What are the partners' particular weaknesses (difficulties)?

1. Government authorities
2. Rebel forces
3. UN agencies
4. International NGOs
5. National NGOs

◆ Identify which areas, for each WFP or HCR, have the lead role (Mark an X and elaborate, as required):



		WFP	HCR
1. IDP questions	_____		
2. Refugee questions	_____		
3. Returnee questions	_____		
4. Host communities	_____		
5. School canteen issues	_____		
6. Food-for-work activities	_____		
7. Food-for-training activities	_____		
8. Security issues			
9. Protection issues	_____		

Observations:

◆ Identify, whether WFP or HCR, has the responsibility to supply/provide the following (Mark an X and elaborate, as required):

		WFP	HCR
1. Basic food items	_____		
2. Supplementary food items (nutrition)			



- 3. **Additional food items** _____
- 4. **Technical assistance** _____
- 5. **Non-food items** _____

Observations:

- ◆ Have you raised resources locally for the PRRO and/or EMOP activities (relief feeding, recovery, FFW, etc.)? Specify.

D. Implementation

- ◆ What were the main problems and/or obstacles during the implementation phase (specify how they were overcome)?
- ◆ Were there significant delays in food arrivals in-country (please give details)?
- ◆ If so, what was done to address these delays?
- ◆ What would you do differently?
- ◆ Which entities are responsible to provide non-food items (please specify entities and NFIs)?
- ◆ Were there significant delays in the distribution of non-food items (please give details)?
- ◆ If so, what was done to overcome these delays?
- ◆ Who are the main implementing partners at the operational level (please tick relevant box(es) and specify in what capacity)?
 - ☐ **Direct WFP involvement**
 - ☐ **Direct HCR involvement**
 - ☐ **Other UN agencies**
 - ☐ **Government authorities**
 - ☐ **Rebel forces**
 - ☐ **National NGOs**
 - ☐ **International NGOs**
- ◆ Have you adopted a different approach in Government areas versus Rebel held areas?
- ◆ Are there Implementing Partners' Agreements (if so, please provide sample formats)?
- ◆ Which crosscutting issues have been covered and in what way (please tick relevant box(es) and elaborate, as required)?
 - ☐ **Gender**
 - ☐ **Environment**
 - ☐ **HIV/AIDS**
 - ☐ **Protection**
 - ☐ **Security**



❑ Others

Observations :

- ◆ What would you have changed/proposed changing in relation to the implementation?

E. Regional approach

- ◆ Underline the entity you feel has the prime responsibility to :

◆

- **Carry out joint Government/UN/Donors needs assessments**

CO	RHCSO*	RB	HQ
----	--------	----	----

- **Identify target groups (population, refugees, internally-displaced people, returnees, etc.)**

CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
----	-------	----	----

- **Establish beneficiary numbers**

CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
----	-------	----	----

- **Define selection criteria for each beneficiary group**

CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
----	-------	----	----

- **Design the intervention strategy**

CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
----	-------	----	----

- **Select specific activity types to be supported**

CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
----	-------	----	----

- **Draft project documents and budgets**

CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
----	-------	----	----

- **Establish staff and budgetary requirements**

CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
----	-------	----	----

- **Clear project documents for submission to the PRC**

CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
----	-------	----	----

- **Amend intervention and activity objectives**

CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
----	-------	----	----

- **Reorient project objectives**

CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
----	-------	----	----

- **Initiate budget revisions**

CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
----	-------	----	----

- **Manage/administer daily implementation**



CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
➤ Identify Implementing Partners			
CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
➤ Establish implementation arrangements			
CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
➤ Establish monitoring approaches/systems			
CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
➤ Develop reporting formats			
CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
➤ Select indicators for performance measurement			
CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
➤ Initiate the shift from relief to recovery (and vice versa)			
CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
➤ Arrange for periodic assessments of progress towards objectives			
CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ
➤ Undertake corrective measures to improve implementation			
CO	RHCSO	RB	HQ

- * CO: Country offices
RHCSO: Regional Humanitarian Coordination and Support Office in Abidjan
RB: Regional Bureau
HQ: HQ divisions

- ◆ In your opinion, what have been the main benefits (added-value) of the regional approach, compared to a country-specific operation?
- ◆ In your opinion, what have been the main difficulties with the regional approach, compared to a country-specific operation?
- ◆ In your opinion, what would be the main role and responsibilities for:
 - WFP Regional Humanitarian Coordination and Support Office, in Abidjan
 - **WFP Regional Bureau, in Dakar**
 - In your opinion, what would be the benefits of merging both regional operations (WAC PRRO/ IVC EMOP)?
 - In your opinion, what would be the disadvantages of merging both regional operations (WAC PRRO/ IVC EMOP)?



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Operation*

- Specify your favoured option (merging or not) and the added value (provide sufficient grounds for your favoured option).

NOTA BENE:

Could you please prepare, for the CO briefings, examples of monitoring reports for last year, relevant food needs assessments, and studies, reviews or surveys on nutritional status and/or people's capacity to cope? Or any other reports of particular interest?

END



Annex 6

Nutrition Surveys Consulted for the Evaluation, 2004

Security issues have been major constraints to conducting nutrition surveys in the West Africa coastal region. This explains the irregularity in the availability of nutrition data, and also why only restricted geographical areas were covered. As a consequence, the nutritional data available from the surveys may not be representative.

In general, reports of nutrition surveys undertaken in the region lack detailed information on the methodologies used. In addition, little attention seems to have been given to the timing of the surveys (e.g. surveys conducted towards the end of the rainy season, when both diarrhea and malaria are at their peaks, are likely to find a worse nutrition situation than surveys conducted during the dry season). Very few of the nutritional surveys provide data on chronic malnutrition rates; only a small number include under-five mortality rates. Yet both of these data are key pieces of information for needs assessments.

The quality and training of some of the field surveyors is also questionable. This has implications for the quality and reliability of anthropometric data collected.

NUTRITION SURVEYS IN GUINEA

Location	Type of population	Organisation	Date	Sample Size	Acute Malnutrition < -2Z-Scores +/- oedema	Severe Acute Malnutrition < -3Z-Scores +/- oedema	Oedema	Confidence Interval	<5 Mortality Rate	Methodology
Gueckedou Prefecture	Urban + Rural	ACF / GRCS / DPS / WFP	Jun.00		4.2percent	0.4percent		2.6-6.5 0.0-1.6		
Kouankan	REF.	ACF/IFRC	Jun. 01	967	2.1percent	0percent	0percent	1.0-3.9 -0.0-1.0		2 stage cluster
Boreah Camp Kissidougou	REF.	ACF / ARC / MSF / HCR	Mar.02	467	3.4percent	0.4percent		1.1-5.7 0.4-1.2		



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Prefecture										
Kountaya I & III	REF.			444	2.2percent	0.4percent		0.3-4.2 0.4-1.3		
Kountaya II & IV + Telikoro	REF.			477	4.2percent	0.6percent		1.7-6.7 0.5-0.7		
Gueckedou Prefecture	Urban + Rural	ACF/MSF	Mar.02	1018	8.2percent	0.3percent		6.0-11.0 0.0-1.4		2 stage cluster
Kola camp	REF.	IFRC / GRCS	Mar.02	470	3.0percent	0.9percent				Systematic
Kouankan camp	REF.	IFRC / GRCS	Mar.02	512	4.5percent	2percent				Systematic
Kankan	Residents	MoAg / PPDR-HG / IFAD	May.02	966	5.9percent			4.5-7.4		2 stage cluster
Macenta Prefecture	Urban + Rural	ACF / MSF / DPS	Jul.02	1006	8.4percent	0.9percent		6.2-11.4 0.3-2.3		2 stage cluster
Gueckedou Prefecture	Urban + Rural	ACF	Sep.02	1018	7.9percent	0.7percent		6.3-9.8 0.3-1.5		2 stage cluster

NUTRITION SURVEYS IN LIBERIA



Location	Type of population	Organisation	Date	Sample Size	Acute Malnutrition < -2Z-Scores +/- oedema	Severe Acute Malnutrition < -3Z-Scores +/- oedema	Oedema	Confidence Interval	<5 Mortality Rate	Methodology
National		Unicef / MoH	99 - 00	NA	5.9percent	NA				
Montserrado Camps :	IDP	SCF-UK / ACF	Nov. 03						NA	Systematic sampling
- Blamasee	-	-	-	425	3.8	1.2		2.2–6.20.4–2.9		-
- Jahtondo	-	-	-	407	6.6	0.7		4.4–9.70.2–2.3		-
- Perry	-	-	-	267	6.7	0.4		4.1–10.7–0.1–2.4		-
- Plumkor	-	-	-	398	6.3	1.5		4.1–9.30.6–3.4		-
- Saygbeh	-	-	-	290	3.4	0.3		1.7–6.50.0–2.2		-
- Ricks	-	-	-	455	6.4	0.4		4.4–9.20.0–1.8		-
- Wilson	-	-	-	309	7.8	0.6		5.1–11.60.1–2.9		-
Monrovia	Residents	WFP / Unicef / CDC / WHO / MoH	Nov. 03	867	6.9	0.9		5.4–8.40.2–1.7	1.13 /10,000 /day	2 stage cluster
Monrovia + environments	Urban settlements + 2 IDPs camps	WFP (VAM)	Nov. 03	888	6.2	1.1				

NUTRITION SURVEYS IN SIERRA LEONE



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Location	Type of population	Organisation	Date	Sample Size	Acute Malnutrition < -2Z-Scores +/- oedema	Severe Acute Malnutrition < -3Z-Scores +/- oedema	Oedema	Confidence Interval	<5 Mortality Rate	Methodology
Kono district : 3 chiefdoms (Gorama, Nimiya, Nimikoro)		World Vision Intern.	Sept. 01		17.1 percent	4.7 percent		11.5-22.7 3.3-3.3 (?)		
Bombali District	Rural : end of harvest season	ACF	Feb. 02	860	4.9 percent	0.6 percent	0 percent	3.1 – 7.5 2.0 – 0.1		2 stage cluster sampling
Tonkolili district		ACF	Mar. 02	900	5.6 percent	0.6	0.1	3.7-8.3 0.1-2.0		2 stage cluster
Jimmi	REF. camps	ACF	Sept. 02	499	22.2 percent	2.4 percent		18.7-26.3 1.3-4.3		Systematic sampling
Bandajuma	-	-	-	456	14.5 percent	3.5 percent		11.4-18.2 2.1-5.8		Systematic
Gondama	-	-	-	587	10.1 percent	2.9 percent		No		Exhaustive
Gerihun	-	-	-	472	12.7 percent	1.9 percent		9.9-16.2 0.9-3.7		Systematic
Jembeh	-	-	-	450	9.8 percent	0.7 percent		7.2-13.1 0.1-2.1		Systematic
Taiama	-	-	-	1233	6.6 percent	0.4 percent		No		Exhaustive
Kono district		ACF	Sept. 02	946	6.8 percent	1.5 percent	0.4 percent	4.7-9.6 0.6-3.2	2.71/10,000 /day	2 stage cluster
Kailahun district		UNHCR/ MOH/ IMC	Nov. 02	890	14.6 percent	1.1 percent	0.4 percent	12.4-17.1 0.6-2.1	2.31/10,000 /day	2 stage cluster

NUTRITION SURVEYS IN SIERRA LEONE

Location	Type of	Organisation	Date	Sample	Acute	Severe Acute	Oedema	Confidence	<5	Methodology
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	population			Size	Malnutrition < -2Z-Scores +/- oedema	Malnutrition < -3Z-Scores +/- oedema		Interval	Mortality Rate	
Bombali district : Bombali Sebora Chiefdom		ACF	Nov. 02	971	8 percent	0.5 percent	0.0 percent	5.8-11.0 0.1-1.8	2.51/10,000 /day	2 stage cluster
Bo & Pujehun districts	REF. camps	MSF	Feb. 03							2 stage cluster
Bandajuma camp	-	-	-	123	5.7	0	0	0-11.5 0	0/10,000 /day	-
Gerihun	-	-	-	245	7.3	0.8		2.7-11.9 0-2.4	0.2	--
Gondama	-	-	-	213	16.0	1.9		9.0-23.0 0-4.5	0.6	-
Jembe	-	-	-	154	12.3	0.6		5.0-19.6 0-2.3	0.1	-
Jimmibagbo	-	-	-	180	11.7	0.6		5.1-18.3 0-2.2	0.6	-
Bo, Pujehun, Moyamba & Kenema districts	REF. camps	UNHCR /WFP /MSF-B /Merlin /ACF /WVI / MOHS	Oct.03							2 stage cluster
Jimmibagbo	-	-	-	792	7.6	1.8	0	5.0-10.2 0.5-3.1	1.2	-
Bandajuma	-	-	-	715	14.3	2.1	0.1	10.7-17.9 0.7-3.5	0.4	-

NUTRITION SURVEYS IN SIERRA LEONE



Full Report of the Evaluation of the WFP West Africa Coastal Regional Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation

Location	Type of population	Organisation	Date	Sample Size	Acute Malnutrition < -2Z-Scores +/- oedema	Severe Acute Malnutrition < -3Z-Scores +/- oedema	Oedema	Confidence Interval	<5 Mortality Rate	Methodology
Gondama	REF.	UNHCR /WFP /MSF-B /Merlin /ACF /WVI / MOHS	Oct.03	799	4.8	0.1	0	2.8-6.8 0.0-0.4	0.3	2 stage cluster
Jembe	-	-	-	816	7.6	1.6	0	5.1-10.1	0.5	-
Gerihun	-	-	-	797	5.9	1.0	0	3.6-8.2 0.7-1.3	0.7	-
Largo	-	-	-	909	29.2	3.7	0.6	25-33.2 2.0-5.4	0.5	-
Taiama	-	-	-	900	12.9	1.7	0	9.9-15.9 0.6-2.8	0.0	-
Tobanda	-	-	-	903	5.8	1.0	0	3.7-7.9 0.8-1.2	0.5	-



Annex 7

Objectives of WFP Emergency School Feeding Programmes

Draft Guidelines for Emergency School Feeding were produced by WFP Headquarters in November 2002. WFP and UNESCO jointly developed an edited version of these draft Guidelines (with some additions), probably also in late 2002. Although there have been some later modifications, neither of these documents has been officially released.

With no official WFP guidelines for emergency school feeding, some individual country offices have produced their own guidance material, largely based on the WFP/UNESCO/WHO School Feeding Handbook, produced in 1999 for development school feeding.

In mid-2003 UNESCO and WFP undertook a joint review of WFP support to education in West Africa, which mainly focussing on development assistance but also touched on emergency school feeding.

Reviewing these different documents, and in discussions with WFP staff in West Africa, it became clear that there were a number of fundamentally different approaches within WFP to emergency school feeding. These different approaches have often been intermixed both within WFP project documents and in discussions on the implementation of emergency school feeding.

Three different approaches to emergency school feeding can be identified in the West Africa coastal PRRO over the past few years:

1. Emergency school feeding to distribute food into food insecure communities.
2. Emergency school feeding is intended to jump-start the education system after major crisis.
3. Emergency school feeding has broadly the same objectives as development school feeding.

Emergency school feeding to distribute food into food insecure communities

This approach uses schools as a distribution channel for relief food aid, with no (or minimal) education objective. Guinea adopted this approach in the initial response to internal displacements caused by the rebel incursions into the parrot's beak region ("Languette"). The implications of this approach are:

- Targeting is based on food insecurity (or areas highly affected by population movements).
- There is a reasonable level of assurance that children from the poorest or most food insecure households (which in displacement situations means children from displaced households) can be reached via the schools.
- Food can be distributed even during times when the schools do not normally function (such as during the rainy season), which is often one of the periods of local food security.
- WFP (or the implementing partner) will meet all of the implementation costs involved, including payment of cooks¹³³ and provision of condiments and complementary foods.

¹³³ If WFP (or the implementing partner) does not meet the costs of cooks, there is a danger that the older girls in the school will be assigned this task, to the detriment of their education.



(These are usually met through parental or government contributions, but this in effect places another barrier to participation by the poorest, who should be the main target group).

- Requiring participating communities to establish and maintain school committees may not be warranted, as this may become another burden on the women in poor communities¹³⁴.
- Phase out to occur when the community has sufficient access to food (presumably as a result of return to normalcy).
- The WFP intervention is short-term (to assist the community while the crisis situation lasts). Thus there should be no implication that WFP assistance will continue (e.g. through a Country Programme) after the crisis has passed.

Emergency school feeding to jump-start the education system after major crisis

In this approach, the rationale is to provide WFP food aid (often the major type of assistance available) as an initial response to encourage the resumption of schools, attract children back into the classroom, and (perhaps) provide initial support to teachers and school staff. This is currently the situation in Liberia (and may have been the case in Sierra Leone in 2000/2001). The implications of this approach are:

- Within a region or district, all schools should be included (as presumably all schools will have been equally affected by the crisis).¹³⁵
- Unlike in development school feeding programmes, there probably is a case for including food for teachers and school staff, to encourage them to return to work¹³⁶.
- The school feeding programme should be linked with strong efforts (including by donors and other agencies) to encourage the Government to rehabilitate school infrastructure and resume its normal responsibility to implement education programmes.
- Phase out would be linked to the Government's ability to implement an education programme, including paying salaries, rehabilitating classrooms, re-establishing teacher training, and so on.
- If it is intended that parental school committees will eventually adopt a strong role in the local school system, then this should be planned for from the beginning, with a strong formal programme to establish, train and support parent committees.
- As the overall objective is to encourage children back to school, it is probably not advisable to impose another barrier in the form of demanding parental contributions to pay cooks or purchase condiments. WFP (or its implementing partners) should cover all implementation costs.

Emergency school feeding has broadly the same objectives as development school feeding

This is the approach adopted by the draft Emergency School Feeding guidelines. It has also become the broad approach of the emergency school feeding interventions in Guinea and Sierra Leone¹³⁷. Significant emphasis is given to the educational objectives (increasing enrolments and

¹³⁴ Although Emergency School Feeding in these circumstances may encourage parents and the local community to maintain their own school meal programmes once the crisis situation has passed (and thus the WFP intervention is completed), it is probably unwise to build this expectation into the programme implementation, and to encourage poor, food insecure communities to have unrealistic ambitions.

¹³⁵ In Liberia, private schools are not currently covered by ESF.

¹³⁶ Teachers in Liberia receive food through the ESF programme for three months only.

¹³⁷ Documentation in the Liberia country office also supports this approach.



attendance, attention to girl enrolments, demands for the establishment of parent committees) rather than food security objectives. The implications of this approach are:

- Targeting of emergency school feeding should be by education factors (i.e. school enrolments and attendance are lowest), rather than by community food insecurity (or impact of the crisis). Current emergency school feeding in Guinea is in the process of moving in this direction¹³⁸.
- Phase out of emergency school feeding would normally mean transition into a development school feeding programme. (However resources for development are currently much lower than resources for PRROs. Thus it may not be feasible to phase in all the schools covered by a PRRO into a development programme.)
- Emergency school feeding would cover the entire school year. (In coastal West Africa, the school year runs from September to June, but the PRRO covers the period January to December.)
- The justification of food must be clear. Evidence from the VAM study in Sierra Leone suggests that the reasons that children are not enrolled or do not attend school are such that the provision of school meals are unlikely to have any meaningful influence.

Annex 8

¹³⁸ The first schools in the current emergency school feeding programme in Guinea have been targeted by a combination of food security issues (mainly malnutrition data), crisis issues (number of displaced people within a community) and education issues (school enrolments and attendance). One result of this is that much of the current school feeding programme is in areas where school enrolment and attendance is already high - on the basis of the school enrolment data available to the mission, the current ESF has probably only increased school enrolment and attendance by about 10percent. In Liberia and Sierra Leone school enrolments have probably increased significantly since the commencement of ESF, but this is most likely because schools were not functioning before, rather than because the presence of school meals has acted as an incentive to enroll and attend school. School enrolment and attendance would probably have increased anyway as schools became operational, without ESF. The major barriers to school attendance identified by the VAM study in Sierra Leone are not ones that could be easily overcome through the provision of school meals.



REVIEW OF PROTECTION ISSUES
IN WEST AFRICA COASTAL COUNTRIES

Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Guinea and Liberia

18 September – 13 October 2004

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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this report are those of the independent consultant and are not necessarily those of the World Food Programme.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This review took place within the framework of an evaluation of WFP operations in West Africa (March 2004) which identified protection as an issue cutting across all interventions. It also took place within the framework of activities by PSPT to develop practical strategies for WFP to contribute to the protection of civilians and to provide guidance to field staff confronted with protection challenges.

The main objectives of the mission were to identify issues related to the protection of beneficiaries, examine the role of food assistance in protection, identify steps taken by WFP to maximise protection and propose ways to address similar challenges in the future. The mission should also recommend practical tools and recommend additions or changes in West Africa operations.

The Review Mission worked on the basis of the ICRC definition of protection¹³⁹, and identified the need for protection as arising from situations of (i) violence and coercion (human rights violations or criminal violence) and (ii) violation/deprivation of rights.

Protection is first and foremost the responsibility of States. When a State is unwilling or unable to protect its citizens, this responsibility falls on the international community. Some UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross are specifically tasked with protecting certain rights or certain categories of the population. With regard to WFP's responsibility on protection, the Mission considered that WFP is mandated to save lives through food aid, thus safeguarding the most fundamental right of all: the right to life. In addition, WFP is part of the United Nations, whose mandate is the protection and promotion of human rights and, as such, has a responsibility to work in accordance with UN human rights principles and instruments. Also, the UN Secretary-General has encouraged all agencies to expand and strengthen the protection of civilians in complex emergencies in conformity with international humanitarian law. Finally, WFP also operates on the basis of a set of humanitarian principles¹⁴⁰, by which it is committed to "provide assistance in ways that respect life, health and dignity" and to uphold recognised human rights.

Thus, for WFP, "protection" should not involve a rethink of its mandate but looking at operations through a "protection lens":

- identifying and understanding the context in which it carries out its operations (i.e. in West Africa the food insecurity that prompted WFP action was caused by situations of violence and violation of rights);
- understanding what constitutes a violation under international law;
- understanding whether food aid can have an effect on these violations (positive/negative), or whether it can cause further ones;
- Identifying the best course of action:

¹³⁹140 "The concept of protection encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. international human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law)".

¹⁴⁰ Humanitarian Principles, WFP/EB.A/2004/5-C



- direct action: when the abuse is linked to aid or can be solved by WFP by providing aid or by modifying the way aid is given or by taking disciplinary measures;
- Indirect action: understanding the role of other actors and referring those violations that cannot be solved by WFP alone.
- Advocacy.

This review took place in the context of conflict/post conflict situations in Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, where the protection of civilians was, and still is, particularly important.

WFP, in the course of its operations, is already carrying out several activities that can be construed as protection activities or which have a direct impact on the protection of beneficiaries of aid. For example, WFP has carried out registration of IDP beneficiaries, the first step towards protection. By providing information on the beneficiaries' profile, registration helps anticipate and prevent from the start potential protection problems, such as sexual exploitation and abuse of women and girls, discrimination on account of ethnicity or returns to areas not yet deemed safe. WFP beneficiary registration has often been the only record available of IDP populations and its lists have been used by other UN agencies and NGOs for the purposes of programming their activities and for planning returns.

WFP has also organised school feeding, which protects not only the right to education but which has also been aimed at reducing tensions between refugees and host communities; it has carried out sensitisation on sexual exploitation and abuse and gender-based violence and taken action to prevent them, etc. WFP has even gone further and, in Côte d'Ivoire, has been involved in promoting reconciliation in the course of its operations, as per its aim of "promoting protection and peace-building", of delivering its assistance "in ways that promote the protection of basic human rights" and seeking "to assist those who have suffered from discrimination and to heal the wounds in the community"¹⁴¹.

WFP has also considered and addressed the impact on protection of the way its activities it carries out and has tried to minimise negative effects. For example, it has changed distribution methods in order to address protection challenges. Although in some cases aid did have a negative impact on the beneficiaries (i.e. attacks after food distribution in Liberia), WFP was on the whole able to identify and counter those effects by changing distribution methods to minimise risks. In some cases, WFP even went as far as not distributing food. In other cases, such as cases of sexual violence in camps, it has been able to refer the issues to camp structures. Some effort has to be made on some issues linked to sexual exploitation and abuse in Liberia, including food distribution.

Although protection concerns have often been at the basis of interventions, they are rarely reflected in internal documents, the only exception being gender and HIV/AIDS, where policies and guidelines exist. There is no incorporation of protection concerns in planning

¹⁴¹ See EMOP 10244.2, Emergency Food Assistance to War-Affected People and Vulnerable Groups in Côte d'Ivoire and Neighbouring Countries, Côte d'Ivoire section.



and evaluation tools, result-based monitoring, etc. Post distribution monitoring reports rarely explicitly incorporate protection issues even though the officials carrying them out are aware of protection concerns.

Gender analysis/action has often tended to be quantitative rather than qualitative, and equated to women's issues, focusing on numbers of women involved in distribution, as recipients of food, etc., and measuring success on those numbers. More attention should be given to men's concerns.

With regard to advocacy on protection issues, WFP could better exploit its position as a major humanitarian agency to address issues such as the situation of IDPs in Côte d'Ivoire, forced recruitment and access. Whether advocacy is done publicly or whether it is done discretely with other agencies should be a matter of a strategy. WFP's advocacy role is all the more important in situations of internal displacement, where the UN inter-agency policy of not giving one agency overall responsibility for IDPs has led in practically all cases to serious gaps in protection and assistance. As food aid provider, WFP is usually the only agency dealing with the whole IDP beneficiary population.

Most staff have expressed a strong interest in protection issues, and most are quite aware of them. Nonetheless, staff awareness and understanding of WFP's role with regard to protection, human rights and humanitarian law vary across the region. This has an impact on planning and design of programmes and the ability to monitor protection issues. Many staff members have requested guidance on protection. For instance, what should be the limits of WFP's role and responsibilities as an assistance agency vis-à-vis protection; , when and how should WFP intervene and the role and mandate of others. In sum, there is a need for a common understanding on protection concerns, why WFP should be concerned, and guidance on when to intervene.

WFP's protective role has been recognised by other UN agencies and NGOs in the region and has been more successful when WFP actions were part of an inter-agency response or in coordination with other agencies, such as WFP's involvement in actions to combat sexual exploitation and abuse in Sierra Leone and the registration of new arrivals in Guinea following the Côte d'Ivoire crisis. WFP's interest in protection issues was generally welcomed and a well-defined role within its mandate encouraged by other UN agencies, ICRC and NGOs. Enhanced participation in inter-agency protection fora, at a decision-making level, was likewise encouraged by UN agencies and NGOs alike. However, in several cases, WFP's efforts to bring protection concerns at UN Country Team fora have met with resistance and staff have expressed great frustration at the lack of internal mechanisms for raising these concerns beyond Country Team level.

Finally, donor policies have an impact on protection and on the ability to provide aid by WFP staff. For example, ration reductions due to lack of funding in Guinea were considered both by beneficiaries and by some NGOs as part of an effort to push the refugees out; and some have argued that a reluctance to provide resources for host communities in Guinea can exacerbate the tensions between them and the refugees, etc. WFP should advocate further on these issues, using protection arguments.



RECOMMENDATIONS

For WFP as an institution

1. Conduct similar protection reviews of other operations taking place in different contexts in order to clearly appreciate the protection challenges WFP staff face and provide guidance to staff.
2. WFP should clarify, to its own staff and to others, its position and responsibility regarding protection.
3. Issue guidance for staff on how to integrate and conduct protection into WFP's work. This is of particular importance in conflict and post-conflict situations where violations of human rights and humanitarian law are usually at the root of the conflict. A first step would be to review all existing protection policies and guidelines and see how other protection issues could be incorporated, in a similar way as was done, for example, with gender and HIV mainstreaming. For example, a "protection focal point" within PSPT could assist in developing an overall policy on protection in coordination with other units carrying out protection functions. This would involve:
 - developing simple checklists, with examples of best practice, to guide staff on protection issues, clarifying their role and limits, the scope of their intervention and how to relate to other agencies with a "protection mandate".
 - As WFP reviews several of its guidelines on its programming tools, protection concerns should be incorporated.
 - Continuing efforts already under way to increase staff knowledge of international humanitarian law.
4. Establish one or two pilot projects in the field to test initial guidelines and the usefulness of the focal point concept.
5. WFP should consider stronger advocacy on protection and human rights issues.
6. When WFP beneficiary lists are the only available source of information on a beneficiary population, as is frequently the case in IDP situations, carefully review the information to be collected and include that which will allow better protection, in particular age and sex breakdown, type of vulnerability and place of origin and intended return. The establishment of partnerships with other agencies with expertise in registration would be of great benefit, particularly with a view to setting up and maintaining a centralised registration database which could be used not only by WFP but by all agencies providing assistance and protection to IDPs both in camps and in areas of return.



For West Africa Operations

WFP should:

1. The protection dimensions of WFP's assistance activities should be clearly articulated in programme documents, and in particular when an activity specifically aims to contribute to special protection concerns. In these cases, protection outcomes should be clearly stated and used to assess performance.
2. Increase advocacy to promote greater action within the UN community, donors and governments with regard to already identified gaps in the protection of beneficiaries, and agree mechanisms for WFP to be able to take these concerns further in the face of inaction by UN actors or government at country level.
3. Monitor and evaluate the impact of the "Do No Harm" training in Liberia on staff ability to understand protection issues and incorporate protection in their work, with a view to reproducing it in other countries (in fact, Liberia could constitute one of the "pilot projects" referred to above).
4. WFP Offices in the region should exchange information and practices regarding protection issues.
5. Participate actively and at an adequate level in protection coordination groups set up within the UN coordinating structures in each country.
6. Take the lead, and be seen to take the lead, in efforts to combat sexual exploitation and abuse in Liberia.



1 BACKGROUND TO THE REVIEW OF PROTECTION ISSUES IN WEST AFRICA COASTAL COUNTRIES

In March/April 2004, WFP's Office of Evaluation (OEDE) organised an evaluation mission to the West Africa Coastal sub-region to review the implementation of the Regional PRRO (10064.2). The objectives of the mission were to evaluate the PRRO's effectiveness, to examine the efficiency of implementation and processes and to establish the advantages and disadvantages of the regional approach¹⁴².

The regional and country offices had determined that "protection" was a key issue that deserved to be examined specifically by the evaluation mission, given the unpredictable and volatile situation in West Africa, with widespread human-rights abuses such as killings, torture, rape and other acts of gender-based violence, forced recruitment and use of child soldiers, and a difficult security situation impeding humanitarian access. Though the PRRO evaluation itself was, in the end, unable to deal with the issue in depth, the Office of Evaluation, the Emergencies and Transitions Unit of the Strategy, Policy and Programme Support Division (PSPT) and the Sub-Regional Coordination Office in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, felt that it merited more attention, not only because of its specific application in the West Africa coastal operations, but because the lessons learned from it could have wider applicability.

2 TERMS OF REFERENCE AND METHODOLOGY FOR THE REVIEW

The overall Terms of Reference for the review (see Annex I) included:

Protection and the WFP mandate

- Identify and assess issues related to the protection of beneficiaries from the perspective of WFP operations and mandate, including humanitarian access and food assistance.
- Examine whether or not food assistance itself fosters or impedes protection.
- Identify steps already taken by WFP, or necessary within its mandate, to operate in a way that maximises protection of beneficiaries.
- Examine past challenges and solutions, as well as propose ways to address these in the future (identify key elements of programming, monitoring and implementation that would enable staff to carry out their daily duties in a 'protection' mind frame)
- Suggest how findings could be translated into practical tools to raise awareness and change behaviour (for example, guidelines, best practice and training material)

Recommendations for the West Africa operation

¹⁴² See "Full Report of the Evaluation of the WFP West Africa Coastal Regional Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation – 24 February – 29 March 2004", Ref. OEDE/2004/6, WFP, Rome, September 2004, Annex 1.



- Recommend additions or changes in relation to the implementation and preparation of future phases of PRROs in the West Africa coastal region, as well as ongoing operations.

The mission spent a total of 25 days in the field, visiting four countries (for a detailed itinerary, see Annex II):

Côte d'Ivoire, from 18 to 24 September and from 11 to 13 October;
Sierra Leone, from 24 to 29 September;
Guinea, from 29 September to 6 October;
Liberia, from 6 to 11 October.

In addition, the consultant spent two days at WFP HQ for briefing and preparation of the mission and a day for de-briefing.

In each country the mission held meetings with WFP professional and non-professional, international and local staff and representatives from implementing partners, other UN agencies, OCHA, NGOs who are not WFP implementing partners, ICRC and beneficiaries of food aid/WFP's activities. In addition, in some countries the mission met with Government counterparts and donors (see Annex III). The purpose of these meetings was to obtain relevant background information on protection issues and WFP's response.

While the mission strongly tried to obtain quantifiable data, supported by documentation, the nature of the issues reviewed made this quite difficult, as protection considerations, important as they are in designing operations, very rarely make their way to WFP programme documents, and no protection outcomes and/or indicators are present through which to assess protection performance. Although a framework for the mission was initially drawn (see annex IV), not all elements could be assessed. The comments made in this report are therefore mostly the result of the Review Mission delegates' own observations and discussions with WFP staff and others.

One strong element that came out in all of the Mission's travel was the difficulties and dangers that WFP staff, as well as other humanitarians, have faced and continue to face in their endeavour to bring food aid to war-affected populations. Their courage, bravery and imagination in the face of extremely difficult circumstances is an inspiration for others in this field. In this line, the critical observations made by this Review Mission should be taken in the spirit of providing further elements to facilitate operations, and do not in any way diminish the value of those presently conducting them.

Finally, the Review Mission wishes to extend its thanks to all those who assisted them and gave them much of their time and insight during the country visits.



3. PROTECTION IN HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS

3.1. What is protection?

When humanitarians speak of “protection”, what do they actually mean? How does “protection” relate to humanitarian activities? And, more specifically, how does WFP as an assistance agency, refer and relate to “protection”? These were the initial questions that had to be answered prior to any review of the sub-regional PRRO and the EMOP in Côte d’Ivoire.

In the words of Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees,

"Humanitarian assistance is much more than relief and logistics. It is essentially and above all about protection — protection of victims of human rights and humanitarian violations."

In today’s humanitarian operations the term “protection” is commonly used – and abused – to cover a wide range of activities seeking to help and save people from the harm caused by violations, abuses and the consequences of conflict or massive human rights violations. But it also implies that assistance activities can help protect those victims. Indeed, according to the widely-accepted, ICRC-crafted definition,

“The concept of protection encompasses all activities aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law (i.e. international human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law)¹⁴³”.

This definition is comprehensive in scope, both in terms of the legal framework for protection – *full respect* – and in terms of the strategies and methods by which “protection” may be achieved – *all activities*. However, such a definition, while it helps understand the link between protection and assistance, the role of assistance in promoting and protecting human rights and the importance of a wholistic approach to address the full spectrum of human rights (civil and political, as well as economic, social and cultural), does little to clarify what “protection” really means and has resulted in a great deal of confusion regarding the responsibilities of the different actors in ensuring it. A sharper inter-agency definition of “protection” is acutely needed in order for all agencies to understand their roles, duties and responsibilities, as well as the limits thereof, with regard to protection. In the absence of such a definition, this report considers “protection” as, first and foremost, equated with safety. The need for protection, therefore, arises from situations in which human rights, humanitarian law and refugee law have been violated, and more specifically from:

¹⁴³ Gioosi Caverzasio, Sylvie (ed), *Strengthening Protection in War – A search for Professional Standards*, Geneva: ICRC (2001).



- violence and coercion, (either as a result of human rights violations and/or criminality), and
- violation and/or deprivation of rights.

"Protection means to recognize that individuals have rights and that the authorities who exercise power over those individuals have obligations. Protection means at one and the same time to defend their existence in legal terms and their physical existence. It is to add to the assistance chain a link in the form of juridical responsibility, the only true guarantor of their survival."

Françoise Bouchet-Saulnier, Médecins sans Frontières-France

3.2. Protection and WFP

3.2.1. The legal background

The promotion and protection of human rights have been an essential part of the mandate of the United Nations since its creation. Indeed, Article 1.3 of the Charter of the United Nations [1945] describes one of the purposes of the organisation as “*promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all*”. Human rights are codified in three main instruments, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), commonly known as the International Bill of Rights. These instruments have since led to the elaboration of other conventions covering specific topics such as the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (1981), the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) and the Convention on Rights of the Child (1989).

In addition to human rights law, in situations of armed conflict, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) applies as a specific branch of human rights law governing situations of armed conflict. Its core is found in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocols I and II of 1977. IHL regulates the conduct of hostilities and seeks to minimise the suffering that armed conflict produces, limiting the rights of belligerents to choose methods of warfare and seeking to balance military imperatives with the principles of humanity. Those who are not taking part in the conflict; be they civilians, prisoners or wounded combatants, should not suffer disproportionate harm and those assisted should also be protected from the consequences of the conflict. Although the precise articles to apply in each conflict situation depend on whether the conflict is international or non-international¹⁴⁴, the key principles are generally applicable: distinction between combatants and non-combatants; the use of force proportional to the anticipated

military advantage; and taking adequate precaution to minimise incidental damage to civilians and civilian property and non-combatants. It is the International Committee of the Red Cross

¹⁴⁴ International armed conflicts are conflicts between states and the four Geneva Conventions and Protocol I deal extensively with the humanitarian issues raised by such conflicts. In non-international conflicts on the other hand, the humanitarian law applicable is derived from one main source, namely article 3 common to the Geneva conventions of 1949, supplemented by above mentioned Protocol II of 1977, relating to the protection of civilians in armed conflict.



(ICRC), as guardian of the Geneva Conventions, who determines the type of conflict and the articles and conventions that apply.

To address situations related to refugees, International Refugee Law applies and the key instrument is the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol¹⁴⁵. Regional instruments such as the Organisation of African States Convention of 1969 (which includes specific refugee provisions) and the Cartagena Declaration of 1984 (with regard to specific refugee problems in Central America) support and enlarge the refugee definition in the 1951 Convention to include people fleeing situations of generalised violence, massive human rights violations and serious breakdown of law and order. The key principle in these conventions is the principle of *non-refoulement* - that a person shall not be returned to a country where his/her life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.

Although not part of international law *per se*, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement draw upon the provisions of refugee law, human rights law and international humanitarian law to provide a framework for protecting the internally displaced. They identify the rights and guarantees relevant to the protection of IDPs in all phases of displacement

3.2.2. The responsibility to protect

The primary responsibility for the protection of human rights and of civilians in armed conflict lies with their governments¹⁴⁶. In situations of armed conflict, armed groups have a direct responsibility to protect civilian populations as per the provisions of Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions and customary international humanitarian law. Both governments and armed groups are required by these international instruments to take measures to ensure that civilians are protected and that their basic needs are met.

When governments and armed groups are unwilling or unable to protect their own citizens, or are themselves the perpetrators of violations, the responsibility to protect civilians must be borne by the broader community of states¹⁴⁷.

Some UN agencies are tasked with safeguarding the rights of particular groups of people, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the United

¹⁴⁵ According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, a refugee is "a person who is outside his/her country of nationality or habitual residence; has a well-founded fear of persecution because of his/her race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion; and is unable or unwilling to avail himself/herself of the protection of that country, or to return there, for fear of persecution".

¹⁴⁶ See, for example, the Guiding Principles on Humanitarian Assistance adopted by General Assembly Resolution 46/182 of 19 December 1991, or the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.

¹⁴⁷ See *The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*. Canada: IDRC, December 2001, reviewed by the Humanitarian Practice Network, www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2422.



Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)¹⁴⁸. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) has a global mandate to promote and protect human rights. In addition to the United Nations, the ICRC, as the guardian of the Geneva Conventions, is entitled with ensuring protection of civilians in situation of armed conflict.

3.2.3. Application to WFP

As a UN agency, WFP shares the organisation's mandate to promote and protect human rights. In fact, WFP's mandate is to protect the most basic of all rights: the right to life, as WFP aims at saving lives through the provision of food aid. Other human rights are also at the basis of WFP's mandate to eradicate hunger and poverty through the use of food aid. In seeking to free poor or crisis-affected people – including refugees and internally displaced persons – from hunger, WFP not only addresses the basic right to life; it also helps them realise other human rights.

WFP is, however, considered not to have a “protection” mandate in the same way as UNHCR or UNICEF or ICRC, but rather a mandate for assistance. Nonetheless, assistance and protection should not be looked as two separate issues but rather as the two sides of the same coin. Both as a member of the UN system and on its own right, as an agency with a mandate to save lives through the provision of humanitarian assistance, WFP does have a major responsibility in protection and the promotion of human rights and the fulfilment of this responsibility should be the ultimate goal in all its interventions.

In 1997, and again in 2002, the UN Secretary-General reiterated the responsibility of the UN to ensure the protection of Human Rights in all its activities in its Programme of Action for Reform and encouraged all agencies to ensure that Human Rights were mainstreamed in development and humanitarian programming. This culminated in a plan of action (Action 2) for strengthening human rights-related UN activities at the country level, the development and implementation of related training activities, and the expanded deployment of human rights advisors to assist UN Country Teams, to strengthen national human rights promotion and protection systems.

In addition, the Secretary-General's Millennium Declaration of September 2000 identified 'Protecting the Vulnerable' and developing a 'Culture of Protection' as UN priorities. The Secretary General also noted the need to 'expand and strengthen the protection of civilians in complex emergencies in conformity with international humanitarian law.' While responsibility for the protection of civilians in armed conflict rests primarily with Member States and the international community, the UN family has a special role in promoting and leading the global implementation of the Secretary-General's agenda on protection and to collaborate towards enhanced protection on the ground.

¹⁴⁸ UNHCR's protection mandate stems from the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees from 1951 and its two additional protocols. To protect the rights of Children, UNICEF refers to the Convention of the rights of the child of 1968 and other relevant human rights sources. ICRC's protection mandate is rooted on international humanitarian law; i.e., the four Geneva Conventions (1949) and their two additional Protocols (1977).



Finally, WFP also operates on the basis of a set of humanitarian principles, which apply when providing food aid, non-food assistance and technical support in response to humanitarian needs¹⁴⁹. Acting along the core values of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and respect, WFP has committed itself to “*provide assistance in ways that respect life, health and dignity*”, and to “*respect local customs, traditions and the sovereignty of the state in which it is working, upholding internationally recognized human rights*”¹⁵⁰.

All the above result in an obligation for WFP to deliver food to the hungry poor in a manner that enhances the human rights of beneficiaries or that at best helps protect them from further violations.

A Word on Coordination: It is widely recognised that, especially in complex emergencies such as the ones witnessed in West Africa, no one agency can address all the resulting problems. It is also true that complex emergencies have increasingly been crowded with humanitarian, human rights, development and peace-building agencies, peace-keeping missions, etc. For WFP, for aid to be truly effective, it should be “*fully integrated into the development plans and priorities of recipient countries and coordinated with other forms of assistance*”¹⁵¹. Thus, an “integrated” or “collaborative” approach by UN agencies, governments, donors and NGOs is needed to ensure an effective, coordinated response which maximises efficiency and minimises duplication of efforts. Likewise, in terms of protection, no humanitarian or human rights agency on its own can ensure protection.

Agencies need to cooperate in protection work and know which one is best placed to act at a particular moment and on a particular issue. This does not mean that all agencies need to be involved in protection, but that they should cooperate and coordinate their work around a shared understanding of protection needs and protection goals, taking care not only not to undermine other agencies’ efforts but to maximise protection and support each other’s efforts in the course of each agency’s operations. Once again, in this context, the need for a commonly accepted definition of protection would go a long way towards ensuring better coordination and support among agencies.

4 OVERVIEW OF THE PROTECTION SITUATION IN THE WEST AFRICA COASTAL COUNTRIES

Most of the protracted crisis and conflict in the West Africa coastal region can be traced back to the Liberian civil war that started in December 1989. Between 1989 and 1996 over 200,000 people were killed and 1.8 million were displaced within Liberia and in neighbouring countries. In 1991, Sierra Leone was itself engaged in a brutal war, aided and abetted by its Liberian neighbours, which ended in 2002 with the help of British troops and a large UN peacekeeping mission. Neighbouring Guinea suffered some of the consequences of these conflicts as it provided shelter for more than 500,000 refugees,

which severely taxed the resources of a country already characterised by weak governance and extreme poverty, and generated suspicion and ethnic tension among Guinean themselves and

¹⁴⁹ *Humanitarian Principles*, WFP/EB.1/2004/4-C, 11 February 2004.

¹⁵⁰ *Idem*, principles I and IV.

¹⁵¹ WFP Mission Statement, para. 14.



between Guinea and its anglophone neighbours, amid mutual accusations of attempts at destabilisation and border attacks.

Renewed fighting in Liberia at the beginning of 2001, and especially in the summer of 2003, again plunged the country and the region into crisis. Only with the signing of the August 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement in Accra, the departure of Liberian President Charles Taylor and the arrival of peacekeepers under the United Nations Mission for Liberia (UNMIL), was a sustainable cease-fire achieved.

Once hailed as a model of stability, by late 2002 Côte d'Ivoire had slipped into the kind of internal strife that has plagued its neighbours. An attempted coup d'état-turned-rebellion in September 2002 split the country in two and the main players in the conflict have so far failed to find a political solution or to implement the terms of the Marcoussis-Linas peace accord despite the presence of French troops (*Forces Licorne*) and a UN peace-keeping mission. Although essentially internal, the conflict has been fuelled by and has contributed to lawlessness and ethnic-based fighting in Liberia. Liberian armed factions, of the same ethnic group of their neighbours across the border, have been directly involved in fighting on both sides of the conflict in western Côte d'Ivoire. More than one million people – including many people of Burkina Faso and Malian origin who have worked the cocoa and coffee plantations of Côte d'Ivoire for generations – have been displaced or have sought refuge in neighbouring countries.

Despite tentative moves towards stability in the region, the risks of renewed fighting and a broader regionalisation of conflict in West Africa are real. Major threats to regional stability include a badly planned and incomplete demobilisation in Liberia; the export of hardened fighters from Sierra Leone and Liberia around the region; the continued conflict in Côte d'Ivoire and its effect on its northern neighbours; and the fragile political situation in Guinea. Given the weakness or absence of the state in many parts of the region and the influence of armed groups, the protection of civilians – whether in terms of ensuring peaceful resettlement or providing basic needs – remains the main humanitarian challenge in the region.

4.1. Côte d'Ivoire

Threats to protection

Human rights abuses, including arbitrary arrests, summary executions, torture, inhuman and degrading treatment, persecution and disappearances, continue with impunity on both sides of the former frontlines and neither the government nor the rebel *Forces Nouvelles* (FN) appear to be in control of their elements in the field. In government territory, the rule of law has yet to be firmly re-established and in FN territory in-fighting between factions has resulted in human rights and international humanitarian law violations. In both government and FN territory, checkpoints continue to be used for random arrests and extortion. In the west of the country French forces are limited in their movement



around Guiglo as they are often blocked by unofficial militias. WFP operations are also hampered on occasion by unofficial roadblocks. Attacks in June against the French Embassy, the United Nations and other international personnel in Abidjan and against members of the National Assembly have not even been the subject of a judicial enquiry.

Ethnic tensions have continued, especially in government-controlled areas in the west of the country, with foreign migrants and northern Ivorians harassed and intimidated by paramilitary and militia groups and youth groups. Land ownership has been at the core of these tensions. In Guiglo and Duékoué, an unidentified armed group has been targeting foreign communities since June, resulting in the death of at least seven civilians and the displacement of thousands of farm workers of Burkinabe origin. Government forces have prevented more than 1,000 people, mainly from Mali, Guinea and Burkina Faso and the north from returning to their plantations in Government-controlled zones.

The deteriorating security situation in the west of the country has also been marked by a general rise in crime, with several incidents reported in late August as local authorities in Guiglo attempted to bring the rise in crime under control. The increased movement and presence of militia groups present a further problem, with access to beneficiaries a serious concern. Despite sensitisation efforts and the involvement of local authorities, humanitarian actors, including WFP, still experience difficulties in gaining access to certain areas in the west.

The threat of HIV/AIDS: Côte d'Ivoire is the country in West Africa most affected by HIV/AIDS, with a national prevalence rate of 9.7%¹⁵². Some 84,000 children between the age of 0-14 years are HIV positive¹⁵³ and the number HIV/AIDS orphans is about 420,000. The country is beset with a potent brew of factors known to impact detrimentally on the epidemic: large transit populations, mobile and ill-disciplined militia groups, the general breakdown in law and order, frequent human rights abuses, sexual exploitation, the rapid increase in numbers of commercial sex workers, and the collapse of basic social and health services.

Groups especially at risk

In such a context, the groups especially at risk are:

- Refugee and displaced women and girls are at risk of sexual exploitation and abuse; domestic violence and other forms of sexual and gender based violence are also highly prevalent in camps;
 - IDPs and other persons of foreign origin, as well as Ivorians of northern origin, in the South-Western areas of the country;
 - IDPs in host families in Abidjan and other areas in the country, particularly as economic conditions continue to deteriorate and their coping ability becomes strained.
-
- Liberian refugees, as some of them are perceived as having taken sides, and even participated, in the Ivorian conflict;

¹⁵² UNAIDS report, 2001. This rate is expected to have risen since September 2002.

¹⁵³ UNAIDS report, 2002.



- Youth and children, particularly unaccompanied and separated children, are vulnerable to recruitment and to different forms of child labour and exploitation.
- Unaccompanied elderly, the disabled, the chronically ill (such as persons with HIV/AIDS) also face threats of abuse and exploitation, but also face risks with regard to access to services and information.

Future risks

The most likely scenario is continued political reluctance to commit to peace and reunification. National elections scheduled for 2005 could be a source of further tension. The presence of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and of French Forces will probably prevent the situation from deteriorating into violent and widespread confrontation but sporadic fighting will most likely continue, as will ethnic tension resulting in confrontations between different groups.

4.2. Guinea

Threats to protection

Guinea had managed to avoid becoming involved in the conflict until early 2001, when Sierra Leonean and Liberian fighters attacked the Parrot's Beak (*Languette*) region in Guinea. These attacks displaced local populations as well as refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia. Following the killing of the UNHCR Head of Office in Guékédou in late 2001, United Nations personnel were evacuated and there was no access to the area until mid-2002. Most displaced people had returned to their homes by late 2002. Nonetheless, in early 2004 the security situation in border areas with Liberia and Sierra Leone remained volatile. The main concerns regarding threats to protection in Guinea are:

- Growing ethnic and religious tensions in Guinea Forestière as economic conditions deteriorate;
- Growing tensions between refugees and host communities, also as a result of the deterioration in the economy;
- The presence of armed former fighters in Guinea Forestière, amid reports of recruitment of former Liberian and Sierra Leonean fighters, as well as children, allegedly in order to organise a rebel movement in Guinea.

Groups especially at risk

- Refugee and displaced women and girls are at risk of sexual exploitation and abuse; domestic violence and other forms of sexual and gender based violence are also highly prevalent in camps;
- Liberian refugees, especially women and children when they leave the camps, facing abuse at the hands of host communities;
- Refugee youth and children, particularly unaccompanied and separated children, are vulnerable to recruitment and to different forms of exploitation.



- Unaccompanied elderly, the disabled, the chronically ill (such as persons with HIV/AIDS) also face threats of abuse and exploitation, but also face risks with regard to access to services and information.

Future risks

In addition to the current threats, a deterioration in the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire may have serious effects in Guinea. Likewise, Guinea will remain affected by the situation in Liberia.

4.3. Sierra Leone

Threats to protection

Overall, the situation in Sierra Leone has continued to improve since peace was reached in 2002. The Repatriation of Sierra Leonean refugees from neighbouring countries was completed by the end of June 2004; the Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (DDR) programme was officially closed at the end of 2003 and considerable progress has been made in terms of rehabilitating the economic and social infrastructure throughout the country.

Nonetheless, important challenges remain: the ability of national security forces to assume security responsibilities when the United Nations' Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) troops withdraw is still open to question; the economy is not yet buoyant enough to provide for significant employment creation, and the situation of the youth, particularly the demobilised ones, and their sustainable reintegration/reinsertion is of major concern. As a result of these risks, the Security Council recommended an extension of the mandate of UNAMSIL with a continued but reduced presence likely until June 2005.

In addition, Sierra Leone continues to host some 66,400 Liberian refugees, of whom 54,700 are currently accommodated in eight camps and the remainder are living in urban centres and along the border with Liberia. While the situation in Liberia has stabilised considerably with the presence of UNMIL, the establishment of the interim government and the advancing DDR process, facilitated repatriation of Liberian refugees will not begin until late 2004.

Groups especially at risk

- Refugee and displaced women and girls are at risk of sexual exploitation and abuse; domestic violence and other forms of sexual and gender based violence are also highly prevalent in camps;
 - Refugee youth and children, particularly unaccompanied and separated children, are vulnerable to recruitment and to different forms of child labour and exploitation.
-
- HIV/AIDS) also face threats of abuse and exploitation, but also face risks with regard to access to services and information.



Future risks

Outside events – i.e. a renewal of conflict in Liberia and/or Côte d'Ivoire – could trigger instability in the country. An accelerated UNAMSIL pull-out could have disastrous effects on the stability of the country if no effective hand over of responsibility for security is carried out. Lack of donor interest in the economic rehabilitation of the country and lack of economic opportunities for former combatants could result in renewed movement of fighters and weapons throughout the region.

4.4. Liberia

Threats to Protection

Killings, abductions, rapes, forced labour, and destruction of property have been, and continue to be, perpetrated in parts of Liberia. Fifty percent of Liberian refugee women in Sierra Leone report experiences of sexual violence before and during their flight; according to a United Nations survey in Liberia, 40% of women who came forward had suffered abuses including rape, gang rape, and being stripped naked and put on public display.¹⁵⁴ The primary coping mechanism people have is simply to move.

Sexual exploitation, particularly of IDP and returnee women unaccompanied by a male partner, is reportedly widespread. According to Oxfam, in IDP camps in Montserrado and Bong counties, women who are excluded from distributions or receive insufficient assistance to support themselves and their dependants are frequently forced to trade sex for food, NFIs and shelter¹⁵⁵. Unlike in Sierra Leone, the humanitarian community in Liberia still lacks inter-agency mechanisms to eliminate these practices, and UNMIL's own procedures for responding to allegations of abuse remain unclear. Linked to this, Oxfam and other NGOs have reportedly documented instances of aid being diverted from IDPs by the Liberian authorities, service providers, camp management staff, and by so-called "IDP leaders" and members of the camp management committees. Non-registration of some IDPs, especially in camps, compounds this. Although in practice there are camp management structures, mechanisms at the camp level appear weak.

Forced labour and forced recruitment have been widely reported. Forced recruitment of IDP children and men has been reported amid rumours that former Charles Taylor militias are preparing to enter Guinea. Forced labour will likely continue in the countryside until combatants are completely disarmed.

Extortion is prevalent in many areas of the country, with armed gangs demanding "taxes" from civilians. Children (and others) in the demobilisation process have reportedly been asked to give a percentage of their entitlement to commanders.

¹⁵⁴ UNDP and World Vision joint survey, IRIN report March 3, 2004.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with Oxfam's Protection Coordinator.



Groups especially at risk

- Returnee/displaced women and girls;
- Youth and children associated with the fighting factions: over half of all youth in Liberia are ex-combatants and are extremely vulnerable to recruitment by state and non-state actors. If no economic alternatives are provided soon, they may become willing recruits or will join criminal gangs – a rise in criminality has already been reported in Monrovia, linked to the presence of former combatants. Youth and children associated with the fighting factions also face discrimination or rejection in the community.
- Women and girls associated with the fighting factions: female fighters and mothers of “rebel babies” risk marginalisation by their home communities. Protection concerns include gender-based violence such as rape and domestic abuse; lack of access to education, health care and property (especially in polygamous families) and involuntary resettlement. Those who return home face exclusion, particularly with respect to income-earning activities.
- Unaccompanied elderly, separated children, the disabled, and the chronically ill (such as persons with HIV/AIDS), in addition to threats of abuse and exploitation, they face particular risks in terms of access to services and information.
- The Mandingos: tensions between them and majority groups arise from disputes over land and perceived lack of respect for majority group traditions. Most Mandingos are Muslim and intermarriage with other clans is rare. They are also resented for their relative economic success. They are still collectively associated with LURD, although Mandingos have participated in all sides of the conflict as well as suffered its consequences.
- Third country nationals, particularly the Lebanese.

Future Risks

A badly planned disarmament and demobilisation process has produced large groups (twice those planned) of men and young children with available money, but few weapons have been handed in. Lack of funding for the reintegration component of the process, coupled with lack of economic opportunities, increases the chances that these former combatants will return to their previous ways of making a living. Reports of recruitment in Liberia and Côte d’Ivoire for Guinea increase the risks for continued instability in the region.

In addition, a poorly designed reintegration assistance package, which does not include seeds and tools for an essentially rural population, may be a recipe for further unrest as returned populations have exhausted their four-month WFP rations and have no possibility of obtaining food otherwise.

5 WFP’S RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS IN THE REGION

WFP started its operations in West Africa in a context of bloody conflicts characterised by massive violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, including mass killings, mutilations, rape, forced abductions, virtual slavery, indiscriminate destruction and looting and ethnic strife. A major feature of the crisis has been the large-scale displacement of civilians, often many times over. Ignoring the reasons for the food insecurity in the region was simply not



possible, and WFP had to take into account the evolving situation in the region in order to provide a better response.

WFP's assistance to Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone started in 1990 with a series of short-term operations, which first were country-specific and later became regional, in order to provide a more flexible response to the various population movements that took place in the region as conflicts evolved¹⁵⁶.

WFP'S assistance in the region had broadly the following objectives:

- To save lives by providing relief assistance
- To contribute to longer-term recovery prospects,

to be realised through the following activities:

- General food distribution
- Curative feeding, including therapeutic, supplementary and preventive MCH feeding.
- Emergency school feeding
- Food for Training
- Food for Work
- Food for Agriculture (seed protection)
- Institutional feeding of vulnerable groups¹⁵⁷.

WFP has usually been the first, or among the first, humanitarian actor to assist war-affected populations. As people fled and returned and fled again, food has often been the only humanitarian assistance available to victims of war. But food provided by WFP has also been a valuable commodity in war-torn countries where infrastructure was destroyed, markets were depleted and there was little or no possibility of growing or purchasing food. Warehouses have been attacked and looted¹⁵⁸, ambushes of food aid convoys on main roads have been frequent throughout the different conflicts, staff have been threatened and beneficiary populations have suffered incursions by fighters

immediately after food distribution and their supplies have been stolen by the belligerent factions.

WFP, like other humanitarian actors, has therefore been confronted with the need to take operational decisions in order to protect not only the security of its own staff and supplies, but also the security of the beneficiaries and the imperative not to contribute to the conflict by allowing belligerents to take food aid rations. As war slowly made way for peace, WFP has had to tread a careful path in order to ensure that its food aid was delivered in a way that did not

¹⁵⁶ For a review of WFP's response in West Africa between 1990 to 2004, see *Full Report of the Evaluation...*, pp. 11-16.

¹⁵⁷ Returnees were also supported, but this was often overlooked in the PRRO documentation.

¹⁵⁸ The most famous case of looting of food aid took place in Liberia in April 1996. The realisation that food aid could be diverted and fuel the conflict prompted a group of NGOs and UN agencies to issue the Joint Principles of Operation, a sort of code of conducts for humanitarian actors in Liberia which operated throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s.



play into the hands of those opposed to peace and that it indeed supported the efforts of all those involved in peace-building and reconstruction processes.

The scandal that broke out in early 2002 in West Africa as a result of a joint UNHCR/ Save the Children-UK report detailing cases of aid-related sexual exploitation and abuse in refugee and IDP camps by humanitarian workers and others, brought into the open the vulnerability of beneficiary populations and the ample possibilities for the misuse of food aid. The need to protect aid-receiving populations from exploitation and abuse by the very people supposed to help them has, since then, been a determining concern in WFP interventions.

The four West African countries subject of this review are in different stages of the transition between conflict and post-conflict. In carrying out operations in these contexts, WFP has carried out activities that:

- (i) can be construed as protection activities or have been designed with a protection objective in mind
- (ii) have an indirect impact on protection

In addition, WFP is often confronted with situations which threaten the safety and human rights of its beneficiaries, or of the population at large, and which have nothing to do with the delivery of food aid. Forced recruitment, attacks on beneficiaries, denial of access to certain populations, racism and human rights violations against a particular ethnic group, as well as continuing human rights violations against the population WFP is trying to help are all known to have happened at the same time as WFP was conducting its operations.

WFP is not the only agency helping war-afflicted populations, in West Africa or elsewhere in the world. Assisting and protecting refugees, IDPs, communities hosting those displaced by the conflict and local populations are complex tasks which require the skills and expertise of a wide variety of UN agencies, ICRC and NGOs. In addition, safeguarding the fragile peace in the region has required the presence of UN peace-keeping missions in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire. In such an environment, WFP has carried out activities which support the efforts of others to provide protection to war-affected populations. In several cases, WFP activities have bridged protection gaps for the benefit of populations at risk. WFP has also advocated for action on a particular protection issue, going in some cases as far as to take the initiative, only to take a step

backwards later once the more protection-oriented actors have stepped in. All these activities are examined below.

5.1. Activities designed with a protection objective in mind

Although not recognised as such, WFP does carry out several activities which are essentially protective ones. For some of them, policy and guidelines already exist, such as gender and HIV/AIDS. Among these activities there are those undertaken to protect beneficiaries are those from



sexual exploitation and abuse; activities intended to prevent sexual and gender-based violence in beneficiary communities; activities to enhance women's rights, beneficiary registration and identification. WFP has even gone as far as delivering messages of reconciliation and non-discrimination in the course of its distributions, in an effort to diffuse tension among divided communities, i.e. in Côte d'Ivoire. In conversations with WFP staff they defended these activities by saying that they fitted into the wider UN mandate of promoting peace and security. But they also saw them as necessary for their own security, as they used the opportunity to explain within that context of peace and reconciliation that that WFP was not taking sides in the conflict, but provided food on the basis of need and according to the principles of non-discrimination and impartiality.

5.1.1. Registration

The first step to identify those in need of protection and assistance is to obtain reliable information regarding their identity, numbers, profile, including gender and age breakdown, vulnerability and location. Registration is thus the first protection activity to be carried out. In refugee situations, UNHCR is the agency mandated to obtain this kind of information and to register populations of concern. In situations of internal displacement, no one single UN agency is responsible for ensuring protection of IDPs, as the primary responsibility for protecting and assisting internally displaced persons lies first and foremost with the national authorities¹⁵⁹. However, in many post-conflict situations, national authorities are too weak or lack the skills and resources to carry out such tasks, and international humanitarian organisations have the right to offer their services to alleviate suffering and support national efforts. Thus, with regard to the identification of IDPs, in many situations, WFP beneficiary lists are often the only proof of existence that many individuals have¹⁶⁰. And WFP lists are used *in lieu* of registration and form the basis for protection and assistance interventions by government authorities, other UN agencies and NGOs.

Such has been the case in Liberia, where WFP beneficiary lists are the only existing record of IDPs in camps in the country and are now being used as a basis for establishing

a nation-wide return plan involving the United Nations, the Government of Liberia and NGOs.

WFP lists, however, are limited in scope and purpose. While UNHCR registers beneficiaries primarily for protection purposes (identification being the primary one), WFP registers beneficiaries basically with the objective of obtaining numbers for food aid planning. WFP has registered some basic information regarding the population (gender breakdown, family size and place of origin), but both NGOs and other UN agencies, while recognising the value of WFP lists, have expressed concern at the fact that they are incomplete, inaccurate and not always reliable. Other information considered basic, both for the purposes of assistance and protection, as well as for planning returns, includes age breakdown, type of vulnerability and intended place

¹⁵⁹ In situations of armed conflict, combatants (including non-state armed groups) and occupying powers also have legal responsibilities for IDPs under international humanitarian and human rights law - see *Implementing the Collaborative Response to Situations of Internal Displacement – Guidance for UN Humanitarian and/or Resident Coordinators and Country Teams*, Inter-Agency Standing Committee, September 2004, p.1.

¹⁶⁰ In many cases, WFP ration cards are the only proof of identity for a refugee.



of return. Criticism has been leveled, in particular, at the sources of information and data collection methods (which reportedly included data obtained through the camp management structures, IDP leadership, government officials in camps, etc. These have often proved corrupt or vulnerable to pressure to include IDPs or even non-IDPs not living in the camps). Criticism has also been leveled at the verification methods used (checking dwellings and deleting people from lists if there is no evidence that they are living there – however, NGOs and others have indicated that sometimes families have had to move out of their houses and in with another family in the camp because of the bad state of disrepair of their shacks).

WFP's intervention, particularly with regard to IDPs, is particularly important because of the recurring protection gaps with regard to this population and because WFP is the only agency to work in all camps. As explained above, the UN, rather than adopting a single agency approach with regard to responsibility for IDPs, has adopted a collaborative response, by which a broad range of UN and non-UN, governmental and non-governmental actors “*work together in a transparent and cooperative manner to respond to the needs of IDPs on the basis of their individual mandates and expertise*”¹⁶¹. In practice, however, this has often resulted in a situation where no agency feels responsible for the situation of IDPs, and where different agencies work with different approaches and/or on a piece meal basis. For example, in Liberia UNHCR has taken over responsibility for only some IDP camps and has raised funds to cover operations in those camps only; OCHA and/or the Humanitarian Coordinator not always having taken the lead in ensuring a coordinated response and centralising advocacy and fund raising.

In such a situation, WFP can help ensure that not only food needs but also other needs of IDPs, and particularly protection needs, are adequately addressed¹⁶². The importance of the involvement of all agencies in the protection of IDPs was recognised by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), which in its *Policy on the Protection of IDPs* of December 1999 stated that all agencies have a responsibility to address more proactively the needs of IDPs; to assess and analyse those needs; and to act when the rights of IDPs are being violated. In its guidance on *Implementing the Collaborative Response*, the

IASC actively encourages all agencies “*to ensure that their activities support protection objectives by considering how their programming advances respect for the rights of the displaced*”, adding that, as no sole agency can claim to carry out protection activities for IDPs, “*it is widely accepted that all agencies have a responsibility to approach their work with protection considerations in mind. Indeed, all agencies are encouraged to ensure their activities support and are aligned with protection objectives*”¹⁶³.

¹⁶¹ *Implementing the Collaborative Response...*, p. 4.

¹⁶² A UNHCR official in Liberia clearly expressed that “WFP's role could be greater in protection, as they feed people no matter what”.

¹⁶³ *Implementing the Collaborative Response...*, p. 15.



In the case of IDP registration in Liberia, OCHA and UNHCR among others¹⁶⁴ have pointed out that it would have been very useful if WFP had taken into account the fact that it was the only agency working in all IDP camps and that therefore its lists could be exploited for protection and return planning purposes. They both highlighted the need for WFP to look at registration/compilation of beneficiary lists with protection in mind and suggested that in such cases WFP could have perhaps worked in collaboration with other agencies so as to make sure that not only the food needs of IDPs were taken into account, but that, as the sole source of information on a population that exceeds 300,000 people, the lists could be used to enhance protection. While some WFP officials did not consider that their role should go as far, the Review Mission would strongly support the need for WFP to reorient its data collection on beneficiaries to facilitate the task of other agencies – and the government – to provide protection and other forms of assistance in situations where WFP is the only actor providing assistance to a particular vulnerable population.

An example of how WFP has moved further along the road to ensure the protection of a beneficiary population is Guinea, where in late 2002, WFP, together with OCHA, UNHCR and UNICEF, organised a border registration system, with the collaboration of the authorities, to track down the arrival of those fleeing the conflict in Côte d'Ivoire. These populations included Ivorian refugees, Guinean nationals or persons of Guinean ethnic origin who had been living in Côte d'Ivoire for generations and were considered Guineans upon entry, as well as nationals of third countries who had been living in Côte d'Ivoire for varying periods of time, sometimes generations. The four agencies organised a system by which they took turns in collecting information on the new arrivals at official border points (on the whole, the only crossing points used). The information collected included not only names and family composition, but also nationality and origin, crucial in order to ensure adequate assistance and protection. With that information at hand, WFP helped ensure that third country nationals were adequately protected as UNHCR declined responsibility on those who were not considered Ivorians, by actively advocating with and encouraging OCHA and IOM to take action on their behalf. The third country nationals were thus safely taken care of and transported to their country of origin with the support of other agencies.

The difficulties in achieving a comprehensive registration system in situations like Liberia must not, however, be underestimated. While it is important that WFP improves its registration methods, forms partnerships with agencies who have more extensive

expertise in registration, for example with a view to creating a central registration database, registration will remain a sensitive issue, especially because of the opportunities it provides for corruption, exploitation and abuse and the political implications of a larger or smaller number of IDPs. It is also a costly exercise, as it requires not only staff to carry it out but also periodic updating if data is to be reliable. Even UNHCR, with decades of experience in refugee registration, acknowledges these problems, and while its systems have much improved over time, it is still struggling to find the right balance.

¹⁶⁴ Both were enthusiastic about the possibility of WFP's collaborating in protection, OCHA's acting Head of Office in Liberia going as far as suggesting writing to the WFP Country Director welcoming the review and WFP's interest in protection issues.



5.1.2. Advocacy to address protection gaps

a) IDP issues

The protection gap concerning IDPs is also evident in Côte d'Ivoire, where WFP is providing assistance to over 7,000 IDPs, virtually all of Burkinabe origin, who were chased from the lands they were cultivating in the west of the country as a result of the conflict. These IDPs lived for several months in the open in Guiglo town until UNHCR made available a former transit centre for them in August 2003 and a second, nearby site was established in September in the locality of Nicla. The camps are run by IOM; WFP is the only UN agency providing aid. There is no durable solution in sight and no government willingness to address the problem amidst the hostility of the surrounding population. Despite the presence of an OCHA IDP advisor at different moments, no inter-agency strategy has been established to deal with the problems confronted by this population and the camp continues to be considered a "temporary reception centre", with no will from donors, government or agencies alike to improve the living conditions, which are quite harsh. WFP has been very involved in the camp and is aware of the issues affecting the Burkinabe population. It has sought to enhance the protection of beneficiaries by organising sensitisation sessions regarding sexual exploitation and gender based violence and has put measures in place to ensure that women receive food rations themselves. Given reports that female genital mutilation is prevalent among the IDP population, WFP is planning to contribute to the organisation of a sensitisation campaign in order to address the issue.

Equally importantly, WFP officials have been vocal in advocating for a more durable solution with inter-agency coordination structures both at the local and national level and have repeatedly expressed frustration at the lack of strategy and action and of responsibility, in particular by the UN Country Team, with regard to this population. In this context, they have also expressed the need for internal WFP mechanisms for bringing the matter higher than at country level.

b) Forced Recruitment and the presence of armed elements in camps.

Recruitment, and particularly forced recruitment, of adults and children both within and outside refugee and IDP camps is widely acknowledged in the region. In Guinea, the presence of armed elements and recruitment in Kwankan refugee camp resulted in UNHCR relocating refugees to Albadaria, further away from the border. There have been

renewed reports in past months that former Liberian leader Charles Taylor's forces have been recruiting people, including children, not only in Liberia but also in Cote d'Ivoire, in order to launch an insurrection in neighbouring Guinea¹⁶⁵.

For WFP, the issue has presented a problem. Its officials have not witnessed any instances of forced recruitment, but have heard about it from refugees and from partners. They are conscious of the importance of the issue in terms of its potential to destabilised the fragile peace that exists

¹⁶⁵ See *Taylor loyalist recruits Liberians to fight in Guinea - ex-combatants*, an IRIN West Africa Report, in http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=43308&SelectRegion=West_Africa



in the region and in terms of the human rights violations forced recruitment and the presence of armed elements in camps involve, and have repeatedly raised the issue, primarily with UNHCR but also with other UN agencies at Country Team meetings.

WFP, particularly in Côte d'Ivoire, where reports indicate that recruitment is tolerated, and perhaps even encouraged, by government elements linked to the presidency, have expressed frustration at the lack of action on the part of UNHCR and the UN Country Team as a whole to confront the issue. As in the case of IDPs, their frustration was compounded by the lack of known mechanisms to address the issues beyond the UN Country Team. The need for clear procedures for country offices to refer these issues for action by WFP at the Regional Directorate or Headquarters level was clearly expressed by officials in the country offices.

Notwithstanding the above, the Review Mission has observed that WFP's advocacy initiatives have been few and far between, and that the organisation as a whole has been rather timid in its attempts to advocate for the respect of the rights of the beneficiaries. This often stems from the fear of compromising its "neutrality", but also from the fact that WFP staff lack clear information and tools on how to do effective advocacy. While the option of taking a strong public stance on a particular issue should be considered in terms of the potential benefits it might bring to the assisted population and the risks for WFP operations, WFP's considerable weight as the main provider of food aid throughout the world could be used further for several protection purposes, especially if done as part of an inter-agency collaborative approach. WFP could, for example, be more vocal with regard to ensuring a higher level of assistance for host communities in Guinea.

5.1.3. Activities intended to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse and sexual and gender-based violence

Exploitation and abuse of beneficiaries of aid has happened in different contexts and different regions throughout the years. Women and girls who are displaced or caught up in conflict situations face particular risks, and protection issues have always been of concern in the region. Exploitation is extremely difficult to prove, given the stigma attached to sexual activities and because both sides draw some advantages, as well as the fear of negative consequences if the victims or others speak out. However, the sex exploitation scandal that erupted in early 2002 as a result of the UNHCR/SCF-UK report

so shocked the humanitarian agencies that they took immediate steps to put an end to these abuses and to prevent them from happening.

In all countries in the region, WFP has taken strong measures to address aid-related sexual exploitation, including:

- Incorporation of the United Nations Code of Conduct and, in Sierra Leone, the United Nations-NGO developed Standards of Accountability into all staff contracts. These are also displayed in all WFP distribution sites and have been an integral part of MoUs with implementing partners, including WFP/UNHCR/partner tripartite agreements.



- A zero-tolerance policy, by which any WFP staff member found in violation of the Code of Conduct faces summary dismissal. The zero-tolerance policy extends to staff of implementing partners.
- Training of all WFP staff and implementing partners.
- Sensitisation campaigns in camps.
- Participation in inter-agency committees to prevent sexual exploitation and abuse.
- Increase in the number of WFP female staff, particularly field and food aid monitors.

Overall, WFP staff are well aware of the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse and the need to combat it. However, some country offices appear to have developed a higher degree of activity than others. For example, staff in Sierra Leone are extremely aware and active, have received refresher training sessions, and the issue, together with that of gender-based violence, features highly in their work agenda. WFP staff have not only participated, but also chaired the Coordinating Committee to prevent Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (CCSEA), whose membership includes all UN agencies and local and international NGOs. The Review Mission was concerned, however, that in Liberia most local staff questioned on the issue were not able to refer to the UN Code of Conduct as a component of their contracts; they vaguely referred to “some clauses” relating to SEA being incorporated into their contracts and their awareness levels appeared lower.

Likewise, and in great measure due to the fact that all previously established structures collapsed as a result of the fighting that broke out in mid-2003, it is only recently that an inter-agency committee to deal with the issue was formed, apparently mostly at the instigation of NGOs, even though most UN agencies and particularly NGOs acknowledge the existence of sexual exploitation and abuse in IDP camps. According to NGO workers interviewed, the difficulty in obtaining concrete evidence on cases of sexual exploitation seems to be responsible for the reluctance - and sometimes as an excuse not to - to intervene on the matter. The Review Mission had conversations with only a few WFP field monitors. However, they did not appear concerned that SEA and/or sexual or gender based violence reportedly took place regularly in camps¹⁶⁶.

One WFP partner, in particular, was extremely vocal in its conversation with the Review Mission delegates about the occurrence of sexual exploitation related to food aid in IDP camps, and claimed to have raised the issue with WFP on several occasions. However, the documents produced dated from late 2003 or early 2004, and then, very little if any information relating to SEA was included in them. No new information was provided to the Review Mission despite several requests¹⁶⁷. Still, the issue has been openly and repeatedly discussed by the inter-agency protection core group established as part of the inter-agency coordination structure in the country. One NGO reported that gratuity of aid is not widely understood by IDPs and that this

¹⁶⁶ According to the Inter-Agency Internal Displacement Division (IDD)’s report on its mission to Liberia from 3 to 10 October 2004, abuse in camps is “rampant” and between July and early October 40 cases of child rape had been reported to UNMIL’s Human Rights and Protection Section, the oldest victim being 13 (see p. 3).

¹⁶⁷ The same partner also made allegations of widespread corruption and diversion of food aid by camp management structures, aid workers and government officials. Once again, however, these allegations were not supported in the documents provided to the Review Mission. The partner is however, a reputable international NGO whose allegations cannot be ignored or dismissed without further investigation.



lack of knowledge rendered the IDPs even more vulnerable to exploitation and abuse by aid providers.

Even if faced with a lack of concrete evidence, the need for a strong initiative by a UN agency is imperative. Once again, the lack of overall responsibility for IDPs seems to be a handicap to deal with this particular protection issue. Nonetheless, since food aid is the main item provided to IDPs in camps, and its potential for exploitation and abuse is high, it would be strongly recommended that WFP take the lead in addressing the issue, organising aggressive information campaigns and, using the experience gained in other countries in the region, plays a major role in implementing the special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse contained in the Secretary General's Bulletin of 4 December 2003.

Linked to the above, WFP staff have also been very active on the issue of sexual and gender-based violence. WFP has conducted sensitisation campaigns on the issue for staff, implementing partners and government counterparts, and staff were on the whole aware of what to do if they came across such cases. In Sierra Leone, for example, WFP chairs the UN Country Team Gender Theme Group.¹⁶⁸

5.1.4. Other gender-related activities

Gender activities have become greatly intertwined with the above, and WFP has taken a major interest in ensuring mainstreaming of gender and the Enhanced Commitments to Women in all activities, going as far as to include the relevant sections of the ECW in letters of understanding with partners. Nonetheless, gender analysis has tended to be quantitative rather than qualitative, measuring success in terms of numbers of female food monitors, women involved in refugee food committees, distribution, etc., and gender issues have become synonymous with women's issues. Several international staff members of WFP, and also some international UNHCR staff, have expressed concern that insisting too much on women empowerment can make them more vulnerable, especially to domestic violence, as men see themselves deprived of power in an already

diminishing (refugee) situation, and some expressed concerns of a "backlash" by men once they return home. In any case, when asked what could be done to prevent domestic violence in camps, a group of women in Lainé camp said "give the men jobs". It is worth noting that in all camps visited, all women acknowledged that WFP's – and others' – sensitisation campaigns had had a beneficial effect on domestic violence and that a considerable reduction of instances of domestic violence could be observed. It was also reported to the Review Mission by the camp manager that when more men were incorporated in an income generating/training project, the level of violence in one of the camps decreased.

5.1.5. Protecting the right to education - and more

¹⁶⁸ Under the lead of UNHCR, refugee camp structures include committees to deal with instances of SGBV, and NGOs have set up specialised assistance programmes providing counseling, rehabilitation and legal support for victims. The situation is less clear in IDP camps, however, as there is no overall agency with a responsibility for IDPs.



One of the most effective of WFP's interventions with regard to protecting children's, and in particular girls', right to education, has been school feeding. School feeding in the region has been used as a measure to help food-insecure communities, to boost the education system after major crises, to promote the right to education and to increase enrolment, in many cases providing initial support to teachers newly arrived in certain areas¹⁶⁹. The project has been on the whole highly successful in increasing enrolment numbers of both girls and boys¹⁷⁰, aiding in the establishment of public schools and in fostering community participation.

But school feeding can have additional positive effects that go beyond the protection and promotion of the right to education, such as fostering integration between divided communities and reducing tensions between refugees and their hosts, and sensitising children to the dangers of sexual and gender-based violence and HIV/AIDs. In Guinea, for example, where tensions between refugees and host communities are running high, emergency school feeding in the Guinée Forestière region has intentionally targeted first and foremost villages around refugee camps and refugee-hosting areas, in an effort to show local communities that they could also reap some benefits from the presence of refugees. Indeed, WFP's intervention has for some time been the only assistance local communities have received despite the presence of UN agencies and local and international NGOs assisting refugees¹⁷¹. While it is difficult to measure the results in terms of these protection objectives precisely because the assistance to host communities is so limited and the differences between them and the refugees are stark, it is nonetheless noteworthy that WFP has targeted its interventions in terms of the capacity of this programme to prevent further tension and thus protect its beneficiaries.

5.2. Activities that have a direct impact on the protection of beneficiaries of aid

In addition to the "protection" activities above, WFP has had to contend with the negative impact on beneficiaries of the provision of aid. In the majority of cases WFP has been able to anticipate these effects and counter those effects by changing its methods of operation in order to minimise risks and protect aid beneficiaries, while in other cases it went as far as refusing to distribute food because of the risks that this would pose to the beneficiaries. In other cases, however, WFP appears to have failed to identify the risks the conduct of a certain activity would pose in terms of the protection of beneficiaries.

5.2.1. Food distribution

WFP has recognised in many previous instances that the manner in which food is distributed has an important effect on the well-being and protection of beneficiaries, and has issued clear

¹⁶⁹ See *Full Report of the Evaluation...*, Annex 7.

¹⁷⁰ WFP Guinea, however, has observed that while enrolment increased in the early years, there was virtually no increase in the upper classes, as those children usually work, i.e. in market stalls, and the fact that they missed school for a prolonged period made them more difficult to integrate in the formal school system.

¹⁷¹ It is only in recent months that some international NGOs have started productive programmes in refugee-hosting areas.



guidelines with regard to this, to ensure that the distribution points are as near as possible to the beneficiaries' dwellings, to organise distributions according to vulnerability, etc.

One major issue in the region has been the risk posed to communities by the mere possession of food and by the type of food they received¹⁷². In past years, WFP took a conscious and comprehensive decision to deliver bulgur wheat instead of rice to its West African beneficiaries, as possession of rice had resulted in violence against them and attacks on staff, convoys and warehouses. This has been particularly problematic in Liberia, where food has been, throughout the 15-year conflict, a valuable commodity for fighting factions. Attacks on convoys and warehouses were common in Liberia, but in early-mid 2003 WFP observed that IDPs had become the target of militias after the former had received their food rations, and militias could be seen roaming around the camps during and after distributions. In April and May 2003, at least two camps in Montserrado county – Ricks and Jatondo - were attacked immediately after food was distributed to IDPs, and in one case the attack took place during distribution. WFP responded by requesting the deployment of the army during and after distribution, going as far as to contributing financially to their deployment¹⁷³. This, however, did not always work and government troops were unable to hold off the attacks for long, so WFP reviewed its distribution methods and started distributing smaller rations (15 days) so that a lower quantity of food would be less attractive for militias to attack the camps. The effectiveness of this decision could however not be proven, as fighting intensified and IDPs abandoned their camps and fled to Monrovia. In June and July 2003, as fighting had erupted all over the country, Monrovia had filled with displaced people and international staff had been evacuated, WFP local staff and partners also distributed smaller, 15-day family rations, which would be more easily transportable should they have to run again.

Some concerns remain with regard to the way food distribution is carried out. While in most countries in the region the scooping method of distribution is in operation, in Liberia the preferred method by all but one of WFP partners is the grouping method. Distribution methods have been subject to much – and at times acrimonious – debate in Liberia. Nonetheless, it would seem that protection considerations have not been taken into account when choosing the grouping method; the main reason argued both by partners and WFP staff for preferring it is that it was much quicker– and cheaper - to distribute in this way. The Review Mission was told, however, that many of the instances of sexual exploitation and abuse are linked to this method of distribution, and it is felt that the matter deserves further investigation¹⁷⁴, perhaps in consultation with other offices in the region.

In Lainé camp in Guinea, many women expressed concern about the safety of their children during distribution, as small children are not allowed in the distribution area and women are obliged to leave them outside, exposed to security risks. As WFP is committed to ensuring that

¹⁷² These issues have been raised by WFP staff throughout the world. See the report on a "Food Aid in Conflict" workshop in September 2001 which brought together WFP staff throughout the world to discuss the challenges of providing food aid in conflict and post-conflict situations. The report of the workshop was published by WFP in June 2002.

¹⁷³ As this presented budgetary problems, these deployments were budgeted as missions by government counterparts.

¹⁷⁴ In Guinea, WFP fought a long struggle with UNHCR to impose the scooping method in refugee camps over UNHCR opposition, as they felt grouping did not ensure that beneficiaries had access to their full rations and opened them to the possibility of abuse.



women are the recipients of food rations, some thought must be given to the safety of the children who are left behind while their mothers go to collect the food. In Liberia, UNMIL's Human Rights and Protection Unit reported to the Review Mission the case of a four-year-old girl who was raped by a former combatant in an IDP camp while her mother went to collect food. Without exonerating parents from the responsibility of making arrangements for their children while they are away, instances like this should prompt WFP to consider that there are risks for some beneficiaries, and perhaps seek the collaboration of partners, other UN agencies and the beneficiaries themselves in organising safe areas so that mothers with no other means of arranging for the care of their children can leave them in a secure place while they are collecting their food rations.

5.2.2. Reduction of the ration and its effect on protection

Owing mainly to lack of funding that has resulted in pipeline breakdowns, WFP has had to cut down rations of refugees and IDPs throughout the region. The cutting of the rations in refugee camps in Guinea, while apparently also justified in terms of the nutritional status and capacity of the refugees to access alternative sources of food, has nonetheless presented particular problems, mainly regarding the perception of refugees as to the reasons why this happened. The ration reduction happened in the context of a verification exercise which sought to reduce the number of aid beneficiaries¹⁷⁵, and, more importantly, as UNHCR started to facilitate repatriation. In this context, refugees felt that the reduction in the ration was an attempt to push them to return to Liberia before they had made up their minds to return. At the same time, the verification exercise and the suspension of the entitlements to some registered beneficiaries resulted in an attack and looting of the warehouse in Kola camp in June, and reportedly in threats to the refugee

executive as well as their subsequent refusal to cooperate in verification exercises. Staff of WFP have also been threatened in connection with this.

Some NGOs and UNHCR have been quick to make the link between the reduction of the ration and an increase in prostitution in camps; this link has however not been demonstrated as the ration decrease took place in September only. WFP is conscious of these allegations and is following up the issue together with its partner doing post-distribution monitoring.

5.3. Staff attitudes to protection

Many staff, both local and international, have expressed a strong interest in and understanding of protection issues. They were fully knowledgeable of the environment they are working in, of the powerful instrument food aid is and of the need to use it not only for humanitarian imperatives but also to enhance the protection of beneficiaries and to foster peace and reconciliation. Still, awareness and understanding of WFP's role with regard to protection, human rights and humanitarian law vary greatly across the region.

¹⁷⁵ as it was observed that many people receiving food aid did not live in camps, and that some were not even refugees.



The issue of sexual exploitation and abuse and SGBV has opened an avenue for discussing protection issues; still, even there staff attitudes and level of awareness of when and where WFP could intervene, or where its responsibility lay, varied. Many staff are new and have received little training; some staff argued that WFP lacks a mandate to deal with protection issues. For instance, one gender focal point said she did not see how WFP should or could intervene in the case of the rape of a little girl while her mother was collecting her food ration, while a field monitor failed to identify sexual exploitation as one problem in camps. On the whole, however, staff knowledge of who to refer SGBV cases in refugee camps was clear, but in the context of IDP camps referring cases to authorities was less so, as no agency has taken overall responsibility for IDPs and government structures are, at best, inefficient.

All Country Directors expressed their belief in WFP's role and need for involvement in protection issues, as WFP staff in the field are daily confronted with protection dilemmas. They all talked about the need for a clear policy on protection, together with simple "checklists" to make sure protection is integrated – mainstreamed – in their activities, as well as mechanisms for addressing protection concerns, especially when they were not directly related to food aid and those responsible do not act. Likewise, many staff requested information on WFP's position, what they were expected to do in terms of protection, how to do it and, importantly, the limits of their intervention.

5.4. Incorporation of protection concerns in WFP documentation

While in many cases protection concerns have been at the basis of interventions, these are rarely reflected in planning documents, working plans and reports, with the notable exception of gender/sexual exploitation and abuse, for which paragraphs can be found in all documents). There is little incorporation of protection concerns in planning and

evaluation tools, result-based monitoring, etc.¹⁷⁶. Of all the reviewed documents, only on one occasion have clear protection objectives been formulated in a planning document. This is the case of the Côte d'Ivoire EMOP document of November 2003, which lists among the main features of WFP's EMOP strategy:

***"Promoting protection and peace-building.** As a UN agency, WFP has an obligation to deliver its assistance in ways that promote the protection of basic human rights. In areas rent apart by ethnic strife (west of Guiglo, for example), WFP assistance must be cognizant of village dynamics and not inadvertently contribute to consolidating acts of discrimination. On the contrary, WFP support for rebuilding should seek to assist those who have suffered from discrimination and to heal the wounds in the community. In this context, WFP will target equally according to the needs of vulnerable groups, whether among the IDP, refugee or host population."*

In line with this objective, WFP interventions in Côte d'Ivoire have sought to increase opportunities to bring together people in divided communities, for example by passing on strong reconciliation messages during food distributions and discussions with community leaders and

¹⁷⁶ One Country Director attributed this to a limitation in the number of words in documents which prevented the incorporation of protection considerations.



authorities, by insisting on organising joint distributions to different ethnic groups and by insisting on its impartial role to assist war-affected populations.

Post-distribution monitoring (PDM) reports in particular present a great opportunity to incorporate and report on protection concerns, but this is not always done. However, monitors frequently identify such concerns in their discussions with beneficiaries. Sometimes a separate report is made; sometimes the issues are passed on orally. In Guinea, PDM reports are regularly analysed among partners and special issues identified for special investigation, such as child labour. However, officials in Guinea have complained that there is often not enough analysis and treatment of the information contained in the PDM reports, usually because of the workload they have, and that therefore some issues are not taken up.

5.5. Other observations regarding WFP's role in protection

5.5.1. Access problems

As WFP operates under UN security rules, in many areas throughout the region which were deemed insecure by UN structures, WFP provided its food to NGO partners and to the ICRC in order to reach needy populations. NGOs often have less security restrictions than the UN and can therefore be present where the UN cannot. But it must be recognised that even in normal security conditions, it is NGOs who usually deliver WFP's food to beneficiaries, with WFP mostly monitoring the delivery. While NGOs do try and ensure that food reaches the beneficiaries, WFP cannot, in cases where the situation is deemed unsafe, monitor the delivery of aid. In the summer of 2003, however, not even NGOs could distribute food in Liberia, as WFP lost control of its warehouse in July 2003 and fighting broke out in the port area.

Access doesn't automatically translate into the protection of beneficiaries, but it does allow at least for obtaining information on conditions in a particular area. This information can be used to design aid activities that will at least not make the situation of the population worse, can be used for lobbying for an improvement of the conditions found and can also be passed on to other organisations and groups dealing with human rights issues.

Access problems are currently being experienced in Western Côte d'Ivoire, where the increased movement and presence of militia groups, particularly in government-controlled areas, has prevented humanitarian access. Despite various sensitisation efforts and the involvement of local authorities, difficulties are still experienced in gaining access to certain areas in the west, particularly between Guiglo and Bolequin and to villages North of Bolequin. One such incident took place on 27 August, as WFP and two international NGOs (Solidarités and Save the Children), were blocked in the village of Pohan at an unofficial roadblock erected by youths from the villages. The youth claimed that they wanted to draw the authorities' attention to the ethnic-based attacks in the region. Access has also been denied since April 2004 to several villages north of Bolequin, where there is reportedly illegal cultivation and harvesting of



timber. Government forces patrolling the area report that there are no people residing in this area, which was home to some 12,000 inhabitants, but have continued to deny access to humanitarian actors. Only ICRC has recently been able to visit the area, which they report is inhabited by some 300 people now, but has not made available any further information except that they do not require assistance.

In the framework of an integrated, country-team approach to crisis response, access issues are to be taken up by the Humanitarian Coordinator, and WFP staff have expressed frustration at the failure to take up the issue with the government, and at the lack of known in-house mechanisms for taking the matter higher up.

5.5.2. Perception of other UN agencies, NGOs and others

WFP's enhanced involvement in protection was generally welcomed and encouraged by all those outside WFP interviewed by the Review Mission. There was initial surprise at the putting together of the words "WFP" and "protection" as well as concern regarding the possibility of overlapping mandates, but both UN agencies and NGOs were enthusiastic about having "an extra pair of eyes" to look for protection issues and about having persons in WFP who can relate better to protection concerns. This is as long as WFP remains within its mandate and does not seek to address directly protection issues that are the resort of other agencies.

Likewise, UN agencies and NGOs alike said they would welcome the participation of WFP in inter-agency task forces and sectoral coordination sub-groups on protection. WFP's participation in these groups appears to have been mostly ad hoc, or not carried out at adequate levels. WFP officials have acknowledged that their participation has not always been consistent, and have argued that they had to balance their workload with the myriad of coordination meetings which they had to attend.

5.5.3. Protection in coordination with others

WFP's role in protection was better understood and accepted when it was carried out in the context of an integrated inter-agency approach, either in formal coordination structures or in ad-hoc arrangements. WFP's leadership in Sierra Leone with regard to the issue of sexual exploitation and abuse, and its participation in registration and referral of new arrivals in Guinea, are two examples of WFP's successful participation in protection activities in cooperation with other agencies.

Coordination structures in the region have varied in efficiency and cohesiveness, and this had an impact on protection. In all cases, WFP officials and others have attributed the success or failure of the coordinating structures to adequate leadership on the part of the Humanitarian Coordinator as well as, on the one hand, his/her ability to use OCHA effectively as a supporting tool for information exchange and coordination and, on the other, his willingness to raise humanitarian and protection issues at the highest level of UN structures. This seems to be a common pattern in many UN operations, but the responsibility of individual agencies in ensuring effective coordination and team work must not be overlooked. Sierra Leone stands as



an example of an effective UN country team working on a common vision and shared objectives. Thus, WFP was able to take initiatives and participate in activities relating to protection with the full backing of the whole UN system. For example, WFP was part of the first teams sent to the countryside in Sierra Leone after fighting subsided in order to assess the possibilities for resuming aid and to lay down the conditions for providing it¹⁷⁷.

The situation is less clear in other countries, where country team leadership appears to be weaker and where co-ordinating structures have been less effective in addressing protection gaps. In Liberia, for example, the initial coordinating structure established right after the conflict ended in September 2003 was replaced as it was decided to integrate it into the UN peace keeping mission. For months, this resulted in parallel co-ordinating structures, a multiplication of meetings for UN agencies and NGOs and unclarity towards coordination responsibility. It has now been decided that OCHA will withdraw from the country and that UNMIL will be taking over total control of humanitarian coordination. This has raised strong objections, particularly of NGOs, concerned about the blurring of the lines between humanitarian and military action.

In Côte d'Ivoire, no strategy has been established to deal with the IDP issue, and the Humanitarian Coordinator has appeared reluctant to take up, with government structures, issues relating to the protection of beneficiaries such as forced recruitment, as well as problems of access faced by WFP and its partners. Thus, the need for clear mechanisms

for WFP to act when country team structures are weak or ineffective was highlighted by many officials in the region.

5.5.4. Donor policies and their impact on protection

Donor policies, both in terms of funding but also political support, also have a serious impact on WFP's ability to protect beneficiaries. For example, lack of funding results in reductions in rations which, in turn, have resulted in insecurity and other problems for the populations concerned. Likewise, the withdrawal of funding in Guinea as a means to show discontent with its government prevents the implementation of programmes to aid refugee-hosting communities amidst an economic crisis, thus increasing tensions with those who receive aid and are already seen as better off. Finally, the insistence of some donor countries to support the government in Côte d'Ivoire, to the point of denying the existence of irregular militias in government-controlled areas, weakened the UN ability to advocate for access when these militias have prevented access to certain areas.

6 CONCLUSIONS

¹⁷⁷ This also had protection implications, as the negotiating team at times witnessed serious human rights violations, including killings, which they were unable to prevent or say anything about so as not to compromise the negotiations. While in the case of a rape by a rebel leader taken place in an adjacent room the team left the area saying that they would not bring food aid in those conditions, these human rights violations remained unreported – interview with former WFP official in Sierra Leone.



WFP staff in the field have been confronted to protection challenges since WFP has started its operations. They have had to address them, with varying degrees of success, in many different situations, mostly out of humanitarian concern and personal initiative in the absence of clear tools and guidelines. However, these challenges have become all the more pressing as the nature of conflict has evolved and targeting the civilian population has become a major method of warfare and violence is rife in areas where beneficiaries settle. Thus, as WFP tries, through its food assistance interventions, to protect the right to life of war-affected populations, it also has to make sure that the populations it assists are safe from other threats, either by acting directly or by getting others to act. These challenges are all the greater when WFP is dealing with IDPs, as no agency has overall responsibility for them, and WFP, at the forefront of efforts to provide assistance to this population, is in a unique position to enhance their protection.

All those interviewed by the Review Mission agreed that “protection” for WFP should not involve a rethink of its mandate. What WFP should do is “practical protection” which in essence means looking at operations through a “protection lens” and acting accordingly. In essence, what this amounts to is mainstreaming protection issues into WFP programming, and involves:

- understanding the power of food aid and the underlying mandate to promote and protect human rights entrusted to WFP as an integral part of the United Nations;
- identifying and understanding the context in which WFP carries out its operations (i.e. in West Africa the food insecurity that prompted WFP action was caused by situations of violence and violation of rights); knowing who are the actors in each context, at local, national and international level and the power they have to influence the context positively or negatively;

- understanding what constitutes a violation under international law, who is responsible for it and for providing redress;
- understanding whether food aid can have an effect on these violations (positive/negative), whether it can cause further ones, or whether the violations escape the scope of food aid altogether;
- Recognising the need to act and identifying the best course of action:
 - direct action: when the abuse is linked to aid or can be solved by WFP, i.e. by providing aid or by modifying the way aid is given or by taking disciplinary measures;
 - Indirect action: understanding the role of other actors and referring those violations that cannot be solved by WFP alone.
 - Advocacy on certain issues or violations. Advocacy does not always need to be done by WFP directly and publicly; often the best course of action might be to discretely advocate with other actors who might take a more vocal stance for changes in the patterns of violations WFP has witnessed, while WFP continues its operations and observes the evolution of the situation.

From discussions with country teams, interviews with beneficiaries and stakeholders in the four countries, it became clear that, in the course of its activities, WFP already plays an important



role in protection, but that it lacks the tools to do it in a systematic and consistent manner. As one staff member in Liberia put it, “WFP is a “protection agency”: what more protection can we give than to save lives? But we are limited to one tool [food aid] to do so. The question is how we use this tool to ensure that lives are saved and protected and that no harm comes to those we are trying to save, and that the efforts of others who use other tools are complemented by what we do”.

7 RECOMMENDATIONS

For WFP as an institution

1 Conduct similar protection reviews of other operations taking place in different contexts. This review of protection issues took place mostly in situations of post-conflict and at different stages in the recovery process. In order to clearly appreciate the protection challenges WFP staff face and provide guidance to staff, other reviews of operations taking place in different contexts (development, natural disasters, etc.) should be conducted to identify further protection concerns. These could be incorporated in the framework of already planned evaluations and will certainly feed into the current work to mainstream human rights into WFP’s work as instructed by the Secretary-General.

2 WFP should clarify, to its own staff and to others, its position and responsibility regarding protection. As requested by many WFP staff, issue a simple policy statement clarifying WFP’s responsibility with regard to protection, the operational definition of protection, the limits of its intervention and its relation with others, in particular with agencies with a “protection” mandate which will help understand WFP roles and will provide support to staff already grappling with protection

issues. This report already contains the basic elements for such a statement. WFP should also clarify how its staff could bring protection concerns above the UN Country Team level and push for these concerns at relevant inter-agency fora, or bilaterally with the agencies concerned.

3 Issue guidance for staff on how to integrate and conduct protection into WFP work. A first step would be to review all existing protection policies and guidelines and see how other protection issues could be incorporated, in a similar way as was done, for example, with gender and HIV mainstreaming. For example, a “protection focal point” within PSPT could assist in developing an overall policy on protection in coordination with other units carrying out protection functions. This would involve:

- Developing simple checklists, with examples of best practice, and mechanisms to mainstream protection into WFP operations and to guide staff on protection issues, clarifying their role and limits, the scope of their intervention and how to relate to other agencies with a “protection mandate”. Some tools have been developed and are widely used by several organisations, such as the “Do No Harm” framework or the ALNAP



humanitarian protection guidelines¹⁷⁸ and could be easily adapted to WFP's own operations. Guidance should also aim at assisting staff to deal in a consistent way with protection issues which remain unaddressed and are beyond the scope of WFP, clarifying the roles, mandates and responsibilities of other agencies.

- As WFP reviews several of its guidelines on its programming tools, (i.e. needs assessments, contingency planning, etc.), protection concerns should be incorporated. Likewise, some of the monitoring and evaluation tools recently developed, and particularly result-based management, should incorporate protection outcomes reflecting the rationale for WFP programmes.
- Continue efforts already under way to increase staff knowledge of international humanitarian law, such as those conducted in the framework of the ERT, and extend it to human rights, refugee law, and other protection issues. WFP staff assigned to a particular country or region could be provided with human rights information (obtainable, for example, from the UNHCHR website or from human rights organisations such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch) as part of their briefing.

4 Establish one or two pilot projects in the field to test initial guidelines, with a protection focal point responsible for training and awareness of staff and for reviewing WFP programmes and activities in terms of protection.

5 WFP should consider stronger advocacy on protection and human rights issues. This does not mean, however, taking a public denunciation stance in all issues. Advocacy strategies should be carefully weighed on a case by case basis and on their ability to produce the desired results.

6 When WFP beneficiary lists are the only available source of information on a beneficiary population, as is frequently the case in IDP situations, carefully review the information to be collected and include that which will allow better protection, in particular age and sex breakdown, type of vulnerability and place of origin and intended return. The establishment of partnerships with other agencies with expertise in registration would be of great benefit, particularly with a view to setting up and maintaining a centralised registration database which could be used not only by WFP but by all agencies providing assistance and protection to IDPs both in camps and in areas of return.

For West Africa Operations

¹⁷⁸ The "Do No Harm" methodology is well known to WFP, as it was used in the "Food Aid in Conflict" workshop. The report of the workshop includes a good description of the DNH framework. The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP), has developed a guidance booklet on "humanitarian protection" currently being piloted in the field by several NGOs. Although the DNH framework focuses on conflict situations and the role that aid can play in it, both methodologies are very similar in that they advocate for an in-depth situation analysis which includes knowledge of the perpetrators, violations and threat analysis as well as other actors in the situation and the role that aid can play in it as a precondition of programme design, and encourage the inclusion of protection aims and outcomes which are realistic within the limit of each agency, as a prerequisite for designing an appropriate programme. The ERT module on international humanitarian law/access also incorporates a similar analysis. In addition, WFP has issued a *Negotiation of Access Package* and a *Frequently Asked Questions on Human Rights* document.



1 The protection dimensions of WFP's assistance activities should be clearly articulated in programme documents, and in particular when an activity specifically aims to contribute to special protection concerns. In these cases, protection outcomes should be clearly stated and used to assess performance. Staff should be encouraged to use existing tools, and particularly post-distribution monitoring, in a systematic manner to look further than the utilisation of food by beneficiaries and into protection impact and problems encountered. So far this is being done in ad hoc way, and while many protection concerns are reported by those conducting PDM, these rarely make way to the written reports, and as a result remain at best inconsistently addressed. Partners conducting PDM should also be encouraged in this regard.

2 Increase advocacy to promote greater action within the UN community, donors and governments with regard to already identified gaps in the protection of beneficiaries, and agree mechanisms for WFP to be able to take these concerns further in the face of inaction by UN actors or government at country level. As indicated above, WFP should take a stronger role in pushing for others to take action when it has identified protection gaps, especially with regard to recruitment of children across the region, the situation of IDPs in Liberia and the worsening situation of refugee host communities in Guinea that can result in further tensions if no appropriate and timely support is given. WFP officials have in many cases stumbled upon the inaction of the UN at the country level; however, these cases are rarely taken up, for example, at high level meetings with UNHCR or other UN bodies, and country directors often do not know how to ensure that the issues are taken up by their hierarchy.

3 Monitor and evaluate the impact of the "Do No Harm" training in Liberia on staff ability to understand protection issues and incorporate protection in their work, with a view to reproducing it in other countries (in fact, Liberia could constitute one of the "pilot projects" referred to above). In Liberia, the NGO German Agro Action has made available to all NGOs, UN agencies and government counterparts the services of a training consultant in the "Do No Harm" methodology. Following a presentation at a heads of UN agencies meeting, the Liberia Country Office has requested to be trained in the DNH framework. The consultant will provide a one-day session to senior staff and a two-day session to programme staff in October and November. This is all the more important as WFP has now opened field offices in several areas of the country, and these offices are, among other things, responsible for situation and needs assessments, the ability to analyse the situation and anticipate the positive and negative effects that food aid can have is crucial towards ensuring protection of beneficiaries. Staff assigned to these offices should also undergo this training.

4 WFP Offices in the region should exchange information and practices regarding protection issues. As countries are at different stages of emerging from conflict, some are at a more advanced stage in the formulation of procedures, for example, to deal with sexual exploitation and abuse and prevent SGBV. Liberia is at the moment, in the framework of an inter-agency task force, looking into the establishment of such protocols. The experience of Sierra Leone in this regard could be extremely useful. Likewise, more exchange could take



place with regard to distribution methods and their effect on the protection of beneficiaries, in view of the current debate on these in Liberia.

5 WFP should participate actively and at an adequate level in protection coordination groups set up within the UN coordinating structures in each country. So far, WFP participation in such fora has been irregular, and WFP has mostly participated as an observer. WFP partners and counterparts have all expressed the need for WFP, as a major aid provider, to attend those meetings as a full participant and to do so at a level that would allow for some decision making.

6 WFP should take the lead, and be seen to take the lead, in efforts to combat sexual exploitation and abuse in Liberia. While the Review Mission was able to fully appreciate the difficulties in obtaining concrete information on the issue, the reports received are of a sufficiently serious nature to merit strong action by WFP. At least, this should involve an aggressive campaign to remind all staff, partners, government counterparts and beneficiaries themselves, of the gratuity of humanitarian aid, of the zero-tolerance policy with regard to instances of abuse and of the obligation of all staff and partners to report such cases.



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Appendix I: TERMS OF REFERENCE

Review of Protection Issues

Regional West Africa Coastal Region

1. Background

In March/April 2004, WFP (OEDE) fielded an evaluation mission to the sub-region to review the implementation of the Regional West Africa Coastal PRRO (10064.2). The regional and country offices had determined that protection¹⁷⁹ was such an important issue, given the unpredictable and volatile situation in West Africa, with widespread human-rights abuses such as killings, torture, rape and other acts of gender-based violence, forced recruitment and use of child soldiers, and a difficult security situation impeding humanitarian access, that it deserved to be examined specifically by the evaluation mission. Though the PRRO evaluation itself was, in the end, unable to incorporate the issue, OEDE, PSP and the regional office still feel that the issue is of critical importance to WFP, both specifically to WFP's West Africa coastal operations, and corporately, as the lessons learned here could have much wider applicability.

The current review is intended to review *beneficiary and beneficiary community* protection issues in relation to WFP's humanitarian operations.

The protection role of WFP has not to date been clearly enunciated as a guiding principle of the organisation's mandate. WFP does not have a treaty-based protection mandate as do UNHCR or the ICRC; there is no basis in WFP regulations or other measures approved by our Executive Board that gives WFP a "mandate" for protection. WFP does have a mandate to provide humanitarian assistance, which itself is a form of protection. Also, as an international humanitarian organization, WFP has a responsibility to act in a way that is consistent with protection guarantees provided under international humanitarian and human rights law. The current review is intended to consider protection issues in the context of WFP's humanitarian operations, and both the review and recommendations need to be within the context of WFP's mandate to provide humanitarian assistance when needed.

Specific practical outputs of the mission will include proposals for tools to assist WFP to raise awareness about protection responsibilities, and recommendations for preparation of future PRROs in the West Africa coastal region.

2. An Overview

The crisis in coastal West Africa began in December 1989, with the incursion into northern Liberia by the National Patriotic Front; soon neighbouring countries were drawn into the conflict. In 1991, the Revolutionary United Front - RUF, a Sierra Leone resistance movement allegedly affiliated with armed factions in Liberia, launched attacks against Sierra Leone Government forces, beginning a civil conflict that lasted for ten years. In early 2001, Sierra Leone rebels made a series of major military incursions into Guinea that displaced local communities along with refugees. The on-going conflict in Liberia has fuelled much of the regional instability.

¹⁷⁹ "Protection" refers to, citing ICRC, "all activities aimed at ensuring full respect for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law, i.e. human rights law, international humanitarian law and refugee law (ICRC, Strengthening Protection in War : A Search for Professional Standards, Geneva : ICRC, 2001), p. 19.



President Taylor was forced to step down in August 2003, a National Transitional Government was created in October, and the UN Security Council established a multinational UN peacekeeping force to help maintain peace and establish order in the country. A UN peacekeeping force is also active in Sierra Leone.

The regional crisis has followed a cyclical pattern of violence giving way to efforts to establish cease-fires under fragile peace agreements. Each round of fighting has been accompanied by atrocities against civilians, including mass killings, mutilations, female and male rape, forced abductions, indiscriminate destruction and looting.

A major feature of the crisis has been the large-scale displacement of civilians. From the beginning of the Liberian conflict, the Governments of Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Sierra Leone pursued a liberal "open-door" policy in providing asylum to refugees. In Liberia, it is estimated that between 700,000 and 800,000 sought refuge in neighbouring countries, and up to one million others have been displaced internally, mostly to Monrovia. In Sierra Leone, an estimated 1.5 million people abandoned their homes. The political instability in Côte d'Ivoire since 2002 has displaced more than one million people. With the establishment of peace in Sierra Leone in 2002, most refugees have been repatriated. Guinea and Sierra Leone continue to host an estimated 200 000 refugees from Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire.

By mid-2004 the region was generally calm, though tense. However the situation in Côte d'Ivoire remained volatile, following the breakdown of the 2003 Marcoussis-Linas peace accord, and the withdrawal of the opposition parties from the Government of National Reconciliation.

WFP assistance to the region began in 1990, with a series of short-term country-specific EMOPs. From early on, the operation has been challenging, mainly because of continuing insecurity, including attacks on humanitarian staff. The unpredictability of population movements, including frequent cross-border movements, has made the operation complex from the beginning.

Up until the mid-1990s, the main focus of WFP assistance was on free food distribution - the prevailing security situation severely restricted opportunities to undertake meaningful recovery activities. In 1996, WFP evaluated its experience with the Liberian regional operation. The evaluation recommended the phasing down of general food distributions and the strengthening of targeted recovery activities. Consequently, general food distributions were progressively replaced by more targeted food interventions. The upsurge in violence in 2000 and 2001, which continued in Liberia into summer 2003, curtailed the expansion of recovery activities and emphasis switched once again to the provision of relief assistance. Improved stability in Sierra Leone and Guinea after 2002 gave opportunities once again to shift emphasis back to recovery strategies in those countries. However in 2003/2004, general food distributions still accounted for some 60 percent of WFP commodities.

In late 2003, coordination of the regional PRRO and the Côte d'Ivoire regional EMOP was transferred from the Regional Bureau (ODD) in Dakar to WFP's sub-regional coordination office in Abidjan, the Regional Humanitarian Co-ordination and Support Office (RHCSO). At the country level, the WFP Country Representatives have national responsibility for coordinating and implementing the respective relief and recovery activities.

3. Scope of Work



Overall, the goal of the mission is to improve WFP's understanding of how its food assistance and field presence impact on the protection of populations and beneficiaries in the midst of large-scale humanitarian intervention.

4. Mission Objectives

Protection and the WFP mandate

- Identify and assess issues related to the protection of beneficiaries from the perspective of WFP operations and mandate, including humanitarian access and food assistance.
- Examine whether or not food assistance itself fosters or impedes protection.
- Identify steps already taken by WFP, or necessary within its mandate, to operate in a way that maximizes protection of beneficiaries.
- Examine past challenges and solutions, as well as propose ways to address these in the future (identify key elements of programming, monitoring and implementation that would enable staff to carry out their daily duties in a 'protection' mind frame)
- Suggest how findings could be translated into practical tools to raise awareness and change behaviour (for example, guidelines, best practice and training material)

Recommendations for the West Africa operation

- Recommend additions or changes in relation to the implementation and preparation of future phases of PRROs in the West Africa coastal region, as well as ongoing operations.

5. Key issues to be explored by the mission:

5.1 *Protection of civilians*

5.1.1 Violations and Threats

From a general protection point of view, what are the nature, pattern and scope of violations of persons targeted by WFP in the WAC and Cote d'Ivoire? Assess in particular, how they are arising either from acts of commission or acts of omission. Is there a logic or symbolism connected with the abuses and hence are they predictable in any way?

Who are the particularly vulnerable groups in the region (e.g. children, women, youth at risk, refugees, IDPs, Third Country Nationals (TCNs), and returnees), and what are their particular protection needs? Have they been adequately addressed by WFP/partners/other humanitarian agencies? If gaps exist, how could they be filled? The consultant will look specifically at issues of forced recruitment and sexual exploitation related to food aid distribution, as well as general access issues.

Key points to be addressed in the report: Have the needs of particularly vulnerable groups been adequately addressed by WFP, and/or other humanitarian agencies, including WFP partners? What are recommended actions for change and improvement?

5.1.2 Impact and Effect on Protected Persons

Understand *how* different groups of people remain physically, socially, politically, economically, and emotionally vulnerable to recent violations or future threats. To this end are there any *specific factors* (physical, social, gender, health, spatial, economic, habitual) that make particular groups (the above mentioned and/or others) more at risk or threatened?



From a WFP perspective, identify *the immediate and longer-term needs* for safety and assistance resulting from the impact of existing violations and continuing threats and differentiate between them more precisely in regard to age, gender, class or group.

Bearing in mind the WFP commitments to women and the history of sexual abuse in the region, also consider the extent to which WFP has adequately addressed the gender issues in the design and implementation of relief and recovery activities. Particular protection needs of children and youth should also be highlighted.

Key points to be addressed in the report: Has WFP correctly identified needs for safety and assistance, and been able to address these needs? What are proposed actions for change and improvement?

5.1.3 Legal Standards and Responsibility

Determine which specific standards of national, regional and international law are relevant to the pattern of violations and identify the laws, conventions, declarations, and specific articles that clearly define who constitute protected persons in the above situations. Identify articles that refer expressly to the kinds of incidents observed and the strategies and policies functioning. Identify laws/articles ratified &/or enacted in each country related to the incidents observed.

Identify which international agencies and/or international human rights mechanisms are mandated to respond to such violations. *What mechanisms exist to identify and report protection breaches*, both within WFP and to the broader international community?

Key points to be addressed in the report: What standards are relevant to WFP operations, and what can WFP draw on in adding an appropriate 'protection' dimension to its operations in future? What mechanisms exist for identifying and reporting violations?

5.1.4 WFP Response: to date and proposed

How has WFP addressed the situation of vulnerable persons in the past? Have WFP interventions been designed and implemented to reduce current threats and prevent future violations? What positive steps have staff taken in challenging situations? *What more could or should the organisation do?* In view of findings in section 5.1.3, what additional roles/responsibilities could be taken on by WFP? How should this be reflected in programme activities & MOUs?

Consider, *inter alia*, extended cooperation with partners/civil society/ security forces and how these do or could facilitate access to populations at risk.

Key points to be addressed in the report: What has WFP done to implement programmes in a way that aims to reduce current threats and prevent future violations, and what more could or should WFP do in future?

5.1.5 Protective Capability, Intent and Compliance Attitude

Understand the coping mechanisms and self-protection capabilities of protected persons and how they might best be supported and developed. Assess the freedom of movement and WFP's levels of access to different threatened communities as an essential prerequisite to different protective ability. In relation to this, map the strengths of, and the gaps in, any network of powerful relationships that may determine the ability of state authorities, humanitarian agencies, and vulnerable communities to engage strong protective alliances. Identify any key individuals particularly responsible for shaping and sustaining such relationships.



Key points to be addressed in the report: Has WFP assessed threats to beneficiaries and acted to support their coping mechanisms? What are proposed actions for change and improvement?

5.1.6 Inter-Organisational Complementarity

Understand the different mandates, programming capacities, priorities, expertise and ‘added value’ of other agencies, peacekeeping missions and organisations.

What has been the involvement of the UN Humanitarian Coordinator (HC) and Resident Coordinator (RC) on protection issues? How do the humanitarian and political actors interact in support of humanitarian goals and/or common goals?

What have been the respective roles and contributions from other agencies (especially those with a clear protection mandate) on protection and security issues? (How does for instance UNICEF deal with the issue of forced recruitment)? How does UNHCR deal with issues related to access and the presence of armed elements in refugee camps?

What are the existing relationships between WFP, as a front-line agency, and the agencies/missions/security forces with clear protection mandates? Were structural or procedural problems encountered?

Assess the best way to combine different agencies working in different modes so that they complement one another’s efforts in the best interests of protected persons and avoid contradicting or jeopardising one another’s strategies and activities.

Key points to be addressed in the report: How can WFP build on relationships with other agencies/missions/actors in order to maximize beneficiary protection within the context of assistance provision?

5.1.7 Impact of security situation on the protection of WFP beneficiaries

How have security issues (in relation to beneficiary communities) affected the transition from relief to recovery? Would different types of recovery activities have been more appropriate, given the prevailing security and protection situation?

What are the threats (situations) that WFP staff is confronted with that impede access for the provision of humanitarian assistance? What has been WFP’s reaction to these in the past? Has the organisation provided assistance to beneficiaries despite these threats and if so, with what implementation partners?

Key points to be addressed in the report: How has WFP dealt with security issues in relation to beneficiaries in the past? What are proposed actions for change and improvement?

6. Notes on Methodology

6.1 Phases of the review

Phase 1 – Preparation and Desk Review (the equivalent of 3 days):

Prior to the in-country missions, the consultant will review all relevant background documentation.



In order to help structure the review and ensure a systematic examination of protection issues, the consultant may wish to prepare an analytical framework, prior to arrival in-country. The framework will ensure systematic data/information and will specify, for each major question/key issue (under each one of the objectives and corresponding sub-questions), indicators, data/information collection methods, sources of information (such as documentation review, questionnaires/surveys, focus group interviews, individual interviews, data analysis, visits to project sites). Also, the consultant should give due consideration to the danger of attribution (the tendency to attribute achievements to a single action, without sufficient evidence) and the need for triangulation (a minimum of three sources of information to confirm findings).

Basic documents to be reviewed (this list is indicative):

- Mission report, PRRO Evaluation mission to WAC – March/April 2004;
- Other protection background material as made available by OEDE;
- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: Humanitarian Challenges in West Africa: Report from 19-21 meeting held in Accra, Ghana;
- OCHA West Africa Regional Protection Strategy Outline, as of June 2004 (Draft);
- WFP Information pack on WFP's role in access negotiation;
- IASC Sub-working Group on Human Rights and Humanitarian Action: Frequently asked Questions and Answers;
- IASC Manual of Field Practices in Humanitarian Negotiations with Armed Groups
- The "Growing Sheltering Tree", IASC publication including field practice by agency, on how to address protection concerns through their programmes, including WFP
- Humanitarian Protection – ALNAP Guidance Booklet (March 2004 draft version)
- WFP Food Aid in Conflict Workshop report – June 2002

Prior to departure for the mission, TORs will be forwarded to the Regional Humanitarian Coordination and Support Office, in Abidjan. These should be shared with key government focal points and implementing partners. A small task force of key stakeholders (composition to be determined by relevant WFP offices) may be established to review the TORs as well as the debriefing at the end of the mission.

Phase II – In-country/regional field visits (estimated 30 days):

To the extent possible, the consultant will meet with all relevant stakeholders, including beneficiaries, local and national government/authorities, major donors, key implementing partners and other UN agencies involved.

Data collection will take place both in the offices of key stakeholders in the capital and during field visits, scheduled as appropriate. The consultant will determine the optimum balance between mission time spent in the field and in the capital cities, together with the regional and country offices.

Phase III – Debriefing and report writing (the equivalent of 10 working days, 3 for debriefing and travel, and 7 for report-writing):

The consultant is responsible for writing of an aide-mémoire, containing only bullet points of main findings, conclusions and recommendations. This aide-mémoire will be helpful in guiding discussions, during the debriefing session and should, therefore, be distributed before the session, to take place in Abidjan. This aide-mémoire will be shared also with OEDE, PSP and other key WFP units during a debriefing to be held at WFP Headquarters.



Finally, a final report, including any annex will be produced, structured along the lines of the review's objectives. The final report will not exceed 30 pages. The report will include the specific recommendations on ongoing and future operations and on next steps for WFP, as specified below in 6.4, and above in Mission Objectives.

The consultant will assume overall responsibility for the mission, with necessary support from country offices and the Regional Humanitarian Coordination and Support Office (RHCSO). The consultant will synthesize the inputs from all sources in order to produce the necessary outputs, within prescribed deadlines.

6.2 *Expertise*

It is expected that the tasked mission member will be able to contribute to finding *practical solutions* to security and protection issues. The following skills are particularly sought:

- Recent practical experience in security and protection issues in situations of conflict and civil unrest
- Ability to use analytical frameworks to examine issues systematically
- Fluency in spoken and written English and ability to communicate in French (knowledge of local languages spoken in coastal West Africa would be a bonus)
- Understanding of the practical implications of gender differences in terms of designing and implementing assistance programmes
- Demonstrated ability to find creative solutions to practical problems.
- Background in International Humanitarian Law and/or Human Rights

6.3 *Timetable and Itinerary*

Along the lines of this timetable, a detailed itinerary (in-country programme of meetings and visits) will need to be prepared by the Abidjan office, in consultation with relevant country offices. Field visits (to Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire) are planned from mid-September, for one month.

<i>Review of Protection Issues</i>	
<i>West Africa Coastal Region</i>	
Itinerary of visits	
Desk review/reading (3 days, including travel)	Prior to mid-September
TORs finalisation	During the first few days of field visits
Travel to Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire	<i>This and all following dates to be confirmed by RHCSO following finalization of TORs and recruitment of consultant</i>
ODD Briefing, documentation, meetings and planning	
Travel to Conakry, Guinea	
Travel to Freetown, Sierra Leone	
CO Briefing and documentation	
Meetings with	
Field visits and field meetings	
Wrap-up, supplementary information, meetings	
Travel to Conakry, Guinea	
CO Briefing and documentation	
Meetings with	
Field visits and field meetings	
Wrap-up, supplementary information, meetings	



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Travel to Monrovia, Liberia	
CO Briefing and documentation	
Meetings with	
Field visits and field meetings	
Wrap-up, supplementary information, meetings	
Travel to Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire	
CO Briefing and documentation	
Meetings with	
Field visits and meetings	
Wrap-up, supplementary information, meetings	
Aide-mémoire and debriefing preparation	
Debriefing in Abidjan	
Return travel	
Debriefing at HQ, Rome	
Debriefing at HQ in Rome (3 days, including travel)	
Report writing	
Report writing (the equivalent of 7 working days)	
Deadline for first draft of report	
Deadline for final draft of report	

6.4 *Products of the review*

To this end, the consultant is expected to produce:

- Finalised and agreed TORs, after arrival in Abidjan;
- Aide-mémoire, containing in bullet point form the main findings, conclusions and recommendations (maximum of 2,000 words);
- Debriefing session in Abidjan;
- Debriefing session in Rome;
- A full report, containing:
 - o All annexes: Annex 1: Final terms of reference – TORs; Annex 2: Itinerary of visits; Annex 3: Persons met, including name, functions, organization, location; Annex 4: Consulted documentation
 - o Immediate recommendations for the ongoing operation(s)
 - o Medium-term objectives for the preparation and implementation of future phases of the WAC and Cote d'Ivoire PRROs
 - o Recommendations for WFP in general, to bring a 'protection lens' to its programming and operations, and in capturing and disseminating lessons learned
 - o Major lessons learned on protection in the context of WFP's humanitarian operations
 - o Identification of key gaps in knowledge and next steps for WFP to add an appropriate protection dimension to its West Africa coastal operations

All written reports and debriefings are to be in English. The final report will be circulated once for comments, which will be considered by the consultant, and then finalized by the consultant.

The consultant is fully responsible for his independent full report, which may not necessarily reflect the views of WFP.

6.5 *Estimated costs*



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The current cost to WFP for such a mission is estimated at some US\$36,000, to be shared equally among OEDE, PSPT and RHCSO/Country Offices. This cost does not include the cost of the WFP staff member to accompany the review mission to provide technical backstopping.



Terms of Reference (P-2)

For relevant background information, the present TORs (L-2), should be read together with the Main Review of protection issues Regional West Africa Coastal region TORs, covering the responsibilities of an International Consultant (P-4/P-5 level), in annex. *As part of WFP's engagement on Protection, the current mission is intended to review beneficiary and beneficiary community protection issues in the context of the Programme's humanitarian operations.* Specific practical outputs of the mission will include proposals for tools to assist WFP in raising awareness about protection responsibilities, and recommendations for preparation of future PRROs in West Africa Coastal region.

Mission objectives

Protection and the WFP mandate (as outlined in the above Main TORs)

- Identify and assess issues related to the protection of beneficiaries from the perspective of WFP operations and mandate, including humanitarian access and food assistance.
- Comment on the readiness of WFP in the field in terms of knowledge, competence, capacity, systems, partnerships, to integrate IHL and other protection elements into their everyday work.
- Examine whether or not food assistance itself fosters or impedes protection.
- Identify steps already taken by WFP, or necessary within its mandate, to operate in a way that maximizes protection of beneficiaries.

Recommendations for the West Africa operation

- Recommend additions or changes regarding the implementation and preparation of future phases of PRROs in the West Africa region, as well as ongoing operations.

Phase I - Preparation and Desk review

The incumbent will carry out the below tasks, in liaison and consultation with the Consultant:

- Provide the Consultant with a **relevant background documentation** for the mission (including the below listed documents). In addition, provide the Consultant with a background document outlining to what extent **WFP's mandate, implicitly and/or explicitly involves humanitarian protection aspects**.
- **Collection, in consultation with the COs, of relevant background material** to be able to prepare an analytical framework, including data on relevant beneficiary and beneficiary communities (Who are the vulnerable/Where are they located/What are their Key protection concerns).
- In consultation with the Consultant, contact RB to discuss the upcoming mission against the TORs as agreed by RB and COs. Also, prepare for phase II (in-country and field visits); establish who does what in terms of meetings and logistics.
- As part of Preparatory Desk work, review the implementation of previous WFP projects to examine whether food assistance itself has fostered or impeded protection.

In close consultations with the Consultant, draft **questionnaires**, for WFP beneficiaries and staff. The main objectives of the questionnaire will be as follows: 1) to review beneficiary and beneficiary community protection issues, 2) to raise awareness about protection issues; 3)

to propose WFP awareness training tools on Protection responsibilities/recommendations for future activities. **Suggested areas** are outlined below (detailed questions to be drafted based on the findings in the above desk-review)



Related to Beneficiaries:

What are the main protection concerns (Violations and Threats) (*The further development of areas related to beneficiaries are pending the findings of the desk review and consultations with the consultant*).

Related to WFP staff:

- What is their Impact and Effect on Protected persons?
- How are different groups vulnerable and what factors make certain groups more at risk/threatened?
- What is WFP's Protective capability, intent and compliance attitude?
- What existing mechanisms exist for identifying and reporting violations?
- What impact does the Security situation have on the Protection of WFP's beneficiaries
- How has **WFP** dealt with security issues in relation to beneficiaries in the past? What are the proposed actions for change and improvement)?
- What is the existing **Inter Organisational Complementarity in-country?** (Questions will focus on the different agency mandates; programming capacities, priorities, expertise and comparative advantage).
- What is WFP's response: to date and proposed; how has WFP addressed the situation of vulnerable persons in the past? Have WFP interventions been designed and implemented to reduce current threats and prevent future violations?

Phase II – In-country/Regional Field visits

During the visits the incumbent will support the Consultant as required (specific responsibilities/division of labour to be discussed with the Consultant).

In view of Phase III of the mission (Debriefing and report writing), at the end of each country visit, the incumbent, together with the Consultant, will be responsible for informal de-briefing sessions with WFP CO. The incumbent will help ensure that conclusions in the final aid memoire (as drafted by the Consultant), do address key concerns from a WFP perspective and that recommendations can be easily made use of in current operations/future WFP projects in the region (and elsewhere, where applicable).

Phase III – Debriefing and report writing

Contribution to practical solutions:

As above, under Phase II.

Based upon previous WFP protection related work and the recommendation of the final aide - memoire, the incumbent will together with the consultant provide suggestions on practical tools to raise awareness and change behaviour on security and protection issues in WFP i.e., guidelines, best practice and training material). For the eventual realisation of these, the incumbent will follow-up together with WFP partners (Harvard University).

Moreover, based upon the experience of the mission the incumbent will make suggestions to PSPT on a medium-term corporate strategy on defining WFP's protection responsibilities under IHL and Human Rights Law.



Saturday 18 September

Arrival in Abidjan

Sunday 19 September

Documentation and research

Monday 20 September

Briefing, WFP Regional Coordinator

Briefing, WFP Abidjan

Briefing, ICRC

Briefing, Amnesty International

Briefing, Swedish Embassy

Briefing, OCHA, UNHCR, IOM

Tuesday 21 September

Travel to Guiglo

Briefing, WFP Head of Office Guiglo

Visit to Niela IDP Temporary Centre and briefing with IOM

Visit to Niela Refugee Camp – meeting with Camp Management

Briefing, UNHCR

Wednesday 22 September

Briefing, WFP Food Aid Monitor

Travel to Ourialé village (distribution to recently returned IDPs)

Meeting with WFP Man Head of Office, briefing

Briefing, MSF Holland, Bin Houyé

Meeting with members of the association of (returned) IDPs in Bin Houyé

Briefing, ACF Therapeutic Feeding Centre, Danané

Briefing, PAHO, Danané

Thursday 23 September

Briefing, WFP Programme Assistant

Briefing, ICRC

Travel to Dieukoué, meeting with Head of Office Guiglo for further briefing

Return to Abidjan

Friday 24 September

Travel to Freetown

Briefing, HIV/AIDS staff, WFP Sierra Leone

Saturday 25 September

Briefing, WFP Country Director and Head of Programme

Travel to Bo

IRC Protection Unit, Bo

Sunday 26 September

Visit to Jembe and Gerihun camps (camp management, women's groups, UAMs)

Briefing, UNHCR

Travel to Freetown

Monday 27 September

Briefing, OCHA

Briefing, UNICEF



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Briefing, UNHCR
Briefing, Ministry of Gender and Social Welfare
Briefing, NaCSA
Briefing, ICRC

Tuesday 28 September

Briefing, SCF-UK
Briefing, WFP partners for food distribution in refugee camps
Briefing, WFP staff (focus group discussion)
Briefing, WFP Gender Focal Point
Briefing, WFP School Feeding Programme
Briefing, WFP PDM and VAM
Debriefing, CD and Senior Programme Officer

Wednesday 29 September

Departure for Conakry
Briefing, WFP Guinea CD
Briefing, ICRC
Briefing, UNHCR

Thursday 30 September

Briefing, MSF France
Briefing, MSF Switzerland
Briefing, UNICEF
Briefing, OCHA
Briefing, GTZ
Briefing, USAID

Friday, 1 October

Briefing, WFP Programme Officer Conakry

Departure for N'Zérékoré

Briefing, Head of Office WFP N'Zérékoré

Briefing, GTZ School Feeding

Saturday 2 October

Briefing, WFP N'Zérékoré
Visit to Lainé camp

Sunday, 3 October

Briefing, Head of Office N'Zérékoré
Review and documentation

Monday 4 October

Briefing, IRC
Briefing, UNICEF
Briefing, OCHA
Briefing, ACF

Tuesday 5 October

Briefing, UNHCR N'ZÉRÉKORÉ
Briefing, WFP staff N'ZÉRÉKORÉ

Departure for Conakry

Wednesday 6 October



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Departure for Monrovia
Briefing, WFP CD Liberia
Security Briefing,
Security CD Test (MCM)

Thursday 7 October

Briefing, IRC
Briefing, Don Bosco Boy's home
Briefing, UNMIL Human Rights and Protection Unit
Briefing, Catholic Relief Services
Briefing, ICRC
Briefing, SCF-UK
Briefing, UNICEF
Briefing, UNHCR
Briefing, OCHA - Inter-Agency IDP Division (on mission in Liberia)

Friday 8 October

Site visit, Sinje Transit Centre, Sinje
Short visit to Plumkor IDP camp

Saturday 9 October

Review and documentation
Briefing, WFP Field Monitor
Briefing, WFP Gender Focal Point
Briefing, WFP Senior Programme Officer
Briefing, "Do No Harm" Consultant from German Agro Action
Briefing, Joint Principles of Operation Consultant from German Agro Action
Briefing, OCHA – Inter-Agency IDP Division

Sunday, 10 October

Review and documentation
Briefing, WFP Programme Officer
Briefing, OXFAM Protection Coordinator

Monday 11 October

Departure for Abidjan
Briefing, WFP Côte d'Ivoire

Tuesday 12 October

Briefing, ICRC
Briefing, OCHA
Drafting of Aide-Mémoire
Discussion with WFP CD and Regional staff

Wednesday 13 October

Drafting of Aide-Mémoire
WFP donors (US, Sweden, Japan)
Debriefing, WFP Cote d'Ivoire CD
Departure for Rome

Appendix III: PEOPLE MET BY THE MISSION



Côte d'Ivoire

WFP

Mr Gemmo Lodesani, Regional Coordinator
Ms Myrta Kaulard, Country Director
Mr Antonio Avella, Programme Officer
Ms Amy Martin, Programme Officer

WFP Donors

Ms Kerstin Jonsson-Cissé, Councillor, Humanitarian Assistance and Conflict Management for West Africa,
Swedish Embassy
Mr Greg Bloh, US Embassy
Mr Masataka Nakamura, First Secretary, Japanese Embassy

OCHA

Ms Besida Tonwe, Head of Office

One more

UNHCR

Mr Chubaka Innocent Sangara, Protection Officer
Mr Panos Moumtzis, Deputy Representative

IOM

Mr Jacques Seurt, Head of Office IOM Guiglo
Ms Mame Fatou Ndoeye, Operations Officer

ICRC

Mr Pierre Rytter, Head of Delegation
Mr Régis Savioz, Deputy Head of Delegation

Liberian Refugee Representatives (Camp management)

IDP Representatives at Nicla Temporary Reception Centre

Sierra Leone

WFP

Mr. Louis Imbleau, WFP Country Director

Ms Jyotti Rajkundlia, Senior Programme Officer

Ms Jestina

Ms Rafal Mohammed, Focal Point

Ms Alessandra Gilotta, Emergency School Feeding Coordinator

Ms Zainab Mansaray, Food Aid Monitor, Focal Point for FFT & Institutional Feeding

Mr Charles Rogers, Focal Point for FFW & FFA Agriculture

MS Petra Linderberg, Therapeutic and Supplementary Feeding Programmes

Mr Lansanah

Mr Sheku

Mr Johnny Amara, OIC Kenema

Mr Jalla Mohammed, Food Aid Monitor, Kenema

UNHCR

Mr. Musa Abiriga, Country Representative

Mr Kenneth Conte, Protection Assistant, Freetown

Alex Mundt, Protection Officer, Bo

Helène Daubelcourt, Protection Officer, Bo



UNICEF

Mr Donald Robertshaw, Child Protection Officer

OCHA

Mr Mukhtar Farah, Head of Office

ICRC

Caroline Douilliez, Deputy Head of Delegation

Ministry of Gender and Social Welfare

Ms Fatu Kargbo

National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA)

Mr. Sylvanus Fannah, Executive Director
Director for Repatriation
Director for Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation
Field Staff in Jembe and Jerihun camps

NGOs

Mr Paul Robert, Director, SCF UK
Mr Tamba Kargbo, CRS
Mr Abu Yamah, World Vision International
Mr David Yambasu, Child Protection and Gender Officer, IRC Bo
Ms Mariam Assale, Child Protection Officer, and three other CPOs, IRC Bo
Mr Kawa, Field Coordinator, Peace Winds Japan, Kenema

Mr Suela, Lutheran World Federation

Refugee representatives in Jembe and Jerihun camps, women's committee, UAM group spokesperson

Guinea

WFP

Mr. Stefano Porretti, Country Director

Mr. Hakan Falkell, Deputy Country Director
Mr. Etienne Labande, Head, N'Zerekore sub-Office
Mr Robert Oliver, Programme Officer, Conakry
Mr Raymond Boisvert, Field Security Advisor, Conakry
Mr Etienne Labande, Head of Office N'ZÉREKORÉ
Mr Richard Pépé Sagno, Field Monitor
Staff of Sub-Office N'ZÉREKORÉ

WFP Donors

Mr Thomas Crubagh, Supervisory Programme Officer, USAID

UNHCR

Mr. Stefano Severe, Country Representative
Ms Louise Aubin, Senior Programme Officer
Mr Cesar Pastor-Ortega, Head of Sub-Office, N'ZÉREKORÉ
Mr Charles Gatoto, Senior Protection Officer, N'ZÉREKORÉ

UNICEF

Ms Rose-Anne Papavero, Child Protection Officer
Ms Deirdre Kiernan, Head of Sub-Office Kissidougou



OCHA

Ms. Madelaine Makakaba, Communications Officer
Ms Lauriane Comard, Contingency Planning Consultant
Mr Milan Sannerkvist, Head of Office N'ZÉRÉKORÉ
Mr Yann Bazire, Communications Officer

GTZ

Mr Hanns Pollack, Programme Coordinator, GTZ International Services
Mr Kai Schmid, GTZ N'ZÉRÉKORÉ

NGOs

Mr Duccio Staderini, Head of Office, MSF-F
Mr Luis Cremades-Cid, Head of Office, MSF-S
Mr David Johnson, Deputy Director, IRC
Ms Ranjana Ariaratnam, Protection Coordinator, IRC N'ZÉRÉKORÉ
Head of Office N'ZÉRÉKORÉ, ACF
Officer in Charge of Post-Distribution Monitoring, ACF

ICRC

Barbara Hintermann, Head of Delegation

Refugee Representatives

Mr Isaac B. Kreyo, Refugee Education Committee, Lainé Camp
Mr Thomas Kpawor, Refugee Agriculture Committee, Lainé Camp
Mr Joseph N. T. Dunna, Protection Committee, Lainé Camp
Ms Gormah M. Goteh, Chairlady, Women's Committee, Lainé Camp
Members of the Women's Committee, including GBV focal point.

Liberia

WFP

MR Justin Bagirishya, Country Director
Ms Maarit Hirvonen, Deputy Country Director
Ms Sitta Kai-Kai, Senior Emergency Coordinator
Mr Steven Loegering, Field Operations Coordinator
Ms Elaine Scott, Gender Focal Point
Ms Victoria Foh, Programme Assistant
Ms Maran Narmah, Programme Assistant
Ms Elizabeth..., Programme Assistant
Mr Amos Ballayan, Field Monitor
Other staff of CO Liberia

UNHCR

Mr Peter Deck, Senior Programme Officer

UNICEF

Ms Fatumah Ibrahim, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Officer

OCHA

Ms Anne Davies, Head of Office, a.i.

Mr Magnus Murray, IDP advisor
Mr Mark Cutts, Chief, Field Response Section, Inter-Agency Internal Displacement Division, OCHA Geneva
(on mission in Liberia)
Mr Andrew Bagshaw, Inter-Agency Internal Displacement Division, OCHA Geneva (on mission in Liberia)



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UNMIL

Adam Abdelmoula, Acting Chief, Human Rights and Protection Section
Maryse Fontus, Women and Children Officer, Human Rights and Protection Section
James Rodehaver, Juvenile Justice Officer, Human Rights and Protection Section

ICRC

Mr Roland Hunziker, Tracing Coordinator
Mr Robertson, Senior Field Officer

NGOs

Ms Dienneleke van der Wijk, Programme Director, SCF-UK
Ms Leila Bourahla, Senior Programme Manager, SCF-UK
Ms Aine Bhreathnach, Protection Advisor, OXFAM
Ms Amy-Bess Wachtel, Child Protection Officer, IRC
Mr Samuel Kamanda, Child Protection (in charge of DDDR and child soldiers), IRC
Ms Nancy Hearne, Programme Manager (programme quality), CRS
Mr Joe-Hoover-Gbadyu, Programme Manager, CRS
Mr Peter Briggs, Head of Programming, CRS
Mr Justin Comeh, Programme Manager, (IDP feeding), CRS
Mr Sam Wuo, Programme Manager (safety nets), CRS
Mr David Konneh, Director, Don Bosco Boy's Homes
Mr Welleh Bohlen, Outreach Coordinator, Don Bosco Boy's Homes
Mr Holger Leipe, Training Consultant, "Do No Harm" Project, German Agro Action
Ms Rachel, Joint Principles of Operation Consultant, German Agro Action

Appendix IV – REVIEW FRAMEWORK

Issue	Primary Indicator	Questions	Sources of Information
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1. What is “protection”	Operational definition of protection relating to WFP operations	General definition of protection and its relation to humanitarian assistance Definition of protection and protection activities by different agencies Protection and human rights/ humanitarian law Protection and physical security Responsibility of WFP as a UN agency to ensure protection (legal obligation, directives by the S-G, humanitarian principles). Protection/security of staff	Different UN agencies, ICRC, IASC literature, other literature relating to protection
2. Needs identification by WFP	Incorporation of situation of beneficiaries in terms of security and other protection needs in assessments Level of staff understanding of protection and its link to assistance Integration of protection concerns in vulnerability analysis Influence of above factors in decision to assist	Vulnerable groups in country Threats/violations Needs by group Protection needs directly related to WFP’s operations and mandate Protection needs that are not Vulnerables assisted by WFP and why Vulnerables assisted by others	PRRO Work plans WFP staff UN agencies Govt Partners Beneficiaries External literature on countries/region
2. Adequacy of WFP’s response to needs in terms of protection of beneficiaries Have the needs of particularly vulnerable groups been adequately addressed by WFP, and/or other humanitarian agencies, including WFP partners?	Incorporation of protection concerns and objectives in programme design Level of staff understanding of potential effect of WFP interventions on protection. Level of staff understanding of human rights/humanitarian law and recognition of abuse/violations Existence of guidelines to support staff in making that recognition and what to do Change in pattern of violence/abuse Perception of beneficiaries of change in pattern of violence/abuse	Immediate and longer term needs for safety and assistance. Actual or potential protection problems related to them Beneficiaries’ coping mechanisms WFP action to address needs/support coping mechanisms: - direct action - indirect action (advocacy with others, etc.) Needs left unaddressed and why (outside mandate, resources, security constraints, etc.) Related effect on beneficiaries in terms of protection Has WFP played a role in ensuring that needs unaddressed by it are addressed by others (i.e. advocacy) How does WFP assess changing needs	PRRO Work Plan WFP staff Partners UN agencies Government Beneficiaries
3. Gender issues			
3.1. SEA	Prevalence of instances of SEA	Have needs been differentiated	PRRO



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	Level of awareness of staff and partners of SEA issues	according to gender? Action by WFP (and others) to eliminate instances of SEA related to food	Work plans WFP staff UN agencies Govt
3.2. SGBV	Prevalence of SGBV Increase in reports of SGBV Beneficiaries' perception of change in prevalence of SGBV as a result of action	Action by WFP and others to reduce prevalence of SGBV Targets of that action	Partners Beneficiaries
3.3. Gender mainstreaming	Incorporation of particular needs in programme design (i.e. need to increase girl's enrolment). Increase in girls' school enrolment and attendance Percentage of women involved in distribution Level of food control by women	Particular needs of women, men and children Action to address those needs Has gender meant more than addressing women's issues?	