OPERATION EVALUATION

Zambia - Country Programme 200157:
Evaluation Report

September, 2014
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# Operational Fact Sheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OPERATION</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type/Number/Title</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Approval</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Amendments</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Duration</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Planned beneficiaries</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Planned food requirements</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>US$ requirements</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\)Direct support costs
\(^2\)Indirect support costs
\(^3\)Other direct operational costs
\(^4\)Landside, transport, storage and handling costs
## OPERATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approval</strong></td>
<td>The operation was approved by the Executive Board in February 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amendments</strong></td>
<td>There have been 3 budget revisions to the initial project document to decrease the (DSC(^5)), (ISC(^6)), (ODOC(^7)) and (LTSH(^8)) rates.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration</strong></td>
<td>Initial: 5 year period (2011-2015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planned beneficiaries</strong></td>
<td>Initial: 1.15 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Planned food requirements</strong></td>
<td>Initial: 44,882 Mts of mixed food commodities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cash and vouchers: 2.9 US$ million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>US$ requirements</strong></td>
<td>Initial: 50.9 million</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^5\)Direct support costs  
\(^6\)Indirect support costs  
\(^7\)Other direct operational costs  
\(^8\)Landside, transport, storage and handling costs
### OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Objective</th>
<th>Operation specific objectives</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| SO 3                | Government has improved monitoring and implementation of disaster risk reduction activities by 2015 | • Support to expansion of the social protection strategy  
• Provision of school meals to schools |
| SO 4                | Number of targeted households that rely on negative coping mechanisms decreased by 80%  
Assisted schools have increased access to education and human capital development | • Support the Government’s Home Grown School Feeding Strategy  
• Food/voucher distribution to pregnant and lactating women and for HIV/TB clients attending health clinics  
• Capacity development of the Government’s Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (DMMU) in livelihood profiling and integrated early warning analysis of floods and droughts |
| SO 3                | Increased marketing opportunities for participating smallholder farmers by the end of the intervention | |

### PARTNERS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>MESVTEE, MCDMCH, MAL, MoH, DMMU, ZVAC</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental organisations</td>
<td>Adventist Development and Relief Agency, Clinton Health Access Initiative, Technoserve, Red Cross Re Crescent Movement, Heifer International Zambia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Contribution received by WFP
21 April 2014:
US$ 43,497,412
59.2% against appeal:

Top 5 donors:
Zambia (34%), Multilateral (31%), EDMF\(^9\) (14%), Carryover from previous operations (10%), Canada (5%)

\(^9\) Emerging Donor Matching Fund (EDMF)
Operations Maps

HOME GROWN SCHOOL FEEDING DISTRICTS

Key

HGSDistricts

District=Secondary

Dedicated Maps and Map Design by VAR/DFM Unit, WFP
Revision Date: 08/02/14

300

0

300 Kilometers

viii
Executive Summary

1. In the context of a renewed corporate emphasis on providing evidence and accountability for results, WFP’s Office of Evaluation, in consultation with the Southern Africa Regional Bureau (RB) in Johannesburg and the Zambian Country Office (CO), selected the latter’s country programme (CP) 200157 for an independent evaluation in 2014. The dual objectives of the evaluation are to: i) Identify and validate results achieved to date, and ii) Generate the information that would enable the CO to revise CP in order to increase its relevancy. The scope of the evaluation included the performance and results of three main components of the CP 200157 is:

Component 1: School Meals Programme, which later became known as the Home Grown School Feeding (HGSF), and the associated Purchase for Progress (P4P) pilot (2009-ongoing) designed to expand market opportunities for smallholder farmers;

Component 2: Nutrition: Food Security for vulnerable groups through food-based safety nets using in-kind food and vouchers including school feeding and support for patients with HIV/AIDS, children under five, and pregnant and lactating women;

Component 3: Disaster Risk Management (DRM) by strengthening the Government’s capacity to reduce vulnerability to climate shocks, disasters and environmental degradation.

2. As the current CP reaches its final year, an evaluation was required to assess its performance to date, to: ascertain the appropriateness of the CP, assess its effectiveness, and elucidate the factors that explain the results obtained. The CP covered a period of significant change in the Zambian context, and therefore the evaluation captures WFP’s operational shift response to these changes. The Evaluation Team (ET) was specifically requested to consider how the CO’s operations can align with the evolving reality in Zambia. The report will be of use to the planning of the RB, the OEV, and WFP’s Executive Board, and the CO’s partners in the Government of the Republic of Zambia, the United Nation’s Country Team, and amongst NGOs and the private sector, will find information on WFP’s performance since 2011 and the considerations underpinning the changes the CO may make to its operations.

3. The evaluation took place from April 2014 (Preparation Phase) to May/June 2014 (Evaluation Mission), during which the Evaluation Team (ET), comprising of three members, employed qualitative methods including secondary data review, key informant interviews and focus group discussions along with some quantitative analysis of secondary data captured through WFP’s internal monitoring processes.

Country Context: Zambia, a country in transition

4. In the period of the current CP, Zambia has continued to improve its macro-economic standing, achieving classification as a Lower Middle Income Country by the World Bank in 2011. Its agricultural production also continued to flourish, particularly production of maize, which saw bumper crops in 2010, 2011, and 2012. Zambia has become a net producer and exporter of food and its success compared to neighbouring countries means it is now viewed as ‘land-linked’ in the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) rather than land-locked.

5. Although in 2014 Zambia has minimal prevalence of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 1), it is still a long way from food security defined as ‘all people at all times hav[ing] access to sufficient, safe, nutritious food to maintain a healthy and active life.’ Issues of income inequality and poor access to services have so far limited the
distribution of benefits from the macro-level successes, and Zambia’s long-standing high malnutrition rates, rural poverty, HIV/AIDS and malaria continue to affect large parts of the population.

6. **Poverty persistence:** While Zambia has reduced the rate of extreme poverty from 58 percent (1991) to 42.3 percent (2010), extreme poverty still stands as a major development hurdle and continues to be much higher in rural areas (57 percent) compared to urban areas (13 percent). The most vulnerable populations are the poorest from rural areas, relying on subsistence smallholder agriculture, which has not been developed at the same pace as other sectors linked to the current economic growth.

7. **Food insecurity upswing:** According to the Zambia Vulnerability Assessment Committee, the number of people at risk of food insecurity increased from 63,000 in 2012 to 209,000 in 2013. This is attributed to localized poor crop production and due to difficult weather conditions in some parts of the country. Zambia’s food security challenges are exacerbated by a high dependence on rain-fed agriculture and the absence of market incentives to encourage a shift from subsistence farming. High food prices and high unemployment rates combine to place considerable stress on those vulnerable to Zambia’s persistent problems, particularly those burdened with HIV/AIDS. The national HIV prevalence rate, at 12.7 percent, ranks Zambia 7th worst affected country globally. Consequently, food access is still precarious for many.

8. **Nutrition:** The problem is not just sufficient quantity of food intake but also nutritional quality. Chronic malnutrition stands at 45.4 percent in Zambia. Some 53 percent of Zambian children have Vitamin A deficiency and 46 percent have inadequate iron levels, factors that compromise their long-term development. Nutrition, for a long time a low priority area, is now a growing interest area in Zambia, and the country is part of the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement.

9. **Schooling lag:** According to national statistics, there have been significant improvements in school enrolment rates in Zambia since the mid-1990s, but educational attainment remains low and inequitable. The median years of completed schooling for the adult population are only six, falling short of the required seven years of primary education in Zambia. While gender disparities in education have narrowed, large disparities persist between rural and urban areas.

**Transition challenges for WFP Zambia and development partners**

10. In response to these challenges, WFP and the United Nations system have adopted new strategies to align with the current needs in Zambia. The UN Country Team, with the contribution of the UN agencies, is currently conducting a context assessment of Zambia to inform the development of the next UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) for the country. WFP is a part of this process, and, in addition, has begun internally discussing the future of its operations. For the CO this is an important stepping-stone in a process of readjustment occurring throughout a CP in which it has increasingly played a technical assistance role to the government and expanded its areas of operation to social protection and nutrition governance. While these areas are in line with the government’s agenda for poverty reduction and the need to tackle malnutrition, they also reflect the fundraising potential in a country where donors are less willing to fund food distribution.
Findings

Appropriateness

The ET confirmed that the CP was on the whole appropriate, with rational geographic targeting and good alignment with the poverty reduction activities of the GRZ. Although their extent was curtailed, the appropriateness of the activities conducted was maintained despite threats from underfunding. The CO has taken a number of sensible steps to respond to the changes in Zambia, quickly instituting a shift from food distribution to food assistance within the timeframe.

Results of the operation

11. When considering the funding challenges faced by the CP, the overall results of the operation are good. A strict comparison with the objectives set at the design of the CP and the actual outputs and outcomes would not reflect favourably on the CO and it does not capture WFP Zambia’s performance since 2011. The CO has pursued a number of activities, such as policy influencing and the provision of technical assistance, which are not explained well in the SPR format, but are nevertheless found by the ET to be valuable contributions to food security in Zambia.

12. SF: The evidence available demonstrates only a slight numeric increase in attendance and enrolment between 2011-2013, and the drop-out rate only slightly decreased during the period. The ET concludes that these were stable where the SF was implemented. However, key informant interviews at various levels in the education system attest that when the provision of meals ceases, it quickly results in lower attendance and an increase in absenteeism. Equally, reinstituting the daily meals reverses these negative impacts. SF maintained a consistent gender balance in the number of boys and girls fed.

13. Food Security for Vulnerable Groups: Due to underfunding, WFP did not achieve the objectives established in this component. The CO adapted to the altered funding environment by changing its focus to technical assistance in support of nutrition governance, formulation of relevant policies and assistance in national programme frameworks. The ET found that the most evident achievement in nutrition came from the CO utilising its convening power to assist in the expansion of multi-sectoral discussions between strategic partners (e.g. private sector and government ministries) to influence nutrition policy and interventions. Furthermore, technical assistance (TA) to National Food and Nutrition Commission (NFNC) has been important in enabling the institution to move in tandem with the growing global momentum in nutrition (e.g. the SUN movement).

14. DRM: The DRM work yielded a number of positive results in improving the capacity of the government’s national level disaster management structures, and the CO’s on-going support to the national disaster risk and vulnerability assessments and disaster policies is highly appreciated by the government. WFP was the driving force behind the creation of a platform that gives Zambia a real time early-warning tool for weather events and standardised reporting model for multi-sectoral stakeholders’ input prior to and during disasters. WFP is helping the DMMU implement a shift away from disaster response to resilience building, and strong enthusiasm for the move was found during KII s on each side of the partnership, and the tangible evidence of the shift is found in current and forthcoming projects.

15. P4P: By 2013, approximately 11,000 farmers in 96 Farmer Organisations (FO) had engaged with WFP generated demand in local market economies, and between
2011 and 2013 a total of 608 mt of beans and 870 mt of cowpeas were procured from 47 FOs. Although it is hard to verify gate prices and livelihood improvements with exact figures, interviews with beneficiaries and partners in the P4P provided anecdotal evidence to suggest inputs and training provided through P4P partnerships had helped increase their production and reduce post-harvest losses.

16. **Gender (cross-cutting):** The ethos of gender-sensitive programming was positively expressed in interviews with CO staff and it has been factored into the design of the CP operations. The CO achieved gender balance in the number of boys and girls fed, aims to have balance in food management committees, and is engaged in promotion of ‘women’s crops’ under P4P. However, overall gender outcomes are insufficiently measured and monitored in the absence of a gender specific strategy.

**Factors affecting results**

17. **Internal:** Adroit decision making in the CO kept the CP relevant to the improving economic and food production context in Zambia. Possessing and being able to draw upon high-quality technical expertise helped it to achieve results in all three components and allowed it to compensate for missed direct food delivery targets with support to the implementation and policy framework of the government-led safety net measures. Working in support of government-led initiative is a factor in the success WFP has achieved through technical assistance, but the lack of a coherent M&E system to cover its whole operations has stymied it from articulating these successes and means its decision-making is not fully capitalising on the usable and useful information.

18. **External:** Decline in multilateral and bilateral donor contributions for food based programmes has posed a serious threat to the CP since its inception in 2011. It necessitated the shift away from food distribution activities under Component 2 and contributed to the reduced funding and inadequate quantities of pulses and for SF. Government enthusiasm for social protection and an emerging interest in nutrition in Zambia has created the space for WFP to support these agendas, and the CO has played a role in furthering them. In some areas where the CO is providing technical assistance WFP has fallen short of targets because of a capacity deficit in the recipient to receive such support – particularly noticeable in the targets for number of women trained under the DRM – or because external policies and systems are not robust enough to allow WFP to carry out its intentions.

**Overall assessment/conclusions**

**Efficiency**

19. The overall efficiency of the operation is given a low rating mainly because of the continuous resource shortfall that the CO experienced since inception of the CP. Efforts were thus expended on finding alternative funding and modes of working. Nevertheless, the measures taken were generally moves to greater efficiency: for the school feeding programme WFP eliminated the overhead costs of running satellite offices by placing field coordinators directly at the Provincial level to help build the capacity of government partners at District Education Board offices.

**Effectiveness**

20. For the most part, the CO achieved targets as planned, with the exception of Component 2, and the adaptations in the operations have allowed it to make achievements towards three of its four overall objectives. The exception - ‘Number of targeted households that rely on negative coping mechanisms decreased by 80%’ -
can be evaluated when the support to the social protection system is operationalised fully.

Sustainability

21. Overall the ET scored sustainability to be medium. Sustainability is improving for the SF, with evidence of GRZ increased commitment to the programme (e.g. 100 percent maize donation as the largest donor). The linkages local farmers and Home Grown SF created by the P4P pilot help to promote local production and procurement, which, if promoted widely and maintained, would be the most sustainable option. The move to technical assistance brings risks of fostering dependency, but the CO’s partnership model and engagement in policy dialogue increasingly allows them to influence rather than implement.

Main Recommendations

22. Overall, whilst it is not certain that parts of Zambia would never need food distribution again, now is an opportune time to support the GRZ so that it can cover such events and, more importantly, to support longer-term initiatives, such as the social safety programme, nutrition sensitive programming and building disaster resilience, designed to meet the needs of those that remain food insecure. The ET recommends that the CO continues on its current transition to providing a technical assistance role in these areas. The CO has clear comparative advantages in knowledge sharing, and its convening power and strategic partnerships in disaster risk management, P4P, and school feeding and nutrition are already widely appreciated by external stakeholders in Zambia. Specific recommendations are as follows:

Recommendation 1: Concentrated focus in relevant technical assistance areas. Feeding into the UN Country Team-led contextual assessment currently being prepared for the next UNDAF, the CO should as soon as possible 1) commission a situation analysis for the groups it traditionally works and 2) perform an institutional assessment of the policies and programmes (and the capacities of those delivering them) designed to meet the food needs of these people. By performing a gap analysis between the two, the CO could define in a strategy what WFP wants to achieve through technical assistance in Zambia, and it would help the CO to articulate what it does and why to donors. If matched with a flexible operational plan, it may reduce the costs of its operations.

Recommendation 2: With the GRZ’s increasing focus on social safety net schemes, and as a way to address Zambia’s persistent hunger in rural areas, a next phase of the CP should continue to provide Technical Assistance to the MCDMCH to support the rollout of the new social cash transfer system. For the remainder of the CP, the CO should continue its current activities in policy development and MDT

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10 The Brazil model offers a noteworthy example of social protection given the wide range of social interventions that the Ministry of Social Development is using to fight poverty and hunger. The CO has already acknowledged this and has made an exchange visit and subsequent action plan to capture lessons. The MCDMCH could benefit from additional technical support from the CO which could help articulate specific programmes to address poverty and food insecurity of vulnerable groups.

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support, but in the design of the next CP it should determine where its comparative advantages in technical assistance and its convening power with the government and the private sector are best placed.

**Recommendation 3: Finalise effective exit plan and decentralize implementation for SF.** For the remainder of the current CP WFP should finalise the development of its phase out plan\(^\text{11}\) for the SF in consultation with the government (e.g. the MESVTEE as the policy lead) and other stakeholders, and operationalise a gradual takeover by the government in the next phase.

**Recommendation 4: Support scale-up; use pulse procurement.** WFP should play an advisory role and provide technical assistance to expand school feeding in the remaining geographical locations. WFP should be directly involved in procurement of the pulses for a period of time, and gradually remove itself for full takeover by the government by the middle of the next CP.

**Recommendation 5: Build a national expertise pool in nutrition.** Over the full course of the next CP, the CO strengthen Government capacity by building a new cadre of national nutritionists through local universities that train nutritionists and upgrade their nutrition curricula in cutting edge nutrition interventions.

**Recommendation 6: Expand resilience building initiatives.** WFP should widen its effort toward supporting the government in the implementation of projects designed to build resilience to disaster. Such initiatives have links to the P4P farmer-approaches, and they would help the DMMU move in two essential directions: from response to resilience building, and from coordination to implementation. The CO should aim to be supporting the DMMU implement resilience building projects in the most disaster-affected areas by the end of the next CP.

**Recommendation 7: Strengthen district and satellite structures.** WFP should help the DMMU to strengthen the basic institutional set-up of the district and satellite structures. Certain need-areas highlighted are: member retention (including trained members), disenfranchisement from the provincial and national level, inadequate and underused reporting structures, and funding for basic equipment. There will be no quick solutions for this work, and it should cover the entire duration of the next CP.

**Recommendation 8: Integration of all activities in M&E.** In light of the P4P and the early promising results of the pilots to strengthen SF and social cash transfer systems, WFP should define a way to incorporate lessons learned from all its activities into its M&E system. This should begin immediately as the system is already under-review and should be ready for the next CP.

\(^{11}\)The phase out plan should comprise a budget and a detailed work plan that provides quantification, monitoring, and a summation of agency-specific milestone achievements. The plan should identify who will assess district readiness for complete takeover and who will provide reinforcement support for non-ready entities; readiness criteria should be developed together with the District Education Board and their Planning Officers.
Recommendation 9: Clarify and adapt the P4P framework to the Country Programme. Adaptation of the P4P design and M&E system is needed to reflect the activities WFP Zambia can realistically undertake based on its comparative advantages; the skills available in-house and its demand platform. Based on this it can identify where partnerships (ideally with independent funding) are needed, and over the next 18 months WFP should relinquish production aspects to these independently funded partners and focussing on its core strengths.

Recommendation 10: Develop the export potential of pulses. The CO should use the P4P pilot and its history of maize export to exploit the possibilities of exporting pulses to WFP’s food baskets in Southern and Eastern Africa. This would be a medium-term measure as there are insufficient quantities currently produced in Zambia, but assistance given to Small Holder Farmers (SHF) to develop this production capacity would be beneficial for improving livelihoods within the security of a guaranteed market.
1. Introduction

1.1 Evaluation features

1. In the context of a renewed corporate emphasis on providing evidence and accountability for results, WFP’s Office of Evaluation, in consultation with the Southern Africa Regional Bureau (RB) in Johannesburg and the Zambian Country Office (CO), selected the latter’s country programme CP200157 for an independent evaluation in 2014.

2. The evaluation was required to meet a number of needs, broadly falling under the mutually reinforcing objectives of accountability and learning (see Terms of Reference in Annex 1), and two general purposes: i) to identify and validate results achieved to date; and ii) to generate lessons on the CO’s operations and information on the Zambian context that will enable WFP Zambia to revise the CP. Internally, the report will be of use to the planning of CO, the RB, the OEV, and WFP’s Executive Board, and the CO’s partners in the Government of the Republic of Zambia, the United Nation’s Country Team and amongst NGOs and the private sector, will find information on WFP’s performance since 2011 and the considerations underpinning the changes the CO may make to its operations in the future.

3. WFP’s operations, like Zambia, are now at a period of transition. As the CP reaches its final year, an evaluation was required to assess its performance to date and to look to the future to align the CO’s operations with the evolving reality in Zambia. The CP was designed in 2010, and there have been many changes in the external environment since then, necessitating a shift in current and future CP activities. Zambia is now a net producer of food, with a minimal prevalence of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 1), and WFP has increasingly focussed on addressing food and nutrition security through capacity building, technical assistance and promoting public/private sector partnership. WFP in Zambia has embarked on an operational shift from direct implementation of food assistance to technical support, and continues in this transition within its current prioritization areas of school feeding, nutrition, social protection, and disaster risk management.

4. The CO specifically requested that Zambia’s graduation to a Lower Middle Income Country in 2011 and towards technical food security be factored in when considering the recommendations of this evaluation. Of particular concern is how to address the unmet needs of those that remain at risk of food insecurity – a number that increased from 63,000 in 2012 to 209,000 in 201312 – and how to fund the CP in light of changes in donor priorities. Assessment of its P4P pilot, although not currently falling directly under CP core activities, was requested, with a specific interest in understanding how P4P can be integrated into the CP.

5. The timing of the evaluation was intentionally chosen so that findings will feed into the planned Budget Revision (BR) for the Country Programme, which will go to

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12 World Food Programme http://www.wfp.org/countries/zambia/overview
the Executive Board in February 2015, and to facilitate future decisions on programme design and implementation.

1.2 Process

6. The evaluation took place from April 2014 (Preparation Phase) to June 2014, conducted by an Evaluation Team consisting of three members: a Nutritionist acting as Team Leader, a Food Security Specialist, and a Disaster Management/Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist. The ET used a mixed method design linked to the theories of change underlying WFP’s main interventions, and assessed the CP using three broad evaluation questions: 1) How appropriate is the operation?; 2) What were the results of the operation?; and 3) How and why has the operation produced the observed results? The evaluation began with an extensive desk review of CP-related documents and resulting in the Inception Package (IP) laying out the methodology and tools (a detailed methodology of the quantitative and qualitative techniques and instruments used for data collection can be found in the Inception Package; the sites visited, documents reviewed, people met, and the evaluation matrix, are available in Annexes 2 and 3).

7. The fieldwork took place during the agricultural harvesting period and the second term of the school year calendar (May 26 to June 13 2014). While in country, the ET reviewed additional documents provided by the CO, visited project sites in 10 districts, and conducted 68 interviews amongst key government officials (national, provincial and district), WFP staff, other United Nations agencies staff, donors, and private sector and civil society stakeholders. Five Focus Group Discussions were held with beneficiaries from across the CP’s three components. Validation methods included visits to WFP-supported schools, P4P and DRM project sites, and secondary data from the literature review was triangulated with primary data obtained in country. At the end of the mission, the ET held two debriefings: one internally with the WFP staff and one for the stakeholders including government, civil society, United Nations, and donors.

8. There were a few factors that affected the scope of the evaluation, mainly by posing constraints on time and data collection. The ET tried to balance the time allotted for site visits with KII of stakeholders in Lusaka, and during the field work divided itself at the province level to broaden its coverage of activities and gain a wide representation of stakeholders under the three components. Inevitably, the ET wasn’t able to meet all the people that they would have liked to whilst in Zambia. A notable omission is the parents of school children and, subsequently, the evaluation lacks their perspectives on the food management support received at schools and their children’s food consumption.

9. The partial absence of an ET member meant that for the first week the DRM primary data collection was covered by a substitute person working in liaison with the assigned Evaluator, who was out of country. CO staff were readily available and willing to participate throughout the period, but unfortunately the mission coincided with the leave of the P4P M&E Officer. Nevertheless, the Officer kindly made herself available for participation at points during the visit. These limitations meant that the ET on the whole relied more on secondary data from the CP documentation than on primary data from the interviews. The reverse is true for the P4P as results data were not readily available until later in the evaluation.
1.3 Country Context

10. Zambia is a landlocked country in Southern Africa sharing borders with Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Tanzania and Zimbabwe. Having achieved independence in 1964, the country made slow economic progress due to pervasive post-colonial underdevelopment, tight government control of business, and its relative isolation from major outlets for its exports. Through the rest of the century Zambia experienced numerous setbacks linked to falling international copper prices (1970s), privatisation (1980s), national health epidemics, and natural disasters. Today, with a 60.5 percent poverty rate and 53,000 refugees and other populations of concern, Zambia is ranked 141 out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index. However, over the past decade, Zambia has also been emerging as a fast-growing and ambitious economy, prompting government and donor reassessments of how best to secure and foster human development achievements for this emergent lower middle income country.

11. The total land area, consisting mostly of high plateaus, covers 752,618 sq km and is divided into ten administrative provinces and over 100 districts. There are over 73 different ethnic groups in Zambia, of which the Bemba and Tonga are the largest. Over 40 percent of its 14.6 million people live in its two predominately urban provinces - Lusaka and Copperbelt – and in close proximity to main transport infrastructure, making Zambia one of the most urbanised countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. The remaining provinces, namely Central, Eastern, Luapala, Northern, Muchinga, North-western, Southern and Western, are predominantly rural and more sparsely populated. Extreme poverty is much higher in rural areas (57 percent) than in urban areas (13 percent). The country’s population is young, with 49.6 percent of people aged between 0 and 14 years, a product of Zambia’s enduring high-birth rates (6.2) and low life expectancy (49.4 years).

12. Zambia’s economy is heavily dependent on copper mining and processing in the central parts of the country. However, despite being generally underutilized for national economic growth, agriculture remains the largest (although declining) employer, creating work for 61 percent of the population, and agricultural production contributes the vast majority of food consumed in the country. The two outputs combined gave a significant boost to the economy in 2010 when copper prices rose and the country recorded a large maize crop. Zambia has achieved a large increase in the food production index since 2008, now is a net producer of

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5. World Food Programme [http://www.wfp.org/countries/zambia/overview](http://www.wfp.org/countries/zambia/overview)
6. Zambia Demographic and Health Survey 2007
8. FAOSTAT (Food and Agriculture Statistics)
10. CIA World Factbook, updated April 15, 2014
food, and its exports to SADC countries have re-framed it as a land-'linked' country where once it was seen as land-locked. In 2011 Zambia was classified by the World Bank as a Lower Middle Income Country (LMIC).

13. However, this economic success is not experienced equally across the population, as shown in Zambia’s 54.6 rating on the Gini index for income distribution.24 The LMIC classification belies the fact that 60.5 percent25 of the population live below US$1.25 per day and the proportion of population living in extreme poverty in 2010 was 42.3 percent. Stunting was prevalent in nearly half (46 percent) of all children in 2010, and 15 percent of children were underweight.26 In 2013, for the rural population, stunting affected 47 percent, wasting affected six percent, and 13 percent were underweight.27 Additional nutrition problems faced in Zambia are the prevalence of low birth weight (9 percent of children under-five had a LBW), maternal nutrition, and micronutrient deficiencies (mostly affecting children 6-24 months, pregnant women and adolescent girls).28

14. Schools serve as a key entry point for nutritional programmes, such as Zambia’s School Health and Nutrition (SHN) programme, which, as of 2008, had expanded nationally if not implemented in all schools. In 2011, SHN developed and launched the Home Grown School Feeding Programme, merging two complementary school feeding programmes, one directly funded by the Government and the other (Access to Basic Education) funded by WFP.29 Although free basic education was established in 2002, more than a quarter of a million school-aged children are not in school and nearly half of the three million enrolled do not complete the primary cycle.30 There is a significant difference between urban and rural education as more than 50 percent of female adults in rural areas were illiterate in 2000, compared to one-fifth of urban women.31

15. A range of factors have prevented Zambia from securing its population’s food and nutrition needs and achieving wider human development goals. Outside the more fertile and accessible central areas where the commercial farms are predominantly based, the north has generally high soil acidity and the south a drier climate. At the small-scale level, farming is mainly subsistent and rainfall-dependent; land preparation uses a mixture of hand-hoeing and draft cattle, especially important in the southern half of the country. Farmers turn to local markets to sell surplus crops, and a large portion of the Government’s agricultural budget is allocated to subsidies, particularly maize. The Zambian diet is dominated by maize with 57 percent of the daily caloric intake accounted for by the single food

27 UN OHCA Zambia: Vulnerability Assessment Results 2013
29 Ibid
crop; this lack of food variety makes the population vulnerable and inhibits their nutritional intake.

16. HIV/AIDS emerged in Zambia in the mid-1980s and spread rapidly to one in seven Zambians by 2012. According to 2012 estimates by UNAIDS, 30,000 deaths and 670,000 orphans were attributed to HIV/AIDS. Geography (urban/rural) and gender distinguish the HIV epidemic in Zambia as the percentage infected is double for urban areas than rural and is higher for females than males. HIV has undermined the health and productivity of a significant part of the population and left households with fewer members and less strength and time for agricultural tasks whilst also facing other debilitating diseases such as tuberculosis and malaria. For those bearing these illnesses, proper health maintenance requires sufficient or even excess consumption of specific foods, which places further strains on the household health for those in food security.

17. Food insecurity also has a large gender factor: customary law, which covers 82 percent of farming households in Zambia and is often better enforced than the country’s statutory laws, limits women’s access to and control over land, making it very hard for women to farm securely if unmarried or widowed. Women make up 46 percent of the agricultural labour force in Zambia, but many have been forced into low-paid temporary work and female headed households constitute the poorest and most vulnerable food insecure segment of the population.

18. Over the past decades, this already strained agricultural base has been hit by drought and flood to create periods of intense food shortage – this occurred in 1991/2 and most damagingly in 2002, when a national disaster was declared after poor weather conditions and eventual drought heavily decreased food production in the country. In 2007 flooding affected the North Western, Western, Eastern and Northern provinces. These events have had lasting impacts on the nutrition and chronic hunger levels and human development in general, and remain a persistent threat to the food security of those that rely on subsistence agriculture to meet their food needs. It is expected that drought and unpredictable rainfall are likely to worsen with climatic change in Southern Africa and, combined with Zambia’s existing environmental problems of deforestation, soil erosion, and desertification, threaten to place further stress on food security in the future.

19. The government and its development partners now recognise that they must promote growth, increase its inclusivity, and address the persistent threats faced by the population. To this end, a range of overarching measures have been instituted.

References:
34 UNAIDS, Zambia
38 Zambia, Immediate Needs for Children and Women Affected by the Floods, UNICEF
Released in 2006, Zambia Vision 2030 encapsulates the macro ambition, and sees Zambia achieving ‘prosperous middle income country’ status and a range of human development achievements in the next 15 years. The Sixth National Development plan is the current 5-year set of operational goals contributing to this long-term vision, with a multi-sectoral approach towards accelerated infrastructure development: achieving economic growth and diversification, promoting rural investment and enhancing human development. Zambia is also a self-starting ‘Deliver as One’ country, and the United Nation’s activities in the country are grouped under the following areas: HIV/AIDS; Sustainable Livelihoods and Food Security; Human Development; Climate Change, Environment and Disaster Risk Reduction and Response; Good Governance and Gender Equality.

1.4 Operation Overview

20. Within this context of a macro-economy growing at a faster rate than achievements in food security, poverty alleviation, and vulnerability reduction, WFP has been working to address the needs of people in the areas where the government has identified the highest poverty, food insecurity, malnutrition, HIV/AIDS prevalence and lowest education levels exist. WFP has been operating under the Country Programme 200157 (2011-2015) strategy through a combination of Home Grown School Feeding, disaster risk management, nutrition and social protection measures, and by piloting a P4P project, which aims to increase market opportunities for small landholders by leveraging local food procurement.

21. The CP was designed in 2010 and has gone through a shift in activities in response to Zambia’s changing context and the Government’s economic development plans. Two overriding influences are Zambia’s transition to a net producer of food and, to a slightly lesser extent, its achievement of lower middle-income country status. Consequently, the CP has increasingly focussed on addressing food and nutrition security through capacity building, technical assistance and on promoting public/private sector partnership rather than through direct food distribution.

22. In the wider context of United Nation’s operations, CP 200157 contributes to WFP’s Strategic Objectives 2, 4 and 5, United Nations Development Assistance Framework Outcomes 1 to 5, and to the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). WFP’s closest alignments in Zambia are with UNICEF and the Rome Based Agencies (RBAs) – the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FOA) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).

39 This report is organized around the three Components under the CP: 1) School meals programme 2) Food security for vulnerable groups 3) Disaster Risk Management. Though the P4P pilot project was designed and funded separately, P4P has a direct linkage to the ‘home grown’ aspect of the HGSF concept as the pulses in the school meal are procured from local farmers. Under the advice of the CO we have addressed P4P within Component 1 despite it not falling directly under this component.

40 The FAO in Zambia is researching and providing policy advice on agricultural methods that can improve food security and address the predicted climatic changes the country is expected to experience later in the century. IFAD is supporting the commercialization of smallholder agriculture through policy advice and programme implementation. It is particularly interested in creating links between small-scale farmers and suppliers and market intermediaries and improving the availability of rural financial services to small-scale farmers. Both agencies’ activities are particularly relevant to WFP’s P4P pilot, and in the future could be linked to DRM. But whereas FAO and IFAD have research expertise, WFP has purchasing and logistical strength and longer experience in large-scale food systems.
Component 1: School Meals Programme

23. School feeding was implemented as a recognised food safety net for social protection against crises and shocks and because of its longer term contribution to improved nutrition, improved education performance, gender equality, and income transfer for poor families. WFP support was planned to support the MoE in providing school meals that are locally-sourced through Home Grown School Feeding Programmes. School feeding was also seen as a platform for complementary health interventions (de-worming, vitamin supplementation, improvements in water and sanitation, HIV awareness, etc.), nutrition awareness, and environmental protection, and was to achieve these the School Meals Programme was intended to be linked to the GRZ School Health and Nutrition Programme, and partnerships with UNICEF and UNDP.

24. The School Meals Programme targeted 22 districts in ten provinces where there was the greatest overlap of poverty, hunger, underweight, and poor educational performance. The CP intended to reach 280,000 primary-school pupils each year and gradually reach one million pupils by 2015 with a food basket consisting of 120g of fortified cereal meal, 20g of pulses and 10g of vegetable oil, as per national guidelines.

25. At the school level, the programme planned training in school meal management for parent-teacher association members, and WFP intended to promote community participation by utilizing their labour in the preparation of the food and requesting contributions of iodized salt, fuel, condiments and vegetables, and in some instances community support in sourcing public land for tree planting.

26. Although not in the initial CP, a Milk-for-Schools pilot was planned for implementation in 39 schools in Nyimba district in Eastern Province. In partnership with the private sector, processed milk was provided as a supplement to school meals three times a week to primary school children.

Market-based sustainable hunger solutions through Purchase for Progress Pilot (P4P).

27. Standing alone from the core components of the CP, the P4P pilot is an example of an innovation introduced to improve livelihoods and address food insecurity by stimulating local markets in rural areas. Smallholder farmers engaged in the P4P pilot are among the food insecure in Zambia (although they are not among those most vulnerable), and therefore the P4P can be said to contribute to this component. Procuring pulses, a crop traditionally planted and managed by women, P4P was intended to directly support women farmers and female-headed households, who are among the most vulnerable.

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41 The school meals programme is also known as the Home Grown School Feeding (HSGF).
42 Zambia Vulnerability Assessment Committee, Comprehensive Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis and Living Conditions Monitoring Systems
43 WFP Country Programme, Zambia 200157, December 2010
28. In 2011, in order to help fill the gap of available food in this component, the CO realigned and expanded the P4P pilot that had been supporting CP 104470 (the Country Programme prior to CP 20015) since 2009. This was critical at a time when the School Feeding programme sought to adopt the concept of Home Grown School Feeding and source more food locally. Retargeting the P4P to districts with a HGSF programme was done to supply the latter with locally produced pulses, which should have decreased transport costs and therefore increase the quantity for local consumption. By linking the P4P to the HGSF, P4P directly supports the pupils receiving meals from that programme.

29. The design of the P4P pilot was guided by three strategies and four activity pillars connected to the corporate P4P programme. Implementation has had two distinct phases. The first phase, 2009 – 2011, focussed at a macro-level to create the commercial settings that could accommodate smallholder engagement. Learning from the first, the second phase, 2011 – 2014, worked directly with smallholder farmers (SHFs), building their capacity to engage and sell their produce in competitive markets through village-level partnerships, and with other partners to expand the network of certified commodity warehouses for Farmer Organisations (FO). This helped to increase market access, create price transparency for farmers, reduce the cost of doing business, and develop the value chain of rural agriculture markets.

30. The geographic coverage was determined by three considerations: WFP’s food requirements for school meals, the potential for a surplus production, and the availability of partners for capacity building and other services. Participating farmers were organised through Farmer Organisations of varying capacities and were engaged using procurement modalities tailored for smallholder farmers (e.g. direct funding, revolving funds, and private sector provision).

Component 2: Food security for vulnerable groups

31. This component aimed to support expansion of the national social protection strategy with transfers of in-kind food in rural areas and transfer of vouchers in peri-urban areas. Targeting was designed to select the most vulnerable food-insecure households (HH) that had at least one member: i) receiving anti-retroviral therapy (ART) or ii) TB treatment, or iii) attending mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN) centres. Electronic food vouchers, valued at US$25 per month per household, were to use a mobile delivery and tracking (MDT) system consisting of mobile technology and utilising of private sector Payment Service Providers (PSP).

32. Due to underfunding of the CP and changes in the direction of the national social protection policy, these planned activities were not implemented and there was no food distribution component under this activity. Instead the CO engaged in technical assistance initiatives to support the GRZ’s national social protection

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44Strategy 1: Strategic partnership to complete the cycle of confidence; Strategy 2: Innovative procurement approach; and, Strategy 3: Learning and Sharing.
45Small holder farmer productivity and production: ‘farming as a business’; Group marketing; market development and; Policy
framework and nutrition governance. Along with the Cooperating Partner Group, the CO decided to focus on cash-based interventions such as the Social Cash Transfer (SCT) Programme run within the Ministry of Community Development and Maternal Child Health (MCDMCH), which has received an 800 percentage increase in GRZ funding as a clear indication of the government’s priorities.

**Component 3: Disaster Risk Management and Response**

33. WFP’s disaster risk management activities under the current CP were planned to build the capacity of and providing technical assistance to the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (DMMU), the government institution responsible for coordinating and managing disaster response, and the Zambia Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZVAC), a consortium that leads the design and implementation of vulnerability and needs assessments in the country. The overall intended objective was to help the government reduce vulnerability to climate shocks, disasters and environmental degradation. Planned activities fall broadly under the aim of improving disaster information, and are delivered through a combination of ongoing support and distinct project-related initiatives.

34. As part of the ongoing support, annual technical and logistical support was planned for the ZVAC during their In-Depth Vulnerability Assessments by training on study methodologies, data collection techniques, and data analysis at the national and district levels prior to and after the data collection. Although not in the initial CP design, this work was expanded to TA in the development of a number of disaster-related policy and strategic documents and frameworks.

35. A significant planned output of the capacity building was the creation of a national platform for disaster information and the development of common database formats for sharing this information. The application of geographic information systems and remote sensing in integrated early-warning analysis and mapping was planned to accompany this. WFP’s capacity building was also planned to help the DMMU in the development of a national network of sentinel sites to monitor food security and livelihoods in coordination with DMMU and the National Food and Nutrition Commission; and to link community-level disaster preparedness activities to the national Living with Floods Campaign for vulnerable communities in upper and lower Zambezi and the Zambezi river basin.
WFP in a transition country

In spite of improved economic performance and food production levels in Zambia, large parts of the population still face very real issues of food and nutrition insecurity, income inequality, poor access to services, and long-standing health problems. These challenges necessitate development actors to re-think their strategies to help the transitioning Zambia address the needs of those that do not immediately benefit from the country’s economic transition. This is most acute for WFP, whose traditional operations centred around food distribution are perceived to be less relevant and fundable in a net food producing country.

Across and beyond the CP’s three components, the CO’s response has been to shift from direct implementation to the provision of technical assistance. The CO is diversifying its portfolio to support the GRZ in Home Grown School Feeding, while also strengthening its social protection efforts and assist the government in advancing nutrition governance.

A notable example of the CO’s positioning in this context is the role it has played in purchasing large volumes of commodities both for local and export demand to WFP operations within Southern and Eastern Africa. WFP Zambia assisted the WFP Southern Africa Regional Bureau in sourcing a quarter ton of commodities between July 2009 and August 2014, and Zambia has become a major supplier of non-GMO white maize and related products to Eastern Africa as well. Interviews with Ministry of Agriculture officials suggested that WFP is viewed as a responsible and transparent buyer purchasing for humanitarian needs - a view evinced by the exemptions WFP receives during periods of national export bans.

The United Nations Country Team in Zambia is currently engaging United Nations agencies in the development of a new version of the UNDAF that aims to be more relevant to the country’s realities. The strategy of the United Nations in Zambia will be based on a forthcoming situation assessment of the countries, and the agencies’ objective and operations will be designed out of this assessment. The CO is active in these discussions, and with its staff and its partners is attempting to align its comparative advantages and become more coherent in its programmes.

46% for WFP operations in Zambia and 93% for WFP operations within the Southern and Eastern Africa regions.
2. Evaluation Findings

36. This section is divided into three subsections: Section 2.1 addresses the appropriateness of the CP objectives, strategic relevance, including targeting, relevance of its activities, its alignment and complementarity with government programmes and other partners. Section 2.2 presents the results of the operation in terms of outputs, and an analysis of the performance in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the results. Section 2.3 examines both internal and external factors that shaped the results and/or the CP’s performance.

2.1 Appropriateness of the operation

Appropriateness with the needs of the population

37. The need for the type of support the CP provides is clearly identified in a number of government assessments, including the ZVAC Comprehensive Vulnerability Assessment of 2010. CP 200157 was designed in 2010 in response to the Government’s request for WFP to play a crucial role in social protection programmes at a time when the GRZ was on a course to accelerate poverty reduction through various social safety net interventions and needed additional support and resources to meet demand. WFP responded by providing support for “a social protection strategy that ensures that incapacitated and low-capacity households have sufficient livelihood security to meet basic needs and are protected from the worst impacts of risks and shocks” identified in Zambia’s Vision 2030. Despite the improvements to the Zambian context, these remain a need area because of the un-met food and nutritional needs, and the shortfall in government capacity and resources to deal with it.

38. The focus on disaster risk management in Zambia is appropriate given the recurrence of various climate and non-climate induced hazards - such as floods, droughts, animal and human epidemics - the country faces. The ZVAC assessments (including the Comprehensive Vulnerability Assessments) demonstrate that the food security and agricultural assets of the poor are hardest hit from these events. Historically, disasters in Zambia have been treated through response measures (and the largest financial contributions have been channeled to these), and therefore WFP’s focus on risk reduction and resiliency building is appropriate for limiting the impact of disasters and represents international best practice for disaster work.

Appropriateness of geographical targeting

39. Geographic targeting appropriately focussed on chronically food insecure areas, particularly those with high HIV prevalence, high rates of school dropout and low attendance (especially for girls), and high underweight rates for children under five. School Feeding started in 31 districts and after a retargeting exercise in 2012 was reduced to 22 to place greater focus on the districts with lowest performing

47WFP NFR Strategic Committee Review, 29.06.2010
indicators in education and lowest nutrition rates. This retargeting was largely driven by limited resources (stemming from the donor unwillingness to fund food distribution) that could be used as twinning costs for the government donated maize. As a result, the CP addressed the needs of the most vulnerable primary school children; the needs of other vulnerable groups, particularly those being treating for HIV/AIDS and/or TB, pregnant and lactating women, and children under five, were considered to be met though the government’s social cash transfer system and other donor-funded projects.

40. P4P sites were selected from locations within the school feeding catchment area that combined a high level of poverty with high agricultural production. The concept of connecting agricultural development to vulnerability through the education sector, and within the same geographical locations, was highly commended by government officials in all 10 districts that the ET visited, and the co-existence of both the most vulnerable Small Holder Farmers (SHFs) with those that have a greater producing power allows the CP to link safety-net and development operations. Geographical targeting was of a lesser importance for the DRM component, which focussed largely on capacity building at the DMMU’s national level; however, the Gender Participatory Risk Analysis (GPRA) pilot project was implemented in areas identified as having the greatest disaster impact from the ZVAC’s assessments.

Coherence with government policies

41. The CP aligns with several GRZ strategies aimed at reducing poverty, improving nutrition, disaster risk management and health. The SF programme, the increased local procurement of food through SHFs in the P4P pilot, and the DRM component all serve to expand the national social protection goals outlined in the Sixth National Development Plan (SNDP) and Zambia Vision 2030. In the current Social Protection framework, school feeding is in two of the five pillars.48

42. In the version of the SNDP at the inception of the CP a number of strategies for mainstreaming disaster risk management in most priority growth sectors and in government district planning processes were identified. After the SNDP’s revision in 2013, DRM was no longer a cross cutting issue. However, as DRM components remain in sectors such as Social Protection, Agriculture and Food Security, the CP’s relevancy has been largely unaffected by this, and is proceeding with a clear understanding of the DMMU’s objectives.

Coherence with interventions of other partners

43. Partnerships in this CP were of greater importance as WFP reduced its presence on the ground and emphasized collaboration with district level government and communities to build the accountability and capacity for the SF, work with SHF, and to build resilience to disasters. The ET confirmed high complementarity with other

48 The two pillars are 1) Social Assistance and 2) Protection
agencies through documentation reviews and during the site visits and found no obvious sign of duplication of activities. In Eastern Province, for example, the ET found that UNICEF provided latrines and hygiene education at the schools where SF was implemented, an effective collaboration to improve the nutritional status of school children by preventing intestinal worm infection. (See Annex 7 for more detail on partnerships.) In supporting the MCDMCH, WFP has a pragmatic technology focus that complements the social protection expertise held by UNICEF.

44. In P4P WFP actively engaged both formal and informal partners for institutional and technical support to FOs, traders and processors participating in P4P activities. The plurality of entry points provided an opportunity for multi-sectoral coordination which proved extremely successful and appreciated in the districts. The CO has made efforts to maintain a convenor rather than a participant role, taking on the latter only where no other options are possible. The P4P initiative provided an opportunity in the CO’s shift to food assistance for introducing new modalities for delivery in line with the Strategic Results Framework (SRF). (A more detailed list of P4P partnerships can be found in Annex 13.)

45. The DRM work is coherently organized within the UNDAF Outcome 4, and responsibility for subcomponents is clearly demarcated between WFP and UNDP. The DMMU National Coordinator expressed clear understanding of the roles WFP and other agencies perform in the United Nations Disaster Management Team. Opportunities for greater coherence in climate change/disaster management implementation with UNDP exist, but the attempt to capitalize on them failed due to the CO’s inability to get clearance from WFP headquarters for a change in approved districts in time for UNDP’s submission of a project proposal.

Appropriateness of the choice of activities and transfer modality

46. The ET did not find any deviance of the CP from the WFP normative guidance and the CP is therefore considered compliant. The CP was designed to align with WFP’s global strategic objectives 2, 4, and 5 (WFP, strategic plan 2010-2013), and is in line with WFP Nutrition Policy (2012), the WFP School Feeding Policy (Revised November 2013), and the WFP Gender Policy (2009). For SF, all five policy goals in the WFP School Feeding 2013 Guidelines have been incorporated into the CP.

47. P4P in Zambia is based on the WFP’s Corporate P4P Logical Framework objectives49 and fell in line with the global strategic operational shift from food aid to food assistance under the Strategic Result Framework. In addition, the toolbox included seven activities falling into the three main pillars50: a) demand/procurement; b) partnerships and training, and; c) learning/sharing.

48. The CO has achieved an appropriate balance between food and cash in the transfer modality. Distributing food is required for the school feeding programme,

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491) To identify and share best practices for WFP, NGOs, governments and agricultural market stakeholders and to increase profitable smallholder/low income farmer engagement in markets; 2) To increase smallholder/low income farmers’ capacities for agricultural production and market engagement in order to raise their income from agricultural markets.

50 WFP 2008 – 2013 Purchase for Progress (P4P) Initiative: A Strategic Evaluation (mid-term); October 2011
where a cash scheme would be difficult to implement, and distributing food through 
school meals is still acceptable in food-secure countries because of the special 
requirements of children. Furthermore, as the government provides maize to the 
programme, distributing food in this manner raises fewer sustainability issues. On 
the cash side, WFP is providing technical support for the national social security 
system’s transfer modality, and as this system is very much driven by government, 
WFP’s actions are highly appropriate.

49. P4P’s role in poverty reduction and agricultural development is clearly 
demonstrated in that it procures pulses that previously had limited market and was 
grown mainly for domestic use. P4P supports increased production of pulses by 
providing agricultural extension, access to inputs through private sector suppliers, 
and a reliable market through intermediaries. The market development benefits of 
P4P are sufficiently clear in Zambia, particularly in the regions where the CO is 
operating, because of the coincidence of productive potential and food insecurity, the 
fact that there is a national system for purchase of SHF’s maize, and because of the 
potential to increasing the inclusivity of Zambia’s success in macro-level food 
production. Once the linkage is established, there is the possibility for the 
relationship between SHFs and intermediaries (both on supply and marketing side) 
to expand beyond pulses to rural based economies. There is also a vast potential for 
linking Zambian SHFs to WFP’s export market.

50. School feeding was a good choice of activity for Zambia. First, it was a carry-
over activity from the former CP which implemented the Assistance to Basic 
Education (ABE) programme. Second, it was recognised and accepted as an 
important safety net option to reach primary school children in districts classified as 
very poor. Third, the food basket addressed short-term hunger for children from 
households that could not afford to feed them; stakeholders interviewed confirmed 
that for many children, the school meal was the only meal they would receive in a 
day.

51. In 2011, whole-grain maize replaced milled maize (MML) meal in the SF food 
basket to increase shelf life, minimize spoilage during district depot storage and 
transport delays, and lower costs associated with milling and transporting the maize. 
Focus Group Discussions with seven school representatives revealed that children 
prefer the milled maize meal, but that does not prevent them from eating whole-

grain. WFP ensures that the food basket contains the best possible nutritional quality 
by including pulses and Vitamin A & D fortified cooking oil.

52. WFP’s purchasing power has encouraged the market for pulses by linking SHFs 
to district level markets through which WFP purchases for the HGSF programme. 
Through the P4P, it was recognised that pulses had great potential for both national 
and international markets, and, therefore, the CO’s shift to procure pulses from FOs

51 The 2011 mid-term evaluation of the global P4P pilot recommended that WFP ‘Do not engage in a context where potential market development benefits of P4P are unclear’. The P4P in Zambia has acted upon a number of recommendations identified in the 2011 mid-term evaluation of the global pilot – including categorising and creating a progression strategy for Farmer Organisations – but others, particularly the recommendation to conduct market analysis, have not yet been addressed.
closer to local markets is highly commendable. Pulses are widely cultivated by SHFs and considered a 'woman’s crop', but prior to the P4P they did not reach a large formal market. The CO is considering expanding beyond pulses and is still exploring the profitability of other produce, such as soya beans, Vitamin A rich maize, chicken, goats, and groundnuts, in the hope of developing market demand, and having wider range of crop/livestock products is a key nutrition-sensitive activity which can promote diet diversity in the general population. Planned procurement through the Commodity Exchange (CEX), which allows for the purchase of larger volumes, has faced some limitations in the legal framework covering the operations and in tracing the source of the produce back to SHFs.

53. The CP’s focus on information management systems for DRM was appropriate given the assessment of DMMU’s capabilities by Tango in 2005, the gaps identified as part of PRRO10954, the conversations with DMMU conducted during the design of the CP, and the relatively low disaster threat level in Zambia. Furthermore, WFP’s shift away from disaster response to ‘resilience building’ through the implementation of resilience-related projects is highly appropriate given DMMU’s priorities and internationally recognised best practice for disaster risk management.

54. Overall, the appropriateness of the activities has remained high because the CO has demonstrated flexibility in the activities it pursues in assisting the government to meet its poverty reduction needs. By increasing its technical assistance provision, and the targeting of it to areas of government priority, such as the national social cash transfer programme, WFP has supported the integration of mobile technology into government systems for paperless data collection and provided technical advice in the selection of a Payment Service Provider (PSP). The initiation of a private sector partnership strategy for nutrition governance, and the various activities to build a multi-sectoral strategy for social protection through the SF, are all very appropriate given the lessening need for food distribution. Similarly, the CO has expanded its nutrition governance activities to align with other initiatives, including the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement, with its focus on 1000 most critical days, the country-led Renewed Efforts for Addressing Child Hunger and under-nutrition (REACH), and through participation in activities such as food fortification.

55. The CP has recognised the importance of mainstreaming gender as per the WFP Gender Policy (2009) and is compliant; specifically the CP has ensured gender disaggregation of project data for school feeding (boys and girls), and advocates for women to take leadership roles in food management committees at the schools, targets female small holder farmers and cooperatives through the P4P project, and stipulating that all project training activities have a positive gender balance.

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52 Pulses also have well established contributions to conservation agriculture and diet diversification
Summary: Appropriateness of the Operation

The CP has a high level of appropriateness in relation to government policies, WFP global strategies, partners’ activities and the needs in Zambia. Whilst policies and strategies have largely remained the same, underfunding (for food distribution in particular) threatened the extent but not the appropriateness of the CP’s activities. The CO was unable to reach all the groups that it intended to reach, but donors’ reluctance to fund food distribution is a legitimate statement about the inappropriateness of this activity in a country that is now a net producer of food and a lower middle income country. The corollary to this statement is that the government should meet the food needs of the food insecure, and WFP’s support to Zambia’s social protection system and the CO’s general shift to technical assistance are appropriate responses to this and moves that have brought it closer to government priorities.

2.2 Results of the operation

56. When considering the funding challenges faced by the CP, the overall results of the operation are good. A strict comparison with the objectives set at the design of the CP and the actual outputs and outcomes would not reflect favourably on the CO and it would not capture WFP Zambia’s performance since 2011. The CO has pursued a number of activities, such as policy influencing and the provision of technical assistance, which are not explained well in the SPR format, but are nevertheless found by the ET to be valuable contributions to food security in Zambia.
Component 1: School Feeding programme (SF)

Actual versus planned outputs

57. SF intends primary school children to receive one meal a day for five school days a week during term time. Using the SNDP target, beneficiary targets were exceeded in 2011 and 2013, but fell short in 2014. Using the annual planned figures (per SPR) 2011 and 2012 fell short while 2013 and 2014 targets were met. The results show a small increase (15 percent) between 2011 and 2012 and a relatively constant annual achievement with good gender balance thereafter (Table 1, page 17).

58. The number of schools reached by the SF is impressive considering the logistical and administrative difficulties described in Section 2.3. The marked difference in 2012 relates to the geographic retargeting when the number of districts was reduced from 31 to 22. Though the number of schools was increased in those 22 districts it is still not enough to reach the CP target of 2400 schools. On the other hand, the total number of beneficiaries reached actually increased from 2011 to 2012.

59. The data in Table 253 (page 18) demonstrates that SF maintained a consistent gender balance and there was high enrolment and low drop-out rates in the schools where it was implemented. Attendance was already high and remained that way with marginal improvements; now at 84 percent, it is only six percentage points away from WFP’s standard target of 90 percent. Although close, it is not reasonable to expect a 6 percent per year increase for the final year, though it could be higher than the 1 percent per year achieved.

60. Table 3 (page 19) shows that the proportion of all school days when students received meals was only 70 percent in 2011, 36 percent in 2012 and 76 percent in 2013. Although the targets were missed (primarily due to under-funding), the ET feels that less than a 100 percent rate for school feeding is inappropriate given the demonstrable importance of what may be the only daily meal for many pupils. As for 2013, the target was reduced from 80 percent to 60 percent with no explanation found for the adjustment. The target has been revised back to 80 percent. In 2012, only two meals / week were provided on average, but this improved to four meals / week in 2013.

53 Because the HGSF started in May of 2011 (being carried over from the SF under Access to Basic Education (AEABEAE))2010 would be the baseline year if comparing HGSF to the AEABEAE SF model. The ET has no data to compare the HGSF to a school that has never had a SF programme.
Table 1: Component 1: SF Beneficiary Analysis (2011-2014)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Districts</th>
<th>Schools</th>
<th>Targeted (Planned)</th>
<th>Total Targeted (Planned)</th>
<th>Actual = achieved</th>
<th>Total achieved</th>
<th>% of targeted CP (% Planned)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>Girls</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>2365 (2300)</td>
<td>490,000</td>
<td>510,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>365,646</td>
<td>349,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2022 (1847)</td>
<td>490,000</td>
<td>510,000</td>
<td>1,000,000</td>
<td>421,901</td>
<td>414,363</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2181 (2212)</td>
<td>399,517 SPR1</td>
<td>415,815</td>
<td>815,332</td>
<td>435,935</td>
<td>433,016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014 (Q1)</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2181</td>
<td>421,957</td>
<td>439,180</td>
<td>861,137</td>
<td>431,459</td>
<td>422,782</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


---

54 # of schools obtained from district database
55 The planned number of beneficiaries is based on the number of children enrolled at supported schools as per the WFP records.
56 The ET did not conduct a Data Quality Assessment so it cannot verify the actual (achieved) values; they are taken from reports.
57 (854,241) in Quarter 1, 2014 is a reliable estimate of the # reached at the end of the year which indicates the achievement will be 85% of the target for 2014.
### Table 2: Summary of Outcomes: CP 200157

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Ratio: (girls to boys) enrolled</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>0.98</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Attendance rate in WFP-assisted primary schools</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Average annual rate of change in number of children enrolled</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drop-out proportion of pupils</td>
<td>2.29%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Strategic Objective 4: Reduce chronic hunger and under nutrition**

**Strategic Objective 5: Strengthen the capacity of countries to reduce hunger**

| SF       | Food purchased locally as % of food distributed in-country for SF (This does not include the Maize which is all procured locally by the GRZ) | 26% | 14% | 6.37% |

Source: WFP Zambia CP 200157, SPR 2011, 2012, 2013. Note that in this programme all cereals are locally purchased by government and P4P purchases pulses locally. The only imported commodity is oil.
### Table 3: SF Outputs - WFP SPR 2011, 2012, 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WFP/Zambia Annual Planned</th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>Actual = achieved</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>% of Planned (% adjusted planned)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GRZ contribution towards WFP-run School Feeding activities</strong> (as % of total School Feeding budget requirements)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td></td>
<td>20% shortfall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013*</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20% over (4% shortfall)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of feeding days as % of actual school days</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>10% shortfall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td></td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>44% shortfall</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013*</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>20% over (4% shortfall)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of PTA members trained in school feeding management or implementation</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>1,859</td>
<td>1151</td>
<td></td>
<td>61.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2521</td>
<td></td>
<td>126.1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WFP SPR 2011, 2012, 2013; (-) Data not available
61. Tables 4 and 5 (below) provide evidence of how the quality of the meals might have varied over time by presenting the planned and actual distribution of all commodities (Table 4) and pulses and oil (Table 5). This helps explain the poor performance in meal frequency for 2012 seen in (Table 2), as well as the reduction in nutritional quality (total kilocalories and nutritional value). When actual tonnage distributed is presented as a percent of the target in Tables 4 and 5 it gives the impression that 2013 was not as successful as 2011, but 2013 was the best year in absolute terms for grains and pulses. Distribution of oil in 2013 was, however, only 50 percent of the 2011 volume of oil.

Table 4: Total Commodity distribution (2011 to 2013) for SF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>5000</td>
<td>7000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>20000</td>
<td>15000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>25000</td>
<td>20000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


62. The poor performance in 2012 was caused by a combination of underfunding and an increase in transportation costs that year, and this disrupted the timely distribution of commodities. WFP reported that in 2012, late disbursement of the government fund delayed payment to transporters. If 2012 data were available for Table 2, the ET would expect to see a sharp decrease in attendance and/or increase in drop-outs.

63. Table 3 also shows the GRZ’s contribution to SF increased between 2012 and 2013, but that is not surprising given the explanation of the problems encountered in 2012. What is impressive is that the GRZ contributes 76 percent of the total budget to the SF, demonstration of a veritable commitment to the programme. This translates to in-kind contributions of 10,054 metric tons of maize (an increase from the 7,526 metric tons of maize in 2012 (WFP, SPR 2013)) and US$1 million worth of operational costs in 2013. The GRZ also covered transportation of the food from the district to the schools.

Effectiveness of school feeding:

64. When the food basket was received in full, which would consist of a daily meal consisting of 120g of cereal (either maize cereal meal, or whole maize grain), 20g of pulses (beans or peas), and 10g of fortified vegetable oil, it provided an appropriate lunch constituting a third of the daily energy requirement of 515 Kilocalories. Micronutrient needs are met through the oil fortified with Vitamin A and D and the nutrients which are naturally found in the grain and pulses.

65. There is a good basis of anecdotal evidence suggesting SF is an effective safety net for rural households in the districts targeted. All stakeholders interviewed stated that SF is critically important as an incentive to guarantee at least one meal per day to many school children. School teachers reported that they have seen an increase in
enrolment, attendance, and attentiveness in class, and that children also have more energy to participate in extra-curricular activities after school. The ET finds this credible as trained-teachers have the best opportunity to observe these behaviours in school children and it was widely reported.

Table 5: SF Commodity Distribution: Planned vs Actual by Type

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Planned</th>
<th>Actual</th>
<th>% of Planned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(In mt)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>946</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>533</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peas</td>
<td>724</td>
<td>2895</td>
<td>2451</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total pulses</td>
<td>1670</td>
<td>3000</td>
<td>2984</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable Oil</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>662</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>13,860</td>
<td>13,842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize Meal</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>4,440</td>
<td>3,963</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Cereal</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>18,000</td>
<td>17,805</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GRZ Cereal*</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>NA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


66. Many schools in Eastern and Southern Provinces were experiencing stock out of pulses at the time of the evaluation, so the remaining period of 2014 is likely to produce similar results as 2013 as seen in Table 4. There are many reasons for this, among which insufficient funds to purchase pulses seem to be most plausible. Without the required supply of food daily meals cannot be prepared, or, as described during some interviews, only boiled maize is served. In both scenarios the meals are of lower nutritional value and caloric content.

Efficiency of school feeding:

67. For the purpose of this evaluation, efficiency of the implementation of SF is defined by the rating on the performance of the SF standards: the ET rated it as medium overall as the findings indicate in the Table 6 (below). Half of the SF standards are rated low. The most significant being the lack of stable funding and an
established budget line (national budget line for school feeding is needed for sustainability to ensure that it receives resources from national budgets)\textsuperscript{58} followed by limited partnership, lack of adequate staffing at the national level, and limited community participation. As the ET also confirmed during the site visits, poor logistics and administrative difficulties, both within WFP and the government, caused delays in the delivery of the food to the schools, and this occurred even in the dry season when the road network is easier to use. Delayed government contribution for transportation of the food to the schools at the district level was a major factor in the delays. Because this happens frequently, the schools are not able to provide the daily meal when there is a shortage.

68. A second component of efficiency is the increase in local procurement, which reduces transport costs. Table 7 (below) seems to reinforce the correlation because an upward trend is visible in the local procurement of the pulses (e.g. doubling to 945mt. in 2013) from the previous two years, and may have been influenced by WFP exceeding its objective of strengthening local famers groups consistently in all five indicators (Table 6 below). Teachers and government officials expressed that WFP is moving in the right direction by promoting local procurement of food (especially pulses) for SF through the P4P Programme. Many expressed that savings could be used for school supplies and for building food storage space at the schools.

69. A third element of efficiency is the fact that the CO managed to keep commodity losses from handling as low as 0.2 percent; the spike in 2012 is still at a very acceptable level and might simply reflect that following the retargeting WFP worked with new partners (District Education Boards) whom had not yet been trained in food handling, storage and transport. Once the CO provided this training, the trend was quickly reversed. Additionally, the change of commodity from MML to maize grain helped reduce the losses incurred by the programme.

70. A previous WFP study established that the SF food basket is cheaper than the one offered by the GRZ under the previous school feeding programme, which included a food supplement purchased from South Africa.\textsuperscript{59} WFP has estimated the current food basket costs between US$0.125 to US$0.155 per meal (the addition of milk being responsible for the more expensive meals). \textsuperscript{60}

\textsuperscript{58} WFP School Feeding 2009 Policy, Standard 3: Stable funding and budgeting, Indicator 3: The district-, regional- and national level structures include school feeding in their annual budgets and plans; Indicator 2: Donor funding: WFP, NGO, Government, or others is stable and multi-year where possible - without pipeline breaks.

\textsuperscript{59} The GRZ School feeding programme supplied schools with instant fortified protein meals called Provita which enhances children’s energy, protein and micronutrient requirements. The Provita was imported in 90 day lots (ie. enough for one term) from South Africa at a cost inclusive of inland delivery to the District Education Board Secretary (DEBS) branches of U$0.38 per 100g sachet. Source: WFP HGSF Strategy, 2010 p. 30

\textsuperscript{60} Under the ABE programme, the cost per meal ( U$0.11 per pupil) is based on a food basket consisted of: HEPS, vegetable cooking oil (10g),) and transportation and storage , administration cost. For the GRZ programme, the cost of U$0.42 per pupil is based on: Provita (100g), transportation and storage, and Administration. Source: WFP HGSF Strategy, 2010.
## Table 6: Zambia SF Compliance with WFP School Feeding Standards

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WFP 2009 SF Standard(^{61})</th>
<th>SABER Policy Goal areas(^{62})</th>
<th>Findings/Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability strategies (1)</td>
<td>Policy Frameworks</td>
<td>The ET confirmed a SF strategic plan (2010). The WFP exit strategy is not yet operational.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sound alignment with national policy (2)</td>
<td></td>
<td>SF policy is at cabinet level only but is already part of various other policy documents including social protection and education, SHN Policy. The GRZ has requested TA from WFP for implementation of the SF programme.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stable funding and budget (3)</td>
<td>Financial Capacity</td>
<td>GRZ is a lone stable donor (100% maize and 76 percent of the total budget to the SF (including operational cost)). However, only Southern Province has a SF budget line for all of its districts. Current funding level in School Health Nutrition budget is insufficient and delays often affect programme implementation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional arrangements for implementation, monitoring and accountability (5)</td>
<td>Institutional capacity and coordination</td>
<td>SF is housed in the SHN unit at the MESVTEE but does not have a line budget and only one staff person is supported by WFP. SF is currently incorporated into the Annual Education Survey form used to report on school performance. WFP has launched a pilot (May 2014) in three districts to identify the best mobile technologies for reporting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnership / inter-sector coordination (7)</td>
<td></td>
<td>The importance of inter-sectoral coordination is recognised by stakeholders, but there is no formal multi-sectoral coordination body/secretariat. However, since the second half of 2013, following two visits to the Centre of Excellence in Brazil, there have been more inter-sectoral meetings on the transition of the Schools Meals programme into HGSF.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local production &amp; sourcing strategy (6)</td>
<td>Design and implementation</td>
<td>100% of the maize is procured locally by GRZ; in 2013, local procurement of pulses reached 63% of total food procured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Needs-based, cost effective, design (4)</td>
<td></td>
<td>WFP targeted districts with overlapping of high poverty, poor education indicators, and high malnutrition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community participation (8)</td>
<td>Community Roles – reaching beyond schools</td>
<td>Community contribution (cooking, collecting firewood, organisation, water, cooking utensils) exists but is not uniform throughout programme. Some schools / communities still perceive SF programme as a WFP activity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Green = Strong achievement; Orange = Moderate; Red = Limited (Needs Improvement)

\(^{61}\)WFP School Feeding Policy, 2009  
\(^{62}\) WFP School feeding Policy Revised, 2013
### Table 7: Local pulses purchased as percentage of total pulses distributed for SF (mt)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>752</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cowpeas</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>696</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>1362</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1305</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>489</td>
<td>1598</td>
<td>945</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Local as % of (Actual) total distributed</td>
<td>3.1%</td>
<td>60.8%</td>
<td>59.1%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Traders provided the highest proportion of this produce (53%), which is a very high percentage considering they only became intermediaries in 2012.*

**Sustainability:**

71. The ideal situation for sustainability would be the government taking over the SF programme. The momentum behind school feeding is high and it is widely referenced in government strategies, perceived to be a good transfer modality for social protection, and recognised as a great stimulator for retention and attendance in primary schools. However, despite signs of promise, the ET did not find evidence that the government is ready to take over completely for the reasons explained above, most notably, that there is no budget for SF. Once the CO and the government jointly operationalise the exit strategy it will be a step forward for the government to assume responsibility. One positive finding is the fact that Southern Province has included SF in its budget and in all district level budgeting.

72. Although the SF may not be independently sustainable as yet, WFP has done a good job of sustaining the programme despite serious financial constraints (its operating budget had a consistent shortfall of 46 percent). The CO became very dynamic and engaged in other activities (e.g. pilot of Milk for School project, redesign and retargeting) to support the school feeding operation. The table below represents the chain of catalytic activities that the CP is conducting to reinforce the SF and nutrition and expand funding opportunities.

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63 WFP, Final Evaluation of Milk for Schools Programme, Final Report, August 13
SF Current Support Activities as of June 2014

Cow peas supply chain: Supporting cow peas production and marketing; addressing challenges in cow peas supply chain from farmer to school

Advising on secondary transport: Supporting MESVTEE to implement more cost effective and transparent contracting of local transporters

Linking FRA maize directly to schools: Linking SGR maize from FRA Satellite/District depots to schools; aligning administrative and logistics procedures

2014 P4P procurement approach and strategy: Linking local procurement of pulses to schools; ensuring accountability and transparency of procurement procedures, and encouraging decentralization policies

Nutritious food basket: Developed local and seasonal menus based on nutrition gaps within communities

Model school: Turning schools into community Centres of Excellence, and investing in specific infrastructure to improve operations (storage, gardens, electricity, water harvesting)

Fortification: Supporting fortification of staple food strategy nationwide; promoting fortification of school meals

Development of SF policy: Developing policy framework outlining multi-sectoral linkages with other national policies

Long-term financial commitment: Advocating to secure long-term government commitment and allocation of funding through relevant line ministries, and as a social safety net

Private sector assessment: Assessed the potential for local private sector production and private-public partnerships for highly nutritious foods (supercereal, supercereal+, and Ready to Use Supplementary Food (RUSF)) in retail shops in Zambia.

Private sector partnership strategy: Providing guidance to the private sector, government and NGOs on how to engage the companies to address malnutrition.

SF unintended effect:

73. The fact that the deworming activity was cut short due to underfunding has likely produced the unintended effect that school children participating in the school feeding remain at risk of helminths infections (roundworm, whipworm or hookworm) and therefore susceptible to anemia. Those infected will not be receiving the full nutritional benefit from the meals. Evidence suggests that deworming can make significant reductions in anaemia, and is considered essential to achieve better
absorption of food and maintain good nutritional status, as well as improve cognition, in situations of high prevalence.\textsuperscript{64}

**Market-based sustainable hunger solutions through P4P**

As a standalone from the core components of the CP, the P4P pilot is an example of an innovation introduced to improve livelihoods and address food insecurity by stimulating local markets in rural areas. The results witnessed by the Evaluation Team are very exciting and promise a tangible future niche for WFP. By 2013, approximately 11,000 farmers in 96 FOs had engaged with WFP generated demand in local market economies. Over 73 percent of these FOs joined the programme between 2012 and 2013. In 2011, 84 percent of WFP’s total local purchases from Zambia were channelled through the Zambia Agricultural Commodities Exchange (ZAMACE).\textsuperscript{65} This volume made P4P cost-efficient while supply-side costs remained insignificant. Between 2009-2013, 57 percent of WFP Zambia’s procurement came through competitive tendering of grain, 35 percent from processors and 8 percent from direct purchases (which began in 2013).

**P4P Outcomes**

Data analysis for P4P activities is limited due to a corporate decision made in 2013 to have all P4P pilot data (including Zambia’s) sent to the African Economic Research Council (AERC) in Nairobi, a data hub for quality control. No report had been received back at the time of the Evaluation Mission. Information available on benefits received by SHFs is mainly anecdotal and farm-gate prices were not collected. The data available is partial and spread out between individual case studies and success stories. Information collected from partner reports and district level annual reviews mainly covers operational matters. This lack of consolidated data, together with the short implementation period of Phase 2, provided little opportunity to attribute the actual effects of P4P to participating FOs and SHF members.

Nevertheless, P4P activities implemented using different models during Phase 1 and Phase 2 produced some interesting results. Between 2011 and 2013, a total of 608\,mt of beans and 870\,mt of cowpeas were procured from 47 FOs of 92 participating FOs using the three following models: 18 were registered vendors (typically agri-business vendors); 9 direct contracts with District Warehouse Operators; and 20 through small-scale traders. Traders provided a high proportion (53 percent) of the total pulses procured in Phase 2 considering this procurement modality only begun in 2012 and only five traders have been engaged. Early indications from WFP’s trial of using traders as intermediaries for higher level of aggregation suggest that P4P’s ‘hand-holding’ approach stimulates and supports the engagement of and investment from entrepreneurs to SHF. WFP’s added value is in sharing risk with traders and providing a guaranteed market.

\textsuperscript{64} WFP School Feeding Policy, October 2009, p 7 & 8

\textsuperscript{65} P4P Global Learning Support: Study 5: Structured Markets presentation by Miriam Sohlberg
77. All FOs interviewed indicated that the inputs and training provided through P4P partnerships had helped them increase their production and reduce post-harvest losses. However, there were mixed reports on increased sales to WFP itself as SHFs sometimes chose to use alternative buyers offering better prices and, in instances, because of delays in payment.

78. The small-holder entrepreneurial mechanised farming pilot provided evidence to financial institutions that SHFs can be reliable borrowers. It impacted beneficiary farmers by reducing the field preparation days by 93 percent, and farmers who used WFP-supported mechanised services are reported to have increased their household income by 130 percent. The pilot was discontinued, but it has been replaced by another pilot project supporting the use of draft animals and other simpler, cheaper mechanisations that are especially suited to women SHFs.

79. The processing model explored markets for SHF produce through two intermediaries, one of whom, Community Markets for Conservation (COMACO) supplied WFP with 2,437 mt of mixed commodities from 995 SHF between 2009 and 2010. However, both intermediaries were discontinued due to low quality of produce and weak capacity on the partners’ side. WFP’s demand for processed foods also diminished with the lack of funding under Component 2.

80. At the macro-level, WFP’s trading helped increase the volume of commodity exchanged through ZAMACE, helped reduced the trading margins, and helped lift the credibility of the CEX. In 2011, FRA increased maize purchases fourfold and bought maize at 65 Kw/kg whilst selling at 40 Kw/kg, reducing the maize trading level through ZAMACE.

81. The second phase of P4P (2012-2014) shifted in approach to reach Farmer Organizations through community aggregation centres, District Warehouses Operators and traders acting as direct suppliers to WFP. Through partners, P4P offered more to SHFs beyond price premiums: supply-side partnerships provided capacity development for increased productivity at farm level, and the capacity of FOs to act as a marketing channel for SHF was built.

82. The local procurement demand for Phase 2 was much lower than the demand projected at design. However, the CIP and log-frame were not revised to set new targets and indicators after the drastic programme adjustment. Within project sites, baseline studies were planned to be conducted by implementing partners at the beginning of the activities, and then monitored through annual surveys at household and FO levels to track outcomes and capacity development of participating FOs.

83. One notable initiative of immediate benefit is the skill criteria established in 2013 to categorize FOs into three groups as they progressed in the capacity building

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66 The P4P Story
67 Market Study on Maize Commodity Trading Behaviour and impact in Zambia (2001-2012); Mulungushi University, School of Agriculture and Natural Resources
68 For example procurement plan for September 2013 to March 2014 was for 1985 MT of mixed beans and cowpeas compared to 35,950MT mixed commodities over the P4P five year period i.e. roughly 7,200MT per annum.
efforts. This was a recommendation of the 2011 mid-term evaluation of the global P4P pilot. The progression strategy will help to separate FOs into their respective skill level (e.g. basic marketing, aggregation) up to higher levels of readiness for full engagement with competitive tendering and trading systems. It will also help keep track of the FOs’ training needs as they graduate from one level to the next.

84. Some P4P activities have a strong gender focus, especially those with business models that reduced the burden of women with appropriate technology (like draft animals, hammer mills, and shelling machines). With the introduction of equipment in the mechanization pilot, labour shelling days were reduced from 37 to 4 days. Based on reports from WFP partners, lower agriculture demands have increased the time women have to attend to the nutritional needs and care for their families. Although these may be counter to gender equality, other reports suggest that free time is also used to invest in other entrepreneurial activities. Women’s participation in FOs seems to be higher where the original FO was initially a women’s group. The P4P pilots provide good lessons on the inclusion of gender training in progressive training programmes for FOs. Female farmers’ contribution to HGSF increased from 6 percent (2011) to 44 percent (2013) in Luapula and Northern provinces following a gender mainstreaming pilot activity.

85. The likelihood of gender balance was increased with the P4P’s shift from commercial to domestic crops traditionally grown by women and which have low fertilizer and labour demands. Focus group discussion with FOs and key informant interviews at district offices all indicate that cowpeas had little or no market before WFP generated a demand but were now providing women with a source of income over which they have more control. However, it was reported that beyond a certain income threshold ‘women’s crops’ tend to become male-controlled crops, as has happened with groundnuts, so the impacts of the gender-benefits may not last.

Sustainability:

86. In the case of P4P, linkage to the programmes of the Food and Agriculture Organisation and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) provides an opportunity for up scaling P4P interventions. Since the two other Rome Based Agencies (RBA) have comparative advantages in capacity building on livelihoods and credit for SHF’s development, WFP could then concentrate on its strength areas in logistics, procurement and market development. An opportunity for improving sustainability is presented if commodities are procured through intermediaries like small-scale traders, District Warehouse Operators and FOs, once their capacity to engage in commercial markets is fully developed.

Component 2: Food Security for Vulnerable Groups
Actual versus planned outputs

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69 E.g. P4P activities in partnership with Heifer International (WEAT), ADRA (Mechanization through labour saving devices on post-harvest handling)
87. The CO was unable to implement food distribution under this component as planned due to underfunding and therefore planned targets were not met. Instead, the CO engaged in capacity building activities to strengthen nutrition governance. Results through nutrition governance provide evidence for potential future direction for the CP to engage in nutrition and in strategies to address food security that would mitigate hunger and poverty in Zambia.

88. WFP seconded staff to the National Food and Nutrition Commission (NFNC), supporting a range of activities, such as the multi-stakeholders’ forum on nutrition, the development of the National Food and Nutrition Strategic Plan 2011-2015, and the conducting of a "Cost of Diet" study, which was used to inform nutrition strategies in the country. Also under this component, WFP carried out a familiarization exercise to identify opportunities for enhanced knowledge management on nutrition and HIV in relation to the national health information system. WFP’s engagement in the SUN movement and support towards NFNC’s catalytic activities has helped create a broader perspective of nutrition compared to the narrow clinical view earlier pursued by many stakeholders in Zambia.

Table 8: Component 2 Outputs -Technical Assistance for Food Security for Vulnerable groups

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Plan</th>
<th>Actual</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of WFP-managed under nutrition solutions in the process of being handed over to the government hunger solution</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of government staff training in supply management</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of government staff assisted in policy development</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of government/national partner staff receiving TA and training in food security</td>
<td>671</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of national food security/nutrition programme receiving WFP TA and training</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of TA projects conducted by WFP to strengthen the national capacity</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP expenditures to strengthen the national capacity</td>
<td>US$50K</td>
<td>US$50K</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WFP SPR 2013

89. The results from Table 8 suggest that the technical assistance efforts were heavily underfunded, and, while the targets were met, they do not convey confidence

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70 Social cash transfer tool for the MCDMCH
71 Male staff from MCDMCH were trained
that this type of assistance is meaningful in the long term. For example, having one person trained in supply management seems insufficient for national level responsibilities and raises serious questions related to sustainability and quality.

90. On the other hand, the ET believes that the mobile tool developed for the social cash transfer system at the MCDMCH is more significant than the ad hoc training of single individuals since the tool can be applied for national coverage of the social safety net programmes. This result aligns well with the CP’s goal of expanding its role in social protection. WFP is therefore more likely to gain more funding for this type of technical assistance. In addition, since the MCDMCH also has the mandate for implementing nutrition, social protection, and maternal and child health interventions at the community level, the ET estimates that this line ministry is well positioned to be a multi-purpose partner for WFP to pilot more innovative solutions to address hunger and malnutrition at the community level.

91. The ET found that engaging private firms to address malnutrition is a worthwhile endeavour; the proposed Nutrition Commercialization Strategy to identify nutrition business models (e.g. SF, bio-fortification) is a promising niche for the CP and would attract donors interested in multi-stakeholder approach to address malnutrition in Zambia. The ET feels that the CO is well positioned for this type of activity since it has a strong history of piloting innovations to enhance systems that provide solutions for multiple interventions in food security and social protection in Zambia.

Sustainability:

92. In relation to the other activities under this component, sustaining the current global momentum in nutrition sensitive programming is only possible if the national nutrition policy entity, namely the NFNC, is overhauled technically in order to guide the country forward. In the absence of relevant global guidelines on nutrition sensitive programming, the ET estimates that it may be difficult to achieve this in the remaining term of the CP. To advance this further, the next CP should consider building the capacity of the NFNC as a key activity.

Unintended effect

93. A representative from the MoH reported that the food aid programme (direct food distribution) was cut too abruptly without a phase-out plan from WFP to allow the government to gradually take over this activity. The MoH still considers food aid as a critical intervention to address malnutrition among HIV/AIDS, TB patients, lactating and pregnant women, and children under five. The gap in service was created as no other partner is filling the service.
WFP’s activities in information system strengthening

Across its three components, WFP is providing technical assistance in the use of electronic reporting systems to the government, and the CO is particularly recognised for its unique expertise in mobile delivery and tracking (MDT) in Zambia. Its objective is to improve government’s capacity in data collection, reporting, and decision-making. The CO has ongoing system strengthening work in the social protection programme, in disaster management, has a pilot ongoing for the school feeding programme, and a number of pilots completed in the CP period.

a) Mobile Technology for the Ministry of Community Development, Mother & Child Health (MCDMCH) and the Social Cash Transfer Team. WFP first introduced mobile payment using vouchers for the social cash transfer (SCT) in 2004.

b) Assessment of mobile technology for delivery and tracking in partnership with UNICEF. The assessment provided recommendations for an information system that is currently being developed by the Ministry of Health.

c) Mobile Technology for the Food Reserve Agency (FRA). WFP is supporting the development of a mobile phone based tool (app) with the overall goal to enhance stock management, minimize data entry and accelerate decision making and feedback loops. A pilot for testing the quality of purchased maize and tracking its transport to FRA’s depots was well received.

d) Mobile Technology for Enhanced Food Distribution Management & Performance Monitoring of the Home Grown School Feeding Programme (HGSF). WFP is currently procuring an m-tech solution provider to develop a mobile-based reporting system to monitor the distribution of school meals and evaluate the programme by capturing key indicators in real-time.

Component 3: Disaster Risk Management (DRM)

Actual versus planned outputs

94. The SPR measures DRM outputs against planned targets for training only and registers the additional technical assistance output without planned figures. In each year since the start of the CP, WFP has trained fewer government staff than planned due to funding shortages and fewer qualified staff in government positions than anticipated. The CP started low, and in 2011 only 26.6 percent of the planned numbers received training. Planned figures are not available for 2012, but the actual figure of 155 is lower than the figure for 2011, when 160 people were trained. In 2013 a significant lowering of the planned number of trainees (from 150 for each of the four types of training in 2011 to 20 for each of the two types of training in 2013) saw a greater percentage (75 percent) achieved in planned versus actual. Although attempts have been made to increase female participation, figures are low in 2013, when recording began, due to a lack of qualified female participants.

95. Outside of the planned results, the CO has achieved a number of actual outputs. A significant accomplishment was the operationalisation of the Zambia Emergency Preparedness and Response Information System (ZEPRIS), which is now open to public use. This new platform provides real time early-warning data related to the local weather situation, which is critical in natural disaster emergency response. The system is designed to boost coordination of multi-stakeholders’ response through a
standardised reporting model for their individual input prior to and when responding to a disaster.

96. WFP has worked on the development of a number of key disaster management documents. In 2012, WFP provided a full review of the draft Disaster Management Policy and Operations Manual, which is currently with the Zambian cabinet for endorsement. In 2013, it worked with a consultant in the development of the draft National Disaster Risk Management Framework, providing specific input on the design of the framework and the incorporation of the sectoral actors. In 2014, the CO helped in the development of a five-year Strategic Plan for the ZVAC, again through technical support provided to a consultant hired by ZVAC. For the latter, WFP is particularly focussed on the methodologies used, the cross-cutting themes, and the development of the monitoring and evaluation system.

97. WFP made a special effort to achieve gender balance in the trainings that it offered but faced challenges because there are fewer women who qualify for participation. A six-month Gender-Based Participatory Risk Analysis pilot project was completed in February 2013. In six sites in three districts the project provided support to the Satellite Disaster Management Committees in the form of training in human resources for community members to apply principles and practices of Community Managed Disaster Risk Reduction using the Participatory Risk Analysis lens, Community-led hazard profiling and risk identification, and developed guidelines to facilitate identification and analysis of frequent occurring hazards by the communities.

98. Another pilot project, titled ‘Technical Assistance in Emergency Preparedness & Disaster Risk Management to the Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit (DMMU)’ commenced in January 2014 under WFP’s Capabilities Partnership Programme (CAPRO). In April 2014, national level training of emergency simulation facilitators was implemented, and this will be followed by provincial-level mentored emergency simulations in July 2014. As part of this project WFP is introducing the use of Geographic Information System (GIS) and Earth Observation Satellite Technology (remote sensing) for undertaking integrated early warning and analysis.

Effectiveness:

99. It is difficult to accurately assess the effectiveness of the DRM capacity building support as the SPR only captures data at the output level with a description of outcomes listed separately, and there is no logical causality plotted between the two. In addition, there is no baseline information from a needs assessed. Nevertheless, relying on the testimonials of those that have been trained, there is a strong acknowledgement that the training, particularly surrounding the ZVAC assessments, is highly useful for them in their work and contributes to WFP DRM objective.

100. As is to be expected, there is a high-degree of effectiveness where WFP has produced and/or had a high-level of input into the output – such as the ZEPRIS site and the policy documents. However, the implementation of the Disaster Management Policy and Operations Manual, once approved by the Cabinet, will be the first test of the outcomes and impact of this work and needs to be monitored. The same applies for both the National Disaster Risk Management Framework and the five-year ZVAC strategy once they are finalised and accepted.

101. The GBPRA pilot demonstrated a low-level of effectiveness as the partial achievement of the outputs has not translated into the intended outcome:
Communities and especially women are empowered to manage DRR systems’ 16 months after its closure. However, the six-month timeframe for the pilot was certainly too ambitious. Women were included into the community disaster management structures but the ET found that a large number of these had left since, and inclusion was not necessarily an indication of empowerment because the SDMCs are weak organisations for creating or implementing meaningful disaster plans.

**Sustainability:**

102. The sustainability of the DRM work is mixed. The ZVAC expressed clear understanding and ownership of the methodologies introduced to their assessments and of the ZEPRIS platform. It is fully possible to envisage these continuing if WFP’s support were to cease. The ZVAC recognised the importance of having improved tools to enhance the quality of their vulnerability assessments, but also expressed concern about funding the maintenance required for the GIS mapping.

103. The fact that WFP has such a high input into the development of the Disaster Management Policy and Operations Manual and other documents, even when external consultants are employed by DMMU, is a suggestion that this model of technical assistance work is not fully sustainable and indicates a degree of reliance. Although the ZVAC lead their assessments, WFP has had a large input into the report writing and analysis of the in-depth assessments and the rapid assessments. The training of DRR analysts in partnership with the DMMU, FEWSNET, and MAL is a positive step in securing the sustainability as it is intended that the analysts to take over when WFP’s support ceases.
Summary: Results of the Programme

Overall, the results of the programme in Components 1 and 3, and in the P4P, are good, particularly given the challenges faced through underfunding, and WFP has made achievements towards its key objectives. The SF has reached 100 percent of the planned number of pupils by 2014, and through anecdotal evidence there is a discernible positive impact on enrolment, attendance, and attentiveness. WFP was unable to implement intended wider benefits because important additional activities, such as deworming and environmental management, performed below target as their activities were substantially scaled down.

Linkages between the HGSF programme and P4P were established, and the former became the main demand platform for SHF produce in P4P’s second phase. Under the pilot, WFP is working with 92 participating FOs and has, in a relatively short period, procured significant amounts of pulses from small-scale traders. Where particular gender activities have been applied, they have significantly improved the participation of women. However, it remains difficult to accurately and reliably depict the impact this has had on food security or livelihoods.

The DRM work is difficult to track through the recorded input to impact process, but the capacity building has undoubtedly registered a high-level of quality and relevancy, as expressed by the DMMU, ZVAC, and a review of the outputs. The best results can be seen in improvement to the ZVAC assessments, and in the support given to DMMU in creating the ZEPRIS. WFP has achieved its goal of supporting the development of a national platform for disaster information.

Outside of these components and the P4P pilot, the CO is evidently engaged in valued capacity building activities to strengthen nutrition governance, and it is putting in place the technical and stakeholder modalities for Zambia’s social cash transfer system. Again not covered in regular monitoring, the CO has adapted to the country’s context to support other parts of WFP’s work in Africa, supplying 98 percent of non-GMO white maize and related products for operations in Southern and Eastern Africa between 2009 and 2014.

2.3 Factors affecting the results

Internal Factors

Gap between resources mobilised and the resources required

104. The CP experienced a recurring shortfall of near 45 percent of required funds – this was present at the CP’s inception in 2011 and still had not closed by the time of the evaluation. One major consequence of this gap was that food distribution for vulnerable groups under Component 2 was never implemented. Although the national safety net programme was intended to meet the needs of the vulnerable groups older than school children, the MoH representative reported that there was still a high-level of vulnerability underserved by other measures.

For the SF, with diminished buying power due to underfunding, schools have experienced a chronic stock-out of pulses, as witnessed by the ET during site visits in
Eastern and Southern Province; many schools received a low ratio of maize to pulses, sometimes as low as 76 bags of maize/five bags of pulses for an entire quarter. The CO could not operationalise the planned exit strategy for handover to the government by the end of 2015 due to underfunding. Although the CO has been meeting with key line ministries through the inter-ministerial technical team (MCDMCH, MAL, MoF, and WFP) to work out an implementation framework, the debate has not yet reached consensus and the dialogue is still on-going. In order to bring this programme to scale, it is critical to have the concrete commitments from key government ministries and the engagement of community leaders and private sector actors (see box below).

**WFP engages the private sector**

WFP’s convening power has enabled it to utilize the role of private sector actors in unique cross-sectoral engagements within Zambia. These include:

- Technology and systems for data collection that WFP is currently piloting in three districts (SMS, Mobile data collection system, USSDT)
- Mobile money (facilitator of cash movement) including banks (financial systems)
- Mobile Network operations (good infrastructure)
- Commercialization of nutrition (food processing, value chain, retail, agriculture companies, handling companies, etc.)

105. In some areas the CO was able to make up the shortfall in funding. Though underfunding in 2011 led to underachievement of the results for the DRM component, in later years WFP has fully funded the training of government staff and provided 85 percent of the funding required for the DMMU-led creation of hazard and risk profiles for three districts. This is likely due to the fact that the DRM work is closer to pure technical assistance work and the DRM component has been successful in winning new projects aligned to its objectives.

**Capacity to adapt to and mitigate external factors**

106. While the funding shortfall may have caused a somewhat negative impact on the CP, it also served as an impetus for the CO to initiate creative fundraising strategies and adopt innovative strategies for supporting the government’s poverty reduction goals. As the CO took a greater role in technical assistance and a lesser one in direct implementation, it decreased the burden on its operations under this CP. After closing its field offices it placed four field coordinators at provincial level government offices, a move that lowered costs, switched emphasis on capacity building activities, and gave local government the space to resolve their issues independently. Although this is a step towards sustainability, there is still the risk that WFP staff placed in government offices become relied upon for the implementation of their roles.

**Emerging synergies in project implementation**

107. There is a clear linkage between P4P and HGSF. As the latter served as a market for P4P, this may have helped the CP stimulate local production among farmers groups (including female farmers) and community mobilization around those schools. The CP also leveraged that synergy among the two operations components
to increase focus on social protection. The main drawback for P4P is that many of the activities had only been implemented for two years or less, allowing little time to observe results and to draw lessons for the synergy between P4P and HGSF.

High-quality relevant expertise

108. The CO clearly has expertise in the areas in which it is currently working and this contributes to the positive results, the ability to adapt, and the perceptions of WFP with the government, partners, and donors. This is highly apparent in the DRM component where WFP is recognised for its quality of expertise and years of experience in food security and disaster assessments in country and globally. The DMMU National Coordinator expressed that there is a clear value addition to their work due to WFP’s expert input, and the ZVAC described the support as ‘pioneering’.

109. Currently, the CO has a limited ability to handle more specialised functions in some areas it plans to engage with, such as nutrition sensitive programming and the synergies with agriculture and nutrition. WFP’s staff has good knowledge of the social protection agenda in the country, but its specialised input in this area is in the technology for cash-transfer, not social protection as an approach. The CO has overcome this through partnerships to provide the technical expertise required.

110. The P4P had direct personnel issues, and was seriously understaffed due to two vacancies in senior positions in 2011, which caused the P4P coordinator to assume duties as officer-in-charge for over 15 months from mid-2010. This meant that continuing a few activities was given priority over learning, and there was less emphasis on quality control. The situation improved in 2012 when the new P4P coordinator took the position and additional members of staff were engaged. This enabled the P4P unit to give attention to improve quality programming, expand the number of pilots, and begin to engage with a wider variety of partners.

Monitoring and Evaluation

111. The CO would have benefited from improved decision making tools, and at the least been better able to demonstrate its results, had it not for a long period been limited to basic monitoring and reporting on the SPR format. Primarily, the SPR template captures input and outputs for the CP’s three original components. The CO was neither engaged in analysis of the quality of its processes, nor in capturing data on its technical assistance in policy work.

112. Furthermore, P4P has a separate, parallel M&E system and staff to fulfil the corporate reporting requirements. Since P4P activities only overlapped with HGSF in a few districts, the CP reporting system only captured data for a few indicators and the CP was not able to fully exploit P4P data to inform decision-making. This would have been particularly useful for HGSF procurement and building community partnerships around the use of locally available indigenous crops. It would have also allowed the CO to showcase the synergies of P4P, HGSF, and its social protection work.

113. Overall, similar to the case study in 2011, the ET holds the opinion that P4P is under a heavy monitoring and evaluation burden for an exploratory/learning project. In total, the P4P data is collected through: i) Baseline surveys; ii) Annual surveys of SHFs (agricultural practices, production & marketing, food security & household characteristics, livelihood sources; household welfare); iii) Annual surveys of 100-160 FOs (structure and membership; facilities and services; and marketing); iv)
Biennial survey of traders; and v) Long survey instruments (baseline interviews of SHF require 3 hours).

114. Trust funds and/or special projects should ideally have their own log-frame and M&E plan feed into the CO’s M&E system. However, the latter does not currently support certain data, as was the case in the Milk for Schools project, which reported on outputs incompatible with the CO’s M&E database and the WFP regional automated output monitoring system (ATOMS).

**Partnership modality**

115. WFP has good relationships with the key government departments in Zambia, and the way in which the CO works in support of government-led programmes helps improve the relevance and increase the adoption of its activities. WFP’s social cash transfer technology is as highly welcomed as it is because it fits within the MCDMCH’s social protection agenda, and the same is true for the inputs WFP has made to the social protection policy. Within DRM, WFP is providing support to the DMMU’s regular activities rather than creating parallel structures. Suggestions for capacity building originate from both DMMU and WFP, but the CO is able to make relevant suggestions because it has a good understanding of the DMMU’s objectives and processes. Interviewed separately, WFP and DMMU staff expressed a common understanding of needs and a common direction for future work. This does not necessarily mean that all activities suggested by WFP are applicable, but the ZVAC expressed that even from unsuccessful activities they are able to extract elements of useful learning. This understanding has mitigated the absence of a formal needs assessment, but that will be essential in strengthening the work at sub-national DMMU levels and with other government departments.

**External Factors**

**Macro-context changes**

116. As mentioned throughout, the present CP has been operational during a period of significant change in Zambia. The country’s move to a Lower Middle Income Country and becoming net food producer have altered perceptions of the type of assistance that is required in Zambia. The most immediate manifestation of this is the reluctance in the donor community to fund food distribution, a fact that was evinced in all interviews with donor representatives, and which had the most impact on Component 2 of the CP. Nevertheless, it is only perspectives of food distribution that have altered, and the CO has been successful in gaining recognition for providing a valuable technical and convening role in school feeding, DRM, P4P, social protection, and nutrition.
Performance of implementation partnerships

117. Although WFP has close and strong working relationships, the current sustainability of its results may be let down by the quality of its partnerships. Though there were several development partners operating with synergy in SF and/or P4P operational districts, the SF would benefit greatly from all relevant line ministries of the government committing a full budget besides the maize donation, and for all the provinces to do the same. Currently only one province (Southern) has made this commitment.

118. Under DRM, WFP missed trainee results because there are not the required number of qualified staff, and particularly female staff, in the DMMU and ZVAC. This may point to unrealistic targets (there are certainly qualified people in both), but WFP’s high-level of input in the production of some outputs also suggests that WFP may be operating beyond the capacities of its partners. The fact that WFP played a reviewer’s and a producer’s role in the production of a number of DMMU-owned documents is a drawback of the close working relationship. The problem of capacity matching, however, is more pronounced at the lower level DMMU structures, the weakness of which (at the satellite level) is a large factor of the lack of success in the GBPRA pilot.

Lack of coherent policies, supportive/enabling environment

119. Although SF has been embraced by the government, commitment for full-scale implementation is weak without a national budget, support staff within the national level SHN unit, and an advocacy strategy to promote the multi-sectoral facets of SF. While SF is referenced in four key government documents, lack of official SF and SP policies pose bottlenecks for fundraising. However, there are promising signs that this may change: the government is seeking TA from the CO to help them finalise the school feeding policy documents, and if this policy becomes official it should be easier to advocate for an operational budget and convince other line ministries (Agriculture, Transport, and Trade) to invest already stretched resources. There is potential for the CO to negotiate with the government because the Ministers from MAL and MESVTEE would like to expand the programme to reach the 3.5 million school children in Zambia. Although this will not be achieved in this CP timeframe, the changing political environment is a useful beginning from which the CO could garner multi-sectoral support.

120. In the case of P4P, trading through ZAMACE was suspended to allow internal restructuring within the commodities exchange and because there was a lack of a legal framework for the functioning of the warehouse receipt system. This reduced WFP’s purchases. In an effort to reduce FRA’s market involvement, advocacy for

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72 The most prominent for WFP’s purposes is UNICEF, who in Eastern province is implementing hygiene education and building of latrines, ECD Centre of Excellence, De-worming; Step Up Zambia, Room To Succeed, Time To Learn; in Southern province is implementing hygiene education, ECD, De-worming; Room To Succeed, Time To Learn, and in Western province is implementing hygiene education and building of latrines, ECD Centres.
policy change by ZAMACE partners resulted in the Credit Act being revised in 2011 to formalise the warehouse receipt system and the appointment of warehouse receipt managers. However, progress on policy changes have stalled and ZAMACE has remained inactive since 2011 in the absence of a legal framework. The CO has found SHF adoption rate to be poor through ZAMACE.

Management of logistics and supply chain challenges

121. As mentioned above, the efficiency and effectiveness of the SF was significantly affected by the lack of a dedicated national SF budget. A series of cascading effects occurred as a result, including the late payment of transportation invoices, with subsequent delayed food distribution, and the inability to pay for adequate food storage warehouses. WFP had no control over these issues as the districts were tasked to handle them. Zambia’s geography and transport infrastructure also delayed food delivery, and particularly during rainy seasons, and in instances food was transported over long distances between schools and central distribution points (e.g. in Kazungula there is a zone that is over 250 km from the district office and food is delivered by rail). These challenges were noted in several reports and confirmed during the evaluation mission at the district and provincial levels.

122. However, there seems to be a positive trend in finding solutions, and these difficulties had relatively minimal impacts on the SF outcomes. While WFP does not have primary responsible for the final delivery of the food to the schools, the WFP-paid field coordinators are working with the local government to find solutions for the numerous problems. Additional assessments are needed to determine the wisest combination of mitigation strategies to resolve these issues. This could include building infrastructure for food storage and diversifying the transfer modality to include a social-cash transfer scheme.

Summary: Factors Affecting Results

Internal: Adroit decision-making in the CO kept the CP relevant to the improving economic and food production context in Zambia. Possessing and being able to draw upon high-quality technical expertise helped it to achieve results in all three components and allowed it to compensate for missed direct food delivery targets with support to the implementation and policy framework of the government-led safety net measures. Working in support of a government-led initiative is a factor in the success WFP has achieved through technical assistance, but the lack of a coherent M&E system to cover its whole operations has stymied it from articulating these successes and means its decision-making is not fully capitalising on the usable and useful information.

External: Decline in multilateral and bilateral donor contributions for food based programmes has posed a serious threat to the CP since its inception in 2011. It necessitated the shift away from food distribution activities under Component 2 and contributed to the reduced funding and inadequate quantities of pulses and for SF. Government enthusiasm for social protection and an emerging interest in nutrition in Zambia has created the space for WFP to support these agendas, and the CO has played a role in furthering them. In some areas where the CO is providing technical assistance WFP has fallen short of targets because of a capacity deficit in the recipient to receive such support – particularly noticeable in the targets for number of women trained under the DRM – or because external policies and systems are not robust enough to allow WFP to carry out its intentions.
3. Conclusions and Recommendations

This section is divided into an overall assessment and conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations.

3.1 Overall Assessment

Table 9: Overall Assessment of CP 200157 against the Key Evaluation Questions

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>Relevance</th>
<th>Effectiveness</th>
<th>Efficiency</th>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>Gender</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>Medium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Food and nutrition for vulnerable groups(^{73})</td>
<td>Medium to high</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>N/A</td>
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<td>DRM</td>
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<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>P4P</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Operation</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
<td>Low to medium</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Overall integration of activities: Medium

### Appropriateness

Across all components, the ET found good alignment with government priorities and policies, WFP and UNDAF strategies, and no duplication with other partners’ work was found. The components and activities are appropriate to the needs in Zambia, and the shift to greater technical assistance has helped the CO stay relevant as the requirement for food distribution decreased. Where WFP had to scale-down activities designed to meet the needs of other vulnerable groups, it was done with the understanding that the national social protection system would cater to these people. The SF and P4P activities were good, complementary activities for the communities where they were integrated in the HGSF. DRM is appropriate for Zambia, where the food security of the poorest is hit the hardest by disasters, and

\(^{73}\) The rating for this component is based on what was implemented, and not what was designed, given that the implemented activities were significantly different to the planned activities.
WFP’s focus on information systems is well placed given the relatively low-level disaster threat.

**Efficiency**

125. The overall efficiency of the operation is given a low rating mainly because of the continuous resource shortfall that the CO experienced since inception of the CP. Efforts were thus expended on finding alternative funding and modes of working. Nevertheless, the measures taken were generally moves to greater efficiency: for the school feeding programme WFP eliminated the overhead costs of running satellite offices by placing field coordinators directly at the Provincial level to help build the capacity of government partners at District Education Board offices.

**Effectiveness**

126. For the most part, the CO achieved targets as planned, with the exception of Component 2, and the adaptations in the operations have allowed it to make good achievements towards three of its four overall objectives. The exception - ‘Number of targeted households that rely on negative coping mechanisms decreased by 80%’ – can best be evaluated when WFP’s support to the social protection system is operationalised fully.

127. The ET confirmed that school feeding was an effective approach to improve enrolment, attendance and dropout rates, and that P4P was also appropriate to increase local production. Over the three years of SF implementation, attendance remained constant and the proportion of pupils dropping-out slightly decreased from 2.29 to 2.0 percent in the targeted districts. The DRM component has been effective in generating a number of useful outputs that have improved the information systems used by the DMMU.

128. For P4P, it has been difficult to judge the level of effectiveness against indicators set in the P4P global log-frame. Achievement on the procurement targets and SHF participation targets set in the Country Implementation Plan (CIP) was diluted by the adjustment in implementation approach occurring as a response to a change on the demand side of WFP’s portfolio and due to the closing of the CEX as an option for procurement. This resulted in a change in commodity focus and reduced the volumes WFP could purchase; however, the overall P4P design and targets were not modified accordingly.

**Sustainability**

129. The transition to technical assistance is making the CP more sustainable, but there is a lack of exit strategies and phase-out plans, and there a risk that WFP becomes relied on as a ‘doer’ rather than a capacity builder. Its largest engagement, the SF, would require explicit financial commitments from relevant line ministries and, ideally, the incorporation of a community-based system before it could be handed fully over to the government.

**Gender**

130. The intention of achieving gender-specific outcomes was positively integrated into the CO operation and P4P, but insufficiently measured and monitored in the absence of a WFP country level gender strategy. Most stakeholders acknowledged the need to better monitor gender equity issues. In the future, the CO could benefit from a better system to keep track of its progress and that of its partners on mainstreaming gender into their activities.
3.2. Key Lessons for the future

131. WFP’s image as a food aid agency limits its fundraising efforts as donors are now averse to funding food aid - a position that is likely to continue in the future unless a major disaster seriously impacts food production in the country. However, WFP is recognised by other sector actors in Zambia as having specialist technical skills beyond food aid, and all donors recognise the existing needs in Zambia, which are still in the areas of food security, and support for key vulnerable groups similar WFP’s target areas, and increasingly in nutrition. This suggests that the CO’s needs to consolidate its ‘image’ to capture its capabilities in social protection, nutrition, livelihoods support, and mobile tracking technologies (along with its other comparative advantages in logistics, quick response, and convening power) and re-market these.

132. Taking the lead role among the United Nations agencies to pilot mobile technologies that help to strengthen reporting systems has been a very positive experience that has given WFP credibility as an expert in this area. WFP should assess the need for other areas of government operations that may benefit from MDT technology. Once the mobile reporting system for the SF is in place WFP should support scale-up in the remaining SF districts using a phased plan that captures lessons on the enabling environments for encouraging the adoption and sustainability of the tools.

133. Diversifying partnership is critical to fundraising, and the traction that WFP has gained with the private sector should be capitalized on as a new model for attracting funding for innovative nutrition solutions in Zambia. The lessons learned regarding partnership from the Milk for School and P4P pilot projects provide good starting points for the next CP. Partnerships built over the coming years with larger, independently funded specialised agencies would help P4P to expand its geographical coverage and increase the volume of produce available for purchase, decreasing the financial burden on WFP and allowing it to focus on market development, procurement, and policy aspects.

134. Both the implementation of the P4P pilot and the way it is housed within the CO’s operations have generated many lessons for P4P’s future in Zambia. WFP has performed well in exploring different modalities to support SHFs, and its FO graduation strategy will help FOs progress towards participation in WFP competitive tendering and to identify training requirements. However, venturing into capacity building on the supply side may be stretching its current capacity too far in terms of staff numbers and their agriculture skills base. WFP’s role as a participant or a facilitator will vary from site to site depending on the extent to which local markets are established, but market analysis of each site, ideally conducted through partnerships, is fundamentally important to identify bottlenecks for market development.74

74 This remains an important unaddressed recommendation from the mid-term evaluation of the global P4P pilot
Local procurement of food under HGSF would provide solutions to transportation issues, reducing cost and minimize storage needs, helping to ensure timely delivery and enhancing local ownership. It would also help to integrate P4P into the CP core activities, which needs to be accompanied by a more inclusive M&E system.

3.3 Recommendations

Whilst it is not certain that parts of Zambia would never need food distribution again, now is an opportune time to support the government so that it can cover such events and, more importantly, to bolster longer-term initiatives, such as the social safety programme, nutrition sensitive policies and programming, and building disaster resilience, designed to meet the needs of those that remain food insecure. Overall, the ET recommends that the CO continue on its current transition to providing a technical assistance role in these areas. The CO has clear comparative advantages in knowledge sharing, and its convening power and strategic partnerships in disaster risk management, P4P, school feeding, and nutrition are already widely appreciated by external stakeholders in Zambia. Specific strategic and operational recommendations are prioritised as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Priority Level</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>High priority</td>
<td>Concentrated focus in relevant technical assistance areas.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Medium priority</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Low priority</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

1. **Concentrated focus in relevant technical assistance areas.** The ongoing UN Country Team-led contextual assessment being prepared for the next UNDAF is the most pressing opportunity for the CO to define a relevant role for itself in Zambia’s future. WFP would be most influential in explaining the food and nutrition needs that persist despite the country’s high food production and Lower Middle Income Country status. As soon as possible the CO should 1) commission a situation analysis for the groups with whom it traditionally works and 2) perform an institutional assessment of the policies and programmes (and the capacities of those delivering them) designed to meet food and nutrition needs of these people. By performing a gap analysis between the two, the CO could define in a strategy what WFP wants to achieve through technical assistance in Zambia, and it would help the CO to articulate what it does and why to donors. The analysis would define when WFP’s TA support should end, which could be used to design much-needed exit plan, and, if a strategy for TA were matched with a flexible operational plan, it may reduce the costs of its operations.
Strategic Social Protection

2. Social protection is a high-priority area in Zambia and is reaching beneficiary groups within WFP’s remit. Furthermore, it is clearly an area where WFP is filling a gap not covered by others. The CO should, for the next 18 months, support the current government priorities in social protection and nutrition through the following:

   a. Provide TA to advance the finalisation of the SF and SP policy documents.

   b. The CO should use its convening power to make functional the multi-stakeholder secretariat and to provide TA to the government in convincing the line ministries to commit to a national budget for SF. A specific advocacy strategy might be necessary to help the ministries understand the importance of their investment.

   c. For the remainder of the CP the CO should maintain the existing collaboration with the MCDMCH to support the rollout of the new social cash transfer system. To determine whether there is a greater use for the this sort of technical support, WFP Zambia should explore 1) whether and where else MDT would help the government become effective and efficient in improving the food and nutrition needs, and, if the need is established; 2) draw specific lessons across its MDT experience to create a niche in system strengthening. The CO could explore this over the next six months and in the next year consult widely on how this expertise could be integrated better into the next country programme.

   d. Making use of its existing multi-sectoral relationships, the CO should position itself as the lead in engaging the private sector as part of the multi-stakeholder agenda to combat malnutrition in Zambia. The proposed Nutrition Commercialization Strategy to identify nutrition business models (e.g. SF, bio-fortification) is a promising niche for the CP and would attract donors interested in wide-reaching approach for addressing malnutrition. The ET feels that the CO is well positioned for this type of activity since it has a voice in the high level discussions on the current nutrition in Zambia.

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75 The Brazil model offers a good reference point for of social protection because of the wide range of social interventions that the (Brazilian) Ministry of Social Development is using to fight poverty and hunger. The CO has already acknowledged this and has made an exchange visits and subsequent action plan to learn the lessons. The MCDMCH could benefit from additional technical support from the CO which could help articulate specific programmes to address poverty and food insecurity of vulnerable groups.
Home Grown School Feeding

3. **Finalise exit plan and decentralize implementation.** For the remainder of the current CP WFP should finalise the development of its phase out plan for the SF, and do so in consultation with the government and all relevant stakeholders so that implementation of the plan can begin shortly after this CP. While the MESVTEE should take the policy lead, WFP should promote a decentralized implementation system for the HGSF at the province and district levels so that the District Education Boards are given the flexibility to manage the logistics of local distribution more efficiently.

4. **Support scale up; use pulse procurement.** For the HGSF’s scale-up plan WFP should play an advisory role and provide technical assistance for expanding school feeding to the remaining geographical locations. WFP should start establishing the market linkages now but use direct involvement in the procurement of pulses until the linkages are established, and then gradually withdraw for full takeover by the government towards the mid-point of the next CP.

**Food security and nutrition**

5. **Build a national expertise pool in nutrition.** To help generate better understanding of nutrition in Zambia the CO should, over the course of the next CP, help build a new cadre of national nutritionists who will disseminate ideas and build the capacity of the government. The CO should work through national universities that train nutritionists, and upgrade their nutrition curricula by introducing cutting-edge interventions. It could also facilitate exchange visits for experienced Zambian nutritionists with countries modelling successful nutrition programmes. Scoping work for this could begin within the remainder of this CP, and the relationships built would be useful for building momentum behind the SUN movement.

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The phase out plan should comprise of a budget and a detailed work plan that provides quantification, monitoring, and a summation of agency-specific milestone achievements. The plan should identify who will assess district readiness for complete takeover and who will provide reinforcement support for non-ready entities; readiness criteria should be developed together with the District Education Board and their Planning Officers.

The nutritionists would gain practical experience that they could bring back to Zambia with the stipulation of committing at least three years at the MCDMCH (national and district levels) and train junior staff.
Disaster Risk Management

6. **Expand resiliency building initiatives.** WFP should repurpose its DRM work towards building resilience to disaster, thus providing a strong message within Zambia that resilience is a desirable goal. This would capitalise on the start already made by the CO, and if successful would bring benefits, such as livelihood and gender-related improvements, beyond disaster preparedness. The CO’s plans to implement the Rural Resilience Initiative ‘R4’ in Zambia could yield these benefits, and, because of their pre-disaster and farmer-oriented approach, have the potential to be linked to the P4P. New initiatives, such as the CAPRO are already demonstrating to the government what is possible, and are assisting the DMMU move in two essential directions: from response, or ‘reaction’, to resilience building, and from coordination to implementation. The CO should aim by the end of the next CP to helping the DMMU cover the most disaster affected areas in Zambia with resiliency projects, and by that stage they should be DMMU-led.

7. **Strengthen district and satellite structures.** WFP should help the DMMU to strengthen the basic institutional set-up of the district and satellite structures. Certain need-areas highlighted are: member retention (particularly trained members); disenfranchisement from the provincial and national level; inadequate and underused reporting structures, and; funding for basic equipment. Strengthening these components would not only be of direct value to the DMMU, but would enable these districts and communities to better apply specific DRM-related interventions from WFP and others in the future. There is an opportunity to do this as part of the CAPRO and the forthcoming R4 programme; however, results will not be achieved quickly, and therefore it should be focus area for the entire duration of the next CP.

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*R4 is a strategic partnership of WFP and Oxfam America. The name refers to the integrated risk management strategies it pursues: resource management (risk reduction, DRR asset building), weather index insurance (risk transfer), risk reserves (micro savings) and microcredit (prudent risk taking). Although an attractive proposition, there are lessons to be learned from the initiative in Ethiopia and Senegal, and the CO would benefit from an extensive review of the implementation of the project in East Africa before implementing. Particular attention needs to be paid to the SHF’s understanding of insurance mechanisms and the decision making powers that women have in determining their engagement with the finance components especially. In doing so, WFP would be utilizing its uniquely strong connection with the DMMU, although it should acknowledge that systemic factors contribute to limitations at the lower levels.*
8. **Integration of all activities.** In light of the P4P, and the early promising results of the pilots to strengthen HGSF and social cash transfer systems, WFP should define a way to incorporate lessons learned from all its activities into its M&E system. This would give it better decision making powers and allow it to better demonstrate to donors its relevance and successes. Now is an opportune time as the system is currently being revised. The new mobile technology system should allow straightforward determination of performance against tangible targets using both processes and outcomes indicators. The P4P should be integrated into the next CP together with an M&E framework that facilitates simultaneous follow-up both on the demand and the supply side.

9. **Clarify and adapt framework. Enhance collaborative synergies.** The guiding P4P design (including the log-frame) is very broad and lacks clarity in its conceptual framework particularly with regards to changes on the demand-side of WFP operations. As the P4P is brought further into a future CP, adaptation of the P4P design and M&E system is needed to reflect the activities WFP Zambia can realistically undertake based on its comparative advantage: the skills available in-house and its demand platform. Based on this it can identify where partnerships (ideally with independent funding) are needed. The ET feels that the highest need areas are on supply-side and in market analysis. WFP should now augment its collaboration with the other Rome Based Agencies, taking their comparative advantages to scale to bring greater efficiency and community impact. Over the next 18 months WFP should relinquish production aspects to these independently funded partners and focus on its core strengths.

10. **Develop the export potential of pulses.** The CO should use the P4P pilot and its history of maize export to exploit the possibilities of exporting pulses to WFP’s food baskets in Southern and Eastern Africa. This would be a medium-term measure as there are insufficient quantities currently produced in Zambia, but assistance given to SHF to develop this production capacity would be beneficial for improving livelihoods within the security of a guaranteed market. Purchase through the CEX and established traders has proved to offer the greatest possibility for large volumes to be purchased, but further exploration on how to link WFP’s small-scale intermediary partners to competitive trading systems is required. Exporting from a country where WFP continues to work towards food security may raise questions about conflicting priorities, but the CO should market it as a step towards promoting inclusive growth, and Zambia could become a case-study for WFP’s transition out of food assistance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronyms</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADRA</td>
<td>Adventist Development and Relief Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AERC</td>
<td>African Economic Research Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALNAP</td>
<td>Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action</td>
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<tr>
<td>ART</td>
<td>Anti-retroviral therapy</td>
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<tr>
<td>BR</td>
<td>Budget Revision</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAADP</td>
<td>Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPRO</td>
<td>Capabilities Partnership Programme</td>
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<td>CASU</td>
<td>Conservation Agricultural Scale Up</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CEX</td>
<td>Commodity exchange</td>
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<td>CIP</td>
<td>Country Implementation Plan</td>
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<td>CO</td>
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<td>CP</td>
<td>Country programme</td>
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<td>CSB</td>
<td>Corn-soya blend</td>
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<td>DAC</td>
<td>Development Assistance Committee</td>
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<td>DEBS</td>
<td>District Education Board secretary</td>
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<td>DMMU</td>
<td>Disaster Management and Mitigation Unit</td>
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<td>DMR</td>
<td>Disaster Management and Response</td>
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<td>DRR</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Reduction</td>
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<td>DSC</td>
<td>Direct Support Costs</td>
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<td>EB</td>
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<td>Emerging Donor Matching Fund</td>
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<td>EM</td>
<td>Evaluation Manager</td>
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<td>EQAS</td>
<td>Evaluation Quality Assurance System</td>
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<td>ER</td>
<td>Evaluation Report</td>
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<td>ET</td>
<td>Evaluation Team</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>FAOSTAT</td>
<td>Food and Agriculture Statistics</td>
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<td>FISRI</td>
<td>Farmer Inputs Support Response Initiative</td>
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<td>FNNDP</td>
<td>Fifth National Development Plan</td>
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<td>FLA</td>
<td>Field Level Agreement</td>
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<td>FO</td>
<td>Farmer Organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRA</td>
<td>Food Reserve Agency</td>
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GDP  Gross domestic product
GIS  Geographic Information System
GPRA  Gender Participatory Risk Analysis
GPS  Global Positioning System
GRZ  Government Republic of Zambia
HEPS  High Energy Protein Supplement
HGSF  Home-Grown School Feeding (programme)
HIV/AIDS  Human immunodeficiency virus infection / Acquired immunodeficiency syndrome
IFAD  International Fund for Agricultural Development
IP  Inception Package
ISC  Indirect Support Costs
KADI  Kasamanda Agri-business Development Initiative
KDFA  Kawambwa District Farmers Association
LBW  Low birth weight
LMIC  Lower-middle income country
LTA  Long-Term Agreement
LTSH  Logistics, transport, shipping and handling
MAL  Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock
MCHN  Mother-and-child health and nutrition
MDG  Millennium Development Goals
MDT  Mobile delivery and tracking
M&E  Monitoring and Evaluation
MESVTEE  Ministry of Education
MoH  Ministry of Health
MOU  Memorandum of understanding
Mt  Metric Ton
NFNC  National Food and Nutrition Commission
NGO  Non-governmental organisation
NWK  Network Agri-Service (formerly Dunavant)
ODOC  Other Direct Operational Costs
OEV  Office of Evaluation (WFP)
OpEv  Operation Evaluation
P4P  Purchase for Progress
PDS  Planetary Data System
PRA  Participatory Rural Appraisal
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>Protracted Relief and Rehabilitation Operation</td>
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<td>RB</td>
<td>Regional Bureau (WFP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>RBA</td>
<td>Rome Based Agencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>REACH</td>
<td>Renewed Efforts Against Child Hunger</td>
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<td>SADC</td>
<td>Southern Africa Development Community</td>
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<td>SAPP</td>
<td>Smallholder Agri-business Promotion Programme</td>
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<td>SCN</td>
<td>Standing Committee on Nutrition</td>
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<td>SCT</td>
<td>Social Cash Transfer</td>
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<td>SDMC</td>
<td>Satellite Disaster Management Committee</td>
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<td>SF</td>
<td>School feeding</td>
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<td>SHFs</td>
<td>Smallholder farmers</td>
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<td>SHN</td>
<td>School Health Nutrition</td>
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<td>SNDP</td>
<td>Sixth National Development Plan</td>
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<td>SPR</td>
<td>Standard Project Report</td>
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<td>SRF</td>
<td>Strategic Results Framework</td>
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<td>Small Scale Farmers</td>
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<td>Scale Up Nutrition</td>
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<td>TA</td>
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<td>TOR</td>
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<td>UNAIDS</td>
<td>Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
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<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
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<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
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<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>Vulnerability Assessment Mapping</td>
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<td>VGF</td>
<td>Vulnerable Group Feeding</td>
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<td>WEAT</td>
<td>Women Empowerment through Animal Traction</td>
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<td>World Food Programme</td>
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<td>World Health Organization</td>
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<td>ZAMACE</td>
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