United Republic of Tanzania: an evaluation of WFP’s Portfolio (2011–2014)

Context

The United Republic of Tanzania is a low-income country and one of the United Nations’ pilot Delivering as One countries. During the evaluation period, the food security situation improved, but food security gains did not match the country’s economic growth (6.0% growth between 2004 and 2012).

Poverty and livelihood insecurity still remain severe. According to recent government statistics, 33% of the rural population and 24.5% of female headed households live below the poverty line. WFP's 2012 CFSVA shows that 730,000 (8.3%) of Tanzania’s households are food-insecure. Conflicts in neighbouring countries have also resulted in periodic influxes of refugees from Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Rwanda.

The Government rapidly developed safety net systems as part of a broader social protection strategy and, as a result, there was less need for direct food assistance from WFP.

WFP Strategy and Portfolio in Tanzania

WFP’s 2011–2015 Country Strategy (extended to 2016) identified three priorities for the period: emergency humanitarian action; food security and nutrition support; and community investments in food security support. Two key features of the strategy can be seen as design assumptions. One was the emphasis on programmatic integration across activities and on geographic focus, achieving, inter alia, “concentrated and integrated programmes and hunger solutions”. The other was the ultimate objective, shown in the strategic framework, of “hand-over to government and partners”.

Guided by the CS, the portfolio under review comprised three Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRROs) and one Country Programme (CP). Its main components comprised food assistance for assets (FFA), school feeding (SF), blanket supplementary feeding and targeted supplementary feeding to support mother-and-child health and nutrition (MCHN), emergency relief (with general food distribution, GFD) and support to HIV/AIDS clients. Cash modalities were piloted in 2012 (Mtwara Region) to promote MCHN interventions through the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF).

About 167.6 million USD were resourced (57%) of the total planned budget of 293.3 million USD. PRROs were funded up to 77% while there was more uneven funding for the country programme (CP), funded at 42%. From 2009, there was a Purchase for Progress (P4P) pilot programme supported through a trust fund (3.5 million USD).

Objectives and Scope of the Evaluation

Tanzania’s country portfolio evaluation (CPE) covered the period 2011–2014. Focusing on the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole, the evaluation assessed: i) the alignment and strategic positioning of WFP’s Country Strategy and Portfolio; ii) the factors and quality of strategic decision-making; and iii) the performance and results of the WFP portfolio.

Key Findings

Alignment and Strategic Positioning

WFP contribution to integrated national approaches and thus to ending hunger and food insecurity is seen as only modest. The food assistance to refugees was operationally relevant, making a direct contribution to addressing food insecurity. The SF, FFA and nutrition activities in the rest of the portfolio were operationally relevant too, being targeted on the more food insecure areas of the country. The operational relevance of the P4P activity was less direct, as participants were (as intended) not the poorest in the community and it was not restricted to the most food insecure areas.

However, although the CS and the CP were aligned with national policies and strategies, the portfolio did not develop the deeper integration required for full strategic relevance. With the exception of vulnerability analysis and mapping (VAM) and P4P, there was no clarity about sustainability or hand-over of activities.

The evaluation found that WFP engaged constructively in the nutrition agenda, and in VAM work with significant capacity development among participating government agencies as well as through the P4P experience and with the UN DAO process. Yet, the operational synergy of P4P and UN DAO were hardly evident.

Despite early policy and programmatic collaboration in SF, WFP and the Government of Tanzania had drifted apart by the end of the evaluation period. At the same time, Tanzania was moving ahead with an integrated social protection strategy and framework. While WFP interacted with TASAF, it did not engage with policy development, or orientate its potential for technical assistance in this field, as thoroughly as might have been expected.

Factors Driving WFP’s Strategic Decision-Making

The portfolio outlined in the Country Strategy was based on sound analysis, but its design and implementation was dominated by funding and operational priorities. Many decisions were taken from year to year and the ultimate strategy of turning a crisis into an opportunity was not effectively put in place.

Decisions on logistics and humanitarian action to support refugees resulted in effective assistance. WFP’s activity monitoring was generally adequate; some learning and adaptation from the data collected was found though less consistent. While the WFP’s cash transfer pilot project demonstrated the feasibility and effectiveness of cash transfers, WFP Tanzania did not do sufficient analysis in the period evaluated to reach a conclusion. Instead it assumed vouchers were more appropriate than cash transfers.

There is no evidence of substantive analysis of gender issues in the CS or operation design, nor of any overarching gender strategy in the portfolio. However, at operational level, some changes were introduced such as the registration of women as
the recipients of food rations at the refugee camp.

**Portfolio Performance and Results**

Overall, WFP's results in the non-refugee sectors were significantly affected by funding constraints, although the shortfall of beneficiaries reached was proportionally less than the reduction in food assistance.

**Food assistance to refugees** was effective with good integration achieved between the partners in the camp. The 2014 nutrition survey shows decreasing GAM rates (2.6% in 2010 to 1.4% in 2014), and stunting rates from 48 to 40.7%.

**School feeding** reached 629,000 in 2011 against 477,000 children in 2014. The proportion of planned children receiving school meals declined from 96% in 2011 to 65% in 2014, and school feeding days declined from 100% of the number planned in 2011 to 82% in 2013. They were again below plan in 2014, but reports do not state how much. The coverage was also influenced by declining enrolment rates. The prospect for sustainable results had deteriorated by the end of the review period as policy dialogue with the Government had virtually ceased, without effective handover.

**Nutrition activities** were effective for individual beneficiaries but they were carried out on a very small scale. Other factors also contributed to the reduced number of beneficiaries below targets, such as late roll-out and changes in admission criteria.

Although FFA activities achieved a satisfactory technical standard and were effective in addressing food insecurity (about 600,000 beneficiaries representing 27% of chronically food-insecure people in eight regions), they had only a limited effect on beneficiaries' resilience to livelihood shocks and stresses.

**P4P** was effective in strengthening the participation of smallholder farmers—albeit not the poorest ones—in national agricultural markets and efforts were made to build a sustainable institutional framework. In 2014, P4P worked with 28 farmers' organizations in 10 districts, representing about 18,000 farmers.

During the evaluation period, there were substantial achievements in VAM capacity development and it was considered one of WFP's comparative advantages.

At operational level, WFP contributed to reinforcing women's participation and leadership in the refugee camp and to reducing gender gaps in other sectors. However, the portfolio lacked adequate resources to achieve more meaningful implementation of the Gender policy.

**Conclusions and Recommendations**

**Overall Assessment**

Outside generally effective support to refugees and logistics capacity to neighbouring countries, the portfolio was constrained by funding. Overall, it was characterised by technical competence but strategic drift. The integration and mode of handover envisaged by the CS were not achieved.

Largely but not entirely due to funding shortages, the integrated, district-wide approach was not effective, and activities turned into the “silos” that their design had sought to avoid. Yet, the P4P pilot and activities to support refugees showed evidence of synergy and multiplier effects.

Good progress was achieved in improving operational and logistics, largely avoiding pipeline breaks and cutting costs through attention to detail on numerous fronts as well as enhanced logistics strategy (direct support costs were cut by 18 per cent in 2013 and by a further 21 per cent in 2014). However, spatial efficiency/geographic concentration and—outside the refugee sector—institutional efficiency/collaboration with partners were inadequate. There was no evidence that UN DAO enhanced efficiency.

The portfolio achieved a degree of operational effectiveness. Nonetheless, WFP did not engage adequately with the strategic content and direction of national approaches to food and livelihood insecurity, and the sustainability of the portfolio's results was thus limited. While exit was forced on WFP in some circumstances, handover was not effectively achieved—except in the P4P pilot.

**Recommendations**

**Recommendation 1.** The CO should redefine and restructure any future food assistance—outside humanitarian food assistance and the P4P agricultural marketing initiative—within the national social protection framework.

**Recommendation 2.** The CO should apply as much flexibility as possible in the design, resourcing and management of any further programme of food assistance so that it becomes a tool for creative, proactive support to the Government. To enable this, WFP should explore how to maximize the delegation of authority for budget adjustments and the use of programme funds; and 2016 should be a transitional year and be programmed accordingly.

**Recommendation 3.** WFP should shift from operations to advice in its food-assistance work, and focus on operational services (including procurement and logistics), technical assistance (notably on cash and voucher transfers and social protection); and transfers of food only in refugee emergencies and other crises that the Government cannot handle alone.

**Recommendation 4.** The CO should ensure that any future support to refugees is based on reappraisal and justification of WFP’s role and comparative advantage in medium- and long-term food assistance, maintaining front line emergency assistance to refugees and the provision of any supplementary feeding (for example to pregnant and lactating and young children) that no other agency is better equipped to supply.

**Recommendation 5.** The CO should work to optimize the value of Delivering as One and WFP should undertake a corporate review of its experience with Delivering as One to clarify its corporate position and responsibilities at different levels.

**Recommendation 6.** The CO should ensure that in its future food assistance advisory services it specifies how WFP’s Gender Policy (2015–2020) will be implemented in each activity, and should prioritize the resourcing of Gender Policy implementation.

Reference:
Full and summary reports of the evaluation and the Management Response are available at www.wfp.org/evaluation. For more information please contact the Office of Evaluation WFP.evaluation@WFP.org