

# OPERATION EVALUATION

## UKRAINE – EMOP 200765 Emergency Assistance to Civilians affected by the conflict in Eastern Ukraine

November 2014 – December 2015

### Final Report

April 2016

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Commissioned by the  
**WFP Office of Evaluation**

Report number: OEV/2015/015

## **Acknowledgements**

The Evaluation Team sincerely thanks the WFP Ukraine Country and Field Offices for the efficient facilitation of the evaluation process. The staff generously afforded their time to support the team with excellent planning and logistics and to provide relevant information.

Our gratitude also goes to all stakeholders (the Ukrainian authorities, the donor community, the World Food Programme staff and those from other United Nations agencies, the operating partners and other non-governmental organizations, the beneficiaries and civil society), who dedicated their time to participate in informative discussions and contributed significantly to the findings of the evaluation.

*Alison Gardner, John Prout and Valeriy Danylin*

## **Disclaimer**

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## Operational Fact Sheet

OPERATION			
<b>Type/Number/ Title</b>	Ukraine EMOP 200765 – Emergency Assistance to Civilians Affected by the Conflict in Eastern Ukraine (November 2014 – December 2015)		
<b>Approval</b>	The operation was approved by the Executive Director of WFP and the Director General of FAO on 10 November 2014		
<b>Amendments<sup>1</sup></b>	<p>There have been two amendments to the initial project document.</p> <p><b>1) Budget Revision 01 (May 2015):</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project extended by two months, from 1 May to 30 June 2015;</li> <li>• Increase in the food requirements from 878 Mt to 2,372 Mt to provide in-kind food assistance through Immediate Response Rations (IRR) for additional 68,000 beneficiaries;</li> <li>• Increase the level of other direct operational costs (ODOC) to enable WFP to expand its operations in Non-Government Controlled Areas (NGCA).</li> </ul> <p><b>2) Budget Revision 02 (June 2015):</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Project extended by six months, from 1 July to 31 December 2015;</li> <li>• Increase in the overall food requirements from 2,372 Mt to 12,989 Mt allowing WFP to expand its food assistance in non-Government controlled areas (NGCA), where over 80 percent of the food insecure beneficiaries are located and where market-based transfers are not currently feasible;</li> <li>• Increase the overall number of beneficiaries from 188,000 to 575,000 given a deterioration of the food security situation, especially in NGCA;</li> <li>• Introduce support to beneficiaries in the formerly state-financed social institutions in NGCA;</li> <li>• Introduce a nutrition intervention to target children aged 6-23 months, identified by the nutrition cluster as most at risk;<sup>2</sup></li> <li>• Continue to support internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Government controlled areas (GCA) through cash-based transfers (CBT) (using cash and vouchers) (increased by 60,000 to 140,000);</li> <li>• Adjust other direct operational cost (ODOC) and direct supporting costs (DSC) to accommodate cost foreseen with the implementation and ensure rapid scale-up and extended presence.</li> </ul>		
<b>Duration</b>	<table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> <u>Initial:</u> 03 Nov 2014 to 30 April 2015                 </td> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> <u>Revised:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BR 01: Extended from 01 May 2015 to 30 June 2015</li> <li>• BR 02: Extended from 01 July 2015 to 31 December 2015</li> </ul> </td> </tr> </table>	<u>Initial:</u> 03 Nov 2014 to 30 April 2015	<u>Revised:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BR 01: Extended from 01 May 2015 to 30 June 2015</li> <li>• BR 02: Extended from 01 July 2015 to 31 December 2015</li> </ul>
<u>Initial:</u> 03 Nov 2014 to 30 April 2015	<u>Revised:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BR 01: Extended from 01 May 2015 to 30 June 2015</li> <li>• BR 02: Extended from 01 July 2015 to 31 December 2015</li> </ul>		
<b>Planned beneficiaries</b>	<table border="0" style="width: 100%;"> <tr> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> <u>Initial:</u> 120,000                 </td> <td style="width: 50%; vertical-align: top;"> <u>Revised:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BR 01: 188,000 (+ 68,000)</li> <li>• BR 02: 575,000 (+ 387,000)</li> </ul> </td> </tr> </table>	<u>Initial:</u> 120,000	<u>Revised:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BR 01: 188,000 (+ 68,000)</li> <li>• BR 02: 575,000 (+ 387,000)</li> </ul>
<u>Initial:</u> 120,000	<u>Revised:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• BR 01: 188,000 (+ 68,000)</li> <li>• BR 02: 575,000 (+ 387,000)</li> </ul>		

<sup>1</sup> BR 03 came into effect on 01 January 2016, extending the operation to 30 June 2016, increasing the overall cost to US\$91,913,123 and targeting 267,000 food insecure beneficiaries.

<sup>2</sup> As agreed with the members of the Nutrition Sub-Cluster (UNICEF, RAF and other partners) WFP will target 20,000 children with complementary food assistance (locally-purchased) for a period of six months to prevent a further deterioration of their nutrition status.



### OPERATION (continued)

<b>Planned food requirements</b>	<u>Initial:</u>	<u>Revised:</u>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In-kind: 878 Mt food commodities</li> <li>Cash-based transfers (CBT): US\$10,800,000</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BR 01: In-kind: 2,372 Mt of food commodities (+ 1,494 Mt);</li> <li>BR 02: In-kind: 12,988 Mt of food commodities (+ 10,616 Mt);</li> <li>BR 02: CBT: US\$14,400,000 (+ US\$3,600,000)</li> </ul>
<b>US\$ requirements</b>	<u>Initial:</u>	<u>Revised:</u>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>US\$17,021,318</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BR 01: US\$21,461,308 (+ US\$4,439,990)</li> <li>BR 02: US\$55,981,054 (+ US\$34,519,746)</li> </ul>

### OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES

Cross-cutting results and indicators			
Gender	Gender equality and empowerment improved		
Partnership	Food assistance interventions coordinated and partnerships developed and maintained		
Protection and Accountability to Affected Populations	WFP assistance delivered and utilized in safe, accountable and dignified conditions		
Contribution to MDG 1	<b>WFP Strategic Objective</b>	<b>Operation specific objectives, outcomes and outputs</b>	<b>Activities</b>
	<b>SO 1: Save lives and Protect Livelihoods in Emergencies</b>	<b>Objective 1:</b> Meet urgent food and nutrition needs of IDPs (returnees, residents in conflict hotspots) while protecting lives and livelihoods to enable safe access to food and nutrition for girls, women, boys and men.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In-kind distributions (food insecure and most vulnerable individuals in NGCA; Immediate response rations (IRR)/contingency; Food insecure individuals in social institutions in NGCA)</li> <li>Nutrition component<sup>6</sup> (6-23 month children)<sup>3</sup></li> <li>Cash-based transfers (CBT) to IDPs in GCA</li> </ul>
		<b>Outcome 1:</b> Stabilized or improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and/or individuals	
		<b>Output:</b> Sufficient food and vouchers distributed in timely manner	


<sup>3</sup> This component is not associated with a nutritional objective of prevention or treatment.

<b>PARTNERS</b>		
<b>Government</b>	Ministry of Social Policy (MoSP); State Emergency Services (SES)	
<b>United Nations</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); UNICEF; UNDP	
<b>NGOs</b>	International Relief and Development (IRD); People in Need (PIN); Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA); Save the Children; Mercy Corps; Rinat Akhmetov Foundation (RAF); International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)	
<b>RESOURCES (INPUTS)</b>		
<p><b>Contributions received as at 31 December 2015:</b></p> <p>US\$31,524,259</p> <p><b>Percentage funded against appeal: 56 %</b></p> <p><b>Top 5 donors:</b>            United States (32 %); Germany (18 %); Russian Federation (16 %); European Commission (8.5 %); Multilateral Funds (6.9 %)</p>	<p><b>Overall Funding Situation (December 2015)</b></p>  <p>■ Shortfall ■ Funded</p>	<p><b>Donors</b></p>  <p>■ United States ■ Germany ■ Russian Federation ■ European Commission ■ Multilateral Funds ■ Other</p>


## Outputs (at design)

### Percentage of beneficiaries by activity (BR2)<sup>4</sup>

#### Planned




#### Actual as of Oct. 2015




### Gender breakdown by modality

#### Planned




#### Actual as of Oct. 2015




<sup>4</sup> For the 'actual' figures presented here, the evaluation team was only able to access data up to the end of October 2015.

### Planned Beneficiaries by activity (BR2)



### Beneficiaries planned vs actual by transfer modality



Source: Planned per BR2, actuals SPR 2014 and 2015 aggregated

## OUTCOMES

		Baseline	Target	Actual
<b>SO1</b>	<b>Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies</b>			
<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Stabilised or improved food consumption over assistance period</b>			
	Food consumption score (poor)	7.0 %	7.0 %	0 %
	Household dietary diversity score (average)	5.1	>5.1	5.6
	Average household coping strategy index reduced / stabilised	20.3	<20.3	4.9
<b>Cross cutting results and indicators</b>				
<b>Gender</b>	Women and men making decisions over the use of food, cash and vouchers within household.	33.0 %	>28.0 %	35.0 %
	Proportion of households where females make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food.	55.0 %	>60 %	63.0 %
	Proportion of households where males make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food.	4.0 %	<12.0 %	10.0 %
<b>Protection</b>	Proportion of assisted people not experiencing safety problems travelling to/from/at WFP programme sites.	99.0 %	80 %	100.0 %
	Proportion of assisted people informed about programme, rations and complaints procedures.	21.0 %	70 %	25.0 %
<b>Partnership</b>	Amount of complementary funds provided to the project by partners	n/a <sup>5</sup>	TBC	0
	Number of partner organizations that provide complementary inputs and services.	1 <sup>6</sup>	≥1	6 <sup>7</sup>
<b>Key observations:</b> <i>Baseline outcome data was derived from averaging pre distribution assessment data. The "Target" and "Actual" data provided comes from the draft SPR 2015 unless otherwise noted.</i>				

<sup>5</sup> Baseline and target valued for the complementary funds were not available to the ET.

<sup>6</sup> Baseline as provided in the SPR 2014 report.

<sup>7</sup> This includes United Nation Agencies, International Organizations and the ICRC.

# Operational Maps

## WFP operational coverage by transfer modality



## WFP offices in Ukraine



## Executive Summary

### Introduction

1. This report presents the findings of the Operation Evaluation of the WFP Ukraine Emergency Operation (EMOP) 200765. It covers the period of the emergency preparedness activity (March–June 2014), the IR- EMOP (August–November 2014) and EMOP 200765 and its two Budget Revisions<sup>8</sup> (BRs) (November 2014–December 2015). This study, timed to ensure that findings can feed into future decisions during the next project document formulation, took place from September 2015–April 2016.

2. The evaluation has two objectives: i) to assess and report on the performance and results; and ii) to draw lessons learned for the future. The principal stakeholders are the WFP Ukraine Country Office (CO) and their partners, the Regional Bureau (RB) and the Office of Evaluation (OEV) in headquarters. The evaluation addresses three principal questions: i) How appropriate is the operation?; ii) What are the results?; and iii) Why and how has the operation produced the results?

3. EMOP 200765 contributes to WFP’s Strategic Objective 1 (SO1)<sup>9</sup> as per the Strategic Results Framework (SRF) 2014-2017. The initial cost of EMOP 200765 was US\$17.02 million, which increased to US\$59.98 million through the first two BRs. The funding level by 31 December 2015 was 56 percent. EMOP activities, as extended under its latest BR3 from 01 January 2016, include a combination of food assistance (in-kind food, vouchers and cash) and in-kind food for social institutions.

4. Ukraine, a country in the Commonwealth of Independent States, is located in Eastern Europe and has an estimated population (2015) of 44.4 million people. It is a lower middle-income country ranked 83<sup>rd</sup> out of 187 countries on the United Nations Development Programme’s Human Development Index. Political unrest and internal conflict over the past few years have contributed to increased food prices, substantial unemployment and, as a result, food insecurity in the conflict-affected areas. At the same time, Ukraine’s economy is undergoing a political and economic crisis resulting in the decline of gross domestic product (GDP), an increase in Government debt and a devaluation of its currency.

### **Key Findings**

#### Appropriateness

5. *Overall:* WFP’s intervention in Ukraine was largely appropriate given the developing and ongoing humanitarian needs and the inability of the authorities to meet them. The RB’s preparedness activities in Ukraine facilitated the early phases of WFP’s response as well as the design of its later emergency interventions. The key goal of WFP’s EMOP was to address Strategic Objective 1. The ET found this objective to be appropriate given the operational context on the ground over the evaluation period.

6. *Needs Assessment and targeting:* Although conducting needs assessments was challenging due to a number of constraints, by the time of the evaluation mission WFP had conducted three assessments and applied the results to inform geographical targeting as well as to support the development and revision of beneficiary targeting criteria. However, some of the indicators measured varied, making it difficult to directly compare findings over time and to identify trends in food security. Geographical targeting approaches varied between the Government controlled (GCA) and non-government

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<sup>8</sup> A third BR came into effect on 01 January 2016, extending the operation to 30 June 2016, increasing the overall cost to US\$91,913,123 and targeting 267,000 food insecure beneficiaries.

<sup>9</sup> WFP’s Strategic Objective 1 - Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies.

controlled areas (NGCA) and WFP's cooperating partners applied targeting criteria differently when selecting beneficiaries.

7. *EMOP Activities:* WFP's use of in-kind food for Immediate Response Rations (IRR) and food parcels was found to be appropriate, as were cash-based transfers (CBT), using both vouchers and cash. Regarding institutional feeding (IF), no current guidance exists making it impossible for the Evaluation Team (ET) to assess its appropriateness, although this intervention did lack a formal assessment process and an exit strategy. The planned intervention for children from six to 23 months, a Baby Food Basket (BFB), was included in BR2 (and in its successor BR3, which is not covered by this evaluation), though implementation was delayed during BR2 (and in fact placed on hold during the BR3 review process in late 2015). The ET concluded that a ration with infant food products tailored to the nutrition needs of infants and young children would be an appropriate intervention in Ukraine.

8. In terms of the food provided, the general food distribution (GFD) ration reduction in September 2015, although merited, did not follow SPHERE protocols and may have been too drastic. The ET concluded that it was a missed opportunity to continue providing a nutritionally adequate ration but also noted that the continued inclusion of iodized salt was positive. The ET questions the nutritional adequacy of the IF ration, although poor information on the availability of other foods made it difficult to conclude.

9. *Choice of different transfer modality options:* Through the evaluation period, WFP expanded the use of both in-kind food and cash-based transfers (CBT), although decisions on choice of modality continue to be based on feasibility and practicality rather than an evidence base of which is more appropriate. WFP's preferred choice of transfer appears to be an electronic voucher, but this position is not supported by any detailed documented analysis of the comparative advantages of vouchers in achieving project objectives and outcomes. The ET concludes that further study is required to demonstrate whether the use of CBT have significant advantages over in-kind food, along with a comparative analysis between vouchers and cash, so that WFP's future choices of transfer modality are supported by a clear evidence base.

10. *Gender and Protection Considerations:* These indicators show some improvement, though the base value was high in Ukraine. In accordance with WFP guidance, the ET found that the CO has integrated gender in needs assessments, and the implementation, monitoring and reporting on food assistance. In turn, this information has informed programme targeting criteria. Nevertheless, further presentation and dissemination of gender and protection disaggregated data is needed. Training on gender and protection for WFP and CP staff has been well integrated in the operation. For other cross-cutting issues, the accountability indicators have improved over the period of the EMOP and are higher than other countries in the same WFP region.

11. *Coherence:* The EMOP is aligned with Ukraine legislation and overall with WFP policy and normative guidance.

12. *Coordination:* The Food Security Cluster (FSC) and Nutrition Sub-Cluster (NSC) structures were found to be underutilized due to intermittent and changing leadership. The FSC, under WFP's co-leadership was found to be addressing this with funded staff included in BR3. The NSC, under UNICEF's leadership, is still struggling to resolve staffing issues. The Cash Working Group (CWG), whose work in coordinating cash interventions and reviewing ways of improving the delivery of CBT in Ukraine, is timely and critical, although its future depends on being adequately funded.

## Results

13. Overall, the results of the operation are good: the IR-EMOP achieved nearly 100 percent of its planned outputs although the later EMOP faced a number of implementation challenges that hampered achievement of its planned outputs, particularly for in-kind food, which reached only 40 percent of planned beneficiaries. The CBT modality (cash and vouchers together) reached 100 percent of the planned caseload. Regarding outcomes, the reported food consumption indicators are, as expected, higher when comparing results pre- and post-food assistance and, at the same time, the use of coping strategies reduced.

### Factors Affecting Results

14. *External Factors:* Positive factors, such as strong beneficiary social networks and a high level of knowledge and commitment amongst local authorities responsible for identifying very vulnerable people were noted. However, several external factors negatively influenced WFP's results, including the Government authorities' lack of understanding of the humanitarian principles, conflict-affected factors including limitations on humanitarian access, Government coordination issues, an underfunded official safety net system, under-resourcing (for WFP) and food import restrictions.

15. *Internal Factors:* A number of internal factors affected WFP's results. On the positive side, a strong monitoring and evaluation (M&E) unit and good support from the RB. More challenging were the lack of WFP in-country presence at the onset of the crisis, insufficient numbers of experienced staff being deployed on time, and other administrative and operational issues, such as the slow accreditation by the Government, that all affected the efficiency of WFP's work. At the HQ level, delays in convening the Internal Review Committee Technical Assistance Group (IRCTAG) delayed decisions and programme implementation for the BFB activity.

### Conclusions

16. The RB's preparedness efforts for a potential response in Eastern Ukraine greatly facilitated the early phase of intervention and laid the groundwork for the design and implementation of EMOP 200765. Given the operating constraints over the evaluation period, both WFP and the individual staff who were deployed to Ukraine performed exceptionally well. With minimal and intermittent staffing, a CO and four area/sub-offices have been established, basic administrative and programme management systems have been put in place and strong relationships developed at national, regional and district levels.

17. WFP's initial choice of transfer modalities appears to be generally appropriate in terms of feasibility and practicality, but needs to be supported by a stronger documented evidence base demonstrating comparative cost efficiency and effectiveness. If more detailed analysis indicates positive advantages of cash over vouchers and/or in-kind food transfers in meeting WFP's food security objectives, coordinated multi-sectoral and/or multi-purpose cash transfers should be considered and WFP is well positioned to take a lead role in this.

18. The security and political situation in eastern Ukraine remains fragile, changes rapidly and varies significantly between the NGCA and conflict-affected areas of the GCA. The general humanitarian response so far has had very short-term horizons. The Government of Ukraine and local authority ownership of the humanitarian response remains weak, as is the coordination between the international community and local authorities.

19. The GFD and IF rations need to be reviewed in light of the findings of low nutritional quality; assessments need to be conducted to inform and improve the rations'

design and complementarity with available foods. Efforts to improve GFD beneficiaries' access to fresh foods are also needed, particularly for the internally displaced beneficiaries. Some of WFP's delay in providing a nutrition intervention is understandable but the process took too long. A nutritionist at the CO level would have helped them develop and implement options to take the BFB forward, and a temporary position still needs to be considered.

20. WFP's outcome monitoring clearly demonstrates short-term impact of food assistance. However, given the way that monitoring information was collected soon after distribution had taken place,<sup>10</sup> there is no way to determine if WFP beneficiaries were better off, what the impact of the assistance in the medium and longer term was, or whether continued assistance is required.

21. The mission concluded that WFP assistance had been required, and provided critical support to beneficiaries at the height of the crisis. It was also clear that longer term needs exist but are largely due to a deepening economic crisis as well as the continuing conflict that could re-escalate at short notice. Programme planning for the future will require a longer-term approach with a focus on recovery and capacity building.

## **Recommendations**

### *Recommendations for WFP Country Office in Ukraine*

**R1. WFP engagement in Ukraine** – Provided the situation continues to stabilise, WFP should continue with their plans to shift from an EMOP to a one year PRRO starting January 2017 as the intended final phase of this intervention. WFP should, with key stakeholders, undertake a strategic review of its potential for involvement in longer term food security issues in Ukraine and start to position itself accordingly, if found to be appropriate.

**R2. Transfer modality choice** – The following issues should be addressed with regard to transfer modality choice and the delivery of CBT:

- An evidence base needs to be created through the application of recent WFP corporate guidance, using systematic analysis of cost efficiency and effectiveness, to monitor the criteria and assumptions used to support the selection of transfer modalities;
- The capacity to review and periodically change between modalities, and/or alter the transfer value for CBT in a timely manner, needs to be strengthened;
- Given the wide use of CBT in WFP's response, as well as those of other organisations, WFP should advocate for and, as appropriate, support the wider humanitarian community in a shift towards coordinated multi-sectoral and/or multi-purpose CBT.

**R3. Coordination** - WFP should continue to play a prominent advocacy role in established coordination mechanisms:

- Food Security Cluster: Measures taken by WFP under BR3 to consolidate and decentralise the FSC to the field should be implemented as soon as possible.
- Cash Working Group: WFP should continue to play a lead role in the CWG.
- Nutrition Sub-Cluster (NSC): WFP needs to strengthen its involvement in the NSC, particularly as it makes plans for deactivation and transfers its responsibilities.

**R4. Nutrition** – WFP should hire a CO nutritionist for six to nine months to strengthen nutrition coordination, address nutrition issues (poor nutritional composition of rations,

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<sup>10</sup> This has been partially addressed as of February 2016 when the M&E unit through its third party monitoring system starting collecting data from former food assistance beneficiaries.

resolve the BFB question), improve nutrition education and build the capacity of a national officer/international staff.

**R5. Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation:**

- WFP's Food Security Assessment reports should more completely disaggregate outcomes by sex, age and geographical areas to promote gender/protection issues through disseminating evidence of high-risk groups. In collaboration with the FSC, eligibility criteria for assistance and harmonisation of approaches between agencies for their application need to be reviewed and strengthened.
- While already meeting WFP's minimum monitoring requirements, more complete disaggregation of outcome indicators by activity and beneficiary groups would allow for better interpretation of results and analysis of the comparative impact of the assistance in different circumstances.<sup>11</sup> As recently initiated (February 2016), indicators should also be measured from two to three months after transfers are completed to better determine the sustainability of outcomes, whether the duration of the assistance was appropriate, and if further assistance is required.

**R6. Institutional Feeding** - Prior to initiating IF in NGCA of Donetsk region as planned, an exit strategy that includes a handover plan to the Government should be developed and a nutrition assessment carried out to design an improved ration. Iodized salt should be added to the ration and the provision of foods in bulk should be considered.

*Recommendations for WFP Corporate Headquarters and the Regional Bureau*

**R7. Staffing** – the Human Resources Division at the corporate level should review its emergency staff deployment policy and take into account the need for consistent staffing with sufficiently experienced international officers.

**R8. Cash-based transfers** – Key areas requiring the attention of the Programme and Policy Divisions are:

- Corporate training on reviewing the appropriateness of transfer modality choices vis-a-vis cost efficiency and effectiveness needs to be strengthened, both at the design and implementation phases of WFP response;
- Clarifying WFP's position with regard to its involvement and role in multi-purpose cash transfers based on a minimum expenditure basket approach, or similar.

**R9. Strengthening the capacities in HQ related to the functioning of the Internal Review Committee Technical Assistance Group (IRCTAG)** and shifting to a more proactive approach is recommended<sup>12</sup> to enable timely responses to new food product reviews.

**R10. The pro-activeness of the RB in planning and implementing a preparatory phase for WFP's operation in Ukraine should be used as an example of good practice** within WFP. As part of the preparation phase, WFP should not just plan for a response but should first assess whether their involvement is appropriate given the context.

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<sup>11</sup> For transfer modalities this was done in 2015 for food versus vouchers, and from the beginning of 2016 a third strata on 'unrestricted cash' was introduced.

<sup>12</sup> The ET has latterly been advised that this process is now underway.

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1. Evaluation Features

1. In the context of renewed corporate emphasis on providing evidence and accountability for results, WFP mandated its Office of Evaluation (OEV) to commission a series of Operation Evaluations (OpEvs) in 2013-2016. From a shortlist of operations meeting these criteria prepared by OEV, the Regional Bureau (RB) selected, in consultation with the Country Office (CO), the Ukraine Emergency Operation (EMOP) 200765 for evaluation.

2. This EMOP evaluation took place from September 2015 to April 2016, with fieldwork in-country in January/February 2016. It covers the period of the emergency preparedness activities (March–June 2014), the Immediate Response (IR)-EMOP (August–November 2014) and the EMOP 200765 and its two initial budget revisions (BRs) (November 2014–December 2015). This evaluation has been timed to ensure that findings can feed into future decisions on the next project document formulation.

3. The two objectives of the evaluation were to assess and report on the performance and results of the operation; and to identify lessons to be learned for the future (see Annex 2: Terms of Reference). The principal stakeholders are the Ukraine CO and their partners, the RB and OEV, as well as the beneficiaries. The main users will be the CO and its partners for decision-making related to implementation and future programme design, the RB for providing strategic guidance and technical support, and OEV in feeding into an annual synthesis of all OpEvs and reflecting upon the evaluation process.

**The evaluation team (ET) used a pragmatic and participative approach combining quantitative (eg. extracting data from the Ukraine CO database) with qualitative methods (including key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs)), coupled with direct observations at project sites (for more details see Annex 3: Evaluation Methodology). The evaluation included nine days of intensive fieldwork across two regions (Oblasts), including Government-controlled areas (GCA), non-government controlled areas (NGCA) and the buffer zone, in seven districts (rayons) and over nine WFP programme sites. The sampling approach employed to select field sites was initially representative and was implemented to the extent possible given the evolving context. Food distribution sites and institutions that received food assistance were visited, and beneficiaries receiving cash, vouchers and in-kind food were interviewed in their homes. Also, approximately 75 interviews were held with staff members of WFP, cooperating partners (CPs), local authorities and United Nations (see**

4. Annex 4a: List of Field Sites Visited and Annex 4b: Stakeholders Interviewed During Fieldwork in East Ukraine), either face-to-face, by telephone or by email.

5. The evaluation addresses the following three questions: i) how appropriate is the operation; ii) what are the results; and iii) why and how has the operation produced the results. The range of sub-questions explored relevance, outputs, impact, efficiency, gender, capacity building and sustainability, as presented in the evaluation matrix (Annex 5: Evaluation Matrix).

6. The ET developed their conclusions and recommendations through triangulating different sources of information, including a review of WFP and partner documents and internet research (see Annex 6: Documents Consulted), WFP and CP monitoring data, KII feedback from stakeholders (using interview questionnaires), FGDs with direct beneficiaries (following discussion guides) and food distribution/bank/shop site visits for direct observation of activities. Mixed and single gender FGDs were held, and the ET members (with local interpreters/facilitators) used participatory approaches to make sure women expressed their opinions during these meetings. Holding individual interviews with women was also an alternative way employed to seek their answers and gender-specific information. Interviewed stakeholders were systematically informed of the objectives of the study, and assured of non-attribution (see Annex 7: Stakeholders interviewed in Kyiv).

7. At the end of the field mission, the ET presented their preliminary findings to WFP CO staff, followed by a similar presentation to external stakeholders. This allowed for further triangulation of findings and comments, for outstanding questions to be answered, and to ensure transparency and openness to external stakeholders.

8. Several constraints encountered affected the analysis and findings presented in the report: i) some key stakeholders, such as the UNHCR Head of Programme, the RB nutritionist and the Cash Working Group (CWG) coordinator, were not available for interview; ii) the newness of WFP's operation and frequent staff changes made it difficult for the ET to access documents in a timely way and, in some cases, to triangulate information to assess WFP's performance; and iii) the conflict, security issues and the evolving situation on the ground lengthened travel times and in turn curtailed time for site visits and interviews. The ET made attempts to mitigate these constraints through increasing the working length of the field days to compensate for the longer travel times, and contacting former WFP staff and others by email to provide additional information.

## **1.2. Country Context**

9. Ukraine, a country in the Commonwealth of Independent States, is located in Eastern Europe and has an estimated population (2015) of 44.4 million people.<sup>13</sup> It is a lower middle-income country ranked 81<sup>st</sup> out of 188 countries on the United Nations Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Index for 2015;<sup>14</sup> and ranks 61<sup>st</sup> in the gender inequality index<sup>15</sup> with a life expectancy at birth of 71 years.<sup>16</sup> Ukraine's per capita GDP in 2014 was US\$3,082, after declining significantly over previous years.<sup>17</sup> Ukraine has a strong agricultural sector and is one of the world's largest grain exporters, although underdeveloped infrastructure and transportation, corruption and Government bureaucracy have hampered economic growth.

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<sup>13</sup> CIA World Factbook; available at [www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html](http://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html). Retrieved 29 Sept. 2015

<sup>14</sup> Source: <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI>

<sup>15</sup> Human Development Report 2013, UNDP, 2014.

<sup>16</sup> ACAPS Ukraine Country Profile, August 2015.

<sup>17</sup> Source: <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD>

10. Ukraine has managed to achieve certain progress in reducing absolute poverty; the poverty rate reduced from 11.9 to 1.9 percent between 2000 and 2015.<sup>18</sup> Despite this, 33 percent of families with children are classed as poor, as is every fifth working person.<sup>19</sup> Literacy is estimated at 100 percent and gender parity for primary and secondary education in Ukraine is 1:1.<sup>20</sup>

11. Recent data on nutritional status is not available for Ukraine. A 2002 national nutrition survey of children from six to 35 months reported low levels of malnutrition, with wasting estimated at zero percent, underweight at one percent and stunting at four percent.<sup>21</sup> In 2014, micronutrient deficiencies and poor infant and young child (IYC) feeding practices were more worrying, with anaemia amongst young children at 22 percent,<sup>22</sup> and only 43 percent of young children between six and eight months receiving solid food.<sup>23</sup> Low exclusive breastfeeding rates (less than 20 percent), widespread bottle-feeding and significant violations of the breast milk substitute marketing code compounded this. Iodine deficiency, although not recently studied, is also likely to be a problem since only 21 percent of households use adequately iodized salt.<sup>24</sup>

12. It is within this context and with the previous Government backing away from an agreement to work more closely with the European Union that unrest in Ukraine began in November 2013. After Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula in February 2014, there was a massive displacement of the population and tensions escalated into fighting between the Ukrainian authorities and anti-government entities in the eastern part of the country. This produced over a million registered internally displaced people (IDPs), and left an estimated five million people in the conflicted areas, with over 6,000 deaths and 16,000 wounded.<sup>25</sup>

13. Recent household economic constraints related to the unrest continue to threaten food security in conflict-affected areas. Additionally, food prices have increased at a time when household incomes are impacted by substantial unemployment. The economy is undergoing a political and economic crisis resulting in the decline of GDP and foreign investments, an increase of Government debt, and the devaluation of its currency.

14. WFP's active operational areas of emergency response have been the GCA and NGCA of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts, which can be further separated into four distinct operational areas: Luhansk GCA and NGCA, and Donetsk GCA and NGCA. The contact line and buffer zone separating the GCA and NGCA also presents a distinct operational environment.

### **1.3. Operational Overview**

15. In light of the increasing political tensions, in March 2014 WFP initiated an Immediate Response Preparatory phase operation (IR-P 200695) to anticipate and plan for potential needs of IDPs from Crimea. However, the focus of attention shifted following the onset of conflict in the east. In line with the broader United Nations response, in

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<sup>18</sup> Based on the share of the population with daily income below US\$5.05; noted in: UNDP, MDG 1 Eradicate Hunger and Poverty, available at <https://www.ua.undp.org/content/ukraine/en/home/mdgoverview/overview/mdg1/>

<sup>19</sup> United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, 2010.

<sup>20</sup> State Statistics Service and Ukrainian Centre for Social Reforms, 2013. Ukraine Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2012, Final Report. Kyiv, Ukraine: State Statistics Committee and the Ukrainian Center for Social Reforms.

<sup>21</sup> CDC nutrition survey results (2002) cited in Cattaneo et al (2008), Child Nutrition in Countries of the CIS: Time to Redirect Strategy, *Public Health Nutrition*, (12) pp. 1209-1219 and UNICEF, 2014 The State of the World's Children 2015. The nutrition data reported in both documents cited above is similar; however, it varies from the MICS 2000 nutrition data, particularly the stunting data, suggesting that the latter may be questioned.

<sup>22</sup> Ukraine Ministry of Health (MoH), 2014; anaemia over 20% ranks it as a moderate public health problem according to WHO's classification.

<sup>23</sup> Ukraine MICS survey 2012, December 2013.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> UNOCHA Ukraine Situation Update No. 5; 26 June 2015; available at: <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/ukraine/document/situation-update-no-5-26-june-2015-0>

August 2014 WFP launched a three-month IR-EMOP, with a budget of US\$1.39 million, serving 28,000 IDPs and other conflict-affected people.

16. Following this and in response to the continuing conflict, the humanitarian situation deteriorated further and WFP developed a six-month emergency operation (EMOP 200765) expanding the caseload to 120,000 in the five eastern Oblasts of Ukraine. It had a budgeted cost of US\$17.02 million, was launched in November 2014, and extended the duration of assistance to the end of April 2015. This phase of the operation continued with the one month in-kind immediate response rations (IRRs) to meet the urgent needs of those with very limited access to food, but also introduced three months of food assistance using cash-based transfers (CBTs) in more secure IDP hosting areas with functioning markets and an adequate food supply.

17. WFP's approach was designed to reach the most vulnerable IDPs, returnees, host families and those trapped in conflict areas, with female-headed households cited as being particularly vulnerable. WFP's response was delivered through the modalities of both cash/voucher transfers and food parcel delivery.

18. Under the EMOP's first BR (May 2015), with an increased budget of US\$4.44 million, the operation was extended for two months to reach an additional 68,000 beneficiaries and the operation was extended into NGCA. Due to a continuing deterioration in food security, a second BR increased the budget by a further US\$34.5 million, targeted an additional 387,000 beneficiaries and extended the EMOP through to December 2015. Additional interventions targeted to social institutions and IYC were added under BR2.

19. In areas most significantly impacted by the continued fighting, and where markets were either not functioning or where safe access to stores was not ensured, WFP was able to deliver timely food assistance in the form of locally purchased food parcels, distributed by local non-governmental agencies (NGOs).

20. In December 2015, a third BR was approved to extend the operation through to June 2016. This evaluation considered the operations and analysed data up to the end of 2015. Current plans are for the EMOP to be succeeded by a Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) in January 2017 as the final phase of the intervention.

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## **2. Evaluation Findings**

### **2.1. Appropriateness of the Operation**

21. The relevancy and role of a WFP operation in a food surplus middle-income country during a political emergency has to be questioned. The preparatory phase (March to August 2014), when this situation could have been considered, focused solely on preparing for a response and did not explore issues such as WFP's relevancy. In Ukraine, facing a political emergency dominated by human rights and protection issues, WFP should have carefully considered its added value beyond food assistance. In response to the official failure to guarantee the population's human rights, particularly for those in areas affected by the conflict, WFP in collaboration with others could have better used its experience and access to the authorities within Ukraine and elsewhere to advocate for the continued respect for rights and obligations.

22. However, the evaluation finds that the WFP intervention in Ukraine, responding to and building on an initial Government request for assistance, was largely appropriate given the developing humanitarian needs, the inability of the authorities to meet them sufficiently and WFP's mandate to save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies. This situation was critical because of the Government's lack of previous experience in

responding to humanitarian crises, or dealing with the humanitarian relief system and a multi-agency response. Beyond emergency response, other important contributions for WFP in Ukraine do potentially exist as elaborated later in this report.

23. Following the Crimea crisis in March 2014, WFP Cairo RB initiated a number of preparedness activities, including scoping missions and short-term deployments to Ukraine, to analyse the operational context and requirements for the establishment of a WFP office in Kyiv. These also included meetings with resident United Nations agency representatives, Government counterparts and potential partners to introduce WFP as an agency that could potentially respond to the growing crisis. These activities were complemented by a desk review of food security documents and a feasibility assessment for the potential use of CBT as part of a potential future intervention. The timeliness of these proactive early actions undoubtedly facilitated the early phases and design of WFP's later emergency responses in eastern Ukraine, and may be viewed as an example of good practice within WFP.

24. An initial request to support conflict-affected people of eastern Ukraine came from the State Emergency Services (SES) of the Government of Ukraine in August 2014. WFP responded with IR-EMOP 200759 to meet the immediate food needs of 28,000 IDPs identified by the Government of Ukraine and other partners. One month of immediate response rations were distributed through a combination of in-kind food and CBTs in the form of vouchers.

25. Budget revision 2, starting in July 2015, responded to a significant deterioration in the food security and nutrition situation following a severe intensification of fighting in eastern Ukraine in the first half of 2015. A further 387,000 beneficiaries were added to the EMOP, which included two new activities targeting 7,000 food insecure individuals in formerly state funded institutions in NGCA, and 20,000 children aged six to 23 months in NGCA, for a period of six months.

26. Initial targeting was done largely based on Government of Ukraine and United Nations requests, cross-referenced with anecdotal and cooperating partners' reports. There were complemented by secondary analysis of third party food security data, when available, and a basic understanding of the context and unfolding events. WFP's first food security needs assessment (FSNA) was conducted in September/October 2014. The report was published in January 2015 although the results had been available early enough to help inform the design of EMOP 200765.

27. Needs Assessments: Conducting needs assessments was challenging due to several constraints, ranging from a low level of WFP in-country presence at the beginning of the emergency to data collection bans in NGCA, and limited access to some of the affected areas. WFP's appointment of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in March 2015 as a third party monitor greatly enhanced the capacity of the CO to collect and analyse information on the ground, both on the general food security situation as well as for post-distribution monitoring (PDM). Although up to 70 percent of information collected from individuals by third party enumerators is collected over the telephone, an internal study by KIIS showed that the difference in responses between face-to-face and telephone interviews was quite small despite the reduced level of interaction possible with telephone respondents.<sup>26</sup>

28. Up to the end of 2015, the following food security related assessments had been carried out in the conflict affected areas of eastern Ukraine:

- August 2014 – WFP food and nutrition security in Ukraine (based on secondary data analysis);

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<sup>26</sup> Food Security Assessment, WFP Ukraine, November 2015

- September 2014 – WFP Food Security Context Analysis developed;
- January 2015 - WFP Ukraine 1<sup>st</sup> FSNA report (carried out Sept/Oct 2014) with preliminary results informing the design of EMOP 200765;
- March 2015 – Multi Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA), including food security done by WFP; 2<sup>nd</sup> FSNA used to inform design of BR2 to EMOP 200765;
- July 2015 - Rapid multi-sectoral needs assessment in villages located over the contact line; Triangle Generation Humanitaire (an NGO);
- February 2016 – WFP 3<sup>rd</sup> FSNA (conducted October/November 2015) with preliminary results informing BR3.

29. Although the approach of the various assessments undertaken was consistent, the indicators included and/or their analysis varied making it difficult to directly compare findings over time and identify trends in food insecurity, as can be seen from the tables in Annex 8: Summary of WFP food security assessment results and estimates of affected population) summarising assessment results. Disaggregation of analysis between geographic and administrative areas and different population groups was not comprehensive and, in the rapidly evolving situation in eastern Ukraine, by the time FSNA results became available, they lagged behind the changing needs and circumstances.

30. As the operation now moves towards the end of its second year regular needs assessments need to be continued to support adjustments to the response and strengthen its appropriateness in a rapidly changing environment.

31. Geographic Targeting: The targeting approach for the one and three month general food assistance distributions changed over the duration of the evaluation period. In October 2014, OCHA had estimated that some 380,000 IDPs (60 percent of the total) had already been registered in the five eastern Oblasts, and the EMOP was intended to target these people and other war-affected people in all these areas, due to needs originally identified in the WFP food security context analysis in September 2014.

32. However the MNSA of March 2015, which helped inform BR2 of the EMOP, identified significantly higher levels of food insecurity in the two directly conflict-affected Oblasts of Luhansk and Donetsk, as compared to the registered IDPs in the three neighbouring Oblasts of Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhya.<sup>27</sup> Some 1.3 million people were estimated to be in need of food assistance in the GCA and NGCA of Donetsk and Luhansk, of whom approximately 50 percent were considered a priority.

33. Geographical targeting approaches varied within each of these operational areas with different degrees of involvement by the GCA and NGCA authorities. The ET noted that clear geographical divisions of target areas between WFP's cooperating partners, and other agencies distributing food assistance through independent pipelines, were compromised by some factors as explained here.

34. In the NGCA, the authorities had a much more centralized approach to targeting and closely controlled which agencies were 'accredited' to work, and where assistance was targeted within their areas of control. Sharing of information was limited and allocation of targeted beneficiaries between agencies was frequently based on targeting criteria rather than geography, often leading to more than one agency delivering assistance to different groups within the same location, albeit at different times. WFP staff had a positive dialogue with both the NGCA authorities and other operational agencies but, nevertheless,

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<sup>27</sup> See

there were instances of duplication and some confusion among beneficiaries as to who was doing what and how assistance was allocated. However, as relatively few agencies were delivering in-kind food assistance, and had close working relationships, such problems tended to be isolated and quickly addressed on a case-by-case basis.

35. In the GCA, the ET noted greater engagement between the local authorities and humanitarian agencies, including WFP. Although gaps in understanding still exist, and it has taken some time to reach this level of engagement, progress continues to be slowly made, thereby facilitating the targeting and delivery of assistance in the GCA with a greater level of transparency. In the buffer zone on either side of the contact line, local assessments and targeting were further complicated by insecurity and limited access on both sides of the line.

36. Beneficiary Targeting: Linking the broadly assessed numbers of food insecure people identified in the various food security assessments to the most food insecure individuals on the ground was a challenging exercise for all agencies. Matching planning figures to specific individuals was guided by a list of targeting criteria developed by the food security cluster (FSC), which are included in Annex 10: Targeting criteria used by the Food Security Cluster and other agencies.

37. Beneficiary lists for general food assistance were generated from a number of sources. Local level administrators generated lists of those in need from various communities that were passed to CPs, either directly or through local authorities. IDP lists were widely recognized to be problematic as authorities were not able to keep track of those returning, and so they reflected the cumulative numbers of those registered rather than those who actually remained as IDPs in a given area. This was compounded by the reluctance of male IDPs to register, fearing conscription into the armed forces.

38. The CPs and the local authorities in the GCA operated beneficiary hotlines. These hotlines were well known about and used by potential and existing beneficiaries, many of whom reported that they had only been made aware of their eligibility for assistance after contacting the hotlines. Operators were trained to screen callers according to selection criteria.

39. The CPs selected beneficiaries based on the food security cluster (FSC) criteria (which are broadly inclusive) and generated beneficiary lists, which would have required more resources than WFP had available. The CPs then had to do a secondary round of targeting to prioritise the numbers of potential beneficiaries to match the available level of resources. The ET noted a lack of consistency in the way beneficiaries were prioritised by the different CPs, and saw that they did not necessarily identify the most food insecure, but no formal methodologies for doing this exercise were presented to the ET.

40. The inability of WFP and the wider community to carry out more systematic and comprehensive food security assessments, combined with difficulties in linking planning figures to the most food insecure individuals and targeting them with assistance, may well have led to higher levels of inclusion and exclusion error. However, the short-term nature of the WFP assistance, the vast majority of which was for three months or less, should have mitigated any negative impacts such as disincentives, dependency and widespread misuse of resources that inappropriate targeting could create in the medium to long term.

41. Other actors were also providing food assistance: the largest was the Rinat Akhmetov Foundation (RAF), which provided food packages on an ongoing basis to eligible beneficiaries every 42 days. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) provided monthly or bi-monthly food assistance on an ongoing basis to those eligible. People in Need (PIN), funded by the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department (ECHO), distributed monthly food packages to eligible

beneficiaries for three months. The mission noted that some beneficiaries had received assistance from other agencies before WFP assistance started, or after it had come to an end, highlighting the difficulties in assessing whether or not the duration of WFP support was appropriate.

42. **EMOP Activities:** Over the course of the evaluation period, WFP's emergency response has evolved to include four main areas of activity, which between them used in-kind food, CBT (cash and vouchers) as transfer modalities.

43. **Immediate Response Rations (IRR):** The first IRR, distributed under the IR-EMOP, included a five-day supply of ready-to-eat items, such as canned meat and fish, canned vegetables, instant buckwheat, biscuits and jam. It was transportable, with a weight of four kilograms, and provided 2,100 calories per person per day; food selected considered local food preferences. Those targeted to receive support were located in IDP centres and thus expected to require very short-term support. At this early point in the emergency response, no monitoring was done. However, given the ET's understanding of the context at that time and the IRR target group, the IRR seemed an appropriate response for transient IDPs.

44. Under the later EMOP and its BRs, in-kind food parcels were targeted to people in areas of active conflict, mostly trapped residents, so the ration changed accordingly and was extended to 30 days. Calories increased to 2,600 to reflect the colder winter months and the ration became more diverse, with pasta, regular buckwheat, tea, sugar, oil, canned beans and iodized salt added, reflecting beneficiaries' more stable living conditions where they could prepare foods. Jam, canned vegetables and biscuits were eliminated. From the SPR 2015, it appears that IRR were mostly targeted as planned to NGCA. Post-distribution monitoring (PDM) reports indicate that beneficiaries overwhelmingly appreciated the rations and they met their staple food needs.

45. **Three-month food assistance:** WFP introduced an extension to the duration of food assistance from one month to three months at the start of EMOP 200765. Three months of food assistance was initially planned for some 80,000 people using CBT to address short-term food needs in more secure IDP hosting areas that had an adequate food supply and functioning markets in the GCA, including those areas where fighting had subsided and market functionality was restored. Vouchers were the main form of CBT for the first four months of the EMOP, with cash transfers being introduced in March 2015.

46. The WFP food security update of March 2015, using the findings of the MSNA, concluded that in the GCA WFP should provide three months of food assistance to fill an immediate food gap among the food insecure population, primarily targeting IDPs. It was expected that the Government's safety net programmes would absorb beneficiaries after this transitory period.

47. In July 2015, under BR2, the three months of food assistance was expanded to include some 200,000 people with in-kind food parcels, and a further 60,000 people in GCA via CBT, bringing the total number of planned beneficiaries receiving three months of food assistance under the EMOP to 340,000.

48. **Social Institutions:** In March 2015, at the request of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, OCHA appealed to the Food Security Cluster (FSC) to consider providing humanitarian aid to people in need in NGCA; the request included a list of institutions prepared by the Ministry of Social Policy (MoSP). As a result, the CO made a decision to introduce Institutional Feeding (IF) via the BR2, and in particular to support facilities in NGCA where state funding had been cut and where the ICRC was not assisting. However, with the suspension of WFP's operations in the NGCA from July to October 2015, an assessment and selection of facilities did not take place.

49. During this time, the World Health Organisation (WHO) approached WFP to provide in-kind food assistance to hospitals located in the GCA where patient numbers had increased significantly, including many IDPs. The IF activity was a WHO/WFP partnership supported by the United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) with US\$1.3 million. One of WFP's CPs, ADRA, implemented the activity. When selecting the hospitals and social institutions, ADRA focused on those located in frontline settlements hosting the largest number of IDPs, cross-referenced with a list of WHO-supported mobile clinics.<sup>28</sup> ADRA visited the institutions, confirmed their food assistance needs, verified requests and developed a food distribution plan, although no formal assessment was done.<sup>29</sup> Upon completion of distributions to the hospitals, ADRA submitted distribution reports.

50. The rations were designed with input from the RB nutritionist to complement the other foods available to institutions. Rations packed as parcels (one per patient per month) were provided to targeted hospitals. No salt was provided and thus an opportunity to address low iodine intake was missed.<sup>30</sup> Overall, the ration relied heavily on wheat flour and was not as well balanced (lacking the minimum requirements, in all vitamins and most minerals) as the general food distribution (GFD) ration (see Annex 11: Ingredients, Quantities and Nutritional Content of WFP's Institutional Food Ration in comparison with the ICRC's Institutional Ration). PDM reports confirmed the excessive quantity of flour in the ration. Compared with the ICRC's institutional ration, WFP's had more calories (2,032 vs. 600) but less diversity, lacking such food items as canned meat and fish but providing canned beans, a vegetable source of protein with less available iron and lower protein content; and the beans were provided in a smaller quantity (see Annex 11 for more information on the ICRC IF ration.) Requests for more canned foods were received during the PDM. Based on the available information, the ET questions the nutritional adequacy of the ration, but poor information on other foods available made it difficult to conclude either way.

51. The foods were provided in parcels instead of in bulk, because of the preference of the CP and the institutions, and it was thought to be easier logistically.<sup>31</sup> However, food parcels involve additional work because household size packaging is not convenient when hospital meals are prepared in quantity.

52. Post-distribution monitoring and ET visits confirmed that WFP food assistance was very timely and important for institutions. Of the two institutions visited by the ET, the Severodonetsk City Hospital reported that 35 percent of its patients were IDPs and the Luhansk Oblast TB Centre for Children reported that 10 percent of its patients over the last eight months had been IDPs. Administrators reported that they were able to maintain their patient meal service because of WFP food. Government funds have been significantly reduced over time (the budget for 2016 decreased from UAH 60,000 (US\$2,220) to UAH 4,000 (US\$148) per institution/month) though has still not been approved.

53. The ET and PDM found that hospitals' administrators, cooks and patients appreciated the WFP foods. Due to savings on the staple foods provided, they were able to buy complementary fresh foods and as the menu was more diversified. Three meals a day were consistently served, the quantities of food provided increased and the overall nutritional quality of the meals improved.<sup>32</sup> The foods were reported to be of high quality,

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<sup>28</sup> Most hospitals hosting IDPs used budgets designed in 2010 unadjusted for inflation and the increasing prices of foods (from personal communication, WFP Ukraine staff).

<sup>29</sup> ADRA reported that in all visited hospitals there was inadequate food to meet nutrition and food diversity requirements. For example, some did not have bread, some were in need of meat, others lacked oil or sugar. Further, some hospital warehouses visited were nearly empty (personal communication, WFP Ukraine staff).

<sup>30</sup> Information regarding the availability of iodized salt to the institutions targeted was not provided to the ET.

<sup>31</sup> Personal communication, WFP Ukraine staff.

<sup>32</sup> The canned beans were popular; and were widely used in preparing recipes such as in soups and even in rolls.

particularly the flour; a bread maker was purchased to save money by making their own bread and rolls. The TB Centre for Children also reported more menu diversity and improvement in nutritional quality with the addition of buckwheat and beans provided by WFP. They were also able to purchase other complementary foods such as cheese and meat. They reported that without WFP's assistance, they could not afford to follow the Ministry of Health (MoH) guidelines for feeding children living in institutions.

54. The ET concludes that identifying and supporting patients in the most food insecure hospitals is an appropriate activity, particularly in NGCA without other means to support institutions. However, a formal assessment process is needed and assistance, especially without an exit strategy including a hand-over agreement with the authorities, is not advised, as it could be interpreted as taking over or duplicating an official responsibility.

55. **Nutrition Interventions:** Infants and young children in emergency settings are at higher risk of developing acute malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies, and the foods provided in the general food parcels were neither appropriate for infants nor tailored to the higher nutritional needs of IYC. Baby Food Baskets (BFBs) with IYC rations, geographically targeted to 20,000<sup>33</sup> beneficiaries in NGCA, was planned under BR2.<sup>34</sup> Two food rations consisting of a variety of infant cereals and baby food purées (one ration for infants six to 11 months and the other for young children 12 to 23 months) were developed by the Nutrition Sub-Cluster (NSC), with the participation of the WFP RB nutritionist (see Annex 12: Ingredients, quantities & nutritional composition of Baby Food Baskets ).

56. In Ukraine, the rate of acute malnutrition among IYC was low prior to the conflict<sup>35</sup> and recent assessments conducted in 2015, in conflict and conflict-affected areas, confirmed that it had remained so, though Luhansk Oblast (GCA and NGCA) had not been assessed. WFP's food assistance may have contributed to this, as well as cultural practices which prioritize feeding young children over other family members (see Annex 13: Results from the Emergency Infant and Young Children Nutrition Assessments.)

57. Furthermore, although little is known about the level of micronutrient deficiencies in Ukraine, anaemia has been identified as a problem. According to MoH statistics for 2014, anaemia prevalence in pregnant women was 24.1 percent nationwide.<sup>36</sup> Initial anaemia surveillance data (January 2016), among pregnant women and children under one year old, from health centres in the GCA of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, suggested a public health problem (mild to severe), with worse results from Luhansk (see Annex 14: Anaemia surveillance results). According to national protocols, all women should be tested for anaemia during pregnancy and those who have low iron levels are prescribed iron supplements. However, with the high cost of medicine, not all women take the medicines, including iron tablets.<sup>37</sup>

58. As a result of the conflict, IDPs and other people affected have more limited access to iron-rich foods such as meat, fish, other seafood and eggs,<sup>38</sup> which has likely increased the prevalence of anaemia. Ukraine, unlike many middle-income countries, has no policy

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<sup>33</sup> This was based on the NSC estimates of unmet coverage of young children in need of complementary food.

<sup>34</sup> Due to WFP's low caseload of families with IYC, they planned to work with UNICEF and Save the Children to develop the BFB implementation modality. Complementary nutrition and IYC feeding infant informational brochures were developed for dissemination with the BFBs, based on the infant feeding issues identified in the IYC nutrition assessments.

<sup>35</sup> Most recent nutrition data indicates a prevalence of 1.3 percent (MICS 2000). It is expected that the percentage of wasted children did not deteriorate substantially between 2000 and 2014 as the economic situation in Ukraine remained fairly stable over this period.

<sup>36</sup> As reported in the GNC Ukraine Scoping Mission Report (Feb. 2015); according to WHO this indicates a moderate public health problem.

<sup>37</sup> As reported in the GNC Scoping Mission Report (Feb. 2015).

<sup>38</sup> As reported in the GNC Scoping Mission Report (Feb. 2015) and confirmed by the ET, PDM reports and the recent FSA report (Feb. 2016), which presents information on the percent of HHs consuming iron-rich foods. Eighty percent rarely or never consume iron-rich foods.

on distribution of supplements for children, such as Vitamin A or multiple micronutrient supplements.<sup>39</sup>

59. A necessary assessment of infant food suppliers and their products delayed the implementation of the BFB distributions. In July 2015 a RB food technologist visited Ukraine, assessed infant food suppliers and based on his findings, identified a local supplier of infant food products. One of the items included in the BFBs (meat purée) was not included in the assessment, and given its high bioavailable iron content and the known problem of anaemia among young children, it is unclear to the ET why this was excluded.<sup>40</sup> As a follow-up to this assessment, food specifications for infant cereal and infant food purée (fruits and vegetables) were developed in consultation with a WFP HQ food technologist, in preparation for a WFP internal product review process. Setting a time for the WFP HQ Internal Review Committee Technical Assistance Group<sup>41</sup> (IRCTAG) to meet took longer than expected because it had not been functioning for several years and there was no staff member coordinating the process.<sup>42</sup>

60. The IRCTAG meeting (held in late November 2015) concluded that, given WFP's lack of experience with sourcing and distributing puréed foods, they should not be included in the BFB. Regarding the provision of locally produced infant cereals, a number of issues related to its nutrition composition and caloric content were raised;<sup>43</sup> and it was felt that although the problems could potentially be addressed with the supplier, it would take time and thus during the BR3 review process, the BFB activity was placed on hold. Since then, the HQ Nutrition Unit has presented three options to the CO for providing infant cereals in the ration, unfortunately none of which is immediately possible given Government constraints and the unknown length of WFP's presence in Ukraine (see Annex 15: HQ Nutrition Unit's advice to the CO on options for providing infant cereal as part of WFP Ukraine ration). At the time of the evaluation, CO staff members were unclear as to why the BFB distribution had been placed on hold and how to proceed, although they had responded to the HQ Nutrition Unit. This may be explained by the CO's lack of staff with nutrition expertise.

61. As relative peace continues and stability returns, more families, including those with pregnant/lactating mothers and IYC, are returning to the NGCAs. Other organizations continue their provision of BFBs (RAF), are planning an assessment to design one (ICRC), or are just starting to distribute BFBs (PIN and Caritas), though according to the NSC estimates, there will still be a large gap in coverage.<sup>44</sup> During the field mission, the ET frequently received requests from beneficiaries, Government authorities, nutrition organizations and CPs for BFBs. In rural areas, particularly in NGCA, where there are only small food shops, baby foods are not available for sale, and where available in larger towns, they have become more difficult for families to buy, given

<sup>39</sup> As reported in the GNC Scoping Mission Report (Feb. 2015).

<sup>40</sup> CO staff remembered this being discussed, but could not recall the reason why meat purée was dropped. It was acknowledged that meat products involve more food safety risk and thus require a more complicated assessment process, but no reasons were provided as to why it was removed from the BFB.

<sup>41</sup> To facilitate internal decision-making on the appropriateness of 'new' foods for its operations WFP has established an Internal Review Committee and a Technical Advisory Group (TAG) according to the WFP Directive on the Establishment of Procedures for Approving 'New' Food Products in WFP Operations 2005, and updated draft 2016.

<sup>42</sup> It should be noted that the IRCTAG was not established to make rapid responses on new commodities. The process to approve new commodities from a nutrition, food safety/food quality and logistics/financial aspects requires some time. Recently a IRCTAG coordinator was appointed. (Personal communication, WFP HQ technical staff.)

<sup>43</sup> Notes for the Record from the IRCTAG Committee (November 25, 2015) mentioned that the micronutrient content of the infant cereal was unclear; a difference was noted between the infant cereal labels and information reported in the NSC meeting minutes. In addition, the micronutrient content and energy density of the recommended infant cereals were significantly lower than WFP's *Super Cereal+* (SC+) and GAIN's recommended composition for infant foods. It was also noted that the NSC based its BFB on an incorrect assumption. In the NSC minutes, it specified that the foods provided for the BFB should provide the same proportion of micronutrients as the proportion of energy they give. This assumes that breast milk and other foods will meet their proportional share of micronutrient requirements. However, breast milk is not a good source of all nutrients (e.g. iron) and when the other foods are not from animal sources or fortified, they will be less nutrient-dense than the fortified cereal and thus provide fewer micronutrients per unit of energy provided.

<sup>44</sup> According to the estimated need and the planned levels of distribution of BFBs, as reported in NSC minutes, February 2016.

their reduced incomes and the increased and relatively high cost of baby foods.<sup>45</sup> As noted by the NSC, one of the gaps in WFP's response has been planning and then not implementing BFBs, an intervention they feel is needed.<sup>46</sup> With the high prevalence of anaemia and the issues identified with accessing baby foods, the ET confirms that a ration with infant food products tailored to the nutritional needs of IYC would be appropriate and an important part of WFP's emergency response.

#### Choice of different transfer modality options

62. In-kind food parcels and CBT have been used as transfer modalities in both the IRR and the three months food assistance activities. Under the IR-EMOP, some 10,000 people were targeted with a one-month voucher transfer in GCA and 18,000 with in-kind food parcels. EMOP 200765 began with 80,000 of 120,000 planned beneficiaries targeted with CBT, mostly with US\$45 value vouchers (per month for three months) based on the Government's defined food basket. Cash transfers were introduced in March 2015 with the CP Mercy Corps International in northern Luhansk Oblast. BR1 to EMOP 200765, in May 2015, increased in-kind food parcels under the IRR, mostly in NGCA, bringing the total assisted to 188,000, of whom 108,000 were targeted with in-kind transfers. BR2, in July 2015, increased the overall caseload to 575,000 of whom 140,000 in GCA were planned to receive CBT, but with a reduction in value to about US\$20 per month to align with the value of the WFP in-kind food parcel.

63. WFP's policy and guidance requires that transfer modality selection follows an evidence-based decision making process to identify the most appropriate transfer modality. As this transfer modality choice potentially has a significant impact on both project costs and outcomes, decisions should be based on an analysis of cost efficiency and effectiveness to highlight the comparative advantages and disadvantages of each modality in helping to achieve intended project objectives and outcomes.

64. In March 2014, the RB carried out a cash and voucher feasibility assessment to look at existing capacity in Ukraine to using CBT modalities, and to recommend which transfer types to use. The study concluded that Ukraine had all the preconditions for contextual and operational feasibility for the use of cash and voucher transfers. This was a critical element of WFP's preparedness enabling it to integrate CBT as part of the first response phase under the IR-EMOP. In turn, this laid the foundations for the future expansion of CBT under EMOP 200765 in later months.

65. An initial cost-efficiency analysis made prior to EMOP 200765, based on estimated costs of in-kind food, gave an Omega value<sup>47</sup> of 3.2 indicating that CBT were not necessarily the most cost effective transfer. Given the difficulties of accurately comparing the comparative cost effectiveness of different transfer modalities at that time, without good quality data, the WFP decision to proceed with CBT in its initial response seems to have been made on the basis of feasibility rather than a systematic analysis of comparative efficiency and effectiveness.

66. Throughout the evaluation period, WFP has expanded the use of both in-kind and CBT to meet the growing needs of an expanded caseload. However, decisions on choice of modality continue to be based on feasibility and practicality rather than an evidence base of which is more appropriate. In-kind food parcels are targeted to operational areas where market and financial infrastructure is inadequate to support the use of CBT and, where

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<sup>45</sup> This was widely reported to the ET and confirmed by ET visits to markets in several rural towns in NGCA/GCA in Luhansk and Donetsk. Even a smaller market in Luhansk city was visited that had a limited selection of infant foods.

<sup>46</sup> Personal communication, Ukraine Nutrition sub-cluster members.

<sup>47</sup> WFP's measure of cost-efficiency, cost-effectiveness and externalities used to compare, ex-ante, the potential and expected cost-efficiency and effectiveness of different food baskets, equivalent or very similar in energy value, but delivered through different transfer modalities. Each basket's nutrient value is measured against its cost of delivery. – WFP Cash and Vouchers Manual, second edition, 2014

such infrastructure does exist, CBT appear to be the default transfer. Similarly, cash seems to have been chosen for northern Luhansk because the retail infrastructure there does not readily support the introduction of an electronic value-based voucher. This implies that WFP's preferred choice of transfer would be an electronic voucher, but this position is not supported by any detailed analysis of the comparative advantages of value vouchers in achieving stated project objectives and outcomes.

67. Further study is required to see whether the use of CBT gives significant advantages or disadvantages over in-kind food in achieving project objectives and outcomes.<sup>48</sup> Without this information, it is difficult to conclude whether or not the current choice and mix of transfer modalities across the WFP response, other than in-kind food parcels in areas where it is not feasible to deliver CBT, is the most appropriate. Similarly, further work is required to help WFP make the most appropriate choice between cash and vouchers in those areas where it is feasible to deliver both.

68. However, with the increased use of cash transfers by different agencies, and in a highly monetized economy like Ukraine, strong arguments exist in favour of single delivery multi-sectoral and/or multi-purpose cash transfers based on a minimum expenditure basket, coordinated between agencies, including WFP. In such a scenario, there needs to be strong evidence, based on food security and nutrition indicators and/or cost, for WFP not to use cash as the default transfer and engage in a single multi-purpose / multi-sectoral cash transfer.

69. The CO has recently carried out studies in the NGCA of Luhansk and Donetsk, again focusing on feasibility, with a view to introducing CBT in 2016. WFP has not yet used its operational experience to systematically monitor costs, output and outcome indicators, or to disaggregate them, in a way that helps determine the most appropriate choice of transfer modality as the operation continues to evolve. While beyond the scope of the ET to carry out such research and analysis, the mission observed a number of factors, as elaborated below, that should be given more systematic consideration by WFP CO to better inform the future choice and size of transfer modality.

70. Cost efficiency: market dynamics in the conflict-affected Oblasts are very dynamic, especially in NGCA. WFP regularly monitors market prices of basic food commodities but does not specifically analyse costs of the in-kind food parcel contents. Systematic analysis of relative costs to WFP for delivering food assistance through different modalities is important for a number of reasons:

- In a chronically underfunded project the relative costs of implementation will have a direct bearing on the numbers of people who can be assisted;
- Adjustments to transfer sizes (cash and value vouchers), if made in a timely manner, can prevent reductions in beneficiary purchasing power or over-distribution of scarce resources;
- Spot checks by the ET showed the average cost of the WFP food parcel (excluding CP costs) in urban shops in Luhansk and Donetsk, on both sides of the contact line, to be cheaper, at an average of approximately US\$15.40, than the US\$19.77 currently paid by WFP to procure and deliver parcels from the supplier (**Annex 16: Cost of food parcels in GGA/NGCA locations in Luhansk and Donetsk**). The CBT value, at US\$20, is linked to the WFP food parcel supplier cost, not the cost of the food in retail outlets.
- Markets were seen to be stabilizing, and prices equalizing, on both sides of the contact line at the time of the mission. WFP's general monitoring of food markets

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<sup>48</sup> WFP Cash and Vouchers Manual, second edition, 2014 offers guidance on how to monitor the assumptions underlying the choice of transfer modality during project implementation and disaggregate outcome data

has shown price volatility, especially in NGCA where, in mid-2015, food prices were almost double the national average in Ukraine.

71. More detailed analysis of the overall costs of delivering different transfers to beneficiary level is required but, if markets do continue to stabilise, it would seem that CBT may well be more cost efficient for WFP than in-kind food parcels.

72. Beneficiary considerations: high beneficiary satisfaction was noted for all transfer modalities by the ET and in PDM reports. This is to be expected unless they had previous experience of receiving different transfers and were able to make real comparisons. However, a number of people met by the ET presented strong arguments in favour of both in-kind and cash. Those preferring cash did not like that vouchers tied them to a shop that did not necessarily have the best prices, while those that preferred in-kind food did so because of concerns that cash could be too easily spent on non-food items, and for some beneficiaries with limited transportation options, receiving in-kind was more convenient.

73. Some beneficiaries reported congestion in shops (vouchers) and banks (cash) immediately after receiving transfers. The Oschad Bank had begun to mitigate this by issuing as many beneficiaries as possible with fee-free bank cards enabling them to collect their money more flexibly, rather than queuing for over-the-counter payments. Staggering of voucher top-ups could also be introduced as a way of alleviating congestion in stores on the days that benefits are received.

74. Monitoring cost efficiency and effectiveness: The CO can disaggregate and analyse much of the data it collects by transfer modality, area and beneficiary type but does not systematically do so, partly due to capacity constraints. The 2008 evaluation of WFP's cash and voucher policy specifically recommended that WFP developed a robust monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and financial accounting platform to systematically track CBT specific costs, inputs, outputs, outcomes and implications within a framework that facilitates comparison between all modalities, over time, across countries and project/activity types.<sup>49</sup> While it is understood that the different contexts in which different modalities are currently distributed can make direct comparisons less accurate, over time the development of a comprehensive evidence base derived from systematically disaggregated data could assist with future decision making, both at the country and corporate levels.

75. Alignment with national safety nets: WFP's handover strategy, as outlined in the EMOP, is dependent on the populations in conflict-affected areas receiving WFP food assistance becoming integrated into national social protection systems that exist to varying degrees in both GCA and NGCA. Consideration should be given to align transfer types and size, to the extent possible, with national systems with a view to future integration of beneficiaries, and WFP's handover and phase out.

#### Appropriateness of General Food Distribution (GFD) Rations

76. The initial GFD (or in-kind food) ration was planned to include 2,600 calories but actually included 2,430 calories (see Annex 17: Ingredients, quantities and nutritional composition of the original GFD ration). The ration was well balanced but was low in half of the micronutrients analysed, including iodine.<sup>50</sup> It was set higher than the 2,100 calorie SPHERE ration standard because of the cold winter temperatures and with reference to the Government's food basket of 2,900 calories. The RB nutritionist developed the ration, taking into consideration cultural food preferences and the ICRC's food ration, which at that time was 2,400 calories. The following Figure 1 indicates how the WFP and other


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<sup>49</sup> WFP's 2008 Cash and Voucher Policy (2008-14): A Policy Evaluation, Report number: OEV/2014/08, December 2014

<sup>50</sup> Iodized salt was included in the ration, but the quantity was low.

rations have changed over time in relation to the Government standards and the SPHERE recommendations.

**Figure 1: Calorie values of different food baskets and recommended standards<sup>51</sup>**



Source: Compiled from data gathered by Evaluation Team [Note: SPHERE guidelines denoted by red triangles]

In March 2015 WFP, in conjunction with the FSC, reduced its ration to 1,600 calories, assuming that beneficiaries could provide a significant portion of dietary needs themselves.<sup>52</sup> This decision was based on PDM reports, monitoring data on food basket costs, the large costs, the large ration size, the Government’s request and the initiation of the Government’s IDP allowance. It is difficult to assess the effects of the ration reduction. A decrease was likely warranted although, but it may have been too large, and no food consumption assessment was done,<sup>53</sup> which would have determined the food and nutrient gap and informed the revised ration. None of the beneficiaries interviewed commented on the smaller ration, which is understandable given the short duration of programme participation. At the same time, based on the costs of foods in the smaller ration, the CBT value was reduced from US\$45 to US\$20, and the ICRC also revised its ration downward to 2,100 calories, based on beneficiary feedback and PDM reports<sup>54</sup> (see

<sup>51</sup> Annex 18 includes a comparison of the ingredients and quantities of foods in the WFP, ICRC and PIN (ECHO funded) food parcels.  
<sup>52</sup> The FSC meeting 3/2015 changed the ration, but because of WFP’s contractual arrangements, distribution of the smaller rations only began in November/December 2015.  
<sup>53</sup> As recommended in the SPHERE standards when providing a ration less than the 2,100 calorie standard.  
<sup>54</sup> Personal communication, ICRC Delegation Ukraine.

77. Annex 18: Current GFD ration of WFP, ICRC and PIN).

78. Based on the actual food provided, WFP's food ration actually only provided 1,530 calories (see Annex 19: Ingredients, quantities and nutritional composition of GFD ration (planned and actual)). Unlike WFP's planned 1,600 calorie ration, the one provided did not include *supercereal+* and was not as well balanced or micronutrient rich (see Annex 19). WFP's planned ration met 75 percent or more of 14 of the 18 micronutrients analysed, compared to seven for the actual ration provided; both provided sufficient protein and fat. In Ukraine, a fortified blended food similar to *supercereal+* is not produced and WFP cannot import food commodities under their agreement with the Government. WFP's current food parcel represents a missed opportunity to provide a nutritionally-adequate ration with sufficient levels of micronutrients; and the fact that an imported fortified blended food could not be included should have been considered when the ration was developed.

79. The importance of the inclusion of iodized salt in the ration (which has been done) is noteworthy given the generally low household use of iodized salt and lack of Government policy or regulation. The most recent Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS)<sup>55</sup> reported 83 percent of households in the East Region<sup>56</sup> use non-iodized salt (67 percent) or iodized salt of poor quality (16 percent). The ET found low availability of iodized salt in food markets, more so in the NGCA and particularly in the smaller markets, and thus its inclusion in the rations was a very positive move.

80. Beneficiary feedback, including PDM reports for WFP and their CPs, and corroborated during ET interviews, indicates that all ration foods are consumed and well liked.<sup>57</sup> Limited suggestions for changing food items have been received (in the PDM and to the ET), other than for the inclusion of fresh foods, such as fruits and vegetables, particularly during winter months, and meat and dairy products year round. Access to fresh fruits and vegetables is even more critical for IDPs who lack access to land and opportunities to garden. This finding was also supported by the recent UNICEF nutrition assessment of the elderly in GCA which reports low consumption of fresh foods, including fruit, meat and milk, particularly among those living on less than US\$2 per day, and recommends modifying food assistance to promote fresh fruits, vegetables, meat and milk products.<sup>58</sup>

81. WFP food consumption data supports the findings of the UNICEF nutrition assessment, in that the recent Food Security Assessment<sup>59</sup> reports high consumption of cereals and sugar with lower consumption of fats/oils and fresh foods, such as fruits, meat, milk, eggs and vegetables for poor and borderline food consumption groups, indicating that adjustments are warranted to improve macro/micronutrient composition and complementarity of the food ration.

82. Gender Considerations: To date, neither WFP Ukraine nor any other United Nations agency has carried out a gender analysis focused on the emergency. Thus this section will consider the extent to which gender was mainstreamed or integrated into WFP's operation. In accordance with WFP guidance, the CO has integrated gender into needs assessments, and the implementation, monitoring and reporting on food assistance, including the well-utilized beneficiary outreach and feedback hotlines.

83. The EMOP document noted that the October 2014 FSNA would disaggregate data by sex and age and collect information on gender issues, such as intra-household food

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<sup>55</sup> Ukraine Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (2012), December 2013.

<sup>56</sup> There are five Oblasts in the East Region of Ukraine: Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk.

<sup>57</sup> Current WFP beneficiaries who formerly received food assistance from ICRC and/or RAF and the Russian Federation reported preferring the WFP ration because of the high quality of the foods.

<sup>58</sup> As reported in the NSC minutes, 29 February 2016.

<sup>59</sup> Food Security Assessment Report November 2015, February 2016.

consumption and coping strategies employed by women, men, boys and girls. However, from reviewing the FSNA report, it appears this was not done. The next FSNA (March 2015) started to disaggregate food consumption and coping strategy data by gender and this has continued.

84. A later FSNA data showed that female-headed households had poorer food consumption and higher reduced coping strategy indexes; this information was used to help guide food assistance targeting and to establish targeting guidelines. The most recent report (November 2015) also disaggregates by age and sex, though the disaggregated data is not presented; based on its findings, elderly women and female-headed households were identified as among the most food insecure. It would be helpful for WFP to present the disaggregated data so that more information related to gender, the elderly and vulnerability was disseminated.

85. Regarding WFP's monitoring data, the focus group discussions and in-depth interviews report gender-specific findings, and WFP's PDM system reports findings disaggregated by gender.

86. WFP staff attended the Protection Cluster (PC) and the United Nations Gender Theme Group (UNGTG). The former FSC coordinator was receptive to protection and gender issues and invited the PC coordination to present to the FSC so that such issues were considered and incorporated in food assistance targeting criteria and revisions. The tip sheet for mainstreaming protection in food assistance was contextualized for Ukraine through a collaboration of the FSC PC coordinators.

87. Four WFP staff attended the two-day 'Gender in Humanitarian Action' organized by the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) last summer. New WFP staff and CPs are trained on gender and protection issues, including how to organize safe food assistance distributions, accountability and humanitarian principles, gender and protection. Several two-day training sessions were held throughout 2015, and in early 2016 there was a two-day training on 'Principled Humanitarian Action and Access' for staff, CPs and the humanitarian community conducted by HQ and RB. Further trainings are incorporated into the FLAs with CPs. CO staff had difficulty identifying ways that the trainings have translated into different approaches by the CO and their CPs. This may partially be explained by the fact that some of the trainings are recent, the WFP gender focal point was recently appointed and that the primary protection issue is access, which is not easily addressed, particularly by WFP alone.

88. Coherence: At that time of its development, the EMOP aligned with the Code of Ukraine 'On Civil Protection' (2012 № 5403-VI), Law of Ukraine 'On ensuring equal rights of women and men' (2005, № 52), State Program to Ensure Equal Rights, Opportunities for Women and Men for the Period until 2016,<sup>60</sup> and the National Action Plan to Implement the United Nations Security Council resolution 1325 "Women, Peace and Security" for the period 2020.<sup>61</sup>

89. More recently, legislation has been enacted directly relating to humanitarian needs, such as the 'Comprehensive National Program for Support, Social Adaptation and Reintegration of IDPs from the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine and Anti-Terrorist Operation Conduct Area to Other Regions of Ukraine'.<sup>62</sup> The EMOP and its BRs are coherent with the recent IDP legislation.

90. Throughout the evaluation period the key objective of the WFP emergency response remained the alignment with WFP's SO1. The in-kind food and CBT activities included in

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<sup>60</sup> Approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, 26 September 2013

<sup>61</sup> Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine [http://www.mlsp.gov.ua/labour/control/uk/publish/article?art\\_id=183136&cat\\_id=102036](http://www.mlsp.gov.ua/labour/control/uk/publish/article?art_id=183136&cat_id=102036)

<sup>62</sup> Enacted 16 December 2015 and will be in effect until 2017

the EMOP aligned with SO1 and with other internal policies and normative guidance. The ET found this overarching objective of the EMOP to be appropriate given the operational context on the ground throughout the period of the evaluation. An area where coherence with WFP's normative guidance could be strengthened is with improved analysis on efficiency and effectiveness to support the most appropriate choice of transfer modalities.

91. The proposed nutrition activity, the provision of a BFB for infants/young children also aligns with WFP Nutrition Policy (2012) and WFP's guidance on nutrition-specific programming (2012). However, as discussed, the specific foods have not been provided by WFP previously (puréed infant food) or do not meet their nutrition requirements (infant cereals).

92. One other area already mentioned which may need further attention to align with WFP's policy is addressing micronutrient deficiencies, such as anaemia among young children and pregnant women. The NSC, in its 2015 response plan, included a UNICEF request to procure micronutrient powders (MNPs) for young children and implement the required activities so that they could be appropriately distributed and used at the household level. However, this activity was later shelved because it was learned that obtaining Government approval would take too long. The recent infant anaemia surveillance data, as well as the WFP HQ Nutrition Unit approved option of distributing infant cereal with MNPs as part of the food ration, might warrant further NSC discussion.

93. WFP's internal guidance on Institutional Feeding (IF) is under revision, and without it it has not been possible to evaluate the appropriateness of the IF interventions in Ukraine.

94. WFP adopted the IASC Gender Marker (GM) guidance on the coding criteria in 2013, which gives a possible range of zero to 2a or 2b. The Ukraine EMOP rated a gender marker score of one during the review process.<sup>63</sup> This reflected the lack of information on gender issues that was left unaddressed in the EMOP. According to the CO, limited information related to gender and the emergency existed at that time. The ET notes that available information on Ukraine's gender issues could have been included and extrapolated to the emergency context.

95. More recently, comments from the BR3 Product Review Process (PRP) called for more elaboration on the streamlining of protection and gender into the operation, as well as adding the lessons learned in these areas since 2014 into the document. Although a section on gender was added to the final version of BR3, it still did not cover these topics. This was a missed opportunity, as the lessons related to gender (such as the ongoing need to collect disaggregated data) and protection issues related to the elderly, which assisted in setting the targeting criteria, would have been meaningful to highlight for the CO staff and others.

96. Complementarity: WFP did not meet all food assistance needs; rather through coordination, it worked to harmonize food assistance and complement other actors, although there were some challenges in Ukraine. The RAF, the largest distributor of in-kind food assistance, is a private foundation new to humanitarian assistance and not bound by the same international conventions; it has not yet been possible to harmonize food rations with them.<sup>64</sup> The Russian Federation also provided in-kind food assistance in

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<sup>63</sup> NfR s-PRP (10/2014) Ukraine EMOP No. 200765

<sup>64</sup> For example, RAF distributes infant formula in violation of the international code on breast milk substitutes (BMS) and the guidance adopted by the NSC, in that they allow mothers to choose whether they would like a food package for themselves to support their nutritional needs as a breastfeeding women, or infant formula to feed their infant. Assessment and counselling on the advantages, disadvantages and risks associated with using BMS is not provided as required in international code and Ukraine guidance. A recent RAF report indicates 25 percent of mothers with infants choose BMS. Condensed milk, a popular food in Ukraine is also provided in RAF food packages, in violation of the international BMS code and Ukraine NSC guidance and general good nutrition practice, given the high levels of overweight and dental caries.

NGCA. Although targeting criteria was shared, the timing and location of distributions was not. This situation has recently improved in Donetsk when the Russian Federation food distributions were discontinued.

97. WFP's assistance is more complementary with the ICRC's. Through regular sharing of distribution and targeting information across NGCA and GCA between WFP, CPs and the ICRC, overlaps are minimized. However, WFP's shorter duration of FA compared to the ICRC's complicates this.

98. Sporadically, WFP's FA is complemented by non-food items (NFIs), primarily hygiene kits. However, there is scope to work toward increasing this, especially because 15 percent of food voucher assistance is used to purchase hygiene products.<sup>65</sup> Currently discussions are underway between WFP and UNICEF to collaborate on a single beneficiary voucher for food and NFIs.

99. WFP's support to conflict-affected hospitals located in the GCAs complemented the WHO's health service strengthening through the presence of its mobile clinics.

100. Some partners are beginning early recovery activities, such as providing seeds and tools for relocated IDPs and conflict-affected residents, which WFP could complement with FA. WFP has discussed working with FAO, when they receive funding for gardening and small farm recovery activities; WFP could provide food assistance during the planting, growing and harvesting seasons.

101. Coordination: The Food Security Cluster (FSC) was officially activated in December 2014 with WFP assuming the role of coordinator.<sup>66</sup> However, as with the staffing approach to the WFP office, no clear strategy was established at the outset to staff and finance the FSC, leading to the same problems of continuity and consistency of approach mentioned elsewhere, especially in the earlier stages of the response. By the end of 2015, the FSC had had three different coordinators supplied through standby partners. The provision of the information manager by FAO was also intermittent, leaving the incumbent FSC coordinator to fill both roles for long periods. The first information manager was appointed in March 2015 and replaced by a second later in the year.

102. Only in BR3 of the EMOP was funding specifically earmarked for the staffing of the FSC with a P4 level professional officer as coordinator and two National Officers to enable the FSC to be decentralized to the field level in Donetsk and Kramatorsk. At the time of the evaluation mission, however, these positions still had to be filled, even though the last FSC coordinator (a Danish Refugee Council standby partner who arrived in June 2015) had left in December 2015. The CO had identified a replacement FSC coordinator who was expected to be in country by the end of February. The decentralized National Officers still had to be identified.

103. Engagement in the FSC was strong at the Kyiv level with up to 12 different agencies attending cluster meetings. However, the FSC website has no record of any meetings having taken place since October 2015, highlighting the problem of intermittent staffing and consistency.

104. The lack of decentralization of the FSC to field level has, to some extent, been mitigated by improvised and informal operational coordination led by the heads of the WFP area and sub-offices. Given the limited number of operational agencies at the field level, especially in the NGCA, informal coordination between partners has been relatively easy, but with some notable gaps in sustained engagement with the local authorities and some of the private initiatives who are unaccustomed to working with the international

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<sup>65</sup> According to Annex 20: Foods and non-food items redeemed with vouchers, which reports on how WFP vouchers are spent.

<sup>66</sup> The Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) did not have a permanent presence in the country at that time. Once they had established an office in Kyiv in March 2015, FAO supported the FSC with the provision of information managers.

community. With the planned decentralization of the FSC in the coming months the potential exists to strengthen coordination and information sharing and to take it beyond the operational level to provide a stronger evidence base for strategic planning.

105. When the FSC was initially launched, it was the Food Security and Nutrition Cluster; and at that time WFP co-led this cluster with UNICEF. The Global Nutrition Cluster Scoping Mission (February 2015) recommended moving nutrition under the Health Cluster. Although this was adopted in March 2015, with UNICEF becoming the sole chair and WFP's role changing to participant, building in a mechanism to strongly link the Nutrition Sub-Cluster (NSC) with the FSC was missing. One outcome of this was the missed opportunity, when the GFD ration was redesigned, to base it on a food and nutrient gap assessment.

106. The NSC has also suffered from intermittent and changing leadership. Since October 2015 this stabilized when a Centre for Disease Control (CDC) staff person was seconded to UNICEF with regular Ukraine missions, and the WHO nutritionist started co-chairing the NSC. How long this will continue is not clear. Meanwhile, with other competing cluster responsibilities and low prioritization of nutrition due to the low levels of acute malnutrition, staffing the NSC was not initially prioritized by UNICEF and more recently, they have had difficulties recruiting a qualified staff person to lead the NSC and UNICEF's nutrition programming. Although NSC meetings have occurred regularly and progress has been made and continues on nutrition assessments, policy development, coordination, training and harmonization of nutrition interventions, progress has been hindered by lack of consistent leadership, clear vision and an updated response plan.

107. WFP's participation in the NSC has been fairly constant, with the nutrition focal point participating regularly in NSC meetings. Her role, in the absence of NSC leadership, in chairing the Infant and Young Child Feeding (IYCF) advocacy task force and leading the production of materials was noted by one of the key partners. Conversely, the ET learned of problems of misinformation and miscommunication with other WFP staff, particularly in regard to the BFB as mentioned but in other areas as well.<sup>67</sup> The ET observed, through review of NSC meeting minutes, that the collaboration between WFP, the FSC and the NSC was limited; the FSC coordinator rarely attends NSC meetings. More collaboration may be starting, as recently a WFP staff person presented results from their latest FSNA at a NSC meeting, and discussion of the NSC collaborating on WFP's upcoming FSNA was also held.

108. Cash Working Group (CWG): Various humanitarian partners expressed the need for a technical CWG from the early stages of the crisis, to support the different clusters using cash-based interventions.<sup>68</sup> The CWG was established in October 2014, initially under the leadership of international non-government organizations (INGOs)<sup>69</sup>, and since April 2015 led by OCHA (with an expert seconded from DFID). The CWG has developed to fill an important role in bringing together partners engaged in CBT. The CWG complements more ad hoc cash coordination mechanisms led by the larger NGOs (such as Save the Children and the Danish Refugee Council) or the shelter cluster, which had taken on an earlier coordination role with multi-purpose cash transfers. The sustainability of the OCHA-led CWG is dependent on funding, which is not guaranteed.

109. Cash transfers in Ukraine have a varied application ranging from multi-purpose transfers to those intended for single purpose use such as for construction, rent, food, and various non-food items. Despite being invited, the Government counterparts have not been participants in the CWG despite their role in significant cash transfers through the

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<sup>67</sup> For example, the FSC circulated along with their targeting criteria an incorrect WFP ration that included *supercereal+*.

<sup>68</sup> Review of Cash Coordination in Ukraine, Nov 2015, UNHCR.

<sup>69</sup> Due to staffing constraints at this time, WFP was not in a position to take a lead role in the CWG

national safety net system and the need to harmonise, wherever possible, the use of cash transfers from different actors. The inability of the Government to share IDP registration lists because of privacy laws also increases the importance of a closely coordinated response from the humanitarian community to avoid overlaps and duplications of assistance.

110. The potential benefits of moving toward single, multi-purpose cash transfers based on a minimum expenditure basket are clear. This would significantly improve coordination and reduce overlaps, but also enhance the potential to harmonize assistance and its eventual integration into the safety net systems already being implemented in both GCA and NGCA.

111. In October 2015, the CWG established a task force, co-chaired by WFP, to specifically look at ways of improving the delivery and coordination of electronic CBT in Ukraine. The potential role for WFP to lead the wider community in a coordinated multi-purpose CBT, and to facilitate their delivery through the use of WFP's single platform technology and corporate beneficiary and transfer management system, SCOPE, was acknowledged.

112. The use of coordinated multi-sectoral cash transfers has been piloted in other operations using WFP's one card platform (in the Syria regional response, for instance), and along with the concept of multi-purpose cash, it remains the subject of much debate at the global level, although clear guidance from key agencies is still lacking in this area. In a highly monetized economy like Ukraine, which has the technical and financial infrastructure to deliver CBT throughout most of the country (with the exception of some conflict-affected areas) the advantages of a shift to multi-sectoral and/or multi-purpose CBT should be pro-actively explored, while acknowledging that this could pose some challenges to the mandates and business models of individual agencies.

## **2.2. Results of the Operation**

113. Overall, the results of the operation are good: on one hand, the IR-EMOP achieved nearly 100 percent of its planned outputs but on the other hand, the later EMOP faced a number of implementation challenges that hampered achieving its planned outputs, particularly for in-kind food. Regarding outcomes, the reported food consumption indicators, as expected, are higher when comparing beneficiaries' results pre- and post-food assistance. For cross-cutting issues, gender and protection indicators show some improvement, though the base value was high in Ukraine. Lastly, the accountability indicators have improved over the period of the EMOP and are higher than in other countries in the same WFP region (see Annex 21).

114. IR-EMOP 200759, from mid-August to mid-November 2014, was, to all intents and purposes, fully implemented with specified output indicators achieving almost 100 percent. No outcome indicators were defined for the IR-EMOP due to the short-term and immediate nature of the operation. All in-kind food was purchased locally and distributed through CPs identified in WFP's preparedness planning. The IR-EMOP laid the foundation for EMOP 200765 and some food parcels were carried over into the initial phases of that operation.

115. For the EMOP, even though the planned number of IDP beneficiaries was significantly lower than the number of residents, only 34 percent of them were reached by WFP. The issue of IDP definition, and the cumbersome process of their registration, remains one of the major challenges still facing the humanitarian community and the Government. Although no official data exists, there is a consensus amongst the agencies that a significant number of unregistered IDPs are residing in the GCA with frequent movement to and from NGCA. Such movement, including those identified as WFP

beneficiaries, was reported by CPs, and confuses the categorization of both residents and IDPs.

116. The category of ‘residents’ covers those beneficiaries living mainly in NGCA and the buffer zone. The FSNA in March and October 2015 found residents in these areas to be amongst the most food insecure and in September 2015 the FSC included hosting communities/residents of GCA living in the vicinity of the buffer zone as one of the targeting criteria. Table 1 below shows the beneficiary data for both the IR-EMOP and the subsequent EMOP.

**Table 1: Beneficiary data, planned vs actual, for IR-EMOP 200759 & EMOP 200765**

Beneficiary Category	Planned			Actual			% Planned vs Actual		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
<b>IR-EMOP 200759 Outputs: Beneficiaries (IDPs)</b>									
CBT	3,900	6,100	10,000	3,787	5,925	9,712	97.1	97.1	97.1
GFD/TFD*	6,100	11,900	18,000	6,246	11,754	18,000	102.4	98.7	100.0
Totals	10,000	18,000	28,000	10,033	17,679	27,712	100.3	98.2	99.0
<b>EMOP 200765 Outputs: Beneficiaries, 2014 (conflict affected)</b>									
CBT	27,000	53,000	80,000	0	0	0	0	0	0
GFD/TFD	19,792	20,208	40,000	2,048	5,964	8,012	10.3	29.5	20.0
Totals	46,792	73,208	120,000	2,048	5,964	8,012	4.4	8.1	6.7
<b>EMOP 200765 Outputs: Beneficiaries, 2015 (conflict affected)</b>									
CBT	n/a	n/a	120,000	n/a	n/a	121,159	n/a	n/a	101%
GFD/TFD	n/a	n/a	423,000	n/a	n/a	219,950	n/a	n/a	52%
Totals	196,566	346,434	543,000	139,673	201,436	341,109	71.1	58.1	62.8%

Source: WFP SPRs 2014 and 2015 [ \* Targeted food distribution]

117. WFP has recently begun rolling out its beneficiary data registration and reporting platform (SCOPE) in Ukraine which will strengthen their capacity to track beneficiary movement. SCOPE, which also has the potential for multi-agency use, has been proposed to other United Nations agencies and partners as a potential common beneficiary platform/database with the capacity to strengthen future coordination and targeting.

118. EMOP 200765 output indicators for 2015 show an overall level of implementation, in terms of beneficiaries reached, of 62 percent of planned. Table 2 illustrates how only some 27 percent of the planned beneficiaries were IDPs in 2015 and that the proportion of planned beneficiaries reached was also significantly higher for conflict-affected residents, indicating the reduction in newly displaced people requiring assistance.

**Table 2: Beneficiary data, planned vs actual by IDPs / Residents**

<b>EMOP 200765 Outputs: Beneficiaries, 2015</b>									
Beneficiary Category	Planned			Actual			% Planned vs Actual		
	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total	Male	Female	Total
IDPs	52,680	92,844	145,524	19,685	29,775	49,460	37.4	32.1	34.0
Residents	143,886	253,590	397,476	120,742	170,907	291,649	83.9	67.4	73.4
Totals	196,566	346,434	543,000	140,427	200,682	341,109	71.4	57.9	62.8

Source: WFP SPR 2015

119. In terms of commodities and CBT, the first two months of EMOP 200765 showed a low level of achievement against output indicators. Delays in signing field level agreements (FLA) with CPs, a restructuring within the Government authorities of Ukraine

which slowed down beneficiary identification, and longer than expected procurement times for the food parcels all contributed to low output levels, with distributions only properly starting at the beginning of 2015. Government-led IDP registration recorded almost twice as many women as men, due to the fear of conscription, which is reflected in the planned and actual output figures.

120. In-kind distributions, however, only achieved about 40 percent of the planned amounts. In-kind food parcels were largely targeted to NGCA. A lack of access for four months in 2015 significantly compromised WFP’s capacity to deliver planned quantities and was the main cause of this low implementation rate. Over 4,000 food parcels carried over from the IR-EMOP were distributed in December 2014 helping to mitigate the delayed start of distributions under EMOP 200765. Table 3 below shows these figures for both operations for 2014 and 2015.

**Table 3: Distribution data: planned vs actual, for IR-EMOP 200759 & EMOP 200765**

Transfer Modality	Planned	Actual	% Actual vs Planned
<b>IR-EMOP 200759 Outputs: Distribution</b>			
Commodity - food parcels	75 Mt	73 Mt	97.4 %
Vouchers	US\$450,000	US\$449,977	100.0 %
<b>EMOP 200765 Outputs: Distribution (2014)</b>			
Commodity - food parcels	878 Mt	97 Mt	11.1 %
Vouchers	US\$3,600,000	0	0 %
<b>EMOP 200765 Outputs: Distribution (2015)</b>			
Commodity – food parcels	12,145 Mt	4,777 Mt	39.3 %
Cash	0	US\$2,571,689	-
Vouchers	US\$10,800,000	US\$6,285,260	58.2 %
<b>Total CBT</b>	<b>US\$10,800,000</b>	<b>US\$8,856,949</b>	<b>82.0 %</b>

*Source: WFP SPRs 2014 & 2015*

121. The above tables also show that CBT (cash and vouchers together) used 82 percent of the planned budget in 2015 and reached 100 percent of the planned caseload (Table 1). This discrepancy is partly accounted for by the devaluation of the Ukrainian currency (UAH) against the US dollar at the end of 2014/early 2015 allowing WFP to decrease the value of CBT in US dollar terms, thereby reaching more beneficiaries with the available resources.

122. The relatively low rate of voucher distribution at 58 percent (see Table 3 above) is artificially reduced as the WFP corporate financial system does not have the capacity to disaggregate cash and voucher figures at the planning level. The actual voucher distribution is therefore shown as a percentage of the overall planned CBT, which includes an amount for cash transfers that should have been disaggregated.

123. Data on the base value indicators were collected on a rolling basis among a representative sample of selected beneficiaries just prior (within one month) of their first receipt of food assistance. Following distribution, during the three-month period they received food assistance, a sample of beneficiaries was interviewed; this data was averaged and provided the post-distribution values or outcome data as reported.

124. The three outcome indicators and their base and post-distribution values, along with the target set by WFP, are included in Table 4 below. The results indicate that the food assistance has been effective in improving food consumption and dietary diversity and in reducing coping strategies after both rounds of distributions. The given targets were set to be lower (or higher) than the base value measured during the first round of

monitoring (April-May 2015) and achieved among beneficiaries at the following post-distribution monitoring (March-June 2015) and thus may need adjusting. As mentioned, prior to February 2016 WFP's monitoring system did not collect any follow-up information from beneficiaries (after they stopped receiving food assistance) to assess ongoing needs and if the duration of assistance had been appropriate.

**Table 4: EMOP 200765 Outcome Indicators**

Indicator and Target	Base Value April-May 2015	Base Value June-July & Oct. '15	Post Distribution Mar-Jun '15	Post Distribution Jul-Dec. 2015
<b>Food Consumption</b>				
Percentage of households (HH) with poor food consumption < 7 %	7 %	4 %	3 %	0 %
Percentage of HH with borderline food consumption	18 %	23 %	13 %	11 %
Percentage of HH with poor and borderline food consumption < 25 %	25 %	27 %	16 %	11 %
Dietary Diversity Increased >5.1	5.1	5.3	5.7	5.6
Coping Strategy Index reduced or stabilized <20.3	20.3	11.1	9.9	4.9

Source: WFP PDM Reports

**125.** The cross-cutting indicators include three gender indicators (as presented in Table 5 below), a protection indicator and one accountability indicator, as well as two indicators related to partners' inputs of funds. Complementary services and inputs were not reported, as they did not appear relevant considering the emergency context in Ukraine; see operational fact sheet for information on complementary services and inputs.

**Table 5: Cross cutting Indicators: Gender**

Indicator	Target	Base value	Dec. 2014	Dec. 2015
Proportion of households where females and males jointly decide over the use of cash, voucher or food (FA)	>28 %	33 %	n/a	35 %
Proportion of households where females make decisions over the use of FA	>60 %	63 %	n/a	55 %
Proportion of households where males make decisions over the use of FA	<12 %	4 %	n/a	10 %

Source: WFP SPR 2015

**126.** Two of the three gender indicators improved over the base values, suggesting that they were achieved. However, gender issues in Ukraine have to be seen in a context where the women have higher levels of education and more autonomy than in many other countries where WFP works. It is usual for a Ukrainian woman to manage household funds along with shopping and preparing foods, so it is unsurprising that in such a high percentage of households women make decisions about the use of food assistance. However, more recent data shows this may be changing where there appears to be more male involvement in the use of food assistance, which may be attributed to higher levels of unemployed men and them taking on more household responsibilities.<sup>70</sup>

**127.** The high proportion of households where women decide on how food assistance is used may also reflect the higher percentage of female-headed households targeted for benefits. From a review of the demographics included in the monitoring reports, approximately 60 percent of beneficiary households are female-headed.

<sup>70</sup> This is similar to a finding in the KIIS Analytical Report: Needs and Concerns of the Population of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions in Terms of Access to Food Products, July 2015, which relates that if a man does not work, he may be more involved in food purchase and preparation.

128. Since the conflict, women have taken a more proactive stance in solving local problems and protecting their families. This is partially due to men losing their self-esteem as they have lost jobs, compounded by their loss of unemployment benefits and other social assistance, and their reluctance to register as IDPs for fear of conscription. Men were also not targeted for food or other humanitarian assistance, and therefore depended on their family members, particularly their wives, who have more readily assumed responsibility for the registration, receipt and use of humanitarian assistance. It is reported that men’s loss of role as ‘provider’ for their families is contributing to increased domestic violence and alcohol abuse.<sup>71</sup> This is an issue that the humanitarian community is trying to address and it presents an opportunity and challenge for WFP to consider how its food assistance can better support unemployed men.

129. Since the onset of the conflict, Government spending on health and social benefits has been shrinking and negatively impacting women, such as a decrease in benefits at childbirth, a reduction in civil servant and social work jobs (of which 75 percent are filled by women), while their living costs (e.g. food, utilities) have increased. At the same time, the lack of social support services has resulted in the increased burden on women for the care of sick, elderly, the disabled and other family members.

130. The target for the protection indicator relates to potential safety issues at food distribution sites and in transporting food home. The target was met when the base value was assessed and has increased slightly to 100 percent, as shown in Table 6 below. However, other protection issues related to access and human rights violations exist in the Ukraine context as discussed in other parts of the report. Another potential protection/access issue, such as housebound/disabled elderly not being able to access food assistance, would not be detected through interviewing beneficiaries, although it appears that providing food assistance to caregivers of the elderly helps to address this.<sup>72</sup>

**Table 6: Cross-cutting Indicators: Protection**

Indicator	Target	Base value	Dec. 2014	Dec. 2015
Proportion of assisted people travelling to, from or at project site without safety problems	>80 %	99 %	n/a	100 %

*Source: WFP Draft SPR 2015*

131. When visiting food distributions, the ET interviewed a number of beneficiaries who confirmed that safety was not an issue. At distribution sites, beneficiaries were observed using multiple modes of transportation (bikes, cars, wagons, etc.) and almost none reported having paid for the transportation of food rations, or that transporting it had been a problem.<sup>73</sup> Strong social networks were reported, in that neighbours helped each other and rarely were transportation services purchased.

132. Table 7 below shows that the targets for accountability have not been achieved, although an increase in all three indicators over the base value was recently reported. It may be difficult for the CO to improve these results given their recent arrival in Ukraine and the local authorities’ resistance to allowing WFP to carry out an awareness campaign. Thus they must rely on the education provided at distribution sites and the food assistance information provided by the hotlines managed by their CPs, which could potentially be strengthened. See also Annex 21: Ukraine accountability indicators relative to those in other contexts where comparisons are made with beneficiaries from other countries in the WFP region.

<sup>71</sup> Personal communication with UNFPA field staff; and Severodonetsk and UNFPA Mobile Team Reports, 2016.

<sup>72</sup> Based on review of FSC criteria and ET conversations with CPs and beneficiaries.

<sup>73</sup> One ET home visit was with an elderly woman who complained of having to pay her neighbour to transport her food parcel.

**Table 7: Cross cutting Indicators: Accountability**

Indicator	Target <sup>74</sup>	Base value	December 2014	December 2015
1. Do you know how people were chosen to receive assistance?	n/a	39 %	n/a	50 %
2. Were you told exactly how much would receive?	n/a	57 %	n/a	68 %
3. Do you know who to contact?	n/a	34	n/a	41 %
Proportion of assisted people informed about programme ( <i>must have said yes to all three questions</i> )	>80 %	21 %	n/a	25 %

Source: WFP SPR 2015

133. Despite the clear achievements of the WFP response to date, there have been a number of factors noted by the ET that have impacted on the overall efficiency of the operation, as discussed below.

134. **Staffing:** Throughout the period of the evaluation, WFP has struggled to maintain adequate staffing levels, to increase staff numbers over time, and build the necessary capacity among national staff who had no prior experience of working in a humanitarian response. Only in April 2015 was a permanent international Head of Office (HoO) appointed, pending the arrival of a Country Director. The arrival of the HoO enabled WFP to start consolidating its presence in Ukraine which had until then consisted mainly of international staff and consultants on short-term missions, supported by a small and inexperienced national staff.

135. Of 15 international staff assigned to Ukraine at the time of the evaluation mission, only three were full time international professional staff with the others being a mix of short-term professionals, consultants or stand-by partners. Many are on short contracts and required to take mandatory breaks in service, whether or not this fits in with the demands of the operation. International staff are complemented by some 34 national staff who, while educated and professional in outlook, have no previous experience of WFP operations, or the broader humanitarian emergency environment in which they are working. This puts additional pressure on a small, and transitory, international staff.

136. While difficult to quantify, it is inevitable that the inability of WFP to deploy a core team of international professional staff at the outset of the emergency has been a weakness leading to inefficiencies and delays in programme development and delivery. If despatched, they could have remained for a more adequate length of time, provided early consistency of approach, and quickly developed and trained a strong in-country team. This is reflective of a broader weakness in WFP at the corporate level that was also recognised in the Executive Director's memorandum of July 2014<sup>75</sup> and again noted in the 2015 evaluation of WFP's Syrian Crisis regional response.<sup>76</sup>

137. **Administration:** Other inefficiencies were triggered by the time it took for WFP to be accredited with the Government of Ukraine. Many WFP internal procedures had to be managed and approved at the RB level due to both the lack of in-country accreditation and delegation of authority. These additional layers of bureaucracy created inefficiencies and delays in many administrative issues, such as procurement, invoicing, staff contracting and salaries which, while not insurmountable, absorbed valuable staff time and detracted from the smooth implementation of a fast-moving emergency response.

<sup>74</sup> Only a target for the combined indicator has been set.

<sup>75</sup> Source: <http://docustore.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/cd/wfp266472.pdf>

<sup>76</sup> An Evaluation of WFP's Regional Response to the Syrian Crisis, 2011-2014, Drummond, Khoury, Bailey, Crawford, Fan, Milhem, Zyck, 2015

138. In terms of operational efficiency, the following factors were identified:

- Access to NGCA was interrupted for four months in 2015 leading to a suspension in the regular supply of food parcels and under-implementation at the output level;
- Planning at the beneficiary level often being driven by resources, with potential beneficiary lists being subject to secondary screening by CPs to reduce the numbers, making the process more cumbersome and less efficient;
- Limitations imposed by donors on committed funds prompted WFP to distribute for three months in advance, leading to unusually high distribution figures in December 2015, following the lifting of the suspension to NGCA, but also for CBT in GCA;
- An increase in the number of agencies operating in the GCA in the contact line/buffer zone areas, exacerbated by the problems with accreditation in NGCA. This led to increased problems of coordination, and the ET observed duplication of food assistance in one village in the GCA near the contact line;
- Once access was restored to the NGCA, internal WFP bureaucratic delays in amending contractual details with the suppliers to adjust destinations and prices led to delays of some weeks in restarting distributions;
- The relative cost efficiency of the different transfer modalities used by WFP is not regularly monitored, thereby hiding possible cost inefficiencies that may be caused by using the current mix of modalities;
- Substitutions of foodstuffs in the food parcels (GFD and institutional) could save money without compromising nutrition (for example, giving dried rather than canned beans);
- Implementing the BFB as planned for IYC could reduce costs, as the current IYC package is more expensive than the BFB. In April 2015, the BFBs were estimated at 250 UAH/about US\$10, compared to US\$18 for the food parcels.
- Harmonizing the in-kind rations for the social institutions with the ICRC and providing the foods in bulk would save money and facilitate its use by institutions.

139. WFP's response to date has been deliberately short-term in nature with the vast majority of food assistance being targeted with the intention of addressing either immediate or short-term food needs up to three months. No support has yet been targeted for children aged six-23 months and for food insecure individuals in social institutions in NGCA. The longer-term benefits of the operation to date are, therefore, difficult to ascertain.

140. As seen from the outcome indicators analysed above, it is evident that both in-kind food and CBT had an immediate and positive impact on the food consumption scores (FCS) of the beneficiaries. However, monitoring is not carried out to determine how these same beneficiaries cope in the longer term after the assistance has come to an end, or if WFP's support was sufficient to bridge the gap until these individuals could be absorbed into the national and local authority safety nets, or find other ways to support themselves, as originally intended. From the ET's field visits it was evident that WFP assistance had been required, and had provided critical support to beneficiaries, at the height of the crisis. It was also clear that longer term needs do exist but that these were, in large part, due to a growing economic crisis and continued conflict.

141. Apart from the short-term benefits intended at the beneficiary level with the WFP response, there are important and, to date, largely unplanned secondary benefits linked to capacity building of the local authorities in GCA. By learning from engagement, authorities will be more enabled to respond more effectively to any possible future crises of this nature, and this should be considered in terms of the longer-term sustainability of the WFP response. Due to the potential volatility of the situation, the humanitarian needs

could re-escalate at short notice and the local authorities should be capacitated to sustain the necessary humanitarian response themselves.

142. Logistics: As a food surplus country, in which some 97 percent of foodstuffs consumed are produced domestically, food cannot be imported without special exemption, including for WFP. The WFP ration was comprised of locally produced and procured commodities, ready packed in commercial packaging, and made up as a monthly parcel in cardboard boxes by a contracted supplier. The contract is on a Delivered at Place (DAP) basis and covers procurement of the individual items, packing into food parcels, and delivery to final delivery points managed by WFP's CPs.

143. The use of local suppliers and logistics service providers, and a ready-made and easy to use food parcel, is very appropriate to the context of Ukraine. In the NGCA and conflict affected areas, special arrangements and clearances are necessary for aid deliveries and this is coordinated through the logistics cluster. This cluster is led by WFP under a Special Operation (SO) outside the EMOP, and was regarded as a functional cluster by stakeholders.<sup>77</sup>

144. The delivery of CBT is contracted out to either the retailer Brusnichka in the case of the electronic vouchers, or Oschad Bank in the case of the cash transfers.

145. Due to the WFP's slow accreditation in Ukraine, the CO was unable to tender for and finalise contracts, even with suppliers and service providers within the country. The CO therefore had to rely on UNDP and the RB to tender, negotiate and sign contracts, and make payments, adding a heavy administrative burden on an already overstretched office that resulted in bureaucratic delays.

146. Use of transfer: no evidence of misuse or resale of in-kind food parcels was noted by the ET and only minimal levels recorded in PDM. While the use of the cash transfer is extremely difficult to monitor, especially in an environment where the majority of beneficiaries have access to different sources of cash, the retailers who issue the electronic food vouchers for WFP provided detailed usage reports. Although categories of 'undesirable' products (such as alcohol and cigarettes) are blocked from the voucher, some 35 percent of the voucher value was still being used on non-food items and foods of low nutritional value (see Annex 20). Further analysis is required by the CO to see how this may, or may not, impact the achievement of project objectives and outcomes.

147. CBT: the ET saw that, in some areas, cash was being used as a transfer by more than one agency for different purposes and that the use of cash transfers was generally growing. While the number of agencies involved is still relatively small, serious questions arise about the appropriateness and coordination of multiple CBT from different agencies, often to the same individuals. The mission noted that WFP has the corporate capacity to manage multi-purpose, multi-agency/sectoral cash transfers and is currently introducing its corporate beneficiary and transfer management system (SCOPE) into Ukraine.

### **2.3. Factors Affecting the Results**

#### External Factors

148. NGCA/GCA authorities' lack of understanding of humanitarian principles: the lack of preparedness of the Government and local authorities to effectively respond to the humanitarian needs was compounded by their lack of understanding of a typical humanitarian response and the principles that guide that response. The very delayed enactment of legislation to support the adaptation and reintegration of IDPs from the areas of conflict is a good example of this. The lack of experience with emergency response and of addressing humanitarian needs, and no law or policy guidance, contributed

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<sup>77</sup> The logistics SO did not fall under this evaluation.

towards - and continues to influence - the varied levels and quality of engagement by Government counterparts.

149. Conflict-related factors: The NGCA areas of Donetsk and Luhansk, the buffer zones and the GCAs affected are subject to rapidly changing conditions on the ground. It remains challenging to develop and foster working relationships with the new and evolving Government bodies in NGCA since officials responsible for humanitarian assistance often change along with their priorities and requirements for accreditation. WFP's inability to be accredited in Donetsk NGCA has made working with official humanitarian counterparts difficult.<sup>78</sup>

150. From late 2015, increasing numbers of returnees to NGCA/GCA have made it difficult to keep MoSP social benefits and Government registered IDP lists up to date with the confusing and shifting patterns of needs, often making it difficult for the vulnerable to access Government stipends and/or humanitarian assistance. Inflation and the high price of food is another significant factor, particularly in the NGCA. Between March 2014 and September 2015, national food prices increased by about 48 percent and more than doubled in NGCA,<sup>79</sup> although more recently food prices in the NGCA appear to be normalizing along with the functioning of food markets. Food prices in markets in GCA and NGCA have been and continue to be monitored by WFP.

151. Some positive factors also exist. The ET observed a high level of organization among the local authorities responsible for food and other assistance in their towns in the Luhansk and Donetsk NGCA. The authorities knew their constituents and had developed a systematic approach to creating and updating lists of vulnerable residents (for example, using hospital out-patient lists), according to criteria supplied by WFP CPs and others providing food assistance. They appeared to understand the eligibility criteria well and to know which beneficiaries were receiving food and other assistance from other humanitarian actors. The long-standing resilience of the Ukrainian people, although clearly stretched, was also observed, particularly among conflict-affected residents who still had access to land. A high level of social cohesion and strong social networks were observed at food distributions and home visits, where beneficiaries and neighbours helped each other with transporting food, and supported each other in other ways.

152. Coordination: the unfamiliarity with a humanitarian situation and an international response has inevitably led to questions about how such a response is usually planned, implemented and coordinated between the different stakeholders. Local volunteer and civil society groups were the first to reach the displaced people in the GCA with an initial response. The authorities themselves, on all sides, have been slow to identify needs and recognise the need for a coordinated response to the crisis. These gaps in understanding remain wide, although incremental improvements were noted in some areas.

153. In the Government structures at the central level, responsibilities for the humanitarian response seem to be largely split between the SES and the MoSP but no strong functional coordinating mechanism (either between themselves or with the humanitarian community) has yet been established. In the GCA at the Oblast level the ET observed a stronger level of operational understanding and coordination developing between the authorities and the humanitarian agencies (led by OCHA and including WFP). This slow but positive development of an operational relationship with the authorities at the field level urgently needs to be replicated at the central level, and also in the NGCA, in order to facilitate the ongoing planning and delivery of assistance in a strategic and coordinated fashion.

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<sup>78</sup> As the ET experienced, sometimes they refuse to meet and discuss with WFP staff.

<sup>79</sup> WFP Market Update #6 (August-September 2015).

154. In the NGCA, the acting authorities in Donetsk and Luhansk have even weaker linkages with, and understanding of, the international humanitarian response. This is further compounded by political considerations and a desire to control, rather than coordinate in a transparent manner, the interventions of international agencies. Authorities are currently requiring agencies to seek formal accreditation with them as a precondition of being allowed to implement programmes in their areas of control. Further, while the international agencies can strive to better coordinate their responses in NGCA between themselves, difficulties to coordinate meaningfully are compounded by significant quantities of food assistance entering these territories from both Russia and Ukraine itself, delivered by the RAF.

155. Despite the constraints, the ET noted in both GCA and NGCA that the WFP field staff were very pro-active in trying to develop good working relations, not just with partner agencies involved in food assistance but also with the authorities. The ET concluded that WFP field staff efforts to engage with the local authorities were, within the constraints mentioned above, as productive as they could be but would benefit from more consistent higher level advocacy and support at the political level in Kyiv, Luhansk and Donetsk.

156. Throughout the evaluation period, the lack of establishment of coherent coordination mechanisms on the side of the authorities has, in turn, made it difficult for the humanitarian community to develop a well-coordinated response. The mission noted that at the operational level this situation was beginning to improve in GCA with authorities starting to regularly engage with coordination mechanisms established by OCHA. But systematic coordination throughout the humanitarian response remains weak and a shared common understanding of the big picture among the various stakeholders does not yet seem to exist.

157. As with many operations in their initial phases, there remains a lack of clarity around the numbers of those who are war-affected and in need of assistance. The situation remains dynamic and Government systems are not able to effectively de-register IDPs who have returned. Also, IDP benefits made available through the official safety nets create an incentive for them not to de-register themselves, which complicates the identification of those in real need of assistance. This situation is further compounded by the different application of targeting criteria<sup>80</sup> by the various agencies whose business models do not necessarily promote the consolidation and standardisation of intervention approaches as they compete for limited resources. In the NGCA a reluctance to share basic information with international partners creates significant difficulties in agencies' ability to systematically identify and target needs.

158. The Government has an extensive social safety nets system, accounting for some 14 percent of its GDP in 2013, which now includes cash entitlements made available to IDPs. Some cash safety nets such as pensions also appear to be in evidence in the NGCA. There is anecdotal feedback that some people are drawing entitlements in both GCA and NGCA. In a stable environment official safety nets should be adequate to cover the basic needs of the population but rising prices, exacerbated by a worsening economic situation in the country, are stretching the ability of people to safeguard their basic needs with existing levels of social transfers. WFP, with other agencies, should strive to ensure that the humanitarian response remains focused on addressing needs created by the conflict and does not become blurred with those being created by broader economic difficulties.

159. Access: A lack of access to NGCA from July to October 2015 prevented WFP and its CPs from delivering assistance to those in need for a significant period. The restriction on

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<sup>80</sup> WFP CPs use the targeting criteria developed by the FSC. However, when provided the numbers of beneficiaries they can serve, reducing the lists of potential beneficiaries is needed; at this point, they apply their own more specific targeting criteria.

agencies able to work in NGCA is linked to the authorities' insistence on registration and being 'accredited' to the authorities, which is politically difficult for some agencies, particularly the United Nations.

160. Import restrictions: As a food surplus country Ukraine is a net exporter of agricultural and food products and does not allow WFP to import in-kind commodities for distribution. This limits the options for WFP to deliver a BFB, as discussed earlier, which meets the safety and nutritional standards stipulated in WFP's guidance.

161. Resourcing levels: EMOP 200765, including BR2, had resourcing requirements of US\$55,981,055. By 31 December 2015, the appeal had received income (or commitments) amounting to US\$31,524,259, or 56 percent, roughly correlating with the level of implementation, which according to the output indicators reached some 62 percent of the targeted caseload in 2015. A combination of external and internal factors as discussed would have prevented WFP delivering at 100 percent even if the funds were available. This makes it difficult to attribute all of the under-performance in 2014/15 to a lack of resources although it would have been a contributing factor. It was not possible for the ET to ascertain that funding levels would be maintained through 2016 and donors interviewed did feel that it would be difficult to sustain current levels of support for humanitarian action over the longer term.

162. Donor perception of WFP: Donors' perception of WFP is generally favourable and for the most part they highly appreciate WFP's work. The CO has done a good job of developing and fostering relationships with their donors; gaps may exist with newer donor representatives still orienting themselves to Ukraine and not yet having had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with WFP's work. WFP's planned donor visit to project sites in Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts, including NGCA, is an example of their work in maintaining the engagement of donors and sharing information.<sup>81</sup>

#### Internal Factors

163. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E): Despite the efforts at the start of the EMOP to increase M&E capacity, the recruited national officer left after receiving training and the recruitment of a United Nations Volunteer (UNV) took several months, with visa issues further delaying his arrival. The CO gap was addressed by the RB M&E unit staff who did an excellent job of backstopping. They negotiated the third-party monitoring (TPM) arrangement, designed the monitoring tools and trained the TPM organization's staff and CP staff by the end of March 2015. The TPM arrangement was extremely useful to WFP: over the course of nine months, TPM provided the CO with more than 4,000 baseline and post-distribution questionnaires on outcome and cross-cutting indicators, distribution monitoring and market/price surveillance.

164. In addition, the RB M&E unit supported the CO in a number of monitoring functions, such as data analysis, technical support and in the rolling out of WFP's corporate monitoring and data tracking system, COMET. Supporting the Ukraine CO was also useful to the RB, as the Bureau used Ukraine as a successful test case which helped them to develop and pilot a user-friendly and practical Emergency M&E Package (EMEP) that is being used elsewhere in the region and beyond, and was launched on 09 February 2016.

165. The UNV finally arrived in April 2015,<sup>82</sup> and in June 2015 a Vulnerability Analysis and Mapping (VAM) office was established under his responsibility. In October the national M&E officer was replaced and a second national M&E staff person hired (delayed

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<sup>81</sup> The well-attended ET debrief, where one of the donors thanked WFP for their transparency in undergoing an evaluation and sharing the results, is another example of their open and excellent relationship with donors, as well as other stakeholders.

<sup>82</sup> From December 2015, the UNV was put onto a consultancy contract.

due to the difficulty in finding qualified applicants), further strengthening the unit's ability to collect, store and analyse information.

166. Notwithstanding the M&E unit's initial successes, the timing of the measurement of outcome indicators just before and during the initial distributions did not provide meaningful information on the medium and longer-term impacts.<sup>83</sup> Another issue identified was the lack of the reporting of disaggregated M&E data, such as by transfer modalities (cash beneficiaries are not separated from voucher beneficiaries).<sup>84</sup> Data is not always presented by GCA vs. NCGA; and sufficient age (< two years old) and life cycle groups (pregnant/lactating/elderly) are not presented separately, to enable estimation of sub-groups of beneficiaries or to monitor nutrition needs and the impact of assistance among particular groups (the elderly, for example). One reason for this is that more detailed FSNA reports could affect WFP's fragile relationship with local authorities in NGCA where data collection is not officially allowed. Lastly, the CO monitoring system also does not include any systematic analysis to support the choice of transfer modality.

167. In-country infrastructure: The lack of WFP's in-country presence created a number of challenges which affected the smooth implementation of the programme through to mid-2015 when the HoO could start to focus on the establishment of a proper office infrastructure, including more permanent staffing and the systematic application of WFP management processes and systems. The staff time and energy required to establish a stable, functional office competed with the implementation of the emergency response adding additional pressures to an already overstretched staff.

168. Staffing: The lack of a clear staffing strategy for the first six months of the WFP response, as discussed above, left the operation with an intermittent and overstretched country team in its early stages, with different staff and consultants rotating through the operation on a short-term basis (see paras 134-136 above). This approach also adversely affected the FSC which, although launched as early as December 2014, had three coordinators and two information managers in its first 12 months and at the time of the mission had also not had a coordinator in place since the previous one left in December 2015. Given the relatively short time since the establishment of a consolidated office in Kyiv, and the opening of field offices in Kramatorsk, Severodonetsk, Donetsk and Luhansk, the mission observed a highly motivated office and staff who had been, and were still, performing well given the constraints. They had established good networks and partnerships with all principal stakeholders. At the field level, staff were seen to be very effective in establishing positive working relationships with partners and local authorities, despite specific challenges of access and coordination in the NGCA.

169. Focus on implementation: It became evident to the ET that the CO has had to devote most of its resources to establishing its presence, the in-country infrastructure and implementing the WFP response. Overstretched staff had little time to do more than identify unfolding events, adapt to changing circumstances, and consolidate WFP's operational response, so the bigger picture appears fragmented and a common understanding is not shared by staff, or between agencies. This is hampering the ability of WFP and other agencies to respond and plan in a more strategic manner.

170. Support from WFP's RB and HQ: The preparedness measures initiated by the RB in early to mid-2014 undoubtedly played a very positive role in the start-up of the WFP response in Ukraine. Notwithstanding issues already discussed, the subsequent quality and level of internal WFP support that the CO received, particularly from the RB, was generally good and much appreciated by the CO, especially in the earlier stages of the operation when staff had frequently been deployed to support the Ukraine operation. The

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<sup>83</sup> This may be partially addressed (from February 2016) as former beneficiary interviews were added under the continuing TPM contract.

<sup>84</sup> This may also be addressed, as disaggregating data by transfer modality has also been recently initiated.

CO considered that the RB nutritionist had been responsive and provided quality technical assistance, although the ET questions this, given her remote participation in the development of the BFB ration and its sub-optimal nutritional value.<sup>85</sup> Support from WFP HQ (as it relates to the IRCTAG), was insufficient due to lack of human resources and caused delays at field level.<sup>86</sup>

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### **3. Conclusions and Recommendations**

#### **3.1. Overall Assessment**

171. The following section on conclusions is broken down into five sections, covering relevance/coherence/appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, impact, and sustainability.

172. Relevance, Coherence and Appropriateness: WFP's initial choice of transfer modalities appears to be generally appropriate in terms of feasibility and practicality but, with the benefit of more than a year of implementation, now needs to be supported by a stronger evidence base. Future opportunities to expand CBT should be carefully considered based on a more careful assessment of its appropriateness in terms of cost efficiency and effectiveness, and as it relates to achieving programme objectives rather than just the feasibility and practicality of implementation.

173. If more detailed analysis indicates positive advantages of cash over vouchers and/or in-kind food transfers in meeting WFP's food security objectives, and as more agencies begin to engage with cash transfers, there is a growing need for the wider community to consider coordinated multi-sectoral and/or multi-purpose single cash transfers, despite the challenges this poses to different agencies in terms of mandate and operational responsibility. WFP is well positioned to take a lead role in such an approach.

174. The security and political situation in eastern Ukraine remains fragile and the general humanitarian response so far has had very short-term horizons. The Government of Ukraine and local authority ownership of the humanitarian response remains weak and the international response is still quite fragmented in its approach. Coordination between the international community and the local authorities has also been weak but is seen to be improving slowly, especially at the field level in GCA, though the technical capacity of Government and national partners remains under-developed.

175. The availability of resources from donors and the Governments of Ukraine and Russia to support and/or absorb an ongoing humanitarian need in eastern Ukraine were unclear and, from the perspective of most donors appeared to be diminishing. At the same time, the ongoing needs, while rapidly changing from short-term immediate assistance to medium and longer-term recovery, clearly remain unmet.

176. Against this context, it is unlikely that the short-term benefits of the WFP response to date can be sustained over the medium to long term without first developing a medium to longer term approach with a focus on recovery and capacity building around humanitarian response. A phased integration of WFP support with that of the Government, and local authorities in NGCA, with the clear intention of these authorities assuming full responsibility for the needs of the local population in the foreseeable future, is required to ensure sustainability.

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<sup>85</sup> Unfortunately the RB nutritionist went on an extended leave at the end of November and thus was not available to provide input into this evaluation and her hand-over notes on this topic were brief.

<sup>86</sup> As previously noted, the IRCTAG was not initially designed to respond quickly to new product reviews. (Personal communication, WFP HQ technical staff.)

177. As in-kind food assistance is likely to continue in areas without fully functioning markets/financial infrastructure, an assessment of beneficiaries' food consumption<sup>87</sup>) is needed, because of changes in the context and the ration's overall low micronutrient and calorie content. Efforts to improve beneficiaries' access to fresh foods are also needed, particularly for IDPs and for all during the winter months.

178. Institutional feeding as implemented in collaboration with WHO and MoH was timely, taking into account the needs. However, it could be considered inappropriate when it takes over a Government responsibility and should not be implemented in GCA and NGCA without an exit strategy that includes a handover plan to the authorities. The appropriateness of the institutional feeding ration may also be questioned because of its over-reliance on flour, lack of iodized salt and overall poor nutritional content. Providing foods in bulk, as the ICRC does, could save costs and facilitate its use. An assessment could help ensure that institutional meals meet minimum daily nutrition requirements and that the foods provided are appropriate and complementary to those available to the institutions from elsewhere.

179. Some of WFP's delay in providing a nutrition intervention is understandable and HQ IRC's decision to place the BFB on hold was well founded, based on the sub-optimal nutritional composition of the planned rations and food safety concerns. However, the process took too long and was not well understood by the CO. As a result, WFP's stature among the NSC and nutrition partners was undermined. Having a nutritionist in the CO would have helped them understand and communicate the decisions taken by the HQ IRC, and to develop and implement options to take the BFB plans forward and resolve the food rations issues.

180. Within the options provided by the HQ Nutrition Unit, opportunities exist for the CO to provide a fortified infant cereal as part of the food ration: WFP in collaboration with the NSC and MoH could request governmental approval to distribute MNPs for young children, and if feasible, WFP could support the local production of a fortified blended food that meets WFP's standards.

181. The CO has integrated gender and protection into its trainings well, including needs assessment and programme monitoring, and this information has been applied in making programming decisions. However, further presentation and dissemination of gender and protection data/information is needed.

182. Efficiency: The RB's preparedness efforts for a potential response in Eastern Ukraine greatly facilitated the early phase of intervention. Scoping missions and preparatory studies begun in the first half of 2014 enabled WFP to move quickly and efficiently to deliver a small initial response under IR-EMOP 200759. This in turn laid the groundwork for the design and implementation of EMOP 200765.

183. The delay in accreditation of WFP by the Government of Ukraine, finally secured only in December 2015, significantly hampered WFP's ability to efficiently administer its response. The inability for WFP to appoint a Country Director and open bank accounts meant that much of WFP's administration, from national staff contracts to procurement contracts, had to be administered through UNDP and the WFP RB resulting in a heavy bureaucratic burden at a time when WFP needed to be at its most responsive.

184. An inadequate staffing response has compromised the efficiency of the operation. While individual staff are clearly dedicated and highly motivated, their deployment in the initial months of the operation was sporadic and inconsistent. Most were/are on short-

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<sup>87</sup> According to the SPHERE Standards, when a ration under 2,100 calories is designed, an assessment of beneficiaries' food consumption should be carried out, to ensure that the ration meets food and nutrient gaps and adequately complements the locally available foods consumed.

term missions and/or contracts, often needing to take mandatory breaks in service. High turnover of international staff was further exacerbated by the initial lack of experience of national staff, who required a high level of mentoring in the early stages of the operation. This inevitably led to inefficiencies from the early stages of the response until the CO consolidated its presence in country.

185. Due to restrictions on direct access, needs assessments have not been able to be comprehensive enough to follow the changing situation and fully identify the specific needs of the most food insecure. Targeting criteria are too broad to link the most vulnerable individuals to the estimated overall numbers of those identified as needing food assistance by the FSNA, the findings of which often lag behind the rapidly changing situation of the ground. Overall and accurate numbers of IDPs and conflict-affected people remains a critical information gap.

186. Careful attention should be given to try and target those individuals whose food insecurity results mostly from the conflict rather than the deepening economic crisis in the eastern region. While not always easy to distinguish, potential overlap of the emergency response with the various authorities' responsibilities under their social safety nets risks creating unintended dependency on the humanitarian response to meet needs beyond its intended mandate.

187. The efficiency of operational implementation has been limited by poor, albeit slowly improving, coordination. Staffing challenges, compounded by lack of dedicated resources, have been key limiting factors with the FSC. Dedicated funding for an international FSC coordinator and two national officers only became available in the EMOP budget in 2016 through BR3.

188. The operating environment evolves rapidly and varies significantly between NGCAs where the context is again quite different from the conflict-affected areas of the GCA. Coordination with the Government and local authorities has been weak in all areas but a growing and positive engagement with the regional level Government authorities in the GCA is encouraging.

189. The disaggregation (by sex and age) of the FSNA data has helped to identify the most vulnerable groups (for instance, female headed households, elderly women) and contributed to the development of more inclusive targeting criteria.

190. One unintended result of the targeting of humanitarian assistance, including FA, is that unemployed men have largely been left out of humanitarian actors' responses, potentially contributing to increased domestic conflict and alcohol abuse.

191. Cost efficiency is a key element of transfer modality choice that should be systematically reviewed by the CO as market volatility in conflict affected areas, compounded by a deepening economic crisis, directly impacts on cost and availability of basic food commodities. Relative transfer values, combined with the delivery costs to WFP, have a direct bearing on operational efficiency. There was insufficient evidence available to the mission to systematically compare the relative costs of the transfer modalities chosen by WFP to date. In a chronically underfunded operation, poor choices and an inflexibility to change between modalities or their value could significantly reduce the number of needy people that can be reached with limited resources.

192. Effectiveness: Given the operating constraints over the evaluation period, both WFP and the individual staff who have been deployed to Ukraine have performed exceptionally well. With minimal and intermittent staffing, a CO and four area/sub offices have been established, basic administrative and programme management systems have been put in place and strong relationships developed at national, regional and district levels.

193. There is a critical lack of nutrition expertise in country that has been compounded by intermittent leadership in the NSC; this has hampered the effectiveness of WFP's work (for example, the delay in the BFB activity, other food ration issues) and it also represents an area to which WFP could potentially make a contribution if it had a nutritionist in country. Given that WFP and UNICEF initially shared the responsibility of the FSC, if WFP had been better positioned with nutrition expertise there could have been better collaboration with UNICEF in helping to fill the NSC leadership gap.

194. Because Ukraine is not a 'typical' nutrition emergency with high levels of acute malnutrition, nutrition has not been prioritized. However, documented nutrition problems exist, and some, such as the inappropriate distribution of infant formula, have been quite challenging for the NSC, as noted. Other nutritional problems may be undetected: Luhansk Oblast (NGCA/GCA), historically the poorest area in Eastern Ukraine and currently considered very vulnerable, has not had a nutrition assessment of young children. Only recently has anaemia surveillance started and a nutrition assessment of the elderly been carried out.

195. The choice of transfer modality can have a direct bearing on the effectiveness of the WFP response. The operation has specific objectives related to its nutrition and food security activities and, regardless of the cost, different transfer modalities may be more effective at helping to achieve the specified objectives than others. WFP has not yet introduced monitoring systems and indicators which help build up an evidence base to better inform transfer modality choice in this regard. For example, the high use of WFP food vouchers for NFIs and non-nutritious foods compromise their effectiveness and highlights beneficiaries' need for NFIs, information regarding voucher use, and nutrition education. Messages based on a behaviour change approach could be developed and used to address information gaps and reduce the barriers to eating healthy balanced diets, particularly as they relate to improved IYC feeding and prevalent health problems linked with diet. Other measures, such as working with the retailers to further disaggregate food groupings and to block some of the non-nutritious food items, could also be considered.

196. Impact: WFP's outcome monitoring clearly demonstrates short-term impact of food assistance. When triangulated with PDM reports there are strong indications that very little of the food was sold and there was a high level of voucher redemption, albeit with a high level of NFIs and non/low nutrition foods being redeemed. There is little evidence available to demonstrate how WFP's cash transfers were specifically utilised by the beneficiaries, or what proportion was spent on food, although PDM data, when disaggregated, does indicate some improvements in their FCS. However, given the way that monitoring information was collected soon after distribution had taken place, there is no way to determine if WFP beneficiaries were better off, whether they could meet their food needs in the medium and longer term after WFP assistance stopped, or whether continued assistance was required.

197. Sustainability: Given that WFP's intervention is an emergency operation in direct response to the humanitarian needs created by the conflict, long-term sustainability is not a central consideration to the design of the intervention. However, through WFP's engagement a number of issues have come to light that could merit a more sustainable approach should WFP, at the strategic level, wish to position itself to do so in Ukraine.

198. The mission concluded that WFP assistance had been required, and provided critical support to beneficiaries at the height of the crisis. It was also clear that longer term needs exist but are largely due to a deepening economic crisis as well as the continuing conflict. Due to the volatility of the situation, humanitarian needs could re-escalate at short notice making it unlikely that the short-term benefits of the WFP response to date can be sustained over the medium to long term. Sustainability will require a longer-term

approach with a focus on recovery and capacity building, with a phased integration of WFP support into the systems of the Government and local authorities in NGCA.

199. Longer term inter-agency collaboration with UNICEF/WHO and other nutrition partners also gives scope for WFP to support the Government in its development of food supplementation and fortification policy/legislation/regulation, to provide technical assistance to food companies and mainstreaming nutrition in WFP's response, which could support greater impact.

200. The prospect of diminishing resources from donors and the Governments of Ukraine and Russia, even to support ongoing humanitarian needs in eastern Ukraine, is such that all key stakeholders need to develop a strategy to determine both the potential and sustainability of any future role for WFP in more developmental activities.

### **3.2. Looking to the Future**

201. Although still fragile, the political and security situation has somewhat stabilized and is conducive to a shift towards early recovery activities. Assuming the situation continues to stabilize, such activities should be introduced as soon as possible. The next phase of the WFP response should also clearly bring back into focus the development of a clear exit/handover strategy, as implied in the initial project document, linking the integration of WFP beneficiaries requiring long-term support into the existing Government and local authority safety nets.

202. The potential for WFP to engage in longer-term capacity building activities should be the subject of a strategic review by WFP and key stakeholders and careful consideration given the Ukrainian context. The Government's low capacity to mandate and regulate food fortification provides an opportunity for WFP, in collaboration with UNICEF, to support them in areas such as the passing of legislation on iodized salt and improving the nutritional composition of infant cereals so they comply with international standards.

203. Depending on the ongoing results from the anaemia surveillance, a nutrition intervention for pregnant women may be called for, particularly in Luhansk, given their high levels of anaemia and documented food access issues. WFP should bring this issue to the NSC for further discussion and if a decision is taken to move it forward, an initial assessment to determine pregnant women's food and nutrition gaps would be needed.

### **3.3. Recommendations**

204. This section includes the ET's recommendations, which have been developed and updated after discussion with the CO, RB and HQ staff. They include six recommendations for the CO and four for WFP HQ and/or the RB, and are shown in order of priority.

#### Recommendations for WFP Country Office in Ukraine

**R1. WFP engagement in Ukraine** – Provided the situation continues to stabilise, WFP should continue with their plans to shift from an EMOP to a one year PRRO starting January 2017 as the intended final phase of this intervention. This concept should be integrated into BR4, which will extend the EMOP to December 2016. Adequate provision for emergency response must be included in the PRRO to cater for unforeseen flare-ups in the situation, but a strong focus on recovery should be introduced, combined with elements of capacity building for Government and local authority counterparts, leading towards a clear handover/exit strategy. In the meantime, institutional feeding support should be harmonized with other actors in the short term, and an agreed withdrawal plan by WFP developed. WFP should, with key stakeholders, undertake a strategic review of its potential for involvement in longer

term food security issues in Ukraine and start to position itself accordingly, if found to be appropriate.

- Timeframe: Immediate - design and approval of PRRO and strategic review to be completed within 2016.
- Responsibility: WFP CO with RB and HQ support.

**R2. Transfer modality choice** – The following issues should be addressed with regard to transfer modality choice and the delivery of CBT:

- An evidence base needs to be created through the application of recent WFP corporate guidance, using systematic analysis of cost efficiency and effectiveness, to monitor the criteria and assumptions used to support the selection of transfer modalities. Future choices of transfer modalities should take into account their comparative advantages in achieving project outcomes, rather than defaulting to CBT on the basis of feasibility alone.
- The capacity to review and periodically change between modalities, and/or alter the transfer value for CBT in a timely manner, needs to be strengthened in order to protect the purchasing value of cash transfers to the beneficiary, and/or allow WFP to better capitalise on potential cost efficiencies in volatile market conditions.
- Multi-sectoral cash transfers: Given the wide use of CBT in WFP's response, as well as those of other organisations, WFP should advocate for and, as appropriate, support the wider humanitarian community in a shift towards coordinated multi-sectoral CBT, harmonised with Government transfers to the extent possible. In such a scenario, WFP should seek to lead on the development, implementation and coordination of this initiative using WFP's common beneficiary and transfer management platform (SCOPE). The logical progression of a shift towards multi-purpose cash should be explored with HQ.
  - Timeframe: 2016-2017; to start as soon as possible
  - Responsibility: WFP CO to take lead with technical support from RB/HQ.

**R3. Coordination** - WFP should continue to play a prominent advocacy role in established coordination mechanisms:

- Food Security Cluster: Measures taken by WFP under BR3 to consolidate and decentralise the FSC to the field should be implemented as soon as possible. Developing a clear common understanding of the needs, targeting criteria, gaps in coverage, and vision to strengthen programme coordination and beneficiary targeting should be prioritised within the sector.
- Cash Working Group: WFP should continue to play a lead role, and strengthen its involvement, in the CWG which will be critical to the coordination of cash transfers and the development of a multi-sectoral and/or multi-purpose transfer.
- Nutrition Sub-Cluster (NSC): WFP needs to strengthen its involvement in the NSC, and in collaboration with UNICEF should plan the way forward as the NSC is deactivated, to ensure its responsibilities are transferred and consistently followed up.
  - Timeframe: Immediate and ongoing;
  - Responsibility: WFP CO to advocate and support existing coordination mechanisms.

**R4. Nutrition** – WFP should hire a CO nutritionist for six to nine months to strengthen nutrition coordination, address nutrition issues and build the capacity of a national officer/international staff.

- In NGCA, carrying out a food and nutrient gap assessment is recommended so that the ration can be redesigned to better complement food consumption. In addition,

increasing beneficiaries' access (particularly for IDPs and the elderly) to fresh foods, through developing partnerships with actors implementing farming, gardening and household food production activities is recommended.

- To support the nutritional status of IYC with nutrition actors, including the Government, WFP should discuss the options for integrating a fortified infant cereal and micronutrient powder with the food ration. At the same time, although a longer-term initiative than an EMOP timeframe, WFP should investigate opportunities to support Ukrainian companies with the fortification of infant cereal.
- WFP in collaboration with UNICEF and nutrition actors should develop nutrition education approaches and messages based on behaviour change, to address nutrient gaps, food-related health issues and to promote better use of food assistance.
  - Timeframe: Immediate, to start as soon as possible; the nutritionist position should be for six to nine months
  - Responsibility: WFP CO with support from RB and HQ Nutrition Unit.

#### **R5. Assessment, Monitoring and Evaluation**

- WFP's Food Security Assessment reports should more completely disaggregate outcomes by sex, age and geographical areas to promote gender/protection information and disseminate evidence and understanding of high-risk groups. In collaboration with the FSC, eligibility criteria for assistance and harmonisation of approaches between agencies for their application need to be reviewed and strengthened to more systematically identify the most food insecure individuals requiring assistance in a more uniform manner. Different criteria for NGC, GCAs and the buffer zone should be considered to take account of the different contexts and levels of access.
- While already meeting WFP's minimum monitoring requirements, more complete disaggregation of outcome indicators, by activity and beneficiary groups would allow for better interpretation of results and analysis of the comparative impact of the assistance in different circumstances.<sup>88</sup> As recently initiated (February 2016), indicators should also be measured from two to three months after transfers are completed, to better determine the sustainability of outcomes, whether the duration of the assistance was appropriate, and if further assistance is required.
  - Timeframe: 2016
  - Responsibility: WFP CO; WFP CO in collaboration with the FSC and with RB

#### **R6. Institutional Feeding**

Prior to initiating IF in NGCA of Donetsk region as planned, an exit strategy including a handover plan to the Government should be developed and a nutrition assessment should be carried out to learn more about the complementary foods available to targeted institutions and the nutrition gap for WFP's ration to address. Iodized salt should be added to the ration and the provision of foods in bulk should be considered.

- Timeframe: 2016; to start as soon as possible
- Responsibility: WFP CO and with RB support

Recommendations for WFP Corporate Headquarters and Regional Bureau (as indicated)

**R7. Staffing** – the Human Resources Division at the corporate level should review its emergency staff deployment policy and take into account the need for consistent staffing

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<sup>88</sup> For transfer modalities this was done in 2015 for food versus vouchers, and from the beginning of 2016 a third line on 'unrestricted cash' was introduced.

with sufficiently experienced international officers, especially in an environment where national staff experience in complex humanitarian response does not exist.

- Timeframe: as soon as possible
- Responsibility: WFP HQ - Human Resources Division/Emergency Preparedness & Support Response (OSE)

**R8. Cash-based transfers** – Key areas requiring the attention of the Programme and Policy Divisions are:

- Corporate training on reviewing the appropriateness of transfer modality choices vis-a-vis cost efficiency and effectiveness needs to be strengthened, both at the design and implementation phases of WFP response. This will raise awareness of recently developed WFP corporate guidance and approaches to assess the comparative advantages and disadvantages of the different modalities in meeting project objectives, and promote their systematic application at CO level;
- Clarifying WFP’s position with regard to its involvement and role in multi-purpose cash transfers based on a minimum expenditure basket approach, or similar;
  - Timeframe: as soon as possible
  - Responsibility: WFP HQ and RB with support from HQ (OSZ) for training / Policy and Programme Division (OSZ) for multi-purpose cash

**R9. Strengthening the capacities in HQ related to the functioning of the IRCTAG** and shifting to a more proactive approach is recommended,<sup>89</sup> to enable timely responses to new food product reviews.

- Timeframe: as soon as possible
- Responsibility: WFP HQ Nutrition and Supply Chain Divisions.

**R10. The pro-activeness of the RB in planning and implementing a preparatory phase for WFP’s operation in Ukraine should be used as an example of good practice** within WFP. As part of the preparation phase, WFP should not just plan for a response but should first assess whether their involvement is appropriate given the context.

- Timeframe: ongoing
- Responsibility: WFP HQ Operations Services Department/Emergency Preparedness & Support Response (OSE) and the RB.

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<sup>89</sup> Recently reported to be underway.

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## **Annex 1: List of Acronyms**

ADRA	Adventist Development and Relief Agency
ALNAP	Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action
BFB	Baby Food Basket
BR	Budget Revision
CBT	Cash-based transfer
CERF	Central Emergency Response Fund
CO	Country Office (WFP)
CP(s)	Cooperating Partner(s)
C&V	Cash and Vouchers
CWG	Cash Working Group
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DAP	Delivered at Place
DFID	United Kingdom's Department for International Development
EB	Executive Board (WFP)
ECHO	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection Department
EMEP	Emergency monitoring and evaluation package
EMOP	Emergency Operation
EQAS	Evaluation Quality Assurance System
EM	Evaluation Manager
ER	Evaluation Report
ET	Evaluation Team
FAO	The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FLA	Field Level Agreement
FCS	Food Consumption Score
FSC	Food Security Cluster
FSNA	Food Security Needs Assessment
GCA	Government Controlled Areas
GFD	General food distribution
GM	Gender marker
FGD	Focus group discussion
HoO	Head of Office (WFP)
HQ	Headquarters (WFP)
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person(s)
IF	Institutional Feeding
IP	Inception Package
IRCTAG	Internal Review Committee Technical Assistance Group (WFP)
IRD	International Relief and Development
IR-EMOP	Immediate Response - Emergency Operation
IR-P	Immediate Response - Preparatory Phase
IRR	Immediate Response Rations
IYC	Infant/young child
KII	Key Informant Interview
KIIS	Kyiv International Institute of Sociology
MDG(s)	Millennium Development Goal(s)
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation

MICS	Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
MoH	Ministry of Health
MNP(s)	Micronutrient powder(s)
Mt	Metric tonne
MoSP	Ministry of Social Policy
MSNA	Multi-sector Needs Assessment
NSC	Nutrition Sub-Cluster of the Health and Nutrition Cluster
NFI(s)	Non-food item(s)
NGCA	Non-Government Controlled Areas
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OEV	Office of Evaluation (WFP)
OpEv	Operation Evaluation
PC	Protection Cluster
PDM	Post Distribution Monitoring
PRP	Product Review Process
PRRO	Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (WFP)
PIN	People in Need
RAF	Rinat Akhmetov Foundation
RB	Regional Bureau (WFP)
SES	State Emergency Services
SO	Special Operation
TOR	Terms of Reference
TPM	Third-party monitoring
UN	United Nations
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Emergency Fund
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEG	United Nations Evaluation Group
UNV	United Nations Volunteer
VAM	Vulnerability assessment and mapping
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organization



## EVALUATION QUALITY ASSURANCE SYSTEM

Office Of Evaluation  
*Measuring Results, Sharing Lessons*

[FINAL, 7 AUGUST 2015]

### TERMS OF REFERENCE

### OPERATION EVALUATION

### UKRAINE - EMOP 200765 – EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO CIVILIANS AFFECTED BY THE CONFLICT IN EASTERN UKRAINE

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#### 1. Introduction

1. These Terms of Reference (TOR) are for the evaluation of the Ukraine Emergency Operation (EMOP) 200765 “Emergency assistance to civilians affected by the conflict in eastern Ukraine”. This evaluation is commissioned by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV) and will commence with preparation in June 2015, a field mission in January 2016, and a final report in April 2016. In line with WFP’s outsourced approach

for Operation Evaluations (OpEv), the evaluation will be managed and conducted by an external evaluation company amongst those having a long-term agreement with WFP for operations evaluations.

2. These TOR were prepared by the OEV focal point based on an initial document review and consultation with stakeholders and following a standard template. The purpose of the TOR is twofold: 1) to provide key information to the company selected for the evaluation and to guide the company's evaluation manager and team throughout the evaluation process; and 2) to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation.
3. The TOR will be finalised based on comments received on the draft version and on the agreement reached with the selected company. The evaluation shall be conducted in conformity with the TOR.

## **2. Reasons for the Evaluation**

### **2.1. Rationale**

4. In the context of renewed corporate emphasis on providing evidence and accountability for results, WFP has committed to increase evaluation coverage of operations and mandated OEV to commission a series of Operation Evaluations in 2013 -2016.
5. Operations to be evaluated are selected based on utility and risk criteria.<sup>90</sup> From a shortlist of operations meeting these criteria prepared by OEV, the Regional Bureau (RB) has selected, in consultation with the Country Office (CO), the Ukraine EMOP 200765 an independent evaluation. In particular, the evaluation has been timed to ensure that findings can feed into future decisions on programme implementation in light of the next Budget Revisions<sup>91</sup> (BRs) and/or the next 2017 project document formulation.
6. In particular, the evaluation should inform the future of WFP interventions in Ukraine, by clarifying which type of activities are recommended to continue the operations in the country. The evaluation should provide a comprehensive assessment regarding the strategic decisions taken/to be taken in defining WFP's role in the country, which include the relevance and appropriateness of the current operation. In the future there will be an increase in focus towards the elements of nutrition and livelihoods and resilience, and there are a number of opportunities for WFP to hook in other activities (UNAIDS, task force on transition from saving lives to early recovery), which the CO would intend to respond to with an appropriate programme.

### **2.2. Objectives**

7. This evaluation serves the dual and mutually reinforcing objectives of accountability and learning:
  - **Accountability** – The evaluation will assess and report on the performance and results of the operation. A management response to the evaluation recommendations will be prepared.
  - **Learning** – The evaluation will determine the reasons why certain results occurred or not to draw lessons, derive good practices and pointers for learning. It will provide evidence-based findings to inform operational and strategic decision-making. Findings will be actively disseminated and lessons will be incorporated into relevant lesson sharing systems.

### **2.3. Stakeholders and Users**

8. **Stakeholders.** A number of stakeholders both inside and outside of WFP have interests in the results of the evaluation and many of these will be asked to play a role in the evaluation process. Table one below provides a preliminary stakeholders' analysis, which will be deepened by the evaluation team in the

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<sup>90</sup> The utility criteria looked both at the timeliness of the evaluation given the operation's cycle and the coverage of recent/planned evaluations. The risk criteria was based on a classification and risk ranking of WFP COs taking into consideration a wide range of risk factors, including operational and external factors as well as COs' internal control self-assessments.

<sup>91</sup> Ukraine CO plans further BRs (potentially 6 + 6 months extensions in time) to bridge up to 2017, when it is thought a Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) might be initiated. Minimally, an extension for the January-June 2016 period is already foreseen to occur.

inception package in order to acknowledge the existence of various groups (women, men, boys and girls) that are affected by the evaluation in different ways and to determine their level of participation. During the field mission, the validation process of evaluation findings should include all groups.

**Table 1: Preliminary stakeholders' analysis**

<b>Stakeholders</b>	<b>Interest in the evaluation</b>
<b>INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS</b>	
<b>Country Office (CO)</b>	Responsible for the country level planning and operations implementation, the CO is the primary stakeholder of this evaluation. It has a direct stake in the evaluation and an interest in learning from experience to inform decision-making. It is also called upon to account internally as well as to its beneficiaries, partners for the performance and results of its operation.
<b>Regional Bureau (RB) in Cairo</b>	Responsible for both oversight of COs and technical guidance and support, the RB management has an interest in an independent account of the operational performance as well as in learning from the evaluation findings to apply this learning to other country offices.
<b>Office of Evaluation (OEV)</b>	OEV is responsible for commissioning OpEvs over 2013-2016. As these evaluations follow a new outsourced approach, OEV has a stake in ensuring that this approach is effective in delivering quality, useful and credible evaluations.
<b>WFP Executive Board (EB)</b>	The WFP governing body has an interest in being informed about the effectiveness of WFP operations. This evaluation will not be presented to the EB but its findings will feed into an annual synthesis of all OpEvs, which will be presented to the annual EB session.
<b>EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS</b> (See Table 2 for list of external stakeholders)	
<b>Beneficiaries</b>	As the ultimate recipients of food assistance, beneficiaries have a stake in WFP determining whether its assistance is appropriate and effective. As such, the level of participation in the evaluation of women, men, boys and girls from different groups will be determined and their respective perspectives will be sought.
<b>Government</b>	The Government has a direct interest in knowing whether WFP activities in the country are aligned with its priorities, harmonised with the action of other partners and meet the expected results. Issues related to capacity development, handover and sustainability will be of particular interest. The State Emergency Services (SES), which leads the Inter-agency Coordination Unit for IDPs, together with the Ministry of Social Policy (MoSP), is currently the designated authority for coordinating humanitarian assistance in Ukraine. The main coordinating body for the gender-related themes is the MoSP and its Department of Family Policy, with a specific Division on Gender Policy.
<b>UN Country team</b>	The UNCT's harmonized action should contribute to the realisation of the government developmental objectives. It has therefore an interest in ensuring that WFP operation is effective in contributing to the UN concerted efforts. Various agencies are also direct partners of WFP at policy and activity level.
<b>NGOs</b>	NGOs are WFP's partners for the implementation of some activities while at the same time having their own interventions. The results of the evaluation might affect future implementation modalities, strategic orientations and partnerships.

<b>Civil society</b>	Civil society groups work within the same context in which WFP operates and have an interest in areas related to WFP interventions (food security, nutrition, education, gender equity, etc.). Their experience and knowledge can inform the evaluation and they will be interested in the evaluation findings, especially those related to partnerships. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) dealing with gender issues include the International women's advocacy center 'La Strada' and the Ukrainian Women's Fund.
<b>Donors</b>	WFP operations are voluntarily funded by a number of donors. They have an interest in knowing whether their funds have been spent efficiently and if WFP's work has been effective and contributed to their own strategies and programmes.

9. **Users.** The primary users of this evaluation will be:

- The CO and its partners in decision-making related notably to programme implementation and/or design, country strategy and partnerships.
- Given RB's core functions, the RB is expected to use the evaluation findings to provide strategic guidance, programme support and oversight,
- OEV will use the evaluation findings to feed into an annual synthesis of all OpEvs and will reflect upon the evaluation process to refine its OpEv approach, as required.

### 3. Subject of the Evaluation

10. Ukraine is a lower middle income country with a population of 45.6 million. It ranked 83 out of 187 countries on the UNDP Human Development Index in 2013. The economy is currently undergoing a political and economic crisis resulting in the decline of GDP growth rates, decline of foreign investments, increase of government debt, and the significant devaluation of its national currency.
11. Recent unrest in Ukraine began in November 2013, when civil protests brought about the dismissal of former pro-Russian leadership. In April 2014, tensions escalated in eastern Ukraine with non-state armed groups in Donetsk and Luhansk regions (collectively called the Donbas). Fighting between the Ukrainian authorities and anti-government entities in the eastern part of the country has produced over a million registered internally displaced persons (IDPs) and left many more caught in the crossfire.
12. As a food surplus nation, food availability is not a concern in most of the country. However, recent household economic constraints related to the conflict continue to threaten food security in conflict-affected areas. Additionally, food prices are increasing at a time when household incomes are impacted by substantial unemployment and a reliance on savings.
13. In light of increasing tensions, in March 2014, WFP initiated the IR-P 200695, a preparatory operation to anticipate potential needs among the population displaced from Crimea. However, the focus of attention shifted following the onset of the conflict in the east. In line with a wider United Nations response to emerging humanitarian needs, by 14 August, WFP launched a three month IR-EMOP 200759 for vulnerable IDPs and other conflict-affected populations. As a result of the continued deterioration of the humanitarian situation, WFP began to implement a full scale EMOP (200765) which was launched in November.
14. Within this framework, WFP's approach has been designed to reach the most vulnerable IDPs, returnees, host families and those trapped in conflict hotspots. WFP's response has been delivered through the modalities of both voucher transfers and food parcel delivery. In areas most significantly impacted by the continued fighting, and where markets were either not functioning or where safe access to stores was not ensured, WFP was able to deliver timely food assistance in the form of locally purchased food parcels, which were distributed through local NGOs.
15. The project document including the project logframe, related amendments (Budget revisions) and the latest resource situation are available by clicking here <http://www.wfp.org/operations/200765->

[emergency-assistance-civilians-affected-conflict-eastern-ukraine](#).<sup>92</sup> The key characteristics of the operation are outlined in table two below:

**Table 2: Key characteristics of the operation**

OPERATION			
Approval	The operation was approved by the Executive Director on 10 November 2014		
Amendments <sup>93</sup>	<p>There have been two amendments to the initial project document.</p> <p>1) Budget Revision 01 (May 2015):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Project extended by two months, from 1 May to 30 June 2015;</li> <li>▪ Increase in the food requirements from 878 mt to 2,372 mt to provide in-kind food assistance through Immediate Response Rations (IRR) for additional 68,000 beneficiaries;</li> <li>▪ Increase the level of other direct operational costs (ODOC) to enable WFP to expand its operations in Non-Government Controlled Areas (NGCA).</li> </ul> <p>2) Budget Revision 02 (June 2015):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>▪ Project extended by six months, from 1 July 2015 to 31 December 2015;</li> <li>▪ Increase in the overall food requirements from 2,372 mt to 12,989 mt allowing WFP to expand its food assistance in NGCA, where over 80 percent of the food insecure beneficiaries are located and where market-based transfers are not currently feasible;</li> <li>▪ Increase the number of beneficiaries from 188,000 to 575,000 given a deterioration of the food security situation, especially in NGCA;</li> <li>▪ Introduce support to beneficiaries in the formerly state-financed social institutions in NGCA;</li> <li>▪ Introduce a nutrition intervention to target children aged 6-23 months, identified by the nutrition cluster as most at risk<sup>94</sup>;</li> <li>▪ Continue to support internally displaced persons (IDPs) in government-controlled areas (GCA) through cash and voucher (C&amp;V) transfers;</li> <li>▪ Adjust other direct operational cost (ODOC) and direct supporting costs (DSC) to accommodate cost foreseen with the implementation and ensure rapid scale-up and extended presence.</li> </ul>		
Duration	<table border="0"> <tr> <td style="vertical-align: top;">Initial: 3 Nov 2014 to 30 April 2015</td> <td style="vertical-align: top;">Revised: • BR 01: Extended from 1 May 2015 to 30 June 2015 • BR 02: Extended from 1 July 2015 to 31 December 2015</td> </tr> </table>	Initial: 3 Nov 2014 to 30 April 2015	Revised: • BR 01: Extended from 1 May 2015 to 30 June 2015 • BR 02: Extended from 1 July 2015 to 31 December 2015
Initial: 3 Nov 2014 to 30 April 2015	Revised: • BR 01: Extended from 1 May 2015 to 30 June 2015 • BR 02: Extended from 1 July 2015 to 31 December 2015		
Planned beneficiaries	<table border="0"> <tr> <td style="vertical-align: top;">Initial: 120,000</td> <td style="vertical-align: top;">Revised: • BR 01: 188,000 (+ 68,000); • BR 02: 575,000 (+ 387,000)</td> </tr> </table>	Initial: 120,000	Revised: • BR 01: 188,000 (+ 68,000); • BR 02: 575,000 (+ 387,000)
Initial: 120,000	Revised: • BR 01: 188,000 (+ 68,000); • BR 02: 575,000 (+ 387,000)		

<sup>92</sup> From WFP.org – Countries – Ukraine – Operations.

<sup>93</sup> CO plans for further BRs (potentially 6 + 6 months extensions in time) to bridge up to 2017, when it is thought a PRRO might be initiated. Minimally, a BR 3 (extension from January to June 2016) is foreseen to occur.

<sup>94</sup> As agreed with the members of the Nutrition Sub-Cluster (UNICEF, RAF and other partners) WFP will target 20,000 children with complementary food assistance (locally-purchased) for a period of six months to prevent a further deterioration of their nutrition status. Currently, UNICEF and Save the Children are conducting a nutrition assessment (with results to be made available by July 2015) that will give a much clear picture on demographics and gender disaggregation data and ensure a targeted assistance. WFP will partner with UNICEF/Save the Children to refine the implementation modality of the nutrition project activities.

<b>Planned food requirements</b>	<u>Initial:</u> In-kind food: 878 mt of food commodities  Cash and vouchers (C&V) Transfer: US\$ 10,800,000	<u>Revised:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BR 01: In-kind: 2,372 mt of food commodities (+ 1,494 mt);</li> <li>BR 02: In-kind: 12,988 mt of food commodities (+ 10,616 mt);</li> <li>BR 02: C&amp;V Transfer: US\$ 14,400,000 (+ US\$ 3,600,000)</li> </ul>
<b>US\$ requirements</b>	<u>Initial:</u> US\$ 17,021,318	<u>Revised:</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>BR 01: US\$ 21,461,308 (+ US\$ 4,439,990)</li> <li>BR 02: US\$ 55,981,055 (+ US\$ 34,519,74)</li> </ul>

### Objectives, Outcomes and Activities


Contribution to MDG 1	<b>Cross-cutting results and indicators</b>		
	<b>Gender</b>	Gender equality and empowerment improved	
	<b>Partnership</b>	Food assistance interventions coordinated and partnerships developed and maintained	
	<b>Protection and Accountability to Affected Populations</b>	WFP assistance delivered and utilized in safe, accountable and dignified conditions	
	<b>SO</b>	<b>Operation specific objectives and outcomes</b>	<b>Activities</b>
	<b>Strategic Objective 1:</b> Save lives and Protect Livelihoods in Emergencies	<p><b>Objective 1:</b> Meet urgent food and nutrition needs of IDPs (returnees, residents in conflict hotspots) while protecting lives and livelihoods to enable safe access to food and nutrition for girls, women, boys and men.</p> <p><b>Outcome 1:</b> Stabilized or improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and/or individuals</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>In-kind distributions (food insecure and most vulnerable individuals in NGCA; Immediate response rations/contingency; Food insecure individuals in social institutions in NGCA)</li> <li>Nutrition component<sup>95</sup> (6-23 month children)</li> <li>C&amp;V transfers to IDP in GCA</li> </ul>

<sup>95</sup> This component is more nutrition sensitive programming than a fully-fledged nutrition activity and it is not associated with a nutritional objective of prevention or treatment.


PARTNERS																					
<b>Government</b>	Ministry of Social Policy (MoSP); State Emergency Services (SES)																				
<b>United Nations</b>	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); UNICEF; UNDP																				
<b>NGOs</b>	International Relief and Development (IRD); People in Need (PIN); Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA); Save the Children; Mercy Corps; Rinat Akhmetov Foundation (RAF); International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).																				
RESOURCES (INPUTS)																					
<p><b>Contribution received (16 July 2015):</b> US\$ 25,820,810</p> <p><b>percent against appeal:</b> 46 percent</p> <p><b>Top 5 donors:</b> United States (39 percent); Russian Federation (19 percent); European Commission (11 percent); Multilateral Funds (6 percent); Netherlands (6 percent)</p>	<div style="display: flex; justify-content: space-around;"> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p><b>percent funded of total requirements</b></p> <table border="1"> <caption>percent funded of total requirements</caption> <tr><th>Category</th><th>Percentage</th></tr> <tr><td>Gross needs funded</td><td>46%</td></tr> <tr><td>Shortfall</td><td>54%</td></tr> </table> </div> <div style="text-align: center;"> <p><b>Top five donors</b></p> <table border="1"> <caption>Top five donors</caption> <tr><th>Donor</th><th>Percentage</th></tr> <tr><td>United States</td><td>39%</td></tr> <tr><td>Russian Federation</td><td>19%</td></tr> <tr><td>European Commission</td><td>11%</td></tr> <tr><td>Multilateral Funds</td><td>6%</td></tr> <tr><td>Netherlands</td><td>6%</td></tr> <tr><td>Other</td><td>19%</td></tr> </table> </div> </div>	Category	Percentage	Gross needs funded	46%	Shortfall	54%	Donor	Percentage	United States	39%	Russian Federation	19%	European Commission	11%	Multilateral Funds	6%	Netherlands	6%	Other	19%
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**PLANNED OUTPUTS (at design)**


**Planned percent of beneficiaries by activity/component**



**Planned percent of women/girls versus men/boys by activity/component**



**Planned percent of food requirements by activity/component**



## 4. Evaluation Approach

### 4.1. Scope

16. **Scope.** The evaluation will cover the Ukraine EMOP 200765, including all activities and processes from its formulation, implementation, resourcing, monitoring, evaluation and reporting relevant to answer the evaluation questions. The period covered by this evaluation captures the time from the development of the operation (March – November 2014) to the beginning of the operation until the start of the evaluation (November 2014 – July 2015).
17. The evaluation will include an analysis dating back to the preparation work done previously by the RB, looking into the formulation phase of the project, taking in considerations the constraints that WFP had in opening a new office in a new and very different environment compared to WFP's usual operational contexts.
18. The Food Security and Malnutrition Cluster is implemented within the EMOP and will be part of the evaluation scope, whilst the Logistics Cluster is under a separate Special Operation (SO) and will be looked at as a contextual factor.

### 4.2. Evaluation Questions

19. The evaluation will address the following three questions:

**Question 1: How appropriate is the operation?** Areas for analysis will include the extent to which the objectives, targeting, choice of activities and of transfer modalities:

- Were appropriate at project design stage to the needs of the food insecure population including the distinct needs of women, men, boys and girls from different groups, as applicable, and remained so over time.
- Are coherent with relevant stated national policies, including sector and gender policies and strategies and seek complementarity with the interventions of relevant humanitarian and development partners.
- Were coherent at project design stage with relevant WFP and UN-wide system strategies, policies and normative guidance<sup>96</sup> (including gender), and remained so over time. In particular, the team will analyse if and how gender empowerment and equality of women (GEEW) objectives and mainstreaming principles were included in the intervention design in line with the MDGs and other system-wide commitments enshrining gender rights.

**Question 2: What are the results of the operation?** While ensuring that differences in benefits between women, men, boys and girls from different groups are considered, the evaluation will analyse:

- The level of attainment of the planned outputs (including the number of beneficiaries served disaggregated by women, girls, men and boys);
- The extent to which the outputs led to the realisation of the operation objectives as well as to unintended effects highlighting, as applicable, differences for different groups, including women, girls, men and boys; how GEEW results have been achieved<sup>97</sup>;
- How different activities of the operation dovetail and are synergetic with other WFP operations and with what other actors are doing to contribute to the overriding WFP objective in the country; and
- The efficiency of the operation and the likelihood that the benefits will continue after the end of the operation.

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<sup>96</sup> Includes: Policy on Disaster Risk Reduction and Management; WFP's role in the Humanitarian Assistance System; Humanitarian Protection Policy; WFP's Role in Peacebuilding in Transition Settings; Policy on Vouchers and Cash Transfers; Food Aid and Livelihoods in Emergencies: Strategies for WFP; Humanitarian Principles; Gender Policy. For gender, please see the Convention to Eliminate all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

<sup>97</sup> In February 2015, WFP Ukraine conducted trainings for WFP cooperating partners on WFP's approach to protection, gender, access, and safe and dignified food distributions.

**Question 3: Why and how has the operation produced the observed results?** The evaluation should generate insights into the main internal and external factors that caused the observed changes and affected how results were achieved. The inquiry is likely to focus, amongst others, on:

- Internally (factors within WFP's control): the processes, systems and tools in place to support the operation design, implementation, monitoring/evaluation and reporting; the governance structure and institutional arrangements (including issues related to staffing, capacity and technical backstopping from RB/HQ); the partnership and coordination arrangements; etc.
- Externally (factors outside WFP's control): the external operating environment; the funding climate; external incentives and pressures; the legal framework; etc.

### **4.3 Evaluability Assessment**

20. Evaluability is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion. The below provides a preliminary evaluability assessment, which will be deepened by the evaluation team in the inception package. The team will notably critically assess data availability and take evaluability limitations into consideration in its choice of evaluation methods. In doing so, the team will also critically review the evaluability of the gender aspects of the operation, identify related challenges and mitigation measures and determine whether additional indicators are required to include gender empowerment and gender equality dimensions.
21. In answering question one, the team will be able to rely on assessment reports, minutes from the project review committee, the project document and logframe, as well as documents related to government and interventions from other actors. In addition, the team will review relevant WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance.
22. For question two the operation has been designed in line with the corporate strategic results framework (SRF) and selected outputs, outcomes and targets are recorded in the logframe. Monitoring reports as well as annual standard project reports (SPRs) detail achievement of outputs and outcomes thus making them evaluable against the stated objectives.
23. However, answering question two is likely to pose some challenges owing in part to data gaps, e.g. in relation to efficiency.
24. For question three, the team members will have access to some institutional planning documents and is likely to elicit further information from key informant interviews.
25. With regards to additional potential evaluability challenges, possibility of limited access and harsh winter conditions during the field mission should be taken into account.

### **4.4. Methodology**

26. The methodology will be designed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. It should:
  - Employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability (or connectedness for emergency operations), giving special consideration to gender and equity issues.
  - Use applicable standards (e.g. SPHERE standards; UNEG guidance on gender<sup>98</sup>);
  - Demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, etc.) and using mixed methods (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means. Participatory methods will be emphasised with the main stakeholders, including the CO. The selection of field visit sites will also need to demonstrate impartiality.
  - Be geared towards addressing the key evaluation questions taking into account the evaluability challenges, the budget and timing constraints;

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<sup>98</sup> These are put into context of WFP evaluation in the OEV technical note (TN) on integrating gender in evaluation. Evaluation team will be expected to review this TN during the inception phase and ensure that gender is well mainstreamed in all phases and aspects of the evaluation.

- Be based on an analysis of the logic model of the operation and on a thorough stakeholders analysis;
- Ensure through the use of mixed methods and appropriate sampling that women, girls, men and boys from different stakeholders groups participate and that their different voices are heard and used;
- Be synthesised in an evaluation matrix, which should be used as the key organizing tool for the evaluation.

#### 4.5. Quality Assurance

27. OEV's Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) defines the quality standards expected from this evaluation and sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance, templates for evaluation products and checklists for the review thereof. It is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (DAC and ALNAP) and aims to ensure that the evaluation process and products conform to best practice and meet OEV's quality standards. EQAS does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team.
28. At the start of the evaluation, OEV will orient the evaluation manager on EQAS and share related documents. EQAS should be systematically applied to this evaluation and the evaluation manager will be responsible to ensure that the evaluation progresses in line with its process steps and to conduct a rigorous quality control of the evaluation products ahead of their submission to WFP. OEV will also share an Orientation Guide on WFP and its operations, which provides an overview of the organization.

### 5. Phases and deliverables

29. The evaluation will proceed through five phases. Annex two provides details of the activities and the related timeline of activities and deliverables.
30. **Preparation phase** (July – August 2015): The OEV focal point will conduct background research and consultation to frame the evaluation; prepare the TOR; select the evaluation team and contract the company for the management and conduct of the evaluation.
31. **Inception phase** (September – November 2015): This phase aims to prepare the evaluation team for the evaluation phase by ensuring that it has a good grasp of the expectations for the evaluation and a clear plan for conducting it. The inception phase will include a desk review of secondary data and initial interaction with the main stakeholders.

- **Deliverable: Inception Package.** The Inception Package details how the team intends to conduct the evaluation with an emphasis on methodological and planning aspects. The IP will be shared with CO, RB and OEV for comments before being approved by OEV. It will present an analysis of the context and of the operation, the evaluation methodology articulated around a deepened evaluability and stakeholders' analysis; an evaluation matrix; and the sampling technique and data collection tools. It will also present the division of tasks amongst team members as well as a detailed schedule for stakeholders' consultation. For more details, refer to the [content guide for the inception package](#).

32. **Evaluation phase** (3<sup>rd</sup> week of January to mid-February 2016): The fieldwork will span over three weeks and will include visits to project sites and primary and secondary data collection from local stakeholders. Two debriefing sessions will be held upon completion of the field work. The first one will involve the country office (relevant RB and HQ colleagues will be invited to participate through a teleconference) and the second one will be held with external stakeholders.

- **Deliverable: Exit debriefing presentation.** An exit debriefing presentation of preliminary findings and conclusions (powerpoint presentation) will be prepared to support the de-briefings.

33. **Reporting phase** (March – April): The evaluation team will analyse the data collected during the desk review and the field work, conduct additional consultations with stakeholders, as required, and draft the evaluation report. It will be submitted to the evaluation manager for quality assurance. Stakeholders will

be invited to provide comments, which will be recorded in a matrix by the evaluation manager and provided to the evaluation team for their consideration before report finalisation.

- **Deliverable: Evaluation report.** The evaluation report will present the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation in a concise report of 40 pages maximum. Findings should be evidence-based and relevant to the evaluation questions. Data will be disaggregated by sex and the evaluation findings and conclusions will highlight differences in performance and results of the operation for different beneficiary groups as appropriate. There should be a logical flow from findings to conclusions and from conclusions to recommendations. Recommendations will be limited in number, actionable and targeted to the relevant users. These will form the basis of the WFP management response to the evaluation. For more details, refer to the [content guide for the evaluation report](#) and the [OpEv sample models for presenting results](#).

34. **Follow-up and dissemination phase** (May – July 2016): OEV will share the final evaluation report with the CO and RB. The CO management will respond to the evaluation recommendations by providing actions that will be taken to address each recommendation and estimated timelines for taking those actions. The RB will coordinate WFP’s management response to the evaluation, including following up with country offices on status of implementation of the actions. OEV will also subject the evaluation report to an external post-hoc quality review to report independently on the quality, credibility and utility of the evaluation in line with evaluation norms and standards. A feedback online survey on the evaluation will also be completed by all stakeholders. The final evaluation report will be published on the WFP public website, and findings incorporated into an annual synthesis report, which will be presented to WFP’s Executive Board for consideration. This synthesis will identify key features of the evaluated operations and report on the gender sensitivity of the operations among other elements. Findings will be disseminated and lessons will be incorporated into other relevant lesson sharing systems.

**Notes on the deliverables:**

The inception package and evaluation reports shall be written in English and follow the EQAS templates.

The evaluation team is expected to produce written work that is of very high standard, evidence-based, and free of errors. The evaluation company is ultimately responsible for the timeliness and quality of the evaluation products. If the expected standards are not met, the evaluation company will, at its own expense, make the necessary amendments to bring the evaluation products to the required quality level.

The evaluation TOR, report and management response will be public and posted on the WFP External Website ([wfp.org/evaluation](http://wfp.org/evaluation)). The other evaluation products will be kept internal.

**Table 3: Key dates for field mission and deliverables**

Entity responsible	Phase	Activities	Key dates
EM/ET	Inception	Draft Inception Package	28 Sept. 2015 (tentative)
EM/ET	Inception	Final Inception Package	27 Nov. 2015 (tentative)
CO/ET	Evaluation	Evaluation field mission	Mid-Jan. – mid-Feb. 2016
ET	Evaluation	Exit Debriefing presentation	Mid-Feb. 2016
EM/ET	Reporting	Draft Evaluation Report	28 March 2016 (tentative)
EM/ET	Reporting	Final Evaluation Report	29 April 2016 (tentative)
CO/RB	Follow-up	Management Response	27 May 2016 (tentative)

## 6. Organization of the Evaluation

### 6.1 Outsourced approach

35. Under the outsourced approach to OpEvs, the evaluation is commissioned by OEV but will be managed and conducted by an external evaluation company having a long-term agreement (LTA) with WFP for operations evaluation services.
36. The company will provide an evaluation manager (EM) and an independent evaluation team (ET) in line with the LTA. To ensure a rigorous review of evaluation deliverables, the evaluation manager should in no circumstances be part of the evaluation team.
37. The company, the EM and the ET members will not have been involved in the design, implementation or M&E of the operation nor have other conflicts of interest or bias on the subject. They will act impartially and respect the [code of conduct of the profession](#).
38. Given the evaluation learning objective, the evaluation manager and team will promote stakeholders' participation throughout the evaluation process. Yet, to safeguard the independence of the evaluation, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings with external stakeholders if the evaluation team deems that their presence could bias the responses.

### 6.2 Evaluation Management

39. The evaluation will be managed by the company's EM for OpEvs (as per LTA). The EM will be responsible to manage within the given budget the evaluation process in line with EQAS and the expectations spelt out in these TOR and to deliver timely evaluation products meeting the OEV standards. In particular, the EM will:
  - Mobilise and hire the evaluation team and provide administrative backstopping (contracts, visas, travel arrangements, consultants' payments, invoices to WFP, etc.).
  - Act as the main interlocutor between WFP stakeholders and the ET throughout the evaluation and generally facilitate communication and promote stakeholders' participation throughout the evaluation process.
  - Support the evaluation team by orienting members on WFP, EQAS and the evaluation requirements; providing them with relevant documentation and generally advising on all aspects of the evaluation to ensure that the evaluation team is able to conduct its work.
  - Ensure that the evaluation proceeds in line with EQAS, the norms and standards and code of conduct of the profession and that quality standards and deadlines are met.
  - Ensure that a rigorous and objective quality check of all evaluation products is conducted ahead of submission to WFP. This quality check will be documented and an assessment of the extent to which quality standards are met will be provided to WFP.
  - Provide feedback on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

### 6.3 Evaluation Conduct

40. The ET will conduct the evaluation under the direction of the EM. The team will be hired by the company following agreement with OEV on its composition.
41. **Team composition.** The evaluation team is expected to include two to three members. It should include women and men of mixed cultural backgrounds. At least one team member should have WFP experience.
42. **Team competencies.** The team will be multi-disciplinary and include members who together include an appropriate balance of expertise and practical knowledge in the following areas (listed in order of priority):
  - Procurement and supply chain;
  - Market based interventions (vouchers);
  - Emergency Coordination;

- Nutrition;
  - Resilience and Livelihoods;
  - Gender expertise / good knowledge of gender issues within the country/regional context as well as understanding of UN system-wide and WFP commitments on gender.
43. All team members should have strong analytical and communication skills; evaluation experience and familiarity with the country or region.
  44. The oral and written language requirements within the Evaluation Team for this evaluation include strong skills in English, Russian and Ukrainian.
  45. The **Team Leader** will have good communication, management and leadership skills and demonstrated experience and good track record in leading similar evaluations. He/she should also have excellent English writing and presentation skills, technical expertise in one of the technical areas listed above as well as expertise in designing methodology and data collection tools.
  46. Her/his primary responsibilities will be: i) defining the evaluation approach and methodology; ii) guiding and managing the team; iii) leading the evaluation mission and representing the evaluation team; iv) drafting and revising, as required, the inception package, exit debriefing presentation and evaluation report in line with EQAS; and v) provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.
  47. **The team members** will bring together a complementary combination of the technical expertise required and have a track record of written work on similar assignments.
  48. Team members will: i) contribute to the methodology in their area of expertise based on a document review; ii) conduct field work; iii) participate in team meetings and meetings with stakeholders; iv) contribute to the drafting and revision of the evaluation products in their technical area(s); and v) provide feedback on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

#### **6.4 Security Considerations**

49. As an ‘independent supplier’ of evaluation services to WFP, the evaluation company is responsible for ensuring the security of all persons contracted, including adequate arrangements for evacuation for medical or situational reasons. The consultants contracted by the evaluation company do not fall under the UN Department of Safety & Security (UNDSS) system for UN personnel.
50. However, to avoid any security incidents, the Evaluation Manager is requested to ensure that:
  - Travelling team members complete the UN system’s applicable Security in the Field courses in advance, print out their certificates and take them with them. (These take a couple of hours to complete.)
  - The WFP CO registers the team members with the Security Officer on arrival in country and arranges a security briefing for them to gain an understanding of the security situation on the ground.
  - The team members observe applicable UN security rules and regulations – e.g. curfews etc.

For more information, including the link to UNDSS website, see [EQAS for operations evaluations](#) page 34.

### **7. Roles and Responsibilities of WFP Stakeholders**

51. **The Country Office.** The CO management will be responsible to:
  - Assign a focal point for the evaluation. The CO focal points for this evaluation will be: Irena Loloci (main/day to day), Gerd Buta, M&E Officer, and Giancarlo Stopponi, OIC.
  - Comment on the TORs, inception package and the evaluation report
  - Provide the evaluation manager and team with documentation and information necessary to the evaluation; facilitate the team’s contacts with local stakeholders; set up meetings, field visits; provide logistic support during the fieldwork; and arrange for interpretation, if required.
  - Organise security briefings for the evaluation team and provide any materials as required

- Participate in discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the operation, its performance and results and in various teleconferences with the evaluation manager and team on the evaluation products.
- Organise and participate in two separate debriefings, one internal and one with external stakeholders.
- Prepare a management response to the evaluation recommendations.
- Provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey;

52. **The Regional Bureau.** The RB management will be responsible to:

- Assign a focal point for the evaluation. Edgar Luce, Regional M&E Officer (day to day), and Claudia Ah Poe, Regional M&E Adviser (alternate), will be the RB focal points for this evaluation.
- Participate in discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the operation, its performance and results. In particular, the RB should participate in the evaluation debriefing and in various teleconferences with the evaluation manager and team, as required.
- Provide comments on the TORs (particularly the Regional M&E Advisor), inception package and the evaluation report.
- Coordinate the management response to the evaluation and track the implementation of the recommendations.
- Provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

53. **Headquarters.** Some HQ divisions might, as relevant, be asked to discuss WFP strategies, policies or systems in their area of responsibility and to comment on the evaluation TOR and report.

54. **The Office of Evaluation.** OEV is responsible for commissioning the evaluation and Filippo Pompili, Evaluation Officer, is the OEV focal point. OEV's responsibilities include to:

- Set up the evaluation including drafting the TOR in consultation with concerned stakeholders; select and contract the external evaluation company; and facilitate the initial communications between the WFP stakeholders and the external evaluation company.
- Enable the company to deliver a quality process and report by providing them with the EQAS documents including process guidance, content guides and templates as well as orient the evaluation manager on WFP policies, strategies, processes and systems as required.
- Comment on the draft inception package.
- Comment on the evaluation report and approve the final version.
- Submit the final evaluation report to an external post-hoc quality review process to independently report on the quality, credibility and utility of the evaluation and provide feedback to the evaluation company accordingly.
- Publish the final evaluation report on the WFP public website and incorporate findings into an annual synthesis report, which will be presented to WFP's Executive Board for consideration.
- Conduct an evaluation feedback e-survey to gather perceptions about the evaluation process and the quality of the report to be used to revise the approach, as required.

## **8. Communication and budget**

### **8.1. Communication**

55. Issues related to language of the evaluation are noted in sections 6.3 and 5, which also specifies which evaluation products will be made public and how and provides the schedule of debriefing with key stakeholders. Section 5 paragraph 33 describes how findings will be disseminated.

56. To enhance the learning from this evaluation, the evaluation manager and team will also emphasize transparent and open communication with WFP stakeholders. Regular teleconferences and one-on-one telephone conversations between the evaluation manager, team and country office focal point will assist in discussing any arising issues and ensuring a participatory process.

## 8.2. Budget

57. **Funding source:** The evaluation will be funded in line with the WFP special funding mechanism for Operations Evaluations (Executive Director memo dated October 2012). The cost to be borne by the CO will be established by the WFP Budget & Programming Division (RMB).
58. **Budget:** The budget will be prepared by the company (using the rates established in the LTA and the corresponding template) and approved by OEV. For the purpose of this evaluation the company will:
- Use the management fee corresponding to a small operation.
  - Budget for domestic travel with respect to flights and train tickets. The CO will support the mission for all the logistical aspects during the entire period in Ukraine, including drivers and vehicles as appropriate.

Please send queries to Filippo Pompili, OEV Evaluation Officer, email: [filippo.pompili@wfp.org](mailto:filippo.pompili@wfp.org), phone: +39 06 6513 6454.

### **Annex 3: Evaluation Methodology**

Please refer to the Terms of Reference, which explain the objectives and scope of the evaluation and provide detailed information on the three evaluation questions to be addressed.

#### Evaluation matrix

The matrix presents the three main evaluation questions and numerous sub-questions. Each sub-question includes measures or indicators appropriate to answer the sub-question. For Q2, sub-questions and indicators related to outputs, outcomes, sustainability and efficiency are included. Detailed questionnaires and field site observation guides were developed for each component in order to respond to the various sub-questions. Some of the indicators included in the matrix were taken from the log frame.

When carrying out the evaluation, creating a balance between the dual objectives of accountability and learning was considered, in that results and progress was assessed and reported, coupled with the reasons why these reasons occurred, along with any lessons learned. Gender and capacity building have been more systematically included in the matrix based on recent guidance provided by OEV.

#### Data collection instruments

The collection of information for the evaluation aimed to ensure triangulation through a variety of tools and approaches:

- Document review: included documents received by the WFP CO, other documents obtained from the principal stakeholders as well as web research, etc.
- Semi-structured interviews with the internal and external stakeholders carried out with interview guides designed based on the principal evaluation questions and adapted according to interviewee. The guides also included open questions to allow those interviewed to share their opinions.
  - Interview guides for WFP staff and external stakeholders in Kyiv
  - Interview guides for local authorities, CPs and other partners (e.g. United Nations staff, retailers, bank staff)
  - Interview guides for staff and beneficiaries and observation checklists for food distribution sites
- Focus Group Discussions (FGD) or individual interviews with the partners and beneficiaries implemented with guides developed based on the evaluation questions and sub-questions and adapted to the groups/persons interviewed.
  - Leaders guides for FGD with food, voucher and cash beneficiaries
  - Interview guides for home visits with food, voucher and cash beneficiaries

#### The field mission

The mission began in Kyiv on 25 January 2016 with a short presentation to staff on the evaluation mission and was followed by a presentation on WFP Ukraine by the Head of Office (HoO) to the ET. Then the team held joint and individual ET meetings with the M&E Unit staff, program officers (CBT), logistics, etc. Over the course of the following four days, the ET continued meeting with WFP staff and also with Government counterparts, United Nations Agencies, cluster staff, main donors and other program stakeholders (see Annex 7). In addition, some stakeholders were interviewed after the fieldwork over the last couple of days in Kyiv when the debriefings were finalized and presented.

On Sunday 31 January, the ET travelled by air to Dnipropetrovsk for a meeting with Brusnichka (WFP voucher retailer) staff and to position the team to travel to Donetsk early the following morning. During the course of the fieldwork, three WFP food distributions, one CP warehouse, a bank, two institutions and seven food markets of various sizes were visited. Local Authorities (Humanitarian Committee staff in NGCA of Donetsk and Luhansk and government staff in GCA), CP staff (PIN, MC, ADRA) were interviewed and beneficiaries of in-kind food, vouchers and cash were met at food distributions, gatherings for the ET and at their homes (See Annex 4). WFP program sites in seven districts or rayons were visited located in NGCA, GCA and in the buffer zone (listed in Annex 4).

The site visits to food markets permitted the ET to check on the availability and price of rations and complementary foods. The site visits to the food distributions allowed the ET to observe the organization and functioning of activities as well as to interview staff, volunteers and beneficiaries, and to review registers and monitoring forms.

### **Team composition and workplan**

The following table presents the members of the evaluation team along with their roles, responsibilities and coverage. It also includes each team member's respective deliverables and due dates.

<b>Team Members</b>	<b>Primary Role</b>	<b>Specific Tasks within Evaluation</b>	<b>Deliverables/Dates</b>
Alison Gardner	Team Leader Emergency nutrition /Resilience and Livelihoods	Interaction with WFP Country Office while in country. Organisation and management of Evaluation Team on daily basis, including setting of tasks and deadlines Responsibility for security aspects Specifically tasked with the nutrition component including the planned interventions for infants/young children and institutions and to review the need to integrate resilience and livelihoods activities	Draft Inception Package by 28 September 2015  Preparation and Delivery of Exit Presentation to CO on 11 February 2016  Draft Evaluation Report by 28 March 2016  Final Evaluation Report by 29 April 2016
John Prout	International Evaluator Food Security, C&V transfers and in-kind distributions	Specifically tasked with evaluating the processes and impact of the cash/voucher and in-kind food elements of the response Generally tasked to support the evaluation on any social protection/safety net activities	Input into Inception Package, Draft and Final Evaluation Report.
Valeriy Danylin	National Evaluator Emergency Response, Gender Expert	Specifically tasked with evaluating WFP's role in the emergency response and the integration of gender issues Generally tasked to liaise with national institutions and local organizations and to support the team in gathering documents/ information and in hiring translators, etc.	Input into Inception Package, Draft and Final Evaluation report.

## Annex 4a: List of Field Sites Visited

Date	Location (Town/Oblast/ NGCA or GCA)	Type of Project Intervention Visited or Meeting	Type of Beneficiaries Met	WFP CP, Partner or Stakeholder	Evaluation Team Member(s)
01 Feb	Zelenoe / Donetsk Oblast/ NGCA	Food distribution	In-kind food	PIN	AG, JP, VD
02 Feb	Komsomolskoe / Donetsk Oblast / NGCA	Food distribution	In-kind food	PIN	AG, JP, VD
02 Feb	Donetsk Oblast / NGCA	Food Storage Warehouse	none	PIN	AG, JP, VD
	Donetsk city/NGCA	Visit to grocery store			AG, JP
03 Feb	Luhansk / NGCA	IDP Collective Center / Group discussion	In-kind food	MC	AG, JP, VD
03 Feb	Krasnyi Luch /Luhansk Oblast / NGCA	Home visits	In-kind food	MC	AG, JP, VD
03 Feb	Luhansk city/NGCA	Visits to grocery stores			AG, JP
04 Feb	Centralniy /Luhansk Oblast / NGCA	Focus Group discussion	In-kind food	MC	AG, JP, VD
04 Feb		Visit to grocery store			AG, JP
05 Feb	Severodonetsk/Luh ansk Oblast/GCA	Institutional feeding/ Visit to Severodonetsk City Hospital	In-kind food	ADRA	VD
05 Feb	Severodonetsk/Luh ansk Oblast/GCA	Institutional feeding/Visit to Luhansk Olast TB Center for Children	In-kind food	ADRA	VD
05 Feb	Severodonetsk/Luh ansk Oblast/GCA	Visit to Oshad Bank branch	Cash	MC	JP, AG
05 Feb	Severodonetsk/GCA	Visit to grocery store			JP, AG
06 Feb	Lisichansk / Luhansk Oblast/GCA	Home visits	Voucher	ADRA	AG, JP, VD
08 Feb	Gorskoe / Luhansk Oblast/GCA	Home visits	In-kind food	ADRA	AG, JP, VD
08 Feb	Toshkovka / Luhansk Oblast/GCA	Home visits	In-kind food	ADRA	AG, JP, VD
09 Feb	Brovskoe / Luhansk Oblast/GCA	Home visits	Cash	ADRA	AG, JP, VD

## Annex 4b: Stakeholders Interviewed During Fieldwork in East Ukraine

Date	Location (Oblast/Town)	Person Met	Job Title / Designation	Government/ Organization	Evaluation Team Member(s)
31 Jan	Dnipropetrosk	Viacheslav Medvedev	Chief Marketing Officer	“Brusnichka” Freshmarket (retailer)	AG, JP, VD
31 Jan	Dnipropetrosk	Yulia	Loyalty Manager	“Brusnichka” Freshmarket	AG, JP, VD
31 Jan	Dnipropetrosk	Sergiy	IT Specialist	“Brusnichka” Freshmarket	AG, JP, VD
01 Feb	Donetsk city/NGCA	Names not provided	Members	Accreditation Centre and Humanitarian Committee	AG, JP, VD
01 Feb	Donetsk city/NGCA	Maria Radvakova	Program Mgr, Relief and Development Dept	People in Need	AG, JP, VD
01 Feb	Donetsk city/NGCA	Oleg Dianyk	Food Coordinator	People in Need	AG, JP, VD
01 Feb	Donetsk city/NGCA	Andriy Sanin	Program Manager/In-kind Food	Rinat Akhmetov Foundation	AG, JP, VD
01 Feb	Donetsk city/NGCA	Genadiy Velichko	Deputy Head	Centre of Recovery Management	AG, JP, VD
01 Feb	Donetsk city/NGCA	Cristoph Polajner	Deputy Head of Office	ICRC	AG, JP, VD
03 Feb	Luhansk city/NGCA	Oksana Vikitenro	Coordinator	Mercy Corps	AG, JP, VD
03 Feb	Luhansk city/NGCA	Vasiliy Nikitin	Vice-Premier/ Social Policy	Council of Ministers	AG, JP, VD
03 Feb	Luhansk city/NGCA	Mher Tovmasyan	Economic Security Delegate	ICRC	AG, JP, VD
03 Feb	Luhansk city/NGCA	Mario Trutman	Coordinator	UN OCHA	AG, JP, VD
04 Feb	Donetsk Oblast/ Sloviansk/GCA	Paul Thibaul	Food Coordinator	People in Need	AG, JP, VD
04 Feb	Donetsk Oblast/ Sloviansk/GCA	Hushnid Satarov	Head of Office	People in Need	AG, JP, VD
04 Feb	Donetsk Oblast/ Sloviansk/GCA	Lina Potaeva	Regional Coordinator, Donetsk Oblast GCA	ADRA	AG, JP, VD
05 Feb	Luhansk Oblast/Severodonetsk/GCA	Svetlana Rybalko	Program Manager in Luhansk oblast GCA	Mercy Corps	AG, JP, VD

<b>Date</b>	<b>Location (Oblast/Town)</b>	<b>Person Met</b>	<b>Job Title / Designation</b>	<b>Government/ Organization</b>	<b>Evaluation Team Member(s)</b>
05 Feb	Luhansk Oblast/ Severodonetsk/ GCA	Yuriy Klimenko	Deputy Head of Governor/Security and Public Order, Public Relations	Luhansk Oblast Military Civic Administration	AG, JP, VD
05 Feb	Luhansk Oblast/ Severodonetsk/ GCA	Olga Lyshik	Deputy Head of Governor/Social Issues	Luhansk Oblast Military Civic Administration	AG, JP, VD
05 Feb	Luhansk Oblast/ Severodonetsk/ GCA		Representative	Oschad bank	AG, JP
08 Feb	Luhansk Oblast/ Severodonetsk/ GCA	Ekaterina Fedotova	Regional Coordinator in Luhansk Oblast GCA	ADRA	AG, JP, VD
08 Feb	Luhansk Oblast/ Severodonetsk/ GCA		Field Coordinator OCHA	OCHA	AG, JP, VD
08 Feb	Luhansk Oblast/ Severodonetsk/ GCA	Akhmad Kayumov	Field Monitoring Specialist/ Humanitarian Response, Protection, GBV	UNFPA	VD
08 Feb	Luhansk Oblast/ Severodonetsk/ GCA	Christophe Gravend	Head of Sub-Delegation	ICRC	AG, JP

## Annex 5: Evaluation Matrix

<b>Key Question 1: How appropriate is the operation?</b>						
Areas for analysis: i) Objectives ii) Targeting iii) Choice of activities iv) Choice of transfer modalities v) Complementarity of activities						
<b>No.</b>	<b>Sub-questions</b>	<b>Measure/Indicator</b>	<b>Main Sources of Information</b>	<b>Data Collection Methods</b>	<b>Data Analysis Methods</b>	<b>Evidence quality</b>
1.1	To what extent are the operation objectives appropriate to the needs of the food insecure displaced population, including the distinct needs of women, men, boys and girls?	1.1.1 Prevalence of acute malnutrition among targeted and non-targeted population 1.1.2 Existence of risk factors (e.g. elevated mortality/morbidity) indicating a deteriorating nutrition status in targeted and non-targeted population 1.1.3 Prevalence of food insecurity among targeted and non-targeted population 1.1.4 CSI data for targeted and non-targeted population 1.1.5 Alignment of EMOP objectives with needs assessment findings	Assessment & Response Analysis Documents External documentation as identified RB/CO WFP staff	Review of information/reports available Interviews with RB/CO WFP staff	Triangulation of available information and data gathered	Some information in assessment reports; other documents may be found
1.2	Is the targeting appropriate considering the needs of the affected populations?	1.2.1 Appropriateness of the geographical targeting criteria for the EMOP activities 1.2.2 Appropriateness and quality of the screening, selection and orientation of beneficiaries 1.2.3 Sensitization of the beneficiary communities of the targeting criteria 1.2.4 Alignment of targeting criteria with other agencies 1.2.5 Community involvement in targeting	Assessment & Response Analysis Documents External documentation as identified RB/CO WFP staff	Review of information/reports available Interviews with RB/CO WFP staff	Triangulation of available information and data gathered	Some information in assessment reports; other documents may be found

No.	Sub-questions	Measure/Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
		1.2.6 Women's involvement in targeting 1.2.7 Percentage of the overall assessed uncovered needs met by WFP assistance 1.2.8 Alignment with national policies for targeting of social protection grants				
1.3	Are the EMOP activities appropriate for the target groups?	1.3.1 Proportion of individual beneficiary needs met by EMOP activities 1.3.2 Proportion of affected populations reached by EMOP activities 1.3.3 Existence of M&E systems / indicators that adequately measure impact of activities and medium / longer term needs beyond planned assistance 1.3.4 Quality and coverage of the needs assessment	Assessment & Response Analysis Documents External documentation as identified RB/CO WFP staff	Review of information/reports available Interviews with RB/CO WFP staff	Triangulation of available information and data gathered	Some information in assessment reports; other documents may be found
1.4	Are the transfer modalities selected appropriate for the respective target groups?	1.4.1 Existence of studies/reviews to adequately inform the choice of transfer modalities for different EMOP activities on basis of cost efficiency and effectiveness 1.4.2 Existence of market analysis and monitoring 1.4.3 Documented WFP decision making 1.4.4 Alignment with Gov't policies (if any)	Transfer modality review/assessment Beneficiaries RB/CO WFP staff Gov't Policies	Review of information/reports available Interviews with RB/CO WFP staff FGDs	Triangulation of available information and data gathered	Some information in assessment reports; other documents may be found

No.	Sub-questions	Measure/Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
1.5	To what extent was the operation design coherent with a gender analyzes which identified the underlying causes and barriers to gender equality?	1.5.1 Implementation of a gender analysis and presence of report 1.5.2 Quality of analysis/report and identification of underlying causes and barriers of gender equality 1.5.3 Presence of gender integration in activities and positive gender results	Gender analysis report WFP staff feedback and programme data/reports	Review of information/reports available Interviews with RB/CO WFP staff	Triangulation of available information and data gathered	No gender assessment located; requested
1.6	To what extent it is the EMOP coherent with national policies & WFP strategy, policies & normative guidance, including gender?	1.6.1 Coherence with national policies and strategies incl. gender 1.6.2 Coherence with WFP strategy, policies and normative guidance including gender 1.6.3 Receipt of relevant Gov't request for WFP assistance	National policy and strategy documents WFP strategy, policy documents WFP/Gov't staff	Review of documents available Interviews with WFP and Government staff	Triangulation of information in documents with information from interviews	WFP and government documents available
1.7	Are the EMOP activities complementary with other humanitarian and development partners' activities?	1.7.1 Complementarity of EMOP activities with those of other humanitarian partners 1.7.2 Complementarity of EMOP activities with development partners 1.7.3 Involvement of WFP in the humanitarian coordination mechanisms 1.7.4 Relevance of the Food Security and Malnutrition Cluster 1.7.5 Positive coordination and WFP involvement at all levels 1.7.6 Involvement of relevant stakeholders in design process 1.7.7 Evidence of coordination / overlap of assistance at field level / uniformity of levels of assistance between actors 1.7.8 Perceptions of main partners / stakeholders	WFP programme documents National development documents Food Security Cluster meeting minutes Key Informants Field visits	Review of documents available Interviews with WFP, UN, Govern. & NGO staff	Triangulation of information in documents with information from interviews	Most documents available

**Key Question 2: What are the results of the operation?**

**Areas for analysis** (considering benefits, by group, between women, men, boys and girls):

- i) Attainment of planned outputs
- ii) Realisation of objectives/unintended effects
- iii) Efficiency of operation and sustainability of benefits

No.	Sub-questions	Measure/Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
2.1	What was the level of attainment against the planned objectives in terms of beneficiaries (disaggregated by women, men, boys and girls) and assistance?	2.1.1 Number of beneficiaries reached through C/V and in-kind food by region/sex/age compared to planned 2.1.2 Frequencies of C/V and in-kind food distributions compared to planned 2.1.3 Quantity of Cash/Voucher and quantity/quality of in-kind food distributed compared to planned	WFP staff IP Staff Programme data/monitoring and SPR reports	Review of data/reports available Interviews with WFP and IP staff	Triangulation of information in documents with information from interviews	Most documents available; others will be sought
2.2	Are the programme results contributing to the realization of the operation's objectives and are there any other impacts of the interventions?	2.2.1 Outcome measures - C/V & in-kind food: Dietary Diversity Score - C/V & in-kind food: Coping Strategy Index - Food consumption score 2.2.2 Other impacts of the interventions - Impact on the socio-economic condition of the displaced population and their hosts - Impact on the price of foods and other items in local markets - Other effects?	Programme data/monitoring and SPR reports Ongoing assessment reports WFP staff IP Staff	Review of data/reports available Interviews with WFP, UN, Govern. And IP staff	Triangulation of information in documents with information from interviews	Some information available; additional information will be sought

No.	Sub-questions	Measure/ Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
2.3	Is the EMOP implemented efficiently? Are the costs acceptable considering the beneficiaries targeted?	2.3.1 Timeliness of C/V and in-kind food distributions 2.3.2 Distribution cycles planned vs actual 2.3.3 Prices of imported foods versus local foods purchased 2.3.4 Relative costs of chosen transfer modalities and their effectiveness 2.3.5 Evolution of the DSC budget 2.3.6 Costs associated with Partners' activities including monitoring compared to WFP 2.3.7 the quality of services provided 2.3.8 Balance between the need for efficiency and effectiveness 2.3.9 Appropriate staffing levels for management and implementation 2.3.10 Resources: planned vs mobilized vs utilized	Programme data/monitoring, budget and SPR reports WFP staff IP Staff Beneficiary perceptions	Review of data/reports available Interviews with WFP, UN, Govern. And IP staff	Triangulation of information in documents with information from interviews	Some information available; additional information will be sought
2.4	Do cross cutting indicators demonstrate results?	2.4.1 Improvement in gender equality and empowerment 2.4.2 Protection and accountability of affected populations 2.4.3 Partnership	M&E reports FGDs WFP staff and other stakeholders	Review of M&E reports Interviews with WFP, UN, Gov't and IP staff FGDs with beneficiaries	Triangulation of information in documents with information from interviews	Some data/reports available; additional information will be sought; dependent on interviews

No.	Sub-questions	Measure/Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
2.5	What is the likelihood that benefits will continue after the end of the operation?	2.5.1 Government ownership; institutionalisation of established concepts, systems, structures and processes 2.5.2 Agreed SOPs 2.5.3 Resource allocation from alternative sources 2.5.4 Institutional capacity to sustain activities (Gov/NGOs/Civil society) 2.5.5 Sustained coordination of complimentary activities 2.5.6 Gaps in policy frameworks 2.5.7 Technical capacity 2.5.8 Availability of resources	Minutes of WFP/ Gov't meetings  Perspectives of Gov't line ministries & staff) and WFP staff  Perspectives of key stakeholders and partners  Donors, UN, Civil Society, IPs  Agreements with Government on Handover /MoUs	Review of meeting minutes  Interviews with WFP, Gov't staff, donors, UN & IP staff  Review of WFP/Gov't. MoU	Triangulation of information in documents with information from interviews	MoU available; additional information will be sought; interviews with stakeholders critical

**Key Question 3: Why and how has the operation produced the observed results? Areas for analysis:**

- i) Internal factors
- ii) External factors
- iii) General factors

No.	Sub-questions	Measure/Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
3.1	What were the main internal factors that caused the observed changes and affected how results were achieved?	3.1.1 Effects of the initial lack of a WFP Ukraine CO on the design and implementation of EMOP 3.1.2 CO capacity to mobilize resources, staff, etc. Impact of any funding shortfalls, evidence of resource allocation / prioritization. 3.1.3 Donor perceptions of WFP presence/ operation	Programme data/ monitoring, budget and SPR reports  Rome/RB Mission Reports  WFP staff (CO/RB/HQ)  IP Staff, Donor staff, Gov't. staff, UN staff  FSC Staff and FSC members	Review of WFP data/reports available  Interviews with WFP (CO/RB/Rome), IP, FSC staff & members, Gov't staff, UN Agencies	Review and analyze documentation; triangulate with interviews	Some reports available, more will be sought. Most information will come from interviews with WFP and others

No.	Sub-questions	Measure/Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
3.1	- continued -	<p>3.1.4 CO capacity to advocate and influence policy and strategy through engagement in relevant coordination structures</p> <p>3.1.5 Appropriateness of staff numbers and skill sets</p> <p>3.1.6 CO capacity to engage and manage good quality and efficient Implementing Partner (IPs)</p> <p>3.1.7 Level of engagement with counterparts in Gov't, UN, NGO partners organizations/other stakeholders.</p> <p>3.1.8 Quality/level of support from Rome and RB</p> <p>3.1.9 Effectiveness of internal WFP management processes and management information</p> <p>3.1.10 Quality and efficiency of the M&amp;E system and ability to anticipate significant external factors</p> <p>3.1.11 Ability to identify unfolding events and adapt to changing circumstances</p> <p>3.1.12 Quality of the support provided to the Food Security Cluster (FSC)</p> <p>3.1.13 Quality of support provided to CPs</p>				

No.	Sub-questions	Measure/Indicator	Main Sources of Information	Data Collection Methods	Data Analysis Methods	Evidence quality
3.2	What were the main external factors that caused the observed changes and affected how results were achieved?	3.2.1 Quality of the coordination with SES and other national counterparts 3.2.2 Political, economic and security factors affecting EMOP implementation 3.2.3 Access to the targeted geographical areas by WFP and their IPs 3.2.4 Functioning of the government and local institutions in the targeted geographical areas 3.2.5 Functioning of the food markets, roads and modes of transportation in EMOP areas 3.2.6 Level of organisation and social cohesion of the targeted beneficiaries (displaced, host population)	Baseline and ongoing assessment reports; WFP programming reports WFP CO, IP and Government (national/regional/local) staff	Review of data/reports available Interviews with WFP CO, IP, Government (national, regional and local) staff	Review and analyze documentation; triangulate with interviews	Some reports available, more will be sought. Most information will come from interviews with WFP, IP and Gov't staff

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## Annex 7: Stakeholders interviewed in Kyiv<sup>99</sup>

Date	Person Met	Job Title / Designation	Organization	Evaluation Team Member(s)
25/01	David Vadachkoria	Programme officer (C&V)	WFP CO	JP
25/01	Carlos Melendes	Regional logistics officer	WFP RB	JP
25/01	Intisar Birkia	Regional procurement officer	WFP RB	JP
25/01	Lindita Bare	Regional resource and pipeline management officer	WFP RB	JP
25/01	Anna Miroshnichenko	Senior regional finance officer	WFP RB	JP
25/01	Aida Filipovic	Logistics / supply chain officer	WFP CO	JP, AG
25/01	Rauf Yusupov	Resource manager	WFP CO	JP
25/01	Zarif Rakhmanov	Finance Officer	WFP CO	JP, AG
25/01	Sergey Petrov	In-kind Food Officer	WFP CO	AG, VD
26/01	Khatuna Epremidze	Regional Prog. Adviser (C&V)	WFP RB	JP, AG
26/01	Claire Whelan	Human Rights Officer/ Monitoring of Human Rights	UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission	VD
26/01	Iryna Yakovleva	Human Rights Officer/ Monitoring of Human Rights in NGCA	UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission	VD
26/01	Carl Paulsson	Senior Regional Prog. Adviser	WFP RB	JP, AG
26/01	Carlo Scaramella	Deputy Regional Director	WFP RB	JP, AG
26/01	Edgar Luce	Programme Officer (M&E)	WFP RB	JP, AG
26/01	Ellen Kramer	Regional Programme Adviser	WFP RB	JP, AG
26/01	Mariko Kawabata	Regional VAM officer	WFP RB	JP, AG
26/01	Anna Miroshnichenko	Senior Regional Finance Officer	WFP RB	JP, AG
26/01	Lindita Bare	Regional Resource and Pipeline Management Officer	WFP RB	JP, AG
26/01	Ludmilla Levenets	Sales Manager	METRO & Warehouse visit	JP, AG
26/01	Giancarlo Stopponi	Head of Office	WFP Ukraine	JP, AG
26/01	Deborah Nguyen	Donor Relations Officer/Nutrition Focal Point	WFP Ukraine	JP, AG
27/01	Pablo Mateu	Representative	UNHCR	JP
27/01	Jock Mendoza-Wilson	Director of International and Investor Relations	RAF	JP, AG, VD
27/01	Barbara Manzi	Head of office	UN OCHA Ukraine	JP, AG, VD
27/01	Toirov Farrukh Abdualievich	Coordinator	FAO	AG
27/01	Pridon Japaridze	Deputy Programme Coordinator for Emergency	FAO	AG
27/01	Dr. Oleg Bilukha	Associate Director of Science, Emergency Response and Recovery Branch, NSC Co- Coordinator	CDC seconded to UNICEF	AG

<sup>99</sup> In addition to interviews while the ET was in Kyiv, some of the individuals were interviewed through skype or e-mail or both as noted.

<b>Date</b>	<b>Person Met</b>	<b>Job Title / Designation</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Evaluation Team Member(s)</b>
27/1	Isabel Periquito	Nutritionist, NSC Co-Coordinator	WHO	AG
27/1	Stuart Willcuts	Country Director, Ukraine	Mercy Corps	JP, AG, VD
27/1	Fredric Larsson	Head	NGO Forum	JP, AG, VD
28/1	Mattias Frick	Medical Coordinator	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency	JP, AG, VD
28/01	Hanna Norell	Project Manager, Humanitarian and Peace Support Operations	Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency	JP, AG, VD
28/01	Koji Tsutsui	Second Secretary	Embassy of Japan in Ukraine	AG
28/01	Irina Kerner	First Secretary/ Economic Department	German Embassy	JP, AG, VD
28/01	Andreas Otto	First Secretary/Economic Department	German Embassy	JP, AG, VD
28/01	Jennifer Cooper	Deputy Director Development Cooperation Section	Canadian Embassy	JP, AG, VD
28/01	Lada Onishyk	The Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation representative	Russian Federation	JP, AG, VD
28/01	Larysa Kobzarenko	Project manager	ADRA	JP, AG, VD
28/01	Gerd Buta	Head of VAM and M&E	WFP Ukraine	AG
28/01	Deborah Wilson	Nutrition Consultant (by skype)	Save the Children	AG
28/01	Nicholas Fleury	Head of Delegation, Ukraine	ICRC	JP, AG, VD
29/01	Andriy Kashyn	WFP KIIS Project Manager	KIIS	JP, AG, VD
29/01	Vanessa Merlet	Deputy Country Director	PIN	JP, AG, VD
29/01	Larysa Kobzarenko	Project Mgr, Institutional Feeding	ADRA	VD
29/01	Ruslan Biloshytskyi	Head of Department/ Logistics	State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine	JP, VD
29/01	Dr. Olena Bykova	Head of Department/ European Integration and International Cooperation	SES	JP, VD
29/01	Oleg Netreba	Deputy Head of Department/ Logistics	SES	JP, VD
29/01	Yuliya Tepluk	Officer/ European Integration and International Cooperation	SES	JP, VD
29/01	Natalka Fedorovych	Head of Department/ Family, Gender Issues and Counter-Trafficking	Ministry of Social Policy (MoSP) of Ukraine	AG, JP, VD
29/01	Iryna Kriukovska	Chief Specialist/Department of Protection of Children	MoSP	AG, JP, VD
29/01	Lilia Kachmola	Chief Specialist/Social Assistance to Families with Children and Needy Families	MoSP	AG, JP, VD

<b>Date</b>	<b>Person Met</b>	<b>Job Title / Designation</b>	<b>Organization</b>	<b>Evaluation Team Member(s)</b>
29/01	Valeriya Vershinina	Counsellor/IDPs Issues	MoSP	AG, JP, VD
29/01	Alexandra Magurova	Counsellor/IDPs Issues	MoSP	AG, JP, VD
09/02	Irena Loloci	Programme Officer	WFP Ukraine	JP, AG, VD
10/02	Claudia Ahpoe	Regional M&E Advisor	WFP RBC	AG, JP
11/02	Sue McIntyre	Senior Humanitarian Advisor, Ukraine	USAID/OFDA	AG, VD
11/02	Giovanna Barberis	Representative UNICEF Ukraine	UNICEF	AG
11/02	Shvets Oleg Vitaliyovych	Director MD, PhD, Chief Dietician	Ministry of Health	AG
11/02	Piven Natalya Vasyliivna		Ministry of Health	AG
11/02	Ostashko Svitlana Ivanivna	Head of the Public Health Dept.	Ministry of Health	AG
11/02	Komarov Mykhaylo Petrovych		Ministry of Health	AG
11/02	Kravhenko Vasyl Vitaliyovych	Head of Medical Department	Ministry of Health	AG
11/02	Mamar Merzouk	Head of Office	ECHO	AG
11/02	Christine Goyer	Coordinator/Protection Cluster	UNHCR	VD
18/02	Mohamed Nasser	Food Technologist (skype & e-mail)	WFP RBC	AG
19/02	Alexsandra Malukalo	National Program Officer/Gender and Protection Advisor	WFP Ukraine	AG
19/02	Valentina Giorda	Food Security Cluster (TCE)	FAO Rome	JP
22/02	Cyril Ferrand	Food Security Cluster (TCE)	FAO Rome	JP
23/02	Giulia Baldi	Policy & Programme Officer, Nutrition Division (e-mail)	WFP HQ	AG
24/02	Josephine Iziku Ippe	Global Nutrition Cluster (GNC) Coordinator (e-mail)	UNICEF Geneva	AG
24/02	Anna Ziolkovska	GNC Rapid Response Team Information Management Officer (e-mail)	UNICEF Geneva	AG
1/03 & 25-26/04	Shane Prigge and Charles Jelensperger	Food Technologists (e-mail)	WFP HQ	AG
28/04	Lynnda Kiess	Nutritionist (e-mail)	WFP HQ	AG

## Annex 8: Summary of WFP food security assessment results and estimates of affected population

Table 1 – WFP assessment food security indicators

	Oct – Nov. 2014 (published Jan. 2015)			March 2015		October 2015 (preliminary results Jan. 2016)		
	Group	FCS (Poor/ border line)	Food Insecu re	FCS (Poor/ border line)	Reduced CSI	FCS (Poor/ border line)	Food Insecure Moderate/ Severe Beneficiary nos (%)	Reduced CSI
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Areas of no conflict w/high IDPs (2014)</li> <li>• DKZ Oblasts (3-2015)</li> </ul>	IDPs	4 %	4 %	16.8 %	15 %	-	46,089 / 15,363	-
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Intermittent conflict-GCA (2014)</li> <li>• DL Government Oblasts (near contact line) 3-2015</li> <li>• DL GCA (11-2015)</li> </ul>	IDPs	7 %	10 %	21 %	19 %	20.5 % (5.1 % / 15.4 %)	126,154 / 40,722 (15.8 % / 5.1 %)	Not aggregated
	Returnees	3 %	14 %					
	Residents	1 %	5 %					
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Active Conflict-NGCA (2014)</li> <li>• DL NG Oblasts (3-2015)</li> <li>• DL NGCA+BZ (11-2015)</li> </ul>	Residents	1 %	14 %	30 %	29 %	10.8 % (2.4 % / 8.4 %)	993,021 / 233,263 (28.1 % / 6.6 %)	Not aggregated
Worst off / most food insecure	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IDPS moved more than once</li> <li>• HHs &gt; 6 members</li> <li>• NGCA Female-headed HHs</li> <li>• NGCA HHs with 2 or more children</li> </ul>			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IDPs living in Collective Centres</li> <li>• NCGA Female-headed HHs and women living alone</li> <li>• HHs with more children</li> <li>• HHs with children with vulnerabilities (disabilities, orphans)</li> <li>• Elderly people</li> <li>• HHs with employed and low-income HHs</li> <li>• HHs with damaged houses</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Women headed households and single women living alone particularly those adopting negative coping mechanism. Luhansk NGCA region seems to be much more affected in this regard.</li> <li>• IDPs living in collective centres.</li> <li>• IDP households sharing house/flat with hosting families in GCA.</li> <li>• Elderly people among IDP population in GCA</li> <li>• Elderly people among the general population in NGCA.</li> <li>• Households with damaged houses in BZ.</li> <li>• Households not having any working age members in NGCA.</li> </ul>		

Table 2 - FA Numbers based on 10/2015 WFP Assessment

	Affected Population	Priority needs	Total Needs
DL GCA	798,462	40,722	166,876
DKZ GCA	365,784	15,363	61,452
Sub-total	1,164,246	56,085	228,328
NGCA & Buffer Zone	3,533,881	233,236	1,226,257
Grand Total	4,698,127	289,321	1,454,585


Table 3 - Data from HRP 2015 and 2016

	HRP 2015 2/2015	HNO 2015 12/2014	HRP 2016 11/2015	HNO 2016 11/2016
In need of HA	5,000,000	5,200,000	3,100,000	3,100,000
Targeted for HA	3,200,000	1,400,000	2,500,000	NA
Food Security: People in Need	1,800,000	1,100,000	1,100,000	1,100,000
Food Security: Targeted	500,000	NA	600,000	NA Including 60,000 (6 to 23 months)

Table 4 - Estimated Targets of those in Need of FA Compared to WFP's EMOP Planned Beneficiaries

	WFP's Planned Beneficiaries	Estimated Food Insecure	Situation
IR-EMOP 8/2014	28,000 (IRR & C/V)	NA	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>GoU requests FA for 10,000 in transit points</li> <li>UNHCR requests FA for ~ 30,000 IDPs in collective centres</li> </ul>
EMOP 11/2014- 4/2015	120,000 (20,000 month)	1,100,000 (HNO, 2015)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP FSA in process; no results available</li> </ul>
BR 1 5/2015- 6/2015	68,000 (34,000 month)	Same as above	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>WFP FSA 10-11/2015;</li> <li>WFP FSA part of MSNA 3-2015; indicates worsening situation; an estimated 1.1 million people in need of FA in NGCA and 200,000 in GCA Donestk/Luhansk</li> <li>An estimated 670,000 with poor consumption</li> </ul>
BR 2 7/2015- 12/2015	387,000 total 327,000 NGCA 60,000 GCA	670,000	
BR 3	267,000	600,000	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>HRP 2016- 600,000</li> <li>WFP FS assessment 10/11-2015</li> </ul>

# Annex 9: IDP Registration by Oblast (UNHCR, July 2015)



## Annex 10: Targeting criteria used by the Food Security Cluster and other agencies

### 10a: The FSC targeting criteria



FOOD SECURITY CLUSTER TARGETING CRITERIAS AND RATION PLANNING<sup>1</sup>:

Categories	Government controlled areas in Donetsk and Luhansk	Verification /Documents	Active conflict zones and Non-Government controlled areas in Donetsk and Luhansk
Status of the beneficiaries	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• IDPs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Registration documents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Returnees</li> <li>• IDPs</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Population Trapped in Conflict Zones (front line, and buffer zone)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decree of civil-military administration about list of locations trapped in conflict as well as documents of lost properties/homes<sup>2</sup></li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Population Trapped in Conflict Zones</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Host communities (families hosting IDPs)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Registration of address of IDPs and further verification</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Host communities (families hosting IDPs).</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economically Affected Host /local Communities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Registration of residence address</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Economically Affected Host /local Communities</li> </ul>
Inclusion criteria	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Households/individuals without any regular income (unemployed/ not receiving social payments)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documents from employment Service/department</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Households/individuals without any regular income (unemployed/ not receiving social payments)</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Households/individuals eligible for social benefits but unable to receive them due to various reasons</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Decree of social departments, jobless, other documents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Households/individuals eligible for social benefits but unable to receive them due to various reasons</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Chronically-ill people (HIV, tuberculosis, others)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Medical certificates</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Chronically-ill people (HIV, tuberculosis, others)</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Elders and handicapped people, including those head of household injured in war;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Medical certificates; other documents from social service</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Elders and handicapped people, including those head of household injured in war;</li> </ul>

<sup>1</sup> Targeting criteria, food basket and voucher value are subject to changes on quarterly basis on the basis of partners' feedback and assessment/ monitoring reports.

<sup>2</sup> List of villages/settlements are updated in the buffer zone, still few settlements are facing registration issues and need to be checked on other indicators.

<http://foodsecuritycluster.net/countries/ukraine>

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• People in remaining institutions (elderly houses, hospitals, orphanages, houses for people with special needs)</li> <li>• Young people who are on the labor market but cannot find a job</li> <li>• Students evacuated with educational institutions</li> <li>• Households with one to 3 member(s) receiving the state social allowance if the sum of all their social benefits is not exceeding UAH 1,330 per person (Average minimum subsistence).</li> <li>• Children/Full-time students without accompanying adults/parents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Evidences/lists of territorial social center/confirmation of social workers</li> <li>• Employment centers evidences</li> <li>• Evidence from the educational institution records</li> <li>• Social benefits for IDPs should not be taken into consideration due to their insignificance and assignment to support in coverage of communal services payments;</li> <li>• Documents, confirming receipt of minimal social benefits; document from Employment department about allowance for social benefit due to unemployment;</li> <li>• Student ID and permanent address</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• People in remaining institutions (elderly houses, hospitals, orphanages, houses for people with special needs)</li> <li>• Young people who are on the labor market but cannot find a job</li> <li>• Households with one to 3 member(s) receiving the state social allowance if the sum of all their social benefits is not exceeding UAH 1,330 per person (Average minimum subsistence).</li> <li>• Children/Full-time students without accompanying adults/parents</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Families with 2 and more children</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Birth certificates</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Families with 2 and more children</li> </ul>
<b>Exclusion criteria</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Households already receiving regular food or cash assistance (equivalent or higher to WFP package)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Checking of registration cards of IDP – most of the assistance received is mentioned there; Cross check with partners agencies;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Households already receiving regular food or cash assistance,</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Households with one to 3 member(s) receiving the state social allowance if the sum of all their social benefits is exceeding UAH 1,330 per person (Average minimum subsistence)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Absence of documents, confirming allowance for minimal social benefits and checking with partners/ local authorities;</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Households with one to 3 member(s) receiving the state social allowance if the sum of all their social benefits is exceeding UAH 1,330 per person (Average minimum subsistence)</li> </ul>

<b>Priority given to:</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Households with large numbers of children (2 and more)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Birth certificates</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Households with large numbers of children (2 and more)</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Single-headed households/families</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Documents from social department or documents confirming absence or another parent/household head</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Single-headed households/families</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Households with pregnant and lactating women and children up to one year</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Birth certificates/medical certificates</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Households with pregnant and lactating women and children up to one year</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The disabled (1st, 2nd, 3rd group)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Medical certificate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The disabled (1st, 2nd, 3rd group)</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The elderly (55+ for women 60+ for men) not receiving pension</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Pension certificate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• The elderly (55+ for women 60+ for men) not receiving pension</li> </ul>
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• People under special emergency medical condition (e.g. need in emergency surgery) or people who need constant/daily medications</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Medical certificate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• People under special emergency medical condition (e.g. need in emergency surgery) or people who need constant/daily medications</li> </ul>
<b>Preferred intervention modalities)</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. e- voucher per individual</li> <li>2. cash transfer per individual</li> <li>3. Food package per individual</li> </ol> <p>The most appropriate delivery tool to be used (or combination of tools), based on the assessment and in agreement with donor</p>		<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. e- voucher per individual</li> <li>2. cash transfer per individual</li> <li>3. Food package per individual</li> </ol> <p>The most appropriate delivery tool to be used (or combination of tools), based on the assessment and in agreement with donor</p>

### RANGE OF FOOD BASKET/ VOUCHER VALUE BASED ON CONTEXT SPECIFICITIES<sup>3</sup>:

The Food Security cluster proposes a range of interventions to provide life-saving assistance to meet the immediate food needs of the population affected by the crisis. This includes the provision of direct food or voucher/cash assistance as prescribed below.

#### a) Total reliance on food assistance-no other source of food<sup>4</sup>

Populations suffering from the aftermaths of the continued unrest, spanning from multiple displacements, to loss of jobs and inability to access social services and benefits, inflation in prices, have been faced with an increase in food insecurity highlighted by a critical lack of access to food. In these situations where households are unable to meet any of their food requirements, humanitarian response is crucial to provide food assistance that supplies the targeted population with their total minimum nutritional requirement i.e.

- 2,100 kcals per person per day

It is important to note that with multifaceted factors affecting the population's access to food, including a decrease in income and loss of property, providing items that are easily and readily consumed, child friendly and rich in vitamins and minerals is essential.

The table below details four 2,100 kcal sample rations for food response providing the full nutritional requirements.

Table 1: Food Basket options at 2,100 kcals per person per day\*

RATION CONTENTS	Daily Ration	Energy
	g/person/day	kcal
BARLEY, DEHULLED	100	354
PASTA, MACARONI	100	371
BEANS, KIDNEY, ALL TYPES	45	150

<sup>3</sup> As per Sphere recommended international standard for humanitarian interventions in emergencies

<sup>4</sup> Geographical division of intervention types apply between Government and non-government controlled areas

CANNED MEAT	18	40
OIL, SUNFLOWER, UNFORTIFIED	30	265
SUGAR	15	58
SALT, IODISED [WFP]	3	0
SARDINES, CANNED IN OIL, DRAINED	45	94
CSB SUPERCEREAL PLUS (CSB++)**	100	394
RICE, WHITE, MEDIUM GRAIN	100	360
Ration totals:	556	2,085
Beneficiary requirements for:		2,100
% of requirements supplied by ration:		99%

\* NutVal Ration Calculation - Exported data

\*\* This commodity has been added compared to the previous basket as a contingency in case supplementary feeding will be identify as a major need to be addressed.

#### b) Partial reliance on food basket; availability of other sources of food<sup>5</sup>

In relatively secure IDP-hosting areas, with adequate food supply and where markets are well-functioning, it is recommended to provide up to 75% of the minimum food basket (2,100 kcal) to the vulnerable population groups. It is assumed that the latter has access to food through (economic) formal and informal safety nets, and consequently do not completely rely on humanitarian/food assistance to meet all their food and nutrition needs.

The food assistance baskets provided should meet the following standards:

- 1,600 kcals per person per day

The table below details two sample rations for food response providing the partial nutritional requirements

Table 2: Food Basket option at 1,600 kcals per person per day\*

<sup>5</sup> Geographical division of intervention types apply between Government and non-government controlled areas

RATION CONTENTS	Ration (gm/day/PP)	Energy (Kcal/day)
BARLEY, DEHULLED	60	212
OIL, VEGETABLE	20	177
PASTA, MACARONI	200	742
SUGAR	25	97
CANNED MEAT	30	66
SARDINES, CANNED IN OIL, DRAINED	50	104
BEANS, KIDNEY, ALL TYPES	60	200
SALT, IODISED [WFP]	3	0
Sub-Total	448	1598
Beneficiary requirements for:		2,100
% of requirements supplied by ration:		76%

*\*NutVal Ration Calculation – Exported data*

*\*\* This commodity has been added compared to the previous basket as a contingency in case supplementary feeding will be identify as a major need to be addressed.*

#### VOUCHER VALUE BASED ON CONTEXT SPECIFICITIES<sup>6</sup>:

The original 45\$ transfer value (equaling to 500 UAG in April 2014) proposed by the WFP C&V feasibility assessment was based on the cost of the minimum food basket defined by the Government of Ukraine providing 2,600 kcal per capita (winter ration). In August, decision was to take the transfer value as a base for calculating the food basket for parcels as well as transfer value for the vouchers. The target groups were reliant on short term support with full basket.

All this has been taken into consideration when relooking at the new transfer value on the recommended food basket to provide 75% of the 2,100 kcal (warmer season recommended food basket)

Based on the current prices the estimated cost of this basket is approx. 450 UAG. This value will be revised according to food prices monitoring across the country.

<sup>6</sup> Need to be updated in light of valid and updated market assessment in Government Controlled Areas

## **10b: ICRC support to the following categories:**

GCA (outside of the front-line) - cash assistance (500UAH/person/month) to unemployed IDPs living below the Minimum Subsistence Level (MSL) average 1,330UAH/person/month;

Front-line (both GCA and NGCA) is divided into two zones, depending on a number of criteria but basically taking into consideration effects of the conflict:

Zone 1 - heavily affected places - all residents receive assistance on a monthly basis

Zone 2 - less affected places - assistance is provided on a bi-monthly basis, to the following categories:

- people whose houses were damaged / destroyed
- unemployed due to the conflict
- IDPs
- households with wounded or killed family member

Please note that in-kind assistance is provided in the front-line places where cash transfer mechanisms and markets are not functioning.

NGCA - in-kind assistance on a bi-monthly basis:

- Disabled groups I and II
- IDPs
- Red Cross clients (elderly living alone people with limited physical abilities, people with oncological diseases / tuberculosis)
- Families whose houses were damaged during conflict
- Households with killed or wounded family member
- Other specific categories such as large families, single parents, etc., defined in agreement with local authorities.

Additionally, ICRC covers 30 percent of food and hygiene needs in various health and social institutions (such as hospitals, homes for the elderly, orphanages, etc.) in NGCA. This support is regularly revised in relation to other types of support such institutions receive (for example, food was not provided since the beginning of 2016 as all food needs were covered from other sources).

An assessment is currently ongoing to verify / correct the targeted categories, and the type of assistance provided, with a possibility to switch to cash assistance (where possible) or productive support projects (ie: various agricultural inputs). Various types of support (cash, in-kind, agricultural inputs) are budgeted for the whole year 2016.

### **10c: Targeting criteria of the Rinat Akhmetov Foundation (RAF)**

The categories of civilians provided with food packages from Rinat Akhmetov Foundation include:

- 1) Disabled people of the 1st and the 2nd categories
- 2) Single parents with children under 18 years old (including widows/widowers with children under 18)
- 3) Families with many children (with at least three children under 18)
- 4) People older than 65
- 5) Families raising disabled children
- 6) Families with adopted children, orphans and children whose parents have their rights annulled
- 7) People who obtained disability due to military actions – equated to World War II disabled veterans
- 8) Pregnant women at all stages of pregnancy
- 9) Orphans from 18 to 23 years old

## Annex 11: Ingredients, Quantities and Nutritional Content of WFP's Institutional Food Ration in comparison with the ICRC's Institutional Ration

WFP Institutional Food Ration			ICRC Institutional Food Ration	
Food Item	Quantity per Individual/month	Daily Amount/grams	Quantity per Individual/month	Daily Amount/grams
Buckwheat	3 kg.	100	0	0
Wheat Flour	10 kg.	333	3.5 kg.	117
Sunflower Oil	1 kg.	33	0.2 kg.	7
Sugar	1 kg.	33	0.3 kg.	10
Salt	0	0	0.06 kg.	2
Canned Fish	0	0	0.5 kg.	17
Canned Meat	0	0	0.5 kg.	17
Canned beans <sup>100</sup>	1.29 kg.	17	0	0

As shown below and on the next page, WFP and ICRC's food rations both have low micronutrient content. ICRC's was designed to complement available foods based on an assessment, but WFP's assessment process was not as complete. Based on the calories provided, the ICRC ration has higher levels of micronutrients and overall is better balanced.

### Nutritional Composition of WFP's Institutional Food Ration

Energy	Protein	Fat	Calcium	Copper	Iodine	Iron	Magnesium	Selenium	Zinc
kcal	g	g	mg	mg	µg	mg	mg	µg	mg
2,032	51	40	92	1.7	0	7.2	334	123.7	5.2
97%	98%	100%	9%	157%	0%	22%	166%	448%	42%
72%	10.1%	17.7%							

Vitamin A	Thiamine Vitamin 1	Riboflavin Vitamin B2	Niacin Vitamin B3	Pantothenate Vitamin B5	Pyridoxine Vitamin B6	Folate Vitamin B9	Cobalamin Vitamin B12	Vitamin C	Vitamin D	Vitamin E
µg RAE	mg	mg	mg	mg	mg	µg DFE	µg	mg	µg	mg
297	0.6	0.6	11.5	2.8	0.4	192	0.0	0.7	2.5	0.2
54%	56%	54%	83%	62%	36%	53%	0%	2%	41%	3%

<sup>100</sup> Canned beans are provided, but the nutritional composition of the ration only includes dried beans; to account for this the actual number of grams provided per day are divided by 2.5. This is based on the weight of cooked vs. dried beans.

## Nutritional Composition of the ICRC's Institutional Food Ration

Energy	Protein	Fat	Calcium	Copper	Iodine	Iron	Magnesium	Selenium	Zinc
kcal	g	g	mg	mg	µg	mg	mg	µg	mg
599	20	13	85	0.2	80	2.6	32	48.7	1.0
29%	38%	32%	9%	18%	58%	8%	16%	176%	8%
68%	13.2%	19.0%							

Vitamin A	Thiamine Vitamin B1	Riboflavin Vitamin B2	Niacin Vitamin B3	Pantothenate Vitamin B5	Pyridoxine Vitamin B6	Folate Vitamin B9	Cobalamin Vitamin B12	Vitamin C	Vitamin D	Vitamin E
µg RAE	mg	mg	mg	mg	mg	µg DFE	µg	mg	µg	mg
5	0.2	0.1	2.9	0.6	0.1	32	1.5	0.0	0.8	3.3
1%	17%	11%	21%	14%	7%	9%	69%	0%	13%	41%

## Annex 12: Ingredients, quantities & nutritional composition of Baby Food Baskets

Two BFBs were developed: one for children six-11 months and one for children 12-23 months)

### a) For infants 6 to 11 months

	g/unit	units	g, total	g/day	Energy	Protein	Fat	Iodine	Iron	Thiamine B1	Riboflavin B2	Pyridoxine B6	Cobalamin B12	C	D
Semolina	1000	1	1000	33	108.7	3.8	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Fortified cereals	250	5	1250	42	160.4	5.4	4.7	37.5	3.9	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	16.1	4.7
Baby vegetable puree	200	6	1200	40	25.2	0.3	0.0		0.5	0.0	0.0			8.0	
Baby fruit puree	200	6	1200	40	21.6	0.2	0.0		0.5	0.0	0.0			1.2	
<b>Total</b>		<b>21</b>	<b>4800</b>		<b>315.8</b>	<b>9.6</b>	<b>4.9</b>	<b>37.6</b>	<b>5.3</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>0.6</b>	<b>25.3</b>	<b>4.7</b>
Requirements according to NutVal					834	21	28	90	10	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.9	30	5
Requirements recalculated for 325 kcal					325	8.2	10.9	35.1	3.9	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4	11.7	1.9
percent of requirements covered					97	117	45	107	135	169	161	205	114	217	243

Source: The information provided in this Annex was taken from the Annexes in the NSC Meeting Minutes for April 20, 2015 with amendments based on discussion on 07 May 2015.

### b) For infants 12 to 23 months

	g/unit	units	g, total	g/day	Energy	Protein	Fat	Iodine	Iron	Thiamine B1	Riboflavin B2	Pyridoxine B6	Cobalamin B12	C	D
Semolina	1000	2	2000	67	217.4	7.6	0.4	0.6	0	0	0	0	0	0	217.4
Fortified cereals	250	5	1250	42	160.4	5.4	4.7	37.5	3.9	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4	16.1	4.7
Vegetable puree	200	3	600	20	12.6	0.1	0.0		0.3	0.0	0.0			4.0	
Fruit puree	200	3	600	20	10.8	0.1	0.0		0.3	0.0	0.0			0.6	
<b>Total</b>		<b>18</b>	<b>5800</b>		<b>424.6</b>	<b>13.5</b>	<b>5.1</b>	<b>37.7</b>	<b>5.5</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>0.4</b>	<b>25.3</b>	<b>4.7</b>
Requirements according to NutVal					834	21	28	90	10	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.9	30	5
Requirements recalculated for 325 kcal					450	11.3	15.1	48.6	5.4	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.5	16.2	2.7
% of requirements covered					94	119	34	78	102	100	100	133	80	156	174

### **Annex 13: Results from the Emergency Infant and Young Children Nutrition Assessments**

Two emergency nutrition assessments of infants/young children (IYC) of IDPs were carried out in June of 2015 in three oblasts in GCA (Khardiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia) and another in Donetsk oblast GCA. The findings were similar – overall infant and young child feeding practices were poor: exclusive breastfeeding rates were low and early introduction of other liquids, solid foods and bottle-feeding were common. No cases of severe acute malnutrition (SAM) were found and few cases of moderate acute malnutrition were detected.

In November 2015 another nutrition assessment of IYC was carried out with households in the NGCA of Donetsk Oblast and found similar results to the previous assessments. Exclusive breastfeeding rates were low with early introduction of other liquids, including formula and solid foods. Among 176 children assessed, no cases of SAM were detected and only one case of MAM was found.

There has not been an emergency IYC nutrition assessment in Luhansk oblast, in the NGCA or GCA.

## **Annex 14: Anaemia surveillance results**

Sixteen Facilities Reporting (eight in Donetsk and eight in Luhansk/GCA) - January 2016

### **Anaemia Surveillance results for infants under one year of age:**

Preliminary January data from Donetsk found that prevalence of total anaemia was 17.1 percent (13.8 percent mild, 3.1 percent moderate, 0.3 percent severe) and data from Luhansk found that prevalence of total anaemia was 45.7 percent (22.9 percent mild, 21.4 percent moderate, 1.4 percent severe).

### **Anaemia Surveillance results for pregnant women:**

The prevalence of total anaemia among pregnant women was found to 15.7 percent (11.3 percent mild, 4.4 percent moderate) in Donetsk and 40.5 percent (27.3 percent mild, 13.0 percent moderate, 0.2 percent severe) among pregnant women in Luhansk. Only summary data has been reported from Luhansk so far.

Total anaemia by facility ranged from 0-55.2 percent.

## **Annex 15: HQ Nutrition Unit's advice to the CO on options for providing infant cereal as part of WFP Ukraine ration**

**If the objective is a nutritional one** - to meet nutrient requirements for 20,000 young children (during the emergency response):

Option 1: The best option would still be to import SC+, while working with local manufacturers to improve the current product, if a long-term engagement in Ukraine is foreseen. This option would allow us to have a nutrition intervention immediately and subsequently to support the development of an improved product in Ukraine. However, this does not seem to be a viable option for the CO, as they have agreed with the government to rely only on local procurement for the emergency response.

Option 2: Another option discussed would be to distribute Micro-Nutrient Powders (MNPs) with the local porridge. MNPs are included in the Nutrition Cluster strategy, but it should be further clarified with UNICEF what is the progress with the process to import the product, the number of children they are going to cover, as well as what is the progress with the other key programming aspects of the intervention (including packaging, messaging, training for BCC which needs to accompany the MNP distribution). If these steps have not been taken yet, this option would require considerable time (a minimum of three months) and therefore would not really be viable. In the end, it does not improve locally available complementary foods. If this is a preferred approach, then we should not refer to this intervention as a nutrition intervention until WFP is distributing the MNPs.

**If the objective instead is to strengthen local manufacturers' capacity to produce complementary foods with adequate nutrient content**, then the best option could be:

Option 3: Use the local porridge for now and work with the local manufacturer to make improvements on it. This option also allows us to support the development of an improved product in Ukraine. But while we distribute the current formulation of the local porridge we would need to be very clear with government, donors and other stakeholders that this is not a nutrition intervention, because nutrient needs are not being met with the current product formulation. This option would be viable only if the local food producer, the government, etc., is committed to making product improvements, and if WFP is planning a longer intervention in Ukraine than a six-month EMOP.

Given the urgency of getting this EMOP approved and the importance of making sure that the 20,000 children are not forgotten, and that WFP stays in sync with the nutrition cluster, we [WFP HQ] recommend that we simply include the local porridge into the GFD ration. This assures that the children are served, but allows us to manage the expectations for any nutritional outcomes.

## Annex 16: Cost of food parcels in GGA/NGCA locations in Luhansk and Donetsk

Donetsk (NGCA)	WFP food parcel (gms)			Shop price 27/12/2015 (WFP monitor)			
	unit size	# units	total	RUB/unit	UAH/unit	unit size gm	UAH/parcel
Buckwheat	1000	2	2000	59.85	23.02	1000	46.04
Pasta	1000	6	6000	25.85	9.94	1000	59.65
Beans (canned)	500	4	2000	87.86	33.79	1000	67.58
Canned meat	525	2	1050	172.83	66.47	1000	69.80
Vegoil	500	1	500	74.50	28.65	1000	14.33
Sugar	1000	1	1000	42.90	16.50	1000	16.50
Salt	200	1	200	10.98	4.22	1000	0.84
Canned fish	230	7	1610	205.84	79.17	1000	127.46
Totals			14360				402.21
		USD	19.77		UAH:USD	27	14.90

Donetsk (NGCA)	WFP food parcel (gms)			Shop price 04/02/2015 (eval mission)			
	unit size	# units	total	RUB/unit	UAH/unit	unit size gm	UAH/parcel
Buckwheat	1000	2	2000	71.00	27.31	1000	54.62
Pasta	1000	6	6000	24.35	9.37	1000	56.19
Beans (canned)	500	4	2000	33.00	12.69	400	63.46
Canned meat	525	2	1050	105.00	40.38	525	80.77
Vegoil	500	1	500	81.00	31.15	920	16.93
Sugar	1000	1	1000	66.00	25.38	1000	25.38
Salt	200	1	200	14.00	5.38	1000	1.08
Canned fish	230	7	1610	47.00	18.08	230	126.54
Totals			14360				424.97
		USD	19.77		UAH:USD	27	15.74

Donetsk (NGCA)	WFP food parcel (gms)			Shop price 06/02/2016 (WFP monitor)			
	unit size	# units	total	RUB/unit	UAH/unit	unit size gm	UAH/parcel
Buckwheat	1000	2	2000	66.57	25.41	1000	50.82
Pasta	1000	6	6000	23.11	8.82	1000	52.92
Beans (canned)	500	4	2000	93.93	35.85	1000	71.70
Canned meat	525	2	1050	264.23	100.85	1000	105.89
Vegoil	500	1	500	73.02	27.87	1000	13.94
Sugar	1000	1	1000	53.00	20.23	1000	20.23
Salt	200	1	200	11.29	4.31	1000	0.86
Canned fish	230	7	1610	178.79	68.24	1000	109.87
Totals			14360				426.23
		USD	19.77		UAH:USD	27	15.79

Luhansk (NGCA)	WFP food parcel (gms)			Shop price 04/02/2016 (eval mission)			
Commodity	unit size	# units	total	RUB/unit	UAH/unit	unit size gm	UAH/parcel
Buckwheat	1000	2	2000	12.55	4.83	800	12.07
Pasta	1000	6	6000	26.45	10.17	1000	61.04
Beans (canned)	500	4	2000	35.00	13.46	360	74.79
Canned meat	525	2	1050	69.60	26.77	525	53.54
Vegoil	500	1	500	74.00	28.46	900	15.81
Sugar	1000	1	1000	55.00	21.15	1000	21.15
Salt	200	1	200	19.75	7.60	1000	1.52
Canned fish	230	7	1610	45.00	17.31	250	111.46
Totals			14360				351.38
		USD	19.77		UAH:USD	27	13.01

Severodonetsk (GCA)	WFP food parcel (gms)			Shop price 05/02/2016 (eval mission)			
Commodity	unit size	# units	total	RUB/unit	UAH/unit	unit size gm	UAH/parcel
Buckwheat	1000	2	2000		23.95	1000	47.90
Pasta	1000	6	6000		13.40	1000	80.40
Beans (canned)	500	4	2000		20.40	400	102.00
Canned meat	525	2	1050		33.95	525	67.90
Vegoil	500	1	500		24.95	870	14.34
Sugar	1000	1	1000		16.30	1000	16.30
Salt	200	1	200		3.60	1000	0.72
Canned fish	230	7	1610		18.50	240	124.10
Totals			14360				453.66
		USD	19.77		UAH:USD	27	16.80

Lisichansk (GCA)	WFP food parcel (gms)			Shop price 06/02/2016 (eval mission)			
Commodity	unit size	# units	total	RUB/unit	UAH/unit	unit size gm	UAH/parcel
Buckwheat	1000	2	2000		26.29	1000	52.58
Pasta	1000	6	6000		10.75	1000	64.50
Beans (canned)	500	4	2000		19.39	425	91.25
Canned meat	525	2	1050		46.05	525	92.10
Vegoil	500	1	500		29.09	1000	14.55
Sugar	1000	1	1000		15.49	1000	15.49
Salt	200	1	200		4.99	1500	0.67
Canned fish	230	7	1610		15.91	240	106.73
Totals			14360				437.86
Brusnichka Store		USD	19.77		UAH:USD	27	16.22

**Average cost of food parcel contents**

**15.41**

Source: ET spot checks + WFP monitoring

Rates of exchange UAH:USD = 27 RUB:UAH = 2.6

## Annex 17: Ingredients, quantities and nutritional composition of the original GFD ration

Actual Ration		
Food	Daily Ration Grams/person/day	Quantity in Monthly Parcel (kg.)
Buckwheat grain	300	9 kg.
Oil, sunflower, unfortified	31	0.92 kg
Pasta, macaroni	200	6 kg.
Sugar	33	1 kg.
Canned meat	18	0.525 kg.
Sardines, canned in oil, drained	61	1.825 kg.
Canned Beans <sup>101</sup>	27	2 kg. (cooked canned beans)
Salt, iodised, WFP	3	0.1 kg
Tea	6	0.2 kg

Information on the quantities of food included in the GFD ration, as it was originally planned, was not available to the ET.

### Nutritional Composition of original GFD Ration

Energy	Protein	Fat	Calcium	Copper	Iodine	Iron	Magnesium	Selenium	Zinc
kcal	g	g	mg	mg	µg	mg	mg	µg	mg
2,431	91	54	370	4.2	120	13.4	869	187.3	11.6
2,100	52.5	40.0	989	1.1	138	32.0	201	27.6	12.4
116%	173%	136%	37%	384%	87%	42%	433%	679%	93%
	14.9%	20.1%							

Vitamin A	Thiamine Vitamin B1	Riboflavin Vitamin B2	Niacin Vitamin B3	Pantothenate Vitamin B5	Pyridoxine Vitamin B6	Folate Vitamin B9	Cobalamin Vitamin B12	Vitamin C	Vitamin D	Vitamin E
µg RAE	mg	mg	mg	mg	mg	µg DFE	µg	mg	µg	mg
20	0.8	1.6	28.7	5.2	1.1	252	5.5	1.1	2.9	14.2
550	1.1	1.1	13.8	4.6	1.2	363	2.2	41.6	6.1	8.0
4%	69%	149%	208%	113%	95%	70%	248%	3%	48%	178%

<sup>101</sup> Canned beans are provided, but the nutritional composition of the ration only includes dried beans; to account for this the actual number of grams provided per day are divided by 2.5. This is based on the weight of cooked vs. dried beans.

## Annex 18: Current GFD ration of WFP, ICRC and PIN<sup>102</sup>

Food Item	ICRC Ration		WFP Ration		ECHO/PIN Ration	
	Monthly Quantity	Daily grams	Monthly Quantity	Daily grams	Monthly Quantity	Daily grams
Wheat flour	5 kg	167	0	0	0	--
Sunflower oil	1 litre	33	0.5 litre	17	1 litre	33
Buckwheat	2 kg	67	2 kg	67	1 kg	33
Pasta	3 kg	100	6 kg.	200	0.5 kg	17
Sugar	1 kg	33	1 kg.	33	1 kg	33
Rice	3 kg	100	0	0	1 kg	33
Canned fish	1 kg	33	1.61 kg	54	0.46	15
Canned meat	1 kg	33	1.05 kg.	35	0.53 kg	18
Yeast	0.07 kg	2	0	0	0	--
Tea	0.2 kg	7	0	0	0.05 kg	2
Canned beans	0	0	2 kg.	27	0	--
Salt	0	0	0.2	7	0	--
High energy biscuits					0.5 kg	17
Wheat porridge					1 kg	33
Oat flakes					1 kg	33
Semolina					1 kg.	33
Peas					0.5 kg	17
Tomato paste					0.5 kg	17
Canned sprat					0.5 kg	17
Total Calories		<b>2,130</b>		<b>1,520</b>		<b>1,698</b>
Total weight	<i>17.3 kg.</i>		<i>14.4 kg.</i>		<i>12.5 kg.</i>	

<sup>102</sup> RAF, although a large food assistance distributor, was not included as they do not comply with the same international standards that guide humanitarian and food assistance, such as SPHERE.

## Annex 19: Ingredients, quantities and nutritional composition of GFD ration (planned and actual)

Actual Ration			Planned Ration	
Food	Daily Ration Grams/person/day	Quantity in Monthly Parcel (kg.)	Food	Daily Ration Grams/person/day
Buckwheat grain	67	2 kg.	Buckwheat grain	75
Oil, sunflower, unfortified	17	0.5 kg	Oil, sunflower, unfortified	20
Pasta, macaroni	200	6 kg.	Pasta, macaroni	75
Sugar	33	1 kg.	Sugar	15
Canned meat	35	1.050 kg.	Canned meat	30
Sardines, canned in oil, drained	54	1.610 kg.	Sardines, canned in oil, drained	30
Canned Beans <sup>103</sup>	27	2 kg. (cooked canned beans)	Beans, kidney	16
Salt, iodised, WFP	7	0.2 kg	Salt, iodised, WFP	3
			CSB Supercereal Plus (CSB++)	75
			Rice White Medium Grain	75

### Nutritional Composition of GFD Reduced Ration (Actual)

Energy	Protein	Fat	Calcium	Copper	Iodine	Iron	Magnesium	Selenium	Zinc	
kcal	g	g	mg	mg	µg	mg	mg	µg	mg	
1,529	62	34	304	1.7	280	9.3	320	161.5	5.9	
00	52.5	40.0	989	1.1	138	32.0	201	27.6	12.4	
73%	118%	85%	31%	152%	203%	29%	159%	585%	48%	
	16.2%	20.0%								
Vitamin A	Thiamine Vitamin 1	Riboflavin Vitamin B2	Niacin Vitamin B3	Pantothenate Vitamin B5	Pyridoxine Vitamin B6	Folate Vitamin B9	Cobalamin Vitamin B12	Vitamin C	Vitamin D	Vitamin E
µg RAE	mg	mg	mg	mg	mg	µg DFE	µg	mg	µg	mg
17	0.5	0.7	12.6	2.2	0.6	168	4.8	1.2	2.6	8.4
550	1.1	1.1	13.8	4.6	1.2	363	2.2	41.6	6.1	8.0
3%	46%	61%	91%	49%	52%	46%	219%	3%	42%	105%

<sup>103</sup> Canned beans are provided, but the nutritional composition of the ration only includes dried beans; to account for this the actual number of grams provided per day are divided by 2.5. This is based on the weight of cooked vs. dried beans.

### Nutritional Composition of GFD Reduced Ration (Planned)

Energy	Protein	Fat	Calcium	Copper	Iodine	Iron	Magnesium	Selenium	Zinc
kcal	g	g	mg	mg	µg	mg	mg	µg	mg
1,518	54	40	549	1.6	164	13.0	279	83.1	10.2
2,100	52.5	40.0	989	1.1	138	32.0	201	27.6	12.4
72%	103%	100%	56%	147%	119%	41%	139%	301%	83%
	14.3%	23.6%							

Vitamin A	Thiamine Vitamin B1	Riboflavin Vitamin B2	Niacin Vitamin B3	Pantothenate Vitamin B5	Pyridoxine Vitamin B6	Folate Vitamin B9	Cobalamin Vitamin B12	Vitamin C	Vitamin D	Vitamin E
µg RAE	mg	mg	mg	mg	mg	µg DFE	µg	mg	µg	mg
417	0.8	1.2	18.4	4.3	1.6	236	4.4	76.7	6.4	16.3
550	1.1	1.1	13.8	4.6	1.2	363	2.2	41.6	6.1	8.0
76%	72%	106%	133%	93%	131%	65%	201%	184%	105%	204%

## Annex 20: Foods and non-food items redeemed with vouchers

Based on the Brusnichka Supermarket Voucher expenditure report (ADRA 2015)

Product category	Quantity	Cost
Soft drinks	4,959.00	42,398.43
Household chemicals,	85,560.00	1,798,079.92
Eastern sweets	1,537.70	19,289.62
Baby food	6,149.00	104,884.70
Jams, pasta, canned desserts	5,637.00	76,605.45
Dietetic food	1,483.99	21,808.55
Candy drops, chocolate bars, lollipops	7,167.00	56,128.67
Chewing gum	3,335.00	17,981.79
Snacks	485.00	2,932.01
Frozen food	3,390.74	91,229.37
Frozen seafood	3,214.60	126,770.48
Frozen meat products	7,961.61	167,312.04
Ingredients	179.60	1,520.39
Sausages and smoked meat	20,401.85	1,040,910.53
Canned Goods	34,015.38	599,041.08
Candies	7,212.88	415,421.77
Coffee, cocoa, coffee beverages	14,780.00	469,496.62
Cereal and pasta	62,380.29	805,682.87
Cooked food, salads	93.82	3,390.27
Mineral water, drinking water	5,196.00	40,375.11
Dairy products	52,336.29	467,890.12
Ice-cream	2,150.00	25,938.46
Pastry	10,572.55	153,543.95
Meat	41,682.92	1,537,523.31
Vegetables and fruits	43,594.25	559,340.52
Chilled seafood	401.00	8,972.00
Grill products	1,232.47	56,184.23
Vegetable oils	16,202.00	384,613.04
Rolls, biscuits, cakes, wafels	2,313.00	33,348.83
Smoked, dried, salted fish	1,586.50	80,419.66
Fish preserves and caviar	2,340.00	72,203.72
Seasonal Products	36,050.00	197,938.42
Sweet snacks	116.00	1,015.36
Snacks	9,358.00	67,264.08
Juices, nectars, fruit drinks	9,160.00	82,614.97
Salted food and Korean salads	410.14	6,959.67
Sauces and marinades	31,533.00	267,633.56
Spices, seasonings, fast food	38,197.00	166,477.27
Cereal breakfasts	3,316.00	39,593.51
Cream powder, milk powder	353.00	5,066.70
Dried fruits, nuts	632.05	29,955.83
Cheeses	17,550.02	438,172.36
Solid fats	22,713.96	449,644.54
Cakes	1,856.38	54,138.06
Bakery products (manufactured)	18,794.00	108,051.76
Bakery products (self-produced)	21,166.47	82,374.40
Tea	18,007.00	410,365.76
Chocolate	8,830.00	119,643.16
Eggs	17,263.00	210,092.78
<b>Total</b>	<b>704,857.45</b>	<b>12,018,239.69</b>

<b>Non food items</b>	<b>Quantity</b>	<b>Expenditure UAH</b>	
Household chemicals,	85,560.00	1,798,079.92	
<b>Percentage of overall</b>		<b>14.96%</b>	
<b>poor nutritional content products</b>	<b>Quantity</b>	<b>Expenditure UAH</b>	
Soft drinks	4,959.00	42,398.43	
Eastern sweets	1,537.70	19,289.62	
Candy drops, chocolate bars, lollipops	7,167.00	56,128.67	
Chewing gum	3,335.00	17,981.79	
Candies	7,212.88	415,421.77	
Coffee, cocoa, coffee beverages	14,780.00	469,496.62	
Sweet snacks	116.00	1,015.36	
Tea	18,007.00	410,365.76	
Chocolate	8,830.00	119,643.16	
<b>Total</b>		<b>1,551,741.18</b>	
<b>Percentage of overall</b>		<b>12.91%</b>	
<b>low nutritional content products</b>	<b>Quantity</b>	<b>Expenditure UAH</b>	
Ice-cream	2,150.00	25,938.46	
Rolls, biscuits, cakes, wafels	2,313.00	33,348.83	high fat, salt
Juices, nectars, fruit drinks	9,160.00	82,614.97	
Sauces and marinades	31,533.00	267,633.56	high salt
Spices, seasonings, fast food	38,197.00	166,477.27	high fat salt
Solid fats	22,713.96	449,644.54	high saturated fat
Cakes	1,856.38	54,138.06	high sugar, high fat
Bakery products (manufactured)	18,794.00	108,051.76	
Bakery products (self-produced)	21,166.47	82,374.40	
<b>Total</b>		<b>1,270,221.85</b>	
<b>Percentage of overall</b>		<b>10.57%</b>	

## Annex 21: Ukraine accountability indicators relative to those in other contexts

As mentioned in the Executive Summary and the results section of the report, Ukraine accountability results compare favourably to other countries in the same WFP region where food assistance is provided in urban areas rather than camp settings, particularly considering the newness of WFP's operation. This may be partially explained by the higher level of education in Ukraine compared to Jordan and Lebanon. In Ukraine over 90 percent of the population has some secondary education compared to 74 percent and 54 percent, in Jordan and Lebanon, respectively.<sup>104</sup>

The following Table 8 indicates these comparisons based on responses given by WFP beneficiaries in two Middle Eastern countries when asked the same questions.

**Table 8: Comparing Ukraine's Accountability Indicators to Other Countries**

Indicator / question	Ukraine	Lebanon	Jordan
1. Do you know how people were chosen to receive assistance?	50 %	7 %	9 %
2. Were you told exactly how much would receive?	68 %	96 %	78 %
3. Do you know whom to contact?	41 %	57 %	41 %
Proportion of assisted people informed about programme (must have said YES to all three questions)	25 %	4 %	5 %

Source: WFP RBC M&E Unit

<sup>104</sup> UNDP Human Development Report 2015: Work for Human Development, NY, New York, 2015.

**Office of Evaluation**  
**[www.wfp.org/evaluation](http://www.wfp.org/evaluation)**