OPERATION EVALUATION

Ethiopia Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation 200700 (2015-2018) Food Assistance for Eritrean, South Sudanese, Sudanese and Somali Refugees: An evaluation of WFP’s current operation and transition period

Evaluation Report

June 2016 [Final]

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Commissioned by the
WFP Office of Evaluation

Report number: OEV/2015/032
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Disclaimer

The opinions expressed are those of the evaluation team, and do not necessarily reflect those of the WFP. Responsibility for the opinions expressed in this report rests solely with the authors. Publication of this document does not imply endorsement by WFP of the opinions expressed.

The designation employed and the presentation of material in the maps do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of WFP concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.

Evaluation Commissioning

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Acronyms

ACF  Action Contre la Faim
ARRA  Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs
BR  Budget revision
CBT  Cash-based transfer
CHS  Community and household survey (baseline)
CO  Country office (WFP Ethiopia)
CRI  Core relief items
CSB+  Corn-soya blend (fortified)
DAC  Development assistance committee (OECD)
DDS  Dietary diversity score
DFID  Department for International Development (UK)
DRM  Disaster risk management
EB  Executive board (WFP)
EQAS  Evaluation quality assurance system
ET  Evaluation team
ETB  Ethiopian birr
FCS  Food consumption score
FDC  Food distribution committee
FDP  Final distribution point
FGD  Focus group discussion
FM  Field monitors
GAM/MAM  Global (or moderate) acute malnutrition
GBV  Gender-based violence
GFD  General food distribution
HH  Household
IGA  Income generating activities
IMC  International Mercy Corps
IYCF  Infant and young child feeding
JAM  Joint assessment mission
KII  Key informant interviews
LWF  Lutheran World Federation
M&E  Monitoring and evaluation
MDG  Millennium development goals
MSF  Médecins Sans Frontières
MT  Metric tonne
MUAC  Mid-upper arm circumference
NGO  Non-governmental organisation
NRC  Norwegian Refugee Council
OECD  Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OEV</td>
<td>Office of Evaluation (WFP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Organisation for Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLW</td>
<td>Pregnant and lactating women</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRRO</td>
<td>Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RB</td>
<td>Regional bureau (WFP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCC</td>
<td>Refugee central committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCI</td>
<td>Save the Children International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEE</td>
<td>Save the Environment Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>School feeding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SO</td>
<td>Strategic objective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPR</td>
<td>Standard project report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANGO</td>
<td>Technical Assistance to Non-Governmental Organizations International, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TSFP/BSFP</td>
<td>Targeted (or blanket) supplementary feeding programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UASC</td>
<td>Unaccompanied and separated children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDAF</td>
<td>United Nations Development Assistance Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children's Emergency Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USD</td>
<td>United States dollar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFH</td>
<td>Weight-for-height</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP</td>
<td>World Food Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WHO</td>
<td>World Health Organisation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Operational Fact Sheet

## OPERATION

| Type/Number/Title | Ethiopia Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 200365 (2012-2015); and PRRO 200700 (2015-2018): Food Assistance For Eritrean, South Sudanese, Sudanese And Somali Refugees. The scope of this evaluation covers the final year of PRRO 200365 through the transition period and start of the current PRRO (January 2014-March 2016); thus, this fact sheet provides information for both operations. |
| Approval | The current operation was approved by the Executive Board in November 2014. |

## Budget Revision (BR)

### PRRO 200365 - BR 3:
Technical revision to reflect updated WINGS. No changes to the overall budget, value of the project, or to the activities.

### PRRO 200365 - BR 4:
- **Previous Budget:** US$332,757,983
- **New Budget:** US$356,769,969
- **Date Approved:** August 2014
- **Nature of Increase:** This BR proposes to:
  1. Increase the number of planned beneficiaries by 126,620 to reflect the influx of refugees from South Sudan;
  2. Increase commodity requirements by 26,860 metric tonnes (MT) for a total value of US$24,011,986; and to
  3. Increase direct support costs (DSC) by US$2,686,786.

### PRRO 200700 - BR 1:
- **Previous Budget:** US$478,900,152
- **New Budget:** US$482,939,186
- **Date Approved:** January 2015
- **Nature of Increase:** The landslide transport storage & handling (LTSH) rate for this project was increased from US$192.06/MT to US$199.12/MT mainly due to the decrease of the overall project tonnage by 20 percent, impacting fixed costs per MT both at port and transhipment points by US$5.59/MT and increasing the transport rate by US$1.47/MT.

### PRRO 200700 - BR 2:
- **Previous Budget:** US$482,939,185
- **New Budget:** US$488,609,733
- **Date Approved:** July 2015
- **Nature of Increase:** Costs of implementing biometric (fingerprint) ID checks during general food distribution (GFD) in 23 refugee camps in Ethiopia. Including costs of constructing verification halls at the Final Distribution Points (FDP) and additional staffing to implement the biometrics project for WFP. This BR increased the budget by USD$5.67 million, broken down as follows:
  1. USD$5,224,537 for capacity development and augmentation (CD&A);
  2. USD$75,041 for DSC; and
  3. USD$370,970 in indirect support costs (ISC).
### PRRO 200700 - BR 3:
- **Previous Budget:** US$488,609,734
- **New Budget:** US$487,291,946
- **Date Approved:** August 2015
- **Nature of Increase:** Decrease in LTSH rate of US$199.13/MT, which resulted in a total budget reduction of US$1,317,788 ISC inclusive. The LTSH matrix was revised to incorporate US$3/MT LESS investment as well as to update the overall cost component.

### Duration
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>Revised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PRRO 200365: 3 years (1 April 2012–31 March 2015)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRRO 200700: 3 years (April 2015–March 2018)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Planned beneficiaries
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>Revised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(PRRO 200365): 496,400</td>
<td>(PRRO 200365): 623,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PRRO 200700): 840,000</td>
<td>(PRRO 200700): 650,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Planned food requirements
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>Revised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(PRRO 200365) In-kind food: 354,376 MT of food commodities</td>
<td>(PRRO 200365) In-kind food: 381,236 MT of food commodities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PRRO 200700) In-kind food: 534,063 MT of food commodities Cash-based Transfers (CBT): US$11,600,440 million</td>
<td>(PRRO 200700) In-kind food: 534,063 MT of food commodities CBT: N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### US$ requirements
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Initial</th>
<th>Revised</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(PRRO 200365) US$304,278,984</td>
<td>(PRRO 200365) US$356,799,969</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(PRRO 200700) US$478,900,152</td>
<td>(PRRO 200700) US$487,291,946</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## OBJECTIVES AND ACTIVITIES

### UNDAF (2012-2015) Outcome 4 MDGs: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7

#### Strategic Objective

**SO #1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies**

**Objective 1:** Enable refugees to meet minimum levels of food security.

**Outcome 1:** Stabilised or improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and/or individuals.

- General distribution (cash and food)\(^{11}\)
- Blanket supplementary feeding programme (BSFP)\(^{12}\)
- Targeted supplementary feeding programme (TSFP)
- Health and nutrition education/ messaging
- School feeding

**SO #2: Support or restore food security and**

**Objective 3:** Stabilise school enrolment of refugee girls and boys in WFP-assisted schools.

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\(^{10}\) WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200365 BR 4.
\(^{11}\) WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200700 BR 3.
\(^{12}\) WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200365 BR 3.
\(^{13}\) WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200700 BR 1.
\(^{14}\) WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200365 BR 1.
\(^{15}\) WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200700 BR 1.
\(^{16}\) WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200365 BR 4.
\(^{17}\) WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200700 BR 4.
\(^{18}\) WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200365 BR 3.
\(^{19}\) WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200700 BR 3.
\(^{20}\) WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200365 Project Document; WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200700 Revised Logframe; and WFP Terms of Reference Operation Evaluation, 22 September 2015.
\(^{21}\) Per the TOR, PRRO 200700 plans to replace six kilograms of cereals with cash in select camps.
\(^{22}\) Per the TOR, BSF takes places in camps with GAM above 15 percent.

iv
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies.</th>
<th>Outcome 3: Improved access to assets and/or basic services, including community and market infrastructure.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WFP Cross-cutting SO</td>
<td>Objective 4: Increase livelihood and environmental opportunities for refugees and host communities in fragile transition situations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender:</td>
<td>Support to income generating activities (IGA)(^3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protection and Accountability to affected population:</td>
<td>Other environmental/protection interventions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP assistance delivered and utilised in safe, accountable and dignified conditions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Partnerships:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food assistance interventions coordinated and partnerships developed and maintained.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**PARTNERS\(^4\)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Government</th>
<th>Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs (ARRA)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-governmental organisation (NGOs)</td>
<td>Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), Action Contre La Faim (ACF), GOAL, International Mercy Corps (IMC), Concern World Wide, Save the Children International (SCI), Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), Organisation for Sustainable Development (OSD), Mother and Child Development Organisation, and Save the Environment Ethiopia (SEE)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**RESOURCES (INPUTS)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contribution received (by 18 June 2015)(^5):</th>
<th>US$247,331,017</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% funded against appeal:</td>
<td>69.3 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 5 donors:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.A. - 28.04%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multilateral - 7.12%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.K. - 5.67%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan - 5.38%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Commission - 4.04%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations Cerf - 4.01%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1: Overall funding situation PRRO 200365**

![Overall funding situation PRRO 200365](image)

**Source:** WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200365 Resource Situation -18 June 2015.

---

\(^3\) Per the TOR, these activities are implemented by partners.


\(^5\) PRRO 200365 Project Duration: 01 Apr 2012 to 31 Mar 2015.
Contribution received (by 23 May 2016): USD$ 184,044,474

% funded against appeal: 37.8 percent

Top 5 donors:
U.S.A. – 17.20%
Saudi Arabia – 6.64%
Stock Transfer – 3.27%
Eur. Commission – 3.23%
United Kingdom – 2.10%

% funded of first-year requirement 80% 17

Figure 2: Overall funding situation PRRO 200700

Figure 3: Funding trends

*Total (PRRO 200700) indicates total 3-year operational requirements vs total contributions as of 23 May 2016.
** 2016 indicates funding for second year of PRRO (200700) through first 2 months (April and May 2016).

17 Calculation by TANGO: total contribution received (6 April 2016) at end of year one of three-year operation against one-third of full operation requirement of latest BR (US$487,291,946/ 3).
## Table 1: Beneficiary numbers- Planned versus actual

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Planned (as per BR 4 and Proj Doc)</th>
<th>Actuals (as per SPR)</th>
<th>% achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2014</strong> (PRRO 200365)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFD (Includes Food and Cash)****</td>
<td>314,520</td>
<td>308,500</td>
<td>623,020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted SFP (6–59 mo.)</td>
<td>10,200</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>20,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted SFP (PLW)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30,700</td>
<td>30,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blanket SFP (6–59 mo.)</td>
<td>31,600</td>
<td>30,700</td>
<td>62,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blanket SFP (PLW)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School feeding</td>
<td>40,600</td>
<td>40,400</td>
<td>81,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood Activities***</td>
<td>6,667</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>16,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2015</strong> (PRRO 200700)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFD (Includes Food and Cash)****</td>
<td>328,100</td>
<td>321,900</td>
<td>650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted SFP (6–59 mo.)</td>
<td>11,900</td>
<td>11,500</td>
<td>23,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Targeted SFP (PLW)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5,900</td>
<td>5,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blanket SFP (6–23 mo.)</td>
<td>26,300</td>
<td>25,700</td>
<td>52,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Blanket SFP (24–59 mo.)</td>
<td>27,000</td>
<td>26,300</td>
<td>53,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blanket SFP (PLW)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School feeding</td>
<td>56,400</td>
<td>54,100</td>
<td>110,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livelihood Activities***</td>
<td>6,667</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>16,667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


*Save the Environment, 2015; OSD, 2015. Combined training participant figures from both partner reports. 669 SEE, 513 OSD and calculated total beneficiaries by multiplying average household size of six.

** SPR, 2015. 500 households figure is taken from SPR narrative and calculated total beneficiaries by multiplying by the average household size of six.

*** Planned annual figures are taken by dividing by the three-year projections of 50,000 individual beneficiaries from original project document by three.

****GFD indicates total number of beneficiaries; all other categories are additional benefits received. GFD consists of both Food and Food & Cash benefits.
Figure 4: Planned and actual beneficiaries

GFD indicates total number of beneficiaries; all other categories are additional benefits received. GFD consists of both Food and Food & Cash benefits. Source: Figure based off Table 1.

OUTPUTS (Continued)

Figure 5: Beneficiary outputs disaggregated by sex

Figure 6: 2015 Planned beneficiaries by activity additional to GFD (total beneficiaries 261,767).

Figure 7: 2015 Actual beneficiaries by activity additional to GFD (total beneficiaries 166,511).

Figure 8: Number of beneficiaries by GFD modality

Figure 9: Beneficiary proportion by GFD modality


Figure 10: Planned vs actual food distributed by year

Table 2: Amount of food distributed by commodity (MT)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Planned 2014 (PRRO 200365)</th>
<th>Actual 2014 (PRRO 200365)</th>
<th>% Actual vs planned 2014</th>
<th>Planned 2015 (PRRO 200700)</th>
<th>Actual 2015 (PRRO 200700)</th>
<th>% Actual vs planned 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>1,717</td>
<td>364</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corn-Soya Blend (CSB+)</td>
<td>16,030</td>
<td>9,397</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>17,937</td>
<td>9,711</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dried Fruits</td>
<td>740</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faffa</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Energy Biscuits</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>155%</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iodised Salt</td>
<td>969</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>878</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lentils</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>63</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maize Meal</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,072</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ready To Use Supplementary Food</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sorghum/millet</td>
<td>7,189</td>
<td>36,345</td>
<td>506%</td>
<td>50,544</td>
<td>29,858</td>
<td>59%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Split Peas</td>
<td>7,976</td>
<td>7,771</td>
<td>97%</td>
<td>8,775</td>
<td>7,809</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugar</td>
<td>3,483</td>
<td>2,176</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>3,649</td>
<td>1,988</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetable Oil</td>
<td>6,141</td>
<td>5,275</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>6,353</td>
<td>4,488</td>
<td>71%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat</td>
<td>94,729</td>
<td>52,950</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44,226</td>
<td>46,836</td>
<td>106%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wheat Flour</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>367</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>139,762</td>
<td>117,646</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>133,429</td>
<td>101,662</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Table 3: Food distributions - Planned versus actual in metric tonnes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Planned MT*</th>
<th>Actual MT**</th>
<th>% achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014 (PRRO 200365)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFD</td>
<td>120275</td>
<td>120714</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>5024</td>
<td>3,783.09</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>1779</td>
<td>445.27</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal 2014</strong></td>
<td><strong>127,078</strong></td>
<td><strong>124,942</strong></td>
<td><strong>98%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 (PRRO 200700)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GFD</td>
<td>162110</td>
<td>143,577</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nutrition</td>
<td>12629</td>
<td>6,817</td>
<td>54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>3282</td>
<td>463</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Subtotal 2015</strong></td>
<td><strong>178,021</strong></td>
<td><strong>150,857</strong></td>
<td><strong>85%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures are based on 3-year operational plan divided by three.
**2014 figures supplied by CO and are based on distribution in Mt. from April 2014 – March 2015
2015 figures supplied by CO and are estimated from nine-month distribution in Mt. from April 2015 – Dec. 2015
Figure 11: Planned vs actual food distributions by commodity (MT)

Source: WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200365 SPR 2014; WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200700 SPR 2015
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Planned (USD)</th>
<th>Actual (USD)</th>
<th>% achieved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014 PRRO 200365</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>$3,036,000</td>
<td>$3,168,366</td>
<td>104%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal 2014</td>
<td><strong>$3,036,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>$3,168,366</strong></td>
<td><strong>104%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 PRRO 200700</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cash</td>
<td>$2,673,000</td>
<td>$2,947,148</td>
<td>110%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Subtotal 2015</td>
<td><strong>$2,673,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>$2,947,148</strong></td>
<td><strong>110%</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td><strong>5,709,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,115,514</strong></td>
<td><strong>107%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200365 SPR 2014; WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200700 SPR 2015.

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**Figure 12: Cash distribution trends (US$)**

## OUTCOMES

### Table 5: Outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PRRO 200365</th>
<th>PRRO 200700</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>CROSS-CUTTING RESULTS</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PROTECTION:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP assistance delivered and utilized in safe, accountable and dignified conditions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of assisted people (men) who do not experience safety problems travelling to, from and/or at WFP programme site</td>
<td>&gt;90</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of assisted people (women) who do not experience safety problems travelling to, from and/or at WFP programme site</td>
<td>&gt;90</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of assisted people (men) informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain)</td>
<td>&gt;80</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of assisted people (women) informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain)</td>
<td>&gt;80</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PARTNERSHIPS:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food assistance interventions coordinated and partnerships developed and maintained</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of project activities implemented with the engagement of complementary partners</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of partner organizations that provide complementary inputs and services</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amount of complementary funds provided to the project by partners (including NGOs, civil society, private sector organizations, international financial institutions and regional development banks)</td>
<td>$368,270</td>
<td>$365,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>GENDER:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender equality and empowerment improved</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of households where females and males together make decisions over use of cash, voucher or food</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions of project management committees</td>
<td>&gt;50</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of women project management committee members trained on modalities of distribution</td>
<td>&gt;60</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OUTCOMES</td>
<td>SO 1 - Save Lives and Protect Livelihoods in Emergencies</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of households where females make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food</td>
<td>79</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of households where males make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROPORTION</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of households where males make decisions over the use of cash, voucher or food</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>16.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**SO 1 - Save Lives and Protect Livelihoods in Emergencies**

1. Stabilized or reduced undernutrition among children aged 6-59 months and pregnant and lactating women: (Nutrition activities)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.1 MAM treatment default rate (%)</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>&lt;15</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage) BSFP</td>
<td>83.5</td>
<td>&gt;70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 Proportion of eligible population who participate in programme (coverage) TSFP</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>&gt;90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 MAM treatment mortality rate (%)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>&lt;3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.5 MAM treatment non-response rate (%)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>&lt;15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.6 MAM treatment recovery rate (%)</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>&gt;75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. Stabilized or improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and/or individuals: (GFD activities)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.1 Diet Diversity Score</th>
<th>4.44</th>
<th>&gt;4.4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Diet Diversity Score (female-headed households)</td>
<td>3.58**</td>
<td>4.21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Diet Diversity Score (male-headed households)</td>
<td>3.31**</td>
<td>4.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score*</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score (female-headed)*</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>&gt;75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SO 1 - Save Lives and Protect Livelihoods in Emergencies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.6 FCS: percentage of households with acceptable Food Consumption Score (male-headed)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8 FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score (female-headed)*</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2.9 FCS: percentage of households with borderline Food Consumption Score (male-headed)* | 26 | <25 | 25 | 21.3 | <20 | 6.7
2.10 FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score* | 5.8 | 29 | 13.3 | <10 | 8.5
2.11 FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (female-headed)* | 5.3 | 13 | 18.4 | <15 | 13.7
2.12 FCS: percentage of households with poor Food Consumption Score (male-headed)* | 6.8 | 39 | 5.4 | <5 | 1

SO 2 - Support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies

3. Improved access to assets and/or basic services, including community and market infrastructure: (School feeding & livelihood activities)

| 3.1 Enrolment (boys): Average annual rate of change in number of boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools | 54** | 32 | =6 | 14
3.2 Retention rate (boys) in WFP-assisted primary schools | =70 | 82
3.3 Enrolment (girls): Average annual rate of change in number of girls enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools | 46** | 32 | =6 | 1.2
3.4 Retention rate (girls) in WFP-assisted primary schools | =70 | 85
3.5 Percentage of targeted households with increased number of income and food source | >50 | 75.0

Key

- Attained
- Not attained
- Not measured

1 Sources - WFP Refugee baseline survey, WFP survey.
2 Sources - WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200365 Revised LogFrame, BR 2.
3 Sources - Jun-2014, Programme Monitoring, WFP survey; Apr-2014, WFP follow up survey, WFP survey; Apr-2014, Refugee school reports, WFP survey.
4 Sources - 2018.03 Refugee CHS; 2018.03 partners’ monitoring reports and joint survey reports.
5 Sources - 2015.06 WFP survey Refugee CHS; 2015.06 WFP survey Household interview through Refugee CHS.
6 Sources - 2015.12 WFP survey; 2015.12 WFP survey Refugee CHS; 2015.12 WFP survey Household interview through Refugee CHS.

*Baseline figures are based on thresholds without sugar. CO realised that at the time the data was collected for the baseline, there was a temporary break in the sugar pipeline and WFP had not provided sugar that month. New figures were therefore re-calculated based on non-sugar thresholds that differs from results show in SPR 200365 (2014)
Following the main recommendation from the 2012 JAM, WFP in collaboration with UNHCR and ARRA introduced the distribution of cash combined with in kind food assistance as a pilot program in Jijiga, Assosa and Afar, reaching about 47,000 refugees by September 2014. By December 2015, the introduction of cash was operational in five camps including Adi Arush, Shedder, Awbarre, Aysaita and Bambasi. Source: WFP Ethiopia Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), December 2014 and WFP Ethiopia PRRO 200700 SPR 2015.

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**Figure 13: FCS disaggregated by transfer modality (% of HHs)**

![Figure 13](image)

Source: Base value: 2015.06 WFP survey Household interview through Refugee CHS; Latest Follow-up: 2015.12 WFP survey, household interview through Refugee CHS.

**Figure 14: FCS disaggregated by sex of head of household**

![Figure 14](image)

Note: Individual Bar graphs might not add up to 100% due to rounding up of figures
Source: Base value: Aug-2012, WFP Refugee baseline survey, WFP survey. Latest Follow-up: Apr-2014, WFP follow up survey;
Base value: 2015.06 WFP survey, household interview through Refugee CHS; Latest Follow-up: 2015.12 WFP survey, household interview through Refugee CHS.
Figure 15: MAM treatment performance: PLW and children 6-59 mo.

![MAM treatment performance graph]

Source: Latest Follow-up: Jun-2014, Programme Monitoring, WFP survey; Latest Follow-up: 2015.12 WFP survey Refugee CHS.

Table 6: School enrolment and gender ratio

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014 PRRO 200365</th>
<th>2015 PRRO 200700</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Boys</td>
<td>32,788</td>
<td>25,251</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Girls</td>
<td>31,466</td>
<td>23,308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ratio</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 16: Rate of change of school enrolment from year to year

![Rate of change graph]

Source: Latest Follow-up: Apr-2014, Refugee school reports, WFP survey. Latest Follow-up: 2015.12 WFP survey Refugee CHS

Figure 17: Percentage of primary school-age boys and girls attending primary school

![Percentage of primary school-age boys and girls attending primary school graph]

Executive Summary

1. **Evaluation features.** The independent evaluation of the transition period\(^9\) and current Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) 200700 in Ethiopia was commissioned by the World Food Programme (WFP) Office of Evaluation (OEV) to provide accountability, learning, and evidence, as per corporate emphasis. TANGO International conducted the evaluation. The PRRO provides food assistance to Eritrean, South Sudanese, Sudanese and Somali refugees as continuation of support from the previous PRRO 200365. The main activities include general food distribution (GFD), nutrition support to vulnerable groups, school feeding, and livelihood support. The evaluation purpose is to assess the previous operation’s transition period and the performance of the current PRRO to ensure that findings can feed into immediate implementation decisions or into future design strategies. The scope covers all activities and processes relating to the transition, design, implementation, resourcing, and reporting from January 2014 to March 2016. The intended audience and users of the results are internal stakeholders including WFP Country Office (CO) and field office staff, WFP Regional Bureau (RB), and WFP OEV; and externally, the refugees-specific country team of implementing partners, United Nations agencies, donors, and the Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs (ARRA) of the Government of Ethiopia, and beneficiaries.

2. **Country context.** Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world. Over half of the country’s households are food insecure as defined as per capita access to calories. Challenges to food security, health and social development include recurrent climatic events—such as the current drought at emergency levels, environmental degradation, high population density and growth, insecurity in some areas, gendered inequality in access to land and livelihoods, and lack of infrastructure (including for health and hygiene). Yet progress has been made in health services access and in education where targets have been met for primary school enrolment and literacy. Ethiopia has seen a three-fold increase of refugees in recent years. In December 2013 civil war in South Sudan resulted in an influx of arrivals to the western region, and in total, around 200,000 refugees arrived from January to August 2014. The Government of Ethiopia generally remains open to refugees seeking protection; though most refugees cannot take part in livelihoods outside of the camps, with the exception of Eritreans as part of a 2010 policy. Rates of undernutrition are high in some camps, particularly in Gambella and Dolo Ado regions. Key protection concerns of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) include child protection, education, and sexual and gender-based violence.

3. **Methodology.** The Evaluation Team (ET) employed a qualitative approach triangulated with secondary information to address the three main evaluation questions: 1) how appropriate is the operation; 2) what are the results of the operation; and 3) what factors generate the results. Methods included a comprehensive literature review, direct observation, and in-depth semi-structured interviews with 130 key informants such as WFP and partner staff, and 35 focus group discussions with 401 (194 male/207 female). Data collection took place from 29 February-19 March 2016 in five refugee regions representing every refugee country of origin: Gambella, Afar, Tigray (Shire), Benishangul-Gumuz (Assosa) and Somali (Dolo Ado and Jijiga). The ET selected this sample based on criteria agreed with the CO. The approach specifically sought to understand the dynamics of gender equity and of women’s participation in the PRRO. Budget constraints limited the fieldwork days for each region; this was addressed by providing overall results and patterns across regions instead of in-depth regional review. The timing was not optimal for

\(^9\) The evaluation covers the activities during the final year of implementation of the predecessor PRRO 200365 and the formulation and implementation of the first year of the current PRRO 200700.
assessing the nutritional situation as it preceded the 2016 nutrition surveys, which the ET has addressed by using the available data to-date.

4. **Appropriateness of the operation.** The PRRO supports government and WFP policies and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and operationally complements UNHCR and ARRA refugee services. WFP operates within government policies and strategies, and is well regarded by government, donors, and NGO partners. Donors appreciate WFP’s openness, communication, and willingness to engage in strategic thinking, yet, financing is a struggle; they see the way forward as greatly expanded livelihoods programming to alleviate resourcing pressures.

5. The ET finds that the PRRO operation is appropriate to refugee needs. WFP reliably delivered a full ration basket up to November 2015 in line with global standards, with just a few delays and with flexibility to accommodate new arrivals. In November 2015 CSB+ (fortified corn-soya blend) was removed from the GFD and sugar in March 2016 due to funding shortfalls. Additional nutritional support is provided to children under-5 years, pregnant and lactating women (PLW), and other highly vulnerable people. WFP adopted innovations in cash and food distribution modalities (e.g., biometrics) that have increased its efficiency, and WFP incorporated measures to meet specific needs such as adding a grinding allowance and exploring the use of alternative cereals. Refugees and other stakeholders, aside from some in Dolo Ado, are very enthusiastic about receiving cash-based transfers (CBT) for part of the cereal allowance of GFD. The livelihoods programme, which is a very small component of the PRRO, is highly appropriate, as are livelihood interventions linked to environmental protections. SF reaches primary school children in all camps except Gambella. The ET finds that WFP strives for gender balance in its activities, though there is room for improvement in considering gender dynamics and women’s roles in design and strategy.

6. **Operation outputs and outcomes.** GFD (in-kind and cash): WFP delivered food rations to 95 percent of planned GFD beneficiaries in 2014 (96 percent of males; 94 percent of females) and 89 percent in 2015 (83 percent of males; 95 percent of females, variance due to higher numbers of female arrivals—particularly from South Sudan). For CBT, 89 percent of planned beneficiaries received cash in 2014 (48,200/54,000), and the target was exceeded in 2015, when WFP received additional resources for CBT. Outcome indicator targets for both household dietary diversity and food consumption were met in 2015, showing improvements since 2014; yet the progress in food security may be tenuous with rations cut in late 2015/early 2016.

7. Refugee complaints about reductions or suspensions of commodities from their basket, as well as their need to sell a sizable portion of their rations every month to purchase basic household items, to pay for milling and wheelbarrow costs or for preferred foods, dominated the discussions with the ET. Refugees generally consider food distributions to be fair; though, smaller households (and women in particular) are at a disadvantage during distributions, some entitlement coupons are not updated and red sorghum is objected to in some regions. The issue of non-refugees in some camps accessing rations shows the necessity to officially re-verify camp residents.

8. **Nutrition:** Blanket and targeted supplementary feeding programmes (B/TSFP) are implemented by WFP and its partners with minimal interruption and with largely good quality of food in all camps. BSFP aims to prevent global acute malnutrition (GAM) among children aged 6-23 months and PLW. Children aged 24-59 months have been included in BSFP in camps with high GAM in Gambella, Dolo Ado and Afar, where high GAM persists according to 2015 nutrition data available; although, this part of BSFP ceased in Dolo Ado at the end of 2014. WFP responded to high PLW GAM rates by including more women in 2014 and 2015 than planned. Supplementary foods were also provided to people living
with HIV or TB. Only around 40 percent of planned TSFP beneficiaries were reached in 2014 and 2015 due to overestimated planning figures; and variance in admission screening tools is an issue. In 2015, WFP assisted all planned feeding centres but did not reach the planned numbers for BSFP and TSFP, which also meant that fewer caregivers were reached with nutrition messages. WFP reports that minimum targets of the Sphere Standards were met for all MAM treatment indicators for under-5 children. Higher GAM in boys than girls is a result that requires further investigation, particularly in Dolo Ado camps. The most significant challenges affecting malnutrition are childcare and infant and young child feeding practices, hindered by the struggles of mothers related to ration cuts, lack of fuel and lack of core relief items. Another factor affecting results is programme and staff continuity issues at partner sites.

9. School feeding: The SF programme provided meals in 18 of 21 target primary schools in 2015, achieving 96 percent of feeding days; yet, only 44 percent of planned refugee children were reached primarily due to a lack of coverage of approximately 50,000 children in the Gambella camps. In 2014, WFP reached 79.3 percent of its beneficiary target. Apart from Gambella, in the other five regions, the ET observed that SF is implemented in a satisfactory manner and is highly appreciated by students and teachers. Overall, the retention rate of girls is 85 percent and 82 percent for boys, exceeding WFP targets, and the enrolment rate is near parity with the exception of Afar where under half of girls are in school. The ET finds that the supportive learning environment of school facilities vary by camp, which are under ARRA and UNHCR.

10. The livelihoods programme is showing some results but requires greater diversity in productive activities, higher coverage, and an overarching strategy that is coordinated with other actors in order to have any significant impact.

11. Factors affecting results. There are important issues with the food distribution system that could improve WFP’s operations, related to various issues around logistics including transport and port backlogs, warehousing—with conditions and commodity management practices varying significantly across camps, and the need to increase the number and capacities of field monitors (FM). Resourcing is both an internal factor, for this operation’s funding, and an external factor as it relates to funding shortfalls of UNHCR in providing complementary services. The other critical external factor is government policy prohibiting formal employment for most refugees.

12. Conclusions. WFP delivers food and cash assistance efficiently and effectively and is well regarded by partners. It has successfully introduced innovations such as cash and biometrics, which have reduced sales of food by refugees and reduced fraud. WFP has been unable to provide a full ration since November 2015 due to funding shortfalls. The impact of WFP’s food assistance is constrained by the limited ability of UNHCR to provide critical complementary services. BSFP and TSFP is reaching vulnerable children and mothers, but GAM rates remain high, and WFP needs to increase its in-house nutrition expertise to address GAM. The need to collect firewood because adequate fuel is not provided by UNHCR puts women and children at risk and is a priority issue to address. Livelihoods programming has significant potential but needs to be greatly expanded. WFP logistics and warehouses are well managed but some ARRA-managed warehouses are below standard and require close follow-up. WFP considers gender issues in food distribution, though women should have greater representation in camp committees, and among WFP FM staff. WFP and UNHCR should strategically collaborate on planning, advocacy, programme priorities, and joint appeals.

13. Recommendations. The recommendations are presented first by timeline and within that timeline, numbered according to priority. Short-term applies to the remaining two years of this PRRO. Medium term recommendations are intended for the next PRRO, and should be incorporated into its design and implementation.
Operational recommendations: Short Term (1-2 years, current PRRO):

14. **R1.** Reintroduce BSFP to Dolo Ado for children 24-59 months, until Super Cereal is reinstated as part of the general food ration, as GAM rates are high in this age group as are admissions in TSFP. (CO to implement)

15. **R2.** Strengthen the models and approaches for sharing key infant and young child feeding (IYCF) messages at household and camp levels alongside health and hygiene promotion, while engaging refugee community leaders and partners to improve the camp-specific enabling environment to increase uptake by mothers/families of improved practices. (CO/field offices, in line with R4, R5, R10; advocacy with UNHCR on supports)

16. **R3.** Promote more proactive WFP field monitor engagement with Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs (ARRA) to ensure that recommendations are implemented and that warehousing and the food distribution system are operating effectively, efficiently, and for the refugees; this includes field monitor reports that incorporate process and outcome results of the institutionalisation of the biometric system. (CO and field offices)

Medium-term (design of the next PRRO and implementation beginning April 2018):

17. **R4.** Develop joint (WFP/UNHCR/ARRA) five-year livelihood strategy based on in-depth assessments in order to scale up promising and innovative livelihood activities to reach all camps by 2021. (CO/field offices)

18. **R5.** Develop a comprehensive strategy in collaboration with UNHCR to promote fuel-efficient or alternative energy stoves and to minimise the use of firewood for cooking, with the aim of reducing firewood use by December 2017 and eventually eliminating use in the camps. (CO)

19. **R6.** Ensure greater participation and representation of women in camp leadership positions in proportion to their population in the camps, and expand the number of female WFP field staff. (CO)

Strategic recommendations: Short to Medium Term:

20. **R7.** Expand CBT as a principal strategy of the GFD component of the PRRO, in conjunction with market assessments, including a study of the potential for CBT in Dolo Ado, and introduce cash for milling costs based on cost per kilo in camps so that refugees are not forced to use their rations or cash to mill their cereals. (CO)

21. **R8.** The concerted and coordinated effort of all actors working in the camps experiencing high GAM rates (Gambella, Dolo Ado and Afar) should be strengthened to develop a comprehensive understanding of the drivers of under-nutrition in each camp and develop a multi-sector approach to address them—including a gender lens. (WFP CO in collaboration with UNHCR and ARRA)

22. **R9.** Increase provision of WFP nutrition expertise in the form of strategic as well as technical support, and consider adding a nutrition post focused exclusively on the refugee programme to ensure that WFP plays a central role in strategic nutrition discussions alongside UNHCR, ARRA and nutrition implementing partners. (CO/RB)

23. **R10.** In the spirit of programme efficiency and effectiveness, WFP and UNHCR should increase formal collaboration on strategic planning, advocacy, and programme prioritisation. This is overarching and is relevant to several recommendations outlined above. (CO Senior Management—WFP/UNHCR to strategically collaborate to undertake joint appeals to promote the full food ration and core relief items)

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The CO notes that in all of Gambella and Afar, and in Dolo Ado as of May 2016, children aged 24-59 months are receiving BSFP, information provided to the ET at the time of finalising this report.
1. Introduction

1.1. Evaluation Features

1. **Purpose:** This independent operation evaluation, commissioned by the World Food Programme (WFP) Office of Evaluation (OEV), addresses WFP’s renewed corporate emphasis on providing accountability and evidence for results. Ethiopia’s Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO 200700) was selected based on utility and risk criteria. Technical Assistance to Non-Governmental Organizations (TANGO) International conducted the evaluation. The evaluation is timed for findings to feed into implementation decisions of the current PRRO and any future design decisions.

2. **Objectives and scope:** This evaluation serves the dual and mutually reinforcing objectives of accountability and learning, and to provide evidence-based findings and lessons to inform operational and strategic decision-making. The evaluation covers two years: activities and processes during the final year of implementation of the predecessor PRRO 200365 (January 2014-March 2015) and the current PRRO 200700 up to the evaluation mission (April 2015-March 2016). Looking into the previous operation’s results and transition period, this evaluation determines the reasons why certain results occurred or not to draw lessons. As an evaluation of the transition and start of the current PRRO, the scope does not include final conclusions on impact, but discusses progress toward targets based on the outcomes and objectives.

3. **Stakeholders and users:** The primary internal stakeholders and intended audience are: WFP Ethiopia country office (CO) and sub-offices, which will operationalise this information in rapidly-changing refugee contexts; WFP regional bureau (RB), which will use the findings for strategic guidance and oversight; and WFP OEV, to continue to improve evaluation processes and to compile the findings into an annual synthesis for the Executive Board (EB). The primary external stakeholders are beneficiaries (women, men, boys and girls), who have an interest in the results since operational changes will affect their lives, and the refugees-specific country team of implementing partners, national and international NGOs, United Nations agencies (UNHCR/UNICEF), and the Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs (ARRA) of the Government of Ethiopia—whose strategies and programmes the evaluation informs in order to make progress overall for refugees.

4. **Methodology:** The evaluation team (ET) applied Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) principles in the methodological design and, as appropriate, to answer the evaluation questions, incorporating the main standards of relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, impact and sustainability. A qualitative approach was employed to collect primary data, which is an appropriate method for explaining issues related to the transition of the PRROs and within budget constraints. This was triangulated with secondary data (and primary quantitative data from the baseline and the Standard Project Reports (SPR) to answer the three key questions: How appropriate is the operation? What are the results of the operation? Why and how has the operation produced the observed results?

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21 As stated in the TOR: The utility criteria looked both at the timeliness given the operation’s cycle and the coverage of recent/planned evaluations. The risk criteria was based on a classification and risk ranking of WFP COs taking into consideration a wide range of risk factors, including operational, external factors, and COs’ internal control self-assessments.

22 Per paragraph 13 of the TOR, this transition to the new PRRO was a critical time due to the worsening refugee situation, the PRRO design containing lessons learnt (e.g., cash pilot), and the CO new approach to outcome monitoring and reporting.

23 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund

24 OECD. 1991. DAC Principles. See Section 3.1 for how these applied in this PRRO.

25 See Supplementary Annex for evaluation matrix sub-questions and topical outlines.
5. Based on feedback from the CO, the ET visited five regions including: Gambella, Afar, Tigray (Shire), Somali (Dolo Ado and Jijiga), and Benishangul-Gumuz (Assosa). The ET employed a purposive sampling method to identify areas visited during the fieldwork. These areas were selected due to the large number of beneficiaries that are present in each location; because they are representative of the breadth of WFP activities in the region; they were accessible within the time constraints of the in-country portion of the evaluation; and they met the security criteria for the ET. Structured in-depth and semi-structured interviews were utilised in focus group discussions (FGD) and key informant interviews (KII) along with direct observations to gain maximum in-depth knowledge from stakeholders. Additionally, interactive participatory tools were used to engage refugee participants to the greatest extent possible. The team also held a series of focus groups and interviews with various stakeholders including WFP staff, donors, partners, civil society and government. During the mission, the team observed activities at 11 refugee camps, including school meals and food distribution sites. The ET conducted 130 KII, and 35 FGD with 401 refugees (194 male/207 female). Fieldwork took place from 29 February-19 March 2016. Upon completion of the fieldwork, the ET conducted internal and external debriefings to share the preliminary findings.

6. **Gender responsive methodology:** To understand the dynamics of gender equity and to verify the nature and extent of women’s participation in the PRRO, the team interviewed women in FGDs and as individual KIs. Additionally, the tools integrated gender considerations to allow understanding of levels of gender equity, gender discrimination and power relations between males and females. The ET ensured that it visited camps in all six camps in order to fully understand regional differences and their impact on programme implementers and beneficiaries. The ET used a gender lens to analyse all data collected. See Supplementary Annex 10 for more description.

7. **Expertise, ethical safeguards and quality assurance:** The field team was comprised of five TANGO consultants with extensive experience in Ethiopia, the refugee contexts of the region, and WFP, and with expertise in food security, nutrition, school feeding, and livelihoods. The evaluation followed the OEV evaluation and quality assurance system (EQAS) standard. The ET maintained impartiality and transparency during data collection. To ensure quality, the ET analysed the data regularly, implementing systematic checks on accuracy, consistency, reliability, and validity of the data through regular communication with WFP. The three international team members were assisted during fieldwork by interpreters, when the national consultants were not present to assist, who were vetted by the ET based on their relevant experience and ability to provide quality services. The study approach observed ethical principles for evaluators of competence, integrity/honesty, informed consent, systematic inquiry, respect for people and responsibilities for public welfare.

8. **Limitations:** The main limitation was the limited time for fieldwork. The refugee operation throughout Ethiopia is expansive, therefore making it difficult for the ET to visit all locations even after splitting into sub-teams. The limited time in each region impacted the depth of the data the ET could collect pertaining to any specific location. Thus, in the presentation of results, the ET provides region-specific examples and clearly states when findings are consistent across refugee regions.

9. Limitations to evaluability of the PRRO include reliability of secondary data sources or inconsistent and unavailable data, which the team has largely mitigated.

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26 See Supplementary Annex for a listing of debrief participants and listing of interviews.
27 See Supplementary Annex for a summary of the team composition.
through discussion with the CO on information gaps. Additionally, the timing of the evaluation was not optimal for assessing the nutritional situation and impact of programmes as the latest available nutrition data was from surveys conducted in March/April 2015 in Gambella and Dolo Ado regions, which are two of the three locations where very high rates of acute malnutrition have been recorded. This evaluation preceded the 2016 round of surveys, which will provide current figures on nutritional status and global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates. The ET has addressed this by using the available data to-date, including early results from the 2016 surveys in Dolo Ado that were made available at the time of report-writing.

1.2. Country Context

10. Note: This section provides a narrative overview of both the national context and refugee camp context for each topical area in order to describe how the refugee situation fits within the larger country context of Ethiopia.

11. Population, economy and poverty: Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world. The gross domestic product is $55.61 billion (2014). Agriculture accounts for 80 percent of employment. The absolute number of poor has remained stagnant at 25 million over the past 15 years due to the simultaneous high population growth. In Ethiopia, 88 percent of the population are multi-dimensionally poor. Additionally, over the past three years, Ethiopia has seen a three-fold increase in refugee numbers. Ethiopia has just over 732,000 refugees, largely from South Sudan (283,007) and Somalia (251,049), with an additional 153,531 from Eritrea, 38,535 from Sudan and 6,587 of various other nationalities. Of that population 49.7 percent are female and 56 percent are children, with just under 38,500 unaccompanied minors and separated children. The Government of Ethiopia has an open admittance policy for all refugees, and has honoured commitments to international agreements and protocols on the rights of refugees, with some reservations about rights of employment. Generally, livelihood activities for refugees are unequal across camps. The government’s 2010 “Out of Camp Policy” allows Eritrean refugees who do not have a criminal record to live in any part of Ethiopia, as long as they have financial support. Other refugee populations cannot seek legal employment outside of the camps. Nearly all refugees are required to live in camps near the borders of their home countries. Somali and South Sudanese refugees face restricted movement, severely affecting their ability to fulfil livelihood strategies.

12. Food security and nutrition: Threats to food security in Ethiopia include droughts; land degradation; high population density; lack of infrastructure; insecurity and conflict; high poverty rates; and the fall in prices of cash crops. Ethiopia is ranked 93rd out of 104 countries on the global hunger index with a value of 33.9 – indicating serious hunger rates. Over half of the country’s households are food insecure as defined as per capita access to calories. More than half of the refugee camps (13 out of 24) are located in Priority 1 Hotspot Areas due to the drought and the El Niño currently affecting Ethiopia. In the camps, food assistance is the primary source of food security. Nutritional surveillance reports in 2012 indicate that GAM rates had fallen below 10 percent in Jijiga, Assosa, and Tigray camps. However, the Dolo Ado, Gambella and Afar

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29 World Bank, World Development Indicators: Ethiopia, 2014.
32 UNHCR Ethiopia Fact Sheet, 29, February 2016
34 IFPRI, Global Hunger Index, 2015.
36 UNHCR, Ethiopia Factsheet, November 2015.
camps’ GAM rates remain above the 15 percent emergency threshold. Anaemia levels among women and children are also high in most camps.

13. **Health:** About 80 percent of diseases in Ethiopia are preventable conditions related to infectious diseases, malnutrition, and personal and environmental hygiene. However, the Government has been making strong efforts to expand and health services at all levels. Between 2005 and 2013, the number of health centres increased from 519 to 3,100, and public hospitals rose from 11 to 127. Ethiopia also reduced the under-five child mortality rate by two-thirds thus achieving MDG 4. Acute respiratory tract infections and malaria are the leading causes of morbidity in most of the refugee camps. The approach in refugee camps follows a modified national health extension model where some components such as model family training and recognition are observed.

14. **Education:** Education in Ethiopia is one sector that performs well. The country has achieved results beyond the target set for 2012/13 specifically for grade 1 intake rates and net primary school enrolment ratio. Literacy rates in Ethiopia are on target for males but lower than expected for females. In 2011, 38 percent of women (ages 15-49) were literate and 65 percent of men (ages 15-59) were literate. The main determinants of inequity in education include poverty and food insecurity; child labour; long distances to schools; early marriage; and the lack of continuous access for children from pastoralist families. In 2013, refugee children in 16 camps had access to primary schools. In 2014, there was improvement in the enrolment rate in WFP-assisted schools, with a growth rate of eight percent compared to six percent in schools not benefiting from school feeding. The gender parity index for programme schools was 0.95:1 and for non-programme schools was 0.87:1.

15. **Gender:** Ethiopia has a gender inequality index of 0.558, ranking it 129th out of 155 countries in 2014. The role of women in the Ethiopian agricultural system is crucial due to women contributing up to 70 percent of on-farm labour. Yet female farmers’ access to resources including education, credit, and land is limited. The overall low level of gender equality affects women’s ability to escape poverty and contribute to the food security of their families. Key protection concerns for UNHCR include child protection, education and sexual and gender-based violence (GBV). The situation of Eritrean unaccompanied and separated children (UASC) in Shire is of particular concern, given the large numbers and limited family-based care options.

16. **Humanitarian situation:** In June 2015, eastern Ethiopia faced a severe drought leading to rising food insecurity, malnutrition, and water shortages in affected areas. Rainfall in central and eastern Ethiopia was very poor during 2015, largely due to the ongoing El Niño. In December 2015, the Government of Ethiopia and partners released a 2016 humanitarian requirements document appealing for US$1.4 billion in assistance. During this time, estimates of Ethiopians requiring food assistance increased to US$10.2 million. As a key external event, in December 2013 civil war erupted in South Sudan. As a result, from January to August 2014 around 200,000 refugees arrived, mostly from South Sudan.

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39 Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 4: To reduce the under-5 mortality rate by two-thirds between 1990 and 2015.
1.3. Operation Overview

17. The EB approved the CO’s PRRO 200700 in November 2014 as a continuation of the previous refugee operation (PRRO 200365). The duration is for three years from April 2015 to March 2018. The resource requirement at design was US$478,900,152; there have been three budget revisions during the evaluation period. The budget is funded at 27 percent against total requirements with support from 14 donors, carryover, miscellaneous income and multilateral funding. The PRRO has three main outcomes and the following activities across the refugee camps of Ethiopia: general food distribution (GFD) of food and cash-based transfers (CBT), blanket supplementary feeding programme (BSFP) for children 6-23 months (6-59 months in camps with GAM>15 percent) and pregnant and lactating women (PLW), targeted supplementary feeding programme (TSFP) for children 6-59 months and PLW, health and nutrition education, school feeding (SF), and livelihoods and environmental support (see Factsheet).

18. The aim of PRRO 200700 is to meet the basic nutritional needs of refugees, in line with WFP Strategic Plan (2014–2017). The objectives are to:
- enable refugees to meet minimum levels of food security (Strategic Objective, SO 1);
- treat and reduce acute malnutrition in children, PLW and other vulnerable refugees with special nutritional needs (SO 1);
- stabilise school enrolment of refugee girls & boys in WFP-assisted schools (SO 2); and
- increase livelihood and environmental opportunities for refugees and host communities in fragile transition situations (SO 2).

2. Evaluation Findings

2.1. Appropriateness of the Operation

19. This section provides evaluation findings related to the evaluation question, “How appropriate is the operation?” It addresses the appropriateness of operation objectives and design to population needs and gender analysis, including the appropriateness of the activities, transfer modality, and geographic targeting by operation outcome. This is followed by discussion of the internal and external coherence of the operation.

20. Overview: The ET finds that the PRRO operation is appropriate to needs. The refugees living in camps are highly dependent on WFP food and cash deliveries for their survival. WFP has reliably delivered a full ration basket up until November 2015 that conforms to global standards, with few delays and with sufficient flexibility to accommodate new arrivals. In November 2015 CSB+ (fortified corn-soya blend) was removed from the GFD, and sugar was removed in March 2016 due to funding shortfalls. Additional nutritional support is provided to children under-5 years, PLW, and other highly vulnerable people. There is a need for additional WFP nutritional expertise to fulfil its role in monitoring and in supporting implementing partners. WFP has adopted innovations in cash and food distribution modalities that have increased the efficiency of its operations, and WFP incorporated measures to meet specific needs, such as adding a grinding allowance and exploring the use of alternative cereals. Refugees and other stakeholders, aside from some in Dolo Ado region, have enthusiastically welcomed the substitution of cash for part of the cereal allowance. The livelihoods programme, which is a very small component of the PRRO, is highly appropriate. SF reaches primary school children in all camps except Gambella. The ET

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finds that WFP strives for gender balance in its activities though there is room for improvement in considering gender dynamics in operation design and strategy.

21. The PRRO supports government and WFP policies and the United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) and operationally complements UNHCR and ARRA refugee services. WFP is well regarded by government, donors, and partners. Donors appreciate WFP’s openness, communication, and willingness to engage in strategic thinking. However, they are struggling to finance the high costs of the refugee operation, and see greatly expanded livelihoods programming, plus greater government flexibility on out-of-camp employment, as a way forward to alleviate the funding pressures. From WFP’s perspective, donors are advocating expanded livelihood programming but to date have not provided funding to scale up livelihood activities.

22. **Gender analysis in design:** The PRRO context analysis very briefly discusses the roles of refugee women in feeding and childcare and the challenges they face in collecting firewood. The PRRO strategy prioritises environmental interventions that include reducing the risk of firewood collection for women, and considers women’s need in food distribution arrangements. The PRRO further states that “a gender strategy will be established with related partnerships to achieve a more structured approach to gender equality in the context of food security in Ethiopia”\(^{47}\) though it appears that the strategy has not yet been developed.

23. **PRRO performance monitoring is designed to collect qualitative data from group discussions, especially with women, and that qualitative case studies on gender and protection, especially in camps where food and cash is distributed, are conducted. The PRRO includes performance indicators on the proportion of households with joint decision-making on cash and food; proportion of women in leadership positions and working as committee members trained in aspects of distribution, and tracks the number of women receiving food assistance. Specific to other components, for nutrition the design sets specific objectives to assist PLW. The ET finds that the design has not specifically considered gender issues in terms of the need to reach both men and women with nutrition behaviour change communication. The majority of parents visiting feeding centres and accessing information and support services are mothers, although outreach teams also meet opportunistically with fathers. Related to SF, the PRRO design also establishes specific objectives for girls’ school enrolment. WFP equally targets boys’ enrolment, and gender parity is high in the primary schools in the camps. In livelihood activities, WFP-supported NGOs are targeting women and men equally.

**Appropriateness to needs**

**Outcome 1:** Stabilised or improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and/or individuals: **GFD (in-kind and cash)**

24. **Design and objectives:** The PRRO is appropriately designed to successfully provide a food basket sufficient to meet the minimum per capita food security requirements of 2100 kilocalories, including 14 percent proteins and 17 percent fat, accepted standards established by World Health Organisation (WHO) throughout the world for most of the years covered by this evaluation.\(^{48}\) WFP ensures that all commodities are transported from the port to ARRA-managed camp warehouses prior to the distribution to refugee households, scheduled to take place during the first week of the month (delays discussed further in 2.2 and 2.3).


\(^{48}\) Funding constraints have hindered WFP from meeting this objective since November 2015; see 2.2.
25. **Beneficiary selection and targeting:** Related to geographic targeting, the Government of Ethiopia has determined the sites of the refugee camps. Although all registered refugees receive GFD (refugees in Gambella claim that some refugees have not been properly registered), many stakeholders interviewed by the ET agreed that non-refugees in some camps also access rations; it is therefore necessary to officially re-verify camp residents. The camp populations receiving rations do not always actually reflect the refugee populations living in the camps. All Dolo Ado stakeholders agree that people in possession of ration cards living outside of the camps from Somalia and the Somali Region come to collect rations during the monthly GFD. Gambella refugees claim that many refugees have entered the camps from South Sudan having bypassed the provisional registration centres near the border and are therefore not eligible to collect food rations. Other stakeholders claim that some of the food rations are transported back into South Sudan.

26. **Off to a good start,** the biometric system offers a substantial improvement to food distribution efficiency, and it is estimated that biometrics will reduce the fraud of non-refugees collecting rations by ten to twenty percent by avoiding the duplication of people registered but not living in the camps as refugees. Despite the onset of the biometric system in many regions and camps, it will also be necessary for UNHCR, ARRA and WFP to undertake refugee census assessment in the camps to verify refugee populations. The ET observed biometric distribution centres under construction, which are well laid out in the biometrics model; although, waiting areas appear relatively small and could be problematic in an emergency.

27. **Context analysis, population needs & appropriate transfer modalities:**

**GFD (in-kind):** The operations of this component are appropriate to the context and population needs. WFP targeted 496,400 refugees for GFD at the commencement of PRRO 200365, covering the period 2013 to 2015, and increased the targeted GFD coverage to 650,000 refugees for PRRO 200700, covering the period 2015-2018, based on projected increases in refugee populations. The PRRO retains sufficient flexibility to account for increases in the refugee population in Ethiopia, or to modify its food basket in response to joint assessment mission (JAM) and nutrition assessment recommendations. For example, CSB+ was introduced to address micronutrient deficiencies observed in earlier food baskets. WFP added 2.5 Kg of cereal per person to the food basket, an increase of twenty percent, to compensate refugees for milling costs, although we shall see (see 2.2) that milling has been problematic in many camps.

28. At the time of this evaluation, WFP was providing a GFD ration basket to 580,000 refugees residing in 26 camps, out of an estimated 730,000 refugees. Some donors told the ET that, given the financial shortfalls to support this programme, WFP must develop an effective strategy to target refugee families in greatest need of food rations. The donor representative stated that such a strategy would necessarily entail improvements in operational modalities and would require WFP to establish vulnerability criteria based on wealth ranking and social welfare criteria for targeting. Donors also noted that adopting such a strategy would necessitate refugees being allowed to work in the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors outside of the camps, which would require a change in government policy. However, the ET does not believe that this targeting approach is a viable strategy as the vast majority of refugees cannot meet their basic food and non-food needs now, and the use of the biometric system to screen out people who are not eligible to receive rations is more appropriate. The ET does believe that greater access to work outside the camps for refugees is essential.
29. **GFD: Cash-based Transfers (CBT):** The cash transfer initiative has thus far proven to be successful and popular and an excellent initiative in the five camps where it has been introduced and implemented. Piloted initially in 2013 in the two Somali Jijiga camps of Aw-Barre and Sheder to enhance refugee cereal consumption options and flexibility, the CBT pilot was expanded in 2014 to three additional camps: Bambasi in Benishangul, Assayita in Afar, and Adi-Harush in Tigray. The TANGO team visited all of these camps. WFP conducted market assessments prior to commencing CBT in the five pilot camps. The refugees actually receive cash directly in Ethiopian birr (ETB) in lieu of vouchers with which they could convert to market purchases. Refugees in the five camps participating in CBT are receiving ten Kg of cereals (reduced by six Kg) supplemented by 100 ETB of cash per person/month. Although the pilot phase was completed in March 2015, WFP has yet to expand CBT operations to other camps, despite its success. Fearing cereal supply and price fluctuations in markets surrounding the camps, the drought compelled CO management to wait.

30. Refugee FGD participants in the five camps and all other stakeholders interviewed by the ET have expressed great enthusiasm for the CBT (see quote box). Dolo Ado was the only region questioning the advisability of introducing the CBT initiative into the camps, as some camps are located very close to the border, which is thought to pose a security risk to the activity. Local authorities also are less enthusiastic about introducing the CBT option. When asked if they would prefer to replace part of their cereal ration entitlement with cash, refugees in Dolo Ado indicated that they would not like to see such a change. They clearly fear further slippage in the terms of trade in their ration package and assume, despite their current struggles to meet consumption challenges, any change in the ration basket would disfavour them.

31. In FGDs in the other camps visited by the ET, refugee participants expressed their preference for a food distribution system that offers a mix of cash and food is the preferred option. Refugees in other camps are requesting introduction of CBT to their camps. This point was most forcefully made at Kebreayeh camp, where refugees have been in uninterrupted communication with those living in the other two Jijiga camps since the inception of the CBT. The CBT initiative has clearly increased refugee options to purchase other food, including other types of more preferred cereals and non-food items and has reduced the sale of food commodities from the monthly ration basket, according to refugees throughout the five camps. Some refugees in the two Jijiga camps apparently use the cash to purchase food items, such as meat as well as milk, eggs, vegetables, pasta, rice, and tea. This finding corroborates a study commissioned by WFP in 2015 that reported refugees receiving CBT sell less of their cereal WFP food basket rations in markets.51 52

“*The distribution of cash was a very good initiative. Now we go to shops to buy things. Now we can borrow milk and other food on credit. The shopkeeper knows that we will have money. Everybody smiles when we get money.*”

– Awbarre woman refugee, Jijiga

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49 Selling six Kg of cereal in local markets nets substantially less than ETB 100, especially for sorghum.
50 Ethiopia has faced five droughts since 2003. The most recent in 2015 drought was exacerbated by the failure of the belg rains (February – May) and the below average rainfall of the main kiremet rains (June-Sept) contributing to an already fragile food security. Compounded by the El Niño phenomenon, production assessments in July 2015 reported harvest lost ranging from 25-70 percent across Ethiopia. Source: WFP Ethiopia (31 Dec 2015) PRRO 200700 Standard Project Report 2015.
51 WFP Ethiopia. The Refugee Cash Pilot Representative Survey and Final Evaluation, 2015
52 The study, which sampled refugees in four of the five camps piloting the food transfer initiative, found great satisfaction, ranging from 78 to 93 percent, with the cash and food transfer mix amongst refugees. An overwhelming proportion (88 percent) of survey refugees residing in the two participating Somali camps, in fact, prefer even more cash in lieu of cereals. A majority of those surveyed however, prefer not to replace non-cereal food items with cash.
32. The study’s findings mirror that of the ET. Ranking five objectives of the initiative—high, medium or low—the study found that CBT had reduced the sale of food assistance (high); increased refugee flexibility and choice (high); increased food consumption to some degree (medium); and somewhat augmented refugee empowerment and dignity (medium). Cash transfers were found to have not necessarily increased dietary diversity (ranked low). Indeed, refugees participating in the CBT programme reported to the ET that most of the cash was expended to purchase other food items. This finding is supported by the WFP-commissioned study cited above, which found that 89 percent of Assayita Afar respondents and 81 percent of Bambasi Assosa respondents utilised their cash to purchase food. Somali Jijiga refugees were spending a lower proportion of their CBT to purchase food in 2015—47 percent in Awbarre and 63 percent in Shedder. The remaining portion of the CBT was used to purchase non-food items. Thus, the ET finds the cash transfers appropriate in design, as refugees who receive CBT in lieu of a portion of their cereal rations do not need to sell as much of their rations to purchase other basic needs than do refugees in the vast majority of camps where the CBT has yet to be introduced.

Outcome 2: Stabilised or reduced under-nutrition among children aged 6–59 months and PLW: BFSP and TSFP

33. **Design and objectives**: Food rations provided by WFP is the sole resource entering the household for many refugee families and thus part of it has to be exchanged for other essential items in addition to feeding the family. In such a context, it is essential that WFP fulfil its mandate, as stated in its Nutrition Policy, “to work with partners to fight under-nutrition by ensuring physical and economic access to a nutritious and age-appropriate diet for those who lack it and to support households and communities in utilising food adequately.”53 The ET finds that WFP has therefore rightly endeavoured in the design of the activity to provide a full ration to each registered refugee and ensure provision of an appropriately sized and complete nutrient composition, of particular importance to vulnerable groups such as PLW, children under-5, older and sick people. In addition, the health and nutrition messaging that accompanies the nutrition supports is highly appropriate; yet, the infant and young child feeding (IYCF) practices education activity is largely carried out by partner NGOs and mostly funded through UNHCR so WFP has not played a strong role in the design of the IYCF activity and messaging. In all, this component appropriately aligns with the operation objective to enable refugees, and those vulnerable groups in particular, to meet minimum levels of food security, and with the WFP SO 1 to “save lives” by preventing malnutrition-related deaths.

34. **Appropriate commodities, targeting and beneficiary selection**: BFSP: WFP implements a BSFP alongside TSFP in all camps. BSFP has no entry criteria, but covers all children of the selected age group, and all PLW and for the first six months of their infants’ life. The BSFP aims to prevent acute malnutrition among children aged 6 - 23 months and PLW. Children aged 24 - 59 months have also been included in BSFP in camps where the GAM rate is above the emergency threshold of 15 percent—mainly in Gambella, Dolo Ado and Afar. Yet, this part of the programme ceased in Dolo Ado camps at the end of 2014 due to concern from donors and WFP that the intervention was not effective at reducing the high levels of GAM.

35. BSFP not only ensures that this vulnerable age group receives a nutritionally appropriate commodity (Super Cereal Plus), but also encourages their families to make

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use of infant feeding support and health services provided, including health and nutrition education services (such as on IYCF practices), and facilitates screening for acute malnutrition. According to the PRRO project document, children in BSFP should receive Super Cereal Plus, while PLW receive a pre-mix of Super Cereal, vegetable oil and sugar. However, at times during the operation (for example at the end of 2014), the Super Cereal Plus for children has been replaced by Super Cereal premixed with oil and sugar due to purchasing and funding constraints.

36. **TFSP:** For TSFP, admission criteria includes PLWs with MUAC <22 cm and children aged 6-59 months with mid-upper arm circumference (MUAC) < 12.5 mm and >= 11.5 cm and/or with weight-for-height (WFH) z-score >=-3 and <-2. However, the majority of screening is conducted by MUAC, at centres and in the community, so that fewer admissions are made by WFH. In some camps run by NGOs, a two-step screening process takes place so that children identified as at-risk with MUAC are referred for WFH screening; however, in other camps height boards are absent, which means the use of the WFH criteria has not been possible at all. It is appropriate to maintain protocols that allow admission by either MUAC or WFH in the current context, however, more could be done to ensure the necessary equipment is available at centres to allow that screening to take place.

37. Children in TSFP receive Plumpy'Sup, or Super Cereal Plus, when the former is not available, while moderately malnourished PLWs and individuals with HIV and TB are given a premix of Super Cereal, vegetable oil and sugar. The use of these commodities is appropriate to their aims of preventing and treating acute malnutrition respectively and in line with UNHCR and WFP guidance.

38. **Activities appropriate to context and population needs: BFSP:** According to UNHCR selective feeding guidelines, BSFP is an appropriate response in populations where the GAM rate is >15 percent or >10 percent where aggravating factors are present, which include a worsening nutritional situation, disease outbreaks, or where the food ration is below the mean energy, protein and fat requirements. The latter is certainly the case currently in the majority of camps following ration cuts since November 2015 and previously during periods of new arrivals and in camps with consistently high GAM.

39. While the rationale for providing BSFP in camps where GAM is <10 percent in addition to a full ration is arguable, and not strictly aligned with UNHCR and WFP guidelines, it is important to note that the Super Cereal Plus provided through BSFP includes animal-source proteins. These proteins are important for growth and development of children under-2 and the Super Cereal Plus is a specially adapted commodity to suit the additional nutrient requirements of this age group. BSFP has also been provided to children aged 24-59 months in camps where GAM rates have exceeded 15 percent. While this has been welcomed by NGO partners and deemed useful, there is some scepticism, amongst donors in particular, concerning its effectiveness. Since high GAM rates are frequently not solely attributable to lack of appropriate food, the nutrition causal analysis that WFP is currently planning in Dolo Ado is an important and appropriate contribution to a more comprehensive assessment of the effectiveness and necessity of this approach.

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54 WFP Ethiopia. Project Document: PRRO 200700, 2014
40. However, since November 2015, the Super Cereal component (CSB+) has been cut from the GFD ration in the majority of camps. In this context, it would seem appropriate for WFP to continue provision of a fortified blended food through BSFP to both the children aged 6-23 months and those aged 24-59 months. Yet, the current PRRO operation is “unsustainable” according to donors, as it is expensive and the situation is intractable. WFP with UNHCR and ARRA need to think about alternative ways to support the beneficiary population (discussed further in 2.3).

41. **TSFP**: The TSFP constitutes an essential component of a treatment programme for acute malnutrition, aiming to capture children early and promote their full recovery, thereby preventing a descent into severe acute malnutrition and a high risk of mortality. These programmes are highly appropriate in contexts where refugees have been arriving in Ethiopia often in poor health and physical condition and they continue to provide a safety net and essential services to those who need them.

**Outcome 3: Improved access to assets and/or basic services, including community and market infrastructure**

**School feeding:**

42. **Design and objectives**: WFP supports 18 primary schools in the camps with a daily hot meal (porridge) of 100 grams of Super Cereal and 20 grams of vegetable oil, plus sugar. The SF component is designed to increase primary school enrolment and stabilise attendance of refugee children. School meals often provide much-needed nutrition to primary school children, a group not normally targeted by other nutrition interventions, and help to improve concentration, which is necessary for learning. Thus, the objectives address the specific needs of its target group and are appropriate. School feeding is particularly appropriate in light of the removal of Super Cereal from the GFD ration since November 2015 in most camps, as it constitutes a much-needed supplement for households with young children. Targeting for SF is appropriate in terms of both beneficiaries and geography, to primary school students (and some pre-primary schools) in refugee camps (with the exception of Gambella camps, where there was no NGO implementing partner at the time of the evaluation). Beneficiaries are all girls and boys attending primary school in the camps. Enrolment is the responsibility of ARRA and its NGO partners, and it should be noted that 17 percent of girls and 16 percent of boys are not attending primary school.

43. **Context analysis, population needs & appropriate transfer modalities**: In discussions with parents, students, and teachers, the ET found that SF is highly appreciated, and that there is high demand for the programme in Gambella. The 2015 baseline states that primary school enrolment rates in Gambella, which has no school meals programme, is higher (87 percent of children) than other regions that provide school meals. The baseline correctly concludes that many factors contribute to the decision to enrol children in school; however, this does not mean that a school meals component in Gambella is not appropriate, as school meals also support better concentration and thus better learning outcomes among school children. However, given other demands on WFP resources, since Gambella schools are already doing well in meeting school enrolment goals, the introduction of school feeding is not an urgent issue. Enrolment in the Dolo Ado camps doubled after the introduction of school meals in 2012. Refugee children attend over 80 percent of school days in camps that have a

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57 WFP supports primary schools in six regions: Dollo Ado (5 schools), Jijiga (3), Gambella, (1), Asosa (3), Afar (2), Shire (4).
58 WFP Ethiopia, Refugee Baseline Survey PRRO 2015, June 2015.
59 WFP Ethiopia, JAM, 2014.
School meals help encourage consistent attendance, particularly from households that suffer food shortages due to sharing with non-registered families or individuals. The average growth rate in school enrolment is eight percent per year. Mothers in Dolo Ado camps told the ET that they depend on SF to provide lunch for their children, and that their children could not continue education without it.

**Resources for livelihood and environment programmes:**

44. **Relevance of design and activities to needs:** This aspect of PRRO Outcome 3 focuses on increasing livelihood opportunities in the form of income-generating activities (IGAs) and environmental interventions for both refugees and host communities. Livelihood programming serves two purposes: to provide income opportunities for refugees and host populations while also improving relations between the two communities. The ET finds that income from livelihoods support is appropriate as refugees in every camp visited report that they must sell part of their already-reduced food rations to purchase essential non-food items. Annex 1a provides an extensive analysis of livelihood activities supported by WFP and NGOs, as well as those independently undertaken by the refugees themselves.

45. Refugees are completely dependent on food rations from WFP and basic complementary items and services from ARRA, UNHCR, and their NGO partners. Livelihood interventions are thus highly appropriate because government policy prohibits most refugees from formal employment. Access to agricultural land, formal employment, and other IGAs that could contribute to their food security and self-reliance are severely restricted; though, refugees voiced a desire to work. Most refugees will remain in the camps for the foreseeable future. Livelihood interventions linked to environmental protection or rehabilitation are also highly appropriate, particularly in light of the possible long-term existence of camps.

46. Yet another reason for its relevance is financial sustainability of the operation. Donors stated to the ET that the funding requirement of the food assistance programme, approximately US$11 million per month, would be a challenge to meet over the long term. Donor ability to fund the PRRO is further stressed by the need to respond to the current severe drought. Donors are stressing the need for more livelihood activities to decrease their financial burden, but to date have not provided funding to scale up.

**Internal coherence with WFP corporate strategy**

47. WFP Ethiopia’s PRRO approach is consistent with corporate SO 1 and 2 under the global WFP Strategic Plan and Strategic Results framework (2014-2017). Specifically, the PRRO aligns with SO 1: “Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies through the food assistance programme to refugees.” This is addressed by PRRO Objective 1 to enable refugees to meet minimum levels of food security, which WFP has done until rations were reduced in November 2015 due to funding shortfalls. It is also addressed through PRRO Objective 2 to reduce acute malnutrition among refugees with special needs, especially malnourished children and PLW, through the supplementary feeding.

48. WFP’s approach in the camps is consistent with the five areas covered by its nutrition policy framework:61 i) treating moderate acute malnutrition—wasting; ii) preventing acute malnutrition—wasting; iii) preventing chronic malnutrition—stunting; iv) addressing micronutrient deficiencies among vulnerable people, to reduce mortality and improve the health of all groups, through fortification; and v) strengthening the

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60 WFP Ethiopia, SPR, 2015.
focus on nutrition in programmes without a primary nutrition objective and, where possible, linking vulnerable groups to these programmes.

49. The PRRO addresses the corporate SO 2: “Support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies” through Objective 3, which provides SF to attract and retain primary school children in the refugee camps. SF for primary schoolchildren in the refugee camps is also aligned with the WFP corporate Revised School Feeding Policy (2013) to increase children’s access to learning opportunities and improve their health and nutrition status. Objective 4 supports livelihoods by providing WFP support to IGAs and environmental protection for refugees and host communities. The PRRO activities support ARRA’s capacity to respond to the food and nutrition humanitarian needs of the refugee population, contributing to the achievement of pillar one of WFP Ethiopia’s 2012-2015 Country Strategy.

50. **Synergies:** The PRRO activities in food/cash assistance and BSFP/SFP are internally synergistic in that they cover refugee family members of all ages while providing additional nourishment for the most vulnerable refugees, including malnourished children and moderately malnourished PLWs and individuals with HIV and TB. The WFP-supported livelihoods activities, while limited, complement the food and cash assistance by supporting refugees in acquiring skills and means to supplement their food and cash assistance. WFP’s work to improve port operations and storage facilities in Djibouti have produced synergies with the PRRO in terms of improved efficiency. In addition, PRRO 200700, which supports ARRA to develop its operational capacity, complements other capacity strengthening activities of WFP, including in national disaster risk management for non-refugee populations.

**External coherence with Government of Ethiopia and partners**

51. **Government policies, strategies, programmes:** Overall, the PRRO supports the government’s realisation of MDGs: 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 7. The operation supports the government’s concern with protecting the health and welfare of refugees, yet, the government regards refugees as temporary guests without the rights of citizens. The operation also supports the government programme to provide free primary education to refugee children in camps and urban areas. As described in Section 1.2, the government does not allow most refugees to engage in formal employment. Many stakeholders, including donors and implementing agencies, would like to see a change in this government policy to allow refugees to seek employment opportunities outside of the camp. This would supplement their less-than-complete food basket and their less-than-complete non-food assets that currently require refugees to sell a substantial portion of their food rations to purchase other food and non-food basic needs.

52. WFP works closely with ARRA, which considers WFP to be its best and most effective partner as told to ET by high level ARRA officials. WFP is responsible for shipping the food to the port and then transporting it to the primary hubs and then to the final distribution points (FDP)–the camp warehouses. ARRA then takes over camp warehousing and food distributions; WFP Field Monitors (FM) are tasked with

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63 Additional discussion on partnerships as a cross-cutting objective may be found in 2.2.
64 The ET notes that the “out of camp” policy may be understandable given the security concerns of the Somali context, or in light of the recent ethnic tensions resulting in conflict between communities in the western Gambella context. It is in this context that Eritrean refugees are given more leeway in seeking income sources outside of the camps.
monitoring (discussed further in 2.3). ARRA officials informed the ET that it has no issues with CBT. Overall, WFP operates within government policies and strategies.

53. **United Nations**: The PRRO’s SO 1 and SO 2 support the achievement of the UNDAF (2012-2015) Outcome 4, which seeks to strengthen national and subnational institutions to reduce disaster risks and to impact and improve food security for vulnerable persons including refugees. Looking ahead to the next two years of PRRO 200700, the design is aligned with the UNDAF (2016-2020) Outcome 3, which envisions greater resilience, diversified income, and improved ability to withstand and recover from emergencies and disasters, through effective and timely responses to refugees. It supports Outcome 6, improved access to quality and equitable health care, by ensuring that the United Nations will strengthen its institutional capacity to deliver health care to refugees.

54. WFP and UNHCR have shared responsibility for nutritional programmes, as laid out in the global MOU and further specified in the WFP/UNHCR/ARRA tripartite agreement for the refugee response in Ethiopia. However, WFP CO has not prioritised nutritional expertise for the refugee operation and UNHCR is playing a more substantial role in monitoring programmes and supporting implementing partners. WFP is aware of the need to step up in this area and has already responded in the field (for example, in Tigray region) to calls from partners for greater and closer engagement in the camps and in strategic meetings. It is important that the considerable investment that WFP is making in terms of provision of food products for nutritional programmes is supported by WFP nutritional expertise to complement the role of UNHCR. The Gambella camps’ programmes have been guided by the Ethiopia Joint UNHCR/WFP/UNICEF/ARRA/ Humanitarian Partners Strategic Guideline 2014 Health, Nutrition and Food Response, Gambella Emergency Refugee Programs, and currently align with the draft Food and Nutrition Strategy 2015. Programming throughout the country also seeks to ensure that host communities can make use of nutritional services in camps.

55. The SF component is a multi-agency partnership between WFP, which supplies the food, kitchen and storage facilities, UNHCR, which provides classrooms and latrines, UNICEF, which provides educational materials and water, and ARRA, responsible for the provision of primary education. The ET observed satisfactory coordination and provision of inputs by the agencies in the camps visited, with the exception of Gambella.

56. **Donors**: Donors consider WFP a good partner that is engaged in strategic thinking and communicates well. Information about pending ration reductions in 2015 was shared by WFP in advance, and donors, WFP, and UNHCR/ARRA have conferred about the cuts and about long-term measures to improve operational modalities. Donors state that they are giving substantial emergency funds for drought assistance and so do not have a lot of additional money to provide further support to refugee operations. The donor agencies interviewed told the ET that due to cost, the present way of operating cannot continue without seeing greater efficiency of operations and more innovation to reduce costs. Donors support the expansion of cash assistance, though they note that obtaining support for this from ARRA has taken a lot of time. One donor expressed the desire to see WFP move certain changes forward, such as demonstrating the effectiveness of CBT and advocating for all-cash assistance in some camps. However, WFP staff state that all-cash is not financially efficient, given high prices for vegetable oil and CSB+ in Ethiopia, and that refugees do not want all cash (a fact confirmed by ET

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65 MOU between WFP, UNHCR and ARRA (WFP PRRO 200270). Dated 21st May 2015.
interviews with refugee FDGs). WFP also notes that it needs to collaborate strategically with UNHCR on any such changes and cannot make them unilaterally.

57. The United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DfID) believes that more livelihoods programming is a way to alleviate the current situation. DfID plans to commit over 25 million British pounds over the next five years to expand it; however, the funding, which was supposed to be available in early 2016, has been postponed to 2017. DfID is also supporting a pilot of fresh food vouchers in Terkidi camp as a way of improving nutritional impact. In light of the cost of the current operation and the pressure on donor funds, donors stressed the need for change in the current way of doing business. As part of this, they would like to see the government relax employment restrictions so refugees have more opportunities to generate income.

2.2. Results of the Operation

58. This section discusses findings for the evaluation question, “What are the results of the operation?” The analysis includes the extent to which assistance was provided based on the plan, timely and of sufficient quantity and quality. It then assesses early progress toward achieving outcomes and objectives, gendered results, and factors contributing to outcomes (even those unintended); results are discussed by operation outcome, with examples provided by region to elucidate the findings. Cross-cutting results are then presented, and the operation’s overall contribution to higher-level development results.

Outcome 1: outputs and outcomes

59. Actual versus planned assistance: WFP managed to deliver food rations to 95 percent of planned GFD beneficiaries in 2014 (96 percent of males; 94 percent of females) and 89 percent in 2015 (83 percent of males; 95 percent of females); this data is presented in Table 1 of the factsheet. Funding shortfalls reduced the cereal rations distributed to refugees through the GFDs in November and December 2015, thereby preventing WFP from achieving the planned GFD outputs in 2015.66 The estimated total of female newcomers arriving in camps—invariably from South Sudan—which far outnumbered the estimated male number of new arrivals, explains the gender variance in GFD figures. For the cash modality, 89 percent of planned beneficiaries received cash in 2014 (48,200 of 54,000).67 This target was exceeded in 2015, when WFP received additional resources for CBT, allowing for the provisioning of CBT to 54,474 beneficiaries (see Figure 8 of the factsheet).68

60. Refugees in Ethiopia received their full food rations of 2100 kcals until November 2015, when WFP suspended fortified CSB+ in the GFD, although some camps were able to distribute CSB+ from previous months’ stocks stored in the ARRA warehouses. WFP was in the process of suspending sugar from the GFD rations from March 2016. For CBT participants, WFP representatives informed the team that the cereal disbursement has been decreased to seven Kg per person per month in the two Jijiga CBT camps, while the cash component remains at 100 ETB.

61. Frequency, duration, timeliness, quality and quantity: Refugee complaints about reductions or suspensions of commodities from the ration basket as well as their need to sell a sizable portion of their rations every month to purchase other basic household items dominated the FGDs with the ET. Refugees generally consider food distributions to be fair.

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67 While the beneficiary target was not met for cash transfers in 2014, the amount of cash distributed was at 104 percent of planned (see Figure 12 of the Factsheet).
68 WFP Ethiopia, SPR 2015, p. 7.
62. The ET finds that most refugees in most camps are aware of their entitled rations, but some refugees who have arrived more recently at the camps are unaware and confused about the ration sizes in the basket; this was most apparent when interviewing women and men queuing (for several hours) to collect their rations in Jewi, Gambella. Able to observe four GFDs in different camps, the ET noticed the use of out-of-date coupons that refugees use to collect their rations. The coupons stated for example that refugee families would collect CSB+ despite that commodity’s disuse from the food ration basket. Accurate coupons that state the entitlement for each food commodity by family size to be disbursed in the GFD had not been produced. Signs were posted at the GFD sites but they proved to be inaccurate as well. ARRA and the WFP food monitors had not changed the signs since prior to November 2015 or even earlier.

63. The ET found that information about ration entitlements is poorly communicated in the Gambella camps. As a result, when refugees see their rations being legitimately reduced but without any explanation, they assume that they are being cheated. The poor communication is causing distrust among the refugees. This was demonstrated during FGDs at the camp, Jewi and especially Terkidi camp refugees protested vociferously to the ET their perception that they were receiving less than full rations. Refugees in both camps, and some other stakeholders involved in implementing non-food activities as well, protested that Food distribution committees (FDC) scoopers were collaborating with ARRA to under-scoop rations. The ET believes the problem not to be under-scooping of food rations or any deliberate intent to cheat refugees of their rations, but instead a consequence of poorly communicated information about ration entitlements. Although the chair of the refugee food committee could recall and describe the food basket and the food distribution system to the ET, refugee representatives collecting their rations had trouble explaining their ration entitlements. The team also found information about changes or delays in ration distributions to be poorly communicated between WFP partners, ARRA, and camp refugee representatives.

64. In addition, the large camps continue to lack sufficient wheelbarrows to cart the monthly food rations from the distribution centres back to the refugee shelters. The 2014 JAM found that refugees pay an average of twenty to thirty ETB per household for cart services to transport their rations back to their shelters.69 Jijiga ARRA officials coordinating in Awbarre and Sheder confirmed that refugees normally pay ten to twenty ETB to transport their food rations home from the GFD. This represents yet another cost for refugee made through food commodity sales. Nevertheless, the ET found that the full basket of food commodities has been delivered to the camps on schedule for most months during this PRRO. Refugee FGD participants voiced numerous complaints related to food consumption and food security affecting their lives in the camps, but these complaints did not usually include the timeliness of the food distributions. Issues related to warehousing/storage and distribution system monitoring affecting the quality of the commodities and efficiency of activities are addressed in 2.3.

65. WFP distributes red sorghum and wheat alternatively from month to month, and in terms of preference and palatability, sorghum is not foreign to Somali and South Sudanese diets, but Somali refugees in particular—South Sudanese voiced this complaint as well (albeit less vigorously)—object to the taste of red sorghum. Refugees reiterated to the team that wheat could be used to make a more robust variety of dishes than is possible with red sorghum, including flour, injera, and porridge. Despite these cereal preferences, WFP distributed

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more sorghum and less wheat than planned in 2015 (see Table 2 of Factsheet), a result of one donor’s reliance on red sorghum. Yet, overall need and dependence on the food may overshadow these preferences that are a form of autonomy (see quote box).

66. As a brief point on households’ ability to make the best use of rations, in Dolo Ado camps it was reported that refugee households had not received food preparation training, particularly affecting single-family food preparation efficiency.

67. **Actual versus planned outcomes:** Both PRROs have sought to “meet the basic nutrition needs of refugees” as the overall objective by “enabling refugees to meet the minimum levels of food security” (SO 1). By successfully delivering a normally stable supply of food commodities to the camps and ensuring the distribution of food basket to all refugees, the PRRO has successfully accomplished this outcome in large part. Refugees receive their food rations as per the basket.

68. Targets have been met by 2015 for both outcome indicators of household dietary diversity score (DDS) and food consumption score (FCS), showing improvements since 2014; full results shown in Error! Reference source not found. of the factsheet. As shown in Figure 18, the percentage of refugee households with acceptable FCS increased from 41 percent in 2014 to 78 percent in 2015. In camps receiving GFD in-kind only, 75 percent percent of households have acceptable FCS at the latest follow up as compared to 83 percent of households with acceptable FCS in camps receiving both cash and food (see Error! Reference source not found. Table 5 in Factsheet).

![Figure 18: Household FCS (% of HHs)](image)


69. **Factors contributing to outcomes and unintended outcomes: GFD (in-kind):** Food rations are indeed tied to food security outcomes: Because of the funding constraints (see 2.3), refugees in the South Sudan, Somali and Sudan camps are no longer collecting sufficient rations to consume 2100 kilocalories. In March 2016, the ration basket provided Gambella refugees with approximately 1700 kilocalories per person per day. Even prior to the recent suspension of some food commodities from the GFD, refugee households dependent on food assistance often ran short during the month and normally struggled to meet the daily requirement of 2100 kcals, in part because of the need to sell part of their ration to meet essential non-food needs.

70. Food insecurity intensifies for refugee households during the second half of month, when rations tend to run out or are consumed in smaller quantities, for a variety of reasons, but largely because refugees are compelled to sell some (or even a major
portion) of their food items to purchase other basic needs. Constantly worried about insufficient rations to feed their families for a full month, refugees complained of the need to sell a substantial portion of their rations to fulfil other household needs and because income from other sources has been insufficient. The ET registered such complaints in all visited camps. Terms of trade also disfavour refugee households, who sell their rations at low prices in camp or local community markets to purchase other items at relatively high and increasing prices. Refugees normally choose to sell a large proportion of their cereals and sometimes a smaller proportion of the other foods in the basket. Many households invariably sell up to half of their cereal rations—reported in the two Gambella camps—to support other livelihood needs, basic needs, and core relief items (CRI) or other foods such as vegetables or condiments. Some also sell part of their cereal ration occasionally to purchase their favoured rice or pasta (at unfavourable terms of trade). Small factories producing bread from refugee wheat have sprung up adjacent to Kebreneyah camp in Jijiga.

71. Another cost that refugees must incur to meet their food needs is milling costs. Grinding mills in camps do not sufficiently meet the refugees’ needs. This important discussion related to the lack of CRI and milling costs continues in Annex 1b.

72. In addition, the distribution system normally calls on larger-sized families to collect their rations in the early days of the GFD, but this has an unintended consequence. According to FGDs, single-member families, who usually collect rations last, frequently struggle to manage their food rations, which run out at an earlier stage of the month than is the case for larger households, although all refugees receive their rations in a one-month cycle. Small households must sell a larger proportion of their rations to purchase other items. Larger households can more efficiently manage the food rations. Gambella refugees claimed that larger sized families sometimes share their rations with smaller sized families, and families also share their rations apparently with non-registered refugees. This has a gendered impact, which is discussed below.

73. Some of the other factors contributing to the outcomes in many camps are related to the food distribution system, logistics, warehousing and food monitoring, which are further discussed in 2.3 and Annex 1c.

74. **CBT:** There are various positive unintended or unofficial/unmeasured outcomes and benefits of the CBT option. Increasing their food purchase options has enhanced the dignity of refugees by providing them with the ability to make own choices. The overwhelming majority of those who collect rations of cash as well as food in Jijiga appear to be women, which undermines the argument that CBT might be monopolised by men and helps ensure that money is spent on the family. Visits to the camps also verified the benefits accrued to host community markets, which are booming with refugee buying and selling activity, particularly during and immediately following the monthly food distributions. Refugees with cash at hand are able to purchase agricultural products harvested by host community farmers. Refugees living in the two Jijiga camps involved in the CBT initiative told the ET that relations with host communities have improved immeasurably.

75. **Gender results:** As noted above, GFD is normally organised to accommodate specific family sizes in order to simplify the scooping system, as the amount of food to be scooped for refugee families depends on their family size; this takes place over several days. Refugee women and men, especially in the larger camps and newer camps, and particularly the Gambella camps, frequently wait several hours to collect their rations. Some Gambella refugees dwelling in the Jewi and Terkidi camps claimed to the ET that
food rations sometimes run out by the time one- and two-member families are ready to collect their food rations, terminating the GFD before every family has collected their rations. Yet, WFP noted to the ET that they maintain a buffer stock of one-to-two percent to avoid such a scenario. The ET acknowledges that the information from the refugees and WFP is inconsistent but was unable to resolve this discrepancy during its visit and suggests that the CO look into the reason for this complaint in greater depth.

76. Refugee women in Jewi complained to the team of waiting in queues, often unprotected from sun or rain, for up to eight hours. Some GFD sites lack water and toilets, or sufficient shaded waiting areas; this complaint was echoed in the Dolo Ado and Gambella camps. The refugee food committee deployed twelve scoopers for the Jewi, Gambella GFD of March observed by the ET; the committee later told the team that the committee membership had changed, resulting in fewer scoopers available to measure out rations to waiting refugees. Refugees complained that the GFD process in the camp had lengthened from seven-to-eight days to ten-to-twelve days, and commenced the first week of the following month. The February GFD for Jewi camp was still ongoing on 10-11 March. The ET notes that the new biometrics system, which is scheduled to reach all camps by the end of 2016, includes the provision of shaded waiting areas, water, and latrines. The biometrics system was being introduced in most of the Gambella camps during the evaluation. Where introduced, it has reduced the number of days required for distribution (e.g., by half in Shire camps).

77. Women frequently walk long distances to reach the distribution centre, which are insufficient in many camps, particularly in Gambella. There may only be one distribution centre located at one end of a camp six-seven kilometre-long of 40,000 people or more. Biometric centres under construction during the visit will help alleviate this problem. In addition, hauling the household monthly food ration allotments back to their shelter is highly burdensome for some women, who may be compelled to pay somebody to help carry their food. While these issues have to do with the food distribution system, they mainly affect women as collectors of the food.

Outcome 2: outputs and outcomes

78. Actual versus planned assistance: Only around 40 percent of planned TSFP beneficiaries were reached in 2014 and 2015. WFP’s planning figures for TSFP were based on estimates from camp statistics and nutrition surveys. While fewer new arrivals were registered in 2015 than originally estimated by UNHCR, the use of WFP GAM rates for predicting beneficiary caseload further overestimated the number of eligible beneficiaries for TSFP in a situation where screening and admission criteria is largely based on MUAC. Since nutrition surveys also record MUAC data this could be used to improve the estimation of beneficiary numbers.

79. For BSFP, 83.3 percent of children aged 6-23 months were reached in 2014 70.9 percent of those 24-59 months of age; and 60.2 percent of PLWs were reached. Planned numbers of beneficiaries were exceeded in 2015 (101.5 percent); however, this represents only 71.1 percent of targeted children, as the remainder of the caseload was made up of PLWs. In 2014, 30,000 PLWs were included in BSFP in camps with high GAM rates, and despite not being included in the plan for 2015, approximately 31,000 were supported in 2015 in response to consistently high GAM rates. In addition, WFP provided a supplement of a pre-mix of Super Cereal, vegetable oil and sugar under BSFP to 2,187 people with HIV or TB in 2014 and to roughly 4,500 in 2015. Coverage as an outcome indicator is further discussed below. Another implication of not reaching the
planned number of beneficiaries for BSFP and TSFP is that fewer female and male caregivers than planned were reached with nutrition messages.\textsuperscript{70}

80. **Frequency, duration, timeliness, and quality of assistance: BSFP and TSFP** have taken place as planned with minimal interruption throughout the period of the programme. Quality of commodities has been good on the whole, although, at times Super Cereal has substituted for Super Cereal Plus due to purchasing constraints.

81. **Actual versus planned outcomes**: WFP’s SPR 2015 states that data received from UNHCR’s health information systems indicated that minimum targets were met according to the Sphere Standards for all MAM treatment indicators for under-five children. Overall, MAM treatment recovery far surpassed Sphere Standard indicators (>75 percent) in both 2014 and 2015 at 92 percent (all camps consolidated data). In 2014, defaulters made up six percent of exits and non-responders three percent; in 2015, mortality was 0.5 percent, defaulters 4.1 percent, and non-responders 2.4 percent. A closer look at operation data from Gambella and Dolo Ado camps reveals that recovery rates met Sphere Standard indicators throughout the year in the majority of camps, except in a few cases where insecurity issues affected the programme, such as Pugnido (Gambella) and camps that were relocated, such as Jewi and Leitchour (Gambella).

82. **Proportion of the eligible population who participate in BFSP and TSFP** is an outcome indicator. No independent coverage survey was conducted in 2014, The June 2015 CHS survey (Figure 19 below) shows BSFP coverage across the camps and illustrates that targets were achieved, with coverage being lowest in the Dolo Ado camps. The SPR 2015 reports that 92 percent of the target population participated in an adequate number of BSFP distributions.

**Figure 19: BSFP coverage among children 6-23 months**

83. The SPR 2015 notes that a reason for not reaching the planned number of beneficiaries under BSFP is that the activity was discontinued for children aged 24-59 months in the five camps in Dolo Ado. However, there are other explanatory factors. The main reason cited by parents of eligible children not in the programme was lack of awareness of its existence. The ET finds this is also likely linked to population movement, reflected in the high number of empty houses reported in Dolo Ado camps. It was confirmed by interviews with WFP and partners that many families return at the time of surveys who may not be resident in the camp consistently outside these periods.

84. According to the SPR 2015, standard nutrition surveys were conducted in 24 camps in 2015: in seven camps, the GAM rates were found to be below 10 percent; in

\textsuperscript{70} WFP Ethiopia. PRRO 200700, SPR 2015.
eight camps, the GAM rate was found to be between 10 and 15 percent; and in the remaining nine camps, the GAM rate was above the emergency threshold of 15 percent. Camps with GAM rate above 15 percent were all in Gambella, Dolo Ado and Afar. Figure 20 shows this data for 19 camps for which surveys were available.

Figure 20: GAM prevalence in camps during nutrition surveys 2014/2015

Note: Surveys in Terkidi and Kule camps were conducted in July 2014 and March 2015; in Berhale and Assayita March/April 2014 and July 2015; in other sites where comparative data is shown for 2014 and 2015, the survey period was March/April in both years. Although issues around seasonality are deemed to have less influence in a camp situation where populations are highly dependent on GFD, climatic and disease factors can still affect malnutrition rates differently during different periods of the year, so this should be taken into consideration when comparing 2014 with 2015 in sites that did not conduct the nutrition survey the same month both years.

85. While GAM rates decreased in all camps from the early emergency rates seen in new arrivals, they have remained high in Afar, Dolo Ado and Gambella camps in 2014 and 2015. Wasting, measured by WFH z-score, is reported higher in boys than girls in almost all surveys, and significantly so in Bokolmanyo and Buramino camps in Dolo Ado in 2015. The reasons for this have not been fully explored. In Melkadida and Bokolmanyo camps of Dolo Ado, acute malnutrition is higher in older children (24-59 months) than younger ones (6-23 months) in both 2014 and 2015, which is an unusual survey finding and merits further investigation. High numbers of children in the older age group were also noted in SFP admissions by WFP’s implementing partners in these camps, along with admissions of children older than five years. This current situation in admissions might be linked to the removal of Super Cereal from the GFD, alongside the ineligibility of children aged 24-59 months to access BSFP in Dolo Ado camps. WFP plans to conduct a nutrition causal analysis in 2016 and these issues should be fully examined during that process.

86. An increasing trend in stunting was found in Dolo Ado camps over the years 2013 to 2015, reaching above the WHO critical cut-off (40 percent) in 2015 in Melkadida, Kobe, and Hilaweyn, and above 30 percent in Bokolmanyo and Buramino camps. Although stunting prevention is not an explicit target of WFP programming, this finding

71 This information has been drawn from the ET’s extensive desk review of camp surveys jointly conducted by nutrition agencies and NGOs, led by ARRA, UNHCR and WFP throughout 2013-2015.
is of concern and requires attention from WFP and its partners. The findings on malnutrition should also be understood in the context of other micronutrient deficiencies. The high level of anaemia in some camps amongst children as well as in women of reproductive age was flagged in the 2014 JAM as a concern, with the recommendation to provide iron supplements to all women of reproductive age. This intervention has not occurred to date. The prevalence of anaemia in children aged 6-59 months was very high in Dolo Ado camps, at 56.0, 61.4, 56.8, 49.7, and 57.6 percent in Bokolmanyo, Melkadida, Kobe, Hilaweyn, and Buramino camps respectively in 2015 (Nutrition survey 2015), surpassing the WHO classification of public health significance (>40 percent). International Mercy Corps (IMC) has initiated a programme of micronutrient supplement distribution alongside the BSFP in the camps. The situation requires careful monitoring.

87. **Factors contributing to outcomes and unintended outcomes**: The latest nutrition surveys from Dolo Ado and Gambella available to the ET were from March/April 2015; therefore, the lack of current data on GAM rates (as well as micronutrient deficiencies) renders interpretation of the current situation challenging. However, preliminary results from 2016 Dolo Ado surveys, just available at the time of writing, show a significant increase in GAM in Bokolmanyo camp and no significant change, though observable increases, in the others, except for Melkadida. Disaggregation of the data by age and gender is not yet available.

88. The most significant challenge affecting malnutrition, mentioned in every location, is likely to be issues around childcare and IYCF practices. It was reported by beneficiaries, NGO partners, and KII throughout the evaluation that in most camps mothers are spending excessive amounts of time searching for firewood, leaving children alone, often to fend for themselves throughout the day, which negatively affects IYCF practices, especially breastfeeding and complementary feeding. This was a major concern in Afar and Gambella camps, where mothers reportedly spend six to eight hours each day fetching firewood to be able to cook even one family meal. The lack of cooking fuel is also highly likely to limit mothers’ ability to cook the supplementary foods provided in BSFP. These issues of firewood and fuel are also discussed under crosscutting results: gender, below.

89. **Household and population movement in and out of camps, as previously described for GFD, is another issue that is affecting both TSFP and BSFP attendance and GAM rates. In Dolo Ado there are questions over whether nutrition surveys are measuring people who live in the camps and receive services or whether they are including a significant number who are registered in the camp but living outside and returning only at the time of surveys or to collect GFD rations. WFP’s implementing partners clearly noted a surge in TSFP and BSFP numbers after the camps fill at the time of GFD and nutrition surveys. If surveys capture children who are not receiving the full package offered in the camp, but are influenced by unknown factors outside, then it is very difficult to assess the effects of services provided.

90. There were also numerous reports of unregistered families or persons living in the camps in all regions visited by the ET. This situation necessitates a sharing of rations and therefore a dilution in the individual amount received and consumed.

91. **A technical consideration with regard to the treatment of acute malnutrition and the ability of the programme to reduce GAM rates is the fact that the TSFP admission criteria is based largely on MUAC screening, while nutrition survey GAM rates are reported according to WFH. This means that children identified in surveys as acutely**
malnourished by WFH are not necessarily included in a treatment programme as they are not picked up through MUAC screening. Rates of acute malnutrition identified through the two measures are dramatically different in most camps and also identify different children in many cases. There is an effort in 2016 to move towards an enhanced WFH screening of all children attending for BSFP once every month or every two months in camps supported by NGOs with adequate capacity. This should assist the programme to improve its coverage and ensure that children with low WFH receive treatment. However, it requires significant resourcing and staff capacity, so it will only be conducted in NGO-supported camps.

92. The SPR 2014 mentions that the lack of NGO partners in some camps resulted in gaps in nutrition screening, with the result that fewer children and PLW than expected were referred for treatment and prevention of MAM at the health facilities. This evaluation observed that nutrition activities appeared to be implemented in a more effective and efficient manner in camps supported by NGO nutrition expertise. For example, in Assayita where NGO expertise is lacking, the ET observed challenges in staffing SFP centres, implementation of outpatient therapeutic programme protocols and best practice, highlighting issues of high staff turnover. Conversely, well-funded NGOs had been able to set up comprehensive outreach and referral services, as well as optimal SFP services for assisting beneficiaries. For example, in Gambella, combined outreach strategies have been developed across sectors so that consistent nutrition, hygiene and health messages reach refugees through the community workers of the various sectors. Action Contre La Faim (ACF), Goal and IMC are also implementing baby friendly/IYCF centres at SFP sites, where mothers and their infants can be assisted, supported and receive one-to-one counselling where necessary. However, some of these services are currently under threat as UNHCR funding is cut back, resulting in reductions in community nutrition staff.

93. Thus, another factor affecting these results is related to programme and staffing continuity. For example, supplementary feeding effectiveness declined in the Assosa camps from 2014, when Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) handed over activities to ARRA; the transition has not been smooth and ARRA has lacked the staffing support that MSF had in the camp. The SFP in Benishangul camps has been plagued by staff turnover and characterised by poorly trained staff in some positions. The lack of staff has meant that the process of screening refugees has sometimes been problematic and inaccurate. Benishangul camps lack nutrition expertise since the departure of MSF. Personnel in the health centres have not been properly trained. MSF had six staff, for instance, working in the health centre at Bambasi camp; ARRA has only assigned three health staff to that camp. The doctor in charge of the health centre claimed that qualified personnel were impossible to find and recruit. Refugees living at Bambasi complained of poor medical service. A similar problem exists at the newly opened Sori camp in Benishangul. The ARRA representative complained that funding constraints limit their ability to provide sufficient medical and educational personnel for these basic services.

94. In 2016, GAM rates may be affected by the ration cuts implemented since November 2015. The removal of Super Cereal from the GFD is of concern, as it plays an important role in ensuring adequate micronutrients can be sourced from the general ration and is a food that is particularly easy to consume for older people and children under-5. Although those under-2 years have access to BSFP, children aged two to five years may be left at risk of inadequate micronutrient consumption.

95. Finally, it was noted by KII, beneficiaries, and partners that the situation of inadequate shelter and protection from harsh climatic conditions (for example in Afar
and Gambella camps), combined with the lack of CRI available in households (discussed above, under GFD), most importantly blankets and cooking fuel, make it challenging for households to feed and nurture their children well; and it is extremely difficult for children who become sick or malnourished to make a full recovery. This adds stress to the well-being of PLW as well (see quote box).

“\textit{In Sudan, we had enough household materials, like clothes, sanitary napkins, soap and kitchen items, but not here. Pregnant women have problems because they have so little support. They have a plastic mat and a blanket.}” - Bambasi refugee woman

96. **Gender results:** There are no major disparities in numbers of boy and girls receiving BSFP or TSFP. However, significant differences in the prevalence of acute malnutrition in boys and girls were noted in the 2015 nutrition surveys in Bokolmanyo and Buramino camps of Dolo Ado, as explained above. This merits further investigation to understand the potential reasons for the finding.

97. As mentioned above, women frequently spend long periods absent from the camps seeking firewood, and even in camps where more men are registered, this work tends to fall to women (an exception was reported in Assayita camp where men assist with this chore). Women’s traditional workloads tend to be very high. In the camp context their role frequently extends to queuing for milling, collecting GFD and seeking IGA as well. While WFP and partners are working to challenge some of these gender roles and engage men in sharing the burden, there is also a much higher ratio of women to men in the majority of camps, particularly in Gambella region. The result is that women often have to carry the full burden of looking after the household. In Tigray, the numbers of men are high and single households constitute a large percentage of the refugees so these issues are less pronounced.

**Outcome 3: outputs and outcomes**

**School feeding**

98. **Actual versus planned assistance:** The SF programme provides a meal of 450 kilocalories per child per school day and reached 18 of the 21 primary schools targeted in 2015, achieving 95.5 percent of feeding days. School feeding reached 61 percent of the 1500 pre-primary schoolchildren targeted in 2014. In 2014, WFP reached 79.3 percent of its target for beneficiaries, providing meals to 64,254 children out of 81,000. In 2015, only 43.9 percent of refugee children received school meals, or 48,559 children from the 110,500 targeted. The large shortfall in school meals provision is primarily due to a lack of coverage of approximately 50,000 children in the Gambella camps. See a summary of these results in Table 1.

99. The primary NGO partner, Save the Children International (SCI), is not supportive of SF and so not willing to implement the programme in Gambella camps. WFP Gambella staff identified an NGO to undertake the programme, but implementation has not moved forward due to lack of funding to build kitchen and eating facilities, purchase materials, and pay staff. ARRA has discussed the issue with WFP and UNHCR, but at the time of the evaluation, there was no plan to initiate school meals. Since attendance in Gambella primary schools is among the highest of the camps even without SF, and in light of the ration cuts due to the funding shortfall, initiating SF for its incentive value is not an urgent issue in Gambella. In Jewi camp, camp elders requested that the ET convey a request to WFP to initiate SF to encourage refugee students to attend classes. The ARRA camp commander for Terkidi camp expressed concern to the ET that children leave school at break time to eat and do not return to their classes.
100. In the other five regions, the ET observed that SF is implemented in a satisfactory manner. The camps in Tigray region in particular have well-constructed and well-equipped SF facilities. In the Afar region, improved food preparation and storage facilities for the SF programme are under construction.

101. Several camps have pre-primary schools and various FGD stated that they would like to have school meals provided in all these schools. This is a desirable goal, but WFP’s primary focus should be on meeting needs in all primary schools, then addressing pre-primary as appropriate, once funds and partners are available. BFSP, which reaches 80 percent of all refugee children under-5, targets nearly the same children as pre-primary school feeding, so in many cases pre-primary school feeding would be duplicate.

102. **Frequency, duration, timeliness, and quality of assistance:** The quality of school facilities is an important factor in providing a supportive learning environment. School facilities, which are the responsibility of ARRA and UNHCR, vary greatly between camps. Schools in more established camps in Shire and Afar regions have well-constructed classrooms and learning materials are provided. In the more recently settled Jewi camp in Gambella, schools are constructed of corrugated iron sheets covered by plastic sheeting, and water is not available in most of the schools. In Bambasi camp in Assosa the two primary schools, managed by ARRA, Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and SCI, are severely overcrowded (average of 120 students per classroom). It is presumed that better facilities will be constructed as these camps become better established. On a positive note, students from Bambasi camp who pass the national secondary school entrance examination can attend school in Bambasi Township. Currently, 15 students are attending Bambasi secondary school with UNHCR assistance.

103. Parents and teachers interviewed by the ET were supportive of the school meals. Teachers stated that on days when the porridge is not given, students were not as attentive and some go home to eat during the break time and do not return because of the distance. Discussions by the ET with students elicited a range of opinions on the taste of the porridge from not sweet enough to too sweet; most students say they appreciate receiving the school meal and consume the porridge because they are hungry.

104. **Actual versus planned outcomes:** Excluding the Gambella camps where there is no SF programme, the coverage of refugee schoolchildren is 80 percent in 2014 and 2015. As of December 2015, the retention rate of girls is 85 percent and 82 percent for boys, exceeding WFP targets of 70 percent. The average annual rate of change in number of boys enrolled in WFP-assisted primary schools is 14 percent, exceeding WFP targets of six percent, and 1.2 percent for girls against WFP targets of six percent (see Table 5 in Factsheet).

105. **Factors contributing to outcomes and unintended outcomes:** SF facilities vary widely, with some schools having many more resources than others. Assayita camp schools are connected to the national grid for electricity and all classrooms have fans to alleviate the heat, but they are using firewood to prepare the school meals. Most schools cook porridge with firewood. The quality of the teaching environment also varies, but in general the ratio of teachers to students is very low; for example, in Assayita camp there are eight qualified teachers and seven assistant teachers (who do not have teaching credentials) for 740 children, for an average class size of 49. The supply of textbooks and teaching materials is inadequate.

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72 Calculated from SPR data minus Gambella camps.
106. **Gender results:** Overall, enrolment rates for girls and boys are near parity (83 percent for girls; 84 percent for boys), with the exception of Afar region, where just under half of girls are in primary school. In Assayita camp, the vice principal reported that many families do not want to send their girls to school, but that this is slowly changing due to awareness-raising efforts. Afar region offers an opportunity for WFP to apply and assess the effectiveness of such incentives, combined with sensitisation of parents, to encourage greater enrolment of girls.

**Resources for livelihood and environment programmes:**

107. Livelihoods support to refugees is currently a small part of WFP’s portfolio, also included under Outcome 3. The majority of livelihood initiatives are supported by UNHCR and a variety of NGOs, with varying degrees of success. Output and outcome data for WFP-supported livelihood activities are not available in the SPR as they are for the other activities. As such, this section does not follow the same subheadings as above; here, the ET describes their findings related to the general progress and challenges of this programme, with extended discussion provided in Annex 1. The ET concludes that the potential impact of IGAs could be much greater if undertaken as part of a coordinated regional strategy designed to build on local opportunities that take the local market and its potential for expansion into account without saturating it.

108. **Progress of the programme:** WFP’s objective for livelihoods assistance is that over 50 percent of targeted households will have an increased number of income and food sources by 2018. The overall target for PRRO 200700 is 30,000 women and girls and 20,000 men and boys assisted in livelihood activities from 2015-2018. The target for 2015 is 16,667 people (10,000 women; 6,667 men). Geographic coverage was limited to five camps in four regions in 2014-2015. An estimated 3,000 people or 18 percent of targeted people were assisted directly by WFP-supported NGOs in 2015 in two camps of Afar region, and it would have to grow exponentially to meet its end of project target.

109. The diversification of IGAs and adaptation to the very different camp and regional environments is a very positive contribution by all agencies. Indeed, any avenue that can provide additional sustenance or cash to the refugees is useful. However, the ET observed that livelihood initiatives are very small-scale, training is not always linked with demand for services, and some initiatives are technically weak. For example, in Assayita camp a local NGO told the ET that poultry projects were unsuccessful in part because they distributed highland varieties of chickens that could not survive in the extreme heat in the camp regions.

110. The ET concludes that livelihood efforts have proven to be far too limited to have any impact on refugee livelihoods. Interventions are implemented by NGOs largely on a camp-by-camp basis, and with no overarching direction or strategy from ARRA, UNHCR or WFP as to which IGAs can best reduce the vulnerability of refugee households and provide desperately needed cash. UNHCR representatives in camps and regions throughout Ethiopia admitted to the ET that the budget for livelihood activities was far below what is needed. WFP staff stated that donors support livelihood activities but have not been forthcoming with funding. Overall, the expansion of livelihoods programming is essential to the increased self-reliance and dignity of refugees. However, financial support and the scale of interventions are far below levels required for any significant impact on the refugee population. Current efforts would need to be scaled significantly for refugees to attain any degree of self-reliance.

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73 The 2015 SPR reports 500 households provided with livelihoods assistance; the 3,000 figure is arrived at by using the standard calculation of six persons per household.
111. **Livelihood expertise:** WFP has organisational IGA expertise but to date IGAs have not been a primary role for WFP in the Ethiopia refugee camps. Given the interrelatedness of food, cash needed for essential non-food items, and nutrition, the ET finds that it is appropriate for the CO to consider hiring a staff member with expertise in livelihoods and IGAs. The ET finds that WFP should also assume a much larger role in formulating a strategy for a coherent approach to livelihoods that will provide all agencies with guidance and coordination.

112. **Gender (and youth) results related to livelihoods programme:** Women lack livelihood opportunities to generate income for themselves and their households, especially female-headed households, which must be balanced with their duties for child rearing, household care, cooking, and collecting water and firewood. WFP-supported NGOs seek to attain gender balance in their training and in access to livelihood opportunities. There is skill training available for women that allow them to integrate IGAs with their reproductive and productive responsibilities, such as hairdressing, without adding more duties to their heavy load. Such training offers women an important earning advantage, as income-earning opportunities for women who do not receive skill-training—typically firewood collection, house cleaning, washing clothes, food vending, mat-making, and teashops—are very limited and low paying. Women’s limited mobility means they do not have the access to informal wage labour as men do.

113. In addition to gender considerations, the needs of refugee youth deserve special attention. Youth need to be able to pursue formal as well as informal jobs outside of the camps to earn income and to acquire the experience needed to further develop their skills. In Buramino camp in Dolo Ado, elders stressed the need to the ET for a comprehensive assessment to identify appropriate IGAs that will enable refugees to generate funds to diversify their food intake and meet other subsistence expenses. According to some elders, the youth need to be given priority in this; otherwise the elders fear that the youth will be persuaded to engage in hostile activities or to undertake the long, dangerous journey to Europe.

**Crosscutting results**

114. **Gender:** WFP has overall done a good job of integrating gender considerations into its programme, with the objective of improving gender equality and empowerment. WFP has taken women’s needs into consideration in the food distribution process and in targeting for livelihoods activities. The majority of women (93 percent) report that they do not experience safety problems travelling to, or at, the food distribution site, and they are informed about the programme. The two main challenges to refugee women’s empowerment the ET observed relate to cooking fuel and committee leadership; and gender balance in WFP field staff.

115. The challenge of cooking fuel not only affects food security outcomes due to selling rations to buy fuel and limiting cooking to one meal per day, but it also disproportionally impacts women and poses protection issues. Refugees face energy shortfalls to cook their meals. According to FGDs with the ET, UNHCR has not successfully provided sufficient cooking fuel to households to cook their rations, so that refugee women must either trek long distances from the camps (depending on the region and the extent of deforestation surrounding the camps) in search of firewood or purchase firewood or kerosene from local markets. The search for firewood can ratchet up tensions between refugees and host communities; women who venture far from the camps to collect firewood put themselves at risk for GBV; and extensive firewood

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74 WFP Ethiopia, PRRO baseline, 2015.
collection discernibly damages already endangered natural environments. This problem was reported in all of the regions visited by the team.

116. Some refugees instead sell some of their food to purchase cooking fuel, invariably in the form of firewood but also kerosene, reported in Dolo Ado and Benishangul. Bambasi refugees, for example, told the ET that they sometimes purchase the rights to a tree from the host community for 300 ETB to be used for firewood, a transaction that is undoubtedly illegal but considered by refugees to be less risky than venturing on their own into forests in search of firewood.

117. Through their NGO partner (The Ethiopian Gaia Association), UNHCR provides ethanol in conjunction with training on how to use it on their stoves to refugees in the Jijiga camps. They provide kerosene to refugees in other regions, including the Benishangul camps where kerosene was distributed six months of 2015 and had not been distributed for the three months prior to the visit of the ET. The kerosene and ethanol is not sufficient to cover the cooking needs for the entire months, and refugees in every camp visited by the ET are compelled to purchase or search for firewood. UNHCR field personnel and other stakeholders in the camps confirmed to the ET the need to explore and source other alternative energy options for the refugee programme, including the use of solar stoves and biogas stoves.

118. On a positive note, women’s association members in Awbarre, Jijiga told the team that incidents of GBV, which were once quite problematic within the camp, have declined significantly, largely a result of Women’s Association education campaign of camp and host community members on this issue. The most worrisome GBV risk occurs when women are compelled to search for firewood in the forest miles from the camp. Mothers therefore never send their daughters to collect firewood. The women’s association advises families to send their daughters to school instead of keeping them home to help with household chores or marrying them early, and girls’ school attendance has reportedly increased in the camp.

119. There is room for improvement in having more women in leadership positions in the camps. The ET observed that women are collecting cash and food during distributions in large numbers, which is positive, but that women are generally under-represented on food committees. Food distribution committee (FDC) leaders are often men while women scoop the food. Related to refugee central committees (RCC) leadership, men dominate RCCs and other committees, even in camps largely populated by women and children and particularly in the relatively newer camps of Gambella; although, the 2014 SPR found 40 percent of leadership positions filled with women. The ET nevertheless observed that men appear to lead most committees that met with the team. Somali Jijiga camps do not appear to conform to this pattern, as women occupy prominent positions in the RCC.

120. Unequal gender relations within the committees within most camps can be problematic not only because men control the food distribution decision-making planning and implementation process, but also because the relationships within the committee between men and women and between ARRA and refugees can foment distrust. This was most evidenced in the two Gambella camps visited by the ET, in a context of women’s responsibility for ration collection. Women in the two Gambella camps visited by the ET determinedly complained about the food distribution system and their belief that ARRA was robbing them of rations. Because they are very poorly represented on the major camp committees, the distrust becomes magnified. Other key
121. The PRRO also contributes to greater gender equity by supporting greater control by women over household decisions on food assistance. Men as well as women at the Jijiga camps have recognised women to be far more efficient in managing household food ration consumption and food preparation strategies. Women in those camps decide the mix of food rations to be consumed as well as sold or traded for other livelihood or food needs. Women have taken the responsibility of collecting most of the cash and food of GFDs in large numbers. Also briefly notable, men dominate WFP field staff positions, particularly the field monitoring and focal point positions in the camps and regions.

122. Protection and accountability to affected populations: At baselines, the proportion of assisted women and men who do not experience safety problems travelling to, from and/or at WFP programme site was 93 percent for both sexes, against a target of 90 percent. The proportion of women and men informed about the programme (who is included, what people will receive, where people can complain) was 93 percent for women and 91 percent for men at baseline against a target of 80 percent for each sex. NGO partners flagged child labour as a great concern in Bambasi camp, Benishangul. Farming communities surrounding the camp recruit children from the camps to work on their land during harvest season at exploitable wages. Thus, school attendance declines during the harvest season. WFP should be alert to these protection issues when designing or engaging in agriculture-based livelihood activities.

123. Partnerships: WFP is well regarded by its main partners, ARRA and UNHCR, and is valued for its strong field presence in all regions and its ability to manage a large and far-flung food and cash logistics operation with few interruptions. WFP communicates well and is conscientious about communicating changes in food assistance to partners in advance. Despite the good relationships, the agencies tend to undertake strategic planning largely independent of one another. The ET, in camp-level discussion with implementing partners, observed that consultation with and between partners could improve to better coordinate and avoid duplication of some activities.

124. ARRA works closely with WFP and considers WFP to be its most essential and reliable partner. ARRA representatives, who met the ET at the national level and in each region and camp visited, invariably expressed their gratitude for WFP’s partnership. Some donors confirmed that WFP is considered to be the most effective United Nations partner, partly because of their strong field presence, unlike other agencies. WFP and UNHCR regional officers meet monthly for structured refugee coordination meetings to discuss programme issues but also frequently outside of the meetings to regularly discuss issues that arise. Monthly meetings include the other implementing partners such as ARRA and the various NGOs working in the camps. WFP FM also meet with ARRA and UNHCR staff in pre and post-food distribution meetings relating to GFDs in the camps. Although claiming that “we have come a long way” in partnering with ARRA, the Dolo Ado WFP team complained to the ET that ARRA frequently bypasses the meetings and sometimes demands an official letter to schedule meetings that could resolve problems. ARRA in some regions apparently lack confidence to make or implement decisions that derive from regional meetings, which can delay needed action.

125. All partners participate in monitoring and evaluation (M&E) exercises every three months in most, if not all regions. WFP and UNHCR regularly conduct coordinated surveys, including JAMs every two years and nutrition assessments every year. The systematic and regular camp needs assessments require follow up to enact
recommendations. A number of JAM recommendations from 2014 had not been implemented by the time of the ET visit in March 2016, but not all. As a result, the same problems are repeated in consecutive JAMs as well as evaluation reports such as this one. Funding constraints present a major roadblock.

126. “There’s not much to squeeze out of the lemon,” said one donor describing the funding conundrum. Donors would like to see enhanced collaboration between UNHCR and WFP. They need to undertake joint strategic planning and jointly develop appeals for funding to support the programme with a coherent approach, especially given the funding constraints that will not necessarily improve in the near future.

Contribution to higher-level development/humanitarian results:

127. The PRRO activities contribute to the achievement of pillar one of the CO Country Strategy (2012-2015) by supporting the capacity of ARRA to respond to food and nutrition humanitarian needs of the refugee population. WFP’s support of ARRA also assists government and donors to improve disaster risk management (DRM) capacity with respect to emergency food and nutrition needs. The PRRO also contributes to higher-level humanitarian goals through its efficient delivery of food and cash assistance that helps ensure the health and wellbeing of a highly vulnerable population. The efficient delivery system of WFP in turn enables and enhances the effectiveness of complementary services provided by other humanitarian actors including UNHCR and NGOs. The operations directly support the government’s policy of offering safe haven to refugees fleeing conflict in neighbouring countries. It also supports national priorities for improved natural resource management, as well as access to primary school for all children and access to health services, especially for vulnerable women and children.

2.3. Factors Affecting the Results

Internal factors

128. Internal factors that support WFP’s efficiency and effectiveness are its good performance on logistics and hub warehousing, despite significant challenges (camp warehousing requires improved implementation and oversight), and its ability to deploy field staff. WFP is challenged by its lack of direct authority over most warehouses in the camps, and the scale of the operation and its demand on FM resources. The most significant factor is the funding shortfall that hampers WFP’s ability to provide a full ration and to support complementary nutrition activities.

129. Logistics: Despite a very challenging logistical environment in Ethiopia, including long food pipeline routes from the ports to the primary warehouses managed by WFP and then on to the warehouses in the camps, WFP is efficiently and effectively delivering the food to the camps every 30 days. The refugee operation has faced some delivery delays, due to a variety of issues discussed below, including a change in the distribution cycle in Gambella and Dolo Ado at the end of 2014 and the massive increase in refugee numbers in the Gambella camps. Transport backlogs resulted in two-to-three week GFD delays in the Dolo Ado camps. The transport pipeline, which was normally able to deliver food commodities within a monthly schedule in time to ensure food distributions in the camps by the first of the month, fell behind schedule from the end of 2015, resulting in delayed food distributions in all camps in early 2016. At the time of the evaluation, some of the camps were compelled to postpone food distributions until the first week of the following month.

130. The slight food delivery and distribution delays of 2015-16 have been attributed to several factors, including Djibouti Port congestion, competition for trucking services,
some problems with trucking subcontractors, and offloading delays in some camps. The operation is dependent on one port, Djibouti, which has had congestion problems for years, and food can rest in the port longer than anticipated. For example, one consignment of CSB+, which has a short shelf life compared to other commodities, languished in Djibouti port warehouses for some months before WFP was able to transport the CSB+ to the primary storage point in Nazareth (Adama). WFP has proactively explored alternative port and transport options to increase efficiency, including using the Berbera port in northern Somalia. Adding Berbera as another port option is also advantageous because demurrage and warehousing costs are less than at the Djibouti port. In March, the first deliveries arrived from Berbera to Jijiga to be dispatched to the Jijiga camps. WFP was even exploring using the road from Jijiga to Dolo Ado, although the condition of that road in stretches renders its use unfeasible in the near future. Additional factors contributing to delays are discussed in Annex 1c.

131. **Warehousing:** The ET visited six camp warehouses managed by ARRA and the Jijiga regional warehouses managed by WFP. The WFP warehouses easily meet WFP global standards, and they are well managed. Many ARRA camp warehouses, however, are not up to WFP standards. Warehouse conditions and commodity management practices vary significantly across camps and regions. The Bambasi, Benishangul and Jijiga warehouses appeared to be in better shape than others. Most ARRA warehouses are Rubb halls provided by WFP and are able to store 500 MT of food. Several of the Rubb halls visited by the ET were not clean and showed evidence of pests and rodents getting into food stocks. Pest control is clearly weak. Half of the Rubb Halls in most of the regions, particularly in Assosa and Gambella, lack cemented floors and commodities were found to have been stacked occasionally directly on dirt floors. Food commodities in some warehouses are poorly segregated. The team observed opened bags in CSB+ and other commodities in Afar and Gambella warehouses. Ventilation can be problematic. Some of the camp warehouses showed evidence of leaky walls and ceilings and wear and tear of years of use, including patched up slits along the walls, where thieves had attempted to or succeeded in entering the warehouse to steal food commodities. Warehouses in Dolo Ado, Assosa, and Gambella visited by the team fit this picture. Several warehouses either lack sufficient pallets or feature broken or unused pallets lying against the walls, while food is stacked directly on floors, inviting pests for a meal. The ET observed animal faeces under the pallets in an Afar warehouse. The ET discovered insufficient or unused pallets in virtually all of the camp warehouses visited by the team, including warehouses relatively well managed, where storekeepers complained that their appeals for pallets have gone unanswered.

132. Stack cards were not found on stacks of commodities in most camp warehouses visited by the team; stack cards invariably sit in the warehouse manager’s office. Stack cards are essential counter-references to commodity quantities and help to track warehousing principle of “first-in-first-out—FIFO.” Most ARRA warehouse managers had been trained, although three admitted to ET members to never having been trained. Frequent staff rotations and transfers undermine camp warehousing standards. Warehouse personnel trained by WFP are frequently transferred to non-commodity jobs after a relatively short period of time to be replaced by staff with no training and little warehousing experience. The Jewi warehouse manager, for example, who supervised a furniture warehouse before working with ARRA three months prior to his interview with the ET, had never been trained in food commodity warehouse management.

133. **Field monitoring:** Field monitoring is carried out in all camps. WFP employs 83 FM to supervise food distributions and monitor food deliveries; the PRRO shares their
time with other programmes (e.g., PSNP, Hubs and Spokes\textsuperscript{75} and emergency drought relief). Each regional sub-office also deploys focal points. Funding shortfalls have limited average Field Monitor days in the field to three to ten days per month. It is essential to efficiently prioritise their activities in the field. For example, the Hubs and Spokes programme in Somali region has nearly one thousand FDPs to monitor, an impossible task given the number of monitors. The number of FM deployed to monitor the operation is insufficient in some regions, including Dolo Ado and Afar, which can impact the warehousing standards, quality and quantity of the commodity and efficiency in distribution. Other issues related to field monitoring are elaborated in Annex 1c.

134. **Resourcing:** Funding shortfalls have severely hampered WFP’s ability to deliver full ration baskets for the GFD and fully support other project activities outlined in the PRRO. WFP has managed to support supplementary feeding activities in all of the camps as well as therapeutic feeding in Afar, where GAM rates have been most problematic. Funding shortfalls have prevented WFP from implementing school feeding in all but one, Pugnido of the Gambella camps, where the population of school-aged children substantially surpasses that of other PRRO regions. CSB+ has been dropped from the refugee food ration basket since November 2015 (but is expected to be resumed as part of the ration basket from June 2016). The next food commodity to be suspended from the GFD has been sugar, which was going into effect from March 2016 in most of the camps. Somali refugees told the ET that the absence of CSB+ eliminated porridge from their diet, a diet that is already quite boring given the few types of foods consumed.

135. At the time of the evaluation, no donor had stepped up to ensure any food commodity deliveries beyond June 2016, which is of concern to ARRA, WFP, and all stakeholders involved in the operation. WFP was hoping for another donation from the government of Saudi Arabia, which helped bail out the operation in 2015, but that did not materialize. ECHO has pledged additional support in 2016, which will allow WFP to increase the cereals basket and re-establish CSB+ in the GFD. The Assosa UNHCR office has unofficially reported that food shortages have compelled some refugees to return to Sudan in the months just preceding the ET’s visit. The current drought in Ethiopia may further strain WFP’s ability to raise sufficient resources and may increase cereal prices in markets used by refugees, although that had not occurred by March 2016.

136. Donors state that they cannot continue current funding levels indefinitely and are hard pressed to find adequate funds for the refugee programme while also disbursing emergency funding to alleviate the current drought. Livelihoods activities, which would provide a much-needed supplement to the diets and cash needs of refugee households, receive little funding from donors despite the large need and potential for impact. Refugee numbers continue to grow. The need for continued high levels of funding is motivating donors to press WFP and other agencies to seek more innovative and cost-efficient ways to deliver assistance to the refugees.

137. WFP has been proactive in searching for solutions to alleviate the problem of underfunding that plagues the programme, for instance, through the CBT pilot and by initiating biometrics to increase food distribution efficiency. WFP has experimented

\textsuperscript{75} The Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), provides predictable, multi-year assistance to millions of chronically food-insecure rural households of Ethiopia to transition from emergency aid. Source: https://www.wfp.org/content/productive-safety-net-programme-ethiopia. Hubs and Spokes is an innovative delivery system built around five storage hubs across the region and a secondary transport system that uses local companies to move supplies along “spokes” to the final distribution points. Source: http://www.wfp.org/stories/hubs-and-spokes-new-answer-ethiopias-challenges.
with purchasing food commodities locally, including fortified CSB+ and RUSF, red beans and chickpeas, salt, and maize to replace imported and more expensive pulses, but were compelled to reject both options, which were of insufficiently high quality. Another constraint facing WFP’s Local Procurement Unit is that traders speculate when they know that an agency has decided to depend on purchasing locally produced food commodities, increasing the price of that commodity. Another constraint is that some local food commodities are more expensive than imported ones; for example, locally produced maize is more expensive than wheat purchased on the international market.

**External factors**

138. Two overarching external factors affect the efficiency and effectiveness of WFP’s operation. These are funding for UNHCR’s activities that form a critical complement to food assistance, and government policy that limits the possibilities for refugees to become less reliant on external assistance.

139. **Resourcing:** The ET finds that funding constraints for other agencies, and UNHCR in particular, have a detrimental effect on WFP’s programme results. Underfunding affects not only WFP but also UNHCR operations, and underfunding by one agency affects both agencies’ abilities to adequately fulfil their mandates. UNHCR’s severe funding constraints affect its ability to deliver critical essential services in health, water, sanitation, and household items, which in turn limits the impact of WFP’s food and cash assistance on the health and nutrition status of children. This funding problem is expected to continue in the near future; the ET was informed that UNHCR is facing a global budget cut of 40 percent in 2016. External key informants also told the ET that WFP and the NGOs it supports are constrained by the time it takes for UNCHR, and ARRA, to move forward on programme innovations.

140. **Government policy:** The government has openly welcomed refugees from all the surrounding countries for many years, and balancing the needs of refugees with those of the host population can be sensitive. Yet, due to the government prohibition on formal employment for most refugees, as discussed, the majority of refugees face the conundrum of not being provided with sufficient food and CRIs to meet their needs, and not having the ability to earn enough money to cover the gaps in official assistance.

### 3. Conclusions and Recommendations

#### 3.1. Overall Assessment

141. **Relevance, Coherence and Appropriateness:** The PRRO activities are relevant to the needs of the refugees. Refugees are almost completely dependent on the food programme for their survival. Since the majority of refugees will be unable to return to their homes in neighbouring countries in the foreseeable future, the objective to enable refugees to meet minimum levels of food security remains valid. The decision to introduce cash is especially relevant as it affords a measure of choice and dignity to refugees who have few options for either. WFP has taken the lead among its partners in advancing the cash agenda. An expansion of cash programming will take place in July 2016 in all Tigray and Assosa camps, and WFP is gathering evidence and consulting with refugees to support the introduction of a full cash provision for cereals in Jijiga. WFP has worked to ensure provision of an appropriate and nutritionally complete ration to treat and reduce malnutrition in children, PLW, and other vulnerable refugees with special nutritional needs. The SF programme is operating in all camps except Gambella region and enrolment and attendance of girls and boys is high. The livelihoods programme, which is a very small component of the PRRO, is highly relevant, as most
refugees are banned from formal employment and have few options to find other means of supporting themselves and their families, and they are forced to sell part of their reduced food rations to purchase essential non-food items and preferred foods. Some livelihoods activities and outputs are consistent with their intended impact, though other activities have not been successful due to technical weaknesses. The livelihoods component needs a coordinated strategy by WFP, UNHCR and ARRA to achieve greater impact and should be greatly expanded. Expanding livelihoods programming also requires that donors increase their financial support to such. In terms of coherence, collaboration and coordination between WFP and UNHCR could be intensified in key complementary activities, such as opportunities for WFP input to UNHCR’s strategy on fuel provision, and between WFP and ARRA in warehousing.

142. **Efficiency:** Innovations in cash and food distribution modalities have increased the efficiency of WFP operations. The introduction of the biometric system has greatly increased efficiency of food distribution, and is expected to reduce fraud 10 to 20 percent. This needs to be coupled with a UNHCR, ARRA and WFP refugee census assessment in the camps to verify refugee populations. Biometric distribution centres are well laid out although narrow enclosed waiting areas could be problematic in an emergency. WFP has also incorporated measures to meet specific needs, such as adding a grinding allowance and exploring the use of alternative cereals. Donors express concern about the high, ongoing cost of the programme and see a greatly expanded livelihoods programme as a way to help reduce costs. Greater strategic coordination between WFP and UNHCR on strategic planning, advocacy, and programme prioritization would improve overall efficiency.

143. There have been minimal interruptions to BSFP and TSFP and the overall quality of commodities has been good, although at times Super Cereal has substituted for Super Cereal Plus due to purchasing constraints. Only around 40 percent of planned TSFP beneficiaries were reached in 2014 and 2015, as the use of WFH GAM rates for predicting beneficiary caseload overestimated the number of eligible beneficiaries for TSFP and where screening and admission criteria is largely based on MUAC.

144. There have been few delays in food distribution and delivery in 2015, mainly due to port congestion and transport issues. WFP has proactively explored alternative port and transport options, though issues have yet to be fully resolved. WFP-managed warehouses meet global standards. The management of camp food warehouses by ARRA varies by region, with older camps more consistently applying proper warehousing standards and new camps failing to meet basic standards for proper food storage and handling. WFP Field Monitors appear to be generally conscientious about fulfilling their duties but could engage more proactively with ARRA to improve the efficiency of warehouse management and food distribution. WFP suboffices regularly monitor the implementation of the pilot cash project through monthly live food/cash distribution monitoring, food/cash basket monitoring, market price monitoring and updates on the progress and risk factors that may affect the project. Suboffice monthly reports cover security, food security, shocks, the food distribution process, beneficiaries reached, new arrivals, and challenges. Suboffices also conduct Beneficiary Contact Monitoring, a qualitative assessment taken from a sample of 10 households in a randomly selected zone and block in a camp.

145. **Effectiveness:** WFP is well regarded by partners and donors as an effective agency. WFP delivered a full ration up to November 2015. In 2015 WFP assisted all planned feeding centres but did not reach the planned number of beneficiaries for BSFP and TSFP, which also meant that fewer female and male caregivers than planned were
reached with nutrition messages. Livelihoods support has not been as high a priority as meeting other basic needs in the camps, and has received little funding so it consists of mostly small-scale activities. Vocational training provided by many NGOs equips adults and youth with durable skills but that have little demand in local markets. Current interventions are promising but technical design should be strengthened and training options need to be diversified. There are models for agriculture-based interventions, including sharecropping, that benefit both host and refugee communities that could be explored with local authorities in other areas. The overall effectiveness of WFP food and cash relief is constrained by the inability of UNHCR to distribute or replenish CRI due to funding constraints, forcing refugees to sell food to meet basic non-food needs.

146. **Impact:** The ration reduction due to funding shortfalls has been the largest internal factor in reducing WFP’s impact. Refugees in every camp visited by the ET expressed frustration over inadequate rations and anxiety about future reductions. The cash transfer initiative has been successful in reducing the need to sell limited food rations, and refugees in the camps where cash transfers are given told the ET that they are selling less of their ration to purchase other items. Much of the available nutrition data was from the first half of 2015, so current figures on nutritional status and GAM rates were not available for the camps of most concern, including those in Gambella and Dolo Ado, thus limiting the ET’s ability to assess current impact. However, with the ration reductions in 2016, GAM rates may be adversely affected by the removal of Super Cereal from GFD. Children under-2 still have access to BSFP, but children aged two to five years in Dolo Ado camps are at risk of inadequate micronutrient consumption.

147. **Sustainability and Connectedness:** The refugee assistance programme is not meant to be sustainable, but it is long-term and will likely continue into the foreseeable future. Donors see the current high level of expenditure as unsustainable and would like to see alternative ways to support the refugee population proposed. One avenue favoured by donors is a greatly expanded livelihoods programme and an easing of government policy on employment restrictions. In all aspects of programming, WFP and UNHCR implement complementary activities that require more collaboration around joint strategic planning, advocacy and programme coordination to be most effective. It is also essential that all implementing organisations work together to understand how the different sectors can prioritise activities to reduce acute malnutrition rates. A gender

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76 Preliminary survey data for Dolo Ado for 2016 became available at the time of writing this report.

77 The CO notes that in all of Gambella and Afar, and in Dolo Ado as of May 2016, children aged 24-59 months are receiving BSFP, information provided to the ET at the time of finalising this report.
lens should be used to assess whether the activities of each sector are adequately supporting the needs of men and women, including services on IYCF and care practices.

149. Gender: WFP has worked to integrate gender considerations with the objective of improving gender equality and empowerment. Food distribution centres take the needs of PLW into account. GBV has greatly reduced in the camps. There is female representation on camp-level FDCs. WFP plans to develop a gender strategy for the PRRO, though this is not yet realised. The ET sees three main areas where gender dynamics can be improved through the design and gender strategy, including: the supply of cooking fuel; women’s representation in camp committee leadership positions; and gender balance in WFP field staff. The supply of cooking fuel is UNHCR’s responsibility, and improving gender dynamics in this area requires collaborating with UNHCR on its strategy to address the fuel issue. In addition, services for PLW should specifically consider gender issues in terms of the need to reach both men and women with nutrition behaviour change communication.

3.2. Recommendations

150. The recommendations are presented first by timeline and within that timeline, numbered according to priority. Short-term recommendations apply to the next 1-2 years and apply to the remainder of this current PRRO. Medium term recommendations apply to the design and early implementation of the next PRRO—beginning in April 2018. The target group for each recommendation is cited within the recommendation.

Operational recommendations: Short-term:

151. Reintroduce blanket supplementary feeding to Dolo Ado for children 24-59 months, until Super Cereal is reinstated as part of the general food ration. CO. Global acute malnutrition rates are high in this age group in Dolo Ado camps, as are admissions in the targeted supplementary feeding programme. It is important that children under-5 years are not placed at risk of heightened malnutrition due to removal of all access to Super Cereal.

152. Recommendation 2. Strengthen the models and approaches for sharing key infant and young child feeding messages at household and camp levels alongside health and hygiene promotion, while improving the enabling environment to increase uptake by mothers/families of improved practices. CO and field offices. Engage influential community leaders and decision-makers and fathers as well as mothers in camps and work with partners to identify the barriers that are impeding optimal childcare and feeding practices, and develop creative solutions to address them. Camps are at different stages along the spectrum of improved knowledge and practices, where some populations lack knowledge of best practices, while others have knowledge of how to improve practices, yet lack the means to make changes. Therefore, there will need to be camp-specific identification of the key barriers, alongside design of contextually and culturally appropriate responses. Proven behavioural change communication models, including mother-to-mother and father-to-father support groups and baby-friendly spaces, alongside creative ideas around community childcare/crèche provision could all be explored and expanded. The experience of NGO partners currently working in the camps can be drawn upon here, as well as experiences of UNHCR and WFP in other refugee camps and programmes. In line with recommendations 4, 5 and 10, advocacy with UNHCR to prioritise the

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Footnote: 78 The CO notes that in all of Gambella and Afar, and in Dolo Ado as of May 2016, children aged 24-59 months are receiving BSFP, information provided to the ET at the time of finalising this report.
provision of cooking fuel, and investing in types of support that reduce women’s workloads would also contribute significantly to improving infant and young child feeding practices.

153. **Recommendation 3. Promote more proactive WFP field monitor engagement with Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs to ensure that warehousing and the food distribution system are operating effectively, efficiently, and for the refugees.** CO and field offices—WFP should ensure appropriate implementation of recommendations that are systematically included in comprehensive camp and regional monthly monitoring reports completed by camp Focal Points and Field Monitors and the regional Field Monitoring team describing and check-listing specific efforts to improve the camp and regional food distribution system and camp warehousing. WFP should have access to warehouse operations at all times and should have their recommendations acted on within reasonably rapid timeframes. WFP should systematically work with ARRA to improve their warehousing capabilities, effectiveness, and efficiency in the camps.

154. All warehouses should be equipped with cement flooring, sufficient pallets, and warehouse equipment such as scales and fire extinguishers. All warehouse staff should be retrained and then monitored to implement basic commodity management protocols. Stacks cards should be used appropriately to indicate that first-in-first-out is implemented. WFP should advocate with ARRA to not constantly transfer their warehouse staff into other positions and replace them with staff with no experience. Similarly, Field Monitors need to ensure that up-to-date vouchers or coupons and signboards announce the ration basket accurately. Larger camps should ensure two general food distribution centres to reduce waiting time and the need for refugees to travel long distances to carry their commodities back to their shelters.

155. The field monitors monthly camp and regional reports should incorporate process and outcome results of the biometric project and concurrent improvements to the food distribution system as it relates to the food distribution system: e.g., women’s waiting time in shaded areas, accurate and complete information about their rations, proper scooping of food items, percent or number of refugees interviewed and rations weighed to ensure accuracy and efficiency of distributed food during post-distribution interviews. The reports should also outline how WFP institutes improved collaboration with ARRA in the field in the form of communication between primary distribution centres such as Nazareth and the Final Distribution Centres—the camp warehouses—to improve logistics efficiency. This might help eliminate waiting time to offload food commodities from the trucks to the camp warehouses.

**Medium-term:**

156. **Recommendation 4. Scale up promising and innovative livelihood activities to reach all camps and by the end of the next PRRO in 2021.** CO and field offices. WFP, UNHCR and ARRA should develop a joint five-year strategy that lays out a coherent and coordinated livelihoods approach that can be implemented on a sufficiently large enough scale to enable a significant proportion of refugee households to have access to one type of income generating activity (IGA) by 2021. As preparation for developing the strategy, WFP/UNHCR/ARRA should undertake two studies: i) an in-depth participatory assessment of current livelihood interventions and their effectiveness in enabling refugees to earn a reasonable level of income, with lessons learned from unsuccessful initiatives; and ii) an in-depth assessment of the skills, resources, opportunities and markets for host and refugee communities of each region.
Host communities and refugees should be a part of, and extensively consulted during, these assessments, along with NGO partners and potential private sector partners. The coordinated strategy should identify the respective roles of each agency, contain an agreement to add the necessary staff expertise to implement it, establish overall goals and measurement methods, and identify funding sources. The strategy should take gender and age into account when designing food distribution and livelihood activities.

157. This should be supported by development of an annual work plan by each agency to establish livelihood initiatives, annual targets, and outcome measurement methods that will allow WFP and its partners to assess the success of the overall strategy. WFP Ethiopia should add a livelihoods/income generating activity staff position in the CO to take the lead for WFP in developing the coordinated strategy, and to oversee an expanded and diversified portfolio of WFP-supported livelihood activities.

158. Although it may be impossible to fully replace food provisioning with income earning opportunities, the programme should explore a wider variety of income earning initiatives than is offered at present, in conjunction with market research to identify local and regional markets for refugee goods. WFP should work with experienced local and international NGOs to identify a more diverse array of locally appropriate and feasible income generation activities that will enable refugees to generate funds to diversify their food intake and meet other subsistence expenses. WFP should explore alternative types of vocational skills training relevant to the refugee environment that provide refugees with income earning opportunities in the near future as well as the distant future. Such an initiative would require investing in materials and capital to support IGA start-ups. In view of the fact that many refugees will not be able to return home in the near future, if at all, WFP, ARRA, UNHCR, and donors should engage in appropriate advocacy with national and local government to allow refugees to access agricultural land surrounding the camps, where available. This includes bringing all parties together at the design stage to plan livelihood activities in a collaborative manner that is beneficial to host communities and refugees, and includes local government, the community, refugees, and ARRA/WFP/UNHCR and partner NGOs. Many refugees have farming experience and could work the land in sharecropping arrangements that benefit host community households as well as refugee households.

159. **Recommendation 5. Develop a comprehensive strategy in collaboration with UNHCR to minimise the use of firewood for cooking, with the objective of reducing firewood use for cooking by December 2017 and eventually eliminating firewood use in the Ethiopia refugee camps.**

This should be done through intensified distribution of fuel-efficient or alternative energy stoves and sufficient amounts of environmentally friendly fuel as an environment mitigation effort to reduce firewood use as well as a means to improve cooking options and childcare and feeding practices. This jointly implemented strategy would begin by exploring alternatives to firewood and kerosene stoves to allow refugee families to safely cook their meals without having to sell rations to purchase cooking fuel or search for firewood. Examples of alternatives to further promote: Lutheran World Federation (LWF) is piloting biogas as an alternative fuel source in the Benishangul camps. The use of brickets, involving elephant grass and production of other types of vegetation, is another alternative. The Ethiopian Gaia Association is providing ethanol as a cooking fuel in the Jijiga camps. NGOs in Ethiopia are experimenting with solar stoves. Pilot the use of “super pots,” which have been introduced elsewhere in East Africa as a means of reducing firewood consumption; UNHCR and WFP will need to jointly co-finance this pilot. Refugees and host populations would then be trained in the proper use of the
alternative stoves and fuel. Explore the community kitchen experiment that appears to be working in the Tigray camps to determine its efficacy and replication potential in other camps. Even though community kitchens contravene Somali and South Sudanese cultural practice, a concerted effort to promote this practice within the refugee setting in conjunction with the provisioning of appropriate stoves that serve several households may offer an acceptable option to reliance on individual household firewood collection or purchases. This strategy would incorporate the provisioning of the most appropriate food commodities to minimise cooking time and educational or training sessions with women and men food preparers to reduce cooking time of food commodities distributed in the food basket. For example, food preparers should be taught that red beans soaked overnight in water require hours less cooking time than do un-soaked beans. This comprehensive strategy would include the provisioning of appropriate kitchen sets and other complementary relief items to be provided on a regular and recurrent basis.

160. **Recommendation 6. Ensure greater participation and representation of women in camp leadership positions in proportion to their population in the camps, and expand the number of female WFP field staff.** CO. When women are enabled to take up leadership positions they gain respect from other members of the community and act as role models for younger women and children, and change attitudes and beliefs about women’s capabilities among the general population. The same is true when refugees see women in WFP Field Monitor positions. Currently, WFP FMs are predominately men. Recruiting women for field positions can be difficult for a variety of reasons; WFP should experiment with a range of incentives to attract more female staff to these positions. This effort would be part of a wider gender strategy for the PRRO to be developed by the Ethiopia WFP CO.

**Strategic recommendations:** Short to Medium Term:

161. **Recommendation 7. Expand the cash transfer initiative as a principal strategy of the general food distribution component of the Refugee PRRO.** CO. WFP should also commence market assessments in all of the camps to ascertain cereal prices and the extent to which markets would support refugee purchases of preferred cereals. The market surveys would include input from refugees on their preferences for the proportions of cereal and cash in their rations. This initiative will include an assessment of the potential and advisability of introducing the cash transfer system within Dolo Ado camps where security concerns may limit the cash transfer programme to those camps situated further from the border. The programme should also introduce cash vouchers to pay for milling costs, based on the cost per Kg in the camps, so that refugees are not forced to sell more of their rations or use their cash transfer to mill their cereals.

162. **Recommendation 8. The concerted and coordinated effort of WFP in collaboration with all actors in the camps experiencing high global acute malnutrition rates (Gambella, Dolo Ado and Afar camps) should be strengthened to develop a comprehensive understanding of the drivers of under-nutrition in each camp and develop a multi-sector approach to address them.** WFP CO, in collaboration with UNHCR and ARRA —It seems clear that the consistently high global acute malnutrition (GAM) rates in camps result from a variety of factors, since they have remained high despite provision of full rations and supplementary food. In particular, the scarcity of core relief items means refugees have to sell food to purchase other items in the context of limited livelihood opportunities. However, there is a lack of a clear and consistent narrative or understanding of the reasons for high rates of acute malnutrition in the camps. It is essential that
Implementing organisations of all sectors (WASH, health, nutrition, livelihoods) work together to understand how the different sectors can prioritise activities to support an assault on acute malnutrition rates. A gender lens should be used to assess whether the activities of each sector are adequately supporting the needs of men and women, including the provision (or absence) of services on infant and young child feeding and care practices. The Gambella model of combined outreach strategies and the use of consistent messages across health, hygiene and sanitation sectors is a good example of agencies and sectors working together, as well as an efficient mechanism to capitalise on limited resources in the face of current funding shortfalls. The Nutrition Causal Analysis in Dolo Ado will provide a narrative for those camps and a tool for WFP to use in advocacy and prioritisation of activities across sectors.

163. Other ways in which agencies can work more closely together to achieve improved nutrition outcomes should also be explored, especially through initiatives to address energy needs, access to complementary relief items and consideration of livelihood options that enable families to benefit without destabilising their ability to feed and care for their children, especially those under five years of age.

164. **Recommendation 9. Increase provision of WFP nutrition expertise for the refugee programme—to provide strategic as well technical support.** CO (in consultation with sub-offices) and RB. Enhanced technical support is required to strengthen and monitor sites where there is no NGO nutritional expertise managing the programme, such as in Assayita camp, Afar. Strategic expertise is required to improve ongoing analysis of programme data and nutrition survey results, using this information to inform programme adaptations and decision-making around implementation of nutrition programming as well as general food distribution ration composition and proposed ration cuts. Considering its commitment to, and investment in, nutrition programming, WFP should ensure it plays a central role in strategic nutrition discussions alongside UNHCR, ARRA and nutrition implementing partners, at country level and at camp level, and seek to influence them where necessary. A nutrition post focused exclusively on the refugee PRRO would be justified in consideration of the large caseload, the consistently high GAM rates in many camps and the protracted context necessitating innovative solutions moving forward. This would substantiate WFP’s role as a lead nutrition agency for the refugee situation. Nutrition expertise deployed to the regions with high GAM rates (Gambella, Dolo Ado and Afar) should also be considered.

165. **Recommendation 10. In the spirit of programme efficiency and effectiveness, WFP and UNHCR should increase formal collaboration on strategic planning, advocacy, and programme prioritisation.** CO Senior Management. WFP and UNHCR should strategically collaborate to undertake joint appeals. WFP should also contribute to UNHCR strategic planning exercises and vice versa. It is clear that the high GAM rates in some of the camps have several interrelated causes touching each agency’s major mandates, so increased collaboration on prioritising programming strategy would be appropriate. Joint appeals should emphasise that the full food ration is critical to the health and well-being of refugee households, but alone is not sufficient to reduce GAM rates, and that other complementary relief items and livelihood opportunities need to be provided. This is overarching and relevant to several recommendations outlined above.
Annexes

Annex 1: Additional discussion and analysis

Annex 1a: Livelihoods programme

Discussion of opportunities for growth and challenges: (continued discussion from Section 2.2 of report) Due to the large number of refugees in Ethiopia and the challenge to WFP, UNHCR and ARRA in meeting basic needs for food, shelter, health facilities and other necessities, livelihoods development has not been as high a priority. The ET finds that current livelihoods programmes are promising and there are experienced NGOs available that are in a position to support innovative IGA projects. Women receive training in skills such as tailoring and hairdressing, which are appropriate, as they are in demand, portable, and can be coordinated with women’s household and childcare responsibilities. Many youth receive vocational training that equips them with durable skills in carpentry, welding, construction and tailoring, but employment opportunities are limited. Livelihood opportunities vary by region but baseline data show that refugees are engaged in self-generated IGAs in all regions.

Geographic coverage of livelihoods support was limited to five camps in four regions in 2014-2015. The local implementing partner, Organisation for Sustainable Development (OSD) used demonstration sites to train over 190 households in vegetable production and reports that some participants are now selling vegetables. OSD stated that it is possible to expand vegetable production to the entire camp, and that ARRA is supportive and the land is available, though OSD did not know if future funding would be available from WFP. The ET observed a number of small vegetable gardens and fruit trees around houses in the camp that could provide a small supplement to the household diet. OSD has also assisted 60 entrepreneurs to set up businesses and form savings groups. One business is donkey cart transport, where OSD provided two donkey carts for 210 IGA participants to manage as a group.

Under PRRO 200365, WFP used other direct operating costs (ODOC) money to assist 6,146 refugees through an integrated livelihood and environmental protection initiative in Afar, Somali, and Benishangul regions. Activities included reforestation, water harvesting, fuel-efficient stoves, bee keeping, cattle fattening, poultry, vegetable gardening, and provision of a grinding mill, though no outcome data is provided. NGO partners provided training on business skills and group formation and start-up materials including the provision of vegetable seeds and technical advice on vegetable gardening, and provision of donkey carts to support commercial activities. Participants were given financial support to purchase inputs and to start businesses. In 2012-2013, WFP also supported livelihood and environmental rehabilitation projects in camps in three camps–Awbarre (Dolo Ado region), Sheder and Kebri Beyah (Jijiga region) including bee keeping, animal fattening, soil and water conservation, and water harvesting with Save the Environment Ethiopia (SEE), a local NGO. The project was designed to benefit over 650 vulnerable households in refugee and host communities equally, and according to project reports was

80 WFP Ethiopia, SPR 2014.
81 WFP Ethiopia, SPR 2015.
successful in creating an income stream and environmental benefits for participants and local communities, though no outcome data is available.

UNHCR representatives in camps and regions throughout Ethiopia admitted to the ET that the budget for livelihood activities was far below what is needed. Sixty percent of the livelihoods budget in the Gambella camps for example, was expended on grinding mills, even though the number and effectiveness of grinding mills is inadequate. Half of the UNHCR partner NGOs operating in the Gambella refugee camps were compelled to close down operations during 2015. UNHCR representatives in Jijiga similarly noted that most NGO partners, lacking sufficient financial support for their activities, have pulled out of Kebebejah and other camps. The ET finds that, currently, the nature of training given and the number of refugees assisted to undertake IGAs, as a proportion of the refugee population, is too low to have an impact.

Livelihoods programming on a large enough scale to have an impact on refugee incomes requires a focused strategy and a long-term investment. To date, funding for IGAs from any source has not been large enough to support training and technical assistance programme that can offer a broad range of skill training and market support to a large section of the camp population. In FGD with the ET, refugees expressed a strong desire for support to enable them to establish IGA and to become less dependent on external assistance, and a strong willingness to work.

While livelihoods assistance from humanitarian agencies is limited, enterprising refugees have established small businesses, often without external assistance. Some refugees try to mitigate their food insecurity with IGAs, including small-scale agricultural production, homestead gardening, day labour opportunities, and some livestock production. Indeed, Somali refugees in the Jijiga camps described seeking daily labour as maids or washerwomen for local households (only women) or as porters (both sexes) or construction workers (normally men) outside and within the camp. Other women found jobs sewing. Women in the western camps sometimes gather and sell firewood. Twenty percent of refugees are engaged in at least one type of business and another 10 percent have invested in productive assets such as livestock or donkey carts, see Table 7.

Table 7: Percent distribution by type of IGA and location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Eritrean-Tigray</th>
<th>Eritrean- Afar</th>
<th>Somali Dolo Ado</th>
<th>Somali-Jijiga</th>
<th>S.Sudanese-Gambella</th>
<th>Sudanese-Assosa</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Running small shop/Suk</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty trade- selling food</td>
<td>13.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>7.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petty trade-selling non food</td>
<td>8.1</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Growing vegetables/fruit</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rearing livestock</td>
<td>10.8</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Running restaurant</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>23.8</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fattening small animal</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poultry</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Running Cinema</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

83 WFP Ethiopia, CHS 2015.
Table 7: Percent distribution by type of IGA and location

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Business</th>
<th>Eritrean-Tigray</th>
<th>Eritrean-Afar</th>
<th>Somali Dolo Ado</th>
<th>Somali-Jijiga</th>
<th>S.Sudanese-Gambella</th>
<th>Sudanese-Assosa</th>
<th>All</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>House</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailor</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Construction works</td>
<td>29.7</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>10.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation services/carts</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other IGAs</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>52.9</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>27.3</td>
<td>39.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: WFP Ethiopia. CHS 2015.

The ET also observed refugee entrepreneurs outside food distribution sites with donkey carts for hire to transport food commodities into the camps or to town. Women set up temporary teashops outside the centres on food distribution days. The nature and extent of employment available to refugees varies by region. The main source of income for 24.8 percent and 33.3 percent of men in Tigray and Jijiga, respectively, is casual labour. Over one-quarter (27.3 percent) of refugees in Afar region report income from casual labour; for example, men in Assayita camp told the ET that they are able to obtain casual labour in construction or at a nearby sugar cane processing plant for 40 Birr per day, though not consistently. Opportunities for casual labour and IGAs are much more limited in Assosa and Gambella. Most unskilled employment in the Gambella camps, such as working as a security guard, is provided by NGOs, and is highly dependent on the NGOs’ ability to obtain continued funding. Any downturn in funding can affect dozens of refugee families. The ET observed also that many refugee households have small livestock in camps, primarily goats and sheep, to provide food and a source of income. The resourceful nature of many refugees provides a sound basis on which to significantly broaden the existing options for training and technical assistance.

Some of the challenges and opportunities that would need to be considered with an expanded programme includes the need for a market strategy with vocational trainings, access to agricultural land, and the potential for collaborations with the host community:

**Vocational training:** UNHCR partners offer some vocational training, including tailoring, cooking, or hairdressing in all of the camps. Other refugees have received vocational training as electricians, carpenters, plumbers, and welders. Refugees in all of the camps visited by the ET expressed appreciation for the training but agreed that (1) participation in the training was limited to far too few women, men and youth; and (2) the training had little value in terms of employment opportunities for the present or near future in the camps, but hopefully would prove valuable in the future, upon their return to their countries.

The range of IGAs for which training is offered is narrow and can create an oversupply within the highly limited market of the refugee camps that dilutes the income-generating possibilities for the individual refugee. For example, in Melkadida camp in Dolo Ado, Partnership for Pastoralist Development Association, a local NGO, has trained 25 groups of male and female refugees in hair dressing activities. While support for such long-term skills is valuable, it is not clear if the training of large numbers of hairdressers was undertaken based on an assessment of the market capacity to support a certain number of hairdressers at a minimal level of income in the camp. Another NGO in Dolo Ado, World Vision, acknowledged they will stop training tailors because the local

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84 WFP Ethiopia. CHS 2015.
85 WFP Ethiopia. CHS 2015.
market is saturated, but plans to introduce hair dressing. Also in Dolo Ado, UNHCR and its programme partners, World Vision, NRC, and DRC, are implementing several small, unconnected activities; as yet another example, after having been trained in carpentry and welding in Dolo Ado, the 15 trained refugees could find no employment opportunities. ARRA/UNHCR contracted a local construction firm to build shelters for refugees in the Dolo Ado camps, but bypassed refugee labour, despite the training. Youth, among others, who receive vocational training also face a shortage of start-up kits, materials and capital as well. Dolo Ado women told the team that they could make mats and kofias if the material were available.

Livelihood opportunities and activities are also promoted by UNHCR partners and vary substantially by region and camp. The ET heard some of the challenges to these activities implemented in past years. The longstanding camps in Tigray and Jijiga have provided more extensive income earning options to refugees than have the more recently established camps in Gambella and Dolo Ado, where the vast majority of refugees currently reside. A relatively larger proportion of refugees have received some form of entrepreneur training in the older Jijiga camps for example, and a few refugees have attempted to initiate IGAs such as poultry production (24 refugees in Awbarre, Jijiga), beekeeping, goats for milking, or even cattle fattening, although five of the 14 refugees trained in cattle fattening, lacking animal feed, were forced to sell the cattle.

UNHCR representatives and their partners in the Benishangul and Gambella camps expressed frustration that despite relative water availability in camps in western Ethiopia, financial constraints blocked drip irrigation development of backyard gardening opportunities. Lutheran World Federation (LWF) has provided refugees with training on this technology in the Jijiga camps but Dolo Ado and Jijiga refugee households complained of the lack of sufficient water or land to pursue this option. In addition to backyard gardens, a few Sudanese refugees in the Benishangul camps have been able to participate in fishpond production activities. NGO partners working in the Bambasi camp expressed frustration that despite sufficient water to support agricultural production activities, even on a small scale, they lack resources to support agricultural activities with seeds or training.

Access to land: Models exist for agriculture-based livelihoods activities that benefit both the host community and the refugees. The ET heard of instances of refugees engaging in sharecropping arrangements in Tigray, Benishangul, and Dolo Ado, which benefit both communities. One such model is in Melkadida camp in Dolo Ado. Melkadida residents from the Baidoa area in Somalia are farmers. Community elders informed the ET that a few refugee families have arranged with local communities to work as sharecroppers. The host communities provide the land, refugees must provide the inputs, including seed, and labour. The host community and refugees divide the harvest in half. The UNHCR Field Office in Melkadida told the ET that the possibility of expanding this type of livelihood support has been discussed with ARRA and the regional government authorities, and the local government is willing to allocate land. Details of the modalities are under discussion between ARRA, UNHCR and the regional government authorities. The IKEA foundation is funding a collaboration with UNHCR, local government, and NGOs for sharecropping by refugees on up to 1,000 hectares of land around each of the five camps in Dolo Ado. The project is being phased in gradually, with clear criteria for refugee sharecroppers, host community farmers, crop selection and markets. Another 120 Dolo Ado refugee households are cultivating some maize, onions, and tomatoes using an irrigation canal, an initiative benefitting refugees, who essentially provide labour, and host communities, whose land the canal traverses. UNHCR representatives
in Dolo Ado told the team that poor markets surrounding the camps limit livelihood opportunities for refugees. At Bambasi camp in Benishangul, refugees pay host communities 500 ETB to cultivate 16 square metres of land.

Sharecropping arrangements might prove possible in other camp and regional contexts, but requires extensive discussion between refugees, refugee authorities, and host community kebeles. Refugees, who may have farming experience – particularly some of the South Sudanese and Somalis – are restricted from pursuing agricultural production opportunities in all Ethiopian refugee contexts outside of Tigray because of the de-facto policy of limiting refugee access to land. Getting access to scarce agricultural land is a challenge, and cooperative arrangements will need close and coordinated management, but such models demonstrate that there is potential for farming activities for refugee households.

Some refugees in Dolo Ado, Afar, and Benishangul camps graze sheep and goats, which sometimes creates tensions with local communities. Very few Somali refugees participate in this activity, which requires land that may infringe on host communities. The camps have established Conflict Resolution Committees to manage grazing disputes.

In areas where there are land constraints, WFP/UNHCR/ARRA and their partner NGOs could potentially adopt initiatives from other refugee programmes. For example, there are pilot initiatives by UNHCR in refugee camps in Kenya and Sudan where refugees are provided with training, materials and technical assistance to form cooperatives to produce soap and sanitary materials.

Collaboration with host community: In addition to the importance of coordinating with host communities over access to land activities that jointly engage refugees and host communities are the most promising, even if they are implemented on a very small scale. The approach of involving the host community in IGA opportunities is being tried in the Tigray camps, where one NGO is constructing a market of the use of the host community and refugees. The NGO is also exploring the possibility of host community members and refugees setting up joint businesses.

Annex 1b: Selling of rations for core relief items and milling costs

CRI: (continued discussion from Section 2.2 of report) It has been established in this report that refugee households must sell a substantial portion of their food rations to purchase other items, including firewood for cooking, to meet their basic needs. Refugee households living in protracted camps must also purchase other non-food items, despite the UNHCR programme mandate to provide such items as soap, clothing, shoes, sanitary pads, sleeping mats, blankets, mosquito nets, kitchen utensils, pots and pans, cooking stoves, housing materials, and Jerry cans. Dolo Ado women describe to the team their need to share cooking items and utensils for eating with their neighbours because families didn’t have sufficient amounts for themselves. Soap and women’s sanitary kits have been very erratically and irregularly distributed; One UNHCR representative in Dolo Ado confirmed that agency’s inability to supply soap to the refugees for the six months prior to the ET’s visit. Women’s sanitary pads were also in short supply. Refugees in the Benishangul and Gambella camps hadn’t received sanitary pads for up to six months.

Budget constraints have rendered CRI in short supply in all of the camps. CRI replenishment either does not occur or occurs infrequently and haphazardly,
depending on the CRI and the camp context. This is despite the existence of UNHCR standards stipulating CRI redistribution or replenishment within specific timeframes, depending on the CRI in question. For example, UNHCR has developed a standard to replenish kitchen sets every three years but has been unable to fulfil this basic standard.

“We fight for the box material from the distributions to use for mats to allow us to sleep on something instead of the dirt floors.” – Woman refugee in Bur Amino, Dolo Ado

UNHCR KII stated to the ET that budget constraints had severely dampened their ability to systematically distribute or replenish CRIs. Refugee households therefore must frequently replenish their CRI supplies and purchase other basic needs by selling some of their rations, increasing their food insecurity. UNHCR is also responsible for cooking fuel disbursement to refugees in Ethiopia, sometimes in the form of kerosene, but have been unable to fulfil this mandate as well. Kerosene distribution has fallen off precipitously. GAM rates are unlikely to decline until complementary services are systematically provided to refugee families.

**Milling:** Grinding mills in the camps do not sufficiently meet the needs of refugees; there are normally only one or two per camp. In Jewi camp, Gambella, where three exist, only two were operational during the ET’s visit. Milling the cereal rations—normally wheat or sorghum—has proven to be problematic for refugees and the programme. Within the refugee programme, WFP decided in 2007, in consultation with ARRA and UNHCR, to compensate refugees for milling costs by providing an additional two and a half Kg (a bit less than 20 percent increase from 13.5 kg) of cereals.

Although the value of two and a half Kg of cereals adequately covers milling costs, refugees in the camps must first sell a portion of their rations to have cash in their pockets to pay for this service. The ET also noticed substantial amounts of cereals on the floor of the grinding mill stations, indicating inefficiencies in the operation. Encountering the challenge of finding spare parts for the milling machines, DRC is considering outsourcing milling to private non-refugee contractors. NRC and DRC told the ET that maintaining the grinding machines, which are old models, is quite challenging.

It would be more preferable to institute a voucher system – vouchers should reflect the real milling costs – so that refugee families are not compelled to sell their rations for this service. Refugees must sell their rations at unfavourable terms of trade, especially for sorghum sales but also for wheat. In addition, refugees must struggle to haul the cereals to the milling station, which may require another cash outlay. Refugees in the Gambella camps sometimes haul their cereal rations outside of camp in search of grinding options.

**Annex 1c: Internal factors affecting results**

**Logistics:** (continued discussion from Section 2.3 of report) The trucking operations face competition for the finite trucking fleets from the fertiliser pipeline, particularly during the major *Meher* agriculture season from March to June. The trucks normally can capacitate forty MT or less of food commodities. The logistics trucking operation depends on contracts with Ethiopian trucking firms for most of refugee food commodity transport needs; the contracts invariably range from six...
months to one year. Some of these trucking firms sub-contract out the trucking operation to smaller firms, rendering it more difficult for WFP to control logistic efficiencies. For example, during the month directly preceding the visit by the ET, several trucks moving under the auspices of a trucking firm sub-contracted to the trucking firm directly contracted by WFP to undertake this shipment arrived in the Benishangul camp warehouses six days after commencing their journey from the Nazareth primary warehouses; the route from Nazareth should only require three days.

The use of sub-contracting firms perhaps explains why ARRA warehouse managers are only aware of truck arrivals at the camps ready to offload food commodities into the warehouses when the trucks actually arrive. This points to a need to improve timely communication about dispatch and delivery arrivals between the primary and FDPs, for example from the regional warehouse in Nazareth (Adama) to the camp warehouses in Dolo Ado, Gambella, and Assosa. It is also necessary to pre-position food commodities in the camps, or at least in some of the camps.

Another reason to pre-position an extra month or two of extra consignments of food commodities when necessary relates to the condition of some of the access roads. The access road, including one bridge, leading into Bambasi camp in Benishangul for example is of extremely poor quality; access to the camp will prove highly problematic during the rainy season. This road clearly requires upgrading and has not been maintained since 2012, according to camp officials. Access road maintenance is a UNHCR mandate.

Field Monitoring (continued discussion from Section 2.3 of report)
Warehousing quality varies from camp to camp and region to region, an issue that is connected to the capacity and role of WFP Field Monitors. WFP Field Monitors apparently assist ARRA with physical verification counts following each GFD. The older camps in Tigray and Jijiga appear to be more consistently applying proper warehousing standards than those of Gambella, Dolo Ado, or especially, Afar. Field Monitors clearly need to be more proactive in inspecting the warehouses and insisting on the application of proper warehousing and commodity management protocols. WFP regional officers noted that field monitors are sometimes required to oversee operations in different programs, such as the Drought Relief Feeding Programme, or PSNP activities, which affects their ability to comprehensively monitor the GFD and other Refugee Programme activities. The Dolo Ado team for example, was operating with six field monitors at the time of the ET visit, but needed eight staff, as required by the large number of FDPs, the population served by WFP operations, and the tonnage of food programmed.

Field monitors generally receive a good grade for undertaking their monitoring duties. They conscientiously participate in GFD pre-distribution and post-distribution meetings, a good practice in most sites. Field Monitors normally randomly post-monitor food rations collected by refugees during the GFD, using salter scales to randomly weigh rations leaving the GFD. Field Monitors are also tasked to measure the scooping materials fabricated and provided by UNHCR to scoop out rations to refugee families. Some scooping utensils provided by UNHCR and stored in the warehouses appeared to be overused, worn out, and in need in replenishment. UNHCR regularly recalibrates the scoops and WFP Field Monitors occasionally monitor the scoops to ensure the proper measurement of rations by commodity. The FM workload does not appear to be overwhelming. One field
monitor told the team that he normally is in the camp for the GFD, which occurs for one week of the month, during the morning and is back in the regional centre by early afternoon. The ET would like to see more proactive engagement to improve warehouse and food distribution operations as well as provide advice to partners on other aspects of the overall programme.
Annex 2: Terms of Reference (TOR)

Office Of Evaluation
Measuring Results, Sharing Lessons

[Final, 22st September 2015]

TERMS OF REFERENCE
OPERATION EVALUATION

ETHIOPIA PROTRACTED RELIEF AND RECOVERY (PRRO 200700) 2015-2018

FOOD ASSISTANCE FOR ERITREAN, SOUTH SUDANESE, SUDANESE AND SOMALI REFUGEES

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Annex 1: Map – Refugees camps/sites in Ethiopia, October 2012... Error! Bookmark not defined.

Annex 1: Map – Refugees camps/sites in Ethiopia, May 2014 ... Error! Bookmark not defined.
Acronyms.................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
Introduction

1. These Terms of Reference (TOR) are for the evaluation of Ethiopia PRRO 200700, Food Assistance to Eritrean, South Sudanese, Sudanese and Somali Refugees. This evaluation is commissioned by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV) and commence in July 2015 with preparation and conclude in June 2016 with circulation of the evaluation report. In line with WFP’s outsourced approach for Operation Evaluations (OpEv), the evaluation will be managed and conducted by an external evaluation company amongst those having a long-term agreement with WFP for operations evaluations.

2. These TOR were prepared by the OEV focal point based on an initial document review and consultation with stakeholders and following a standard template. The purpose of the TOR is twofold: 1) to provide key information to the company selected for the evaluation and to guide the company’s evaluation manager and team throughout the evaluation process; and 2) to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation.

3. The TOR were finalised based on comments received on the draft version. The evaluation shall be conducted in conformity with the TOR.

Reasons for the Evaluation

Rationale

4. In the context of renewed corporate emphasis on providing evidence and accountability for results, WFP has committed to increase evaluation coverage of operations and mandated OEV to commission a series of Operation Evaluations in 2013 -2016.

5. Operations to be evaluated are selected based on utility and risk criteria. From a shortlist of operations meeting these criteria prepared by OEV, the Regional Bureau (RB) has selected, in consultation with the Country Office (CO), the Ethiopia PRRO 200700 for an independent evaluation. In particular, the evaluation has been timed to ensure that findings can feed into immediate decisions on programme implementation of the recently initiated PRRO and any future design decisions.

Objectives

6. This evaluation serves the dual and mutually reinforcing objectives of accountability and learning, with the main focus being on learning:
   - **Accountability** – The evaluation will assess and report on the performance and results of the current operation. A management response to the evaluation recommendations will be prepared.
   - **Learning** – Also looking into the previous operation’s results [PRRO 200365], the evaluation will determine the reasons why certain results occurred or not to draw lessons, derive good practices and pointers for learning. It will provide evidence-based findings to inform operational and strategic decision-making. Noting the PRRO is in its early stage of

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86 The utility criteria looked both at the timeliness of the evaluation given the operation’s cycle and the coverage of recent/planned evaluations. The risk criteria was based on a classification and risk ranking of WFP COs taking into consideration a wide range of risk factors, including operational and external factors as well as COs’ internal control self-assessments.
implementation, the evaluation will provide information that is useful for immediate implementation decisions. The evaluation findings will be actively disseminated and lessons will be incorporated into relevant lesson sharing systems.

**Stakeholders and Users**

7. **Stakeholders.** A number of stakeholders both inside and outside of WFP have interests in the results of the evaluation and many of these will be asked to play a role in the evaluation process. Table one below provides a preliminary stakeholders’ analysis, which will be deepened by the evaluation team in the inception package in order to acknowledge the existence of various groups (women, men, boys and girls) that are affected by the evaluation in different ways and to determine their level of participation. During the field mission, the validation process of evaluation findings should include all groups.

**Table 1: Preliminary stakeholders’ analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stakeholders</th>
<th>Interest in the evaluation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country Office (CO)</td>
<td>Responsible for the country level planning and operations implementation, the CO is the primary stakeholder of this evaluation. It has a direct stake in the evaluation and an interest in learning from experience to inform decision-making. It is also called upon to account internally as well as to its beneficiaries, partners for the performance and results of its operation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Bureau (RB) [Nairobi]</td>
<td>Responsible for both oversight of COs and technical guidance and support, the RB management has an interest in an independent account of the operational performance as well as in learning from the evaluation findings to apply this learning to other country offices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office of Evaluation (OEV)</td>
<td>OEV is responsible for commissioning OpEvs over 2013-2016. As these evaluations follow a new outsourced approach, OEV has a stake in ensuring that this approach is effective in delivering quality, useful and credible evaluations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WFP Executive Board (EB)</td>
<td>The WFP governing body has an interest in being informed about the effectiveness of WFP operations. This evaluation will not be presented to the EB but its findings will feed into an annual synthesis of all OpEvs, which will be presented to the EB at its November session.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EXTERNAL STAKEHOLDERS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beneficiaries</td>
<td>As the ultimate recipients of food assistance, beneficiaries have a stake in WFP determining whether its assistance is appropriate and effective. As such, the level of participation in the evaluation of women, men, boys and girls from different groups will be determined and their respective perspectives will be sought.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government</td>
<td>The Government has a direct interest in knowing whether WFP activities in supporting the refugees in Ethiopia are aligned with its own priorities as far as assistance to refugees, harmonised with the action of other partners and meet the expected results. The Government’s Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs (ARRA) is a key partner in the design and implementation of WFP activities;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN Country team</td>
<td>The UNCT’s harmonized action should contribute to the realisation of the government objectives in relation to the support of the refugees. It has therefore an interest in ensuring that WFP operation is effective in contributing to the UN concerted efforts. WFP most notably works closely with the United Nations High commissioner for refugees (UNHCR) in the design and implementation of the activities, as well as joint assessments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>International and National NGOs are WFP’s partners for the implementation of some activities while at the same time having their own interventions. Because the results of the evaluation might affect future implementation modalities, strategic orientations and partnerships, these NGOs have an interest in the results.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Civil society (including gender-focused)  
There may be other Civil society organisations/groups who may not be direct WFP partners, but are working within the same context in support of refugees in Ethiopia, and have an interest in areas related to WFP interventions (food security, nutrition, education, protection and environment). While majority of the CSOs\(^\text{87}\) work with the Ethiopian population, their experience and knowledge can inform the evaluation especially if any of them also have activities targeting the refugees, or working within the host communities where issues of gender (related to for example risks of gender-based violence) and environment are of mutual interest. Some of the CSOs are working on gender related issues, which may be of particular interest to this evaluation.

Donors  
WFP operations are voluntarily funded by a number of donors. They have an interest in knowing whether their funds have been spent efficiently and if WFP’s work has been effective and contributed to their own strategies and programmes.

8. **Users.** The primary users of this evaluation will be:

- The CO and its partners in decision-making related notably to programme implementation and/or design, country strategy and partnerships.
- Given RB’s core functions the RB is expected to use the evaluation findings to provide strategic guidance, programme support and oversight,
- OEV will use the evaluation findings to feed into an annual synthesis of all OpEv$s$ and will reflect upon the evaluation process to refine its OpEv approach, as required.
- The refugees specific country team\(^\text{88}\) may find the results of this evaluation useful in future review of the progress made in achieving results for refugees

**Subject of the Evaluation**

9. In the last decade, Ethiopia has achieved strong economic growth, making it one of the highest performing economies in sub-Saharan Africa. Yet it remains one of the world’s least developed countries, ranked 173 out of 187 in the 2014 Human Development report, categorised as alarming in the Global Hunger Index and having about 29.6 per cent of its 94 million people living below the national poverty line. In addition, due to its geographical location and geopolitical developments, Ethiopia has been hosting refugees escaping conflict and insecurity from neighbouring countries for several decades. Between January and August 2014, Ethiopia received up to 200,000 refugees from South Sudan, mostly women and children. According to UNHCR, there were up to 659,524 refugees in Ethiopia as of July 2015\(^\text{89}\), accommodated in 23 refugee camps around the country. Provisions for refugees’ local integration are very limited. While the country maintains reservations to the 1951 Refugee Convention, notably regarding refugees’ employment, it supports an out-of-camp scheme that allows refugees to live outside camps and engage in informal livelihood opportunities. Even so, access to farmland and income-generating opportunities outside the camps are limited, which makes refugees almost totally dependent on general food assistance, in addition to other basic services provided within the camps – water, sanitation, health and education.


\(^{88}\) This is specific team that addresses the refugees’ issues in Ethiopia. See PRRO 200365 2014 SPR under partnerships section

10. WFP has been providing assistance to refugees in Ethiopia for many years. Through the PRRO 200365 (April 2012 March 2015), WFP supported up to 593,500 refugees\(^9\). The PRRO 200700 is a continuation of this support, targeting about 650,000 refugees, with some adjustments in the design and implementation arrangements based on reviews and other evaluative work carried out jointly with the Government and other partners. The PRRO has four objectives namely; 1) enable refugees to meet minimum levels of food security; 2) treat and reduce acute malnutrition in children, pregnant and lactating women and other vulnerable groups with special nutrition needs; 3) stabilise school enrolment of refugees girls and boys in WFP-assisted schools; and 4) increase livelihood and environmental opportunities for refugees and host communities in fragile transitions. This operation is aligned to WFP global strategic plan (2014-2017), strategic objectives 1 and 2.\(^1\)

11. The project documents\(^2\) including the project logframes, related amendments (Budget revisions) and the latest funding situation are available on wfp.org\(^3\). Noting that these TOR are prepared at an early stage of the operation of PRRO, it can be expected that there may be further amendments to the PRRO, which will have to be incorporated during the inception phase. The key characteristics of the PRRO 200700 are outlined in table two below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2: Key characteristics of the operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>OPERATION</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Approval</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The operation was approved by Executive Board in November 2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amendments</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>There have been one amendments/budget revisions to the original document. First budget revision was approved in January 2015. This was because the document that was cleared for submission to the executive board had based budget calculations on projected number of refugees at 840,000. A decision was made to use current number of refugees (650,000) instead of projected number. However, to allow the CO submit the documents on time for the November EB it was decided to proceed with the existing LTSH rate (calculated based on 840,000 beneficiaries) for later revision following the formal approval of the project. This revision reduced the food requirements by 20%, thus impacting the fixed costs per metric tonne both at port and transhipment points by $5.59/mt and increasing transport rate by $1.47/mt. This increased the total PRRO by $4,039,034 (0.8%)(^4), Second budget revision was approved in July 2015 to include the costs of implementing biometrics (fingerprint) ID checks during the general distribution in all 23 refugee camps. The overall PRRO budget increased by $5,670,548 (1.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Duration</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial: 3 years (April 2015-March 2018)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Planned beneficiaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initial: 650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised: N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^9\) The last reported total number of beneficiaries in SPR 2014 for PRRO 200365
\(^1\) Strategic objective 1: Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies; Strategic objective 2: Support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies.
\(^2\) Both PRRO 200365 and PRRO 200700
\(^3\) From WFP.org – Countries – Ethiopia – Operations
\(^4\) The reason this revision was done even though the operation had not commenced is due to the time lag between submission of documents for EB discussions and the EB session. The original PRRO document reflects 650,000 beneficiaries with the budget based on 840,000 beneficiaries. BR 1 thus only revised the budget but not the beneficiaries
Planned food requirements

Initial:
In-kind food: 534,063 mt of food commodities
Cash-based Transfers: 11,600,440 US$ million

Revised:
In-kind food: N/A
Cash-based Transfers: N/A

US$ requirements
Initial: 478,900,152
Revised: 488,609,733

OBJECTIVES, OUTCOMES AND ACTIVITIES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Objective 1</th>
<th>Objective 1: Enable refugees to meet minimum levels of food security</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 1:</td>
<td>Stabilized or improved food consumption over assistance period for targeted households and/or individuals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Objective 2</th>
<th>Objective 2: treat and reduce acute malnutrition in children, pregnant and lactating women (PLW) and other vulnerable refugees with special nutritional needs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective 3:</td>
<td>Stabilized or reduced undernutrition among children aged 6–59 months and pregnant and lactating women</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategic Objective 3</th>
<th>Objective 3: stabilize school enrolment of refugee girls and boys in WFP-assisted schools</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective 4:</td>
<td>Increase livelihood and environmental opportunities for refugees and host communities in fragile transition situations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outcome 3:</td>
<td>Improved access to assets and/or basic services, including community and market infrastructure</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Partnerships: Food assistance interventions coordinated and partnerships developed and maintained

Government
Administration for Refugees and Returnees Affairs (ARRA)

United Nations
UNHCR;

NGOs
Action against hunger; GOAL; International Medical Corps; MSF; Save the children; International rescue committee; CONCER, NRC

RESOURCES (INPUTS)

Contribution received By: July 16th, 2015
$104,805,488

% against appeal: 22%

Top 5 donors
USA – 43%
Saudi Arabia – 31%
EU commission - 5%
Japan – 5%
UK – 3%

Figure 1: % funded of total requirements

Figure 2: Top five donors

PLANNED OUTPUTS (at design)

Figure 3: Planned % of beneficiaries by activity

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95 The PRRO 200700 plans to replace 6 kilograms of cereals (about 37%) with cash in selected camps
96 In camps where GAM exceeds 15 percent
97 These are activities implemented by other partners, and supported by WFP. See PRRO 200700 document page 8, para 28
98 This is up to 195% of the requirements for the elapsed period of 4 months, if total funded $104,805,488 is equally distributed over the 4 months
All the 650,000 beneficiaries are targeted for general distribution (Cash or food). In addition up to 45% of these are targeted with supplementary assistance based on needs. Beneficiaries are counted once thus these figures should not be added to GFD. This figure 3 shows beneficiaries targeted for additional assistance by category.
Evaluation Approach

Scope

12. **Scope.** The evaluation will cover the activities during the final year of implementation of the predecessor PRRO 200365 and all activities and processes related to formulation, implementation, resourcing, monitoring, evaluation and reporting of the PRRO 200700, relevant to answer the evaluation questions. As such, this evaluation will cover two years, comprising the transition period (January 2014 to March 2015) and the period from the beginning of the operation until the start of the evaluation (April 2015-March 2016).

13. The inclusion of the transition period between the two PRROs is critical for three reasons: a) the PRRO 200700 was designed at a time when the refugees situation was worsening due to the situation in South Sudan (see Annex 1 and 2); b) the current PRRO is designed based on lessons learnt from a number of evaluative processes that were started and/or completed around the transition date between the two PRROs; and c) WFP CO changed the approach for monitoring and reporting of outcomes from a reliance on external assessments/evaluations exercises to reliance on internal, regularised outcome monitoring exercises. Assessing and appraising these changes to the monitoring approaches across the two PRRO over the transition years of 2014 and 2015/2016 will enrich the contribution of the evaluation to learning.

Evaluation Questions

14. The evaluation will address the following three questions:

**Question 1: How appropriate is the operation?** Areas for analysis will include the extent to which the objectives, targeting, choice of activities and of transfer modalities:

- Were appropriate at project design stage to the needs of the food insecure population (including the distinct needs of women, men, boys and girls from different groups, as applicable), and remained so over time, and in line with the changing refugee context.
- Are coherent with relevant national policies and priorities in relation to refugees (including sector and gender policies and strategies) and seek complementarity with the interventions of relevant humanitarian partners, as well as with other WFP interventions in the country where applicable.
- Were coherent at project design stage with relevant WFP and UN-wide system strategies, policies and normative guidance (including gender and protection), and remained so over time. In particular, the team will analyse if and how gender empowerment and equality of women (GEEW) objectives and mainstreaming principles were included in the intervention design in line with relevant system-wide commitments enshrining gender and protection issues.

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100 See PRRO 200700 project document for more details. The evaluation of the cash pilot was ongoing at the time of the start date of PRRO 200700. FULL REFERENCE TO BE INCLUDED IN FINAL TOR

101 This is particularly important for the livelihoods/environment interventions (see para objective 4, paragraph 10)

102 WFP Policies include: gender, school feeding, Cash-based Transfers, WFP role in humanitarian system, humanitarian protection. For a brief on each of these and other relevant policies and the links to the policy documents, see the WFP orientation guide on page 15. For gender, in addition to WFP policy, refer to http://www.ohchr.org/en/HRBodies/CEDAW/Pages/CEDAWindex.aspx for information on UN system wide commitments.

103 For protection, in addition to WFP policy, refer to other system-wide commitments here http://interagencystandingcommittee.org/accountability-affected-populations-including-protection-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse
Question 2: What are the results of the operation? While ensuring that differences in benefits between women, men, boys and girls from different groups are considered, the evaluation will analyse:

- The level of attainment of the planned outputs (including the number of beneficiaries served disaggregated by women, girls, men and boys);
- The extent to which the outputs led to the realisation of the operation objectives as well as to unintended effects highlighting, as applicable, differences for different groups, including women, girls, men and boys;
- Whether and how results related to Gender, Equity and Empowerment of Women (GEEW) have been achieved;
- How different activities of the operation dovetail and are synergetic with other WFP operations and with what other actors are doing to contribute to the overriding WFP objective in the country; and
- The efficiency of the operation and the likelihood that the benefits, and the extent to which, relevant to refugees’ situation, the benefits are likely to be sustained after the end of the operation.

Question 3: Why and how has the operation produced the observed results? The evaluation should generate insights into the main internal and external factors that caused the observed changes and affected how results were achieved. The inquiry is likely to focus, amongst others, on:

- Internal factors within WFP’s control: the analysis\textsuperscript{104}, business processes, systems and tools in place to support the operation design, implementation, monitoring/evaluation and reporting; the governance structure and institutional arrangements (including issues related to staffing and structure; capacity and technical backstopping from RB/HQ); the partnership and coordination arrangements; strategic and operational decision-making if view of operational constraints etc.
- External factors outside WFP’s control: the external operating environment; cultural context in relation to role of men and women; the funding climate; external incentives and pressures; delivery of complementary services by other partners including NGOs, UN and Government agencies; etc.

Evaluability Assessment

15. Evaluability is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion. The below provides a preliminary evaluability assessment, which will be deepened by the evaluation team in the inception package. The team will notably critically assess data availability and take evaluability limitations into consideration in its choice of evaluation methods. In doing so, the team will also critically review the evaluability of the gender aspects of the operation, identify related challenges and mitigation measures and determine whether additional indicators are required to include gender empowerment and gender equality dimensions.

16. In answering question one, the team will be able to rely on assessment reports, minutes from the project review committee, the project documents and logframes, datasets from various

\textsuperscript{104} This refers to the analytical basis that informed the design, and continues to inform the implementation – it should namely look into the lessons learned from the implementation and results of the previous PRRO 200365
evaluations, reviews and surveys of ongoing and past operations\textsuperscript{105} as well as documents related to government, UN and strategies and interventions from other actors. In addition, the team will review relevant WFP strategies, policies and normative guidance\textsuperscript{106}. It will also rely on documented reviews, lessons learned and performance and monitoring reports from the last year of the similar PRRO 200365.

17. For question two the operation has been designed in line with the corporate strategic results framework (SRF) and selected outputs, outcomes and targets are recorded in the logframe. Additional project specific indicators will be available from various country office documents, which the team will have access to during the inception phase. Monitoring reports as well as annual standard project reports (SPRs) detail achievement of outputs and outcomes thus making them evaluable against the stated objectives. Only the draft 2016 SPR for PRRO 200700 will be available at the time of the team’s field mission in Feb/March 2016, however the final one will be available on 31 March 2016 in time to inform the evaluation team’s analysis and report. The 2014 SPR for PRR 200365 should also be useful to the team, as both operations objectives, target populations, activities and reporting frameworks are similar.

18. There is a substantial amount of data collected over the life of the previous PRRO 200365 that is relevant to this evaluation. The evaluation team will be expected to review that data during the inception phase, and use it in designing the methodology in order to ensure sufficient triangulation in addressing the evaluation questions\textsuperscript{107}.

19. Due to the changes in the corporate indicators and thus the monitoring tools as a results of alignment of PRRO 200365 to the new strategic plan, there may be some discontinuity between the datasets from 2014 and 2015 monitoring, limiting the extent to which some indicators may be analysed over time. The team will need to assess the extent of this challenge during the inception phase and design the qualitative data collection appropriately.\textsuperscript{108}

20. For question three, the team members will have access to some institutional planning documents, including the secondary data referred to in the previous paragraph and documents from other key external players such as UNHCR documents related to refugees numbers etc. Further information will be collected through key informant interviews.

21. There is wide geographical spread of the operation’s refugee camps (6 regions) and as well as diversity of the refugee population within those regions. The team will have to factor this in their evaluation plan in coordination with the CO, to ensure adequate coverage so that there is a representative basis to site selection.

Methodology

22. Based on the overall framework provided by the TOR, the methodology will be designed and elaborated by the evaluation team during the inception phase. It should:

- Employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence (internal and external), coverage, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and sustainability, giving special consideration to gender and equity issues.

\textsuperscript{105}These include: UNHCR /WFP impact evaluation of the Contribution of Food Assistance to Durable Solutions in Protracted Refugee Situations; Joint WFP/UNHCR Programme review of cash for food assistance in Jijiga, 2013; the forth coming WFP Cash-based Transfer evaluation report; JAM 2012

\textsuperscript{106}Full list is provided in the WFP orientation guide, which all team members should review during the inception phase

\textsuperscript{107}The data set for the latest outcome monitoring exercise will be available to them in November/December, and this has informed the timing of the start of the inception phase

\textsuperscript{108}Team should also note that there are some indicators that may have ceased to be corporate indicators and thus dropped from the PRRO 200700 logframe that is attached to project document, but the CO considers them useful and therefore continued to monitor them. Such indicators should be included in the analysis
• Use applicable standards (e.g. SPHERE standards; UNEG guidance on gender\textsuperscript{109});
• Demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, etc.) and using mixed methods (e.g. quantitative, qualitative, participatory) to ensure triangulation of information through a variety of means. Participatory methods will be emphasised with the main stakeholders, including the CO. The selection of field visit sites will also need to demonstrate impartiality.
• Be geared towards addressing the key evaluation questions taking into account the evaluability challenges, the budget and timing constraints;
• Be based on an analysis of the logic model\textsuperscript{110} of the operation and on a thorough stakeholders analysis;
• Ensure through the use of mixed methods (including analysis of secondary quantitative data and collection of primary qualitative data) and appropriate sampling that women, girls, men and boys from different stakeholders groups, participate and that their different voices are heard and used; and that data collected is adequately representative to make reliable conclusions
• Be synthesised in an evaluation matrix, which should be used as the key organizing tool for the evaluation.

Quality Assurance
23. OEV’s Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) defines the quality standards expected from this evaluation and sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance, templates for evaluation products and checklists for the review thereof. It is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (DAC and ALNAP) and aims to ensure that the evaluation process and products conform to best practice and meet OEV’s quality standards. EQAS does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team.

24. At the start of the evaluation, OEV will orient the evaluation manager on EQAS and share related documents. EQAS should be systematically applied to this evaluation and the evaluation manager will be responsible to ensure that the evaluation progresses in line with its process steps and to conduct a rigorous quality control of the evaluation products ahead of their submission to WFP. OEV will also share an Orientation Guide on WFP and its operations, which provides an overview of the organization, including the key policy, strategy and guidance documents.

Phases and deliverables
25. The evaluation will proceed through five phases. Annex two provides details of the activities and the related timeline of activities and deliverables.

26. Preparation phase (July–October 2015): The OEV focal point will conduct background research and consultation to frame the evaluation; prepare the TOR; select the evaluation team and contract the company for the management and conduct of the evaluation.

\textsuperscript{109} These are put into context of WFP evaluation in the OEV technical note on integrating gender in evaluation. Evaluation team will be expected to review this Technical Note during the inception phase and ensure that gender is well mainstreamed in all phases and aspects of the evaluation.

\textsuperscript{110} Noting footnote #19 this should include logframe attached to the documents and other extended model that the CO may have.
27. Inception phase (November 2015 – January 2016): This phase aims to prepare the evaluation team for the evaluation phase by ensuring that it has a good grasp of the expectations for the evaluation and a clear plan for conducting it. The inception phase will include a desk review of secondary data and initial interaction with the main stakeholders.

**Deliverable: Inception Package.** The Inception Package details how the team intends to conduct the evaluation with an emphasis on methodological and planning aspects. The IP will be shared with CO, RB and OEV for comments before being approved by OEV. It will present an analysis of the context and of the operation, the evaluation methodology articulated around a deepened evaluability and stakeholders’ analysis; an evaluation matrix; and the sampling technique and data collection tools. It will also present the division of tasks amongst team members as well as a detailed schedule for stakeholders’ consultation. For more details, refer to the content guide for the inception package.

28. Evaluation phase (28th February - 19th March 2016): The fieldwork will span over three weeks and will include visits to project sites and primary and secondary data collection from local stakeholders. Two debriefing sessions will be held upon completion of the field work. The first one will involve the country office (relevant RB and HQ colleagues will be invited to participate through a teleconference) and the second one will be held with external stakeholders.

**Deliverable: Exit debriefing presentation.** An exit debriefing presentation of preliminary findings and conclusions (powerpoint presentation) will be prepared to support the debriefings.

29. Reporting phase (20th March – 30th May 2016): The evaluation team will analyse the data collected during the desk review and the field work, conduct additional consultations with stakeholders, as required, and draft the evaluation report. It will be submitted to the evaluation manager for quality assurance. Stakeholders will be invited to provide comments, which will be recorded in a matrix by the evaluation manager and provided to the evaluation team for their consideration before report finalisation.

**Deliverable: Evaluation report.** The evaluation report will present the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation in a concise report of 40 pages maximum. Findings should be evidence-based and relevant to the evaluation questions. Data will be disaggregated by sex and the evaluation findings and conclusions will highlight differences in performance and results of the operation for different beneficiary groups as appropriate. There should be a logical flow from findings to conclusions and from conclusions to recommendations. Recommendations will be limited in number, actionable and targeted to the relevant users. These will form the basis of the WFP management response to the evaluation. For more details, refer to the content guide for the evaluation report and the OpEv sample models for presenting results.

30. Follow-up and dissemination phase: OEV will share the final evaluation report with the CO and RB. The CO management will respond to the evaluation recommendations by providing actions that will be taken to address each recommendation and estimated timelines for taking those actions. The RB will coordinate WFP’s management response to the evaluation, including following up with country offices on status of implementation of the actions. OEV will also subject the evaluation report to an external post-hoc quality review to report independently on the quality, credibility and utility of the evaluation in line with evaluation norms and standards.
A feedback online survey on the evaluation will also be completed by all stakeholders. The final evaluation report will be published on the WFP public website, and findings incorporated into an annual synthesis report, which will be presented to WFP’s Executive Board for consideration. This synthesis will identify key features of the evaluated operations and report on the gender sensitivity of the operations among other elements. Findings will be disseminated and lessons will be incorporated into other relevant lesson sharing systems.

### Notes on the deliverables

The inception package and evaluation reports shall be written in English and follow the EQAS templates.

The evaluation team is expected to produce written work that is of very high standard, evidence-based, and free of errors. The evaluation company is ultimately responsible for the timeliness and quality of the evaluation products. If the expected standards are not met, the evaluation company will, at its own expense, make the necessary amendments to bring the evaluation products to the required quality level.

The evaluation TOR, report and management response will be public and posted on the WFP External Website (wfp.org/evaluation). The other evaluation products will be kept internal.

### Table 3: Key dates for field mission and deliverables

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Entity responsible</th>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Key dates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EM/ET</td>
<td>Inception</td>
<td>Draft Inception Package</td>
<td>15th January 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO/RB/OEV</td>
<td>Inception</td>
<td>Stakeholder comments in draft IP</td>
<td>22nd January 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM/ET</td>
<td>Inception</td>
<td>Final Inception Package</td>
<td>29th January 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO/ET</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Evaluation field mission</td>
<td>28th February to 19th March 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ET</td>
<td>Evaluation</td>
<td>Exit Debriefing Presentation</td>
<td>18th March 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO/RB/OEV</td>
<td>Reporting</td>
<td>Stakeholder comments on draft ER</td>
<td>16th May 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EM/ET</td>
<td>Reporting</td>
<td>Final Evaluation Report submission</td>
<td>30th May 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEV</td>
<td>Reporting</td>
<td>Final report approval/circulation</td>
<td>7th June 2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CO/RB</td>
<td>Follow-up</td>
<td>Management Response</td>
<td>21st June 2016</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Organization of the Evaluation

**Outsourced approach**

31. Under the outsourced approach to OpEvs, the evaluation is commissioned by OEV but will be managed and conducted by an external evaluation company having a long-term agreement (LTA) with WFP for operations evaluation services.

32. The company will provide an evaluation manager (EM) and an independent evaluation team (ET) in line with the LTA. To ensure a rigorous review of evaluation deliverables, the evaluation manager should in no circumstances be part of the evaluation team.

33. The company, the EM and the ET members will not have been involved in the design, implementation or M&E of the operation nor have other conflicts of interest or bias on the subject. They will act impartially and respect the code of conduct of the profession.
34. Given the evaluation learning objective, the evaluation manager and team will promote stakeholders’ participation throughout the evaluation process. Yet, to safeguard the independence of the evaluation, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings with external stakeholders if the evaluation team deems that their presence could bias the responses.

**Evaluation Management**

35. The evaluation will be managed by the company’s EM for OpEvs (as per LTA). The EM will be responsible to manage within the given budget the evaluation process in line with EQAS and the expectations spelt out in these TOR and to deliver timely evaluation products meeting the OEV standards. In particular, the EM will:

- Mobilise and hire the evaluation team and provide administrative backstopping (contracts, visas, travel arrangements, consultants’ payments, invoices to WFP, etc).
- Act as the main interlocutor between WFP stakeholders and the ET throughout the evaluation and generally facilitate communication and promote stakeholders’ participation throughout the evaluation process
- Support the evaluation team by orienting members on WFP, EQAS and the evaluation requirements; providing them with relevant documentation and generally advising on all aspects of the evaluation to ensure that the evaluation team is able to conduct its work.
- Ensure that the evaluation proceeds in line with EQAS, the norms and standards and code of conduct of the profession and that quality standards and deadlines are met.
- Ensure that a rigorous and objective quality check of all evaluation products is conducted ahead of submission to WFP. This quality check will be documented and an assessment of the extent to which quality standards are met will be provided to WFP.
- Provide feedback on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

**Evaluation Conduct—Team composition & Roles and Responsibilities**

36. The ET will conduct the evaluation under the direction of the EM. The team will be hired by the company following agreement with OEV on its composition.

37. **Team composition.** The evaluation team is expected to include 3 to 4 members, including the team leader. It should include women and men of mixed cultural backgrounds and Ethiopian nationals with deep understanding of the East Africa refugee context. At least one team member should have WFP experience.

38. **Team competencies.** The team will be multi-disciplinary and include members who together include an appropriate balance of expertise and practical knowledge in the following areas:

- Food security within the particular East African refugee context
- Nutrition programming, within refugee context
- Cash-based Transfer programming, including understanding of assessment of effects beyond delivery and meeting the consumption objectives.\(^{111}\)

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\(^{111}\) The expectation here is that in addition to assessment of whether the cash was delivered and met the consumption objectives, the team should include in their qualitative assessment of effect on other related issues such as household-economy and markets
• Quantitative data analysis and interpretation, with ability to analyse varied secondary data sets, triangulate and provide insights to inform the teams approach to the evaluation design and further analysis to substantiate conclusions.\(^{112}\)

• Good knowledge of gender and protection issues within refugee contexts, understanding of WFP gender commitments and ability to assess achievements within the context of system UN system-wide commitments on gender.\(^{113}\)

39. All team members should have strong analytical and communication skills; evaluation experience and familiarity with the country or region.

40. The **Team Leader** will have good communication, management and leadership skills and demonstrated experience and good track record in leading similar evaluations. He/she should also have excellent English writing and presentation skills, technical expertise in one of the technical areas listed above as well as expertise in designing methodology and data collection tools.

41. **The responsibilities of the team leader** will be to:
   - Define the evaluation approach and methodology, including sampling
   - Guide and managing the team;
   - Lead the evaluation mission and representing the evaluation team;
   - Draft as required, the inception package, exit debriefing presentation and evaluation report in line with EQAS; and with inputs from other team members
   - Review the stakeholder comments and finalise the evaluation products accordingly
   - Provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

42. The team members will bring together a complementary combination of the technical expertise required and have a track record of written work on similar assignments.

43. **Team members responsibilities** will be to:
   - contribute to the methodology in their area of expertise based on a document review;
   - conduct field work, using the agreed upon approach/instruments
   - participate in team meetings and meetings with stakeholders;
   - contribute to the drafting and revision of the evaluation products in their technical area(s); and
   - Review stakeholder comments and revise the evaluation products accordingly
   - Provide feedback on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

**Security Considerations**

44. As an ‘independent supplier’ of evaluation services to WFP, the evaluation company is responsible for ensuring the security of all persons contracted, including adequate arrangements for evacuation for medical or situational reasons. The consultants contracted by the evaluation company do not fall under the UN Department of Safety & Security (UNDSS) system for UN personnel.

45. However, to avoid any security incidents, the Evaluation Manager is requested to ensure that:

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\(^{112}\) This is critical considering that WFP Ethiopia will have sets of data from various reviews and evaluations that should be used to inform further inquiry
\(^{113}\) see footnote #20
• Travelling team members complete the UN system’s applicable Security in the Field courses in advance, print out their certificates and take them with them. (These take a couple of hours to complete.)
• The WFP CO registers the team members with the Security Officer on arrival in country and arranges a security briefing for them to gain an understanding of the security situation on the ground.
• The team members observe applicable UN security rules and regulations – e.g. curfews etc.

For more information, including the link to UNDSS website, see EQAS for operations evaluations page 34.

Roles and Responsibilities of WFP Stakeholders

46. The Country Office. The CO management will be responsible to:

• Assign a focal point for the evaluation. Delphine Dechaux, Programme officer will be the CO focal point for this evaluation, supported by TeweldeBirhan GIRMA (M&E officer).
• Comment on the TORs, inception package and the evaluation report.
• Provide the evaluation manager and team with documentation and information necessary to the evaluation; facilitate the team’s contacts with local stakeholders; set up meetings, field visits; provide logistic support during the fieldwork; and arrange for interpretation, if required.
• Organise security briefings for the evaluation team and provide any materials as required.
• Participate in discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the operation, its performance and results and in various teleconferences with the evaluation manager and team on the evaluation products.
• Organise and participate in two separate debriefings, one internal and one with external stakeholders.
• Prepare a management response to the evaluation recommendations.
• Provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

47. The Regional Bureau. The RB management will be responsible to:

• Assign a focal point for the evaluation. Genevieve Chicoine (Regional M&E advisor) will be the RB focal point for this evaluation.
• Participate in discussions with the evaluation team on the evaluation design and on the operation, its performance and results. In particular, the RB should participate in the evaluation debriefing and in various teleconferences with the evaluation manager and team, as required.
• Provide comments on the TORs, inception package and the evaluation report.
• Coordinate the management response to the evaluation and track the implementation of the recommendations.
• Provide feedback to OEV on the evaluation process as part of an evaluation feedback e-survey.

48. Headquarters. Some HQ divisions might, as relevant, be asked to discuss WFP strategies, policies or systems in their area of responsibility and to comment on the evaluation TOR and report.
49. **The Office of Evaluation.** OEV is responsible for commissioning the evaluation and *Grace Igweta* and *Filippo Pompili, Evaluation officers*, are the OEV focal points. OEV’s responsibilities include:

- Set up the evaluation including drafting the TOR in consultation with concerned stakeholders; select and contract the external evaluation company; and facilitate the initial communications between the WFP stakeholders and the external evaluation company.
- Enable the company to deliver a quality process and report by providing them with the EQAS documents including process guidance, content guides and templates as well as orient the evaluation manager on WFP policies, strategies, processes and systems as required.
- Comment on the draft inception package.
- Comment on the evaluation report and approve the final version.
- Submit the final evaluation report to an external post-hoc quality review process to independently report on the quality, credibility and utility of the evaluation and provide feedback to the evaluation company accordingly.
- Publish the final evaluation report on the WFP public website and incorporate findings into an annual synthesis report, which will be presented to WFP’s Executive Board for consideration.
- Conduct an evaluation feedback e-survey to gather perceptions about the evaluation process and the quality of the report to be used to revise the approach, as required.

### Communication and budget

**Communication**

50. Issues related to language of the evaluation are noted in sections 6.3 and 5, which also specifies which evaluation products will be made public and how and provides the schedule of debriefing with key stakeholders. Section 5 paragraph 29 describes how findings will be disseminated.

51. To enhance the learning from this evaluation, the evaluation manager and team will also emphasize transparent and open communication with WFP stakeholders. Regular teleconferences and one-on-one telephone conversations between the evaluation manager, team and country office focal point will assist in discussing any arising issues and ensuring a participatory process.

**Budget**

52. **Funding source:** The evaluation will be funded in line with the WFP special funding mechanism for Operations Evaluations (Executive Director memo dated October 2012). The cost to be borne by the CO will be established by the WFP Budget & Programming Division (RMB).

53. **Budget:** The budget will be prepared by the company (using the rates established in the LTA and the corresponding template) and approved by OEV. For the purpose of this evaluation the company will:

- Use the management fee corresponding to a large operation
- not budget for domestic road travel, which will be provided by WFP country office

Please send queries to *Grace Igweta, evaluation Officer*, at grace.igweta@wfp.org, +39-066513-2847 or to *Filippo Pompili, evaluation officer* at filippo.pompila@wfp.org, +39-066513-6454
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