

# FOOD SUPPLY AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN BRAZIL: A HISTORICAL REVIEW

Food and Social Policies Series

# 1



**Centre of Excellence  
against Hunger**

## FOOD AND SOCIAL POLICIES SERIES

WFP CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE AGAINST HUNGER

### Director and Representative

Daniel Silva Balaban

### Deputy Director

Peter Rodrigues

### Project Coordinator and Editor of the Series

Gabriel Specht

### Communications Officer

Isadora Ferreira

## FOOD SUPPLY AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN BRAZIL: A HISTORICAL REVIEW

### TECHNICAL TEAM

#### Authors

Francisco Menezes

Ibase Researcher and Consultant

Sílvia Porto

Consultant

Cátia Grisa

Professor at UFRGS – Northern Coast Campus

#### Editorial Coordination

Melina Bandeira

Deputy coordinator of the study

#### Editing

Isadora Ferreira

Gabriel Specht

Manuela Rodrigues Fantinato

Bruno Correia

#### Proofreading

Bruno Fiuza

#### Graphic Design

Maria João Pessoa Macedo

Danielle Costa

#### Translation

Amy Herszenhorn

Charles Landini

Lilia Wachsmann

Elvyn Marshall

#### Photos

Gustavo Stephan

WFP Centre of Excellence against Hunger

Embrapa

Shutterstock

Hero Images Inc./Corbis/Latinstock

#### Print

Athaláia Gráfica e Editora

#### Editions

150 units

## STEERING COMMITTEE

*This study was supported by the invaluable assistance of a group of experts in the fields of institutional procurement and food security, which has guided and followed-up on the evolution of the work in order to ensure the technical and analytical quality, essential for this study*

Maximo Torero

Director of the Markets, Trade and Institutions Division, IFPRI, Washington

Ivan Cossio Cortez

Manager of the Country Program, Latin American and Caribbean Division, IFAD, Rome

Clare Mbizule

Learning and Sharing Counselor, Purchase for Progress (P4P), PMA, Rome

Gustavo Lund Viegas

Analyst Engineer, Agronomist, Superintendence for Support to Family Agriculture, Agricultural Policy and Information Board, CONAB, Brasília

Marco Antonio Rodriguez Pinto

Planning Technician, Superintendence for Support to Family Agriculture, Agricultural Policy and Information Board, CONAB, Brasília

Denise Reif Kroeff

Director, Department for Procurement Support and Family Production Marketing, Food and nutritional Security Secretariat, Ministry of Social Development and to Combat Hunger, Brasília

Janaína Kern da Rosa

Substitute Director, Department for Procurement Support and Family Production Marketing, Food and nutritional Security Secretariat, Ministry of Social Development and to Combat Hunger, Brasília

Hetel Leepkahn dos Santos

General Coordinator for the Procurement and Distribution of Food, National Food and Nutritional Security Secretariat, Ministry of Social Development and to Combat Hunger, Brasília

*This report is based on research supported by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Its conclusions are the authors' responsibility and do not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of the sponsors*

## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

*This study would not have been possible without the valuable cooperation of Andrea Polo Galante, nutritionist from the FAO and of FNDE contributors and nutritionists. Our thanks also go to the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, the staff of the WFP Centre of Excellence against Hunger, particularly the management and communication team, as well as the technical support of the programme, which has contributed greatly in executing this research project. A special thanks must be expressed to the entire team of the authors, that worked tirelessly to fulfill this study.*

# FOOD SUPPLY AND PUBLIC PROCUREMENT IN BRAZIL: A HISTORICAL REVIEW

Food and Social Policies Series

# 1



Centre of Excellence  
against Hunger

# Index

|           |  |
|-----------|--|
| <b>06</b> | <b>Presentation</b>  |
| <b>08</b> | <b>Executive Summary</b>   |
| <b>13</b> | <b>Introduction</b>  |
| <b>19</b> | <b>Supply crises and predominance of the agro-export model</b>                             |
| <b>20</b> | <b>Brief background from the colonial period to the First Republic</b>                     |
| <b>22</b> | <b>Supply crises and how they were managed</b>   |
| <b>23</b> | <b>State action and coffee market: the Taubaté Convention</b>                              |
| <b>24</b> | <b>Early 20<sup>th</sup> century</b>   |
| <b>25</b> | <b>Further attempts to control the food market and the end of the First Republic</b>       |
| <b>27</b> | <b>Effects of the 1929 Crash in Brazil</b>   |
| <b>29</b> | <b>Overview</b>  |
| <b>31</b> | <b>From 1930 to the military coup</b>  |
| <b>32</b> | <b>The start of the Vargas Era</b>   |
| <b>34</b> | <b>New State</b>   |
| <b>37</b> | <b>Post Second World War Period</b>  |
| <b>39</b> | <b>Dutra Government</b>  |
| <b>40</b> | <b>Second Vargas Government</b>  |
| <b>42</b> | <b>The Target Plan: the period of major highway works and the construction of Brasilia</b> |
| <b>43</b> | <b>The Vice (that became) President</b>  |
| <b>45</b> | <b>Overview</b>  |
| <b>49</b> | <b>The supply policy and food supplementation during the military regime</b>               |
| <b>51</b> | <b>The 1960s</b>   |
| <b>52</b> | <b>The 1970s</b>   |
| <b>55</b> | <b>The 1980s</b>   |
| <b>58</b> | <b>Overview</b>  |

|            |  |
|------------|--|
| <b>61</b>  | <b>Food and nutrition security on the public agenda of the 1990s</b>                                       |
| <b>61</b>  | <b>Inclusion of the food security issue in the public agenda</b>   |
| <b>62</b>  | <b>Neoliberal actions in the early 1990s</b>   |
| <b>64</b>  | <b>The Parallel Government Proposal for a National Food Security Policy (1991)</b>                         |
| <b>64</b>  | <b>Civil society goes back to influencing the public agenda</b>  |
| <b>66</b>  | <b>The creation of CONSEA and its activities</b>   |
| <b>68</b>  | <b>Cooling the debate on food security in 1995</b>   |
| <b>70</b>  | <b>Political and institutional recognition of family farming</b>   |
| <b>71</b>  | <b>Overview</b>  |
| <b>73</b>  | <b>Institutional procurement in the sphere of a food and nutrition security policy</b>                     |
| <b>76</b>  | <b>Revival of CONSEA</b>   |
| <b>77</b>  | <b>The PAA in Brazil: trajectory, contributions and challenges for rural development and food security</b> |
| <b>87</b>  | <b>The PAA contributions and challenges to rural development and food and nutrition security</b>           |
| <b>92</b>  | <b>The PNAE: reconstruction and protagonism</b>  |
| <b>102</b> | <b>PAA and PNAE – achievements and challenges</b>  |
| <b>105</b> | <b>Final Considerations</b>  |
| <b>110</b> | <b>References</b>  |
| <b>116</b> | <b>Liste of Acronyms</b>   |

# Presentation

Food insecurity has permeated throughout the history of Brazil. Since colonial times the population has faced problems of access to proper food as a result of the shortage of food or social inequality, which prevented the whole population from being able to procure or produce the necessary food for its livelihood.

For decades Brazil has figured as one of the most unequal countries, as well as one of the most vulnerable to hunger. Recently, however, the country has been distinguished by its success stories in overcoming poverty and hunger. Two programmes played a leading role in this transformation: the National School Feeding Programme (PNAE) and the Food Acquisition Programme (PAA).

This study details the background of institutional food procurement in Brazil, especially during the Republican period, and discusses the different attempts to control the country's repeated crises of food supply. The idea is to show how public policies have changed over the years and how the different experiences have contributed to the design of the strategies currently in force in Brazil, with focus on the PNAE and the PAA and their impacts on family farming and food and nutrition security.

The PNAE and PAA together represent the largest structured demand for family farming in Brazil. The term "structured demand" refers to the efforts of connecting large foreseeable demands of food to the family farmers, which in Brazil now occurs mainly through public procurement.

When making this connection, the government guarantees family farmers conditions to invest in and enhance their production and increase their income. The effect of reducing poverty is maximised by the fact that the food purchased through these programmes is allocated to populations vulnerable to food insecurity, such as children, adolescents and people attended by the public education network and social welfare institutions.

These programmes, and other successful projects, have attracted the attention of a number of countries interested in learning how Brazil is overcoming hunger and extreme poverty. The Brazilian experience has been an inspiration for other developing countries endeavouring to set up their own policies and programmes. However, studies and analyses of the Brazilian experience are still few and far between.

This is why the World Food Programme's Centre of Excellence against Hunger has formed a partnership with the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation to conduct studies on the Brazilian experience of institutional food procurement, focusing on the government programmes that purchase food from family farming. The study's results will be disseminated to governments and other players interested in adopting similar strategies.

The product of the research is a series of five studies addressing the different aspects of institutional procurement in Brazil. This first volume offers an analysis of the background of institutional food purchasing, with focus on the factors that have led to the current scenario in which the country prioritises buying from family farmers. The second volume analyses how the modalities of institutional procurement from family farming function. And the third volume provides the scale of institutional food procurement.

Two other studies complete the series. The fourth study will describe in detail the costs of institutional procurement of the National School Feeding Programme. The fifth study will address a cost-benefit analysis and the PNAE investment model, measuring the benefits on nutrition,

health and education of the students provided with a school feeding programme that procures part of its food from family farming.

The information from this research helps clarify the context, operation and potential benefits of creating programmes and social policies linked to the institutional procurement of family farming produce. It presents the factors that can influence the implementation of such programmes and the scale they can achieve. Moreover, the studies clarify the impacts of institutional procurement from family farming on food and nutrition security.

This series of studies is a meaningful contribution to the South-South cooperation efforts, by acting as a subsidy for dialogues between countries interested in enhancing or creating programmes and policies to overcome hunger and poverty.



**DANIEL BALABAN**  
Director of WFP Centre of  
Excellence against Hunger



# Executive Summary

The purpose of this study is to provide a background analysis of institutional food procurement in Brazil, describing its origins, motivations and political incentives that have led to the current large-scale purchasing from family farmers, linked to the country's food security networks. The history of institutional food procurement since the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to date is given in detail, describing the different attempts to manage supply crises, regulate prices and provide family farmers access to the market. Two programmes are worth mentioning – the Food Acquisition Programme (PAA) and the National School Feeding Programme (PNAE), - because of their impacts on small-scale farming and food and nutrition security, and also for their major contributions to eliminating hunger and reducing poverty in Brazil, especially as part of the Zero Hunger strategy.

The idea is to share the main results with legislators and technical experts of governments interested in adopting similar national policies and programmes. It is also expected to help other countries understand which factors affect the decision-making on institutional food procurement and inclusion of family farmers in such programmes.

## Results

In the past, Brazil faced difficulties against the recurring supply crises. The food supply problems, which began as early as colonial times, endured through the 19<sup>th</sup> century and were still present throughout the 20<sup>th</sup> century. One of the main reasons for these crises was the development model adopted in the country throughout its history, which has always favoured the large rural landowners and farm production directed at exports, in detriment to producing food for the home market.

During the first period 1889-1930 under analysis, the supply crises were connected to the poor food production, logistic challenges, distribution restraints, market restrictions and fast

urban growth with no proper planning. During this period, State intervention focused on reinforcing coffee production, at that time the basis of the Brazilian economy. With the government's eye on farming production for exports, projects to improve the domestic food supply were intermittent and inadequate and in some cases compounded the problem.

The government's main project to protect the farmers' interests was the Taubaté Convention, in which it was established that the government would buy the surplus coffee to create a regulatory stockpile for price control. The Convention collapsed after the 1929 Crash when coffee prices plummeted. This was the country's first institutional experience of procuring an agricultural product.

Between 1930 and 1964, Brazil underwent substantial modernization as a result of fast urban and industrial growth. The government's focus continued solely on agricultural exports. With logistical problems, high inflation and a trade deficit, the supply crisis continued and deteriorated considerably due to large-scale migration of workers from the countryside to the cities. The outbreak of the Second World War worsened the situation even further by creating a shortage of food items worldwide, especially of wheat.

Two of the projects created to overcome these challenges were the minimum guaranteed price policy for farm produce and the first versions of the National School Feeding Programme. Despite the progress in granting rights to workers, women and

the elderly, the federal government was unable to defeat hunger and food insecurity. After endeavours to make drastic social reforms in the country (such as land reform), in 1964 the democratic government was deposed by a military coup d'état.

The military dictatorship lasted until 1985 and was followed by a gradual process of democratisation. It was a controversial period, with widespread strengthening of the State's role in the economy, while at the same time free market strategies were put in practice. This contradiction was especially noticeable in the food supply policy. The State played an important role in institutionalising farming-related actions, but focused its support completely on large farming enterprises. Although institutional food procurement by the government was limited, it was during this period that the

food marketing centres were created and consolidated.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the high international prices of farm produce favoured Brazilian exports, and crops focusing on the home market were put on the back burner. Modernisation of Brazilian farming was encouraged with the adoption of heavy machinery, use of chemical inputs and the expansion of large properties, in a process known as the Green Revolution. The outcome was the move of millions of people from the countryside to the cities, causing disorganised urban growth and in detriment to family farming. The problems of hunger and malnutrition among the poorer populations worsened.

The re-democratisation period began in 1985. With rampant inflation and some isolated projects against hunger, the country entered the 1990s as one of the most unequal in the world, and in

serious political crisis. The civil society organised huge demonstrations throughout the country, demanding further social participation, transparency in rendering government accounts, broader political decentralisation and State intervention in the markets to ensure food supply and agricultural development. These mobilisations placed the question of food and nutrition security on the public agenda.

During this period there was some progress in the field of public food and nutrition security policies: the first experience of the National Council for Food and Nutrition Security (CONSEA); the national conference on food and nutrition security; and the creation in 1995 of the National Programme for Strengthening Family Farming (PRONAF), a rural credit programme for family farmers. The institutional food procurement was quite limited, and the purchases for the PNAE, centralised by

the federal government, were inefficient.

In 2003 the federal government's Zero Hunger strategy emerged, based on a draft national policy for food and nutrition security that included the idea of the human right to food. The Zero Hunger strategy created a group of proposals to solve the access problems of the poorest to quality food. Moreover, the minimum wage had recovered its purchasing power, unemployment was substantially lowered and there was a successful effort to increase formal employment.

To solve some of the main causes of hunger and food insecurity, Zero Hunger also encourage institutional procurement for stockpiling and to strengthen family farming. The Food Acquisition Programme was set up, creating an institutional market for family farmers, on the understanding of

their relationship with food and nutrition security and social protection. The innovation brought by the PAA was exactly its ability to coordinate, within the same public policy, access to the market for family farming linked to a national action of food and nutrition security.

The PNAE, existing since 1954, was restructured and included in the Zero Hunger strategy as a key tool to ensuring access to food for a large segment of the population. In 2009, a revision of the legislation on school feeding stated that at least 30% of funds transferred by the federal government needed to be allocated to procure food from family farmers.

Close participation and monitoring of civil society are part of the project and the implementation of both PNAE and PAA. The programmes help shorten the local food supply networks by cutting the

distance between production and consumption. These short trade circuits bring positive impacts from various aspects, reinforcing the community-based or local food and nutrition security. They also break the impersonal nature of who produced the food, helping to build the social identity and food culture.

The last decade has been marked by significant progress in building food and nutrition security, with 36 million Brazilians leaving the condition of extreme poverty in both the rural and urban areas. Despite the positive results and years of experience in administration of large-scale food security networks, the programmes still face challenges when implementing them and require monitoring of their decentralised structure and social responsibility systems.





# Introduction

The purpose of this report is to contribute to understanding public policies on institutional food procurement in Brazil, and the overall food supply system, by rebuilding the historical process from its development and implementation. To achieve this goal, the authors have used an extensive bibliographic review, dialogue with scholars and activists promoting food security and their own experiences in implementing these policies.

Both Brazil's land occupation process and the growing population made food supply a key issue. Brazilian history is marked by frequent supply crises from early colonial times through to the 20<sup>th</sup> century, caused by a development model in the field of farming and land that has always benefitted large rural properties and export-focused crop production.

With the challenges imposed by the supply crises, the State's power to intervene in the food market is a central point in this process, with consequences for food sovereignty and food and nutrition security in Brazil. The approach proposed herein requires analysis of the economic, political and social scenarios, which will, to a large extent, explain what happened in the context of nutrition and the role played by State intervention in this sector.

Chapter 1 provides a brief background from colonial days to the Proclamation of the Republic, including the imperial period, and analyses State interventions in farm production during the period known as the First Republic from 1889 to 1930. It discusses the causes of the supply crises at that time, and the State initiatives to tackle them. These crises were linked to low food production for the

population's consumption, logistics problems in distribution and marketing, and the ongoing urban spread with no proper planning.

During this period, the State role was strongly focused on strengthening coffee production, the country's main export and the driving force of the national economy. Projects to enhance internal supply were sporadic and insufficient, and in some cases even aggravated the problem. The major landmark in the State presence to protect the interests of the coffee farmers was the Taubaté Convention stating that the government would procure the coffee surplus to stockpile coffee. This was Brazil's first experience in institutional procurement of an agricultural product.

In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Brazil was faced with an economic and social crisis caused by the

plummeting prices of its main exports. Aggravated by the First World War and the 1929 Crash, it was unsustainable to keep the political and social agreements that upheld the Coffee with Milk policy, which ensured the alternating power between São Paulo and Minas Gerais states, benefitting the coffee-based agro-export model. When Washington Luís, the then President stepped down, a new group took over, putting an end to the First Republic.

The second chapter encompasses the Vargas Era from 1930 to 1945, and the subsequent short democratic period, which ended with the 1964 military coup d'état. During this period, Brazil underwent an intense urbanisation and industrialisation process, leaving behind the exclusively agro-exporting profile. This chapter examines the more relevant government intervention in the food market, especially the actions supplying the population with food.

In the course of those 34 years, the country endured constant political instability, social mobilisations and coups d'état. With problems of logistics, high inflation and a trade balance deficit, the

supply crisis persisted and was worsened by a strong exodus from the countryside to the city, exacerbated with the outbreak of the Second World War. Despite social progress, such as the consolidation of labour laws and further rights for women and the elderly, there was no solution to the hunger and food insecurity problems. The governments of that period implemented a number of initiatives, all in line with their ideological conceptions. Although they failed to eradicate hunger, public policies attempted to respond to radical changes in Brazil's then social dynamics, and the various experiments that were put in place, such as funding farming projects, provided the foundation for strategies to fight hunger that would be adopted in coming decades.

The post-Vargas period was marked by intense political turmoil in the country, with strong polarisation resulting from major disputes for political power. The growing urbanisation and industrialisation process and the established social and labour laws coexisted with an even weaker democracy, always accompanied by strong military presence in political life.

It was only with Juscelino Kubitschek, elected President in 1955, that the country achieved relative stability. Kubitschek instituted the Target Plan, accelerating public works to eliminate the country's infrastructure bottlenecks. The objective was to make Brazil advance "50 years in five" – his government motto. Brasília, the country's new capital city, was built in just three years in the Brazilian Midwest, a region at that time of no political importance, symbolising the commitment to developing all regions.

The Kubitschek government ended with a fresh wave of political crises and threats to democracy. The extremely short government of Jânio Quadros terminated with his resignation and substitution by his vice-president, João Goulart. In 1962, he became President of the Republic and indicated the need for the country to undertake major reforms based on overcoming inequalities and guaranteeing equal opportunities for economic and social development.

This strong argument to end illiteracy, for land reform, higher wages for workers, State intervention to regulate and boost the economy, and to bring government and social

organisations closer together caused a reaction among the military, based on a discourse in defence of democracy against Communism. The movement unleashed the 1964 Brazilian coup d'état, the start of a military dictatorship, backed by the business sector, Catholic Church, media and part of civil society. It also received decisive help from the United States.

Chapter 3 addresses the dictatorship and redemocratising process during the second half of the 1980s. The period of the military regime was highly controversial, due to the State's invasive presence in people's lives, alongside the adoption of a liberal-focused economic policy. This apparent contradiction lies in the conduction of the supply policy.

The State played a leading role in institutionalising farming activities, but the policies were aimed at strengthening large-scale farming enterprises. During the 1960s and 1970s, prices of farm produce were predominantly high in the international market, favouring Brazilian exports in detriment to crops for the home market.

In accordance with the prevailing view during the military regime, modernising

agriculture was encouraged in the country, with the adoption of heavy machinery, intensive use of chemical inputs and expansion of large-scale properties. This accelerated the exodus of millions of people from the countryside to the cities, resulting in disorderly urbanisation and impacting family farming. Consequently, hunger and malnutrition worsened among the poorest classes of the population. Moreover, this was a period when there was no social participation whatsoever in terms of defining public policies.

The weakening of the military dictatorship and gradual return to democracy now led to the start of the so-called New Republic. Tancredo Neves was elected President indirectly by the National Congress. He died before taking office and José Sarney took over, continuing

the essence of the policies put in place by the military. With galloping inflation and only a few projects against hunger, the country entered the 1990s with soaring social inequality amidst a major political and economic crisis.

The positive legacy of Sarney's government was the enactment of the 1988 Constitution, the result of participation and drive of civil society organisations. Chapter 4 discusses the relationship between food supply and the State role in the 1990s, marked by a neoliberal political stance. It was a decade of intense social mobilisation, demanding social participation, accountability, decentralisation and the State's actions on important structural issues for nutrition and food security and rural development.





It was a period of intense social mobilisation forcing the public agenda to include discussions on food and nutrition security. The governments of Fernando Collor de Mello, Itamar Franco and Fernando Henrique Cardoso had a strong neoliberal leaning, with privatisations and open markets. Inflation control was one positive aspect, but with little progress in the public policy field for food and nutrition security, except for the first experiment of the National Food and Nutrition Security Council (CONSEA) and the political and institutional recognition of family farming, with the creation of the National Programme for Strengthening Family Farming (PRONAF) in 1995.

The period examined in Chapter 5 covers President Lula da Silva's two mandates (2003-2006 and 2007-2010) and President Dilma Rousseff's first mandate (2011-2014). This period was characterised by prioritising food and

nutrition security, with an institutional procurement policy as a tool to eradicate hunger and poverty, unprecedented in the course of Brazilian history.

The successive economic crises in Brazil had a direct impact on exacerbation of poverty and in increasing the vulnerability of poorer families. It was essential to understand that hunger - affecting more than a quarter of the Brazilian population - was directly linked to the absence of financial and institutional conditions for food procurement or production for their own consumption. Until the Lula da Silva government, the problem of hunger was regarded as a food shortage issue.

One of the first measures to be adopted was Zero Hunger, a draft policy for food and nutrition security that included the notion of the right to food, eventually becoming a federal government programme. CONSEA was re-established as an advisory agency of the President of the Republic's

Office, facilitating dialogue between civil society and the State.

Zero Hunger produced a set of proposals to enable the poor to have ongoing access to healthy nutrition, of quality and in sufficient quantities. The conditional transfer of income through the Family Allowance [Bolsa Familia] was the main response to this challenge. The recovery of the real value of the minimum wage was significant, substantially diminishing unemployment, while simultaneously making a successful effort to increase formal employment.

Institutional procurement and family farming support gained force. In 2003, the Food Acquisition Programme (PAA) was created, including a new topic: building institutional markets for family farming and their coordination with food and nutrition security. The novelty presented by the programme, which attracted a great deal of interest, consists of coordinating,

under the same public policy, support for family farmers to access markets with food and nutritional security initiatives. Generally, the PAA procures food and seeds from family farmers and donates them to public food and nutrition institutions, social welfare agencies and socially vulnerable families. Food and seeds can also be allocated to strategic stockpiling.

During this time the National School Feeding Programme (PNAE) was restructured, having existed since 1954 but only gaining current proportions in 2000. School feeding was one of the first projects to be established in the country as a public policy focusing on feeding a specific age group. The School Feeding Act, approved in 2009, was one of a number of major changes that set a standard that at least 30% of the funds transferred by the federal government for school had to be used for procurement of food produced by family farmers.

This innovation, as yet to be fully implemented, created a potential market of around BRL 1 billion for family agriculture, since the total budget transferred by the Union to the agencies running the School Feeding Programme is approximately BRL 3 billion. In addition to the positive effect on family farms, the new rule enabled students to have access to fresh food produced locally.

Both programmes have a strong component of social participation. They aim to reduce the distance between production and consumption. In fact, they create marketing short circuits with numerous positive repercussions – cutting costs, strengthening local economies, building and reviving lost regional identities –, enhancing the status of food and nutrition security. They interrupt the impersonal nature of the food producers and help build a social identity and food culture.

Despite the positive results of PAA and PNAE, the programmes still face challenges, mainly because they are experiments in maturation. Recent Brazilian history has made major advances in the construction of food security and supply, but continues to reproduce trajectories and dynamics from a past marked by political and economical decisions that restrict, minimise or even clash with the aforementioned achievements. Nevertheless, the experience accrued by Brazil attracts the attention of international governments and institutions interested in learning about the Brazilian achievements and challenges in its quest for its own solutions for hunger and poverty.

\* The values presented in this document are calculated in BRL, Brazilian real. In order to know the amount in US dollars, please check the daily conversion in the Brazilian Central Bank's website.



# Supply crises and predominance of the agro-export model

This chapter discusses State intervention in farming during the period called the First or Old Republic. The period under analysis begins from the proclamation of the Republic in 1889 to the 1930 Revolution. After a short period of military government, in 1894 the first civilian President was elected, giving way to the so-called Coffee with Milk Policy – characterised by the dominion of elites from São Paulo and Minas Gerais states, the main coffee and dairy farmers, respectively, merchandise of the utmost importance for the Brazilian economy and politics at the time. The dependence and alignment of the State with this oligarchy

was apparent in the measures taken in favour of the group during the First Republic, even though there were sporadic interventions to prevent food shortages on the domestic market.



## Brief background from the colonial period to the First Republic

Brazilian colonisation began in the form of territorial administration known as Hereditary Captaincies. The Portuguese Crown granted to a single donee the right and responsibility to explore and colonise stretches of land, accompanied by a series of privileges. The model prevailed from the 16<sup>th</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> century, when there were 15 captaincies in Brazil.

To a large extent, this process represents the genesis of land ownership concentration and the formation of the rural oligarchy, indelible marks of Brazilian reality directly impacting the country's food security. It is worth considering that during the colonial years from 1530 to 1808, there was a succession of economic cycles prioritising the large-scale production of specific merchandise for export – depending on the demands of the international market – in detriment to the economic development for the local market. Until the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, slave labour brought from Africa still prevailed in the countryside.

An example of this was the sugarcane cycle, benefitting from the high sugar prices in Europe. The demand for large areas of land and further capital to make the business profitable caused the emergence of latifundia, in the form of the so-called "sesmarias" (allotments) donated by the Captain General, where there were sugarcane plantations. The captaincies in Northeast Brazil, namely Pernambuco, Paraíba and Bahia, became the main production centres. Staple food such as beans, cassava and corn were secondary crops, only for feeding slave labour.

The mining cycle began in the early 18<sup>th</sup> century, with the declining demand for Brazilian sugarcane and the discovery of valuable deposits of minerals (gold, silver, copper) and precious stones (diamonds and emeralds). The activity attracted expeditions from Portugal and from elsewhere in Brazil, mainly from the São Paulo Captaincy. The expeditions heading to the hinterlands of the country in search of mineral wealth played a leading role in populating the territory. Mining encouraged local trade, especially in the mining regions.

The arrival of the Portuguese Royal family to Brazil in 1808 ended the Brazilian colonial period and allowed the beginning of an urbanisation process. One of its main consequences was the increased demand for food and services, especially in Rio de Janeiro. In 1810, with the opening of Brazilian ports to "friendly nations", Portugal lost its trade monopoly with Brazil, which now depended on English capitalism. The United Kingdom now enjoyed a series of privileges, namely lower taxes than other countries. Until then, the Brazilian economy had focused on raw material exports, while the domestic market was characterised by almost solely subsistence activity, dedicated to the production of food and livestock (Fausto & Devoto, 2005). Nevertheless, there was no change in the prevailing agro-export model.

In 1822, when the country became independent, sugar became a bestseller with 30% of all exports, followed by cotton (21%) and coffee (18%). Twenty years later, coffee was now the leading product in foreign trade (42%), with sugar dropping to a proportionally lower position (27%), hides and leather in third position (9%) and declining participation of cotton (8%). During this period, exports increased their nominal value threefold, due to the development of steamships and railroad construction that cut costs and expedited freight. In 1865, exports exceeded imports to generate a favourable trade balance, this achievement mainly attributed to coffee exports, considering the sharp increase



in worldwide consumption. At this point, around 80% of labour activity in Brazil was devoted to agriculture.

The period from the second half of the 19<sup>th</sup> century to the 1930s was marked by two important processes with definitive repercussion in the country's history: the breakdown in the slavery regime and increased European immigration to work in the fields.

The transition from the slavery regime to free labour was very slow, characterised by partial measures and the strong opposition to full liberation of the slaves. In 1850, the slave trade was abolished. Twenty years later, the so-called Free Womb Act was approved, stipulating that children of slaves born from that date would no longer be deemed slaves. In 1885, the Sexagenarian Act liberated the slaves over 65 years old. Finally in 1888 the end of slavery was decreed, with the enactment of Lei Áurea, the law abolishing slavery. The Brazilian government made no plan whatsoever to support or create opportunities for these dismissed workers and their children, condemning them to a life of poverty and discrimination.

At the same time, there was a stronger immigration process, mainly of Europeans. Immediately after the country's independence, German immigrants arrived in Brazil for the clear purpose of populating the still uninhabited areas in South Brazil, for fear that neighbouring countries would occupy this region. The incentive to settle immigrant colonies in the

southern states of Brazil – Paraná, Santa Catarina and Rio Grande do Sul – laid the foundations for family farming in the region. Later, in 1875, also in South Brazil, a new wave of immigration involved the arrival of a large Italian contingent that had also worked in agriculture. It is estimated that between 1851 and 1900 two million immigrants arrived in Brazil.

The abolition of slavery caused a labour surplus. As a result, employers were able to keep wage very low while raising barriers against the workers' political organisation.

Independence and opening of ports triggered a consolidation process of liberal ideas in Brazil. Formerly, the decline of the sugar cycle had strongly shaken the oligarchies in North and Northeast Brazil. Due to the size of the European coffee market, the Southeast had a long period of supremacy, with large accumulation of capital in the hands of the coffee-growing aristocracy. Since 1850, the country embarked on industrial expansion, building factories plants, banks and shipping companies (Faber, M. et al, 2008), funded by money from the coffee aristocracy and international financial capital. Moreover, the country was still dependent on the export of primary products, with the national industry restricted to consumer goods for the workers. The other products were imported, mainly from the UK.

At the turn of the 19<sup>th</sup> to 20<sup>th</sup> century, the incipient domestic industry benefitted from import substitution process. With the accrual of capital

in agriculture, farmers made industrial investments for processing the raw materials they produced, increasing their capacity to accumulate capital.

The start of the Republic in 1889 brought faster changes in economic structures. The economy became increasingly integrated with international capitalism, playing its role in the international division of labour, based on the adopted agro-export model. The challenge was now truly capitalist, that is, breaking away from the old colonial structures. It was necessary to form a proletariat and create or reinforce consumer markets. To do so, a consumer goods industry was set up. The major obstacle, however, was the dependence on the agro-export model, accompanied by imports of more sophisticated industrial products and heavy industry.



## FIRST REPUBLIC

Also known as the Old Republic, this period stretches from the Proclamation of the Republic in 1899 to the 1930 Revolution. Its Presidents were Field-marshal Manuel Deodoro da Fonseca, head of the Provisional Government and later President elected by the Constituent Assembly (1889-1891); Field-marshal Floriano Peixoto (1891-1894) who took office after Deodoro's resignation; Prudente de Morais (1894-1898); Campos Sales (1898-1902); Rodrigues Alves (1902-1906); Afonso Pena, who died before concluding his mandate (1906-1909); Nilo Peçanha, Afonso Pena's Vice-president, who took over from him (1909-1910); Marshal Hermes da Fonseca (1910-1914); Venceslau Brás (1914-1918); Rodrigues Alves elected in 1918, died of the Spanish flu without taking office, resulting in an interim government of his Vice-president Delfim Moreira (1918-1919); Epitácio Pessoa (1919-1922); Artur Bernardes (1922-1926); and Washington Luís, ousted by the 1930 Revolution (1926-1930).

During the first three decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, the predominance of the rural oligarchical power continued, with a strong emphasis on coffee for export. Politically, this hegemony was guaranteed based on political agreements between Minas Gerais and São Paulo, in the 'coffee with milk policy', a term used to characterize the alternating power between the São Paulo Republican Party and the Minas Gerais Republican Party – an agreement only broken in the 1930 elections.

The 1929 Crash, first in the USA and then spreading to most of the capitalist world, affected the world coffee trade, at that time Brazil's main export. Accordingly, the essentially agro-export Brazilian economy felt compelled to redefine itself. Amidst the questioning of the political-economic structures, Getúlio Vargas led the 1930 Revolution, deposing the São Paulo-born Washington Luís from the Presidency of the Republic.

## Supply crises and how they were managed

The first supply crisis recorded in urban Brazil was in 1870. The main cause was the shortage of labour for livestock and food crops, due to the priority given to sugar and coffee plantations, for example. It is important to underscore that this first crisis had no State intervention measures, conduct compatible with the liberal view prevailing at that time. Moreover, the simple draft of any proposal close to a supply policy would be classified as a step backwards, a return to the colonial era.

The government limited itself to reducing taxes in order to facilitate tropical exports, which meant the option for protecting the farmers focusing on exports, thus further aggravating the food shortage for internal consumption. As a mitigating factor, it encouraged the installation of local grain production centres in regions far from the large latifúndia, to meet the demand for food in cities. At the same time, immigration was encouraged in order to mitigate the problem of a labour shortage for food production. These efforts had no short-term effect; and the food shortage reached the cities of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, the country's main urban centres.

The most severe shortage affected fresh meat, generally pork, since beef was produced far from urban centres and would generally reach consumers in precarious conditions. Disorganised trade was purportedly the main reason for this, with the significant presence of intermediaries monopolising the product supply, negatively impacting the consumer prices. The timid attempts to somehow regulate the trade failed since they went against the interests of breeders and traders.

During the First Republic, liberalism was established as the predominant economic ideology, with its apologia for the free market and its improved capacity to regulate the economy, according to Furtado (1984). Nevertheless, the State's non-

intervention principle became relative, since it had played an active role in facilitating financial policies for the coffee farmers. The economic and political force of the sector was the result, influencing central government decisions.

## State action and coffee market: the Taubaté Convention

A major milestone of State presence in protecting the interests of coffee growers was signed on 26 February 1906 in the city of Taubaté, State of São Paulo. Representatives from the States of Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais and São Paulo met to draft the Taubaté Convention, the first major State instrument to benefit private sector interests. Coffee was the prime Brazilian export product and therefore responsible for generating most of the foreign exchange revenue for the country's international trade.

As the world's main coffee grower, Brazil exerted a huge influence on the product's prices in the international market. However, since it was impossible to curb the increase in production, exceeding the rising demand, caused prices to plummet. The Taubaté Convention attempted to valorise coffee and stabilise the exchange rate. According to Netto (1959), the exchange rate was lowered and set at a level to benefit coffee farmers by transferring the revenue from consumers of imports to the coffee producers.

The Convention further established that, for the first time, Brazil would have an institutional procurement mechanism. The government would procure the surplus production for a stockpile in event of poorer harvests. This procurement would use funds from foreign loans, and intended to prohibit new coffee plantations to mitigate the problem of overproduction. This practice, however, was very difficult to control, since cultivation was encouraged by the product's profitability.

Pereira (2009) comments on the fundamental elements of coffee valorisation – the Convention guaranteed for the State the creation of the Caixa de Conversão, keeping the coffee bean price immune from any increases in the international price, preventing the rise in the exchange rate of the thousand-réis, the currency in effect at that time. This meant that, if international prices increased, there would be the same rise in product's price quotations since:

- The Federal Government was now behaving as the guarantor for foreign loans taken by the states, which would diminish the risk for the creditor and financial cost for applicant state. Without the federal guarantee, it would be difficult to find a private partner willing to incur operating such a risk. It is necessary to keep in mind that coffee protection meant intervention over market forces in their international context, at a time in which many thought this impossible.
- The states were now permitted to charge an export duty to pay for the valorisation expenses, a source of fund-raising and key to fulfilling the agreed commitments.

According to Mauro (2013), some interpretations of the Taubaté Convention called attention to the role of international capital as the big "winner" of this economic policy adopted by the government of São Paulo (and other coffee producing states, in its early years) and, later by its partnership with German, English and North American groups. On this subject, Topik (1987) argues that the federal and São Paulo governments did not expect to profit from their intervention in the coffee market, but merely to improve the product's quotation and protect the farmers, as well as strengthen currency stability and increase tax revenues. In that same direction, Charles R. Whittel Sey, apud Camargo (1997) comments that the valorisation of coffee as an economic political measure should not be confused with state monopoly, since it was designed primarily to protect the interests of competing producers within private enterprise. Nor should it be confused with government-subsidised private monopolies. The author says that there is not necessarily a discrepancy between the State presence in the economic domain and the interests of the business sector. However, Pacheco (2012) believes that the State's prolonged intervention was very harmful to the coffee market. To regulate prices, the government began to incinerate coffee stocks. According to the author, harvesting to destroy crops is not coherent in a market economy but would be in an interventionist government.



The mechanisms adopted by the government attracted new entrepreneurs to the coffee market, principally because of the minimum price policy. Coffee crops have low entry and high exit barriers, since conservation costs are low after the coffee tree is planted. However, it takes four years before the tree is productive.

Generally coffee prices are unstable, oscillating substantially from one harvest to the next. Traditional historiography states that, due to the political importance of interest groups in the coffee sector, there was growing demand for intervention in the market, and the economic policy was oriented to protect the sector's revenue (Pacheco, 2012). Literature indicates that the First Republic was marked by an economic policy of orthodox thinking and that the intervention was the result of the economic structure based on agricultural exports (especially coffee).

Intervention in the coffee price by regulating the supply impaired the diversification of Brazilian agricultural production until the mid-

1930s. Moreover, the exchange policy adopted to protect the sector's income incentivised substitution of imports, but raised serious problems for the central government budget execution. Particularly, the interest of the coffee growers was maintained, but the successive rounds of intervention led to further intervention.

## Early 20<sup>th</sup> century

The first few years of the 20<sup>th</sup> century saw a limited State presence on food supply issues, similar to the second half of the previous century. The economic and social crisis that marked the period was partly determined by the lack of foreign finance and, from 1913, by the falling prices of the top Brazilian exports.

At first the government tackled this situation by issuing currency, which led to inflation, especially in food. In 1914, with the onset of the First World War, the situation worsened due to an increase in exports to countries that were at war, especially rice,

beans and meat, incurring a rise in prices of those products and the sharp drop in supply to the domestic market. Policies backing the coffee producing sector and the intensified issue of currency caused inflationary food prices, leading to another food supply crisis in 1917. In Brazil, the 1891 Constitution provided that import duties belonged to the Union, whilst export duties belonged to the states. This caused considerable asymmetry in economic power between the states linked directly to exports and the rest. Thus, the State of São Paulo, for example, prioritized exports – considering it had specialized in coffee production –, while at the same time it encouraged the reduction in imports of other foodstuffs, in detriment to the food supply (Tosi & Faleiros, 2010).

Setbacks for food imports became more diversified. The most serious situation took place with wheat, due to less Argentinean exports, the result of the disastrous harvests in 1916-1917 and high freight costs, which eventually placed the main

Argentinean export at a disadvantage when compared to the USA and Canada. The Argentinean difficulties caused a sharp rise in the prices of the product and of its by-products in Brazil. The government then encouraged domestic wheat crops in an attempt to counter this situation.

Another factor contributing to rising prices and further deterioration of the food supply crisis in 1917 was the trade and credit control by a small group of foreigners or nationals. This happened through the control of ports and railroads (mainly by foreigners) and by the trade of food, sacks, textiles, cotton and salt (by Brazilians).

## Further attempts to control the food market and the end of the First Republic

In response to the crisis, in June 1918 the government created the Public Food Commissariat (CAP), the first agency with power to interfere in and regulate food supply. Its attributions included regulating prices and inventories, and following up production costs and costs charged by producers. These actions helped define basic products that could be exported, domestic market selling price lists, food procurement from producing regions and allocating it through direct sales or partnerships with private agents (for direct consumer service), the requisition of private stocks for the market – principally in urban areas – to ensure supply and cut prices. The aim was to preserve the domestic supply capacity and avoid the price rise of food considered essential.

The creation of the CAP had the explicit aim of intervening to regulate the food sector, from production to consumption. This agency, based in Rio de Janeiro (the Federal District at that time) and linked to the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Trade, fixed maximum sale prices for the retail market of essential products. It also authorised the Executive Power, during a state of war, to

requisition any amount of food considered essential.

These measures were harshly criticised by the strong sectors of the rural oligarchy, especially producers, but also merchants, importers or other intermediaries. Nevertheless, part of this oligarchy understood that something had to happen to restrain the violent public demonstrations that broke out as a result of the food supply crisis. Some Congress representatives for the more progressive forces and protecting workers' interests pointed out that the problems of the crisis were because the government gave priority to exports of basic foods. Another factor that negatively influenced supply was the precarious status of the infrastructure, particularly cargo transport – by sea or land –, hampering distribution of goods to the different consumer centres.

Despite the range of duties and powers granted to the CAP, there was no practical and effective result. Pressure against this, to some extent, explains why some actions were taken to control the food supply crisis. In the

productive sector, sugarcane producers from Pernambuco were prominent in their criticism and pressure against the government. They considered the CAP was largely responsible for the drop in sugar exports, since it failed to take advantage of new market openings created by the war. Their protests were accompanied by tough reactions from the House of Representatives, who made threats and criticised the fact that these measures were socialising and not in accordance to the Brazilian State's liberal approach. These pressures were decisive in extinguishing the CAP in 1919, with its replacement one year later with the Supply Superintendence, also linked to the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Trade. The crisis situation,

however, did not change significantly. The Supply Superintendence adopted a minimum price policy for the first time in Brazil, thus guaranteeing prices for products such as wheat and beans. It also determined import duty exemptions for several products, such as salt, potatoes, rice, beans, condensed milk, butter, corn, and beef jerky. It also helped further the organisation of cooperatives, in order to increase food production, and encouraged the creation of farmers' markets in the main capital cities, with a view to increasing supply and cutting prices for consumers, reducing the action of the middlemen (buyers and traders who go between production and consumption).

The agency was the administrative tool to regulate export of food and essential goods, as well as to take the necessary government measures, particularly to prevent an exaggerated price rise of these items, safeguarding the legitimate interests of farmers and sellers. These goals were soon discarded, and the Superintendence was now regarded as an agency to further the producer classes, since its first measure was to extinguish export control and do away with the price fixing system.

As can be seen, the First World War years worsened the Brazilian food supply crisis, given the dependence on imports to guarantee supply. The war imposed limits on the circulation of merchandise worldwide and restricted supply, as a result of the decrease in production of some products, such as wheat, leading to a rise in prices. Although the war ended in 1918, food supply problems in Brazil persisted throughout the 1920s, forcing the government to adopt measures in an attempt to control the crisis. A series of public demonstrations began, motivated by the food crisis, in the urban centres and reinforced by the start of urban industrial parks, causing the growth of urban populations – especially in Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo – and the formation of a factory workforce. Moreover, the revolutions underway in Russia, Germany and Hungary contributed to further social mobilisations in Brazil.

In the period 1918-1930 the country had four different presidents: Delfim Moreira (1918-1919); Epitácio Pessoa (1919-1922); Artur Bernardes (1922-1926) and Washington Luís (1926-1930). These governments continued their commitment to the Coffee with Milk Policy, facing a succession of food supply



crises, with strong public pressures, and characterised by many contradictions in handling their policy. Having adopted some interventionist measures in the food market – going against the liberal principles of their parties –, the government faced strong pressure from the rural oligarchy and traders.

These reactions led to a change in course of the government that ceased to use direct control instruments in food marketing and gradually eliminated the ban on exports and price fixing, although the food crisis continued to be a reality. The definition of essential products aimed to justify the actions to promote production, which minimised criticism – above all from the productive sector – and promoted the sale of agricultural inputs at cost price.

In order to strengthen the guidelines to foster production – in detriment to food marketing control –, the government created the Executive Office of National Production, which now directly supported the productive sector. The agency's tasks included incentives to buying and selling tools, implements, machinery at subsidised prices and providing technical assistance.

## Effects of the 1929 Crash in Brazil

The 1929 Crash hit Brazil very strongly, especially due to the plummeting prices of coffee and other exports. This situation further destructured the national economy and forced the government to take new interventionist economic measures. Concerning coffee, government measures had already been taken since the early 20<sup>th</sup> century (Taubaté Convention) to uphold the farmers' prices: payment of subsidies for exports and procurement of products to create public inventories.

At the end of the Washington Luís government in 1930, there was further aggravation of the food supply crisis, with a shortage of essential goods and their consequent price increase. Washington Luís determined direct intervention in the economic domain, with the following actions:

- Price fixing for 59 items of staples (mostly food, but also kerosene and petrol)
- Supervision of compliance with government price lists and, should they be infringed, enforcement of fines to traders failing to comply with the government determination
- Authorisation to requisition inventories of these products, by paying compensation to owners (traders and importers) and transfer by direct sale to traders, based on the acquisition price
- Ban on exporting basic foodstuffs, except in cases where there was a surplus production compared to domestic consumer requirements
- Exemption of custom duties for 11 products considered essential, to facilitate imports and reduce prices

These measures were designed to regulate the food market and control the crisis situation that had arrived. According to Linhares and Silva (1979), the most relevant of these actions was the prerogative granted to the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Trade to ensure the inspection process. In turn, compliance of these measures was guaranteed through joint action with the federal, state and municipal governments.

Sanctions provided the application of fines and prison for up to 30 days. The food list restricted for exports was on the list of products with their prices fixed. It is worth recalling that this measure had already been adopted when the Public Food Commissariat (CPA) was implemented. The intention was to ensure that production

would go to the domestic market, aimed at increasing availability of market staple foods and preventing a price rise.

The government made coastal trade standards more flexible upon permitting foreign ships to transport national products from one port to another in national territory. By adopting this exceptional shipping system, it intended to increase the food flow between producing regions and consumer centres. The idea was to regulate supply, especially through port cities, such as Porto Alegre, Santos, Rio de Janeiro, Salvador, Recife, Belém and Manaus.

According to Linhares and Silva (1979), the measures adopted did not have the impact that the government expected, because surveillance, one of the mainstays of this decree, depended on delegating its jurisdiction to the states, Federal District and municipalities, under formal agreements with the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry and Trade. It is worth bearing in mind that putting the process in place was slow due to the difficulties at different government levels to implement this surveillance action for food retail trade, particularly at that time when

State structures were incipient and lacked administrative experience in this field.

Another relevant aspect that possibly contributed to the failure of these measures was the fact that, among actions set forth by the government, the incentive to increase production and improvement of the infrastructure were not prioritised, especially at a regional level. This being the case, it was virtually impossible to reduce prices by increasing supply, as this increase depended on a greater flow of imports. This government policy would eventually be subordinated to the behaviour of international prices, and even a drop in import tariffs would not suffice.

It should be mentioned that the country responsible for most exports to Brazil, the United States, was striving to recover from the 1929 Crash, focusing its efforts on the domestic market, which contributed to increasing difficulties to Brazil to import food at low prices. Dependence on imports increased the country's vulnerability and it became hostage to similar events in other regions of the world. Brazil did not encourage an increase in economic activity internally, such as higher

occupation and the creation of formal employment by increasing production activities. It did not increase the availability of domestic food production, the centre of the crisis, nor contribute to shortening distances and reducing the final price and transport times between different places of production and consumer centres.

The political situation became so untenable that it facilitated a civil-military cooperation that led to the resignation of Washington Luís at the end of 1930, which marked the end of the First Republic (1889-1930).

## Overview

In short, the agro-exporter model that prevailed during the period described in this chapter caused a mismatch between food production (supply) and consumption (demand), with countless episodes of food shortage and a consequent increase in prices and inflation. Although the State had attempted to intervene in the farm produce market because of the food supply crisis and food shortage mainly affecting urban areas, the liberal view prevailed. The outlook was that the market was the best way to regulate the economy. Any control attempt by the State was the target of strong criticism.

The first experience in institutional procurement took place with the Taubaté Convention, designed to protect private interests. This intervention in coffee prices compromised the diversification of Brazilian agricultural production until 1930. The First World War worsened the situation. Brazil started to export food to countries that were at war, while at the same time faced more problems to import food items, such as wheat, which led to rising domestic prices and caused another food supply crisis.

Faced with the agro-exporting hegemony, interests of the working class were set aside, according to Linhares (1979), since the country's policies were dictated by farmers and traders. The setbacks in domestic supply were not caused by technical failure to meet demand, but rather by the prevalence of large producers interested in exports, led by coffee growers. The 1929 Crash marked the definitive deadlock that resulted in the Vargas Era and the start of a new phase for governmental policies.







# From 1930 to the military coup

During the 1930s, when Getúlio Vargas became President, to the military coup of 1964, Brazil underwent constant political instability marked by successive changes in Presidents and strong mobilisation by civil society. The rural condition and the agro-exporting model gave way to urbanisation and industrialisation. It is undeniable that the country took a step forward in relation to granting rights to workers, women and the elderly. As regards the food supply issue, Brazil was a large laboratory in which different governments experimented with innumerable schemes, expressing their respective ideological concepts. Despite such endeavours, the country failed to assuage hunger and food and nutrition insecurity.

Regarding civil society, it can be considered that advance was made in union organisations and escalation of struggles for land reform, and individual and collective rights, such as labour and social security, for example. There were important social achievements, such as the institutionalisation of the minimum wage, thirteenth salary, shorter working days and the right to unionisation, albeit under State supervision.

Brazil made progress in the field of the workers' right, women and the elderly, but failed to resolve their problems of social exclusion, illiteracy, food and nutritional insecurity, price fluctuations and access to food. On the other hand, the period was extremely

rich in building a new role for the State. Countless solutions were tested, with major breakthroughs in public policies to attempt to respond to the deep changes in Brazilian social dynamics of that time.





## The start of the Vargas Era

The end of the Washington Luís government was troubled. In 1929, when making plans for his succession to the Presidency of the Republic, he broke the existing agreement between Minas Gerais and São Paulo states (Coffee and Milk Policy). At the end of 1929, São Paulo-born Washington Luís presented as his successor Júlio Prestes, his fellow countryman.

As Minas Gerais was against this candidate, it announced the name of Getúlio Vargas, the then governor of the State of Rio Grande do Sul, as a candidate to the country's Presidency. This process was the start of a new configuration in national geopolitics, since Vargas also relied on the support of the Rio de Janeiro and Paraíba governors. The outcome of this articulation was the Liberal Alliance, a political base to support the Vargas candidacy.

Soon after the elections, with the victory for the government slate, a civil-military reaction emerged leading to the 1930 Revolution. Washington Luís resigned and was replaced by a military junta that nominated Vargas to take office in his first term until 1934, the period called the Interim Government.

This new cycle was accompanied by reshaping the strategy for the country's development, moving from the agro-exporting benchmark to an urban-industrial context. The Liberal Alliance platform advocated the defence of rural and urban workers in several areas – such as, for example, education, hygiene, food, housing, credit and minimum wage –, and endorsed the creation of schools of agriculture and consumer cooperatives (D'Araújo, 2001, p. 285-286).

It also advocated to resume economic growth as necessary to develop the national industry and domestic market and to enhance the country's infrastructures. Vargas further aimed to expand food production in order to meet internal demand and reduce dependence on imports, thereby overcoming the food supply crisis (D'Araújo, 2001, p. 293).

Despite a series of government measures, problems continued in the food supply. As a result of the 1929 Crash the country experienced

investment difficulties and a trade balance deficit due to reduced exports, especially coffee. The context was also one of rising fuel prices and low logistics capacity in the country. Brazil had a storage deficit and insufficient roads, making it even more difficult for the storage sector and to cut costs, contributing to expanding the power of intermediaries, traders and importers. To a certain extent, the causes of the crisis in the first three decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century continued, since urbanisation – the most significant structural change in the country – was encouraging migration of the rural population to the cities, intensifying the imbalance between food supply and demand and exerting pressure on food prices.

To remedy this situation, the Vargas government centralised surveillance and price control actions, since it deemed inefficient the model adopted in 1930 that delegated this jurisdiction to the states, Federal District and municipalities. Other important measures were taken early in 1931, to ensure progress in the relations between capital and labour and to guarantee some

social achievements to help improve the workers' lives.

Thus, Vargas instituted the Labour Ministry and new rules for trade unions in Brazil were created. This measure provided single trade union organisation (one trade union for each professional category) and government approval to create trade unions, strongly opposed by the business sector, who were against workers' organisations, and by the Catholic Church, already active in the workers' social organisation. This standard allowed the government manipulation and linked trade unions to its interests, losing trade union autonomy. Nonetheless, it may be considered that there was progress in labour relations, generating considerable discontent in the business sector and support of the working class (Fundação, 2012).

In order to politically minimise some of the criticism against the government, especially from the coffee growers' rural oligarchy in São Paulo, Vargas centralised the power of intervening in the coffee market nationwide in the hands of the National Coffee Council

(CNC). Until then, this task had been the states' responsibility (Taubaté Convention). It is important to recall that São Paulo concentrated most of the coffee production and the economic weight of its business and industrial sectors were emerging on the national scene. To a certain extent, this situation prevails until today.

The CNC restricted the cultivation of new areas and acted directly on coffee procurement to create regulatory inventories, as a way to remove from the market surplus coffee that was not exported. The intention was to sustain prices for farmers. The government, in fact, incinerated part of these inventories, as Delfim Netto (1959 apud Delgado, 1978, p. 13) demonstrates: "the destruction that began in June 1931 and ended in July 1944 eliminated nothing less than 78.2 million sacks of coffee, that is, equivalent to three times the world consumption in one year".

Another important aspect in the geopolitics of the time is that São Paulo was not only the largest coffee producer but also the largest potato, bean and corn producer. It was also

ranked second and third in the national production of cotton and cassava, respectively. This contributed to Vargas giving special attention to this state, considering the political opposition of the São Paulo elite against the government, which in 1932 attempted an uprising through the rapidly averted Constitutionalist Revolution (Moreira, 2012).

Besides coffee, Vargas determined that 10% of the sugar produced in the mills be stored mandatorily, as a government regulated inventory. These inventories could only be moved and sold with prior government authorisation. Even so, this measure was not enough for the sharp 50% drop in the price of sugarcane and sugar, which led the interim government in 1931 to create the Commission in Defence of Sugar Production (CDPA).

The situation did not change, since the domestic market was not sufficient to absorb the total production. Nor were exports an alternative, as other producing countries also had surplus production. In this context, the government created the Sugar and Alcohol Institute, to solve this problem

structurally. Public interventions in the sector were constant, in order to minimise surplus supply and low prices. The situation continued out of step throughout the 1930s, and was basically settled in 1941 with the creation of the Sugarcane Farming Statute.

In 1936, Brazil faced new setbacks in the supply of wheat flour imported mainly from Argentina. The government considered some of the reasons to be:

- The formation of an international trust that sought to “exert a deep disturbing action in the consumption of a product that is essential for people’s nutrition, namely wheat flour”
- “An unjustifiable increase” in prices
- Abuse in the “profit obtained by the milling industry”, deemed to be disproportional “with the capital invested, almost all of foreign origin”
- Urgency in taking measures, with a view to encouraging “the production of national wheat, determining the minimum percentage for its addition to imported wheat”


Another measure to minimise the supply problem, on a cyclical basis, was to increase the aliquot of products stored in ports, as a means of exerting pressure on importers to release their stocks. The estimate was that there were over 100,000 sacks of wheat flour stocked in the ports, and with the release of the product, the government intended to supply the population and cut consumer prices, preventing any speculation by the importers (Linhares; Silva, 1979, p. 100).

The National Agriculture Society (SNA), a non-profit public utility founded in 1897 to take political and educational actions on behalf of Brazilian farming, called the government’s attention to how vulnerable the country was, should Europe begin to import about 10% of their wheat requirements from Argentina. It suggested the government add other starches, such as corn and cassava, to the wheat flour used in bread-making, which they called “mixed bread” (Linhares; Silva, 1979, p. 100). This initiative was to substitute imports, reducing the dependence on Argentinean wheat while, at the same time, guaranteeing Brazilian farmers a new market.

## New State

Vargas achieved a new mandate by a coup d’état backed by the military. In his first actions under the de facto regime in 1937, Vargas closed down the National Congress, put an end to political parties, put in place a new Constitution and fully centralised the power in the hands of the federal government. He then appointed governors to the States, called interveners. He took control of the spoken and written press and then made propaganda glorifying and valorising the Armed Forces, mainly in order to secure his government’s sustainability.

The policy of the Vargas government was to strengthen the domestic market without losing sight of exports. In this sense, he began encouraging other sectors, to guarantee a diversified production. This diversification was to meet



domestic demand, guarantee surplus for export and ensure the inflow of foreign exchange into the country to eliminate the trade balance deficit.

In 1938, the Rural Economy Service was created to further farming planning based on guidelines that should meet the demand of the different consumer regions. For this purpose, it was necessary to undertake economic and social studies and research on rural life, to organise the home market and encourage cooperatives and agro/livestock insurance.

In 1930, coffee accounted for 68% of the value of Brazilian exports, and cotton the second most exported product with only 3%. In 1939, coffee exports dropped to 34%, and cotton increased its share in Brazil's total exports to 18% (Fausto; Devoto, 2004, p. 254). Other products occupied the space lost by coffee throughout the decade, as the government had intended. At the end of the 1930s, diversification of Brazilian exports was quite perceptible, and besides coffee and cotton, products such as cacao, skins and furs, oranges, meat, Carnauba wax, castor beans, tobacco, and oilseeds were economically important (Linhares; Silva, 1979, p. 92).

In this context, the most dynamic sector was citrus fruit growing, in the state of Rio de Janeiro. Making the most of the investments made during the 1920s, from incoming English capital, orange processing plants were set up. In the early 1930s, the industry had an idle processing capacity, enabling it to increase the production from

560 thousand crates of oranges in 1928, to 5 million crates in 1939 (Linhares; Silva, 1979, p. 92-93).

In fact, despite product diversification, after the introduction of citrus crops, Brazil continued to be a country focusing on foreign markets. The urban population, rapidly growing with urban spread, continued to face food shortages, high prices and low wages, and therefore was not able to consume the required amount of food to fulfil their basic needs.

With a rather delicate situation of the food supply, the government toughened its intervention levels and, in 1940, established crimes against the grassroots economy, including the destruction of raw materials without prior authorisation, abandoning crops or plantations and other actions that could concentrate agricultural production, diminish competition or increase prices.

In 1938, the government adopted measures to regulate and organise large fruit and vegetable warehouses, the first of which was in the Federal District, at that time Rio de Janeiro. The government goal was to increase food availability, cutting transaction costs and lowering retail prices by organising the market and shortening the distance between farmers and consumers. This process allowed the government to check the marketed volume, and the quality and prices of the products. It also made it possible to transfer greater gains to farmers, since they would be less vulnerable to pressure from traders. The government also organised large fruit and vegetable warehouses in other cities.

The following year World War II broke out. The future of Brazilian citrus crops was challenged, since the loss of the international market in the 1939 harvest could be of two million crates of oranges that were imported mainly by the United Kingdom and Germany. For the government and farmers, the simplest way of guaranteeing the sale of most of this production would be to set up alternative channels, allowing consumers direct access to the farmers. The solution was to encourage trade through trucks and kiosks distributed at different points in urban areas, closer to the producing municipalities, especially in the city of Rio de Janeiro (Linhares; Silva, 1979, p. 94).

Also in 1939, Vargas created the Supply Commission subordinated to the Ministry of Agriculture with representatives of different ministries, in addition to Rio de Janeiro City Hall (Federal District). This intersectoral Commission must act nationwide, with the following competences:

- To perform stocktaking
- To fix maximum selling prices of merchandise, both wholesale and retail
- To purchase and sell goods, including importing them, if necessary, and transferring them at cost price to the tradesmen in consumer centres
- To requisition stocks, even private ones, for essential foodstuffs to sell in consumer centres

Throughout the 1930s the urbanisation process accelerated in Brazil, concomitantly with a rural exodus. The food supply crises continued and wages lost their purchasing power in relation to the basic food basket. This situation created conditions to strengthen the workers' organisation, which helped increase social pressures for better wages and implement the minimum wage, established by law in 1936, but only enacted in 1940.

Following on and still in 1940, the Food Service of Social Security (SAPS) was created. This initiative was designed primarily to improve work productivity by providing subsidised full meals to social security-paying workers during their working hours.

Although the supply asymmetries were not overcome, the federal government decreed in 1940 the end of the Supply Commission, since it understood that it had fulfilled its purpose. The decree to extinguish the Commission states: "whereas the government objectives to regulate the food market have already been achieved (...) the Supply Commission is therefore extinguished." And this was not the case.

In 1941, because of weather problems in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, there was significant loss in rice production, strongly impacting supply. In that context, the Vargas government banned rice exports until the domestic supply was back to normal. The ban was lifted in March the following year, at the start of the rice harvest in Mid-South Brazil.

In 1942, Vargas declared a state of war throughout Brazil, leading to the creation of the Coordination for Economic Mobilisation. According to Article 1, "All utilities and economic resources existing in the national territory are mobilised at the service of Brazil, regardless of their origin, character, ownership or subordination relationship". It is worth mentioning that some of its missions were to focus on mining, agriculture, cattle farming and industry in general, import and export controls, maximum price fixing and sales limits of goods, as well as intervention in the labour market.

The following year was marked by one of the most significant achievements of the Vargas Era: the Consolidation of Labour Laws (CLT), still in effect today, and which throughout those 70 years or so has only been updated, without losing its essence of protecting all workers. On 1<sup>st</sup> May 1943 when it was launched, Vargas presented the legislation guidelines in a speech that highlighted the government's efforts to settle what he called the "food problem" (Vargas, 1943, p. 33 and 35).

That same year, yet another institutional innovation: the government created the Production Financing Company (CFP), responsible for financing farm production, ensuring food sovereignty and guaranteeing the country's economic and military defence. This structure had links to the Ministry of Financial Affairs. As an agency subordinated to the CFP, there was the creation of the Service for Control and Reception of Agricultural Products and Raw Materials (SCRPA). It was up to this agency to receive, classify, store, release, insure and commercially defend the farming and livestock produce inventories and raw material received by the government.

In 1945, financing – equivalent in minimum prices – for rice, beans, corn, peanuts and soybeans, was authorised. Unfortunately, it was not possible to locate in consulted literature records on possible procurement operations that may have happened in years subsequent to the launch of this instrument.

Another initiative created in 1945 was the National Food Commission that replaced the National Technical Food Service. This commission's task was to carry out studies on the Brazilian population, as well as propose standards for the National Food Policy (Prado, 1993, p. 28). During

that same period, the Vargas government temporarily suspended the collection of food import rights and other ancillary contributions, including the social security contributions and consumer charges on food considered essential. It is important to mention that these measures to reduce or eliminate duties and taxes had little result, even those linked to furthering production.

## Post Second World War Period

In 1945, the last year of the Vargas government, companies were authorised to set up food supply warehouses for their employees. These warehouses could only sell the following products: rice, sugar, oil, lard, potatoes, coffee, beef jerky, onions, flour, beans, pasta, butter, soap and salt. Companies had to employ a minimum of 300 workers. Smaller companies could act in conjunction, as long as they jointly complied with the minimum number of employees. This initiative, besides the complementary dining halls, enabled workers not only to have meals served at the plant but also purchase food for consumption at home. This mechanism was also a form of wage advance, discounting the amount of

the purchase from the payroll at the end of the month or fortnight, provided it was no more than 50% of the wage.

Vargas created the Foreign Trade Council and the Food Commission. The commission was subordinated to the council and made up of technical staff from the Ministries of Education and Health, Labour, Industry and Trade, Agriculture, municipal military services, a representative of the food industry and another three people chosen freely, with knowledge in food technology.

Since the commission had links to the Foreign Trade Council and had representatives from the industry, in principle its work could meet industry's demands, with a view to the foreign market. It is worth noting that the person coordinating this Commission was Josué de Castro, doctor, teacher, public health physician and nutritionist, and one of the greatest world authorities on hunger.

### JOSUÉ APOLÔNIO DE CASTRO

Born in 1908 in Recife, Pernambuco state, he graduated in medicine in 1929. A citizen of Rio de Janeiro, Josué de Castro had an outstanding career in public policies: in movements for the fixed minimum wage, in founding the Brazilian Nutrition Archives, edited under the responsibility of the Technical Service of National Nutrition and the New York Nutrition Foundation in 1941 and in founding the Brazilian Association for Food in 1940. He was a federal congressman and chairman of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Executive Council. He remained in that position until the end of 1956. As chairman of the FAO Council, Josué de Castro, boosted by the success of his books (*Geografia da Fome* was published in 1946) and by the prestige of this agency, undertook a series of works to combat hunger in the world, always seeking to combine scientific knowledge and action. Upon leaving the FAO in 1957, Josué de Castro founded the World Association against Hunger to raise the world's awareness of the problem of hunger and poverty, and to foster projects demonstrating how hunger can be overcome and abolished by the will of mankind (Josué de Castro Research Centre, 2008).

Another important measure was the approval of the Regulation for the Cooperative Credit Bank. This regulation allowed cooperatives to manage funds from credit cooperatives, strengthening this type of system and furthering farming.

In July 1945, the government set minimum prices for rice, beans, corn, peanuts, soybeans and sunflowers. The Bank of Brazil – the oldest bank in the country and today the main financial operator for agricultural and livestock credit – was authorised to finance the production of these goods. If this initiative had been successful, the produce would have rather gone to inventory management in large consumer centres, and exported if there had been a surplus. This process to receive produce and defining its destination was coordinated by the Service for Control and Receipt of Farm Produce and Raw Materials, linked to the CFP. Apparently

this decree was not effective, since there are no records of stock building during the period (Delgado, 1978, p. 14). However, it is important to register that the minimum price policy (through the Minimum Price Guarantee Programme – PGPM) is in effect to date, showing how relevant it is not only for the farming sector but also for the government.

Vargas was ousted from government by the military at the end of October 1945, after eight years of de facto regime. Although he had announced new elections and the rearticulation of political parties, he was forced to withdraw before the electoral process. The military guaranteed holding elections by the end of the year, with victory of General Eurico Gaspar Dutra, representing the articulation of the front that Vargas had publicly supported.

Dutra took office in January 1946. His first year's

mandate was marked by liberal actions, but later the President adopted a more heterodox agenda, with direct State interventions. Even so, his government was still affected by the continuing food supply crisis and social and economic problems, such as low wages, inflation, increasing imports, production below consumer needs, accelerated urbanisation process, accentuated rural exodus and logistics problems (particularly transport and storage).



## Dutra Government

During the Dutra government, a strategic plan was drafted to allocate federal government investments. This plan prioritised health, food, transport and energy, strategic areas sensitive to the population's demands. It should be noted there is little bibliography on the Dutra government's farming and food supply policies. The impression is that this was a much less fertile process compared to the Vargas era. Nevertheless, some initiatives carried out during that period could be identified.

The first recorded was the expansion of sales' warehouses within companies, which started by Vargas, and was expanded with the inclusion of toiletries and clothing under the Dutra government. Similarly, it authorised that each worker's wage commitment to these purchases would be no more than 70% of the wage, a percentage denoting how low their purchasing power was.

The government reduced import duties on basic necessities for five months, in order to increase food availability. This action was contrary to the policy of substituting imports. It further determined a ban on exporting basic foodstuffs. This ban was only to be modified after investigations to determine the production volume, estimated consumption and the food stocks available in Brazil. Another initiative to protect the market of beef and pork farmers was to set a maximum quota for the slaughter of herds belonging to meat packers.

The National Coffee Council was extinguished and the Coffee Economics Division was created, linked to the Ministry of Finance. Its duties strongly focused on foreign policy. Some actions were taken to minimise problems caused by the drought in Northeast Brazil, especially in its semi-arid region, with the predominance of granting financial aid. These funds were granted to farmers





and industrialists for dam construction. However, this measure was extremely restricted since few were able to access credit.

The country intensified industrialisation, which possibly contributed to increasing the recurring supply problems. This phase began in 1947 through to 1961, guaranteeing an annual average economic growth of 9.7% after resuming the exchange control and implementing a system of prior license to release imports (Beskov, 1999, p. 56).

## Second Vargas Government

Although ousted, Getúlio Vargas was still a player on the political scene, albeit more discreetly, as senator of the Republic. During this period, he joined the Brazilian Labour Party (PTB) and was once again elected President of the Republic, in direct elections, beginning his second and last term in October 1951.

His speech was contradictory. He had been elected because of his popularity, but also in dialogue with the liberals. According to Beskov (1999, p.58), Vargas reformulated the State intervention strategy upon intensifying actions in the agricultural and livestock farming sector and adopting the Policy for Guaranteed Minimum Prices.

In 1952, the National Food Commission drafted the plan "Food Conjuncture and Nutrition Problems in Brazil", which called for nutritional investigations, increase in school meals, food aid for teenagers, regional programmes, enriching staple foods, and support for the food industry. The only action of them all to survive was the school feeding, under the control of the Ministry of Education in 1955 (Silva, A., 1995).

The plan did not focus on hunger resulting from the different social and economic problems, the main cause of malnutrition. Even so, several actions were taken to implement this, with the creation of multidisciplinary committees. In 1953, 14 of the 25 Brazilian states subsidised workers' meal programmes, and 10% of primary school pupils received food at school (Peixinho, 2011, p. 32).

The government also launched other initiatives. In 1953, a specific programme was launched to multiply wheat seeds, in which the government would purchase the seeds from farmers at 20% above the lowest price of wheat grain. It would also guarantee farmers registered in the programme technical assistance from planting to harvesting. The seeds purchased by the government were distributed to family farmers. This type of programme tends to contribute to the loss of biodiversity, and de-structure the strategies of family farmers' own seed production. Initiatives like this still exist, based on conservative farming modernisation policies that were implemented particularly in the 1950s, with the arrival of the Green Revolution.

Other measures during the period showed signs of possible interventions regarding land ownership. Some of these are the creation of the National Agrarian Policy Commission (CNPA); the incentive to cooperatives, with the Cooperative Credit Bank transformed into a National Cooperative Credit Bank; creation of the Wheat Advisory Committee in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the creation of the Northeast Supply Committee (CAN). Also, a law was approved authorising the federal government to intervene in the economic domain to ensure free distribution of basic necessities for the population's consumption, put in place by the Federal Commission on Supply and Prices (COFAP). These measures were largely adopted during the first year of the new Vargas government.

In 1952, the Brazilian Coffee Institute (IBC) was created, designed to act more broadly than the Taubaté Convention (1906) and the National Coffee Department (1932). New duties were:

- Agricultural research to develop more productive varieties and provide technical recommendations to cutting coffee plantation costs
- Studies to recommend more favourable regions, from both the agricultural and ecological viewpoints
- Use of advertising to promote coffee consumption
- To promote production, credit and distribution cooperatives

Furthermore, the Supply Council was created, later made up by the Ministries of Justice, Highways and Agriculture, by the Chief of Military Staff of the Presidency of the Republic and by the president of COFAP. This Council acted in cooperation with the COFAP:

- To encourage the increase in food production
- To coordinate different means of transport to ensure improved distribution of production to large urban centres
- To provide large scale warehousing of food crops
- To provide the necessary resources for finance costing and investments in the farming sector and services inherent to the food supply

Getúlio Vargas, upon returning to presidential life, had a mandate with an ideologically better-defined position, with a more explicit approach to workers and with renewal of trade union leaders, less tied to the State. This period was marked by new conflicts, because of the new mood of exercising democracy, with operational institutions, without a de facto regime. These disputes, especially with the liberals, led to growing tensions that culminated in the President's suicide amidst pressures for him to renounce.

In the wake of Getúlio Vargas's death, his Vice-President Café Filho took over as a "stop-gap" President for only a year and a half between 1954 and 1955. In the next presidential election, Juscelino Kubitschek was elected.

#### LAW 1,939, 10 AUGUST 1953

According to Article 5 "For the effect of this law, smallholder farmers will be considered those who cultivate their land alone or with their families, not employing paid labour on a permanent basis". It is worth mentioning that this concept, in part, is present in the current Law 11,326, dated 24 July 2006, called the Family Farmers' Act.

#### GREEN REVOLUTION

Albergoni and Pelaez (2007, p.31) consider that "the Green Revolution can be characterised as a technological paradigm deriving from the evolution of knowledge in chemistry and biology, which defined a technological trajectory based on the intensive use of chemicals (fertilizers and pesticides). In the 1970s, this model began to show signs of depletion, when identifying environmental problems associated with the intensive use of agrochemicals and the actual limitations in growth of the chemical industry".

## The Target Plan: the period of major highway works and the construction of Brasilia

Juscelino Kubitschek was renowned for having introduced a strategy for the country's development by launching the Target Plan. This plan was to accelerate Brazil's development, based on actions planned and coordinated by the federal government. The plan involved 31 targets, including the construction of Brasilia, considered to be the synthesis of his campaign pledge – 50 years of progress in five years of achievements. One of this government's milestones was having accelerated industrialisation and the urbanisation process, which led to further agrarian disputes and rural poverty.

The plan's concept took into account the diagnosis given by the Mixed Brazil-United States Commission (Dalio; Miyamoto, 2010, p. 163) and the studies by the National Economic Development Bank (BNDE), in conjunction with a technical team from the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (Silva, S., 2012). In short, the recommendations pointed to investments in the transport areas (rail and port upgrade), electric energy, farming (warehouse construction) and education. The highpoints of his government were the country's large-scale infrastructure works, financed by international capital and the move of the federal capital from Rio de Janeiro to the central region of Brazil, with the inauguration of Brasilia in 1960.

According to Beskov (1999), it is easy to see that not only the agricultural and livestock sectors but also the industrial supply and processing branches were marginal to the Target Plan. When comparing the values invested in each sector, it is noticeable that over 90% of funds were invested in the energy, transport and base industry sectors. In turn, the food and education sectors received a mere 6.6% of all investment. Nevertheless, Beskov considers that the plan contributed to expanding the farming frontier, by increasing vehicle production and the highway network.

With the idea of eliminating the drought problem in the Northeast, Kubitschek created the Superintendence for Development of the Northeast (SUDENE), which encompassed all the states in the region (Maranhão, Piauí, Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraíba,

Pernambuco, Alagoas, Sergipe, Bahia). It included northern Minas Gerais – that, although in Southeast Brazil, is considered part of the Brazilian semi-arid region due to its climate characteristics. SUDENE's mission was to promote regional development. However, it became known as the "drought industry", characterised by the benefits obtained by the local elite in terms of public investments against drought, such as, for example, the construction of dams and other water facilities.

Land reform, however, was not of interest to Kubitschek's development project. Accordingly, it did not challenge the rural oligarchy that included his own and the opposition's political base.

Although the economic balance during the Kubitschek government was positive, the country's growth was not inclusive for the majority of the Brazilian population. Economic growth contributed to widening the socio-economic differences, creating a real gap between the different regions of the country, between rural and urban Brazil, and between the different urban social classes.



## The Vice (that became) President

Jânio Quadros was Juscelino Kubitschek's successor, elected in 1960 with João Goulart as his vice-president. Brazil was, for the first time since 1930, experiencing a process of building democracy, after voting for the third consecutive time for President of the Republic, although political instability was still present.

The new President renounced his mandate in less than eight months of government. A rapid mobilisation called the "Legality Campaign" was started by Leonel Brizola, state governor of Rio Grande do Sul. This campaign relied on the adherence of trade union and social movements and was decisive in ensuring João Goulart would take office. Even with the economic growth of the Kubitschek government, class contradictions were still very present in Brazilian day-to-day life - including issues relating to food supply, hunger and poverty.

In 1962, on Labour Day, President João Goulart announced his intention to undertake basic reforms, a political platform for development that combined a series of reforms: banks, fiscal, urban, administrative, land, and university. In July, he instituted the thirteenth salary, and in August, created the General Workers' Union (CGT), which led to trade union articulation nationwide.

During João Goulart's time in government, a supply system was structured, based on the creation of the National Food Supply Superintendence (Sunab). This superintendence was broadly empowered to regulate the food market. Its tasks included the responsibility of organising the National Supply Plan for essential products, and incorporating the credit policy and increasing production. The Advisory Council was a strategic administrative instrument, responsible for designing the supply plan to be put in place in the country's main urban centres.

This supply plan established coordinated actions. Besides the SUNAB, the Brazilian Storage Company (CIBRAZEM) was created to ensure supply warehouse management throughout national territory - especially in the main farming and consumer regions. The Brazilian Food Company (COBAL) was also created to act in the retail sector and to structure warehouses for wholesale of vegetables and farm produce, such as the Supply Centres (CEASAs). These two institutions, together with the CFP, were to work in articulation and under Sunab coordination. All these agencies were launched in an attempt to regulate the supply sector, based on increased production, expansion in the public warehousing capacity and the diversification of food distribution and marketing, including direct action in retail under public coordination (Silva, J.; Belik; Takagi, 2003, p. 94).

In October 1962, the Agrarian Policy Superintendence (SUPRA) was created. In the first few months of 1963, the government enacted the Rural Worker's Statute, aimed at taking labour achievements to the fields (contract and working hours, rest periods, vacations and rural worker protection). This recognition led to strengthening the rural workers' union movement, and to the creation of the National

Confederation of Farm Workers (CONTAG) by the end of that year. With guarantees given to the union organisation, many rural workers' leagues became rural unions. The number of rural workers' unions increased from 150 to 1,150. Workers' federations were also organised in the then existing 21 Brazilian states.

Other farming policy factors should not be neglected, namely the begin of technical assistance services through a public system (Credit and Rural Aid Association - ACAR), and its expansion in the second half of the 1950s. The increase in farming credit and imports and subsidised sale of fertilizers also contributed to this growth, as well as the improvement in storage infrastructure and transport for distribution of produce, as a result of road building and truck production. Infrastructure upgrades were undoubtedly more relevant than the farming policy since Technical Assistance and Rural Extension (ATER), credit and fertilizers used to be available only to a very small group of farmers - due to the fact that it was assumed that credit takers would have an indebtedness capacity and access to information, as well as due to the low capillarity of the financial agents in the rural areas.

In the second half of that same year, the union movement, articulated around the Joint Action Pact, mobilised 79 trade unions and four federations, upon called for the "Strike of the 700,000 workers in São Paulo". The outcome was very positive, with an 80% wage increase, although the main claims were for collective

bargaining and recognition of shop floor union stewards. In Recife, the rural workers gathered about 30,000 workers for land reform and were suppressed by the Army. One month later in November, the rural workers' union from the Pernambuco Zona da Mata mobilised around 200,000 people, in defence of the sugar mill workers. This was the largest rural strike in the country. All sugar mills and plants came to a standstill, in opposition to the interests of the mill owners. They also obtained an adjustment of 80%, closed the collective bargaining contract under the representation of the Union Council for the Workers of Pernambuco and succeeded in appointing one shop steward per mill (Ferreira, 2012). The National Confederation

of Farm Workers (CONTAG) was officially recognised by the Ministry of Labour and Employment in January 1964. The entity was organised after the rural workers' struggles over land reform. It supported and debated the basic reforms under discussion by the government, for structural changes in the country. João Goulart, who had been the Labour Minister during the Vargas and Kubitschek governments, publicly stated his commitment to land reform.

Precisely because he made his intentions very clear in favour of structural changes, which would diminish the concentration of land and income in Brazil, João Goulart was deposed by the military on 31 March 1964,

cutting short the endeavour to strengthen democracy, social achievements and food citizenship.

#### ACAR AND THE WORKERS' ORGANISATION

In the context of the political, economic and military polarisation of the Cold War, the creation of associations was due mainly through incentives from the International American Association for Economic and Social Development (AIA), a philanthropic body linked to the Rockefeller family, at that time with close ties to the US government. The first Rural Credit Association (ACAR) was created in Minas Gerais, on 6 December 1948, after conversations between Nelson Rockefeller and the state government of Minas Gerais. Juscelino Kubitschek, after the good results obtained by ACAR-MG, signed an agreement in 1954 with the US government and created the Technical Office for Agriculture (ETA), with a view to a technical-financial cooperation to carry out rural development projects, one of which was the national coordination for rural extension work. Several offices (ETAs) were set up in each state in the following years and, in many cases, have been the embryos of each ACAR in their state (Peixoto, 2008, p.18).

## Overview

During the period in which Vargas was president, many schemes were put in place to overcome problems of food supply, especially to facilitate access to it, by increased availability and lower price. To a lesser degree, it was possible to identify actions in farm production, agricultural research, technical assistance and marketing, in addition to storage and attempts to streamline logistics.

These actions, albeit in large numbers, were fragmented and without strategic and management continuity and often interrupted due to the pressure of political and economic groups' vested interests, even during a de facto government. These actions always addressed farming, in response to conjunctural problems (steep prices and supply shortages). On the other hand, major advances were made regarding the provision of labour and social security rights, as well as in implementing the minimum wage.

It can be said that the Dutra and Kubitschek governments focused primarily on the agenda to expand infrastructure and accelerate the industrialisation process. The expectation was that the creation of jobs would solve the country's social problems. This strategy, however, excluded thousands of families living in the rural areas with no available farming means which would allow their spontaneous inclusion in the production process, guaranteeing their economic feasibility and the reproduction and valorisation of the rural production system. Also, people without access to education, migrating from the rural to urban areas, encountered huge problems finding more skilled jobs. They were therefore subject to poor labour relations, with low





compensations, despite the progress made in labour legislation.

Of all of the actions taken for farming and agrarian issues during this period by the different governments studied, possibly the actions taken by the Goulart government presented the greatest possibility for systemic articulation. Goulart attempted to build a supply plan that he deemed strategic and necessary to incorporate rural families into the production process, in order to provide access to farming, especially land, based on land reform.

The intention was to encourage coordinated actions between different sectors, such as furthering production, stocktaking and guaranteeing access to food and other primary staples for rural and urban workers, to minimise regional inequalities, fight against hunger and poverty and ensure food citizenship for the entire Brazilian population. The government valued social organisations and recognized the representativeness of workers' unions as public actors. In turn, union organisations pressed for greater participation of workers, both male and female, called strikes and demanded progress in basic reforms.

Upon considering the set of initiatives put in place since the 1930s, it is noticeable that they were highly concentrated on price control, without a more concrete and long-lasting articulation for solving structural problems, such as access to production resources, and without public policies that would guarantee a strategy to support production. Some attempts were made to adopt public policies, but were sporadic, and generally not systemic. Their action took place in a conjunctural

manner and only by production chain or by product, separately. Few initiatives took into consideration the economic, environmental and social differences.

It should be stressed that the growth in production was based on the expansion of the farming frontier, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. This movement made it possible to multiply new establishments of small and medium-size owners who left South Brazil for the Midwest. Another migratory move was from São Paulo to Paraná, Mato Grosso and Minas Gerais (Triângulo Mineiro). This was one of the main factors for the 56% growth in production between 1950 and 1965 (Beskov, 1999, p. 64).

The PGPM in turn, may have contributed to agricultural expansion, ever since the official price parameters had

a correlation with production costs and market prices. This correlation tends to generate safety for the production sector, which therefore has the guarantee of government interventions in the case of a drop in market prices. Gordon Smith (1969 apud Delgado, 1978, p. 15) states that minimum prices, in the 1950's, were fixed way below the market price and were not announced until the beginning of the cultivation calendar for each different product and agricultural region (Mid-South, Northeast and North) and for each harvest (winter and summer).

Data show that the CFP interventions during the period 1952-1965 were negligible. According to Beskov (1999, p. 59), the average share of volume of resources invested in procurement of farm produce during that

period was less than 1% of the total internal revenue for the farming sector. Likewise, the CFP funds allocated to marketing (post-harvest) of farm produce reached an even less significant level at barely 0.42%. These resources were not only negligible, according to Delgado (1978, p. 24), but most of them also went to warehouse owners and industries, and not to farmers or their cooperatives.

To some extent, it can be considered that the food supply crisis was based on the following problems:

- A farming model based on the latifundia (large landed estate) and the agro-exporting tradition
- Lack of infrastructure for crop distribution, even within the domestic market
- Concentrated industrial process and wholesale marketing (monopoly) in the hands of few companies, including foreign capital
- Incentive for food imports, by cutting import duties, to solve food supply problems
- Lack of support in food farming for the domestic market
- Failure of the land reform policy

Lastly, the exchange, tax and monetary policies applied throughout this period – albeit considering the fluctuations with regard to their more liberalising or protectionist application – were more relevant than all the farming policy instruments together.



# The supply policy and food supplementation during the military regime

Brazil, like many of its other neighbours in Latin America, underwent a long period of authoritarianism, with military governments and the complete suppression of democracy. Against the social transformations proposed by João Goulart, a military dictatorship in 1964 took over in response to the desires and fears of society's conservative sectors.

This chapter addresses the 21 years (1964-1985) when the Executive was occupied by military governments over five presidential terms, Marshal Castelo Branco, General Costa e Silva, General Garrastazu Médici, General Ernesto Geisel and General João Figueiredo. After General Costa e Silva fell

ill and died, he was replaced for a short period by a Military Junta made up of ministers from the Army, Navy and Air Force. The Executive exercised full control over the Legislative and Judiciary powers. Political parties were extinguished, and two new parties were created: the pro-government National Renewal Alliance (ARENA), and the official opposition party Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB). Power was exercised through institutional acts and decrees. Workers' representations were repressed, but only authorised if they obeyed the government at all times.

Unusual management of the economy marked this period. On one hand, a liberal-

based capitalist development strategy was adopted without demur, and restricted the state presence. On the other, the nature of the regime meant that the government never hesitated to intervene with a strong hand in situations that posed some risk to their intentions. This also happened regarding food supply and what came to be called the "conservative modernisation" of Brazilian farming – modern with regard to farming techniques, but conservative in preserving the concentrated land ownership structure, without its democratisation.

The farming upgrade was not restricted to specific initiatives. It consisted of building a new institutional




model, in accordance with the project to set up capitalist farming. During this period, the highlight was the use of subsidised rural credit and tax incentives that shaped the modernisation to the so-called Green Revolution. Between the 1960s and 1970s, international prices for farm products proved to be favourable to export expansion, principally of soybeans and oranges. Food production for the home market was affected, with repercussions on a variety of products, such as the sharp downturn in bean and cassava production and rice and corn production stagnation.

A farming model was established characterised by lesser demand for labour, attracting the population to the cities. The following period in the 1970s and 1980s corresponded to a strong urbanisation, with an exodus of almost 30 million people from the countryside to the cities in only ten years. This was the start of a sudden unstoppable drop in the rural population, alongside uninterrupted growth of the urban population, as seen in Figure 01.

This new urban and rural configuration in Brazil also posed a threat due to higher living costs caused by inflationary food prices. Although the government claimed little intervention in the market, it participated actively in organising and regulating supply. This occurred through assembling an entire institutional apparatus and, at the same time, direct interventions in specific situations.

FIGURE 01: Brazilian population according to domicile status (1960 – 2010)



Source: IBGE, Demographic Census 1960, 1970, 1980, 1991, 2000 and 2010.

## The 1960s

### Changes in the institutional food supply structure

In September 1964, the Executive Coordination Commission for Supply was created, at the same time as the abolition of the National Supply Superintendence (Sunab). The Commission was chaired by the President of the Republic, and made up of ministers from the economic area, Roads and Public Works, as well as the president of Bank of Brazil and the Sunab Superintendent.

In 1965, the new regime changed the name of the National School Meals Campaign to National School Feeding Campaign (CNAE) and extended its duties, including assistance and food education. The CNAE remained responsible for implementing the programme until 1981, when it became the Brazilian National Student Aid Institute (INAE).

Before the military took over, school feeding received outside support, which was gradually reduced in the early 1960s. Between 1964 and 1972, the United Nations World Food Programme and the Food for Peace Programme supplied almost all the fresh foodstuffs. This aid came mainly from the USA, through donations of its surplus farm produce. The campaign eventually became nationwide, and the State now acted as intermediary for this policy, receiving and distributing food donations. With the downturn in international food surpluses, the Brazilian government, in the early 1970s, was forced to use its own budget to buy products allocated to the food supplementation programmes, including school feeding.

In 1966, new standards were put in place to fix minimum prices, while two mechanisms were set up that, for many years, would have significant weight in the marketing of farm and livestock produce: Federal Government Loans (EGF) for financing operations, with and without selling operations (COV and SOV), and Federal Government Procurements (AGF).

In February 1967, the enactment of Decree-Law 200 was extremely important for reorganising the federal administration in accordance with the projects of the regime in force. Chapter III of this decree was reserved for national supply and provided the way to coordinate measures relating to drafting and enforcement of the national supply policy. It conceived an inter-ministerial agency whose duties, composition and operations were fixed by decree and backed by the National Supply Superintendence, created in 1962, with the delegated task of maintaining the market's regulatory stocks. The information system on production, distribution and consumption was also created, and it was decided that Sunab would sign agreements with the states, Federal District City Hall and Territories, in order to transfer to them supervisory charges. According to this role distribution to the then existing agencies, it was the task of the Farming Financing Committee created in 1943 to outline the financial plans for farming, in the interest of the country's economic and military defence.

#### AGF AND EGF (COV AND SOV)

The EGF finances stock building so that farmers can wait for the best time to sell their produce, ensuring they are not forced to offer their products during harvest time when prices might be lower. The COV option (right to sell) entitles farmers to sell to the federal government, while the SOV option (right to buy) means producers cannot sell to the government, being forced to sell their products at prevailing market prices, or undergo prolonged storage to their own account. With the AGF, the government immediately procures the farmer's surplus produce, forming its own stocks and balancing supply and demand, buying at the time of abundant harvests and selling in weaker harvests.



## The 1970s

### Facing the supply crisis

The Médici government (1970-74) added a new institutional format to the State apparatus with regard to farming and food supply. In 1972 by decree, it regulated the National Central Supply System (SINAC). The decree integrated the Supply Centres (CEASA) in each state of the federation, or even at the municipal level, into the same system. In the 1970s, 21 CEASAs were created in capitals throughout the country. These CEASAs were established as partly state-owned companies, whose shareholders were the Union, states and main municipalities of these Centres. The creation of SINAC helped establish marketing standards, market information and farming incentives for the horticultural segment.

Despite all this institutional reformulation in the supply area, problems continued in relation to the food marketing capacity. The 1960s also had a bottleneck in the marketing of horticultural produce. Accordingly, the government made efforts to prevent supply crises and fluctuating prices and prioritised essential products. It also aimed to upgrade the marketing structures in regional markets by setting up supply centres and terminal markets.

In 1973, the government formed the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA) that has played an important groundbreaking technological role in agriculture. The institution introduced new genetically modified crops, and improved pest control. EMBRAPA's work has always been articulated to the food processing industry, aiming at contributing to modernising this sector.

This consolidated the agricultural strategy tripod at the time, consisting of research (EMBRAPA), rural extension (Brazilian Technical Assistance and Rural Extension Corporation – EMBRATER) and teaching, by strengthening the schools of agronomy, which in fact included the presence of foreign professors. This strategy focused on implementing the green revolution in Brazilian farming.

### National Food and Nutrition Programme (PRONAN)

In 1972, the military government created the National Food and Nutrition Institute (INAN), linked to the Ministry of Health, whose goal was to support the government in drafting the National Food and Nutrition Programme. In March 1973, the First National Food and Nutrition Programme (PRONAN) was launched, involving

12 sub-programmes from the different government structures. PRONAN suffered many setbacks due to inaccurate standards, and was suspended in 1974.

Under the Geisel government, the INAN was reorganised and achieved its first firm administrative structure. In the 1974-1975 biennial, studies were carried out to conceive a new format for the governmental food policy, which resulted in the II National Food and Nutrition Programme (II PRONAN) with a more structural and less assistential focus (Peliano et al., 1985). The II PRONAN was scheduled for the period 1976-1979. The INAN Advisory Council was given the task of coordinating, assessing and controlling the PRONAN execution.

This measure was influenced by the need to find internal financial mechanisms to maintain the school meals and mother-child care programmes, considering the end of the US foreign aid. Nevertheless, this new institutional model of the food supplementation policy was marginal in the government's strategy, scattered, fragmented and truncated due to countless administrative problems (Coimbra, 1985).

In addition to the INAN, then considered to be a key government agency in the food and nutrition sector, several

other agencies were created, namely the ministries of Health, Education and Culture; Social Security and Welfare; Labour and Agriculture. This inter-sectoral articulation of ministries was to become a benchmark in Brazilian food security and nutrition management.

Throughout the 1970s, also to tackle the Brazilian population's more serious food shortages, the government took the stance of reinforcing or creating food supplementation programmes to replace food donations or imports that, until then, were provided by international agencies. Food was now procured from processing companies. Almost all were multinationals, since only they had sufficient capacity to meet the requirements of the public procurement notices.

Initially the Nutrition in Health Programme (PNS) created in 1975 under the management of the Ministry of Health provided food supplementation. It distributed staples, such as rice, sugar, beans, corn flour, cassava flour and powdered milk for pregnant women, nursing mothers and children from six months to seven years of age, in low-income families earning up to two minimum wages. Priority was given to the poorer regions and it sought to meet 45% of nutritional requirements. The food was procured by Cobal with funds

from INAN, and distributed by the state health secretariats. In 1975, the programme attended 452,000 people and distributed about 5,000 tons of food. These figures rose year after year until in 1989 60,200 tons of food were distributed to 6.2 million people.

## Agricultural and Supply Policy

In 1974, the Ministry of Agriculture took on supply management, while at the same time it extinguished the Executive Group on Supply System Modernisation (GEMAB), an inter-ministerial agency created in 1969. The National Supply Council (CONAB) was also instituted – not to be confused with the National Supply Company that would be created in March 1990 –, and chaired by the Minister of Agriculture and its representatives from the ministries of Finance, Transport and Planning.

CONAB was responsible for coordinating the price policy and protecting domestic market's food products. For this purpose, it would intervene whenever necessary, in the farming and marketing of what were considered essential items. It was also in charge of the executive duties of Sunab, which now performed the role of a consultative, advisory and planning institution that was decommissioned in 1979, with its duties transferred to the National Monetary Council.

With the increase in soybean production, it was necessary to increase the bulk storage capacity. This was felt more acutely in 1975, which justified the creation of the National Storage Programme (PRONAZEM) by which the federal government made heavy investments, boosting Brazil's grain storage capacity by 5.3 million tons.

In 1974, the National Rural Credit Commission (COMCRED) was set up to define credit measures for the agriculture and livestock sector. The 1<sup>st</sup> National Development Plan (1972-74) had already proposed private sector funding for expanding storage capacity, implementation of the National System for Storage Centres and the installation of supermarket networks and other self-service systems.

The Geisel government (1974-79) allocated considerable resources to farming, farming technology, logistics and technical assistance. Through the Ministry of Agriculture it further expanded the functions of EMBRAPA, EMBRATER and the Brazilian Storage Company. At the end of its mandate, it created the State Commission for Agricultural Planning (CEPA), to articulate planning of farming activities with state agencies.

Also during the Geisel government, more than twenty farmer markets were implemented to link farming areas to large consumer markets. In the retail sector, horticultural markets were set up. Based on this approach and the specific needs of each region, supply centres, farmers' markets, horticultural markets, indoor markets, integrated units and regional supply centres were created, to comprise the National System of Supply Centres and Satellite Markets. Their purpose was to streamline the perishable food's supply system in Brazil to benefit farmers, distributors and consumers in handling and distribution processes, using modern technology combined with market information and communication media.

The government also set up specific programmes designed to meet the population's basic food requirements. In 1976, the Workers' Food Programme (PAT) was launched by the Ministry of Labour, based on a joint draft by the government, business sector and workers.

It consisted of granting tax incentives to companies that supplied subsidised meals to their employees. The PAT was restricted to the formal labour market, concentrating its activities in South and Southeast Brazil. The PAT continues in force to date, having been regulated in 1991 to be granted to workers earning five minimum wages or less.

To strengthen the distribution system of small retailers and encourage farming, in 1977 the Support Programme for Farming and Marketing Horticultural Produce (PROHORT) was created. By 1978, the Somar Supply Network was created to supply essential products at lower prices for the poor population that had difficult access to the then existing supermarket chain.

Therefore, a fairly large-scale physical and institutional structure was consolidated in the supply area. By the next decade, innovations were made in distribution and retail. In other words, the State decided to guarantee conditions for farming, distribution and supply. Until then, it was thought that supply problems were the main cause of inflation, a theory that had to be reviewed after the rampant inflation in the 1980s.

The world context proved to be favourable at the end of the 1970s, with an increase in food production, forcing prices to drop to levels below those that had prevailed in the 1950s. However, in the 1980s new challenges and contradictions

arose in the food production and supply policy. The international crisis triggered by the rise in oil prices dictated an economic reorganisation and brought dire consequences for supply.

The Planning Office was a protagonist in the supply sector, with the extinction of CONAB, whose main leader was the Minister of Agriculture, and the creation of the Special Supply and Price Department (SEAP). This same Planning Office was already coordinating the Interministerial Council on Prices (CIP) and the National Supply Superintendence (Sunab).

Between 1976 and 1980, different agencies created new programmes. However, the lack of concern with institutional coordination resulted in fragmented and overlapping actions. In 1977, the Brazilian League for Social Assistance (LBA), a Brazilian public welfare foundation, launched the Food Supplementation Programme (PCA), focusing on attending the same target-public as the Nutrition in Health Programme (PNS) (pregnant women, nursing mothers and children up to the age of three), by free distribution of food. In 1979, the INAN launched the Basics Supply Project in Low-Income Urban Areas (PROAB), to subsidise the sale of food in the suburbs of large cities.



## The 1980s

In 1980, the II PRONAN developed a diversified set of programmes, contemplating three basic lines of action:

- Food Supplementation: the Nutrition in Health Programme (PNS), PROAB, School Nutrition Programme (PNE), PCA and PAT
- Streamlining the food farming and marketing systems: Project of Food Farming and Nutrition in Low-Income Rural Areas in Northeast Brazil and basic food procurement project in low-income rural areas (PROAB), created in 1977 through Cobal and, funded by the INAN, purchased basic produce from small farmers to be allocated to the PRONAN programme
- Supplementation and support: Studies and research, experimental tests on supplementary feeding, human resources development, combat against specific nutritional needs and activities to encourage breastfeeding

The II PRONAN had two goals: to eliminate the country's malnutrition problem while modernising small-scale and less capitalised farming and marketing. The programme however failed to achieve its second goal, due to its inherent contradiction with the economic policy and priorities dictated by the authoritarian regime. It was able, however, to innovate by creating some instruments that would later be enhanced and gain ground, such as credit for smallholder farmers, the so-called "PRONAN Credit", which waived a series of requirements prevailing until then for farming credit approval.

It was INAN's responsibility to coordinate the II PRONAN, linked to the Ministry of Health. The INAN president also chaired the PRONAN Advisory Council, consisting of representatives from the Planning Office of the Presidency of the Republic and from the ministries of Agriculture; Education and Culture; Labour; Health; Industry and Trade; Social Security and Welfare, and the Home Office. The purpose of this joint membership was to integrate the different institutions that participated in the II PRONAN.

### Efforts to reduce malnutrition

The II PRONAN emphasised the supplementary feeding policy, focusing especially on school children, low-income workers and other groups considered socially vulnerable. For the first time, the anticipated purchase mechanism was put in place, as well as creating cooperatives and progress at some level of technical assistance for smallholder farmers. These initiatives, albeit incipient, were some solutions that were to be developed in the year 2000. Centres were created to market several products at lower prices. The II PRONAN also became responsible for the National School Feeding Campaign, although funds still came from the Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC).

Despite localised efforts to reduce malnutrition in the country, the II PRONAN failed to achieve the desired impact due to a series of

circumstances. The first of these was a shortage of funds. The resources actually allocated to the programme were substantially lower than had been budgeted: in the period 1976-1979, they corresponded to 71%, 43%, 42% and 42% of the budget for each year, respectively. A second circumstance was the non-use of fresh produce, failing to achieve the goals to create an institutional market directly buying from the farmers. This was due to pressure by the processed food industry, which had the strongest political influence in this context. A third cause was the pressure imposed by the agribusiness industry, owner of a small number of companies, and which was constantly striving to monopolise the supplementary food market developed by the II PRONAN.

It should be emphasised that, at that moment, processed and ultra-processed food were being fast adopted in school feeding, justified by the lack of infrastructure in schools to prepare fresh food. If this argument was already hard to accept in terms of school feeding, it was even less acceptable for food distributed by the LBA to be prepared at home. Nevertheless, the food distributed by the LBA was mainly processed. The last reason for II PRONAN's failure was that the programme became a space of conflict and dispute between its political agency members.

During this period, food farming for domestic consumption suffered serious setbacks, due to the workers' low purchasing power. The outcome of this was

the impossibility of improving the farmers' prices.

### The supply issue

In the 1980s however, the federal government withdrew from the horticultural supply scene. The SINAC was disaggregated, share control of the supply centres was transferred to the relevant state and municipal governments, with countless losses for the country's food supply system. Today Brazilian supply centres are businesses based on a wide variety of corporate models.

The Supply System Modernisation Group, in force since 1969, joined the effort to organise the food distribution system. Fruit, horticultural and fish markets were connected to the National System of Supply Centres, under the management of Cobal. Accordingly, the government hoped to satisfy the interests of the different stakeholders: farmers, consumers and the government itself. It also hoped to have the capacity for cost management, classification and standardisation of goods and services, and to follow up and regulate the fluctuating supply and pricing mechanism, as well as create the necessary conditions for operating the Information Service on the Agricultural Market (SIMA).

The government proceeded to set up large-scale infrastructure in the supply sector, at least compared to what already existed. Large-scale supply centres were built in cities in the interior of Brazil. In the early 1980s, Brazil had 34 CEASAs in urban areas, 32 farmers' markets in rural areas and 157 retail establishments.

### Food shortage challenges

In 1985, the Figueiredo government intervened on several occasions in supplementary feeding for the poorest population, through the INAN, including subsidising consumption for the mother-child group. The Popular Food Programme (PAP) was also created. Unlike the Somar Network, which operated a product line of approximately 600 items, the PAP was restricted to 12 items of the so-called essential foodstuffs, as part of a plan to guarantee a staple diet.

The PAP was run by Cobal, along PROAB lines, and used the traditional network of small retailers. With the direct involvement of professional bodies, philanthropic entities and local community leaders, the PAP guaranteed food supply at lower prices. It operated complementarily to PROAB,

responsible for Northeast Brazil, covering the large urban centres of four of the five regions in the country. Government planned for rapid expansion of the PAP, in order to reach 30 million beneficiaries in 1989. In practice, however, this target was unattainable. At the end of 1985, the PAP was set up in 17 cities (16 capitals), benefitting 3.9 million people. Until the first quarter of 1986, the programme continued to spread, after which it plunged into stagnation.

The New Republic government, after the end of the military dictatorship, made no changes to PROAB, merely increasing the food volume sold. Operational obstacles in 1985 and others since the programme first began were not vigorously challenged. Nevertheless, between 1984 and 1986, the number of beneficiaries increased (from two million to 2.7 million), as did the number of registered small retailers and volume of food sales (Nepp, 1989, p. 373).

## Advances in the PNAE confined by financial restraints

Regarding school feeding, in 1983 the Student Aid Foundation (FAE) was created by merging INAE and the National School Supply Foundation (FENAME), and that year, took over the coordination of the National School Feeding Programme (PNAE) (Nepp, 1989). The PNAE objective was to ensure food aid to supplement nutritional needs and contribute towards a more effective educational system. The programme hoped to improve the students' learning ability, reduce absenteeism, dropout rates and repetition, and to contribute to healthy eating habits through nutritional education. By 1984, the idea was to provide one daily meal during the school period (which, at that time, was 180 days/year) to all children enrolled in public and philanthropic primary school networks.

However, due to financial restraints, this goal was not attained in practice. One of the criticisms of the programme was the lack of continuity. In 1979, for example, the PNAE provided meals during 128 days (70% of the school year). In the Northeast, the situation was even more serious. Students were given meals for

only 97 days, that is, just over half the school year (Torres Filho & Carvalho, 1989).

In 1986, some significant changes were made. On one hand, school feeding distribution was extended to the school vacation period, therefore operating every working day of the year (270). On the other hand, the school feeding target public had increased. In 1986, the Programme for Feeding Students' Siblings (PAIE) was instituted, also known as the "Sibling Programme", to provide a meal to all children in pre-school age (4-6 years) on working days throughout the year, living in poor regions and with siblings enrolled at school.

In 1986, it was estimated that five million children were being fed. Because of these changes and further investment, there was a notable quantitative growth in the number of school feeding beneficiaries. Between 1984 and 1986, public expenditure almost tripled in real terms and in the number of beneficiaries (PNAE and PAIE) from 20.8 million to 31.1 million people (Nepp, 1989, p. 340-346).

Another aspect worth mentioning was the failed drive to decentralise PNAE. The first actions in this sense sprouted in 1983 in the states of São

Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, at the initiative of the opposition governors elected in 1982. In São Paulo, in the mid-1980s, the school feeding management was decentralised in around 90% of the municipalities (Nepp, 1989, p. 337).

At federal level, in 1986 the Ministry of Education (MEC) began a more widespread municipalisation process of the PNAE, understood to be a "political response to the mayors' pressure to effectively transfer food procurement control to the municipal governments" (Torres Filho & Carvalho, 1989, p. 385). Nonetheless, these were tenuous impulses, restricted to a few places and prone to political and economic discontinuities.

## Other programmes

In 1985, the Nutrition in Health Programme (PNS) changed its name to the Supplementary Feeding Programme (PSA). Changes were made to expand the programme's coverage. The field of action, so far concentrated in Northeast Brazil, spread to every region in the country (around 4,000 municipalities). Coverage was extended to children up to four years of age (previously restricted to three-year olds and under), and the



programme target was to reduce infant mortality by 40% by 1990.

Furthermore, the aim was to bring the PSA closer to the Women's and Children's Full Health Care Programme. This programme, developed by the Ministry of Health, combined supplementary feeding, incentive to breastfeeding, prevention of and tackling specific nutritional needs (endemic goitre, nutritional anaemia and vitamin A deficiency) and treating acute respiratory diseases and diarrhoeas. The government target was to benefit 10 million people in 1986 and 15 million in 1989 (Seplan, 1986, p. 72). Between 1984 and 1986, the number of PSA beneficiaries almost doubled, from 4.4 to 8.7 million (Nepp, 1989, p. 364).

In 1977 the LBA put in place the Complementary Feeding Programme for the low-income mother-child population on the outskirts of the country's metropolitan regions – namely

Belo Horizonte and Rio de Janeiro. In 1985, the PCA underwent some changes, such as a fresh food distribution experiment, and especially the expansion of its field of action. Like the other programmes, the number of beneficiaries increased substantially: from 650,000 to 1.2 million people between 1984 and 1987, 60% or so of the beneficiaries living in the Northeastern region (Nepp, 1989, p. 357).

At the end of 1985 the government launched the National Milk Programme for Children in Need (PNLCC), providing one litre of milk a day to all children up to seven years old in families with incomes of two minimum wages or under. The government forecast was to benefit 1.5 million children by 1986 and 10 million by 1989.

The PNLCC *modus operandi* was groundbreaking compared to the traditional programmes. Instead of distributing products, it was decided

to work with an indirect distribution system by giving coupons ("milk-vouchers") to beneficiary families, through community associations and philanthropic entities. This avoided creating a new public bureaucratic apparatus. These coupons were exchanged for type "C" milk in the retail supply chain. These establishments redeemed the coupons with milk wholesalers that were compensated by the Bank of Brazil. Albeit vulnerable to fraud, this operational model contributed to the efficient fast implementation of the PNLCC. In September 1987, the programme attended 259 municipalities in the country, distributing about two million litres of milk a day and benefitting around 4.9 million children through 15,110 accredited community organisations (Torres Filho & Carvalho, 1989, p. 448).

## Overview

The various initiatives taken during the period of the military regime, whether in terms of infrastructure or creation of programmes, were not enough to reduce the low operating capacity of the country's farming and supply systems. There was no political priority, the resources were insufficient and not often fully released, causing interruptions in the service, and the institutions responsible for the programmes demonstrated poor coordination and management capacity. However,



important projects were the construction of food markets, and the creation of structures such as EMBRAPA and EMBRATER. Although both were subsequently depleted, they regained their strength in the future to play a leading role in building the food and nutrition security policy in the years 2000.

Foreign trade expansion, together with the country's fast urban growth, was a determining factor in defining the way to modernise Brazilian agricultural and livestock farming. To create a feasible model, a financing system was designed to induce and leverage the technical changes in that direction, and to force association of groups to adopt conservative modernisation in farming, based on a tripod of large capital, the State and landowners. The State was a strong presence, as befits the authoritarian status of the then political regime, and boosted the reproduction of capital in farming and financial induction mechanisms, which sealed a new social pact for farming, that ignored the issues of food and nutrition security.

This period lacked completely social participation, since any attempt to protest or influence the definition of public policies was strongly rejected. Some of the leading militants of the food issue were victims of the regime's authoritarianism, as in the case of geographer Josué de Castro, who was forced into exile, despite his international renown. The absence of social movements in the struggle for land created favourable conditions for expanding agricultural latifundia and imposing a model strongly against family farming.

Despite the different efforts, the food supply and hunger problems were not resolved during that period. In this sense, a lot is due to the lack of social participation, resulting from the repression by the authoritarian political government, whose solutions were imposed from "the top down". This factor was to prove extremely important in building solutions over the following decades. Several structures and agencies created during the military dictatorship still play an important role in the food supply, but at financial, political and social costs difficult to be measured.

Unfortunately, the political stratum during the subsequent redemocratisation period was unable to catalyse the efforts made previously during the military regime, dismantling several public structures under the support of liberal governments. Civil society, however, was organised to include in the order of the day discussions on the importance of adopting permanent solutions to hunger and poverty.



# Food and nutrition security on the public agenda of the 1990s

The 1990s were marked by the return to democracy and the hegemony of neoliberalism in the country (occurring at the same time in other parts of the world, more particularly in Latin America and the Caribbean). This was a period of downsizing and privatising State intervention instruments, on behalf of building an environment more conducive to private enterprise.

At the same time, it was a decade of intense social mobilisation, such as, for example, the Movement for Ethics in Politics, Citizen Action against Hunger and for Life, the National Conference on Food and Nutrition Security, and Gritos da Terra Brasil [Cries of Land Brazil]. These mobilisations claimed social participation, accountability, decentralisation and State action in major structural issues for food and nutrition security, food supply and rural development.

In the desire for these different political projects for Brazil, food and nutrition security was included in the

public agenda, oscillating depending on social mobilisations and political forces at stake, with few (or transitory) concrete outcomes in terms of public policies.

## Inclusion of the food security issue in the public agenda

According to Maluf (2007), food security appeared for the first time as a benchmark in Brazilian public policies in 1985 during the Sarney government. Before then, the notion of food security was unknown and the purpose of the majority of public food policies was price control and food supply (Takagi, 2006; Belik, Graziano da Silva & Takagi, 2001). "The main concern was not to combat the problem of hunger directly, but rather to offer an answer to society that demanded lower food prices" (Belik, Graziano da Silva & Takagi, 2001, p. 121).

Two policies differ in that sense: the Workers' Food Programme (PAT) and the II

National Food and Nutrition Programme (PRONAN). Created in 1940, the PAT was designed to improve workers' nutrition to increase their organic resistance and working capacity (Takagi, 2006; Peliano, 2001). The National Food and Nutrition Institute (INAN) created the I PRONAN (1973) and II PRONAN (1976) after a downturn in the social situation in the early 1970s, namely malnutrition and poverty. The II PRONAN was actually put in place, incorporating 11 food and nutrition programmes and actions, with PNAE as one of them.





### FEDERAL AUDIT COURT (TCU)

The TCU is recognised in the Brazilian Constitution as an administrative court that analyses and judges not only the accounts of public administrators and other entities responsible for federal public financial resources, assets and securities, but also the accounts on any person who gives rise to loss, misplacement or other irregularities leading to loss for the public treasury.

### GENERAL ACCOUNTS COMPTROLLER (CGU)

Federal government agency responsible for the financial accounts of the executive, as well as for establish public audits and combatting corruption on the Executive Office, the Public Prosecution and the Federal Audit Court.

In the 1980s, food and supply policies underwent major changes in their concept with the inclusion of the notion of food security, arising from a document "Food Security – draft policy against hunger" by technical staff at the invitation of the Superintendence for Planning in the Ministry of Agriculture, whose concept on food security was similar to that adopted by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) in Latin America. The emphasis was on national food self-sufficiency, and on universal access to food (Instituto da Cidadania, 2001). This document, with few practical impacts, provided guidelines for a national policy on food security and the formation of a National Food Security Council, chaired by the President of the Republic.

In 1986 the National Conference on Food and Nutrition was held - as an offshoot of the 8<sup>th</sup> National Health Conference -, which contributed to the later addition of the word "nutrition" to the notion of food security (Maluf, 2007). Attending at this event were civil society representatives and governmental organisations from several sectors relating to food and nutrition, proposing to create the National Food and Nutrition Council, responsible for drafting the National Policy on Food and Nutrition.

This Conference was a landmark in consolidating the diagnosis that hunger and food insecurity derived from the inability to access food, contrary to the understanding prevailing at that time that food security depended on farming and food supply in the country (Instituto da Cidadania, 2001).

The Conference acknowledged that food is a right and demanded that the State should take actions to guarantee domestic food availability, which required land reform, and a policy for supply and marketing for small and medium-size farmers. The State should also guarantee access to food, under a policy for fair wages and full employment (Pinheiro, 2009). However, as Zimmermann (2011) recalls, both the 1985 and 1986 proposals remained on the fringe of the public agenda and were not institutionalised as public policies during that period.

## Neoliberal actions in the early 1990s

Fernando Collor de Mello, victor of the presidential elections of 1989, was the first President elected democratically after the military regime. His government began in 1990, being considered the first initial milestone of neoliberalism in Brazil. There were several changes in the State's positioning and actions in the economy and society, some of which are worth highlighting: less State intervention, move towards deregulating economic activities, dismantling and downsizing farming policy instruments of previous decades, privatisation of state companies, settlement of the policy of regulatory stockpiling, free market approach and reduced import duties on food (Santos, 2011; Sallum Jr., 2003).

An example of the State structure's dismantling and downsizing is the case of the National Supply Company (CONAB) created in 1991, after the merger of the CFP, CIBRAZEM and Cobal.

This process drastically changed the structures and attributions, decommissioning a number of storage and trading businesses and laying off a significant number of their personnel.

Important actions carried out by the CONAB at the beginning of the 1990s, such as the Guaranteed Minimum Price Policy and regulatory stockpiling were restructured or weakened, namely with regard to regulating the public supply. Another feature of this period was certain administrative discontinuity, when the average length of stay of the organisation's chief officer was approximately nine months, reflecting especially how the company carried out its business. This situation was accompanied not only by the CONAB's loss of credibility, but also a significant economic-financial imbalance. In 2001, the idea of extinguishing or privatising the company started to be considered.

This and other changes implied restructuring agencies and public policy instruments relating to food, nutrition, supply, farming and reappearance of policies of direct aid to socially vulnerable populations, such as, for example, the Programme Gente da Gente [People's People], put in place in 1991 and 1992. This programme was run by CONAB based on public food inventories, to distribute food baskets to around 600 poor families in the Northeast, victims of the drought (Peliano, 2001).

As mentioned by Belik, Graziano da Silva and Takagi (2001, p. 123), "with the government's cost cutting in agriculture (in other words, agricultural credit, minimum prices and regulatory stocks), the only option was to adopt compensatory policies. Accordingly, specific and regional policies were included to meet the demands of organised groups. It would not be an exaggeration to say that, except the resources allocated to Rural Social Security (established by the 1988 Constitution), there were widespread cuts in expenditure in programmes and social actions. In farming and in other sectors, public funds were redirected to private sources". Takagi (2006) evidenced, when analysing the information from the Federal Audit Court (TCU) that the federal government reduced to almost a quarter the expenditure on food programmes in the periods between 1986/1990 and 1991/1992.

Peliano (2001, p. 24) also points to "the extinction of almost all food and nutrition programmes". Furthermore, he comments that "in 1992, resources [for this area] were cut to USD 208 million. The School Feeding Programme was limited to providing food for 30 days, when the target was 180 days/year".

Silva's diagnosis (1995) is similar to that of other authors and evidences the reduction of State intervention in food and nutrition. According to the author, "upon taking office in 1990, the new government had at its disposal 15 years of experience in a variety of food and nutrition programmes and an updated diagnosis of the country's nutritional status. However, instead of using this base to enhance the nutrition policy and strip it of its former failures, the new government proceeded to dissolve or abandon almost all programmes, maintaining [albeit with limitations] only the National School Feeding Programme and the Workers' Food Programme" (Silva, 1995, p. 97).

This set of measures, together with the successive hunger



crises from the droughts assailing the Northeast, inflation and rising unemployment caused a situation of growing social vulnerability. These elements required the inclusion of the issue of hunger and food security again in the public agenda, on a broader and more expressive scale.

## The Parallel Government Proposal for a National Food Security Policy (1991)

In the early 1990s, after the defeat in the presidential elections of 1989, a group of actors belonging to the Workers' Party (PT) created a "Parallel Government" to provide a critical follow-up on the actions of the Collor government and to propose alternative public policies to the liberal ideas (Cerqueira, 2010; Marques, 2010).

One of this group's proposals was the National Food Security Policy (PNSA), launched in October 1991 – a document that later contributed to drafting the Zero Hunger Programme. Considering that the "so called 'market laws' or free play of market forces are unable to solve the core problems of underdevelopment, such as hunger, social and regional imbalances and so on" (Parallel Government, 1991, p. 10), the document proposed policies on job creation, wage recovery and increasing agri-food production, in order to ensure that all Brazilians would have, at all times, access to staple food.

Work was proposed in the main areas of activity, as follows:

- Incentive policies for agri-food production through land reform, farming policy and agro-industrial policy, with a view to national self-sufficiency in staple foods and priority for small and medium-size farmers
- Agricultural marketing policy, for example, minimum prices, mandatory procurement regarding small and medium-size farmers, regulatory stocks and trading centre management
- Food distribution and consumption by taking measures to decentralise the retail sector, price control and expanding basic food distribution programmes
- Emergency measures against hunger, such as, for example, guaranteed food for children in day care centres, pre-schools and state education, attending low-budget restaurants and free food distribution to the population at risk (Parallel Government, 1991)

The PNSA also proposed the creation of a National Food Security Council (CONSEA), with its equivalents at state and municipal levels, and the civil society's participation to coordinate and put those policies in place, and to integrate the different government sectors.

However, during the Collor government, the PNSA proposal was not institutionalised as public policies due to its incompatibility with neoliberal precepts and political-party dispute between the

PT and the predominant party group at the time (Zimmermann, 2011). With Collor's impeachment and vice-President Itamar Franco taking office as President of the Republic (1992-94), the Parallel Government resumed the PNSA proposal at the beginning of 1993, when the government was more receptive to it.

## Civil society goes back to influencing the public agenda

The democratic opening in the mid-1980s enabled several left-wing activists, intellectuals and militants exiled during the military dictatorship to return to Brazil and begin their articulations. Many of them founded non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and social organisations that were fundamental to claim social involvement in State administration, to put back on the public agenda the topics of hunger and food and nutrition security, and to institutionalise them in government actions (Nascimento, 2009).

At the start of the 1990s, a strong social mobilisation gained momentum, beginning with the Movement for Ethics in Politics – leading to Collor's impeachment and already addressing the issue of hunger – followed by Action of Citizenship against Hunger, Poverty and for Life, a social movement set up in 1992 that organised the National Campaign against Hunger in 1993. Action of Citizenship was mobilised by Herbert de Souza, known as Betinho, in order

## PARALLEL GOVERNMENT

Inspired by the English experience, the Parallel Government was an instrument to supervise, monitor and act as qualified opposition to the recently appointed Collor government. The Parallel Government also proposed public policies and other State actions.

to consolidate itself as a large ecumenical, plural and supraparty movement, rallying individuals to commit to overcome hunger and poverty (Burlandy, 2011).

In a "Letter from Action of Citizenship", Betinho stated: "the time of abject poverty and resignation with this situation is over. The time for conciliation and conformism is over. Brazilian society has defined eradication of poverty as its priority. (...) Democracy and poverty are not compatible" (COEP, 2008). This was about building "a politically qualified solidarity" rather than actions of charity or philanthropy, in the sense of the construction and expression of citizenship (Burlandy, 2011, p.65).

In 1993, the Campaign against Hunger mobilised the creation of more than 3,000 local citizenship committees in 21 states and the Federal District, involving several members of civil society, such as neighbourhood associations, churches, public authorities, housewives, teachers and unions in the distribution of food, clothing, goods, and later in creating jobs and income, professional training, access to land and so on (Burlandy, 2011). Its merits were principally to give visibility to the dramatic situation of 32 million poor people in the cities and countryside, calling for immediate citizen action and cooperation to implement the CONSEA (Maluf, Menezes & Valente, 1996). In fact, in response to Action of Citizenship and the Parallel Government initiatives, the Itamar Franco government launched the Plan against Hunger and Poverty and instituted the CONSEA in April 1993.

Bearing in mind that the Itamar Franco government also adopted neoliberal precepts, attention is called to the fact that it accepted some of the Parallel Government proposals and the actions of organised civil society, such as the creation of CONSEA. As Zimmermann suggested (2011, p. 24), four factors should be considered:

- The former aforementioned presidents gave different importance to the neoliberal benchmark
- It was a time of intense social mobilisation, with the Movement for Ethics in Politics and Action of Citizenship
- "Itamar Franco's personal sensitivity, which made him very 'open' to dialogue with civil society" and the hunger issue
- Government interests in achieving social legitimacy, considering that Itamar Franco was Collor's vice-president

## The creation of CONSEA and its activities

The CONSEA was established in 1993, comprising ten ministers of State and 21 representatives of civil society appointed by the President of the Republic, 19 of which nominated by the Movement for Ethics in Politics. The CONSEA took important actions in 1993 and 1994, with emphasis on: inclusion of the hunger issue in the public agenda; increased social participation in drafting public policies; implementation of emergency actions; influence on government programmes (such as decentralisation of school feeding) and holding the 1<sup>st</sup> National Conference on Food Security (CNSA) in 1994 (Burlandy, 2011; Menezes, 2010; Maluf, 2007).

According to Maluf (2007), four factors contributed to the limited success of the first CONSEA (1993-94): the novelty of this topic on the public agenda; transitory nature of the Itamar Franco government; resistance of those controlling the economic policy, and the weak performance of the majority of the advisers, whether from government or civil society.

Menezes (2010, p. 249) emphasizes that, although instituted as an advisory agency for the Presidency of the Republic, the CONSEA took “the responsibility of being at the forefront of the mobilisation of specific programmes, as happened with the Emergency Food Distribution Programme (PRODEA), engaging the Action of Citizenship committees to join the National Secretariat for Protection and Civil Defence in distributing food baskets for drought-stricken populations”.

Created in December 1993 as an emergency programme to provide North Minas Gerais and the Northeast, PRODEA distributed food baskets- initially four baskets per family – consisting of 12 kilos of rice, 6 kilos of corn flakes, 4 kilos of beans and 3 kilos of cassava flour. Its work involved the following structure:

- CONAB was responsible for transporting the produce from the warehouses in the Mid-South to the 40 regional distribution centres in the states of the ‘Drought Polygon’ [Northeast Brazil]
- Backed by the Brazilian Army and with the assistance and supervision of the municipal citizenship committees, the local governments transported the food from the centres to their municipalities that were decreed a state of public emergency
- The municipal citizenship committees (encouraged by CONSEA) selected and registered the beneficiary families and distributed the baskets
- The beneficiary families had to comply with requirements relating to education and health (such as participating in literacy programmes, their children’s school enrolment, updating vaccinations) (Carvalho, 1994)

In the years following its creation, the PRODEA was included in the Solidarity Community Programme to become a permanent social programme. At the beginning of the year 2000, it was replaced by other initiatives such as the Food Allowance Programme.

The CONSEA – as well as the group of organisations and stakeholders in the food and nutrition security issue since the early 1990s – influenced the changes in the National School Feeding Programme, namely with regard to decentralising the school feeding in 1994. Until then, food management and procurement for the PNAE was largely centralised in the federal government, mainly meeting the food industry requirements (Spinelli & Canesqui, 2002). The federal government would use public tenders to procure and distribute nationwide a range of foodstuff formulated and industrialised by a small number of companies.

This operational structure offered several distortions: complex food supply and storage systems, forming supplier cartels leading to increase in school feeding costs, standardized national menus that did not consider the regional food diversity, and so on (Spinelli & Canesqui, 2002). Maluf (2009, p. 2) stated that “in most of this trajectory, concentrating the vast volumes of food procurement in the federal sphere advanced the predominance of large

corporations that could, for example, dispatch biscuits or sausages from the South-Southeast to the Amazon region". Because of this structure, in many cases, food would reach the destinations after the expiry date or unfit for human consumption (Triches, 2010).

Given this situation, in 1994 resources were decentralised to the municipalities, now made responsible for preparing the menus, procuring food, carrying out quality control, setting up the School Feeding Council (CAE) to supervise the use of resources and render accounts to the funding agency linked to the Ministry of Education (Triches, 2010). CONSEA played an important role in this process, demanding expansion, decentralisation and procurement of non-industrialized regional food for school meals.

As reported in the basic document for the II National Conference on Food and Nutrition Security (CNSAN) in 2004, "the municipalisation process enabled the menus to be adapted to the local cultural reality; increased the possibility of eating fresh fruit, vegetables and legumes instead of industrialised formulated food that used to be on the menus; and helped develop health promoting activities" (Brazil, CONSEA, 2004).

Although decentralisation encouraged the consumption of fresh local food, consistent with local food culture, it did

not ensure direct procurement of produce from local family farmers, and it was not unusual for the wholesale food industries to continue selling the food and offering processed products. Decentralisation contributed to minimising the concentration of companies in the institutional school meals market and helped include smaller companies to be part of the regional school context. Nevertheless, there were no explicit mechanisms of local agricultural support, to family farmers and healthy nutrition, which only began in 2009.

Another iconic action from CONSEA refers to establishing the National Food and Nutrition Security Conferences. Preceded by a widespread social mobilisation process and discussion involving municipal and state conferences throughout the country, the I CNSAN rallied about 2,000 people to discuss food security in Brazil (Maluf, 2007). The outcome of this Conference was a document with conditions and requirements for a National Food Security Policy, organised around three general axes:

- To extend the conditions of access to food and reducing its weight in the family budget, facilitated by job creation, income distribution, land reform, family farming support, cropping incentive, public regulation of markets, and providing the supply to low-income populations, for example
- To guarantee health, nutrition and food to certain groups of the population through, for example, full mother-child care, extending the PNAE and PAT, and assistance to specific groups at risk
- To ensure biological, health, nutritional and technological quality of the food and its use, encouraging healthy eating habits and lifestyles. It was therefore necessary to reorganise, strengthen and articulate the different organisations responsible for Food and Nutrition Surveillance (Maluf, 2007; Pessanha, 2002; Maluf, Menezes & Valente, 1996; Brazil, CONSEA, 1995)

It should be mentioned that these projects were also part of the Zero Hunger Programme, launched some years later.



## Cooling the debate on food security in 1995

The election of Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the Presidency of the Republic in 1994 again changed the national actions and debates on food and nutrition security. At the beginning of 1995, the government launched the Solidarity Community Programme and its respective council – the Solidarity Community Council –, replacing the CONSEA. This programme proposed to move forward in the State-society partnership to widen the working focus beyond just food issues, to include misery, poverty and inequality in the country. The idea was to give priority to 16 government programmes in areas such as infant mortality, school feeding, family farming and basic sanitation, and to integrate and converge these actions in geographical areas (municipalities) which faced greater poverty (Maluf, 2007; Takagi, 2006; Peliano, 2001).

According to Maluf (2007, p. 85), “the change meant a step back in dealing with the food issue, since it resulted in its removal from the major topics on the national public agenda”. Actions and discussions on the issues of hunger and food and nutrition security were diluted and cooled off, immersed in a neoliberal perspective that prioritised a more stable economy (Maluf, 2007; Takagi, 2006; Pessanha, 2002).

Despite this context, it is important to stress the draft of the Brazilian Report for the World Food Summit held in Rome in 1996, as a moment that contributed to the debate on food and nutrition security in Brazil. This report proposed a new broad definition of food security that would become the springboard for that adopted by the CONSEA in 2003 and approved at the II National Conference on Food Security (2004) (Maluf, 2007).

The document states that “food security means to guarantee everyone conditions to access staple foods in sufficient quality and quantity, on a permanent basis, without detriment to the access to other essential needs, based on healthy food practices, thus contributing to a dignified existence in the context of full development of the human being. Food security must, therefore, be a basic and strategic national and international objective. It should permeate and articulate, horizontally and vertically, the economic and social policies and actions and be pursued by all segments of society in partnership with the governments or in civil initiatives” (Brazil, Ministry of State and Foreign Affairs, 1996, p. 41).

Although this had little practical repercussion and was a matter of contention, the report’s drafting was an important moment to analyse what the government

had been doing in the food and nutrition sectors, and resulted in conceptual strides on the issue, namely with regard to the articulation between food and nutrition security (and, therefore, the need for public intersectoral actions), and the link between access, quality and food quantity (Maluf, 2007; Instituto da Cidadania, 2001). The report also listed a set of requirements for establishing food security in Brazil:

- Economic growth with equality
- Full supply
- Fair international trade
- Secure food and healthy eating habits
- Food security with sustainable models
- Land reform and family-based farming

After the extinction of CONSEA in 1995, organised civil society still looked to build discussion channels for food and nutrition security and monitoring and proposing public policies. In 1998, some civil society organisations came together to create the Brazilian Forum of Food and Nutrition Security (Fbsan), a network with around one hundred NGOs, entities, social movements and individuals from all over Brazil. This network was outlined as a formalised space for discussion, debates, social mobilisation and for proposing public actions. Since then, the Fbsan has been contributing to building a broader vision of food and nutrition security, proposing and following up programmes and public policies and for social mobilisation at the different federal and international levels. It contributed to the creation of the Food Security Forums and state and municipal CONSEAs, the remake of the national CONSEA in 2003, hosting the CNSAs, and organising and participating in international events and networks, for example.



## Political and institutional recognition of family farming

Despite fluctuations in the food and nutrition security in the government agenda in the 1990s, it is important to emphasise a fundamental step taken on the road to reducing social inequalities and promoting the country's food supply: this is the political and institutional recognition of the Brazilian State towards family farming by creating the National Programme for Strengthening Family Farming (PRONAF) in 1995. As stated by Schneider, Cazella and Mattei (2004, p. 23), "the programme was born to provide with farming credit and institutional support the family farmers that had been excluded from the public policies existing so far and were in serious difficulties to remain in the countryside".

PRONAF was conceived as a rural credit policy, the product of many social mobilisations of rural workers' unions and other rural social movements, known as the Cries of the Land Brazil (Gritos da Terra Brasil). These mobilisations denounced the selectivity of the farming modernisation policies of the 1960s-1980s and compounded the problems of trade integration and competitiveness of agriculture after the creation of Mercosur in 1991.

PRONAF was the first national policy specifically addressing family farmers. Arguments to create the programme revolved around the importance of family farming for the country's food production and the need for the State to review the unequal treatment that it had given to the diversity of Brazilian farming in the past, by prioritising large-scale agriculture, not rarely monocropping,

exports and intensive use of inputs. The creation of PRONAF was an important political milestone and opened a window of opportunities for the creation of other public policies and State actions in the food supply arena, as will be discussed in the following chapter.

### PRONAF

The PRONAF finances individual or collective projects that earn income for family farmers and those settlers from land reform projects. The programme has the lowest interest rates of all rural credit system, and the lowest default rates of Brazilian credit systems.

Access to PRONAF begins with the family discussion on the need for credit, whether for financing the harvest or agribusiness, be it investing in farming machinery, equipment or infrastructure and agro-livestock farming or otherwise.

Conditions for access to PRONAF Credit, forms of payment and interest rates corresponding to each line are defined annually with each Family Farming Harvest Plan, published between June and July.

## Overview

In this chapter, it was clear how food supply and food and nutrition security issues fluctuated on the public agenda in the 1990s, susceptible to the neoliberal ideology and political options of the three Presidents in that decade: Fernando Collor de Mello, Itamar Franco and Fernando Henrique Cardoso. It was a period with intense social mobilisation claiming for participation, State decentralisation, accountability, and a stronger civil society. In this context, several proposals have been made in the debate and were discussed and disputed by different groups of stakeholders.

Some of the products of these disputes and political options at stake never reached fruition; others were expressed in actions of the State and civil society, but all were short lived due to political and institutional changes. The lack of definition and implementation of a national food and nutrition security policy and the extinction of CONSEA, soon thereafter in 1995, can be mentioned as the prime examples of this. As mentioned above, in this decade (especially in the second half), discussions on and approaches to hunger and food and nutrition security were reduced to a minimum (or addressed in a more assistentialist and compensatory manner) given the prospect of downsizing the State and strengthening the markets.

Despite the difficulties of institutionalising the topic in public policies and instruments, the set of actions and activities in the 1990s was important to also bring to the fore the scale of poverty and food insecurity in the country. It was also important to move forward in maturing the notion of food and nutrition security, better structured at the II National Conference on Food and Nutrition Security (2004); to instigate the mobilisation of civil society; and learn lessons and plant seeds that would find a more favourable environment for their germination in the early 2000s.







# Institutional procurement in the sphere of a food and nutrition security policy

At the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s, the world economic crisis had a negative effect on Brazil, with ever worsening vulnerability of poor and destitute families. Evidently, this situation clearly demonstrated that the problem of hunger affecting a large contingent of the population was directly related to poverty and, consequently, to the lack of conditions to procure a sufficient quantity of food, or inability to produce for their own consumption.

It was in this context that the Instituto da Cidadania [Institute for Citizenship], a non-governmental organisation directed by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, drafted a national policy for food and nutrition security,

called Zero Hunger. This draft was based on the debate between different experts on the topic, on the guideline to set up some conceptual foundations while at the same time formulate proposals for achievable policies against hunger and poverty. Zero Hunger was a historical landmark in the food and nutrition security policy, since it laid the foundations for what would become a policy integrated by programmes and actions focused on that goal.



## Zero Hunger

Zero Hunger began with the diagnosis that the core problem of food insecurity in the country was the incapacity to access food by those who had an irregular and very low monthly income, or none whatsoever. The study carried out by the Instituto da Cidadania estimated that 44 million people (27.8% of the total population) were vulnerable to hunger. By the fact that Brazil had become a predominantly urban country, the majority lived in small and medium size towns in the interior of Brazil, but, rural poverty was proportionally more significant. Unlike other countries, there was no shortage of food supply; therefore, the main emphasis of the proposed policies was to improve the income of the poorest.

The proposal included the concept of the right to food and nutrition, which would subsequently lead to other important public policies. The concept of food and nutrition security was defined comprehensively and with a clear intersectoral connotation: "food and nutrition security is the guarantee of the right of everyone to access quality food in sufficient quantity and quality on an ongoing basis, founded on healthy eating and without compromising access to other essential needs and the future food system, all on sustainable bases. The entire country must be sovereign to ensure its food security, respecting the cultural characteristics of each people, expressed in the act of eating" (Instituto da Cidadania, 2001, p. 15).

When Lula da Silva took office as President in 2003, this was the start of the Zero Hunger programme, placing the food security at the top of the public agenda. As a result, the CONSEA was restored as an advisory agency for the President of the Republic, facilitating closer dialogue between civil society and the State. The government created the Ministry of Food Security and Fight against Hunger (MESA) later to become the Ministry for Social Development and Fight against Hunger (MDS). MESA was responsible for coordinating the implementation of food security programmes and actions, articulating government agencies, and managing the Constitutional Fund to Fight against Poverty, and for supporting CONSEA operations.

### CONSTITUTIONAL FUND TO FIGHT AGAINST POVERTY

Approved by the National Congress and in force until 2010, its purpose was to finance actions to reduce social exclusion and improve income distribution and quality of life for the poor population.

### SISVAN

SISVAN, programme subordinated to the Ministry of Health, is a monitoring system informing about the population's nutrition conditions and factors determining such conditions.

The government began CONAB's reconstruction process to become the operational branch for Zero Hunger and work to rebuild strategic inventories, support populations suffering food insecurity, assist families affected by climate disasters and to draft and put in place public policies to support marketing of family farming produce. The Food Voucher Programme was also put in place as financial support for families, designed to supplement their income to buy food. There was widespread process of public mobilisation against hunger through donations of food and money. Accordingly, the issues of hunger and of food and nutrition security gained a new dimension on the public agenda.

Zero Hunger brought a set of proposals to challenge what was considered the main problem of food insecurity in Brazil, namely, that the poorest were unable to have regular access to sufficient food of proper quality. Thus, income transfer, through the Food Voucher, was the flagship of the proposal, as well as a policy drafted to restore the minimum wage value and create jobs, regarded as the main ways to

guarantee access to food for the poorest.

Other programmes, directly linked to nutrition, were regarded as necessary for meeting the Zero Hunger targets: the PAT, Food and Nutritional Surveillance System (SISVAN), food education, the PNAE, urban farming, the PRONAF, rural extension and farm insurance – the last two already from the previous government, but somewhat weakened. These programmes were anchored in different ministries. Zero Hunger proposed boosting institutional food procurement projects by creating new programmes or in partnership with state and municipal governments. The idea was to set up a network of public facilities, offering food at low cost, such as through popular restaurants, community kitchens and food banks, coordinated by the same Ministry, MESA, later called the MDS.

The election of President Lula da Silva consolidated as priority the fight against hunger and put in place a food and nutrition security policy. It offered the opportunity for new players to participate in public decisions. Civil society actors

and politicians that have been calling for food and nutrition security policies since the 1990s found room to transform their claims into State actions (Grisa, 2012; Zimmermann, 2011; Menezes, 2010; Porto, 2008). This was an opportunity for the food and nutrition security demands to be institutionalised in public policies and government actions.



## Revival of CONSEA

Since the concept of Zero Hunger, the issue of social participation in implementing a food and nutrition security policy has always been present. In January 2003, as part of his first act as President, Lula da Silva revived the CONSEA, superior social participation body for this policy.

The CONSEA, similarly defined during its short existence between 1993 and 1995, is linked to the Presidency of the Republic and is composed by 2/3 of representatives of civil society and 1/3 federal government. This agency is presided by a representative from civil society. According to the Organic Act on Food and Nutrition Security, which was subsequently approved, it is included in the National Food and Nutrition Security System (SISAN) as an immediate advisory agency for the President of the Republic. It is responsible for the following duties:

- To convene and hold the National Conference on Food and Nutrition Security every four years
- To propose to the Executive power the guidelines and priorities of the Policy and National Plan on Food and Nutrition Security, including budgetary requirements for its attainment
- To articulate, follow up and monitor, in cooperation with the other members of the System, the implementation and convergence of actions inherent to the Policy and National Plan on Food and Nutrition Security
- To define, in cooperation with the Interministerial Chamber on Food and Nutrition Security (CAISAN), the accession criteria and procedures to the SISAN
- To institute permanent articulation mechanisms with agencies and entities for food and nutrition security in the states, the Federal District and municipalities, in order to further the dialogue and convergence of actions included in the SISAN, to mobilise and support civil society entities in the discussion and implementation of public actions for food and nutrition security

Since the beginning, CONSEA distinguished itself as a council with widespread activities, both due to its proven capacity of following up and implementing public policies, and to its proactive willingness, to become a decisive agent in food and nutrition

security. An example of this was its role in specific programmes, such as, for example, the follow-up of PRONAF expansion; the One Million Water Cisterns Programme, and the discussion on adopting the Family Allowance Programme and its later expansion.

The CONSEA also prepared drafts for the National Supply Policy and the Policy for Adequate and Healthy Food. CONSEA was the space to discuss and draft the Organic Act on Food and Nutrition Security that set up the SISAN. Its work is closely regulated by guidelines set by the National Conferences of 2004, 2007 and 2010. The CONSEA played an important role in the concept and follow-up of both programmes relating to the institutional food procurement from family farming: the PAA and PNAE.

### CAISAN

Created by Decree N° 6,273 dated 23 November 2007, under the MDS coordination, the CAISAN is the agency in charge of coordination and intersectoral monitoring of public policies relating to food and nutrition security and the fight against hunger. The Chamber was created to guarantee the government's intersectoral management of the food and nutrition security policy. Its tasks are to draft and coordinate the execution, based on guidelines from CONSEA, the National Food and Nutrition Security Policy (PNSAN) and the National Food and Nutrition Security Plan (PLANSAN), suggesting guidelines, targets, fund sources and follow-up instruments, monitoring and assessing its implementation, and also articulating policies and plans at state level.

### FAMILY ALLOWANCE PROGRAMME

In October 2003, the Family Allowance Programme (PBF) was created, combining four income transfer programmes: Food Allowance, School Grant, Food and Gas Vouchers. Income is transferred to families in poor and destitute situations, in accordance with a monthly per capita income guideline depending on meeting the requirements of keeping children in school and caring for their children's health, pregnant women and nursing mothers. In 2014, it transferred income to around 14 million families, approximately 55 million people.

### ONE MILLION WATER CISTERNS PROGRAMME

The One Million Water Cisterns Programme (P1MC) was created in 2003 as another project in the Zero Hunger Programme. Run on MDS funds in partnership with the Brazilian Semi-arid Articulation (ASA – civil society organisation), the goal of P1MC is to build tanks to capture rainwater for the rural families in the semi-arid region, to ensure access to drinking water. In 2007, the programme was extended to supply water for livestock and farming. In conjunction with building water tanks in schools, these projects are today part of the Water for All Programme, designed to universalise water to the rural populations in the semi-arid regions.

## The PAA in Brazil: trajectory, contributions and challenges for rural development and food security

Since the creation of the PAA in 2003, a new issue has gained ground on the agenda of rural development public policies in Brazil: building institutional markets for family farming and their articulation with food and nutrition security. The programme's innovation consists precisely in articulating, in the same public policy, market access for family farming with food and nutrition security actions. In general, the PAA procures food and seeds from family farmers and donates them to public food and nutrition facilities, socio-assistential organisations and socially vulnerable families. The food and seeds can also be allocated to strategic stockpiling.

### PAA's construction and institutional organisation

A key element for the creation of the PAA was the change in the Brazilian political scenario, with the election of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva for President of the Republic in 2002. As soon as the CONSEA was restored, discussions began on guidelines for actions in the field of food and nutrition, including suggestions on the interface between family farming and food security.

One of the first CONSEA achievements was drafting the document "Guidelines for Food Security and Land Development for the Harvest Plan – 2003/2004 (Technical CONSEA Subsidies)", drafted in February 2003 by a group of members from the MESA, Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA), Ministry of Agricultural, Livestock Farming and Supply (especially represented by the National Supply Company – CONAB) and the Institute for Applied Economic Research (IPEA). Alleging that increased food demand through the Zero Hunger Programme could push up consumer prices, the document proposed creating a Harvest Plan specifically for family farming, considering "its economic, environmental and social importance for the country's food security".

## AGRICULTURAL AND LIVESTOCK PLAN

Before the start of each new farming year, the Brazilian government launches the Agricultural and Livestock Plan, in which it points out to farmers and markets the conditions for agricultural and livestock production. Until 2003, this was a unified plan for family and non-family farmers. Since the CONSEA proposal in 2003, the federal government has launched two Harvest Plans annually: the Agricultural and Livestock Plan, geared to non-family farming, and the Family Farming Harvest Plan, focusing on public policies specifically for Family Farmers.

The CONSEA document underscored the need to subsidise consumption and support for family farming, in order to “boost the food production of family farmers and settlers of land reform, in response to the extra demand for food, subsidised by the Zero Hunger Programme. In other words, the production of a group of storable foodstuffs that should be procured, especially and primarily, by the Federal Government from these farmers”. (Brazil, CONSEA, 2003, p. 7). The elements present in this document were the substrate for the creation of PAA.

The MESA became an even greater protagonist in this debate, and proposed the PAA, regardless of the farming policy of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA) and of the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA). Soon after, on 2nd July 2003, the PAA was regulated by Law 10,696 and included in the First Harvest Plan for Family Farming called “Producing Food for a Brazil without Hunger” (Brazil, MDA, 2003).

Defined as a structuring action in the Zero Hunger Programme, the PAA articulates elements

of the farming policy and components of the Food and Nutrition Security Programme (Delgado, Conceição & Oliveira, 2005; Schmitt, 2005). The PAA involves the articulation of two major historical claims from a group of actors: marketing family farming produce, whose demands by rural workers’ unions date back to the 1970s, and the promotion of food and nutrition security, claimed since the 1990s. To consider both demands, the PAA involves a series of intersectoral actions and relies on interministerial coordination. Its institutional structure includes, therefore, a Management Group (GGPAA) made up of the MDS, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning, Budget and Management (MPOG), Ministry of Agriculture (especially through the CONAB), MDA and the Ministry of Education (MEC).

The Management Group also has an Advisory Council, facilitating civil society participation. The national seminars and regional/national workshops are also opportunities for civil society to put forward its assessments and claims for discussion on the public agenda. With the participation of public



managers, social organisations that implement and/or are beneficiaries of the programme, intermediary agencies, scholars and researchers, the national seminars have contributed to making some changes to the PAA since its creation, mainly in terms of increasing resources, expanding the number of beneficiaries, enhancing modalities and values per modality (Zimmermann & Grisa, undated).

Besides these spaces, the Programme provides that the CONSEA is the priority body for social control, at national, state and municipal levels. In their absence, the Sustainable Rural Development Councils or the Social Welfare Councils

could assume the duties to follow up and monitor the implementation of the PAA. While the decisions regarding the programme are the Management Group's responsibility, it is put in place by CONAB, the states, municipalities and Federal District. Resources for programme's implementation are from the MDS or the MDA.

After some institutional changes, the programme is now organised in six modalities that consider the different kinds of relationship of family farming and markets (whether in terms of production systems or concerning social organisation), and different promotional and support

needs for food and nutrition security. Table 1 summarises the different modalities, their objectives and ways of working.

#### DUTIES OF THE PAA MANAGEMENT GROUP

The Management Group is a deliberative body made up solely of government representatives and defines the following:

- The modus operandi of all modalities
- The methodology to define benchmark prices for food procurement, considering regional differences and the reality of family farmers
- The methodology to define prices and sales conditions of the procured produce
- Donation conditions of procured acquired produce
- Public stockpiling conditions
- The guidelines to prioritise beneficiary suppliers
- Conditions for procurement and donation of seeds, seedlings and other propagating material
- Its modus operandi on approval of house rules and regulations
- Other necessary measures for operationalizing the PAA

#### ANTICIPATED PURCHASES OF FAMILY FARMING PRODUCE

In 2003 and 2004 a new modality came into force called "Anticipated Purchase of Family Farming Produce", which advanced funds to family farmers in the planting season, and settlement could be paid either by delivering to the government the harvest products or through financial payment after the harvest. This modality was extinguished in 2004, amidst arguments that alleged similarity with rural credit and the possible confirmed default (Grisa, 2012).

### PRONAF'S APTITUDE STATEMENT (DAP)

In order to obtain the DAP, the family must go to an agency of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply carrying all the information of its establishment (area, number of residents, composition of the workforce and revenue). The legal DAP is given to formal groups (associations and cooperatives) which have a minimum of 60% of members in hold of physical DAP. Family farmers that own physical DAP and are organized in group but posses no legal DAP are known as informal.

FIGURE 02: Summary of executive modalities for the PAA in 2014



#### **Purchase with Simultaneous Donation (CDS)**

For purchase of many types of foodstuff and simultaneous donation to entities in the social welfare network, public food and nutrition facilities or other purposes defined by the Management Group. The modality can be adopted by the CONAB, states or municipalities, with funds from the Ministry for Social Development and Fight against Hunger (MDS). Farmers can participate individually or through cooperatives/associations.

Limit per DAP/year individually:  
BRL 6,500

Limit per DAP/year through supplying organisation:  
BRL 8 thousand

Limit per organisation/year:  
BRL 2 million



#### **Support Programme for Family Farming Stockpiling (CPR-Stock)**

Acts on financial support for supplier organisations to stockpile food, to then sell and return resources to the public authorities. Modality adopted by the CONAB, with resources from MDS and the Ministry for Agrarian Development (MDA).

Limit per DAP/year:  
BRL 8 thousand

Limit per organisation/year:  
BRL 1.5 million



#### **Direct Procurement from Family Farming (CDAF)**

For purchasing products defined by the PAA Management Group in order to sustain prices. Modality adopted by the CONAB, with resources from MDS and MDA.

Limit per DAP/year:  
BRL 8 thousand

Limit per organisation/year:  
BRL 500 thousand



### Support to Milk Consumption and Production (PAA Milk)

Enables purchase of milk, which, after being processed, is donated to consumer beneficiaries. It is run by state governments in Northeast Brazil and Minas Gerais, with resources from MDS

**Limit per DAP/semester:**  
BRL 4 thousand



### Institutional procurement

Purchases from family farmers through public tenders to the purchasing agency to meet its own demands for food, seeds and other propagating materials.

**Limit per DAP/year/buying agency:**  
BRL 20 thousand



### Seed Procurement

Aims to procure seeds, seedlings and propagating materials for supplier- beneficiaries' human or animal food to donate to consumer or supplier beneficiaries.

**Limit per DAP/year:**  
BRL 16 thousand

**Limit per organisation/year:**  
BRL 6 million



## The PAA financial resources

According to Figure 2, resources invested in the PAA have generally increased year after year, except for 2007 and 2011, when there was a slight drop compared to previous years. In 2003, the PAA invested around BRL 145 million, while in 2012 BRL 838 million were invested, in nominal values. Although data point to a general growth in budgetary resources, this growth occurred to a certain extent at a slow pace when considering the demands of the social movements and family farmers' unions and food and nutrition security organisations, such as the CONSEA.

On the 2007/2008 demands agendas, the Family Farm Workers' Federation (FETRAF) and the National Farm Workers' Confederation (CONTAG) claimed the allocation of BRL 1 billion to family farming (FETRAF, 2007; CONTAG, 2007). In the final document of the III National Conference on Food and Nutrition Security (2007), the demand was to allocate no less than 10% of the PRONAF budget to the PAA (Brazil, CONSEA, 2007).

Attention is called to the fact that the PAA is still a relatively small programme in terms of invested funds, first because of the social demands for its growth, and secondly due to its success. The PAA has become a benchmark for family farmers, social movements and even other countries' governments.

When analysing the PAA funds' distribution to the Brazilian regions during the period 2003-2012 (Figure 3), the Northeast is the region which receives most of the resources, a total of 47% of the PAA resources during that period. The Northeast is the region with the highest number of rural family farms, and is the most socially vulnerable one, with land and water access problems and the need to build coexistence strategies in the semiarid environment. This concentration of resources is explained due to the existence of the PAA Milk modality specifically in the Northeast and in the Northern part of Minas Gerais state, and due to the programme's "founding principles" (Mielitz, 2014, p. 66), which focus on places with food insecurity and rural poverty.


In the second place in terms of resources comes the Southern region (22%), followed by the Southeast (21%). The North and Midwest regions participate with small percentages, 6% and 4%, respectively. In 2012, however, the Northeast region reduced its share. In 2005, the region received around 60% of the total PAA

resources (higher percentage) and in 2012 this percentage was around 36.72% (the lowest percentage share in the programme's ten years of existence). The drought that occurred in 2012 and 2013 in Northeast Brazil may have contributed.

### FETRAF & CONTAG

The CONTAG, created in 1963, was the first rural workers' union organisation in Brazil. Today the CONTAG represents family farmers and rural workers, and disputes this same social base with FETRAF, created in 2005 after criticism against the CONTAG performance.

**FIGURE 03:** Performance (absolute and relative) of the PAA financial implementation among the Brazilian regions, 2003-2012



Source: MDS data (2013)

### The food consumer and supplier beneficiaries

According to Figure 4, the number of family farmers supplying to the PAA rose sharply in 2005 and 2006 (216%), dropped slightly in 2007, and then resumed its upward trend, albeit more slowly. In absolute terms, the number of family farmer suppliers increased from about 150,000 in 2006 to a little over 185,000 in 2012. Figure 2 also shows that the Northeast has always had a predominant share in terms of farmer suppliers throughout the 10 years. In 2012, 40.5% of the family farmers that had joined the programme were from this region. The Southern region comes second (except for 2007, 2008 and 2011, when the Southeast was second).


The data above show that PAA benefits proportionally a low number of family farmers compared to its total number, reaching only 4.2% of family farmers in Brazil (Mielitz, 2014). Several studies carried out over the ten years of the programme highlight, nevertheless, that its contributions have an indirect impact on rural communities overall, due to three factors: recovery of product prices, creation/promotion of other markets and marketing channels (such as street markets), or commercial appreciation of some products (Delgado, 2013; Pandolfo, 2008; Delgado, Conceição & Oliveira, 2005).

The programme's success is more evident when analysing the data on entities/people that benefit from the food and quantity and diversity of procured produce. According to MDS data, in 2011 more than 25,000 entities were benefitted, or over 20 million

people. In 2012, more than 23,000 entities were provided, distributed geographically according to Figure 5: 36% in the Northeast, 22% in the South, 17% Southeast, 14% North and 11% in the Midwest.


Beneficiaries are the day-care centres, schools, care homes, popular restaurants, community kitchens, food banks and socio-assistance institutions. Specific communities, such as the indigenous, quilombolas (descendants of slaves), African-origin communities, squatters, nonindustrial fishermen, those affected by climate disasters and so on, can also become beneficiaries of the programme, provided they are members of any social organisation.

FIGURE 04: Performance (absolute and relative) of family farmer suppliers' share in the PAA among the Brazilian regions, 2003-2012



Source: MDS data (2013)

FIGURE 05: Percentage of the PAA food beneficiary entities, per Brazilian geographic region in 2012



Source: MDS data (2013)

## Products procured

The data in Figure 06 present the quantity of food procured by PAA over the years. Generally, these figures have been on the increase. The programme was first implemented in the second half of 2003, and procured 7,800 tons of produce; in 2009, it procured 500,000 tons, and 529,000 tons in 2012. The large majority of these products come from the Northeast, followed sometimes by the Southeast or sometimes by the South.


According to Mielitz (2014), the PAA has procured over 400 different products, which explains the diversity in production and in food. Although the programme does not supply the daily food quantity needed, it allows further access to a diversity of food consistent with the local/ regional food culture.

Figure 07 shows the main categories of products procured by the CONAB in 2013 through the programme, so that “many of these products are regional, and their procurement is to appreciate and respect local eating habits and the regional farming vocation” (Brazil, CONAB, undated, p. 8).

The large portion of fresh produce is related to problems of access to credit, which would help implement equipment and places suited to processing and industrialising food production in appropriate plants for the family economy scale. Social movements also call


for the adaptation of sanitary standards to match the reality of family farmers. The normative standard adopted by the Health Surveillance and Records System of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply excludes family and peasant farming, since that same standard apply for large food enterprises. The standard does not respect the logic of nonindustrial and family farming systems, which has led to criminalisation of these products and the exclusion of those families from the institutional and private market.

**FIGURE 06:** Quantity of products (tons) procured by the PAA over the years, per geographic region in Brazil



Source: MDS data (2013)

FIGURE 07: Categories of family farmers' produce sold through the PAA, implemented by the CONAB in 2013



Source: Brazil, CONAB, undated.

## The PAA contributions and challenges to rural development and food and nutrition security

### The dialogue and incorporation of family farming's diversity

The PAA is the first public procurement programme focusing solely on family farming and with concerns regarding its socioeconomic and cultural diversity. It procures crops/livestock produced by family farmers, including here food producers based on land reform, landless rural workers, squatters, quilombolas, agro-extractivists, families affected by dams, indigenous communities and family farmers in special circumstances.

When focusing on food and nutrition security, the PAA encourages more equal ways of producing food (Maluf, 2007, 2001). Priority is given to strengthening the different segments involved in family farming, which for a long time has stayed on the fringe of public policies. These segments have always faced problems in farming, especially due to restricted access to land and means of production, as mentioned in the previous chapters.


The PAA engendered different micro-social processes that have contributed to giving visibility and value to the work and lifestyles of the babassu nut-breakers, extractivists, quilombolas, mangaba fruit pickers, small-scale fishermen, indigenous people, land reform settlers, and so on. Delgado (2013, p. 7) highlights how a "result originally unplanned" in the programme has "redeemed significant regional initiatives, bearing the affirmation of identity, autonomy and self-esteem of communities and peasant cultures, marginalised by conventional economy and traditional farming policy".

In its structure, the programme ranges from the more economically structured family farmers, who complement its access to the institutional market by accessing other markets, to the family farmers in a more socially vulnerable situation, whose share in the programme could be their main relationship to markets, or even their re-inclusion in commercial production. A major effort is being made to include in the PAA more socially vulnerable and weak segments, which might regard the programme as an instrument for the productive inclusion and promotion of their food and nutrition security by increasing the production and consumption of a variety of food cultivated on their own farm.

The programme also seeks to strengthen women's participation and give more visibility to their farm work by procuring products produced typically by women, such as vegetables, baked and agro-industrialized products. It has a greater effect in the modality Purchase with Simultaneous Donation (Siliprandi & Cintrão, 2014). Major normative changes were made recently to bring the women's work out of anonymity, for example, through the requirement of minimum percentages of women's share in projects and allocating part of the budget specifically to women's organisations (Brazil, PAA Management Group, 2011). It is also necessary to investigate the changes that these standards cause in the household, society and women's empowerment.



**FIGURE 08:** Relative performance of women’s participation in CONAB operations, in the Simultaneous Donation modality



Source and prepared by: CONAB/Supaf/Gecaf

Generally, data on access between regions and social groups match the programme concepts of holding a dialogue with the populations with the greatest shortcomings in social reproduction and, therefore, more socially vulnerable. Some normative changes have been important in this sense, such as the definition that in the modalities Purchase with Simultaneous Donation and PAA Milk, whenever possible, priority should be given to supplier beneficiaries enrolled in the Single Registry of Federal Government Social Programmes (CadÚnico), beneficiaries of the Family Allowance Programme (Bolsa Família), women, indigenous people, quilombolas, land reform settlers and other traditional peoples and communities and the public assisted by the Brazil without Extreme Poverty Plan (Brazil, Presidency of the Republic, 2013). The programme urges

continuing with or returning to the relationship with the land, social reproduction strategies based on generally diversified agriculture models that promote autonomy and productive inclusion of social vulnerable segments of society.

Several reports and studies have emphasised the work of the programme with poor family farmers, and the opportunities taken when creating markets for surplus products beyond family consumption. Others point to groups that produced little and have now begun to increment their production for commercial purposes and for own consumption. There are also reported improvements in the family and collective infrastructure.

Some surveys mention that the PAA has enabled rural populations to continue working in agriculture, in

contrast to seeking occupation elsewhere and which very often is seasonal and far from the family home (Siliprandi & Cintrão, 2014; Brazil, MDS, 2014; Nehring & McKay, 2013; Delgado, 2013; Plein, 2012; Zimmermann & Ferreira, 2008; Cordeiro, 2007). Despite significant structural limitations, the more vulnerable segments of family farming have seized the farming and marketing opportunities provided by the PAA, and have strengthened their social reproduction.

Nevertheless, considering that it has always been historically difficult for family farming to be included in institutional farm produce markets, it is important that the programme also continues with its emphasis on reinforcing and structuring family farm organisations and on supporting agricultural trade through the Direct Purchase

and Stockpiling modalities. These instruments have contributed to structuring many family farmers' organisations and are an important agricultural policy for them.

## The promotion of social capital in the territories

Some PAA modalities, namely those operated by the CONAB, prioritise the participation of family farmers through social organisations (cooperatives and associations), with a view to strengthening them "as political actors exercising their citizenship" (Porto et al., 2014, p. 47). The rural organisation is leveraged to have access to other public policies and collective actions. The PAA encourages apprenticeships in the management of its administrative, financial and technical procedures, and in the relations of farmers' organisations with markets, contributing to the access and construction of new trading channels.

Some modalities, mainly the Purchase with Simultaneous Donation, require the articulation of a vast group of actors in the local and national contexts, promoting the social capital of actors and territories. Ministries, state governments, city halls, non-governmental organisations, social movements, technical assistance organisations and other social mediators are leading actors in the programme governance and execution.

Muller, Fialho and Schneider (2007) state, when analysing different institutional arrangements for running the programme, that the involvement and articulation of several organisations could contribute to acquiring skills and knowledge for the network involved, to channel public investment to priority areas, in order to minimise distortions, and to co-manage public policies.

Yet the political and logistics articulation of this widespread group of actors and organisations may also imply certain challenges. Despite the efforts, intersectorality remains an important political and institutional challenge at national level. The municipal/state political power is not always willing to partner in running the programme, and quite often family farming organisations are not set up or find themselves at an initial structuring stage, with scant experience in administrative and physical capital management. Generally, socio-assistential entities also pose shortcomings in terms of structure and human resources. Their participation is usually restricted to contributing to the programme's general governance and not proposing projects. Social mediator organisations do not always exist to take the initiative or leverage the necessary political articulation and governance to implement the programme between the public authorities and family farming organisations.

The aforementioned elements do not mean that contexts with those characteristics do not enable participation in the programme. This is a social and political construction that needs time and support and is not necessarily linear. Therefore, the State and social movements must maintain an ongoing role on some fronts: publicising information; project management capacity building; support of technical assistance and public rural extension;

subsidies in infrastructures and governance and social management of projects; greater articulation of public policies; and strengthening intersectoral actions between ministries and other public administration agencies.

Social organisation is not present in all social contexts, and, therefore, modalities that accept individualised participation come to the fore. In this sense, it is important to foster coordination between different programme executors to leverage the different execution configurations in local contexts, minimising possible disputes within the same programme. Given the different political and institutional configurations expressed by the PAA in local spaces, it is also relevant to incentivize and provide similar supports for local actors, regardless of the implementing unit.

## The (re)construction of family farming: lessons learnt

The PAA offers farmers and their organisations the opportunity to supply whatever they have available for sale, provided that it is agreed in the projects established with the CONAB or local and state governments. This process, associated with forming a partnership and trust with socio-assistential bodies and the network of public food and nutrition facilities, has helped families to sell, through the programme, an extremely diversified range of products. In turn, this contributed to strengthening and restoring the regional food culture. PAA acquires a wide variety of products from the same family unit, few of which had a commercial purpose in the past, since they were restricted to family consumption and reciprocal relations.

Generally, they are products cultivated in small amounts, in areas close to home or not used as commercial crops; products that were no longer being cultivated and consumed (Siliprandi & Cintrão, 2014; Mielitz, 2014). This means the recovery of products, working methods, costs, habits, recipes and the stories of people, communities and places. They are lifestyles now being appreciated and which had been forgotten through the generations, very often having been regarded as out-dated or marginalized as a result of the increasing commercialisation of agriculture (Ploeg, 2008), which even permeates the sphere of subsistence farming. The cultural, food and productive diversity of family farming comes to the surface when observing the programme's relationship with extractivists, babassu nut breakers, small-scale fishermen, quilombolas, mangaba fruit pickers and so on.

The PAA encourages agro-ecological and organic production with a surcharge of up to 30%. From the beginning, it promoted the procurement of creole seeds, removing the local seeds from marginality and helping to strengthen the social processes to redeem and use this biodiversity, opposed to what is implemented through green revolution production systems and use of genetically modified seeds. These measures have also contributed to the autonomy of family units by promoting a productive matrix focused on reducing inputs from outside the farm and by co-production with nature (Ploeg, 2008; Petersen, 2009).

The PAA has contributed to rural development by encouraging processing and industrialisation of the agri-food production, since there is considerable participation of processed products in the programme, such as the production of baked goods, processing fruit and vegetables, dairy products (namely milk beverages) and meat processing, for example. It not only guarantees a market, but also helps to add value and increase the farmers' and their organisations' income.

Moreover, in the PAA the food is produced on site or in the territory and, also preferably consumed there. It has endeavoured to shorten the distances between production and consumption, boosting the local economy. Since the inception of the programme, the federal government and local initiatives have made efforts to

bring family farmers closer to consumers in order to qualify the institutional arrangements in place and build commitments and understanding among all stakeholders.

A survey carried out in the South of Rio Grande do Sul state indicates that generally consumer entities know the origin of the food, know many farmers that produce the food, have already visited their production units and chatted to them in discussion spaces on governance and the programme's institutional arrangements. Belik and Domene (2012, p. 63) commented that farmers that take part in the PAA are more concerned with quality and security of their products due to their close relationship with their consumers.

What is at stake is building short marketing channels, in contrast to the long hauls and the disconnection between production and consumption, ensuring construction and recovery of identities. In the short marketing circuits, the rural and personal origin (and not industrial and impersonal) of food is valorised, the farming and food culture regained, and the identity and work of those who produce and transform the food appreciated.

There are still only a small number of studies on the repercussions of the programme on the food beneficiaries. Nutritional analysis of the beneficiaries and the role of the PAA in possible changes in food and nutrition security still lack proper research. However, the research already done

mentions that the programme contributes to food access, improves the nutritional status of the populations by supplying fruit and vegetables and offering courses on good eating habits, provides information on recipes and food transformation, encourages new and regains old tastes and adds value to the local food culture. The PAA has become an important food complement for socio-assistential entities, schools and day care centres in the public education network and for populations in a situation of food and nutrition insecurity.

### The challenge of continuity

The implementation of the PAA implies creating food procurement projects between the CONAB and social organisations (formal and informal), and between the MDS and local or state governments. Generally organised for a one-year period, these projects specify family farmer suppliers, beneficiary social assistance entities, the quantities of food procurement, the price paid for it and the regularity in product delivery. Nevertheless, these projects do not always continue in subsequent years, affecting all stakeholders. This lack of continuity is due to factors such as local social disarticulation, irregularities in implementing the previous project and lack of institutional support.

In addition family farming faces difficulties in adjusting to health standards and classification of plant

products. Several family farming organisations began their processing activities and agro-industrialisation, encouraged by the programme. However, because of the difficult initial structuring process and difficulties in complying with the health surveillance standards, they find restrictions in joining the PAA. To overcome such difficulties, it is necessary to build mechanisms and instruments that are flexible to the specifications of family and peasant farming, preserving health and food security.

In case of discontinuity, farmers need to find new temporary markets or return to their traditional markets. There is the risk of losing their production. Family farming organisations face administrative and financial restraints and a loss of legitimacy, social capital and the power to mobilise and articulate their members/cooperative associates. Political type and social legitimacy implications also weigh upon the mediating organisations that need to explain interruptions and discontinuities of the programme.

For the socio-assistential entities and for people/families in a situation of food insecurity, discontinuity compounds social fragility and broadens the search for other actions and public policies, such as the Family Allowance Programme, for example. Together, these discontinuities affect social capital and the political mobilisation at stake. In order to minimise them, the Terms of Accession, signed by municipal and state

governments and by the MDS, provide a five-year term, with renewal for a similar period.

According to Galindo, Sambuichi and Oliveira (2014), the share in the purchase of organic products was small compared to the total purchases of the PAA, in the modalities operated by the CONAB in the years 2007 to 2012, fluctuating between 1% and 3%, despite the increasing investments in these products. Lack of information about the surcharge and the assessment mechanisms of organic compliance are some of the reasons for the low percentage of procurement of organic produce. Another reason for this low percentage mentioned above is the fact that some organisations that comply with the organic and agro-ecological farming regulations can approach other markets, sometimes more expressive in terms of demand and price levels.

## The accrued construction of the PAA

The PAA promotes processing and industrialisation of agri-foods, with an important share of its procurement being of processed products, such as baked goods, processed fruits and vegetables, dairy by-products (notably milk beverages), meat, and so on. It also guarantees a market, helps to add value and increase the income of family farmers and their organisations.

Rural social movements and civil society organisations are now implementing the PAA, insistently calling for and demanding upgrades in its mechanisms and building new initiatives. Many public administrators have also made efforts to implement the programme and build public participation arenas, which contributed to monitoring and enhancing its mechanisms, such as national seminars and regional workshops for assessing the programme. The PAA in particular, and institutional markets in general have become a recurring theme in studies. The outcome is a certain effervescence regarding the emerging possibilities for family farming, land reform settlers, indigenous people, quilombola communities and other traditional peoples and communities, as well as for food and nutrition security in the country, based on experiences and learning from the PAA.

A number of studies point to the PAA innovations and contributions to rural development and food security

on a national and international level. The programme can play a structural role for the country's family farming and food and nutrition security. Therefore, it is necessary to grant it priority and provide the instruments and resources needed for its development, operationalization and for its monitoring.

Beyond the domestic scenario, the programme has also drawn the attention of international multilateral agencies and of other countries. The creation of the PAA Africa (Purchase from Africans for Africa) in 2010, involving five countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the Purchases for Progress Programme (P4P) and projects to build similar programmes in Latin America are emblematic of the international importance it has achieved. Recent reports organised by the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) also highlight the programme's innovative approaches to build markets, to reinforce family farming and food and nutrition security (Sanchez, Veloso & Ramírez, 2014; FAO, 2013).

It is necessary to bear in mind the elements that have facilitated, promoted or inhibited the creation and execution of the Brazilian initiative regarding PAA, in order to allow proper assessment and to support the possibilities of adapting it to different economic, political and social contexts. The experience of Latin American countries transferring policies through multilateral agencies and the vast literature on the risks of transfers and dissemination of programmes and public actions show that these processes are not automatic. In this sense, it is fundamental to understand the historical process that has helped to create the PAA, elements and factors involved, the institutions at stake, their contributions and challenges for the PAA's development in Brazil.

## The PNAE: reconstruction and protagonism

School feeding was one of the first projects created in the country as a public policy focusing on feeding a certain age group. Launched in 1954, it underwent numerous makeovers and reached 2003 in the form of transfer of funds from the federal government, as a supplement to the states, Federal District and municipalities, for the procurement of foodstuffs for school meals.

In 2003, the PNAE assisted pupils enrolled in child education in day care centres and pre-schools, primary schools in the public education system in the states, Federal District and municipalities, or in central government establishments. Moreover, pupils were also included from indigenous schools, remaining quilombola areas, and special education schools included in the School Census undertaken by the National Institute for Studies and Research (INEP) of the Ministry of Education, the year prior to their receiving the assistance.

The reformulation of the School Feeding Programme in the beginning of the 2000s in order to address the problem of hunger and food insecurity in the country, complied with specific premises. The first was its affirmation as an instrument to guarantee the human right

to food. The second was to reinforce social control. The third, based on the Brazilian federative organisation, focused on the responsibilities, not only of the Union, but also state and municipal governments. Lastly, the programme was now regarded as supplementary to education, and in necessary articulation with three other variables that also impact learning, namely, health, transport and textbooks.

While articulating these four areas, school feeding was now playing a leading role in the student's growth and promotion in the learning process, upholding a good school performance and educating them in healthy eating habits. The programme was now universal, non-discriminatory, ongoing, and decentralised, with regard to food culture and social participation.

The combination of these principles and premises resulted in guidelines for running the programme: to encourage the exercise of social control; to respect regional habits and the farming vocation; to offer good quality food to all pupils, guaranteeing a minimum of 15% of their nutritional needs; and to ensure accountability of all federative entities. In a resolution dated June 2003,

the PNAE goal was defined as "partially meeting the pupils' nutritional needs, in order to guarantee the implementation of the food security policy and to contribute to forming good eating habits".

The National Fund for the Development of Education (FNDE), an public institution linked to the Ministry of Education was made responsible for the PNAE coordination, providing its standards of planning, execution, control, monitoring and assessment. The agency also transfers funds allocated solely to procurement of foodstuffs.

As executing entities, the municipal, state and Federal District departments of education are responsible for supplying school meals, for at least 200 school days, and for providing food and nutritional education. They are also responsible for complementing the transferred funds and for rendering the programme's accounts. Social accountability is carried out by the School Feeding Council (CAE), consisting of an advisory collegiate instituted within the framework of the states, Federal District and municipalities.

The FNDE transfers the funds from the Union to the executing

entities (states, Federal District and municipalities) in ten monthly instalments to cover 20 school days a month. This money is deposited in specified current bank accounts opened by the FNDE in an official financial institution, and the executing entities enjoy autonomy to manage the transferred funds. They must define the financial supplement required, pursuant to the Federal Constitution. It is not necessary to sign an agreement or any other instrument between the Union and the executing entities.

### EXECUTING ENTITIES' OBLIGATIONS

- To invest funds solely for food procurement
- To institute the CAE as the deliberative, supervisory and advisory agency
- To duly render accounts of the funds received
- To comply with the other standards set by the FNDE for the investment of resources.



## Nutrition in the PNAE

The PNAE requires a professional in nutrition to guarantee the provision of balanced meals, in order to improve the pupils' health. Since 2006, nutritionists are the specialists in charge of the programme, with the following duties:

- To define nutritional parameters, which requires knowledge of the population attended, their primary nutritional needs, habits and socioeconomic level
- To plan menus, establishing the menu composition to be served to the pupils
- To schedule products' purchase, according to the menu planning
- To supervise menu planning, including correct preparation and food safety
- To train meal-providers
- To analyse compliance with the legal provisions for nutrient supply
- To assess the impact on the pupils in the different aspects involving school feeding
- To run the acceptability test with pupils in the case of introduction of new meals, together with the professionals involved
- Food and nutrition education through school feeding

Between 2004 and 2008, the number of municipalities with nutritionists in charge of school meals almost quadrupled, from 1,001 to 3,872 in number. The executing entity is responsible for purchasing the foodstuffs defined in the menus prepared by the nutritionists. The meals supplied have to be consistent with local eating habits and the farming vocation. The PNAE prefers basic staples, with priority for semi-processed and fresh products. This guideline combines with the willingness to provide the food from family farming, as defined in the legislation commented herein below.

In the case of indigenous school feeding, the menu must be prepared not only by the nutritionist but also by a representative from the indigenous community. The CAE should accompany this preparation. If the municipality does not have a nutritionist available, it should request due technical assistance from the State.

The executing entity is also responsible for providing the pupils with regular meals, supplying at least 15% of the daily nutritional requirements of the pupils enrolled in day care centres, pre-

school or primary education, and at least 30% of the daily nutritional requirements for pupils in indigenous schools, during their time in the classroom. It should also acquire staples corresponding to at least 70% of the financial resources allocated to the programme.

## Social accountability in the PNAE

The School Feeding Council (CAE) consists of six members: a representative of the Executive; one representative of the Legislative; two teacher representatives; two representatives from the pupils' parents that must be nominated by the school councils, parents' and teachers' associations or similar entities; and a representative from another segment of civil society, nominated by the represented segment. Each member has a substitute of the same category.

The CAE should accompany the investment of the funds transferred by the FNDE, monitor the procurement of products, analyse the accounts rendered to be submitted by the PNAE and issue a conclusive decision on the matter. Moreover, it should inform the executing entity of any

irregularities regarding foodstuffs, such as, for example, expiry dates, deterioration, deviations and theft, in order to take the correct measures. Likewise, any irregularity should be informed to the FNDE, to the General Accounts Comptroller (CGU) – a federal government agency responsible for direct and immediate assistance to the Presidency of the Republic regarding internal control activities, public audits and fighting corruption, in the sphere of the Executive, the Prosecutor’s Office and the TCU. As an additional function, it should publish the amount of funds transferred to the executing entity.

The states, Federal District and municipalities, as PNAE executing entities, are responsible for guaranteeing to CAE the necessary infrastructure to carry out its activities, including the transport of advisers to fulfil their duties and provide the CAE with all documentation issued for the programme’s execution.

### Updating the transfer sum per student

In 2003, the first year of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva’s government, the FNDE adopted a series of resolutions for the PNAE. Probably the most important was the recognition to extend assistance to public day care centres, with the per capita amount of BRL 0.18/meal in nominal values for this modality. At the same time, it updated the per capita value for pre-school children, from BRL 0.06 to BRL 0.13/meal, and the transfer for school meals in indigenous schools to BRL 0.34/per capita/meal, given the need to offer food and nutrition reinforcement to the indigenous pupils, more exposed to food insecurity and the risk of malnutrition.

However, the most serious problem of the programme persisted: the extremely low per capita sum transferred by the FNDE with almost no supplement from the executing entities, especially in the poorest municipalities. In 2004, the PNAE completed ten years without an adjustment in the per capita value for primary education. Thus, the FNDE and CONSEA jointly submitted a claim to the President of the Republic to restate that amount. Given the number of students (36 million in pre-school and primary education) that received school meals at that time, a more substantial amount would mean a strong impact on the Union budget.

A gradual restatement process was put in place to increase the per capita value for school feeding. The value of primary education was adjusted in 2004 from BRL 0.13 to BRL 0.15. Pre-school had the value fixed at BRL 0.15; day care centres (one

million pupils) rose to BRL 0.18, and indigenous school feeding, corresponding to 113,000 pupils, to BRL 0.34. Overall, the budget for school feeding was at BRL 1 billion.

In the next few years all modalities had increases in the per capita values. By 2010, an adjustment of 130% had been made for primary education, fixing a per capita/day value of BRL 0.30. New adjustments were made during President Dilma Rousseff’s government, albeit to a lesser extent.



TABLE 01: Performance of the Per-Capita value of School Feeding 2002-2012 (in BRL)

| Modality  | Programme Name    | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | 2012 |
|---|-------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Child Education (pre-school)                    | PNAP              | 0.06 | 0.13 | 0,15 | 0.18 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 1.00 |
| Primary Education                               | PNAE              | 0.13 | 0.13 | 0,15 | 0.18 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.30 |
| High School Education                           | PNAE              | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.30 |
| Public Day Care Centres, Philanthropic Entities | PNAC              | -    | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.22 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.50 |
| Indigenous Schools                              | PNAI              | -    | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.60 |
| Quilombola Schools                              | PNAQ              | -    | -    | -    | 0.34 | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.44 | 0.60 | 0.60 | 0.60 |
| Youth & Adult Education                         | PDDE              | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 0.22 | 0.30 | 0.30 | 0.30 |
| All-day Education                               | Further Education | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | -    | 0.66 | 0.66 | 0.90 | 0.90 | 0.90 |

National Programme for Pre-School Feeding (PNAP) | National School Feeding Programme (PNAE)  
 National Nursery Feeding Programme (PNAC) | National Indigenous School Feeding Programme (PNAI)  
 National Quilombola School Feeding Programme (PNAQ)  
 Money Directly in Schools Programme (PDDE), that transfers funds from this programme for youth and adult school feeding  
 More Education - transfers funds to school feeding of full-day instruction.

Source: FNDE

TABLE 02: Funds allocated to the PNAE and to students

| Year | Funds<br>(BRL million) | Students attended<br>(in millions) |
|------|------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 1995 | 590                    | 33.2                               |
| 1996 | 454                    | 30.5                               |
| 1997 | 673                    | 35.1                               |
| 1998 | 785                    | 35.3                               |
| 1999 | 872                    | 36.9                               |
| 2000 | 902                    | 37.1                               |
| 2001 | 920                    | 37.1                               |
| 2002 | 849                    | 36.9                               |
| 2003 | 954                    | 37.3                               |
| 2004 | 1,025                  | 37.8                               |
| 2005 | 1,266                  | 36.4                               |
| 2006 | 1,500                  | 36.3                               |
| 2007 | 1,520                  | 35.7                               |
| 2008 | 1,490                  | 34.6                               |
| 2009 | 2,013                  | 47.0                               |
| 2010 | 3,034                  | 45.6                               |
| 2011 | 3,051                  | 44.4                               |
| 2012 | 3,306                  | 43.1                               |

Note: Table 02 covers a longer period, for comparison purposes. It is worth noting the total funds allocated to school feeding and the number of pupils provided. Two considerations are necessary to understand the table. The first is that in the period 1995-2003, there was no adjustment to the amounts transferred. The second is that, in accordance with the approval of the new 2009 School Feeding Act, high school or secondary education pupils were included in the programme, leading to an increase in the number of students provided.

In addition to readjusting the per capita value and even the approval of the new School Feeding Act, other measures were taken with positive results. The FNDE formed a partnership with some federal universities – Bahia, Brasília, Goiás, Ouro Preto, Paraná, Pernambuco, Rio Grande do Sul, Santa Catarina and São Paulo – to create Cooperating Centres in School Food and Nutrition (CECANES). The CECANES contribute to the PNAE with several actions, such as technical and operational support to states and municipalities by providing technical support in school feeding, training agents involved in the PNAE and by carrying out studies and research in the field of food and nutrition.

### The new legal benchmark for school feeding

Of all of the developments made in the PNAE since 2003, certainly the most significant was the enactment of Law Nº 11,947 from 2009, known as the School Feeding Act. The CONSEA was authorised by the Presidency of the Republic to undertake a study concerning what should be reformulated in the existing legislation regarding the programme. A working group was set up and for two years it drafted proposals for school feeding improvement. The study's recommendation was to draft a law that would encompass all of the changes needed for the programme to overcome its main difficulties.

It was necessary to find alternatives for some of the programme's challenging issues, such as:

- Not to compromise school feeding in a municipality or a state when the government of that federative entity has deviated programme resources or failed to meet transfer requirements imposed by the programme
- To extend school feeding to secondary education
- To create incentives for the programme to move forward to offer pupils appropriate and healthy food
- To guarantee a quota for family farming in food provision
- To maintain school feeding in the context of the human right to food

The CONSEA approved the draft bill in 2007 and submitted it to the ministries and public agencies involved in the programme for their consideration. In 2008, the House of Representatives approved it followed by the Senate in 2009. The sanction of the law in June of 2009 enabled considerable progress.

The purpose of the law was to ensure a healthy and adequate diet and include food and nutrition education in the teaching and learning process. It proposed educational activities that go beyond the school syllabus, addressing the topic of food and nutrition and development of healthy lifestyles, from the food and nutrition security perspective. The law established school feeding as a human right to food and decided to extend it to the entire public basic education network (infant, primary and secondary), for students of the Further Education Programme (integral education) and for youth and adult education (EJA). It also provided that 30% of funds transferred by the FNDE for school feeding should be used to procure foodstuff produced by family farmers. When the executing entity commits an irregularity, the law authorises the transfer to an alternative executing entity for a period of 180 days, waiving the tender process for emergency essential food procurement.

A set of laws, resolutions and decrees was published to provide the necessary definitions for the law's enforcement. Three of them include pertinent definitions for this study. Resolution 26, dated 17 June 2013, laid down the responsibilities of executing entities (states and municipalities) and of executing

units (schools), stipulating their duties. Furthermore, it also provided quite detailed guidelines for the menu, which should contain information on the type of meal, name of the preparation, ingredients and consistency, as well as nutrition information on energy, macronutrients and priority micronutrients (vitamins A and C, magnesium, iron, zinc and calcium) and fibres.

Its Article 20 provides that food for the PNAE should be procured by public tender, or even by waiving the tender process. It also determined under which conditions the executing entity is exempt from using at least 30% of the FNDE funds to procure food from family farming, as in the cases of inadequate hygienic-sanitary conditions and unfeasibility of a regular and ongoing food supply, as long as product seasonality is respected. The resolution regulated that pupils enrolled in an all-day school should be given at least three daily meals.

Law 12,982, dated 28 May 2014, amended the School Feeding Act, stating that a special menu should be prepared based on medical and nutritional recommendations for pupils who required customized nutritional care.

Resolution 4, dated 2 April 2015, established an order of priority for food suppliers of

school meals. The group of projects of local suppliers has priority on the school feeding supply, followed by the project group of suppliers from the region (territory), the state and lastly, the country. Within each group of projects (as explained in the last sentence), priority should be given to:

- land reform settlements, traditional indigenous and quilombola communities, with no priority between them
- food providers certified as organic or agro-ecological
- official groups (farming organisations with the PRONAF Declaration of Conformity – Juridical DAP)
- informal groups (family farmers, holders of the PRONAF Declaration of Conformity – Individual DAP, organised in groups)
- individual suppliers (holders of an Individual DAP). It also required evidence that the produce is from family farming.

### **PNAE and family farming**

The debate on including family farming within the PNAE is prior to 2003. Many municipalities had already developed procurement strategies with that focus, even without specific legislation for that purpose. In 1994, when the funds for school feeding were decentralised to states and municipalities, the focus of local procurement was mentioned as one of the process guidelines.

With the Zero Hunger agenda, the focus now was on building and increasing quality of policies for the public that falls within the sphere of the family based economy. The institutional market focus adopted strategic contours, as one of the tools for rural development. In the first years of the PAA, the programme prioritised assistance to schools and day care centres. Acceptance in schools was very positive, because it enabled them to diversify the food, especially in smaller municipalities without the resources to offset those from the Ministry of Education.

The experience gained in the PAA has opened the way to overcome the political barriers that arose during the discussion about the draft bill for school feeding. The approved Act revealed a new market for family farming by guaranteeing the investment requirement of at least 30% of the funds decentralised by the FNDE to the executing entities in procurement of food produced by family farming. Certainly, this institutional food procurement instrument is the most important in the country, considering its coverage. The PNAE operates in all Brazilian states and municipalities, representing a beneficiary group of approximately 45 million pupils 200 days a year.



The new regulation could not be fully implemented and varied widely among the municipalities. It is estimated that, a year after the enactment of the law, 47% of the municipalities had already procured an average of 22% of items from family farming (Saraiva et al, 2013). Doubtlessly, the regulation represented major capitalisation for family farming, with potential to inject considerable resources, since 30% of the total budget of BRL 3 billion is almost BRL 1 billion.

Until time, the regulation to be followed was the General Tenders Act (Law 8,666/1993), which is the standard benchmark for all public administration and instructs the procurement or services contracts of any kind. This law has always been an obstacle to the participation of family and peasant farming in the institutional market in general, and specifically in school feeding, since it is very hard to adapt these regulations to the specific realities of this public.

Alongside the gains for family farmers, this aspect of the law has also favoured major changes in food eating habits and in general children's habits. It increased the diversity of possible food supplies, whether in allowing farmers new ways of food production or farming model, or in the variety of products offered. It also helped short circuit the market between farming and consumption.

The possibility provided by school feeding to family farmers has also demonstrated the existing weaknesses. The law itself restricts the food supply by family farmers in the impossibility to issue a fiscal document, on the unfeasibility of regular and constant supply of food staples, and on inadequacy of hygienic-sanitary conditions. Other setbacks are the farmers' lack of organisation, logistics problems, missing documentation, farmers' low confidence in the public authorities, irregular supply and unsuitable structures in schools to receive and process these kinds of food, and the difficulty in articulating between farmers and administrators.

Nevertheless, this may be considered a period of transition and these are normal obstacles to be overcome. It can be said that the PAA and the PNAE institutional purchases have made it possible to improve family farmers' economic conditions. Both programmes are a very broad market strengthening collective organisations, whether in farming, in trade or even political organisation, in addition to forming a link in the rural-urban relationship.

## Approval and ramifications

The law's procedure in the National Congress was not consensual and required some effort to be approved. Several social movements contributed decisively for this outcome. The CONSEA played a major role as articulator in this mobilisation. With the law approved, the PNAE adopted a new configuration based on incorporating family farming as a mandatory component in the food supply.

The law encouraged food procurement produced by family farmers. In order to facilitate it, an interministerial management group was created to manage these purchases. Since the programme was considered intersectoral, the law instigated participation of not only the


Ministry of Education but also others, namely the Ministries of Health, Social Development and Fight against Hunger, and Fishery. It intensified social control, especially for food procurement, to which corresponded significant progress in accountability.

It is estimated that nutritionists participate in only 15% of the municipalities for the time being, although seemingly on the rise. Although the law has failed to curb outsourcing of the programme's application by the executing entities, municipalities have reduced this behaviour.

The transformation of the programme since its inception in 1954 is clearly evident. This transformation process closely reflects the trajectory of the food-related policies, up to the maturation of a national food and nutrition security policy, which prevails in Brazil today.


Today the PNAE is known worldwide, which motivated the signature of international agreements with the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP), through the Brazilian Cooperation Agency of the Ministry of Foreign affairs (ABC), for cooperation with Latin American, Caribbean, African and Asian countries.

FIGURE 09: Decentralising the School Feeding procurement



Source: Adapted from Specht (2012)

FIGURE 10: Trajectory of the National School Feeding Programme (PNAE) – 1954-2012



Source: Adapted from Specht (2012)

## PAA and PNAE – achievements and challenges

The period beginning in 2003 marks a new stage in the history of policies relating to food and nutrition security in Brazil. What was put in place, based on the Zero Hunger project, was the result of accumulated experience and various attempts to contribute to breaking with the fragmentation of different programmes, and to making efforts to establish a food and nutrition security national policy. This change was feasible due to the political desire to give priority to these efforts. The option was decisive in favour of social participation, through CONSEA, that has played an effective role in accompanying and dialoguing with the government on what was implemented, taking advantage of its capacity to address society's demands concerning the food question.

Although the Zero Hunger project considered the wider context of food and nutrition security, the priority was the fight against hunger, which was translated into several actions geared to ensuring access to food. The PAA emerged in response to further demand for food caused by Zero Hunger and to assist, on a more structured basis, family farmers in a situation of poverty, with no available markets for their produce.

The extraordinary innovation of the PAA, compared to earlier practices in the programmes focusing on food farming or food consumption, was the articulation between the two ends, family and peasant farming produce and the consumption by Zero Hunger beneficiaries. It was the first programme solely directed at family farming, and also at promoting socioeconomic and cultural diversity of the food supplied, two extremely important elements for food and nutrition security.

The programme prioritises rural organisation and thus strengthens and encourages family farmers to form associations and to work together. It also furthers intersectoral actions and

participation of the civil society as a priority forum for social accountability, at the three administrative spheres, the national, state and municipal levels. Besides the CONSEA monitoring, many entities receiving food from the PAA are also involved, at the consumer end, although to date these organisations are far from the programme's management.

Much of what was highlighted in relation to the PAA is also valid for the PNAE, after the approval of the School Feeding Act that allocates a minimum of 30% of the funds transferred by the federal government for food procurement from family farming. The PAA acted as a pilot in the experience of institutional buying from family farmers for the PNAE, inspiring what was proposed in the law and its later regulations.

Both initiatives shortened the distances between production and consumption. In fact, they short-circuited marketing with positive repercussions on several aspects benefiting

food and nutrition security; in other words, cutting costs, strengthening local economies and building and restoring identities that were being lost. They broke with the impersonal nature of the food producer and helped to build their social identity and food culture. In the case of PNAE, for example, the food served in schools could come from farming very close to the reality of those pupils, and even from the farming of their own family and community.

Many challenges are encountered when putting both programmes in place, considering the short experience with institutional procurement in Brazil. One of them is continuity. Interruptions occur in institutions as well as in farming. Interruptions in purchases can seriously hamper the farmers' efforts, both at the family level and within the cooperatives and associations. Likewise, food consumers also suffer the harmful effects of this break in continuity, such as the socio-assistential

entities and group of other social organisations working with the food distribution, in the case of the PAA, and the schools, in the case of PNAE. This exhausts the programmes, which are then discredited as an alternative to the conventional marketing channels. On the other hand, farmers also need to guarantee continuity. School feeding, for example, cannot live with the uncertainty of the availability of food to be provided daily to pupils.

A second very pertinent challenge for a country the size of Brazil concerns the articulation problems between the Union, states and municipalities. Very often the municipal or state public authorities do not partners with the Union in implementing the programmes, or do not give them priority. At the federal level, both programmes are regarded as intersectoral and rely upon interministerial coordination for their management, which does not necessarily happen in the municipalities and states. The same happens with

social participation, more encouraged in some cases or eventually weakened in others. This distinction causes different ways of managing the programme, with varying results in each context.

In short, Brazilian experiences such as the PAA and the PNAE, widely acknowledged internationally, require assessment of the local realities and participation of local actors so that they can be successful when adopted by other countries.





# Final Considerations

Since the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century until the coffee crisis in the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, the Brazilian agro-exporting model prevailed over the food farming model, compromising food supply. All society's organisations and the Brazilian economy, since colonisation, had focused on international trade, and during that period, there were few changes in that context. The supply crises in Brazil were the result of an economic policy focusing on the international market and prevalence of the interests of large-scale agro-exporting farmers, who in turn, were in control of the State actions.

The 1929 Crash instigated the change in this scenario. The end of the Coffee and Milk Policy altered the interests at stake in the federal government and warned about the need to boost the country's home market, with a clear orientation to industrialisation. A

developmentalist process took shape in Brazil, extending to the mid-1970s. The food supply was now the focus of government policies.

The period 1930-1964 was one of major transformations:

- Setting up the minimum wage, labour laws and measures taken to feed the workers
- The creation of instruments relating directly to food supply (although some very short-lived, being extinguished or reformulated soon afterwards), such as the Supply Commission, the Social Security Food Service, the Farming Financing Commission, the National Food Commission, the PGPM, the Federal Supply and Price Committee, the Supply Council, the beginning of actions focusing on school feeding, the National Supply Superintendence, the Brazilian Storage Company and the Brazilian Food Company
- The orientation to interiorize development and deal with the regional differences in Brazil, with the creation of SUDENE

These different actions and initiatives taken by different governments, to a large extent concentrating on controlling consumer prices, were predominantly focused on the urban population. The country lacked more structural propositions with an impact on the short, medium and long terms. Accordingly, many opportunities to make structural changes were missed with the 1964 military coup, which rejected several reforms and actions proposed by the João Goulart government. This was the case of land reform and actions to promote access to water in Northeast Brazil.



In the period 1964-1990, the Brazilian rural hinterland changed drastically, with a strong impact on farming productivity. Major change took place in the Brazilian farming technological matrix, with the introduction of heavy machinery and a wide range of physical-chemical, biological, mechanical and agricultural innovations. A set of public policies was also put in place to uphold these actions, such as rural extension services and technical assistance, agro-livestock farming research, rural credit and the Guaranteed Minimum Price Policy (PGPM).

However, these innovations and public policies were not accompanied by changes in the land structure, which configured a "conservative farming upgrade" (Graziano da Silva, 1980). These State innovations and actions were centred on some products, notably those for exports or of interest to agro-industrial groups, and medium and large farmers in the South and Southeast. In other words, these measures were not very efficient in increasing food farming for internal supply (an important inflation-control element) and increased the concentration of resources and land in the hands of large farming landowners.

Agro-livestock products for export were prioritised, as well as the creation of necessary foreign exchange to promote the developmentalist model adopted by the military. The State, large landowners and financial and industrial capital were articulated into a new farming social pact. Ultimately, these measures exacerbated the socio-economic situation and made it tough for family farmers to stay in the rural hinterland.

To organise supply, some important actions were taken during the period, such as the creation of the CEASAs, the National Food and Nutrition Institute, the National Food and Nutrition Programme (PRONAN I and II), in addition to institutionalising and structuring the National School Feeding Programme. However, many of these actions were short-lived and had insufficient resources that were often not released, leading to interruptions in the service and discrediting the public action.

In the 1990s, the years of political opening, the major national challenges were hunger, poverty and food insecurity. Hunger during this period was not the result of a food shortage, as was alleged insistently, but due to problems in accessing

the food due to population's limited purchasing power. Job creation, minimum wage recovery, emergency food distribution actions, reinforcement of family farming and land reform were some of the social demands in order to solve the problem of starvation.

Although there were some significant achievements in the 1990s, the decade was characterised by the neoliberal political hegemony and its consequences. Some of the experiences in that period were deregulation of economic activities, construction of a free market, increase in imports, privatisation of state-owned companies, political settlement of regulatory inventories, and a reduction in the State intervention in farming. As a result of these measures, it did not take long for a farming crisis to appear, with a drop in farming prices and land value, and loss of competitiveness of some national sectors in terms of foreign trade. This situation led to unemployment and increased poverty.

In the years 2000, new prospects for the domestic supply issues emerged on the Brazilian scene. The federal government, in the wake of neo-developmental ideas, adopted the strategy of a

strong State, active in large-scale investment and infrastructure projects, encouraging private investment, promoting consumption as the strong driving force of the economy's development, with incentives for farming through farming policy instruments (namely rural credit), maintaining a favourable exchange rate for Brazil to compete abroad (especially the agribusiness sector) and macroeconomic stability to build an equally strong market.

Consequently, the advances in promoting food and nutrition security and reducing poverty in Brazil were astounding. Some measures were especially important for this new scenario:

- To set up the Zero Hunger Programme in 2003, and its actions in the various food supply aspects
- To strengthen actions to increase food access for the poorest families, such as the Family Allowance Programme
- Actions to reduce poverty, such as the Brazil without Poverty Plan
- To adopt a minimum wage appreciation policy, that increased more than 500% from 2000 to 2015 in nominal values
- To encourage job creation and a formal labour market
- To boost family farming, with an increase from PRONAF and creation of several public policy instruments, from the farming level (credit, insurance, price guarantee, technical assistance and rural extension) and transformation (policies to support family agro-industrialisation) to the marketing field (PAA, PNAE, Guaranteed Minimum Price Policy for extractivist products)
- To set up public policy instruments that combine the reinforcement of family farming with promoting access to food for the population in a situation of social vulnerability and food insecurity
- To further water access in the semiarid region of the Northeast, with the One Million Water Tanks Programme (P1MC) and access to water for farming with the One Land and Two Waters Programme (P1+2)
- To restore public participation and social accountability spaces, such as the CONSEA

**The result of these actions was that, in 2014, Brazil left the UN World Hunger Map after reducing extreme poverty by 82% between 2002 and 2013.**

The institutional food procurement from family farming in Brazil, mainly due to the Food Acquisition Programme (PAA) and the National School Feeding Programme (PNAE), was one of the main instruments of the food and nutrition security policy of the years 2000. Both programmes are still in the implementation stage and could be enhanced.

The PAA has been undergoing significant regulatory changes that alter its original principles. These principles determined its role in two demand poles, one that ensures the productive inclusion of family farmers, land reform settlers, indigenous peoples and traditional communities and peoples, and another that provides food aid to families or people in a situation of food and nutrition insecurity.

There was, in fact, a need to upgrade the programme's management, which could be achieved by two different ways. The first was based on the theory that the increase in documentary requirements could grant security for the controls at different stages to run the programme. Also, it was suggested to strengthen participation of the municipal public authority, through the Term of Accession. The

second way recommended stronger social control as a means to curb deviations from the PAA objective. This alternative involved setting up a local management forum with participation of representatives of farmers' organisations, food receiving entities, councils (rural development, social welfare, health and school feeding) and the municipality. This process could contribute to consolidating administrative decentralisation, without weakening the protagonism of farming organisations while, at the same time, include municipal administration, and other actors, without transferring the programme administration to the local public authority.

Recent regulatory changes, as well as inadequate health regulations, have caused a

downturn in the PAA result. This was found by analysing different indicators, such as: a drop in funds invested in the programme, in the number of food supplier families, in the number of food consumer entities, quantity and diversity of produce, effective participation of women and a decrease in land base.

School feeding, in turn, with the legal provision to guarantee the investment of at least 30% of the resources transferred by the federal government to purchase food produced by family farmers, faces the challenge of farmers being able to provide ongoing supply, in each of their territories. The effort to increasingly meet this commitment is essential for the consolidation of the institutional procurement provided in the programme.

It is evident that many of these actions and instruments have shortcomings and lack enhancements, but together, they have built a new scenario for Brazilian food security and supply. Given the results of these measures, many of them have achieved international repercussion, making Brazil a benchmark in experiences and public policies in this field. Several countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia have looked to adapt some of these actions to their local realities, in the quest to promote food security and food supply.

In recent years, Brazil has been marked by major strides forward in building food security and supply. The situation of hunger and poverty that the country faced in the early 2000s has changed radically. However,

some political and economic decisions still limit, minimise or even clash with some of these achievements. Policies to support family farming, implemented recently to combat food insecurity in Brazil coexist with the farming model furthered by agribusiness, to a large extent, focusing abroad (mainly through products from the soy complex, meat, corn, pulp and paper sector, poultry, and the sugar-ethanol sector), with intensive use of modern inputs and significant environmental and social consequences. This scenario helps sediment a dichotomy created in Brazil around agriculture as a producer of foreign exchange through exports, mainly agribusiness, and a food producer for the domestic market first and foremost through family farming. Despite the advances

achieved in recent years in food supply, the country still needs change in the farming and land structure, by democratisation of access to land and increasing the presence of family farmers. This could contribute to less social inequality and more diversified food production systems geared to the domestic market, and preferably based on agro-ecological farming, in conjunction with short-circuit marketing.

The food supply area is closely linked to the idea of moral economy, reinforcing short circuits and proximity of trade, setting up alternative channels to relocate the market and strengthen relations of reciprocity between farming and consumption. This strategy should be adopted by

strengthening these relations in the territories, intensifying the experiences in a network of social organisations that promote agro-ecological farming systems and add value to family and peasant farming. It is also important to combine this process with the formation of consumers conscious of their role, to demand quality food, without contamination by agrichemicals and genetically modified organisms, thereby appreciating the regained use of biodiversity and promoting culturally appropriate and healthy eating habits.

# References

ALBERGONI, L.; PELAEZ, V.. "Da Revolução Verde à agrobiotecnologia: ruptura ou continuidade de paradigmas?". *Revista de Economia, Paraná*, v. 33, n. 1, Jan/Jun, 2007, p. 31-53.

ARQUIVO NACIONAL (Brazil). "Fundo: Instituto Brasileiro do Café (IBC): inventário dos documentos textuais" [Online]. Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, 2013. <[http://www.arquivonacional.gov.br/media/Ibc%20final%201%20ago\[1\].pdf](http://www.arquivonacional.gov.br/media/Ibc%20final%201%20ago[1].pdf)> (Access on Dec 19th 2014)

BANCO DO BRASIL (Brazil). História do Banco do Brasil S.A. [Online]. <<http://www.bb.com.br/portallbb/page22,3669,3669,22,0,1,8.bb?codigoNoticia=29857>>. (Access on May 9th 2015).

BELIK, W.; DOMENE, S.M.A. "Experiências de programas combinados de alimentação escolar e desenvolvimento local em São Paulo-Brasil". *Agroalimentaria*, v. 18, n. 34, 2012, p. 57-72.

BELIK, W.; GRAZIANO DA SILVA, J.; TAKAGI, M. "Políticas de combate à fome no Brasil". *São Paulo em perspectiva*, v.15, n.4, 2001, p.119-129.

BESKOV, P., K. "Agricultura e política agrícola no contexto brasileiro da industrialização do pós-guerra (1946-1964)". [Online]. *Estudos Sociedade e Agricultura*, n. 12, April 1999, p. 56-79. <<http://biblioteca.clacso.edu.ar/ar/libros/brasil/cpda/estudos/doze/beskov12.htm>>. (Access on Dec 18th 2014).

BRESSER-PEREIRA, L. C. Do antigo ao novo desenvolvimentismo na América Latina. São Paulo: FGV, Discussion paper n. 274, 2010.

BURLANDY, L. "A atuação da sociedade civil na construção do campo da alimentação e nutrição no Brasil: elementos para reflexão". *Ciência e saúde coletiva*, v. 16, n.1, 2011, p. 65-72.

CAMARGO, R. A. L. "O Convênio de Taubaté: Um Exemplo Histórico de Intervenção Estatal na Economia em Prol da Iniciativa Privada". *Informativo Consulex*. Brasília, Year XI, n. 34, August, 1997.

CARVALHO, D. G. "Licitações sustentáveis: Alimentação Escolar e Desenvolvimento Regional: Uma discussão sobre o poder de compra governamental a favor da sustentabilidade". In: *Planejamento e Políticas Públicas*, n. 32, São Paulo, Jan/Jun 2009, pp.115-147.

CARVALHO, R.K.C. "Programa de Distribuição Emergencial de Alimentos – PRODEA". *Revista de Política Agrícola*, Year III, n.1, 1994, p. 31-32.

CASTRO, C.M.; COIMBRA, M. (Ed.). *O problema alimentar no Brasil*. São Paulo: UNICAMP, 1985.

CASTRO, J. de. *Geografia da Fome: o dilema brasileiro: pão ou aço*. Rio de Janeiro: Civilização Brasileira, 2001.

CERQUEIRA, K.C. "As propostas de política econômica do PT entre 1989 e 2006: um exame sob o referencial teórico das coalizões de defesa". Master thesis, Grad Programme on Social Policies, University of Brasília (UNB). Brasília, 2010.

COELHO, C. N. "70 anos de política agrícola no Brasil (1930-2001)". *Revista de Política Agrícola*, Year 10, n. 3, Jul/Sept 2001, p. 3-58.

COIMBRA, M. A alimentação escolar no Brasil: política e instituição. Brasília: MEC, 1981. 65 pp.

CORDEIRO, A. Resultados do programa de aquisição de alimentos – PAA: a perspectiva dos beneficiários. Brasília: CONAB, 2007.

COUTINHO, A. O. Uma nova abordagem para a Alimentação Escolar no Programa Fome Zero, Document 7. Brasília. Abril, 2004.

DAGNINO, E. "Sociedade civil, espaços públicos e a construção democrática no Brasil: limites e possibilidades". In: DAGNINO, E. Sociedade civil e espaços públicos no Brasil. São Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2002, p. 279-302.

DALIO, D. J.; MIYAMOTO, S. "O Governo Vargas e a Comissão Mista Brasil-Estados Unidos" [Online]. Idéias, Campinas, n. 1, 2º semestre 2010. <[http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Shiguenoli\\_Miyamoto/publication/216747127\\_O\\_Governo\\_Vargas\\_e\\_a\\_Comisso\\_Mista\\_Brasil-Estados\\_Unidos/links/00862055245a84517f940d4e.pdf](http://www.researchgate.net/profile/Shiguenoli_Miyamoto/publication/216747127_O_Governo_Vargas_e_a_Comisso_Mista_Brasil-Estados_Unidos/links/00862055245a84517f940d4e.pdf)>. (Last seen May 9th 2015).

D'ARAUJO, M. C. (Ed). Getúlio Vargas. Brasília: Câmara dos Deputados, Série perfis parlamentares, 62, 2011.

DELGADO, G. Do 'capital financeiro na agricultura' à economia do agronegócio: mudanças cíclicas em meio século (1965-2012). Porto Alegre: UFRGS, 2012.

DELGADO, G.C. Uma metodologia para determinação de preços mínimos. Brasília: CFP, Coleção análise e pesquisa, 3, 1978.

DELGADO, G.C. Relatório de avaliação do PAA – III Síntese. Brasília, 2013.

DELGADO, G.C.; CONCEIÇÃO, J.C.P.R; OLIVEIRA, J.J. Avaliação do Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos da Agricultura Familiar (PAA). Brasília: IPEA, Discussion paper nº 1.145, 2005.

FAUSTO, B.; DEVOTO, F. J. Brasil e Argentina: um ensaio de história comparada (1850-2002). São Paulo: Editora 34, 2004.

FERNANDES, B.M. "A reforma agrária que o governo Lula fez e a que pode ser feita". In: SADER, E. 10 anos de governos pós-liberais no Brasil: Lula e Dilma. São Paulo: Boitempo; Rio de Janeiro: Flacso Brasil, 2013, p. 191-206.

FERREIRA, F. S. Triênio Trágico: Flutuações econômicas e conflito social em Buenos Aires, 1919-1921. São Paulo: USP, 2014.

FURTADO, C.M. Formação Econômica do Brasil. Brasília: Universidade de Brasília, 1963.

FERREIRA, M. M. "A trajetória política de João Goulart: As reformas de base" [Online]. Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2012. <[http://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/Jango/artigos/NaPresidenciaRepublica/As\\_reformas\\_de\\_base](http://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/Jango/artigos/NaPresidenciaRepublica/As_reformas_de_base)>. (Access on May 25th 2015).

FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS. "Anos de Incerteza (1930 - 1937): Ministério do Trabalho" [Online]. Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2012. <<http://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/AEraVargas1/anos30-37/PoliticaSocial/MinisterioTrabalho>>. (Access on May 5 2015).

GALINDO, E.P.; SAMBUICHI, R.H.R.; OLIVEIRA, M.A.C. Compras de produtos agroecológicos e orgânicos da agricultura familiar pelo Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos. In: PAA: 10 anos de aquisição de alimentos. Brasília: MDS, 2014, p. 184-207.



- GASQUES, J.G. Gastos públicos na agricultura. Brasília: IPEA, Discussion paper n. 782, 2001.
- GASQUES, J.G.; BOTELHO, F.; BASTOS, E. Preços de terras e sua valorização. 2015 (mimeo).
- GRAZIANO DA SILVA, J. et al. Estrutura agrária e produção de subsistência na agricultura brasileira. São Paulo: Hucitec, 1980.
- GRAZIANO DA SILVA, J.; BELIK, W.; TAKAGI, M. "Os Desafios de uma política de Segurança Alimentar no Brasil". In: CIMADAMORE, A.; HARTLEY, D.; SIQUIERA, J. A pobreza do Estado: reconsiderando o papel do Estado na luta contra a pobreza global. Buenos Aires: Clacso, August 2006.
- INSTITUTO CIDADANIA. Projeto Fome Zero: uma proposta de política de segurança alimentar para o Brasil. São Paulo: 2001.
- IPEA. Desenvolvimento Rural. Políticas sociais: acompanhamento e análise, n. 20, 2012.
- L'ABBATE, S. "As políticas de alimentação e nutrição no Brasil a partir dos anos setenta". Revista de Nutrição da PUCCAMP, Campinas, 1989, 2:7-54.
- LINHARES, M. Y. L. História do abastecimento; uma problemática em questão (1530-1918). Brasília: Binagri, 1979.
- LINHARES, M. Y. L.; SILVA, F. C. T. História política do abastecimento (1918-1974). Brasília: Binagri, Estudos sobre o desenvolvimento agrícola, v. 6, 1979.
- MALUF, R. "Alimentação, escola e agricultura familiar". Boletim do OPPA, n.26, May 2009.
- MALUF, R.S. "Políticas agrícolas e de desenvolvimento rural e a segurança alimentar". In: LEITE, Sergio. Políticas públicas e agricultura no Brasil. Porto Alegre: UFRGS, 2001, p.145-168.
- MALUF, R. Segurança alimentar e nutricional. Petrópolis: Vozes, 2007.
- MALUF, R.; MENEZES, F.; VALENTE, F. Contribuição ao tema da segurança alimentar no Brasil. Cadernos de debate, v. IV, 1996, p. 66-88.
- MARCELINO, W.B. (Ed). Discursos Seleccionados do Presidente João Goulart [Online]. Brasília: Fundação Alexandre Gusmão, 2010. <[http://www.funag.gov.br/biblioteca/dmdocuments/Discursos\\_joao\\_goulart.pdf](http://www.funag.gov.br/biblioteca/dmdocuments/Discursos_joao_goulart.pdf)>. (Access on December 19th 2014).
- MARQUES, P.E.M. "Embates em torno da segurança e soberania alimentar: estudo de perspectivas concorrentes". Segurança alimentar e nutricional, v.17, n.2, 2010, p. 78-87.
- MARQUES, P.E.M. Segurança alimentar: a intervenção da Associação Brasileira de Agribusiness no campo de disputa e produção ideológica. Master thesis, Grad Programme on Development, Agriculture and Society, Rio de Janeiro Federal University (UFRJ). Rio de Janeiro, 1996.
- MATTEI, L.; WRIGHT, S.; BRANCO, T. C. "Colocando a fome na agenda pública brasileira: a ação do Estado, do Banco Mundial e das Organizações Não-Governamentais". Cadernos de pesquisa, n.7, 1997, p.81-91.
- MENEZES, F. "Participação social no Fome Zero: a experiência do Consea". In: GRAZIANO DA SILVA, J.; DEL GROSSI, M.E.; FRANÇA, C.G. Fome Zero: a experiência brasileira. Brasília: MDA, 2010, p.247-264.

MELLO, V.P.S. "A Sociedade Nacional de Agricultura em revista: divulgação científica e uso racional da natureza em A lavoura (1897-1926)". Revista Brasileira de História da Ciência, Rio de Janeiro, v. 5, n. 1, Jan/Jun 2012, p. 118-130.

MIELITZ, C. "Dez anos de PAA e a constituição de uma estratégia nacional de segurança alimentar". In: BRASIL, MDS. PAA: 10 anos de aquisição de alimentos. Brasília: MDS, 2014, p. 58.73.

MOREIRA, Regina da Luz. "Revolução Constitucionalista de 1932" [Online]. Rio de Janeiro: FGV, 2012. <<http://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/fatosimagens/revolucao1932>>. (Access on May 25th 2015).

MÜLLER, A.L.; FIALHO, M. A.V.; SCHNEIDER, S. "A inovação institucional e a atuação dos atores locais na implementação do Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos no Rio Grande do Sul". Sociedade e desenvolvimento rural, v.1, n.1, 2007.

NASCIMENTO, R.C. "A fome como uma questão social nas políticas públicas brasileiras". Revista IDEAS, v. 3, n.2, Rio de Janeiro, 2009, p. 197-225.

NEHRING, R.; MCKAY, B. Ampliando iniciativas de desenvolvimento local: o Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos do Brasil. IPC Working paper, n. 106, Brasília, 2013.

NETTO, A. D. O problema do café no Brasil. São Paulo, FEA, USP. 1959.

OLIVEIRA, A. A.breu de. "Sistema da unicidade sindical no Brasil: herança deixada pelo autoritarismo?" [Online]. 2009. <[http://www.ambito-juridico.com.br/site/index.php?n\\_link=revista\\_artigos\\_leitura&artigo\\_id=6569](http://www.ambito-juridico.com.br/site/index.php?n_link=revista_artigos_leitura&artigo_id=6569)>. (Access on April 26th 2015).

OLIVEIRA, D. Reflexões sobre o histórico da Alimentação Escolar no Brasil. Brasília: Consea, 2005.

O Rio de Janeiro na República do Brasil. Política econômica agrária. [Online]. <<http://www.marcellio.com/rio/hiregeco.html#pea>>. (Access on 2015)

PACHECO, L. "O café na República Velha: ascensão e queda da intervenção" [Online]. Proza Econômica. <<http://prosaeconomica.com/2012/07/05/o-cafe-na-republica-velha-ascensao-e-queda-da-intervencao/>> (Access on October 10th 2014).

PAGANINI, S. "A implantação do PAA – Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos". In: ARANHA, A.V. Fome Zero: uma história brasileira. Brasília: MDS, v.II, 2010, p. 195-205.

PANDOLFO, M.C. "O programa de aquisição de alimentos como instrumento revitalizador dos mercados regionais". Agriculturas, v.5, n.2, Jun/2008, p.14-17.

PEREZ, J.; PORTO, S. I. A contribuição da abertura dos mercados institucionais na promoção da soberania e segurança alimentar e nutricional: a experiência dos Programas de Alimentação Escolar (PNAE) e de Aquisição de Alimentos (PAA). Brasília, 2013

PELIANO, A.M.M. "Assistência Alimentar nas políticas governamentais". Revista de política agrícola, Year X, n. 1, 2001.

PELIANO, A.M.M. "O mapa da fome: subsídios à formulação de uma política de segurança alimentar". Brasília: IPEA, Document on Politics n.14, 1993.

PELIANO, A. M. M., et al. "O problema alimentar brasileiro: situação atual, perspectivas e proposta de políticas". In: CASTRO, C. M. & COIMBRA, M. (Ed). O Problema Alimentar no Brasil. São Paulo: UNICAMP/Almed, 1985, p. 15 - 43

PELIANO, A. M. M. "Os programas alimentares e nutricionais no contexto da recessão econômica: 1980-1984". In: CHAHAD, J. P.; CERVINI, R. (Ed). *Crise e Infância no Brasil. O Impacto das Políticas de Ajuste Econômico*. São Paulo: Fundo das Nações Unidas para a Infância/Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica/Universidade de São Paulo, 1988, pp. 139-184.

PESSANHA, L.D.R. *A experiência brasileira em políticas públicas para a garantia do direito ao alimento*. Rio de Janeiro: Escola Nacional de Ciências Estatística/Departamento de Ensino e Pesquisa, 2002.

PESSANHA, L.D.R. "Segurança alimentar como um princípio orientador de políticas públicas: implicações e conexões para o caso brasileiro". PhD dissertation, Grad Programme on Development, Agriculture and Society, Rio de Janeiro Federal University (UFRJ). Rio de Janeiro, 1998.

PETRINA, Cláudia. "CUT: Central Única dos Trabalhadores, a organização sindical" [Online]. 1993. <<http://base.d-p-h.info/pt/fiches/premierdph/fiche-premierdph-279.html>>. (Access on April 26th 2015).

PEIXINHO, Albaneide Maria Lima. "Um resgate histórico do Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar – PNAE". Master thesis, Grad Programme on Health Sciences Teaching, São Paulo Federal University (USP). São Paulo, 2011.

PETERSEN, P. "Introdução". In: *Agricultura familiar camponesa na construção do futuro*. Rio de Janeiro: AS-PTA, 2009, p. 05-16.

PLOEG, J.D.V.D. *Camponeses e impérios alimentares: luta por autonomia e sustentabilidade na era da globalização*. Porto Alegre: Editora da UFRGS, 2008.

PORTO, S.I. et al. "Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos (PAA): dez anos de uma política pública múltipla e inovadora". In: BRASIL, MDS. *PAA: 10 anos de aquisição de alimentos*. Brasília: MDS, 2014, p. 34-57.

PRADO JR. C. *Formação do Brasil contemporâneo*. Rio de Janeiro: Companhia das Letras, 2011.

PRADO, Matildes da Silva. "A trajetória da política de alimentação e nutrição no Brasil: de 1889-1945". *Rev. Baiana de Saúde Pública*, v. 20, n. 1/4, Jan/Dec, 1993, p. 23-31.

QUADROS, W. "Classes sociais e desemprego no Brasil dos anos 1990". *Economia e Sociedade*, v.12, n. 1, 2003, p. 109-135.

SALLUM JR. B. "Metamorfoses do Estado brasileiro no final do século XX". *Revista brasileira de ciência sociais*, v.18, nº.52, 2003, p. 35-54.

SANCHEZ, A.; VELOSO, N.; RAMÍREZ, A. "Agricultura familiar y compras públicas: Innovaciones en la agenda de la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional". In: SALCEDO, S.; GUZMÁN, L. *Agricultura familiar em América Latina Y el Caribe: recomendaciones de política*. Roma: FAO, 2014, p. 349-369.

SCHMITT, C.J. "Aquisição de alimentos da agricultura familiar: integração entre política agrícola e segurança alimentar e nutricional". *Revista de política agrícola*, Year XIV, n.2, 2005, p. 78-88.

SILIPRANDI, E.; CINTRÃO, R. "As mulheres rurais e a diversidade de produtos no Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos". In: BRASIL, MDS. *PAA: 10 anos de aquisição de alimentos*. Brasília: MDS, 2014, p. 114-151.

- SILVA, A.C. De Vargas a Itamar: políticas e programas de alimentação e nutrição. *Estudos Avançados*, n. 9, v. 23, 1995, p. 86-107.
- SILVA, José Graziano da; BELIK, Walter; TAKAGI, Maya. "Os Desafios de uma política de Segurança Alimentar no Brasil". In: CIMADAMORE, Alberto; HARTLEY, Dean; SIQUIERA, Jorge. *A pobreza do Estado: reconsiderando o papel do Estado na luta contra a pobreza global*. Buenos Aires: Clacso, August 2006.
- SILVA, Suely Braga da. "50 anos em 5: o Plano de Metas" [Online]. São Paulo: FGV/CPDOC. <<http://cpdoc.fgv.br/producao/dossies/JK/artigos/Economia/PlanodeMetas>>. (Access on December 19th 2014).
- SPECHT, G. "The Brazilian School Food Program and Family Farming: impact on Rural Development". Master Thesis, Wageningen, The Netherlands, 2012
- SPINELLI, M.A.S.; CANESQUI, A.M. "O programa de alimentação escolar no estado de Mato Grosso: da centralização à descentralização (1979 - 1995)". *Revista de nutrição*, n.15, v.1, 2002, p.105-117.
- TAKAGI, M. "A implantação do Programa Fome Zero do Governo Lula". In: *Fome Zero: Uma história brasileira*, Brasília: MDS, 2010, pp.54-73.
- TEIXEIRA, G. "Subsídios para a análise do quadro de abastecimento dos alimentos básicos no Brasil". *Revista da Associação Brasileira de Reforma Agrária*, Year 35, v. 01, n. 01, May/Oct, 2014.
- TOPIK, S. *A presença do Estado na Economia Política do Brasil de 1889 a 1930*. Rio de Janeiro: Record, 1987.
- TORRES FILHO, E. & CARVALHO, M. E. *Uma Análise dos Programas de Suplementação Alimentar nos Anos 80: Desempenho e Formas de Organização. Política Social em Tempo de Crise. Articulação Institucional e Descentralização. Economia e Desenvolvimento 6. v. II*. Brasília: Ministério da Previdência e Assistência Social/ Comissão Econômica para América Latina e Caribe. 1989.
- TOSI, P. G, FALEIROS, R. N e TEODORO, R.S. *Fragmentos de um modelo: pequenas lavouras de café e acumulação de capitais. Franca/São Paulo, 1890-1914. História São Paulo, 24(2), 2010.*
- TRICHES, R.M.; GRISA, C. *Entre mudanças e conservadorismos: uma análise dos Programas de Aquisição de Alimentos (PAA e PNAE) a partir da retórica da intransigência*. In: 52º Congresso da Sociedade Brasileira de Economia, Administração e Sociologia Rural. Goiânia: Sober, 2014.
- VARGAS, Getúlio. *O patriotismo do trabalhador brasileiro e a política trabalhista do Governo* [Online]. 1943. <[http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/ex-presidentes/getulio-vargas/discursos-1/1943/01.pdf/at\\_download/file](http://www.biblioteca.presidencia.gov.br/ex-presidentes/getulio-vargas/discursos-1/1943/01.pdf/at_download/file)>. (Access on May 9th 2015).
- ZIMMERMANN, S.A.; GRISA, C. *Papel do Estado e da sociedade civil na construção do Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos. Brasil. S.d.*
- ZIMMERMANN, S.A.; FERREIRA, A.P. "El programa de adquisición de alimentos de la agricultura familiar em Mirandiba-PE". In: SCOTTO, G. *Aun hay tiempo para el sol: pobrezas rurales y programas sociales*. Rio de Janeiro: Actionaid, 2008.

# List of Acronyms

- ABC - Agência Brasileira de Cooperação – Brazilian Cooperation Agency
- ACAR - Associação de Crédito e Assistência Rural - Credit and Rural Aid Association
- AGF - Aquisições do Governo Federal - Federal Government Procurements
- AIA - Associação Internacional Americana para o Desenvolvimento Social e Econômico - International American Association for Economic and Social Development
- ARENA - Aliança Renovadora Nacional – National Renewal Alliance
- ASA - Articulação do Semiárido Brasileiro - Brazilian Semi-arid Articulation
- ATER - Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural – Technical Assistance and Rural Extension
- BNDE - Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Econômico - National Economic Development Bank
- CadÚnico - Cadastro Único para Programas Sociais do Governo Federal – Single Registry of Federal Government Social Programmes
- CAE - Conselho de Alimentação Escolar – School Feeding Council
- CAISAN - Câmara Interministerial de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional - Chamber on Food and Nutrition Security
- CAN - Comissão de Abastecimento do Nordeste - Northeast Supply Committee
- CAP - Comissariado de Alimentação Pública - Public Food Commissariat
- CDPA - Comissão de Defesa da Produção de Açúcar - Commission in Defence of Sugar Production
- CEASA - Central de Abastecimento - Supply Centre
- CECANES - Centros Colaboradores em Alimentação e Nutrição do Escolar - Cooperating Centres in School Food and Nutrition
- CEPAL - Comissão Econômica para a América Latina e o Caribe - Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
- CFP - Companhia de Financiamento da Produção - Production Financing Company
- CGU - Controladoria Geral da União - General Accounts Comptroller
- CIBRAZEM - Companhia Brasileira de Armazenamento - Brazilian Storage Company
- CLT - Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho - Consolidation of Labour Laws
- CNAE - Campanha Nacional de Merenda Escolar para Campanha Nacional de Alimentação Escolar - National School Feeding Campaign
- CNC - Conselho Nacional do Café - National Coffee Council
- CNPA - Comissão Nacional de Política Agrária - National Agrarian Policy Commission
- CNSA - Conferência Nacional de Segurança Alimentar - National Agrarian Policy Commission
- CNSAN - Conferência Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional – National Conference on Food and Nutrition Security
- COBAL - Companhia Brasileira de Alimentos – Brazilian Food Company
- COFAP - Comissão Federal de Abastecimento e Preços - Federal Commission on Supply and Prices
- COMCRED - Comissão Coordenadora de Política de Crédito Rural - National Rural Credit Commission

CONAB - Companhia Nacional de Abastecimento – National Supply Company

CONSEA - Conselho Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional - National Council for Food and Nutrition Security

CONTAG - Confederação Nacional dos Trabalhadores na Agricultura - National Farm Workers’ Confederation

EGF - Empréstimos do Governo Federal - Federal Government Loans

EMBRAPA - Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuária - Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation

EMBRATER - Empresa Brasileira de Assistência Técnica e Extensão Rural - Brazilian Technical Assistance and Rural Extension Corporation

ETA - Projeto Técnico de Agricultura - Technical Office for Agriculture

FAE - Fundação de Assistência ao Estudante - Student Aid Foundation

FAO - Organização das Nações Unidas para Alimentação e Agricultura - UN Food and Agriculture Organisation

FBSAN - Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional - Brazilian Forum of Food and Nutrition Security

FENAME - Fundação Nacional do Material Escolar – National School Supply Foundation

FETRAF - Federação dos Trabalhadores e das Trabalhadoras na Agricultura Familiar - Family Farm Workers’ Federation

Gemab - Grupo Executivo de Modernização do Sistema de Abastecimento - Executive Group on Supply System Modernisation

IBC - Instituto Brasileiro do Café - Brazilian Coffee Institute

INAE - Instituto Nacional de Assistência ao Estudante - Brazilian National Student Aid Institute

INAN - Instituto Nacional de Alimentação e Nutrição - National Food and Nutrition Institute

IPEA - Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada - Institute for Applied Economic Research

LBA - Legião Brasileira de Assistência - Brazilian League for Social Assistance

MAPA - Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento – Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply

MDA - Ministério do Desenvolvimento Agrário – Ministry of Agrarian Development

MDB - Movimento Democrático Brasileiro - Brazilian Democratic Movement

MDS - Ministério do Desenvolvimento Social e Combate à Fome - Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger

MEC - Ministério da Educação – Ministry of Education

MESA - Ministério Extraordinário de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional - Ministry of Food Security and Fight against Hunger

ONU - Organização das Nações Unidas – United Nations

PAA - Programa de Aquisição de Alimentos - Food Acquisition Programme

PAIE - Programa de Alimentação dos Irmãos dos Escolares - Programme for Feeding Students’ Siblings

PAM - Programa Mundial de Alimentos - World Food Programme

PAP - Programa de Alimentação Popular – People’s Food Programme



PAT - Programa de Alimentação do Trabalhador – Workers’ Food Programme

PBF - Programa Bolsa Família - Family Allowance Programme

PCA - Programa de Complementação Alimentar - Food Supplementation Programme

PDDE - Programa Dinheiro Direto nas Escolas - Money Directly in Schools Programme

PGPM - Política de Garantia de Preços Mínimos - Minimum Price Guarantee Programme

PLANSAN - Plano Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional - National Food and Nutrition Security Plan

PNAC - Programa Nacional de Alimentação de Creches - National Nursery Feeding Programme

PNAE - Programa Nacional de Alimentação Escolar - National School Feeding Programme

PNAI - Programa Nacional de Alimentação de Escolas Indígenas - National Indigenous School Feeding Programme

PNAP - Programa Nacional de Alimentação da Pré-Escola - National Programme for Pre-School Feeding

PNAQ - Programa Nacional de Alimentação de Escolas Quilombolas - National Quilombola School Feeding Programme

PNE - Programa de Nutrição Escolar - School Nutrition Programme

PNLCC - Programa Nacional do Milk para Crianças Carentes - National Milk Programme for Children in Need

PNS - Programa de Nutrição em Saúde – Nutrition in Health Programme

PNSA - Política Nacional de Segurança Alimentar - National Food Security Policy

PNSAN - Política Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional - National Food and Nutrition Security Policy

PROAB - Programa de Abastecimento em Áreas Urbanas de Baixa Renda - Basics Supply Project in Low-Income Urban Areas

PROCAB - Projeto de Aquisição de Alimentos Básicos em Áreas Rurais de Baixa Renda - Project of Food Farming and Nutrition in Low-Income Rural Areas

PRODEA - Programa de Distribuição Emergencial de Alimentos - Emergency Food Distribution Programme

PROHORT - Programa de Apoio à Produção e Comercialização de Produtos Hortigranjeiros – Support Programme for Farming and Marketing Horticultural Produce

PRONAF - Programa Nacional de Fortalecimento da Agricultura Familiar - National Programme for Strengthening Family Farming

PRONAN - Programa Nacional de Alimentação e Nutrição – National Food and Nutrition Programme

PRONAZEM - Programa Nacional de Armazenamento - National Storage Programme

PSA - Programa de Suplementação Alimentar - Supplementary Feeding Programme

PT - Partido dos Trabalhadores – Labour’s Party

PTB - Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro - Brazilian Labour Party

SAPS - Serviço de Alimentação da Previdência Social - Food Service of Social Security

SCRP - Serviço de Controle e Recebimento de Produtos Agrícolas e Matérias-Primas - Service for Control and Reception of Agricultural Products and Raw Materials

SEAP - Secretaria Especial de Abastecimento e Preço - Special Supply and Price Department

SIMA - Serviço de Informação ao Mercado Agrícola - Service on the Agricultural Market

SINAC - Sistema Nacional de Centrais de Abastecimento - National Central Supply System

SISAN - Sistema Nacional de Segurança Alimentar e Nutricional - National Food and Nutrition Security System

SISVAN - Sistema de Vigilância Alimentar e Nutricional - Food and Nutritional Surveillance System

SNA - Sociedade Nacional de Agricultura - National Agriculture Society

SUDENE - Superintendência de Desenvolvimento do Nordeste - Superintendence for Development of the Northeast

SUNAB - Superintendência Nacional de Abastecimento - National Food Supply Superintendence

SUPRA - Superintendência de Política Agrária - Agrarian Policy Superintendence

TCU - Tribunal de Contas da União - Federal Audit Court



[wfp.org/centre-of-excellence-hunger](https://wfp.org/centre-of-excellence-hunger)

[facebook.com/WFPCEAHBrazil](https://facebook.com/WFPCEAHBrazil)

[@WFP\\_CEAHBrazil](https://twitter.com/WFP_CEAHBrazil)



**WFP**



**wfp.org**

[wfp.org/centre-of-excellence-hunger](https://wfp.org/centre-of-excellence-hunger)

[facebook.com/WFPCEAHBrazil](https://facebook.com/WFPCEAHBrazil)

[@WFP\\_CEAHBrazil](https://twitter.com/WFP_CEAHBrazil)