

# COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION

Burundi: An evaluation of WFP's Portfolio (2011-2015)

## Volume II - Annexes

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## **Annex A: Terms of Reference (ToR)** **(Without annexes)**

### **BURUNDI: AN EVALUATION OF WFP'S PORTFOLIO (2011-MID 2015)**

#### **1. Background**

1. The purpose of these terms of reference (TOR) is to provide key information to stakeholders about the proposed evaluation, to guide the evaluation team and specify expectations during the various phases of the evaluation. The TOR are structured as follows: Chapter 1 provides information on the context; Chapter 2 presents the rationale, objectives, stakeholders and main users of the evaluation; Chapter 3 presents the WFP portfolio and defines the scope of the evaluation; Chapter 4 identifies the evaluation approach and methodology; Chapter 5 indicates how the evaluation will be organized. The annexes provide additional information such as a detailed timeline and the core indicators for Burundi.

#### **1.1. Introduction**

2. Country Portfolio Evaluations (CPE) encompass the entirety of WFP activities during a specific period. They evaluate the performance and results of the portfolio as a whole and provide evaluative insights to make evidence-based decisions about positioning WFP in a country and about strategic partnerships, programme design, and implementation. Country Portfolio Evaluations help Country Offices in the preparation of Country Strategies and provide lessons that can be used in the design of new operations.

3. WFP Burundi developed their first Country Strategy covering a 4 year plan 2011-2014.

#### **1.2. Country Context**

4. Burundi, a small landlocked country densely populated with over 10 million people, borders three countries; the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania and Rwanda. Burundi ranks 180 out of 187 countries in the 2014 UNDP Human Development Index.

5. *Politico-Economic*. After more than a decade of civil war from 1993 to 2005, disrupting public services and private investments, Burundi enjoys a moderate economic growth<sup>1</sup>. Poverty remains however widespread and inequalities between the capital and the rest of the country remain high; in rural areas, 61.5 % of the population cannot meet their calorie intake basic needs, versus 41% in Bujumbura<sup>2</sup>. Although the country's gross national income doubled between 2005 (\$130) and 2013 (\$280), it is still amongst the lowest GNI per capita in the world<sup>3</sup>. Some 80% of the total population lives below the poverty line<sup>4</sup>, which has serious repercussions on the ability of households to meet basic needs.

6. Despite progress achieved since 2005, including consolidating peace and security, Burundi still faces significant development challenges. The Government of Burundi has embarked on a potentially transformative process of decentralization,

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<sup>1</sup> Over the last decade, economic growth oscillated between 4 and 5 % (4.5 % in 2013). The World Bank, Jan. 2015

<sup>2</sup> The World Bank, January 2015

<sup>3</sup> Low income country – GNI per capita is \$1,045 or less. The state of the world's children 2015, UNICEF

<sup>4</sup> Less than \$1.25 per day – International Monetary Fund, 2012

with the aim of strengthening social cohesion, improving local governance, and promoting access to basic infrastructure and service delivery.


7. In 2006, Burundi approved a long-term vision through 2025 developed in the *Cadre Strategique de Croissance et de Lutte contre la Pauvrete* (CSLP). Taking roots in the 2025 vision and benefiting from the positive evolution of the political situation, a CSLP II<sup>5</sup> was initiated in August 2010. The document covering the 2012-2016 period is organized around four strategic pillars, of which the three major objectives include good governance in a state of law, the development of a strong and competitive economy and improving the quality of life of the Burundians.

8. Uncertainty regarding the country’s political stability arose around the general election, which was scheduled for mid-2015. Civil unrest erupted at the end of April 2015 after the ruling party elected President Pierre Nkurunziza to run for a third term. The persistent fear of an increase in violence has resulted in movement of people into neighbouring countries. In June 2015, over 100,000 people have fled the country into the DRC, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.

9. At the regional level, Burundi belongs to several regional economic groups such as the CEPLG (*Communaute Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs*) with Rwanda and DRC, the COMESA (Common Market for East and South Africa) which brings together 19 countries, and the EAC (East African Community).

10. *Food Security and Nutrition*. Although cultivable land is scarce<sup>6</sup>, the economy is dominated by subsistence agriculture – employing 90 % of the population. The two lean periods are from September to October and January to March. The agricultural productivity is low, and as illustrated in the below table 1, there is a very low average yields, which underpin the problem of inadequate food production.

**Table 1 - Average Food Crop Yields for Burundi and other Low-Income Food Deficit Countries**



Source: FAOSTAT 2013

11. The poorest and most vulnerable communities generally depend on marginal lands. These communities lack the capacity to cope with severe climatic shocks such as floods and droughts which often claim lives and undermine their livelihoods. Domestic food production is insufficient to meet the needs of the population, as the

<sup>5</sup> Cadre Strategique de Croissance et de Lutte contre la Pauvrete II, Republique du Burundi, January 2012

<sup>6</sup> Burundi has an estimated 1 million ha of total arable crop land. Food Security Country Framework, USAID, 2013

country faced an increasing food deficit from 32 percent in 2010 to 51 percent in 2012 percent.<sup>7</sup>

12. The prevalence of malnutrition in children under 5 is extremely high in Burundi. It differs significantly between the capital, where the prevalence of stunting is lower (27.6 percent ) compared to the rest of the country, where stunting is very high, ranging from 55 percent to 62 percent regionally. The 2014 combined Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) and the Standardized and Monitoring Assessment Relief and Transitions (SMART) show that the Northern region has the highest prevalence of stunting<sup>8</sup>. As shown in the below table 2, the national prevalence of underweight is 29 percent, stunting 58 percent<sup>9</sup> and wasting almost 6 percent. The 2015 UNICEF report also indicates a 3 percent overweight in Burundi.

**Table 2 - Percentage of underweight and stunted <5 yrs children – compared to WHO nutritional classification**

In BURUNDI			WHO's Classification		
Underweight	Stunting (Chronic malnutrition)	Wasting	Underweight	Stunting (Chronic malnutrition)	Wasting
<b>29 %</b>	<b>58 %</b> (50% according to the 2014 CFSVA)	<b>6%</b>	20-29% is classified as : <b>Medium</b>	Over 40% is classified as: <b>Very High (alarming)</b>	5-9% is classified as: <b>Medium</b>

Source: Data from the State of the World Children, Unicef 2015, and the WHO's classification.

13. As evidenced in the 2008 Lancet Series, the 1,000 days from start of pregnancy until a child reaches 2 years is the crucial period of physical and intellectual development for children. Early nutrition deficits damages children's cognitive development in the first 9 months + 2 years of life. By 6 months of age, 26.5 percent of children are already stunted, and the prevalence of stunting gradually increases and peaks at 66 percent among children 24-35 months.<sup>10</sup>

14. According to the last Food Security Monitoring System (FSMS) in November 2013, the food security situation remains fragile and at risk of degradation to any shocks (climatic and other aleas). In October 2013, only 51 percent of respondents households were food secured with acceptable food consumption, while 39 percent had a limit consumption and 10 percent had a poor consumption (versus 5 percent in April 2013). Over 50 percent of the households are food insecure in the following three most affected zones: Plateaux Humides, Bugesera and Haute Altitude.<sup>11</sup>

15. Since the beginning of the political instability of the DRC in 1964 , Burundi has welcomed refugees from DRC in small groups. According to the 2014 WFP & UNHCR Joint Assessment Mission (JAM), nearly 300 to 500 asylum seekers are arriving in

<sup>7</sup> Analyse globale de la securite alimentaire, de la nutrition et de la vulnerabilite au Burundi, WFP, August 2014

<sup>8</sup> The highest prevalence of stunting are located in ten provinces (out of 17 provinces) : Muyinga (59%), Kayanza (56.6%), Cankuzo (56.4%), Bubanza (55.9%), Ngozi (54.4%), Rutana (54.3%), Ruyigi (54.3 %), Karusi (53.9%), Gitega (52.9%) and Muramvya (50%). Muyinga, Kayanza and Ngozi provinces are in the Northern region.

<sup>9</sup> According to the recent 2014 CFSVA, global stunting rate in Burundi decreased from 58 percent to 50 percent.

<sup>10</sup> USAID, Food Security Country Framework for Burundi, Sept 2013

<sup>11</sup> Plateaux Humides covers Ngozi, Kayanza, Karuzi and Gitega provinces. Bugesa covers Kirundo and Muyinga provinces. Haute Altitude covers Muramya.

Burundi monthly. The JAM reported that Burundi hosted some 46,000 refugees in four camps in March 2014. According to the UNHCR 2015 Global Appeal, it is anticipated that Burundi will be hosting 62,000 refugees in 2015. Frequent flooding and drought have also displaced communities and undermined food and nutritional security.

16. Burundi, like much of Central Africa, is prone to natural disasters. Floodings, landslides, torrential rains and drought are recurrent in Burundi. In recent years, the country has registered an unusually high number of natural disasters which have contributed to displacement of communities, destruction of homes, disruption of livelihoods and the further deterioration of food and nutrition security. Since 2011, the country faced the following natural and national disasters<sup>12</sup>: Floods (March 2011), Cholera Outbreak (August 2011 and Oct 2012), Floods (February 2014), Landslides and floods (March 2015).

17. The Government engaged at the highest level in the area of nutrition through the launch in July 2013 of the multisectoral platform for Nutrition and Food Security by the President of Burundi and the appointment of a Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) focal point at the second Vice-Presidency level. Burundi is also part of the REACH Initiative.

18. *Children, Education.* In 2012, a Sector Plan for Development of Education and Training (PSDEF) for the 2012-2020 period was developed. It places particular emphasis on the completion of primary school. According to a national report,<sup>13</sup> Burundi has made education a priority by allocating about 29 percent of the national budget. In 2013, 50 percent of this sum was dedicated to primary education. Primary education has experienced a significant quantitative increase in a decade; the report indicates it has doubled between 2004 (1 million registered) and 2013 (2 million registered). The 2015 UNICEF report indicates that Primary school net enrolment ratio (%) covering 2009-2013 is 94, and the net attendance ratio (%) covering 2008-2012 is 73.7. Girls represent 50.6 percent of the number of pupils in 2013, against only 46.1% in 2004. This is partly explained by the Government's measure of abolishing school fees taken in 2005.

19. *Gender, Protection.* The 2011-2025 National Gender Policy aims to correct the historical disadvantages faced by women by providing substantial gender-sensitive budgetary support. It has relevant indicators but this has not yet been harmonized into the National Public Administration Reform Programme (PNRA)<sup>14</sup>. The 2014 Human Development Report ranks Burundi at 104 (out of 152) regarding the gender inequality index. The 2013 USAID Food Security report identified gender equality as one of the contributing factors to food insecurity. Women in rural areas bear a large part of the responsibilities for agriculture production but are not yet fully involved in making decisions regarding household expenditures or use of land.

20. Commercial sexual exploitation has been identified as one of the worst forms of child labour in Burundi. Thirty per cent out of 307 children interviewed during the rapid assessment on Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children (CSEC) declared themselves to be victims of CSEC, whereas the remaining 70 per cent said they had witnessed cases of CSEC<sup>15</sup>. In March 2013 the Government of Burundi adopted a

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<sup>12</sup> Source: Relief Web/Disasters, Burundi

<sup>13</sup> Rapport national de l'Éducation pour tous, République du Burundi, Décembre 2014

<sup>14</sup> UNDP, Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment in Public Administration, Burundi Case Study, 2012

<sup>15</sup> UNICEF Annual Report 2012 for Burundi, UNICEF 2013

National Child Protection Policy, an important milestone in the context of large numbers of orphans and vulnerable children (OVC).

21. *International Assistance*<sup>16</sup>. The Official Development Aid ranged from USD 523 to 575 million between 2011 and 2013, and the confirmed Humanitarian Aid contributions amounted to USD 2.5 million in 2012 and USD 10.8 in 2013.

## **2. Reasons for the Evaluation**

### **2.1. Rationale**

22. The evaluation is an opportunity for the Country Office (CO) to benefit from an independent assessment of its 2011-2014 Country Strategy and portfolio of operations. The CPE findings are intended to inform the CO for its future operation(s) design and strategic orientation. The CPE will also provide evidence of past and current performance that is useful for the design of a new UNDAF<sup>17</sup>.

23. In relation to the last Strategic Plan (2008-2013), the evaluation will provide evidence on how the portfolio performed. Given that the current Strategic Plan (2014-2017) continues its focus on food assistance, lessons from this CPE are likely to be applicable for the future WFP operations in Burundi.

24. Since there has not been any evaluation of WFP's portfolio of activities in Burundi carried out by the Office of Evaluation (OEV)<sup>18</sup>, the CPE is an opportunity for the CO to benefit from an independent assessment of its operations.

### **2.2. Objectives**

25. Evaluations serve the dual objectives of accountability and learning. As such, the evaluation will:

- assess and report on the performance and results of the country portfolio in line with the WFP mandate and in response to humanitarian and development challenges in Burundi (accountability); and
- determine the reasons for observed success/failure and draw lessons from experience to produce evidence-based findings to allow the CO to make informed strategic decisions about positioning itself in Burundi, form strategic partnerships, and improve operations design and implementation whenever possible (learning).

### **2.3. Stakeholders and Users of the Evaluation**

26. The primary user of the evaluation findings and recommendations will be the WFP Burundi Country Office in the refinement and design of the current and next operations, country strategy and partnerships. The Nairobi Regional Bureau is also expected to use the evaluation findings given its role in providing strategic guidance.

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<sup>16</sup> Source from OECD-DAC and OCHA, 2015 data

<sup>17</sup> Current Burundi UNDAF cycle is 2012-2016

<sup>18</sup> Burundi had been used as a country case study in the 2011 Strategic Evaluation managed by OEV "How WFP CO adapt to change". The previous PRRO and the current CP were reviewed in 2013 (country-led mid term review).

27. The table below provides a preliminary stakeholders list and a thorough analysis<sup>19</sup> will be done by the evaluation team during the inception phase.

<b>Internal stakeholders</b>	
<b>Country Office (CO)</b>	The CO is the primary stakeholder of this evaluation. Responsible for the country level planning and operations implementation, it has a direct stake in the evaluation and will be a primary user of its results to strategically reposition WFP in the country context, if necessary, and readjust advocacy, analytical work, programming and implementation as appropriate. The CO also has an interest in enhanced accountability towards the Burundi government, other partners, donors and beneficiaries.
<b>Regional Bureau in Nairobi</b>	In light of its stronger role in providing strategic guidance, programme support and oversight to the COs in the region, the RB has an interest in learning from evaluation results.
<b>Headquarters Management and relevant Divisions</b>	Executive Management and other Managers based in Rome will be interested in the findings of this evaluation. In particular in the Policy & Programming, the Performance Management & Monitoring, the Emergency Preparedness, and the Partnership & Governance Divisions.
<b>Executive Board (EB)</b>	As the governing body of the organisation, the EB has a direct interest in being informed about the effectiveness of WFP operations and their harmonisation with strategic processes of government and partners.
<b>External stakeholders</b>	
<b>Beneficiaries (women, men, boys and girls)</b>	As the ultimate recipients of food assistance, beneficiaries have a stake in WFP determining whether its assistance is appropriate and effective.
<b>Government (including partner Ministries)</b>	The Government of Burundi (GoB) has a direct interest in knowing whether WFP activities in Burundi are effectively impacting their population, aligned with their agenda and harmonized with the action of other partners. The line Ministry for WFP Burundi is the Ministry of Agriculture. The three main GoB counterparts are the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Education. WFP coordinates with the Ministry of Health (MoH) for nutrition interventions. The MOH has issued policies addressing community health and nutrition. In 2012, the MoH promulgated the establishment of community health committees (CHCs) for each Hill. Last but not least, Burundi is also a donor to WFP Burundi (to the CP 200119); its contribution to the portfolio under evaluation represents 12 %.
<b>UN agencies</b>	UN agencies have a shared interest with WFP in ensuring that the ensemble of UN support is effective and complementary in support of the population's needs, gender equality and human rights. The 2012-2016 UN Development Assistance

<sup>19</sup> The analysis should take account of the WHO, Why, How and When the stakeholders will be involved in the evaluation process. During data collection all groups (gender, age) should be included.

	Framework (UNDAF) supports the Government in developing policies and programmes. The main UN partner for WFP Burundi is UNICEF. WFP coordinates with UNICEF for nutrition interventions, collaborates with UNHCR to provide food assistance to refugees and returnees, and partners with IFAD to implement agriculture-related community recovery and development activities. Other partners are FAO, IOM, UNDP, UN-Women and WHO.
<b>NGO partners and other organizations</b>	NGOs are WFP’s partners in programme implementation and design and as such have a stake in the WFP assessment of its portfolio performance as well as an interest in its strategic orientation. WFP cooperates with <i>WeltHungerHilfe</i> to provide assistance to school children in the north of the country. With regards to refugees, WFP collaborates with <i>IRC</i> , <i>Red Cross</i> , <i>Caritas</i> and several local NGOs. <i>World Vision</i> is the WFP’s partner concerning agriculture –related community recovery.
<b>Donors</b>	WFP activities are supported by donors’ contributions. They have an interest in knowing whether their funds have been spent effectively and efficiently. They also have an interest in knowing to which extent the WFP strategy complement their own strategies and supported-programmes. The portfolio’s top five donors are: USA (50%), Burundi (12%), Canada (9%), The Netherlands (7%) and the European Commission (6%).

### 3. Subject of the Evaluation

#### 3.1. WFP’s Portfolio in Burundi

28. WFP has been present in Burundi since 1968, totalling 38 operations valued at almost USD two billion - see Annex 4. The first WFP Country Strategy document (2011-2014) was developed by the CO in 2010. The strategy considered the national policies and needs, the 2008-2013 WFP Strategic Plan and its transition from a food aid to a food assistance agency. The Country Strategy identifies three priorities: i) Food and Nutrition Security, ii) Capacity Development of Government institutions, and iii) Humanitarian Response action. These three priorities intended to inform the development of future WFP project documents i.e. the PRRO 200164 and the CP 200119, which both started in 2011. The vision of the strategy states that “WFP will be the catalyst to support the Government of Burundi towards post-conflict transition and consolidation of peace that addresses, in a sustainable manner, hunger and nutrition needs for its vulnerable populace.”

29. Since January 2011, there have been two Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO), a Country Programme (CP) and an Immediate Response EMOP in Burundi. Table 3 illustrates the timeline and the funding level of the Burundi portfolio<sup>20</sup>.

<sup>20</sup> The March-May 2015 project 200825 for special preparedness activity (election preparedness) is not included in the table. The budget amounts to USD 250,000 and financial closure is scheduled on 27 Oct 2015.

**Table 3 - Timeline and funding level of WFP portfolio in Burundi (2011-mid 2015)**

Operation	Time Frame	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	
CP 200119 - Country Programme Burundi (2011 - 2014)	Jan 2011 – Dec 2014 + BR (extended to Dec 2016)	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <b>LEGEND Funding Level</b>  <span style="background-color: #e0e0e0; padding: 2px;">&gt; 75%</span>  <span style="background-color: #00a0e3; padding: 2px;">Between 50 and 75%</span>  <span style="background-color: #0070c0; padding: 2px;">Less than 50%</span> </div>					Req: 104,704,558 Rec: 48,411,649 <b>Funded: 46%</b>
PRRO 200655 - Assistance for Refugees and Vulnerable Food-Insecure Populations	July 2014 – June 2016 + BR (extended to Dec 2016)						Req: 69,753,058 Rec: 23,636,218 <b>Funded: 34%</b>
IR-EMOP 200678 - Emergency assistance to victims of flooding	Feb 2014 – May 2014						Req: 1,361,213 Rec: 687,101 <b>Funded: 50%</b>
PRRO 200164 - Assistance to refugees, returnees and vulnerable food-insecure populations	Jan 2011 – Dec 2012 + BR (extended to June 2014)	Req: 98,480,619 Rec: 63,840,369 <b>Funded: 65%</b>					
Direct Expenses (US\$ millions)		18,730	17,906	24,246	27,867	n.a.	
% Direct Expenses: Burundi vs. WFP World		0.5%	0.43%	0.57%	0.59%	n.a.	
Food Distributed (MT)		21,396	19,209	15,731	15,809	n.a.	
Total of Beneficiaries (actual)		784,166	743,377	703,531	943,711	n.a.	
% women beneficiaries (actual)		51%	52%	51%	48%	n.a.	

Source: APR 2014, SPR 2011-2014, Resource Situation Updates as of July 2015 Requirements (Req.) and Contributions received (Rec.) are in US\$

30. With two ongoing operations; the CP 200119 and the PRRO 200655 ending in December 2016, the portfolio globally suffers from 50 % shortfall. The two PRROs together just reached 52 % of the requirements, of which the current PRRO is severely underfunded (only 34% funded according to the July 2015 WFP Resource situation update).

31. The first PRRO started in January 2011 and ended in June 2014<sup>21</sup>. This PRRO was planned to target 547,000 beneficiaries and focused on assisting highly food insecure people, including returnees, refugees and vulnerable host communities affected by successive shocks. It was linked to Strategic Objectives 1 and 3 of the 2008-2013 WFP Strategic Plan. In addition, the operation intended to undertake capacity development activities (addressing the second Country Strategy priority, on Capacity Development), and to directly contribute to the third priority identified by the Country Strategy: *Humanitarian Response Action*.

32. Parallel to the first PRRO mentioned above, in January 2011 the CO also initiated the CP 200119 which will end in December 2016<sup>22</sup>. The CP planned to target 333,000 beneficiaries yearly, and intended to be consistent with WFP Strategic Objectives 3,4 and 5 of the 2008-2013 Strategic Plan. The CP also addresses the first two Country Strategy priorities: *Food and Nutrition Security*, and *Government Capacity Development*. WFP assisted pre-and primary school children, pregnant and lactating women and children aged 6-23 months, Anti-retroviral Therapy (ART) patients, and vulnerable and food-insecure populations.

33. Towards the end of 2013 the CP was revised and extended. Mainly, the School Feeding programme was adapted to the Government's new policy, increasing basic education from six to nine years. Health and nutrition support was reoriented from targeted supplementary feeding to stunting prevention interventions. Community

<sup>21</sup> The PRRO 200164 was originally planned to cover a 2-year period (2011-2012). The 5<sup>th</sup> Budget Revision extended the operation until 30 June 2014, to synchronize it with the Government's 18 months reintegration plan. It also allowed a transition period for the preparation of a new PRRO.

<sup>22</sup> The CP was initially planned to end in December 2014, and was extended for 2 years through a Budget Revision (WFP/EB.2/2013/7-B/4/Rev.1). In May 2013 the CO commissioned an external mid-term review of the CP. Its conclusions and recommendations underpinned the BR.

recovery and development activities were implemented to improve households' access to food, build community resilience to shocks and reduce disaster risks.

34. In July 2014 the activities of the first PRRO were continued under PRRO 200655 which is running until December 2016<sup>23</sup>. This second PRRO seeks to address food insecurity and nutrition challenges among food-insecure, vulnerable groups in Burundi, Congolese refugees, Burundian migrants expelled from Tanzania, vulnerable people in social institutions, and food insecure households in communities with high concentrations of returnees.

35. Voucher transfers for refugees shifted back to in-kind food distribution in November 2014, due to resource constraints. Assistance to school children in the south east of the country continued, however resource limitations did not allow a full coverage of this activity. Since no recent data was available during the development of the PRRO, Pregnant & Lactating Woman (PLW) nutrition needs were estimated based on the 2010 Health and Demographic survey, indicating 16% moderate acute malnutrition prevalence. The SMART survey conducted early 2014 revealed however a significant lower rate; 3.5 % at the national level. This led to an overestimation of the planning figure with regards to the number of PLW assisted; 6,300 planned versus 3,875 actual<sup>24</sup>.

36. At the request of the Government of Burundi, an Immediate Response EMOP was launched in March 2014 to secure the food and nutritional status of some 20,000 displaced people by sudden flooding in Bujumbura and surrounding areas in February 2014. A lower tonnage of food was actually distributed (418 MT) than planned (699 MT) because fresh food provided by the Ministry of National Solidarity was distributed, and the humanitarian stakeholders decided to focus assistance in the temporary sites hosting fewer IDPs. At the closure of the project, remaining food stocks were mainly transferred to the PRRO. The CO learnt that in the context of an emergency, the implementation of a cash transfer as a modality of relief food assistance is challenging, particularly in a country where financial institutions were not familiar with it.

37. *Refugees*. A joint WFP / UNHCR (JAM) mission<sup>25</sup> was conducted in April 2014 in four refugee camps in Burundi. The mission highlighted the very high level of dependence of refugees to food assistance. The table below shows the number of refugees in the four camps.

**Table 4 - Refugees in the four camps in Burundi (source UNHCR, March 2014)**

Camps	Province/Commune	Number of beneficiaries
Musasa	Ngozi/Kirembe	6,668
Kinama	Muyinga/Gasogwe	9,526
Bwagiriza	Ruyigi/Butezi	9,270

<sup>23</sup> In July 2015 the CO developed a Budget Revision to extend the PRRO until Dec 2016, to coincide with the end of the CP and take stock of findings and recommendations from this CPE for the new operation.

<sup>24</sup> Standard Project Report 2014.

<sup>25</sup> Mission d'évaluation conjointe (JAM), PAM & UNHCR Burundi, avril 2014

Kavumu (opened in 2013)	Cankuzo/Cankuzo	3,631
<i>Total</i>		<i>46,626</i>

Extracted from the: "Mission d'évaluation conjointe (JAM), PAM & UNHCR Burundi, avril 2014".

38. The most vulnerable households to food insecurity were small households (53% of households in the 4 camps) and households whose head of household is a woman (70% of the population in three camps; Bwagiriza, Musasa and Kinama). Global acute malnutrition rate varied from 2.1% to 6.7% depending on the camps. Chronic malnutrition levels exceeded the critical threshold of 40% defined by WHO in 2 of 4 camps (Kavumu and Kinama). The mission concluded that refugees in the four camps should continue to be assisted by humanitarian aid. Efforts should be oriented towards the access of refugees to diversified sources of income and support for the economic development of the host areas of the camps. The mission report notes that almost no improvement has been registered in terms of self-sufficiency of refugees and creations of Income Generating Activities since the previous JAM survey conducted in 2010.

39. Illustrated by the below table, the main portfolio's interventions with beneficiaries receiving direct assistance include School Feeding, General Food Distribution, Nutrition-specific interventions and Livelihood activities<sup>26</sup>. School Feeding is the dominant portfolio activity, representing 51% of the portfolio actual percentage of beneficiaries. The CO plans to expend this activity in the coming years by linking it with P4P and local food fortification. 7% of the beneficiaries received WFP assistance through Cash & Voucher transfers, mainly through the current PRRO. During 2011 and 2014, the Standard Project Reports indicate that a total of 72,145 MT of food have been distributed to over 3 million beneficiaries.

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<sup>26</sup> In June 2015, some development focused activities such as cash transfers for FFA and some P4P related activities have been suspended for security reasons.

**Table 3 - Food assistance planned & actual beneficiaries, by activity and by portfolio's operation**

Burundi percentage and total of beneficiaries by activity 2011-2015							
Activity Operation		HIV/AIDS	School feeding	Nutrition	GFD	FFW/FFT/FFA	Cash/Vouchers
CP 200119	Planned	19,375 2%	840,300 76%	163,969 15%		82,543 7%	50,000 5%
	Actual	10,231 1%	838,713 81%	140,270 14%		40,835 4%	42,650 4%
PRRO 200655	Planned		110,000 47%	18,300 8%	85,000 36%	20,000 9%	70,000 30%
	Actual		82,811 45%	13,013 7%	69,387 38%	19,261 10%	64,809 35%
IR-EMOP 200678	Planned			3,500 15%	20,000 85%		
	Actual			1,567 7%	22,160 93%		
PRRO 200164	Planned		195,288 18%	136,963 12%	600,088 54%	182,040 16%	171,000 15%
	Actual		211,507 21%	113,912 11%	534,998 53%	141,234 14%	57,829 6%
<b>Planned % of beneficiaries</b>		19,375 0.8%	1,145,588 46%	322,732 13%	705,088 28%	284,583 11%	291,000 12%
<b>Actual % of beneficiaries</b>		10,231 0.5%	1,133,031 51%	268,762 12%	626,545 28%	201,330 9%	165,288 7%

Source: WFP Dacota as of August 2015

### 3.2. Scope of the Evaluation

40. The evaluation will cover the January 2011-June 2015 period<sup>27</sup>. The CPE will review the 2011-2014 WFP Country Strategy (CS) document, and will assess four operations, including 2 PRROs, 1 Country Programme (CP) and 1 Immediate Response (IR) EMOP. The evaluation will particularly look at the complementarity between the current PRRO and the current CP – and lessons that can be drawn from that angle. It is expected that the evaluation will also look at the innovative approaches and tools, including the P4P-like project, local food fortification initiative, and cash and vouchers.

41. The evaluation will review the 2011-2014 CS and its three priorities i) Food and Nutrition Security, ii) Capacity Development of Government Institutions, and iii) Humanitarian Response Action. In particular, the evaluation will look at the coherence between the directions of its strategic vision and the PRRO 200655 and the EMOP 200678 which both started in 2014. It will also look at how the CP 200119 addressed the first two strategic priority areas of the CS.

42. In light of the strategic nature of the evaluation, it is not intended to evaluate each operation individually, but to focus broadly on the portfolio as a whole. Following the established approach for WFP CPEs, the evaluation focuses on three main areas detailed in the below key evaluation questions (section 4.1).

<sup>27</sup> The portfolio evaluation data will cover the period from 1 January 2011 to 30 June 2015. The CO will provide to the team available data for the first 6 months of 2015, to complement the SPR ending in 2014.

## 4. Evaluation Questions, Approach and Methodology

### 4.1. Evaluation Questions

43. The CPE will address the following three key questions common to the CPE model, which will be further tailored and detailed in a realistic matrix of evaluation questions to be developed by the evaluation team during the inception phase. The evaluation will consider the different needs of various age groups, gender, etc.

44. **Question one: What has been the Strategic Alignment of WFP's country strategy & portfolio in Burundi ?** Proposed sub-questions will include the extent to which the CO main objectives and related activities have been:

- i) relevant to Burundi's humanitarian and developmental needs;
- ii) coherent with the national agenda and policies;
- iii) coherent and harmonized with those of other partners and UN system;
- iv) internally coherent across WFP strategic objectives and the CO's documents; and
- iv) reflect on the extent to which WFP has been strategic in its alignments and positioned itself where it can make the biggest difference.

45. **Question two: What have been the factors driving strategic decision making ?** Reflect on the extent to which WFP :

- i) has analysed the national hunger, nutrition and food security issues including gender issues, and appropriately used this analysis to understand the key hunger challenges in Burundi;
- ii) contributed to developing related national or partner strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues; and
- iii) to identify the factors that determined existing choices (perceived comparative advantages, corporate strategies, resources, organisational structure, etc.) to understand the drivers of a CO strategy and how they need to be considered if/when developing a new Country Strategy.

46. **Question three: What have been the WFP portfolio Performance and Results ?** Reflect on:

- i) the level of effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the main WFP programme activities;
- ii) the extent of WFP's contribution to the reduction of gender gaps in relation to and control over food, resources, and decision-making;
- iii) the level of synergy and multiplying effect between similar activities in different operations, and between the various main activities regardless of the operations; and
- iv) the level of synergies and multiplying opportunities with partners at operational level.

### 4.2. Evaluability Assessment

**Evaluability** is the extent to which an activity or a programme can be evaluated in a reliable and credible fashion. It necessitates that a policy, intervention or operation provides: (a) a clear description of the situation before or at its start that can be used as reference point to determine or measure change; (b) a clear statement of intended outcomes, i.e. the desired changes that should be observable once implementation is under way or

*completed; (c) a set of clearly defined and appropriate indicators with which to measure changes; and (d) a defined timeframe by which outcomes should be occurring.*

*During the inception phase, the evaluation team will confirm the extent to which gender dimensions can be evaluated and identify measures needed to address the evaluability of gender dimensions.*

47. The evaluation will benefit from the findings of the 2013 mid-term reviews of the previous PRRO 200164 and from the current CP 200119, managed by the CO. The evaluation will also benefit from the 2013 external mid-term review of voucher transfers in refugee camps, commissioned by WFP and UNHCR. The three reports are available to the evaluation team.

48. The WFP Burundi Country Strategy document (2011-2014) developed by the CO in 2010 guided the design of two of the four operations covered by the CPE. However, the Country Strategy is not an operational document and does not contain performance results against which WFP reports. Thus the primary benchmarks for assessing performance will be a combination of the operation project documents, standard project reports as well as qualitative assessment of WFP's work.

49. Some 2015 quantitative data will not yet be available while conducting the evaluation. Prior the mid-2015 election, monitoring visits by WFP staff have been reduced for security concerns. The evaluation team will take this into account when developing the evaluation's data collection strategy.

50. The language used to communicate with some national stakeholders (in particular, local NGOs and beneficiaries) may be a constraint. All team members will have to communicate in French with national counterparts, and be assisted by local expertise to communicate in Kirundi with the beneficiaries.

### **4.3 Methodology**

*This evaluation will examine the extent to which gender and equity dimensions are integrated into WFP's policies, systems and processes.*

51. CPEs primarily use a longitudinal design, rely on secondary quantitative data and conduct primary qualitative data collection with key stakeholders.

52. The evaluation will employ relevant internationally agreed evaluation criteria including those of relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, sustainability and connectedness – appropriately linked to the three key evaluation questions. The key questions will focus specifically on issues of relevance to the Burundi context, the ongoing WFP operations, and key technical issues of relevance for future programming.

53. During the inception phase, the evaluation team will design the evaluation methodology to be presented in the inception report. The methodology will:

- Examine the logic of the portfolio based on the Country Strategy and its relationship to the objectives of the operations comprising the portfolio;
- Be geared towards addressing the evaluation questions using triangulation of information from diverse sources and analysis of both quantitative and qualitative

data<sup>28</sup>. A model looking at groups of “main activities/sectors” across a number of operations rather than at individual operations should be adopted.

- Take into account the limitations to evaluability as well as budget and timing constraints.

54. The methodology should demonstrate impartiality and lack of biases by relying on a cross-section of information sources (e.g. stakeholder groups, including beneficiaries, Monitoring reports, PDM<sup>29</sup>, etc.) and following a systematic process to answering the evaluation questions with evidence. The sampling technique to impartially select stakeholders to be interviewed should be specified.

#### 4.4 Quality Assurance

55. WFP’s evaluation quality assurance system (EQAS) is based on the UNEG norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP and DAC). It sets out processes with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes quality assurance of evaluation reports (inception, full and summary reports) based on standardized checklists. EQAS will be systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents provided to the evaluation team. The OEV evaluation manager will conduct the first level quality assurance, and another OEV evaluation officer will conduct the second level review. This quality assurance process does not interfere with the views and independence of the evaluation team, but ensures the report provides the necessary evidence in a clear and convincing way and draws its conclusions on that basis.

56. The evaluation team will be required to ensure the quality of data (validity, consistency and accuracy) throughout the analytical and reporting phases.

### 5. Organization of the Evaluation

#### 5.1. Phases and Deliverables

57. The evaluation is structured in five phases summarized in table 6 below. The three phases involving the evaluation team are: (i) The Inception phase, with a briefing of the evaluation team in Rome, followed by an inception mission to Bujumbura (team leader and evaluation manager), then by the inception report providing details for conducting the evaluation fieldwork. (ii) The Fieldwork <sup>30</sup> phase: primary and secondary data collection and preliminary analysis with approximately 3 weeks in the field. (iii) The Reporting phase concludes with the final evaluation report (a full report and an Executive Board summary report) that will be presented to WFP’s Executive Board in November 2016. A more detailed timeline can be found in annex 2.

**Table 4 - Summary Timeline - key evaluation milestones**

Main Phases	Timeline	Tasks and Deliverables
1.Preparatory	<b>Aug - Nov 2015</b>	Draft and Final TOR Evaluation Team/company selected and contracted.
2. Inception	<b>Dec 2015 – Feb 2016</b>	Document Review

<sup>28</sup> The evaluation matrix – presented in the inception report - will be a crucial organizing tool for the evaluation.

<sup>29</sup> It was planned that the February 2015 PDM would allow to assess development with regards to household gender dynamics reflected in the June 2014 PDM.

<sup>30</sup> An internal exit debrief with the CO is planned on the last day of the Fieldwork, see para.66 below

		Team's briefing at WFP HQ Inception Mission in Bujumbura and Inception Reports
3. Evaluation field work. Data Review, including fieldwork	<b>Feb/March 2016</b>	Evaluation mission, data collection, internal exit debrief Teleconference/Debriefing PPT Analysis
4. Reporting	<b>April - July 2016</b>	Report Drafting Comments Process & Reviews <u>Final evaluation report</u> (including SER)
5. Executive Board and follow up EB.2/2016 (Nov session)	<b>Aug-Nov 2016</b>	Summary Evaluation Report Editing / Evaluation Report Formatting Management Response and Executive Board Preparation

## 5.2. Evaluation team/expertise required

58. The evaluation will be conducted by a team of independent consultants with relevant expertise for the Burundian portfolio. It is anticipated that a core team of three or four evaluators (including the team leader) will be required for the evaluation. It is expected that the team will consist of a mix of international and national consultants, and be gender balanced and gender conscious. All team members must be fluent in French and written English. Fieldwork in Burundi will require a national consultant or research assistant speaking Kirundi.

59. The team leader (TL) will have the additional responsibility for overall design, implementation, reporting and timely delivering of all evaluation products. The team leader should also have a good understanding of food security issues, and familiarity with the relevant portfolio issues, particularly with school feeding being the dominant portfolio activity. He/she will have excellent synthesis and reporting skills in English.

60. The evaluation team should combine between its various members the following competencies and expertise:

- Strong experience in strategic positioning related to food assistance to vulnerable populations in the East African context.
- Deep understanding of the humanitarian/development context in Burundi.
- Expertise in School Feeding, Food security & Nutrition, Livelihood activities and in WFP initiatives such as Purchase for Progress (P4P), local food production, and Cash & Voucher transfers.
- Knowledge of the UN and WFP work modalities, WFP types of programmes, and the WFP transition from food aid to food assistance.
- Ability to conduct a complex evaluation with a strong strategic dimension, and to design an appropriate methodology.

## 5.3. Roles and Responsibilities

61. This evaluation is managed by the WFP Office of Evaluation (OEV). Diane Prioux de Baudimont has been appointed as Evaluation Manager (EM). The EM has not worked on issues associated with the subject of evaluation in the past. She is

responsible for drafting the TOR; selecting and contracting the evaluation team (via contracting a consultant firm); managing the budget; setting up the review group; organizing the team briefing in HQ; assisting in the preparation of the field mission; conducting the first level quality assurance of the evaluation products and soliciting WFP stakeholders feedback on the evaluation report. The EM will also be the main interlocutor between the evaluation team, represented by the team leader, and WFP counterparts to ensure a smooth implementation process.

62. WFP stakeholders at CO, RB and HQ levels are expected to provide information necessary to the evaluation; be available to the evaluation team to discuss the portfolio's performance and results. The CO will facilitate the organisation of the two missions in Burundi; facilitate the evaluation team's contacts with stakeholders in the country; set up meetings and field visits and provide logistic support during the fieldwork. The nomination of a WFP Country Office focal point will help communicating with the evaluation team. A detailed consultation schedule will be presented by the evaluation team in the Inception Report.

63. The contracted company will support the evaluation team in providing quality checks to the draft evaluation products being sent to OEV for its feedback. Particularly, the company will review the first draft inception and evaluation reports, prior sending it to OEV.

64. To ensure the independence of the evaluation, WFP staff will not be part of the evaluation team or participate in meetings where their presence could bias the responses of the stakeholders.

#### **5.4. Communication** (see also the communication plan in Annex 6)

65. WFP stakeholders at CO, RB and in Rome will be kept informed during the evaluation process and will be invited to provide feedback on two core draft evaluation products i.e. the TOR and the evaluation report. Their role will be to cross check factual information, highlight potential gaps in the analysis, and not to provide evaluation quality assurance or approval.

66. The last two days of the fieldwork will be dedicated to preparing for an internal exit debrief by the evaluation team (at least the TL) with the CO. This debrief will focus on a dialogue with the CO about strategic orientation in order to (i) stimulate CO thinking in design of its next operation, pending production of the evaluation report; and (ii) deepen the analysis of preliminary findings. After the fieldwork, the initial findings will be shared with WFP stakeholders in CO, RB and HQ during a teleconference debriefing session.

67. All evaluation products will be written in English. It is expected that the evaluation, with the contracted company providing quality control, produce reports that is of very high standard and evidence-based. While the final evaluation report is the responsibility of the evaluation team, it will be approved by the OEV Director, on satisfactory meeting of OEV's quality standards.

68. The summary evaluation report along with the management response to the evaluation recommendations will be presented to the WFP Executive Board in November 2016. The final evaluation report will be posted on the public WFP website. The CO is encouraged to circulate the final evaluation report with external stakeholders in Burundi.

#### **5.5. Budget**

69. The evaluation will be financed from the Office of Evaluation's budget at a *total* estimated cost of USD xxxx. The total budget covers all expenses related to consultant/company rates, international travels, and OEV staff travel. The evaluation team will be hired through an institutional contract with a consultant company.

## **Annex B: Methodological Note**

### **Basic methodological principles**

1. This annex presents an updated version of the methodology included in the Inception Report.
2. This CPE has adhered to the principles and procedures specified by the EQAS (Evaluation Quality Assurance System) guidelines.
3. The CPE is an independent evaluation and has been carried out as objectively, transparently, and rigorously as possible (see challenges below), in a consultative and participatory manner. The evaluation team has systematically triangulated sources of findings between documents and informants at every relevant level. Where such triangulation was not possible, this has been duly stated (e.g. ‘anecdotal’ *vs* triangulated findings) in the evaluation report. Possible strengths and weaknesses were identified constructively, in order to help the concerned stakeholders identify solutions.
4. During field visits, the evaluation team has addressed potential threats to the validity of findings that appeared due to lack of security, access, or biased/incomplete opinions through strengthened triangulation. The desk study period between inception and field mission has been used extensively for in-depth reviewing of the comprehensive OEV’s electronic library; desk findings have been compiled in accordance with the primary Evaluation Questions and various sub-questions, so that they could readily be compared with field findings. Triangulation was also carried out during field visits (below) by comparing information provided from a wide range of relevant stakeholders – drawing on the stakeholders’ analysis –, and through comparison between findings collected concerning similar activities from the different visited locations.

### **Methodological Approach**

5. As specified in the EQAS guidelines and described in the Matrix ‘data collection methods’ column, the evaluation process has primarily used a longitudinal design, relying on secondary quantitative data (systematic document analysis) and then conducting primary qualitative data collection with key stakeholders in the country using semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions.
6. The following steps have been defined regarding the evaluation team’s methodological approach:
  - i. To construct a conceptual theory of change for the portfolio based on the logical framework of the portfolio.
  - ii. To draft the Evaluation Matrix based on the three standard CPE questions and sub-questions, with a first tentative list of indicators, sources and tools.
  - iii. To review and refine the draft Matrix following the in-county inception mission
  - iv. Concurrent with this, to develop a list of stakeholders to be met during the field phase, and corresponding stakeholder analysis
  - v. To develop quantitative data sets/identify gaps; to refine evaluation matrix indicators accordingly.


- vi. To develop database architecture, data entry tools, semi-structured interview protocols.
- vii. To define the methodology scope and feasibility, e.g. how all these activities will be carried out given the available human and time resources.
- viii. To develop a corresponding work plan for the field data collection.
- ix. To conduct qualitative and quantitative analysis.
- x. To identify, discuss and interpret the results of the analysis; presenting and logically linking findings, conclusions and recommendations

7. As much of the various documents and datasets have been collected and reviewed before the field mission, the field mission itself focused on developing an understanding of the views of stakeholders regarding the evaluation questions and sub-questions.

8. The CPE has formulated the sub-questions in light of the need to make systematic assessment based on the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development/ Development Assistance Committee) (OECD/DAC) evaluation criteria: relevance/appropriateness, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability/ connectedness, and analysis of cross-cutting issues such as gender and capacity development.

### Data Analysis

9. Data analysis was highly dependent on the availability and quality of narrative, quantitative and financial data. The figure below encapsulates the analysis of efficiency and performance at the various levels of results, outputs of activities and outcomes of programs. Outcome level data measures changes in beneficiary status or other direct results of received assistance. This includes such measures as changes in nutritional or food security status, educational attainment measures, and measures of assets created through cash or FFA programs. Quantitative and qualitative data were combined to measure performance at this level. Quantitative assessments were conducted by each team member in his/her sectors of responsibility (see below), who reviewed the definition of desired outcomes and available internal data with CO programming staff by activity. Qualitative assessments, in the form of partner and beneficiary interviews, and beneficiary focus groups, have complemented the quantitative analysis. Figure 1 – Performance at different levels of results



10. In accordance with the Terms of Reference (ToR), the methodology has duly taken into account aspects of gender (see below) and ‘evaluability’. Any successful evaluation must be based on the collection and analysis of an adequate amount of data to ensure that evaluation questions can be satisfactorily answered. The reliability of findings and a high level of credibility for different audiences depend therefore on the extent to which relevant and reliable data are indeed practically accessible – which may

have potentially become a challenge in the field due to security issues.

11. To ensure as much as feasible such reliability and credibility, the evaluation team has collected from available documents, for each of the 3 CS priorities, (i) a clear description of the situation in 2011 that could be used as a baseline to measure changes; (ii) a clear statement of intended outcomes, i.e. the desired changes observable once implementation is under way or completed; (iii) a set of clearly defined and appropriate indicators (quantitative and/or qualitative) with which to measure changes; and (iv) a defined timeframe by which outcomes should be occurring. In terms of efficiency, the team has focused where relevant and feasible on 3 standard questions: (i) were activities cost-efficient; (ii) were objectives achieved on time; and (iii) was the activity implemented in the most efficient way compared to alternatives?<sup>31</sup> More practically, this approach has helped the evaluation team determine what could reasonably be evaluated, and what could not – and why.

12. Regarding gender equality, it has been noted that in 2012 – during the implementation of the Gender Policy 2008 – 2013, WFP has started introducing the IASC Gender Marker (levels 0 – 2), although the Burundi CO staff were reportedly trained rather late on this (2014 - 2015). In the meantime, the WFP Country Strategy was ranked at level 1 (insufficiently mainstreamed), but the CP and both PRROs were positively ranked at level 2. The CPE has tried to measure the operations' contribution to progress on the Gender Inequality Index, in as much this has been used by the CO. Ultimately, one of the evaluation's objectives is to formulate an assessment of the reduction of possible gender gaps in WFP's country portfolio.

13. Gender-responsive questions were included in the interview guidelines, and the Evaluation Matrix included gender-related questions, indicators and methods (separate FGDs) under EQs 1.2, 1.4, 2.2, 3.1, 3.3, and 3.6.

### **Evaluating Performance and Results**

14. The analysis of performance and results has led to findings and conclusions regarding the portfolio's overall performance. This process included the following steps.

- i. Measuring the portfolio's performance in terms of supporting food and nutrition security, institutional capacity development for ultimate handover purposes, and response to emergencies, with due regard to gender issues and new opportunities or challenges that may appear.
- ii. Quantitative and qualitative indicators to assess nutrition and food security at the outcome level, disaggregated by gender where appropriate and feasible.
- iii. The technical notes presented in annexes to the IR were used as a basis for the current analyses in Annexes G and H covering the two key sectors of nutrition (including school feeding) and food security (including P4P, FFA, C&V), with a compendium of related findings.

### **Challenges**

15. The main challenge identified during the IR was the potentially evolving political situation, which may have denied access to some areas due to a lack of security. This was fortunately not the case. A do-no-harm approach has also been followed by all team members while meeting final beneficiaries, either individually or in groups, in

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<sup>31</sup> WFP OEV – Technical Note on Efficiency Analysis

order to avoid potential subsequent queries of respondents by authorities. There were also no reported issues in that respect.

16. The CPE has addressed to the best of the ability of the team members a certain dichotomy between the need to focus on the overall strategic perspective of the portfolio on the one hand, and the necessary level of details to be reached while reviewing the efficiency and effectiveness of individual activities and operations, e.g. under EQ3.1. Regular assessments of the review status and internal team dialogue were performed in order to ensure that the collected details are being captured and translated in a strategic perspective framework.

17. At the institutional level of WFP, the evaluation has duly consider, with the Regional Bureau and the HQ, the dynamic background of evolving relevant corporate policies (nutrition, gender, school feeding, capacity development, C&V, protection Strategic Plans (2008-13 and 2014-17), as well as the global shift from food aid towards a food assistance paradigm.

### **Evaluation Matrix**

18. Following the EQAS Technical Note on Evaluation Matrix, the Inception Report included an Evaluation Matrix (Annex 8), which provided evaluation questions (EQs), sub questions, indicators, data sources, data collection methods, and other relevant information. This approach has allowed the CPE team to focus on the three primary EQs of strategic alignment, factors driving strategic decision making, and portfolio's performance and results.

#### **Data Collection Methods**

19. The evaluation process has been based on the collection of a triangulated mix of secondary quantitative data (documentary analysis of operations' reports and data sets – see below), and primary data from interviews with stakeholders during field visits. Such discussions were either – as relevant - semi-structured interviews or focus group discussions, disaggregated by gender wherever feasible, and attempted to fill in data gaps identified during the desk study.

20. A combination of the comparative advantages of quantitative methods that produce hard, precise, reliable figures, and qualitative methods that capture more descriptive (sensitive, detailed, nuanced and contextual) data, tends to strengthen the reliability and credibility of evaluations. The quantitative and qualitative data collection methods are detailed below.

#### *Quantitative data collection*

21. The inception phase has included the identification and preliminary assessment of available data sets. These were collected during the field data collection phase, and were be a primary source of evidence for the evaluation.

22. The data sets have also provided the basis for establishing baselines for 'evaluability', including key indicators/activities and measurements of change against these baselines, as follows:

- i. Establish a strong baseline for primary indicators/activities (levels of malnutrition, school attendance, livelihood for targeted households and communities, etc.) and track changes against this baseline for the period under review. This was disaggregated by gender and other demographic data as available.

- ii. Determine how changes in these indicators link, in quantitative terms, with broader performance indicators/indices, e.g. food security, nutrition, FFA/resilience, etc.
- iii. Determine how changes in these performance indicators/indices link to broader results/outcomes.

#### *Qualitative data collection methods*

23. The approach has sought to establish trends across cohorts (representative and accessible groups of stakeholders) regarding their perceptions and judgments of key criteria; qualitative data is based on summaries of interviews, using verbatim statements as relevant and possible. These were validated through documentary review, comparative evidence from other contexts, and the evaluators' own expertise and opinion on the subject.

24. The Evaluation Matrix includes the type of cohorts relevant to each EQ. This has been used to determine an appropriate sampling strategy across cohorts for semi-structured interviews. In brief, we have determined a stratified sample based on each cohort and on their relevance to evaluation questions. The three qualitative methods are as follows.

- i. ***Semi-structured interviews.*** Considering the number of stakeholders, the evaluation allowed for a large number of semi-structured key informant interviews, subject to constraints of security, transport time and access. This task, and therefore the need to absorb and interpret findings in a consistent way, has led the evaluation team to develop a standard protocol. Semi-structured interviews with different stakeholders were used extensively to answer relevant EQs and to address crosscutting themes.
- ii. ***Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and story-telling sessions.*** Focus groups were used to: (i) gather evidence on how groups of people think or feel about a specific intervention; (ii) understand why certain opinions are held; and (iii) produce ideas for future planning and better performance. They were gender-disaggregated where relevant and feasible.
  - a. Because the rationale of FGDs is to take advantage of group interactions, the evidence collected was used at the group level, not at the individual level. FGDs were not only used to understand progress achieved in delivering aid, but rather how people perceived the support that was provided to them, as well as its delivery modalities (EQ 3). The CPE team has met with the CO staff and conducted FGDs, in the form of a small interactive workshop.
  - b. Other qualitative data collection methods included secondary data and documents review, and field visits.
- iii. ***Data & Analysis (D&A) Report tool.*** This tool, pioneered by Transtec, has been used to 'measure' and present a representative set of raw qualitative evidence collected throughout the fieldwork. The D&A Report shows in the most transparent way 'what the data says' as well as the main trends that can be observed; it is then used as the basis for formulating statements and conducting more specific analysis. The D&A Report data, which has been compiled by a team member in Bujumbura, has been explained at the end of the field mission and is presented in parallel (separate file to OEV) to the final report. The tool is further detailed at the end of this Annex.

## **Quality Assurance**

25. WFP's Office of Evaluation has developed an Evaluation Quality Assurance System (EQAS) based on the UNEG (UN Evaluation Group) norms and standards and good practice of the international evaluation community (ALNAP<sup>32</sup> and OECD/DAC). It sets out process maps with in-built steps for quality assurance and templates for evaluation products. It also includes checklists for feedback on quality for each of the evaluation products. EQAS has been systematically applied during the course of this evaluation and relevant documents have been provided to the evaluation team. The team is supported in this by a Trantec's Quality Assurance (QA) Director, who has constantly referred to EQAS while checking the quality of the draft CPE deliverables before the Team Leader submits them to OEV Evaluation Manager.

## **Risks and Assumptions**

26. External factors outside of the control of the consultants may have impacted the regular development of the evaluation. To that effect, the evaluation has listed ten major types of risks that could potentially be envisaged, the likelihood of their occurring, potential impact on the project and the prevention and mitigation actions that were planned.

## **Organization of the Evaluation**

### *Roles and Responsibilities*

27. On WFP's side, the CPE has been managed by Dawit Habtemariam, Evaluation Manager; he was assisted by Federica Lomiri, Research Analyst at OEV. WFP stakeholders at CO, RB and HQ levels were expected to provide information necessary to the evaluation, and be available to the evaluation team to discuss the portfolio's performance and results. The CO has facilitated the organization of the inception mission, the main evaluation mission, and the stakeholders learning workshop in Burundi; facilitated the evaluation team's contacts with stakeholders in the country; set up meetings and field visits and provided logistical support during the fieldwork.

28. The core evaluation team consisted of two international and two national evaluators who carried out the main field mission. They were supported by (i) a Project Manager/Evaluator (Lena Zimmer) who has spent a short period in Burundi for D&A reporting, (ii) a short-term P4P expert (Carine Malardeau), (ii) a short-term Methodology Adviser (Dorian LaGuardia), and (iii) a Quality Assurance Director (Marco Lorenzoni). The evaluation Team was gender-balanced (5 men and 3 women), which was a necessary prerequisite to ensure the gender-sensitive approach to data generation (access to women) and analysis (prevention of bias).

29. The roles and responsibilities of the four core CPE team members are shown in the table below, which also indicates how the skills and experience of the core team have met the requirements of the ToR for this CPE.

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<sup>32</sup> Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action

**Table 5 - Core team roles and responsibilities**

<b>Core Team</b>	<b>Roles and responsibilities</b>
<b>Michel Vanbruaene</b> (Team Leader, food security and humanitarian aid specialist)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Principal liaison with WFP evaluation manager (EM), overall direction of the evaluation team (ET) and final responsibility for deliverables</li> <li>• Inception mission to Burundi, and led main fieldwork mission to Burundi.</li> <li>• Led the elaboration of the methodology (with support from methodology expert) and approach in the inception phase, and the drafting of the Inception and Evaluation reports</li> <li>• As well as overall supervision of the team, he led on food aid (refugees, IDPs) and food security (livelihoods, FFA, C&amp;V – with support from the national socio-economist, P4P –with support from P4P expert), capacity development, DRR and</li> </ul>
<b>Friederike Bellin-Sesay</b> (Deputy TL,	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Led on nutrition, school feeding and gender equity</li> <li>• Assisted TL on food security</li> </ul>
<b>Sylvestre Nkizwanayo</b> (National Evaluator, database specialist)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Led on VAM, database and data analysis</li> <li>• Assisted TL on C&amp;V</li> <li>• Assisted Deputy TL on gender equity</li> </ul>
<b>Augustin Ngendakuryo</b> (National Evaluator, socio-economist)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Led on socio-economic studies, social safety nets, returnees and do-no-harm</li> <li>• Assisted TL in food security, livelihoods, humanitarian aid and protection</li> </ul>

*Time schedule and tasks carried out*

30. The evaluation process started with the inception phase, the main purpose of which was to ensure that the evaluation team has acquired an in-depth understanding of the TOR, in particular its scope and approaches, and has translated them into an operational plan according to which the CPE was to be carried out. The inception phase involved preliminary analyses of background materials and discussions with WFP internal and external stakeholders.

31. A briefing was carried out at WFP's Headquarters (HQ) in Rome during January 12-13, 2016. From February 1-5, 2016, an in-country inception mission was undertaken which involved meetings with WFP Country office and its stakeholders. The outcome was the Inception Report (IR). Inception was carried out in parallel to the desk review, which was pursued between December 2015 to April 2016.

32. This phase was followed by the field evaluation mission in Burundi. Meetings with stakeholders at national level took place in Bujumbura from 14/04 until 20/04. They involved: WFP staff; donors (US, NL); UN or international agencies UNICEF, IFAD, FAO, HCR, IOM; Ministries and authorities (Agriculture, Education, Solidarity, National DRR Platform, Pronianut, SUN/Reach secretariat); partners (Red Cross, Caritas, Capad, Oxfam, WVI); and external stakeholders (former MINAGRIE Minister). Fieldwork was carried out by 2 sub-teams (in charge respectively of food security and nutrition/ school feeding) from 21st until 29th April 2016, as follows.

- i. Based in field Office of Ngozi (21-24/04), and covering the provinces of Ngozi, Muyinga, Kirundo and Karuzi. Meetings and visits were performed with: WFP staff, authorities (3 governors' offices, 2 Directions Provinciales de l'Agriculture, 2 Directions Provinciales de l'Education, 2 Bureau Provinciaux de Santé, 2 Health Districts), UN (FAO, UNICEF, HCR), partners (Caritas, 2 Dioceses, Red Cross, CRS, FFH, WHH, WVI), beneficiaries (3 schools, 2 health centers, committees for Batwas, 2 refugee camps, 1 P4P cooperative, 2 FFAs, 2 orphanages, 1 center for disabled, and disaggregated focus groups on stunting prevention).
  - ii. Based in field office of Gitega (25-27/04), covering the provinces of Gitega, Ruyigi, and Rutana. Meetings and visits to: WFP staff (monitors), authorities as in Ngozi, ONPRA, provincial DRR platform, UN (HCR), partners (14 social institutions, Diocese, CRB, WVI, Floresta), beneficiaries (2 schools, 3 health centers, 1 refugee camp, 2 FFAs), communal authorities around refugee camp.
  - iii. Based at the CO in Bujumbura (28-29/04): visits in provinces of Bujumbura rural, Cibitoke and Bubanza to: WFP staff; 3 P4P cooperatives; Directions Provinciales de l'Education, 5 school feeding sites; communal authorities, Caritas, Red Cross, IDP committees in 2 camps.
33. All components of the CS could be assessed: nutrition (chronic, MAM, HIV), school feeding, food security and safety nets (GFD for most vulnerable, FFA, P4P, C&V modalities), institutional development, DRR and emergency relief. The main evaluation tools were the evaluation matrix and related interview guides. Data collection methods included, as foreseen: triangulation for evidence, face-to-face interviews, workshops, focus group discussions (disaggregated as feasible / relevant), site visits, and review of new documents.
34. Overall, the evaluation team met at least 329 people (23 from WFP, 38 from national NGOs and charity organizations, 12 from other UN Agencies, 6 from Red Cross, 36 from the public administration and more than 129 beneficiaries.
35. The evaluation work was followed by the preparation of this report, by a stakeholders' workshop held mid-July in Burundi to present preliminary conclusions and recommendations, the finalization of the report, and its submission to WFP's Executive Board.
36. The Data & Analysis (D&A) Report methodology applied in parallel by Transtec is presented below

## Data and Analysis Report

37. Transtec is committed to apply an objective and transparent approach throughout any evaluation it conducts. That includes the analysis of data whether quantitative and qualitative. Our experience is that qualitative data analysis in evaluation practice (and in evaluation reports), is often not that evident. There seem to be various standards and approaches, sometimes more and sometimes less evidence-based. Therefore, Transtec has been developing the practice of compiling a so-called **Data Analysis Report** for all its evaluations, being used as relevant in its medium-to-large size evaluation projects.

38. This proprietary tool presents the full set of qualitative and quantitative data collected with the use of the different data collection tools throughout the evaluation. The Data and Analysis Report shows in the most transparent way ‘what the data say’ and the main trends that can be observed. It is then used as the basis for formulating statements and conducting more specific analysis; finally, it allows the various stakeholders to access the evidence that creates the basis for the findings presented in the final report. Finally, it helps the evaluation team and the stakeholders to have a dialogue on the evaluation findings that is based on fully-documented evidence, made anonymous.

39. The Data and Analysis Report of this evaluation was shared with WFP at the end of Field phase and it is resubmitted with the delivery of the second draft of Evaluation Report. At the Field-Exit Meeting, the main trends and findings as indicated by the (raw) data of the Data and Analysis Report were presented and stakeholder feedback and buy-in on the major points obtained.

### *Purpose of the D&A Report*

40. **The D&A Report provides the data and initial analysis of data collected during the Field Mission.** At the stage of the exit meeting, the data is incomplete and has not yet been triangulated. Several key-informant interviews could not be included due to the short time-span between the end of the data-collection phase and the presentation, a wealth of secondary data has yet to be analyzed, and the case studies have not been elaborated yet, likewise due to the time-constraints.

41. The overall data collected and assessed during the field phase includes over 329 persons consulted in structured interviews, site visits for each team member on specific sectors/activities, and Focus Group Discussions with program beneficiaries.

42. The primary purpose of this D&A Report is to provide this data and an initial analysis of its implications. **This analysis is not meant to be exhaustive or complete for the evaluation’s purpose.** Instead, it focuses on the primary data sets that are drawn from cohorts and sources directly related to the evaluation’s objectives. This includes structured interviews with key respondents from WFP and partner organizations, group-interviews and focus-group discussions.

43. Given this, additional analysis will be conducted on the data presented here and the remaining datasets to be added, digging deeper to determine relevant patterns and trends. This will be supported by additional analysis and data, especially as regards existing primary, secondary and comparative materials and information.

### **Sources**

44. The following sources are included in the D&A Report.

45. The sources of the field-phase included 329 people met (23 WFP, 38 national

NGOs and charitable organizations, 12 other UN Agencies, 6 Red Cross, 36 from the public administration and more than 129 Beneficiaries and Community Representatives through Focus Group Discussions, Schools- and Health Center Visits).

46. Interviews used standard protocols, with the possibility for each interview to ask additional standardized questions relevant to the respondent. All questions are linked to specific Evaluation Questions (EQs) for this IPE. This evidence constitutes the relevant qualitative data collected during these interviews. **This includes, in total, 463 qualitative data points.**

47. At times, data is repeated verbatim as different respondents said the same thing.

### Using Qualitative Data Graphs

48. Qualitative analysis graphs demonstrate trends by categorizing responses according to a set scale and organizing them according to specific Evaluation Questions and cohorts. Qualitative data is inherently difficult to analyze but can provide strong evidence for trends in current perceptions.<sup>33</sup>


49. Each Qualitative Analysis Graph includes color coded and numbered boxes for each piece of qualitative data. Thus, if there were 35 responses, as in the example below, there will be 35 corresponding boxes, with box “1” corresponding to statement “1,” box “2” to statement “2,” etc. It is expected that each question has a different number of responses—appropriate qualitative data analysis generates different numbers of responses for each subject.

50. Each respondent statement (data point) has been evaluated according to the following scale:

■ Positive; achieved expected results   ■ - Neutral; Mixed results   ■ - Negative; did not achieve expected results

51. These rankings are subjective. They are based on the statement as confirmed by respondents and on their overall intent. Others may reasonably arrive at different conclusions. Each qualitative data point includes identifiers as to stakeholder. Some qualitative data points are repeated as different cohorts often say precisely the same things and it is best to establish this linguistic trend. Every attempt has been made to preserve respondent’s anonymity although confidentiality cannot be assured.

*EXAMPLE:* Figure 2 - How did the new business process enable you to do better work?



<sup>33</sup> For a review of evidence based evaluations and the use of qualitative data, see “Evidence-based Evaluation of Development Cooperation: Possible? Feasible? Desirable?,” Kim Forss and Sara Bandstein. *Network of Networks on Impact Evaluation (NONIE)*, World Bank, January 2008.

52. This example illustrates that many more respondents had positive impressions (23) than those who had neutral (9) or negative impressions (3).

I am able to get my work done much more quickly; I have saved at least 10 hours per week because of the new process good (LFO)

- The process enabled me to save a lot of time; it was much clear and quicker (HQ)
- While most aspects of the process helps, there are some serious bugs; we need to change . . . (JFO)
- I liked it but there were a few things that could be improved (HQ)
- The new system is a nightmare! It takes us longer to process and, actually, it doesn't even allow us to do . . . (SFO)
- What a waste of money and time; the previous system worked fine; yes, it was old but it worked. This one has forced us to change all of our systems; it takes longer, can't do the right things; it is very frustrating (WFO).

53. The following evidence constitutes the relevant qualitative data collected during the interviews during the field phase of this review. **This included, in total, 463 qualitative data points.**

54. This is based on summaries of what people said, using verbatim statements as particularly relevant. These are organized according to the primary Evaluation Questions. These were further analyzed and divided into additional Evaluation Questions as part of the final analysis and thus presented in the Final Report. The Evaluation Questions conform to OECD DAC criteria for humanitarian responses.

55. **Qualitative evidence is inherently messy.** Sometimes people say things that are seemingly un-related to the question. These are included from time to time and ranked according to the context and the overall interview. Some data points are repeated when multiple respondents state the same thing and when they apply to different evaluation questions.

56. As noted above, these have been ranked according to positive, neutral and negative. A person who did not conduct the interview does the initial categorization and then the actual interviewer reviews this. Reasonable people could arrive at different rankings for these statements. However, they do reflect the insights of the Review team who conducted the interviews and thus the general intent of each respondent. Qualitative data analysis graphs are included per evaluation level, an example is given below:

**Table 2 - Example of a Qualitative Graph - Effectiveness**


1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25
26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75
76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	84	85	86	87	88	89	90	91	92	93	94	95	96	97	98	99	100
101	102	103	104	105	106	107	108	109	110	111	112	113	114	115	116	117	118	119	120	121	122	123	124	125
126	127	128	129	130	131	132	133	134	135	136	137	138	139	140	141	142	143	144	145	146	147	148	149	150
151	152	153	154	155	156	157	158	159	160	161	162	163	164	165	166	167	168	169	170	171	172	173	174	175
176	177	178	179	180	181	182	183	184	185	186	187	188	189	190	191	192	193	194	195	196	197	198	199	200
201	202	203	204	205	206	207	208	209	210	211	212	213	214	215	216	217	218	219	220	221	222	223	224	225
226	227	228	229	230	231	232	233	234	235	236	237	238	239	240	241	242	243	244	245	246	247	248	249	250
251	252	253	254	255	256	257	258	259	260	261	262	263	264	265	266	267	268	269	270	271	272	273	274	275
276	277	278	279	280	281	282	283	284	285	286	287	288	289	290	291	292	293	294	295	296	297	298	299	300
301	302	304	305	306	307	308	309	310	311															

Figure 1 - A snapshot of the evidence table

 <span style="margin-left: 100px;">WFP CPE Burundi 2011-Mid2015</span>								
ID (leave blank)	Initials	Date	Location (Primary)	Evaluation Level	DATA (Indicate if direct quotes ("quote"); Separate points with semi colon (;); Try to avoid dashes (-) colons (:); or other punctuation except for semi-colon. Distil evidence to single bullet points as possible; use standard abbreviations; when using shorthand/abbreviations, use find/replace function to change into whole words.)	EQ	POS/NEG/NEU	Sub Question
	MW	23/04/2016	Musasa	Efficiency	Also due to price deviations, some traders come to fairs with only small quantities of items for which market prices are higher	EQ3.2. How efficient were the main activities in the WFP portfolio?	Negative	E 3.2. c How cost-effective were the activities, including logistics vs C&V (compared to alternatives)?
	MW	23/04/2016	Kinama refugee camp	Efficiency	Camps complain strongly about (1) poor quality of maize (local not imported, rotten, full of sand), beans (old, like stones); all traders propose the same bad quality, not competition; (2) prices (often inflated as traders seem to have organised themselves into cartels after October 2015 to ask the same prices also without competition.	EQ3.2. How efficient were the main activities in the WFP portfolio?	Negative	E 3.2. c How cost-effective were the activities, including logistics vs C&V (compared to alternatives)?
	MW	23/04/2016	Musasa	Efficiency	Camps complain strongly about (1) poor quality of maize (local not imported, rotten, full of sand), beans (old, like stones); all traders propose the same bad quality, not competition; (2) prices (often inflated as traders seem to have organised themselves into cartels after October 2015 to ask the same prices also without competition.	EQ3.2. How efficient were the main activities in the WFP portfolio?	Negative	E 3.2. c How cost-effective were the activities, including logistics vs C&V (compared to alternatives)?
	MW	23/04/2016		Efficiency	need more QA for traders' goods going to fairs. Cartel practices must be avoided. Fairs' prices need to be as close as possible to market prices. Complaints from camps distribution committees must be taken more seriously.	EQ3.2. How efficient were the main activities in the WFP portfolio?	Negative	E 3.2. c How cost-effective were the activities, including logistics vs C&V (compared to alternatives)?
	MW	23/04/2016	Musasa	Efficiency	Very good	EQ3.2. How efficient were the main activities in the WFP portfolio?	Positive	E 3.2.d. How flexible, responsive and timely was WFP in emergencies during the review period?
	MW	23/04/2016	Musasa	Efficiency	need of faster / more flexible adaptation to market price changes for vouchers	EQ3.2. How efficient were the main activities in the WFP portfolio?	Negative	E 3.2.d. How flexible, responsive and timely was WFP in emergencies during the review period?
	MW	22/04/2016	Kinama refugee camp	Efficiency	Very good	EQ3.2. How efficient were the main activities in the WFP portfolio?	Positive	E 3.2.d. How flexible, responsive and timely was WFP in emergencies during the review period?
	MW	22/04/2016	Kinama refugee camp	Efficiency	need of faster / more flexible adaptation to market price changes for vouchers	EQ3.2. How efficient were the main activities in the WFP portfolio?	Negative	E 3.2.d. How flexible, responsive and timely was WFP in emergencies during the review period?
	MW	22/04/2016	Muyinga	Efficiency	Very good	EQ3.2. How efficient were the main activities in the WFP portfolio?	Positive	E 3.2.d. How flexible, responsive and timely was WFP in emergencies during the review period?
	MW	22/04/2016	Muyinga	Efficiency	need of faster / more flexible adaptation to market price changes for vouchers	EQ3.2. How efficient were the main activities in the WFP portfolio?	Negative	E 3.2.d. How flexible, responsive and timely was WFP in emergencies during the review period?
	MW	25/04/2016	Gitaga	Efficiency	DPAE is providing monthly updates of market prices; could be used for trade fairs in camps, if 3 months contracts foresee revisions.	EQ3.2. How efficient were the main activities in the WFP portfolio?	Neutral	E 3.2.d. How flexible, responsive and timely was WFP in emergencies during the review period?
	MW	25/04/2016		Efficiency	Market prices are changing much and fast: 1 kg of beans costed 600 FBu in June 2015, and 11-1200 FBu in April 2016 (Institution for Enfants des Rues, Ngori 23/04).	EQ3.2. How efficient were the main activities in the WFP portfolio?	Neutral	E 3.2.d. How flexible, responsive and timely was WFP in emergencies during the review period?
	MW	25/04/2016		Efficiency	For Batwis: 1 year was too short for CFW to change behaviours...need 3-5 years and coaching to ensure systematic follow up after initial enthusiasm.	EQ3.2. How efficient were the main activities in the WFP portfolio?	Neutral	E 3.2.d. How flexible, responsive and timely was WFP in emergencies during the review period?
	MW	25/04/2016		Efficiency	use of updated market prices by DPAE Gitaga must be strengthened and computerised for faster use.	EQ3.2. How efficient were the main activities in the WFP portfolio?	Neutral	E 3.2.d. How flexible, responsive and timely was WFP in emergencies during the review period?
	MW	25/04/2016		Effectiveness	Perhaps indirectly as school feeding encourages attendance of girls.	EQ3.3. To what extent did WFP assistance enhance gender equity and women's empowerment?	Neutral	E 3.3. a. To what extent did WFP assistance contribute to the reduction of gender gaps in relation to: access to and control over food and resources;
	MW	23/04/2016	Musasa	Effectiveness	In camps girls tend to leave school early (15 years), sometimes for early marriage.	EQ3.3. To what extent did WFP assistance enhance gender equity and women's empowerment?	Negative	E 3.3. a. To what extent did WFP assistance contribute to the reduction of gender gaps in relation to: access to and control over food and resources; responsibility for decision-making; livelihood opportunities; education through school feeding?
	MW	23/04/2016		Effectiveness	to provide take home food packs to girls in secondary school in camps	EQ3.3. To what extent did WFP assistance enhance gender equity and women's empowerment?	Neutral	E 3.3. a. To what extent did WFP assistance contribute to the reduction of gender gaps in relation to: access to and control over food and resources; responsibility for decision-making; livelihood opportunities; education



**Figure 4 - Data and analysis report – trends across different clusters of respondents**



## Annex C: Evaluation Matrix

Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
<b>Strategic positioning</b>	<b>EQ1.1. Extent to which the Country Strategy (CS) main objectives and related activities have been relevant to Burundi's humanitarian and developmental needs, in changing environment ?</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Were the CS, PD and logframes in the CP and PRROs realistic and relevant considering the context of Burundi and the constraints and opportunities of food and nutrition security?</li> <li>- Does the portfolio outline the short, medium and long term focus to address chronic food insecurity and chronic malnutrition (stunting and micronutrient deficiencies)?</li> <li>- What was the concept of development in the Burundi context in 2011? Did it change?</li> <li>- What were /are the Burundi humanitarian needs, and how were/are humanitarian principles and protection issues considered?</li> <li>- Is the portfolio addressing social protection adequately?</li> <li>- What were / are the objectives and activities of strategic partners in humanitarian and development efforts? (see stakeholder analysis)</li> <li>- What were / are the UNDAF objectives?</li> <li>- Is the portfolio focus and modalities still appropriate given the recent evolution of the national context?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Quantitative food and nutrition indicators, disaggregated</li> <li>- Qualitative food and nutrition indicators, disaggregated)</li> <li>- Livelihood vulnerability data</li> <li>- Standard international economic, social and governance data (UN indexes)</li> <li>- PRSF, National development plans and relevant sector policies</li> <li>- WFP Strategic Plans and relevant sector policies</li> <li>- Mapping of actors</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- UN, WFP and NGO datasets, secondary quantitative databases</li> <li>- UN policy and PDs, HDI, others (see Dropbox)</li> <li>- Government and development partner policy statements</li> <li>- Government, WFP, UN, development partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document analysis</li> <li>- Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO, UN, Ministries, other partner agencies</li> <li>- SWOT analysis</li> <li>- Triangulation where possible by cross-checks among datasets</li> </ul>

Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
	<b>EQ1.2. Extent to which the CS main objectives and related activities have been coherent with the national agenda and policies?</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Were the CS, programme documents (PD) and the logframes in the CP and PRRO realistic and relevant to the PRSF (Poverty Reduction Strategic Framework), national agenda, policies and co-ordination frameworks?</li> <li>- Did the portfolio appropriately combine humanitarian and development approaches?</li> <li>- Did the portfolio seek to engage the affected populations in identifying needs and priorities, and ways to respond to these?</li> <li>- Did the portfolio offer a realistic and appropriate approach to capacity development?</li> <li>- How gender-disaggregated, gender sensitive was the portfolio?</li> <li>- Did the portfolio address longer term issues such as chronic under nutrition and resilience ?</li> <li>- Is the nutrition programming, especially addressing stunting, in line with Government strategy? Does the WFP nutrition program contribute appropriately and adequately to the overall partner contribution?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Statements in the CS (vision, objectives etc)</li> <li>- PRSF, National development plans and relevant sector policies</li> <li>- Comparison of WFP operational objectives and targets with other analysis (see EQ1.i)</li> <li>- Review of treatment of gender in PDs and CS (see EQ3.iii)</li> <li>- Comparison of WFP operational objectives regarding gender with those of national policy and partner programming (see EQ3.iii)</li> <li>- Comparison of programme data and data on beneficiary needs</li> <li>- Analysis of gaps in WFP partner organisations</li> <li>- Analysis of targeting approaches and data</li> <li>- Analysis of participatory processes in the design of operations</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PDs, CS</li> <li>- Analysis generated for EQ 1.i</li> <li>- Comparable WFP and partner programme documentation and data</li> <li>- Government, WFP, UN and other partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document analysis</li> <li>- Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO, other</li> <li>- UN, Ministries, partner agencies</li> <li>- SWOT analysis</li> <li>- Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>

<b>EQ1.3. Extent to which the CS/portfolio main objectives and related activities are coherent and harmonised with those of the partners (UN, multilateral, bilateral and NGOs)?</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- How coherent was the portfolio with the strategies and programmes of the concerned UN agencies (UNICEF, FAO, IFAD, UNHCR...)?</li> <li>- Were there duplications or gaps among UN agencies and key other international actors?</li> <li>- Was the portfolio effectively integrated into the UNDAF? Extent to which WFP has been involved in UN joint programming and programs in Burundi ?</li> <li>- How coherent was the portfolio with the strategies and programmes of the key concerned donors (US, Netherlands...)</li> <li>- How coherent was the portfolio with the strategies and programmes of the key concerned implementing partners</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Degree of consistency (1-5 and narrative) of WFP objectives and strategy (PDs, CS) with relevant government policy, strategy and plans</li> <li>- Degree of consistency of WFP objectives and strategy (CS, PDs) with relevant partner strategies and plans (at central but also lower regional level – implementation), and co-ordination frameworks, e.g. UNDAF</li> <li>- Degree of active harmonisation and collaboration achieved between WFP and partners at central but also lower regional level – implementation</li> <li>- Degree to coherence to the needs and priorities of the beneficiaries</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PDs, CS</li> <li>- Analysis generated for EQ 1.i</li> <li>- Policy and strategy documents</li> <li>- Government, WFP, UN and other partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document analysis</li> <li>- Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO, other UN, Ministries, partner agencies</li> <li>- SWOT analysis</li> <li>- Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>

<b>EQ1.4. Extent to which the CS main objectives and related activities have been internally coherent with WFP's Strategic Plans 2008-13 and 2014-17 and other relevant corporate policies?</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- What was the level of coherence with Strategic Objectives 1 – 5 of the WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2013?</li> <li>- What was the level of coherence with Strategic Objectives 1 – 4 of the WFP Strategic Plan 2014-2017?</li> <li>- What was the level of coherence with the relevant WFP policies: gender, nutrition, HIV, C&amp;V, Emergency (incl. humanitarian principles and protection), Food security, school feeding, capacity development, DRR, FFA, resilience and safety nets ?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Degree of coherence (1-5 and narrative) for each policy and strategic objective</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PDs, CS</li> <li>- Analysis generated for EQ 1.i</li> <li>- Government, WFP, UN and other partner and external informants</li> <li>- Analysis of application of humanitarian principles, Do No Harm approaches and Sphere standards</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document analysis</li> <li>- Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO, other UN, Ministries, partner agencies</li> <li>- SWOT analysis</li> <li>- Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>
<b>EQ1.5. Extent to which WFP has been strategic in its alignments and has positioned itself such as to make the biggest difference ?</b>			
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- What were the comparative advantages of WFP in Burundi and how clearly did WFP define and recognise them?</li> <li>- How explicit was WFP's strategy about maximizing its comparative advantage and making the biggest difference?</li> <li>- How realistic was WFP about the constraints on its Burundi portfolio?</li> <li>- How strategic was WFP in selecting its partners (national and local levels)?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Review of WFP PDs and CS for analysis of comparative advantage and how it should be exploited and maximized</li> <li>- Consideration of WFP potential to add value in the context of other actors' strengths and weaknesses (EQ1.i above)</li> <li>- Analysis of logframes (CP, PRROs) in the portfolio</li> <li>- Analysis of implementation capacity of partners at lower level, and adequacy of their coverage</li> <li>- Analysis of geographical coverage of WFP and related targeting</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PDs, CS</li> <li>- Analysis generated for EQ1.i</li> <li>- Logframes</li> <li>- Government, WFP, UN and other partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document analysis</li> <li>- Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO, Ministries, partner agencies</li> <li>- SWOT analysis</li> <li>- Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>

**Key question 2: What have been the factors driving strategic decision-making?**

<b>EQ2.1. Extent to which WFP has analysed the national hunger, nutrition and food security issues including gender issues, and appropriately used this analysis to understand the key nutritional and food security challenges in Burundi ?</b>				
<b>Strategic decision-making</b>	<b>EQ2.1. Extent to which WFP has analysed the national hunger, nutrition and food security issues including gender issues, and appropriately used this analysis to understand the key nutritional and food security challenges in Burundi ?</b>			
	<p>For each of its interventions and with reference to specific target groups, what analysis did WFP undertake in deciding whether and how to intervene? In particular:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- mapping and use of data and analysis gathered by WFP and others for strategy formulation;</li> <li>- analysis of the food security, nutrition, livelihoods, markets and gender concepts and context, and how this was used for effective programme planning, design and targeting;</li> <li>- assessment of WFP use of research and monitoring data to inform strategic decision-making, with particular focus on nutrition (stunting), GFD and FFA.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Degree of appropriateness (1-5 and narrative) of written and oral evidence concerning the analysis WFP undertook in preparing its PDs and CS during the review period</li> <li>- Degree of clarity and thoroughness (1-5 and narrative) with which PDs and CS refer to relevant data and analysis</li> <li>- Assessment of regularity with which WFP updated its analysis on the basis of new information</li> <li>- Level of adjustments to design based on identified changes in needs (RBM flexibility)</li> <li>- Analysis on BRs and changes implemented for the activities in geographical areas, modalities, targeting, coverage and implementation methodology</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PDs, CS</li> <li>- WFP and other UN analysis and data; secondary quantitative databases</li> <li>- Government, partners and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document analysis</li> <li>- Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO, Ministries, partner agencies</li> <li>- Lessons learnt workshop</li> <li>- Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>

EQ2.2. Extent to which WFP has contributed to developing related national or partner policies, programmes and strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues ?				
	<p>What specific efforts did WFP make in terms of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Supporting / advocating for national policies on food security, nutrition, livelihoods, DRR, C&amp;V, social safety nets and gender dimensions?</li> <li>- Developing national, provincial and communal capacity and ownership for monitoring, analysis and decision-making in the above fields?</li> </ul> <p>Did WFP:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- influence the <i>policy</i> and <i>programs</i> of the Government and/or other partners on these issues?</li> <li>- influence the <i>strategy</i> of the Government and/or other partners on these issues?</li> <li>- strengthen national, provincial and communal capacity and ownership for analysis and decision-making in these fields?</li> <li>- influence UN strategy and planning in these fields?</li> <li>- have the capacity to do the above?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Appropriateness (1-5 and narrative) of documentary record on WFP advocacy efforts, if any, in these areas</li> <li>- Appropriateness (1-5 and narrative) of documentary record on WFP capacity development efforts in these areas</li> <li>- Appropriateness (1-5 and narrative) of documentary evidence, if any, on the influence that WFP advocacy had</li> <li>- Level of satisfaction (1-5 and narrative) of participants' perceptions about the extent and effectiveness of WFP advocacy and capacity in these areas</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- WFP records, including PDs, and documentation of UN and other partners ( UNDAF)</li> <li>- Government, WFP, partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document analysis</li> <li>- Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO, Ministries, partner agencies</li> <li>- Lessons learnt workshop</li> <li>- Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>

Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
	<b>EQ 2.3. Which internal and external factors have affected WFP's choices in its country strategy and portfolio?</b>			
	<p>To what extent were the choices in the portfolio influenced by:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- perceived comparative WFP advantage(s);</li> <li>- corporate strategies and change processes;</li> <li>- UN programming and priorities; WFP's involvement in UN joint programming and programmes</li> <li>- previous programming;</li> <li>- national policy;</li> <li>- resource availability, donor preferences and restrictions;</li> <li>- organisational structure and staffing;</li> <li>- analysis of context and need;</li> <li>- monitoring information;</li> <li>- emergencies;</li> <li>- other factors?</li> </ul> <p>How explicitly were these factors ranked and compared in strategic decision-making?</p> <p>What resourcing strategy did WFP adopt for each operation and type of activity, and how effective was this strategy?</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Analysis of available documentation on preparation of CS, PDs, BRs</li> <li>- Analysis of perceptions of participants in preparation of CS, PDs, BRs</li> <li>- Analysis of CO resourcing strategies</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- WFP records including Budget Revisions</li> <li>- UN records</li> <li>- Government, partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document analysis</li> <li>- Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO (including previous incumbents)</li> <li>- Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>

Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
	<b>EQ2.4. To what extent was WFP in Burundi able to learn from experience and adapt to changing contexts?</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- What (systematic or <i>ad hoc</i>) efforts did WFP make to learn from experience, including adaptations to the changing context in Burundi (elections...)?</li> <li>- To what extent did WFP benchmark its plans and performance in Burundi against those of WFP and other organisations elsewhere?</li> <li>- How did WFP respond to developments in international practices of livelihoods, food insecurity, nutrition, school feeding etc. (including the development of WFP's global strategy and policies from food aid to assistance)?</li> <li>- How effectively did WFP adapt its programming to fit within UN/UNDAC frameworks?</li> <li>- Did WFP (jointly with the Government?) monitoring provide beneficiary feedback mechanisms?</li> <li>- Was beneficiary feedback acted upon constructively?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Appropriateness (1-5 and narrative) of references found in WFP planning docs regarding broader WFP experience and evolving context in Burundi</li> <li>- Appropriateness (1-5 and narrative) of references found in WFP planning docs regarding performance benchmarks, standards, and developments in international practices</li> <li>- Appropriateness (1-5 and narrative) of references found in WFP planning docs regarding feedback from beneficiaries, individuals and communities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- PDs</li> <li>- CS</li> <li>- Other internal CO / RB docs about context analysis</li> <li>- Monitors</li> <li>- Key informants</li> <li>- External benchmarks (to be defined)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document analysis</li> <li>- Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO (including previous incumbents)</li> <li>- Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> <li>- Data &amp; Analysis Report (for CP and PRRO 200655)</li> </ul>
<b>Performance and results</b>	<b>EQ3.1. Were the intended results at output and outcome levels achieved?</b>			

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Is the targeting of beneficiaries (nutrition, GFD and FFA/CFA) appropriate and are the numbers targeted sufficient based on the needs?</li> <li>- Are the objectives of FFA/CFA activities still relevant and are they achieved?</li> <li>- How well targeted and effective were GFD/ supplementary feeding to displaced (incl. humanitarian principles and protection), social institutions, urban and rural food insecure, victims of disasters, and why?</li> <li>- How well targeted and effective were school feeding activities, and why?</li> <li>- How well targeted and effective were other nutrition security activities, and why?</li> <li>- How well targeted and effective were P4P, DRR, safety nets activities, and why?</li> <li>- How effective is home grown SF and what is link between local purchase and the home grown school feeding programme?</li> <li>- Whether decisions to use cash-based and other transfer modalities were appropriate?</li> <li>- How effective has logistical support been with regard to above activities, and why?</li> <li>- What were the effects of funding shortages on each of the above activities?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Review of WFP M&amp;E analysis and VAM data about effectiveness of activities and extent to which positive changes can be attributed to WFP activities</li> <li>- Analysis of perceptions of qualified observers about extent to which positive changes can be attributed to WFP activities, and why</li> <li>- Analysis of most appropriate geographical areas where there is most food insecurity</li> <li>- Analysis of available WFP and government data on changes in indicator variables on relevant aspects of nutrition (wasting, stunting, treatment of MAM, underweight, low birthweight, mortality), targeted food aid, livelihood (UNDP, WB indexes), enrolment and results in education, emergency response and institutional capacity since baseline analysis of context (EQ 1.i)</li> <li>- Household asset score</li> <li>- Community asset score</li> <li>- % increase in agri. production yields</li> <li>- Household's additional agricultural income</li> <li>- Proportion of beneficiaries using learnt skills</li> <li>- Emergency preparedness and response capacity index (EPCI)</li> <li>- Coping strategy index, disaggregated</li> <li>- Analysis of effects of funding shortages (as compared to initial requirements)</li> <li>- Beneficiary satisfaction levels (1-5 and narrative) about adequacy to needs</li> <li>- Equity scores</li> <li>- National capacity index (NCI)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- WFP M&amp;E, VAM baseline data</li> <li>- Analysis of change in relevant variables and sectors</li> <li>- Beneficiary views</li> <li>- Government, WFP, partner and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document analysis</li> <li>- Statistics compilation and analysis</li> <li>- Semi-structured interviews and/or focus groups: HQ, RB, CO, local authorities, government, partner agencies,</li> <li>- other agencies monitoring and analyzing the relevant sectors</li> <li>- Beneficiaries Focus Group Discussions (FGD), story-telling sessions (women and men separately where appropriate) with DO-NO-HARM approach</li> <li>- Triangulation by cross-check of available data and analysis, where possible</li> <li>- Data &amp; Analysis Report (for CP and PRRO 200655)</li> </ul>
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Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
	<b>EQ3.2. How efficient were the main activities in the WFP portfolio?</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- What did the operations and activities cost?</li> <li>- How efficient was WFP in terms of logistics, systems and delivery (compared to benchmarks and alternatives)?</li> <li>- How cost-effective were the activities, including logistics vs C&amp;V (compared to alternatives)?</li> <li>- How flexible, responsive and timely was WFP in emergencies during the review period?</li> <li>- How adequate was WFP staffing structure with regard to portfolio design and implementation?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Cost per operation</li> <li>- Cost per activity</li> <li>- Operation and activity costs per recipient</li> <li>- Comparison of P4P costs/ benefits with imported food</li> <li>- Nutritional value, considering the high level of stunting</li> <li>- Cost-benefits from synergies with partner agencies (list, examples)</li> <li>- Assessment of performance reports on WFP activities during flooding and other emergencies</li> <li>- Beneficiary satisfaction levels (1-5 and narrative) about information, accountability and timeliness of activities</li> <li>- Equity scores</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- WFP records and reports</li> <li>- WFP benchmarks for cost-effectiveness (to be developed in desk study)</li> <li>- Other agencies' records and reports</li> <li>- Beneficiary views</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document analysis</li> <li>- Statistics compilation and analysis</li> <li>- Semi-structured interviews and/or focus groups: HQ, RB, CO, local authorities, government, partner agencies</li> <li>- Triangulation by cross-check of available data and analysis, where possible</li> </ul>

Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
	<b>EQ3.3. To what extent did WFP assistance enhance gender equity?</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To what extent did WFP assistance contribute to the reduction of gender gaps in relation to:               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>o access to and control over food and resources;</li> <li>o responsibility for decision-making;</li> <li>o livelihood opportunities;</li> <li>o education through school feeding?</li> </ul> </li> <li>- Was the internal CO structure and functioning in accordance with WFP gender policy?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Proportion of assisted women and men who make decision about the use of C&amp;V or food within the household</li> <li>- Proportion of women beneficiaries in leadership positions in project management committees</li> <li>- Indicators of gender differentials in the specified nutrition and livelihood parameters</li> <li>- Human resources indicators (M/F ratios and grades) for the CO staff over the period</li> <li>- Level of effectiveness (1-5 and narrative) of Gender training in CO</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- WFP M&amp;E data</li> <li>- Gender inequality index</li> <li>- WFP partner reports</li> <li>- Analysis of change in relevant variables</li> <li>- Beneficiary views</li> <li>- Ministries, partners and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document analysis</li> <li>- Findings from evaluations by partners about gender issues</li> <li>- Semi-structured interviews: CO, Ministries, local authorities, partner agencies, other agencies monitoring and analyzing the relevant variables</li> <li>- Beneficiaries: separate FGDs with women and men</li> <li>- Triangulation by cross-check of available data and analysis, where possible</li> </ul>

Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
	<b>EQ3.4. What was the level of synergy and multiplying effect between the main activities in the country portfolio?</b>			
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To what extent did the main activities in the country portfolio complement each other? Any duplications or gaps?</li> <li>- What multiplying effects were there between the main activities in the country portfolio (in particular nutrition-stunting, resilience, school feeding and P4P)?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Analysis of linkages and complementarity (1-5 and narrative) between activities in the portfolio</li> <li>- Analysis of extent to which (1-5 and narrative) activities in the portfolio facilitated increased outputs and/or enhanced effectiveness of other activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- WFP records and reports</li> <li>- Government, partners and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document analysis</li> <li>- Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO, UN, Ministries, partners, donors (US, NL)</li> <li>- Case studies (P4P, school feeding, DRR, returnees villages...)</li> <li>- Benchmarks (MERET program in Ethiopia...)</li> </ul>
	<b>EQ3.5. What was the level of synergy and multiplier opportunities with partners at operational level?</b>			

Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- To what extent did WFP operations complement those of UN, multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners? Any duplications or gaps?</li> <li>- To what extent did multiplier opportunities develop (and were or not captured) between WFP operations and those of UN, multilateral, bilateral and NGO partners?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Analysis of linkages and complementarity (1-5 and narrative) between activities in the CP, PRROs, EMOPs and activities of partners, especially at operational level</li> <li>- Analysis of extent to which (1-5 and narrative) activities in the CP, PRROs and EMOPs facilitated increased outputs and/or enhanced effectiveness of partners' activities</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- WFP records and reports</li> <li>- Government, partners and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document analysis</li> <li>- Semi-structured interviews: CO, RB, UN agencies, Ministries, local authorities, other partners</li> <li>- Case studies (number and subject to be determined)</li> <li>- Triangulation of written analyses and informant opinions</li> </ul>
Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
	<p><b>EQ3.6. How sustainable – where this was intended - are the results of the main activities in the WFP portfolio likely to be, and why?</b></p>			

Area of enquiry	Specific questions	Analysis/indicators	Main sources of information	Data collection methods
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- How sustainable are the food security results of WFP activities in terms of food security, nutrition security, school feeding, likely to be for resilience purposes, and why?</li> <li>- How sustainable are the results of WFP activities in the field of capacity development of govt institutions likely to be at central, provincial and communal levels, and why?</li> <li>- Is the portfolio focus still appropriate given the protracted crisis and population displacement?</li> <li>- How does the current crisis impact on the partnership arrangements required for successful program implementation?</li> <li>- How does the ongoing crisis affect the objective of strengthening Government DRM capacities and handing over DRM related functions to Government?</li> <li>- How effective was WFP in identifying and managing strategic and operational risks ?</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Analysis of perceptions (1-5 and narrative) of qualified observers about how sustainable WFP- influenced change and WFP-supported systems and capacity are likely to be, and why</li> <li>- Assessment of status (1-5 and narrative) of assets created by FFA, P4P, school feeding, returnees villages...</li> <li>- Number of hand-over strategies agreed between WFP and Government</li> <li>- For FFA, the quality and the level of maintenance of created assets after handover</li> <li>- For skills training, level of ability to use the skills productively</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Analysis of change in relevant variables and sectors</li> <li>- WFP reports on FFA, C&amp;V, P4P etc</li> <li>- Final beneficiaries</li> <li>- Government, provincial and communal authorities, WFP, partners and external informants</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Document analysis</li> <li>- Beneficiaries FGDs (women and men separately where appropriate)</li> <li>- Semi-structured interviews: HQ, RB, CO, Ministries, local authorities, partner agencies,</li> <li>- other agencies monitoring and analysing the relevant sectors</li> <li>- Case studies (number and subject to be determined)</li> <li>- Triangulation by comparison of written analyses and informant opinions</li> <li>- Data &amp; Analysis Report (for CP and PRRO 200655)</li> </ul>

Levels/ Degrees 1-5: 1: very good / 2: good / 3: average / 4: poor / 5: very poor

## Annex D: List of People Consulted

Name	Function	Type of organisation
<b>MBONIGABA Cressent</b>	Président coopérative Tuziganirize akazoza	Cooperative
<b>NZEYIMANA Balthazar</b>	Secrétaire de la coopérative Tuziganirize kazoza	Cooperative
<b>KAZIRI François</b>	Trésorier de la coopérative Tuziganirize kazoza	Cooperative
<b>Communauté des Batwa</b>	Représentant /comité des sinistrés batwas	Comité des sinistrés
	Président du comité des sages Camp des réfugiés de Kinama /GASORWA/	Comité des réfugiés
<b>KIKWINDI Jean Marie</b>	Secrétaire	Comité des réfugiés
<b>Révélant Patrick</b>	Camp MUSASA/Chef du Camp	Comité des réfugiés
<b>SAMURARWA</b>	Chef de camp Bwagiriza	Comité des réfugiés
<b>BUTABURA Gedéo</b>	Prés.de distribution /Camp Bwagiriza	Comité des réfugiés
<b>MANIRAKIZA Tatien</b>	Chef de site des déplacés de Cashi	IDP Committee
<b>NIYONZIMA Edite</b>	Site des déplacés de Cashi/Représentante des Femmes	IDP Committee
<b>BARAMPAMA Pierre</b>	Président coop. / Rugombo	Cooperative
<b>HAVYARIMANA Augustin</b>	Vice président coop ./Rugombo	Cooperative
<b>NIYONIZIGIYE Hadji</b>	Trésorier coop. /Rugombo	Cooperative
<b>Adja Pendeki</b>	Secrétaire de la coop./Rugombo	Cooperative
<b>KAMAZI Alice</b>	Comptable de la coop./Rugombo	Cooperative
<b>NKURIKIYE Berchimas</b>	Charge des récoltes sur Terrain/Rugombo	Cooperative
<b>NDAYIKEZE Déogratias</b>	Représentant de la coopérative KAZE	Cooperative
<b>SEZIBERA Siméon</b>	Secrétaire de la coopérative KAZE	Cooperative
<b>HAKIZIMANA Virginie</b>	Trésorière de la coopérative KAZE	Cooperative
<b>NITUNGA Anne-Marie</b>	Vice président de la coopérative KAZE	Cooperative
<b>NIYUHIRE Claudette</b>	Comite de surveillance de la Coopérative KAZE	Cooperative
<b>NINDORERA Clémence</b>	Vice-secrétaire de la Coopérative KAZE	Cooperative

<b>NIYONIZIGIYE Floride + une 30 membres participants</b>	Représentante de la coopérative TERIMBERE/Bubanza	Cooperative
<b>Communauté des expulsés de Muzye /Bukemba</b>	Bénéficiaires des maisons/WV	Exclusés réintégrés
<b>MPOZIRINIGA Audace</b>	USAID /Food Aid specialist	Donor
<b>GELLIS Victoria R.</b>	Country Representative	Donor
<b>MPORINIGA Audace</b>	Food Aid Specialist	Donor
<b>NOORDAM Gerrit</b>	Charge de programme. 1st Secretary, Food Security / Sustainable development	Donor
<b>NIYONZIMA Eddy</b>	Rural development specialist	Donor
<b>ZIVIERI Antonio</b>	OXFAM	INGO
<b>LACASSE Francis</b>	OXFAM/Coord. Humanitaire	INGO
<b>MENGWE Marthe</b>	WORD VISION/Directeur	INGO
<b>MASUMBUKO Jean Dominique</b>	WORD VISION (WVI)	INGO
<b>NTIHIWAYO Emile</b>	WORD VISION/Coordinateur prévention de la malnutrition chronique	INGO
<b>BIGERANIZA Donatien</b>	WORD VISION/Coordinateur des programmes	INGO
<b>Gérard Ntahomvukiye</b>	WORD VISION	INGO
<b>Donatien Bigiraneza</b>	WORD VISION	INGO
<b>Marthe MBENGUE</b>	WORD VISION - Program Development and Quality Assurance Director	INGO
<b>GATIMANTANGERE Laetitia</b>	WORD-VISION/Cluster programme Malnutrition	INGO
<b>Eric NSHIMIRIMANA</b>	Deputy Chief of Cabinet, 2nd Vice-Presidency	Ministry/ National Administration
<b>Dr. Jean-Claude</b>	Secretariat SUN&REACH	Ministry/ National Administration
<b>Dr Déo-Guide Rurema</b>	Minister, MINAGRIE	Ministry/ National Administration
<b>Joseph</b>	Secrétaire Permanent, MINAGRIE	Ministry/ National Administration
<b>Gérard NDABEMEYE</b>	DG Planification agricole & élevage, MINAGRIE	Ministry/ National Administration

<b>Dr Evelyne NGOMIRAKIZA</b>	Medecin - Directeur	MINISANTE/PRONIANUT
<b>Leonidas BARIHUTA</b>	Conseiller	MINISANTE/PRONIANUT
<b>Dr Janvière Ndirahisha</b>	Minister, MINEDUC	Ministry/ National Administration
<b>Salvator Ntakiyiruta</b>	Director, Ministry for Human Rights, Social Affairs and Gender	Ministry/ National Administration
<b>Liboire Bigirimana</b>	Secrétaire Permanent, Mineduc	Ministry/ National Administration
<b>NIVYABANDI Martín</b>	Ministère de la personne humaine des affaires sociales et du genre/Ministre	Ministry/ National Administration
<b>DNAYIHANZAMASO Jacqueline</b>	Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage /Assistant du Ministre	Ministry/ National Administration
<b>RUFYIKIRI Herménégilde</b>	Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage /Coordonateur FIDA	Ministry/ National Administration
<b>KAYITESI Odette</b>	EX Ministre de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage	Other resource person
<b>RWASA Privat</b>	DPAE –NGOZI/Suivi-Evaluation	Service public déconcentré/Ministère de l'Agriculture et Elevage
<b>SENDEGEYA Philibert</b>	NGOZI/Médecin provincial	Service public déconcentré /Ministère de la santé
<b>MAJAMBERE Gustave</b>	DPAE KARUZI	Service public déconcentré/Ministère de l'Agriculture et Elevage
<b>NDAYISHIMIYE André</b>	Direction Provinciale de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage (DPAE- Gitega)	Service public déconcentré/Ministère de l'Agriculture et Elevage
<b>NSHIMIYE Théophile</b>	Directeur provincial de l'enseignement PAM/Cantine scolaire	Service public déconcentré/ Ministère de l'Education
<b>MPABASI Jean Berchimas</b>	MUYINGA/Conseiller principal	Administration
<b>RURIBIKIYE Grégoire</b>	Chef de colline de Kasorwe en commune Buhinyuza	Local Authority/ Administration
<b>MIBURO Gervais</b>	Camp MUSASA/Administrateur adjoint du Camp de MUSASA(ONPRA)	Service publique /Administration du Camp de réfugiés
<b>NGENDABANKA Venant</b>	Conseil Principal Province KARUZI	Administration (provinciale)
<b>NYANDWI Bed</b>	Gouverneur RUTANA	Administration (Provincial)

<b>Sébastien MBISAMAKORO</b>	Conseiller chargé d'affaire adm. et sociale /Commune Bukemba	Administration (communale)
<b>NDITIJE Fanuel</b>	Chef de colline Bukemba	Administration/autorité locale
<b>NKUNZIMANA Fiacre</b>	Chef d'antenne /ONAPRA RUYIGI	Service publique Administration du camp
<b>NDIKUMANA Onesphore</b>	Chef de zone Bwagiriza	Administration (locale)
<b>NYANDWI Jérôme</b>	DPE Muhuta/Représentant de l'Administrateur de la commune Muhuta (empêché)	Administration
<b>Damien NAKOBEDETSE</b>	Director of BBN - Burundi Standard Bureau (BBN)	Organisme administratif public
<b>NZEYIMANA Joséphine</b>	Centre Sourd- Muets /Econome	National Social Organisation
<b>NGENDAKUMANA Christine</b>	Orphelinats /Sœur ABAHOZA/Econome	National Social Organisation
<b>Sœur HAKIZIMANA Magnifique</b>	Centre des Aveugles /Econome	National Social Organisation
<b>Sœur NDABIRORE Léa</b>	Orphelinat MUSINZIRA /Econome	National Social Organisation
<b>Sœur MUKESHIMANA Joselyne</b>	Orphelinat NYABIHARAGE/KEZAKIMANA	National Social Organisation
<b>Sœur NIYIMBONA Concilie</b>	Magasinière centre de sante GACIRO	National Social Organisation
<b>Sœur BAKUNZI Daphrose</b>	Econome de l'orph .Ste Maison de Nazareth	National Social Organisation
<b>Fr NDAYISHIMIYE Barthelemy</b>	I.M.P MUTWENZI	National Social Organisation
<b>HAVYARIMANA Donatien</b>	Association des enfants en difficulté pour le progrès au Burundi (AEDPB) /Magasinier	National Social Organisation
<b>NKENGURUTSE Moise</b>	Organisations des personnes Albinos du Burundi (OPAB)	National Association
<b>UWIMANA Elisabeth</b>	centre National d'Appareillage et de Rééducation (CNAR)	National Social Organisation
<b>NSABIMANA Espérance</b>	Centre national d'appareillage et de rééducation (CNAR)/Directrice-Adjointe	National Social Organisation
<b>NIYOMASABO Oscar</b>	Fondation sainte Rita	National Social Organisation
<b>Sœur IRAMBONA Charlotte</b>	Fondation sainte Rita	National Social Organisation

<b>SIBOMANA Sylvia</b>	Fondation sainte Rita	National Social Organisation
<b>Sœur MANIRAKIZA Modeste</b>	Orphelinat Mugeru	National Social Organisation
<b>Didace NDUWIMANA</b>	CM SOS Gitega /Infirmier et Gestionnaire de stock	National Social Organisation
<b>Claver BARAGENDANA</b>	SWAA BURUNDI Antenne Gitega	ONG Nationale
<b>Jean Marie NDAYISHIMIYE</b>	CAPAD/Coordinateur	ONG nationale
<b>Richard NDIKUMANA</b>	CAPAD/Suivi- Evaluation	ONG Nationale
<b>François NDAYIZEYE</b>	CAPAD	ONG Nationale
<b>Anick SEZIBERA</b>	CAPAD/Secrétaire Exécutif	ONG Nationale
<b>Maurice NZOSABA</b>	CARITAS-BURUNDI/Chargé de projet : Distribution des vivres aux réfugiés	Organisation caritative
<b>Oscar HAVYARIMANA</b>	CARITAS-BURUNDI: Directeur Admin et Financier	Organisation caritative
<b>Sœur HAVORIMANA Goretti</b>	Responsables des Ressources Humaines/ CARITAS	Organisation caritative
<b>ABBE JEAN BOSCO NINTUNZE</b>	CARITAS-BURUNDI - Secrétaire Exécutif	Organisation caritative
<b>Chrisostome Ndizeye</b>	CARITAS-BURUNDI - Charge de programme	Organisation caritative
<b>Diomède GIRIGI</b>	Chef de programme urgence et accompagnement social/ CARITAS-BURUNDI	Organisation caritative
<b>Duncan CAMPBELL</b>	CRS - Chief of Party, AMASHIGA, CRS Burundi	Organisation caritative
<b>Dr Ketsebou Hervé KAPTCHOUANG</b>	CRS	Organisation caritative
<b>Patricie NDIKUMUGONGO</b>	Comptable du Projet/ CARITAS-BURUNDI	Organisation caritative
<b>Hérménigilde RUFYIKIRI</b>	Coordinateur du Projet PAIVAB-FIDA	
<b>Daniel BURUNKIKO</b>	FIDA/PAIVAB/Ingénieur Agronome de terrain	
<b>JEAN PAUL BITOGA</b>	PRODEFI/Coordinateur National	Projet FIDA
<b>David NZISABIRA</b>	PRODEFI/Coord.Régional	Projet FIDA
<b>Marius</b>	BADEC/Ngozi	Service diocésain de développement

<b>Jean Baptiste HAKIZIMANA</b>	Secrétaire Exécutif du BADEC	Service diocésain de développement
<b>Sœur Christiane NSHIMIRIMANA</b>	Centre GIRITEKA/Responsable du centre	Institution sociale
<b>Sœur Christina J GIUSTOZZ</b>	Centre GIRITEKA/Econome /Médecin	Institution sociale
<b>Sœur Liliane AHISHAKIYE</b>	Orphelinat la Divine Miséricorde/Karuzi /Magasinière	Institution sociale
<b>Jean Claude HARERIMANA</b>	CARITAS Encadreur des coopératives en province de Cibitoke/Bubanza/Bujumbura rurale	National caritative Organisation
<b>Méthode .....</b>	FORESTA /RUTANA	National NGO
<b>KAGOMA Prosper</b>	CRB/Branche Bujumbura Rural /Chef de site Gitaza	National Red Cross Society
<b>Dawit Habtemariam</b>	Evaluation Officer	OEV
<b>LOMORI Federica</b>	Research Analyst	OEV
<b>Sally BURROWS</b>	Deputy Head	OEV
<b>Aysha TWOSE</b>	Consultant	Vulnerability Analysis (VAM) Unit
<b>Jacques ROY</b>	Country Director and WFP Representative	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Claude KAKULE</b>	Directeur Pays PAM	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Nicole JACQUET</b>	Deputy Country Director - WFP / PAM-Bujumbura	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Hugh LONG</b>	Field Security Officer	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Mohammad A. Gadir Musa</b>	Head of Logistics, WFP	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Rénovat Goragoza</b>	PAM Bujumbura	UN Agency / WFP
<b>SEBATIGITA Liliane</b>	PAM Bujumbura	UN Agency / WFP
<b>NGUEYAP Ferdinand</b>	WFP Programme Alimentaire mondial /chef de sous Bureau sous Bureau de Ngozi	UN Agency / WFP
<b>SINDIHEBURA Damien</b>	PAM- Bureau Ngozi/M&E Coordinateur du programme	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Laurent KAMULETE</b>	PAM- Bureau Ngozi/Assistant au programme cantine scolaire	UN Agency / WFP
<b>HAKIZIMANA Siméon</b>	PAM-Bureau Ngozi /M&E Assistant et point focal Nutrition	UN Agency / WFP

<b>NSABIMANA Frédéric</b>	PAM Bureau -Ngozi /Programme Associative VAM /FFA/ Résilience	UN Agency / WFP
<b>MINANI Marie Goreth</b>	PAM Bureau -Ngozi /Responsable de base de données	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Alain Bruce RUKUNDO</b>	PAM-Bureau Ngozi/Assistant au programme P4P	UN Agency / WFP
<b>HATUNGIMANA Apollinaire</b>	Bureau – PAM Gitega	UN Agency / WFP
<b>KIBINAKANWA Renus</b>	Bureau – PAM Gitega/Chargé du programme du Bureau	UN Agency / WFP
<b>NDUWAYEZU Genine</b>	Bureau – PAM Gitega/Adm. Fin	UN Agency / WFP
<b>NKESHIMANA Christophe</b>	Bureau – PAM Gitega /Base de	UN Agency / WFP
<b>KARIKUNZIRA Claver</b>	Bureau – PAM Gitega /Monitor assistant	UN Agency / WFP
<b>NIKWIBITANGA Alice</b>	Bureau – PAM Gitega	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Gloriose NYANDIMBANE</b>	Bureau – PAM Gitega	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Remy KIBINAKANWA</b>	Bureau-PAM Gitega	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Abel MBILINYI</b>	UNHCR/Représentant	UN Agency / UNHCR
<b>MADANI TALL</b>	UNHCR/Représentant Adjoint	UN Agency / UNHCR
<b>IoFrédéric de WOELMONT</b>	UNHCR/Administrateur chargé de la protection	UN Agency / UNHCR
<b>Nantenin CONDE</b>	UNHCR/Chef de Bureau Ruyigi	UN Agency / UNHCR
<b>Dr Mohamed HAMAGARBA</b>	FAO/Représentant de la FAO au Burundi	UN Agency / FAO
<b>Bo Viktor NYLUND</b>	UNICEF/Représentant	UN Agency /UNICEF
<b>Marie-Claude DESILTES</b>	Nutrition manager	UN Agency /UNICEF
<b>Prosper RUBETINTWARI</b>	Programme officer	UN Agency / FAO
<b>Isidore SINDABARIRA</b>	FAO NGOZI/Point focal pour le projet intégré	UN Agency / FAO
<b>Mohamed HAMA GARBA</b>	Representant FAO	UN Agency / FAO
<b>Salvator</b>	(UNICEF NGOZI)/Coordinateur du projet intégré	UN Agency /UNICEF
<b>Géni KANEZA</b>	HCR/Assistance de protection	UN Agency / UNHCR
<b>Egide MANIRAKIZA</b>	Field Associate /Bureau HCR-Ruyigi	Agence UN

<b>Abel Mbirinyi</b>	Representative, UNHCR	UN Agency / UNHCR
<b>Matteo FRONTINI</b>	Emergency and Resilience advisor	UN Agency / RCO /OCHA
<b>Amadou Bailo SOW</b>	Burundi Focal Point	OCHA
<b>Millan ATAM</b>	Team Leader	OCHA
<b>Kristina MEJO</b>	OIM Organisation Internationale pour les Migrations/ Chef de Mission	IOM
<b>Oriane BATAILLE</b>	Emergency Coordinator	IOM
<b>Antoine Ntemako</b>		National Platform
<b>Antoine NTEMAKO</b>	Directeur general de la protection civile et President de la Plateforme	National Platform
<b>Antoine NTAEMBAKO</b>	Président de la Plateforme Nationale de prévention des risques et gestion des catastrophes /Directeur protection civile	National Platform
<b>Anicet NIBARUTA</b>	Directeur Adjoint de la protection civile et Secrétaire de la Plateforme Nationale	National Platform
<b>Daniel NANKWAHAFI</b>	Plateforme provinciale-Gitega ; Secrétaire	Plateforme provinciale
<b>NSABIYAREMYE Maurice</b>	Commerçant /MUYINGA	Commerçant
<b>KAGIMBI Gaspard</b>	Commerçant /MUYINGA	Commerçant
<b>GAHUNGU Patrick</b>	Commerçant /MUYINGA	Commerçant
<b>Isidore Hatungimana</b>	Welthungerhilfe /GAA	
<b>Lucien d'Hooghe</b>	Welthungerhilfe /GAA	
<b>Dr Jean RIRANGIRA</b>	SEP/CNLS _ Secrétaire Executif Permanent _Directeur Régional	SEP/CNLS _Directeur Régional
<b>Anselme KATIYUNGURUZA</b>	Croix-Rouge du Burundi / Secrétaire Exécutif	National Red Cross Society
<b>NZIBAVUGA Joseph</b>	Croix-Rouge du Burundi /Secrétaire Provincial, Branche Rutana	National Red Cross Society
<b>Vénérand NZIGAMASABO</b>	Croix-Rouge du Burundi (CRB)/Chef de département de prévention des catastrophes	National Red Cross Society
<b>Sylvestre GACECE</b>	Point Focal Distribution des vivres PAM/CRB	National Red Cross Society
<b>Jacqueline NDIKUMANA</b>	Croix Rouge/ Branche Bujumbura Rural /Adjoint du secrétaire provincial Coordination/Site des déplacés Gitaza	National Red Cross Society
<b>NKESHIMANA Claver</b>	Chargé de l'hygiène Site des déplacés de Gitaza	National Red Cross Society

<b>NDIKUMANA Vénérand</b>	CRB-Kirundo /Point focal du projet Renforcement de la Résilience communautaire	Red Cross - National Society
<b>Volli Caruci, Jean-Noël Gentile (Policy Officer)</b>	Chief, Asset Creation & Livelihoods Unit	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Chad Martino</b>	Program Adviser, Performance Management and Monitoring Division	UN Agency / WFP
		UN Agency / WFP
<b>Britta Schumacher</b>	Policy Officer, Nutrition Unit	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Seung Woo Chi</b>	Donor Relations Officer, Government and Private Partnerships Division	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Dominique Debonis, Consultant</b>	Technical Assistance and Country Capacity Strengthening Services	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Anna Fiona (telecon)</b>	Deputy Team Leader, Regional Office	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Paul Howe</b>	Chief, Emergency Programmes & Policy Unit	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Omar Bennamour, Anne Valand</b>	Program Officers, Cash-Based Transfers	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Véronique St Luce</b>	Programme Adviser, Gender Unit	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Rebecca Bjork Skovbye</b>	Protection & Accountability to Affected Populations	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Damien Fontaine</b>	Programme Officer, Purchase for Progress (P4P)	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Genevieve Merceur</b>	Human Resources Officer	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Anatole Ntamagiro</b>	Pipeline Officer	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Evelyne Guidigbi</b>	P4P Programme Policy Officer	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Jean Mahwane</b>	VAM Programme Policy Officer	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Joséphine Twagirayezu</b>	M&E Programme Policy Officer	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Liliane Bigayimpunzi</b>	Education Protection & Gender Programme Policy Officer	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Emmanuel Twagirumukiza</b>	Emergency Coordinator, Programme Policy Officer	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Food Assistance for Assets : Renovat Goragoza (telecon)</b>	FFA, Rural development, DRR, C&V Programme Policy Officer, Gitega sub-office	UN Agency / WFP
<b>Arthémon GAHIMBARE</b>	GIZ/Access - Coordinateur des Activités GIZ	UN Agency / WFP

## Annex E: Stakeholders Analysis

The matrix below details the various stakeholders of the WFP Burundi CPE.

### Major stakeholders for the evaluation

Stakeholders	Interest in the evaluation	Participation in the evaluation
<b>A. Internal (WFP) stakeholders</b>		
<b>Country Office</b>	The CO also has an interest in enhanced accountability towards the Burundi government, The CO is the primary user of this evaluation. Responsible for country level planning, operations implementation and accountability towards government and other partners, donors and beneficiaries, it has a direct stake in the evaluation and will be a primary user of its results to strategically reposition WFP in the country context, if necessary, and readjust advocacy, analytical work, programming and implementation as appropriate. .	During the inception mission, there were briefing and planning discussions with the CD and DCD, as well as senior staff of the CO and the Gitega Sub Office (by Skype).  CO staff will be further involved in a participatory approach in workshops/ feedback sessions at the beginning and end of the field mission, and they will have an opportunity to comment on the draft ER (D1) during the in the stakeholders workshop in July. The country office will prepare the management responses to the ER. Past CO staff are also key informants who will be interviewed if they are available.
<b>Nairobi Regional Bureau</b>	In light of its strong role in providing strategic guidance, program support and oversight to the COs in the region the Regional Bureau has an interest in learning from the evaluation results for strategic and technical guidance in support of the CO CS and portfolio.	The relevant Regional Advisers for food security, nutrition...) will be contacted for strategic perspective feedback. The Regional Bureau will have the opportunity to comment on the draft ER and participate at various debriefing sessions
<b>WFP Executive Management and relevant technical Divisions</b>	WFP Executive Management has interest in both accountability and learning for the CPE evidence for strategic and policy decision making.  WFP technical offices and specialized Units, in particular VAM, Assets Creation, Nutrition, Capacity Development, Policy & Programming, school feeding, gender, P4P, Performance Management & Monitoring, Emergency Preparedness, Partnership & Governance, have an interest in lessons form the Burundi CPE relevant to their mandates.	Executive Management group will have the opportunity to review and comment on the summary ER.  Relevant staff of these units were interviewed during the inception briefing in Rome. The team will seek further information on WFP approaches, standards and success criteria from all units linked to main themes of the evaluation, as relevant.  Performance Management & Monitoring will be coordinating the preparation of management responses to the ER.
<b>WFP Executive Board (EB)</b>	As the governing body of the organization the EB has accountability role and an interest in learning from lessons on the performance of the portfolio to inform policy making and harmonization of strategic processes.	Presentation of the evaluation report at the November 2016 session for consideration by the Executive Board members.

Stakeholders	Interest in the evaluation	Participation in the evaluation
<b>B. External stakeholders</b>		
<b>B1. National Strategic Partners</b>		
<b>Ministry of Agriculture</b>	Line Ministry in charge food security and main counterpart of WFP in the Government (which is also a major donor to WFP, with 12% of portfolio contributions over the period 2011-15).	Will be involved in providing perspectives and information on alignment at both policy and technical levels in the evaluation process through interviews and feedback
<b>Ministry of Health</b>	Partnership with WFP in PRONIANUT (Programme National Intégré d’Alimentation et de Nutrition) and supplementary feeding programme for HIV victims (CNLS – Conseil National de Lutte contre le Sida).	Will be involved in providing perspectives and information on alignment at both policy and technical levels in the evaluation process through interviews and feedback
<b>Ministry of Education</b>	Partnership with WFP in school feeding and related activities; decentralized management at provincial level (DPE – Directions provinciales de l’Education)	Will be involved in providing perspectives and information on alignment at both policy and technical levels in the evaluation process through interviews and feedback
<b>Ministry of Human Rights, Social affairs and Gender</b>	This very large portfolio covers broadly national solidarity, rights and equity for the most vulnerable (response to emergencies - see also below, targeted institutional feeding), although resources appear limited. Capacity for upholding humanitarian principles of human dignity, gender equality and equity are core issues of the portfolio.	Will be involved in providing perspectives and information on alignment at both policy and technical levels in the evaluation process through interviews and feedback
<b>National Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction and Prevention</b>	Responsible for co-ordination of DRR, Civil protection and responses to disasters (Hyogo and Sendai Frameworks), to which all relevant actors take part; decentralized management at provincial and local levels. The platform functions as part of the Ministry of Interior.	Will be involved in providing perspectives and information on alignment at both policy and technical levels in the evaluation process through interviews and feedback
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Vice-Presidency</b>	Created to ensure authority over a number of technical line Ministries (Education, Agriculture, Health, Energy, Commerce, Communal Development). Houses also the Secretariat for global SUN and REACH nutrition initiatives.	Will be involved in providing perspectives and information on coordination and alignment of nutrition interventions at overall policy level only.

Stakeholders	Interest in the evaluation	Participation in the evaluation
<b>B2. International Strategic Partners</b>		
<b>UNICEF</b>	Main UN partner in nutrition, school feeding and pre-school programs.	The evaluation team will seek key informant interviews with the UN agencies that have been most involved in nutrition, food security, livelihood, education, protection and capacity development issues.  The CO will keep UN partners informed of the evaluation's progress.
<b>FAO</b>	'Sister agency', very close collaboration with WFP in Burundi in programs of livelihoods / food security, resilience, nutrition and early warning.	In key informant interviews with FAO in nutrition, food security, livelihood gender and capacity development issues.
<b>UNHCR</b>	Partner for providing food assistance to refugees (5 refugee camps in Rutana, Ruyigi, Cankuzo, Ngozi) and some DRC refugees are also vulnerable in urban context) and returnees (although many have left again from newly created return villages)	In key informant interviews with the UN HCR in humanitarian principles, shelter, nutrition, food security, l, gender, protection and capacity development issues.
<b>IOM</b>	Partner for protection of IDPs (25000+ in Makamba) from the recent crisis.	IOM will participate as key informant regarding IDPs, humanitarian principles and protection, and gender issues.
<b>IFAD</b>	Partner for implementing agriculture-related community recovery and development activities	In key informant interviews most involved in rural development, food security, livelihood gender and capacity development issues.
<b>UN-Women, UNFPA</b>	Partners in(respectively) contributing to define gender and equity policies, and implementing relevant activities.	In key informant interviews most involved in gender, health, humanitarian principles, protection and capacity development issues.

<b>Stakeholders</b>	<b>Interest in the evaluation</b>	<b>Participation in the evaluation</b>
<b>OCHA and UN Country Team</b>	OCHA has returned to Burundi due to recent events, after having left in 2010. A UN Country Team has just been set up. Implementation of humanitarian principles and protection may need to be coordinated again. The ER can inform coordination, collaboration and partnerships among the UN agencies.	In key informant interviews most involved in humanitarian coordination, UNDAF, humanitarian principles, protection and capacity development issues.
<b>B3. Donors</b>		
<b>USAID</b>	All donors to WFP have an interest in knowing whether their funds have been spent efficiently and if WFP's work is effective in alleviating food insecurity of the most vulnerable.  Overall, USAID is the major donor (50% of portfolio contribution 2011-15) in particular for the 2 successive PRROs.	Feedback/debriefing at the end of the field mission and stakeholders workshop in July.
<b>Canada</b>	9% of portfolio contribution 2011-15. Not met during Inception mission; any specific interest to be explored.	Will participate in key informant interviews to provide funding perspectives.
<b>The Netherlands</b>	7% portfolio contribution 2011-15. Integrated approach of school feeding and P4P in Cibitoke and Bubanza (case study for field visits)	Feedback/debriefing at the end of the field mission and final restitution in July.
<b>European Commission</b>	6% portfolio contribution. Topics of discussion: 11 <sup>th</sup> EDF has defined resilience as a major component; flexibility of EU procedures; possible return of DG ECHO for emergency humanitarian aid.	Feedback/debriefing at the end of the field mission and final restitution stakeholders workshop in July
<b>Switzerland (SDC)</b>	Not specifically listed among donors to WFP in Burundi, but mentioned by UNICEF as main donor to an integrated nutrition program in Ngozi (to be re-checked) with UNICEF, WFP, FAO and WHO (case study)	Feedback/debriefing at the end of the field mission and final restitution stakeholders workshop in July
<b>B4. Direct Partners</b>		
World Vision International (WVI)	Key implementing partner of WFP for (i) food distribution, C&V (Cankuzo, Karusi) and FFA (Rutana, Karuzi, Cankuzo, Muramvya), cash for assets / resilience (Karusi), (ii) chronic malnutrition (Rutana, Karuzi, Muramvya), and (iii) SUN advocacy.	Regarding GFA, C&V, FFA,CFA, nutrition, interviews at both policy (suggestions) and technical levels in the evaluation process through interviews, field visits and feedback sessions.

<b>Stakeholders</b>	<b>Interest in the evaluation</b>	<b>Participation in the evaluation</b>
National Red Cross Society	Huge national network (1/2 million volunteers in every location); key partner for responses to emergencies (Kirundo, Makamba, BJM rural) FFW and GD (with WFP logistical aid)	Regarding emergency response; interviews at both policy (suggestions) and technical levels in the evaluation process through interviews, field visits and feedback sessions.
German Agro Action (Welthungerhilfe)	WFP's implementing partner in school feeding (Kirundo province) pre-school, kitchen gardens.	Regarding SF interviews at both policy (suggestions) and technical levels in the evaluation process through interviews, field visits and feedback sessions.
CAPAD	Partner for P4P and school feeding in BJM rural, Cibitoke, Bubanza.	Regarding P4P and SF: CAPAD will be involved at both policy (suggestions) and technical levels in the evaluation process through interviews, field visits and feedback sessions.
International Rescue Committee (IRC)	Not present at inception briefing. Partner for food assistance in the form of hot meals and return food package for returnees in Makamba, Bujumbura mairie and Rutana.	Regarding food assistance to returnees, IRC will be involved at both policy (suggestions) and technical levels in the evaluation process through interviews, field visits and feedback sessions.
CARITAS Burundi	Not present at inception briefing. Partner for targeted food distribution, vouchers and livelihoods for refugees and IDPs in all provinces	Regarding food assistance to refugees CARITAS will be involved at both policy (suggestions) and technical levels in the evaluation process through interviews, field visits and feedback sessions.
Faith-based network (Bureaux diocésains)	Partners for food distribution to social institutions in Bubanza, Buja mairie, Muramvya, Gitega, Makamba, Ngozi, Rutana, Ruyigi, Muyinga, Kirundo	Regarding food distributions through social institutions, FBN will be involved at both policy (suggestions) and technical levels in the evaluation process through interviews, field visits and feedback sessions.
PAIVA-B	Partner until 2014 for FFA / watershed management	Regarding FFA / watershed management, PAIVA will be involved at both policy (suggestions) and technical levels in the evaluation process through interviews, field visits and feedback sessions.
<b>B5. Operational beneficiaries</b>		
Agricultural cooperatives	Beneficiaries of the P4P program	Selected key informants will be interviewed for their views on the performance and relevance of P4P program. Gender roles, disaggregation among beneficiaries and their understanding of gender equality, vulnerabilities and rights will be thoroughly examined.

Stakeholders	Interest in the evaluation	Participation in the evaluation
Provincial Directorates for Education, school directors	Participated in WFP-supported school feeding and capacity development activities in Cibitoke, Bubanza, Bujumbura rural, Muyinga, Ngozi.	Selected key informants will be interviewed for their views on the performance and results of SF and Capacity development. Gender roles, disaggregation among beneficiaries and their understanding of gender equality, vulnerabilities and rights will be thoroughly examined.
School committees, parents (school feeding, school garden)	Participated in WFP-supported school feeding and capacity development activities.	Selected key informants will be interviewed for their views on performance and results of SF and Capacity development. Gender roles, disaggregation among beneficiaries and their understanding of gender equality, vulnerabilities and rights will be thoroughly examined.
Districts sanitaires (decentralized MoH)	Partners in supplementary nutrition in Ruyigi, Rutana and Ngozi	Selected key informants will be interviewed for their views on the performance and results of supplementary nutrition . Gender roles, disaggregation among beneficiaries and their understanding of gender equality, vulnerabilities and rights will be thoroughly examined.
Civil Protection	Benefited from WFP food and logistics support during emergency responses to natural disasters, and capacity development activities	Selected key informants will be interviewed for their views on the performance and relevance food and logistics assistance. Gender roles, disaggregation among beneficiaries and their understanding of gender equality, vulnerabilities and rights will be thoroughly examined.

Stakeholders	Interest in the evaluation	Participation in the evaluation
<b>B6. Final Beneficiaries</b>		
<p><b>Beneficiary Groups</b> (GFD s, beneficiaries of nutrition, FFA, C&amp;V, P4P and capacity development, refugees, IDPS and returnees, victims of natural disasters, HIV victims, school children)</p>	<p>Beneficiaries are crucial stakeholders and are interested in WFP's assistance and its appropriateness, relevance, performance and results.</p>	<p>Recipients (parents in the case of young children benefiting from school feeding activities) will be consulted during the field missions.</p> <p>Gender roles, disaggregation among beneficiaries and their understanding of gender equality, vulnerabilities and rights will be thoroughly examined.</p> <p>Meetings with final individual recipients/communities will be illustrative and triangulated, but will not be representative (non-probability sample) in the framework of this CPE.</p> <p><u>A DO-NO-HARM approach will be strictly applied in the field with final beneficiaries.</u></p>

## Annex F: Analysis of Main EQ 1: Strategic Alignment

### EQ1.1. Extent to which the Country Strategy (CS) main objectives and related activities have been relevant to Burundi's humanitarian and developmental needs, in a changing environment.

a. Were the CS, PD and logframes in the CP and PRROs realistic and relevant considering the context of Burundi and the constraints and opportunities of food and nutrition security?
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1. The CS was globally realistic and relevant in its analysis of the national context in 2010-11, as well as its constraints and opportunities – with some caveats as detailed below.

2. Although the CS did not present either a structured logframe, a theory of change (see Annex K) or a SWOT analysis, the various chapters of the document offer a comprehensive approach to the strategy, as follows.

- i. Political and security context (history, governance)
- ii. Socio-economic / development context, with both detrimental actors (poor resources, high population pressure, dominating subsistence agriculture, effects of global economic crisis of 2007-8, life expectancy, HIV) and positive ones (free basic education, gradually improving social indicators).
- iii. Food and nutrition insecurity, with regional and sectoral highlights based on the CFSVA 2008, including regarding issues of GAM, stunting and micronutrient deficiencies.
- iv. Climatic shocks that threaten food security.
- v. Regional differences (North – East, North – West, Central and Southern regions)
- vi. Lessons learned from past operations (to concentrate on priorities and target most vulnerable areas, to deliver food rations appropriate to outcomes, to develop FFA projects with better technical expertise as well as M&E systems, and strengthen capacity development efforts and work more closely with the government).
- vii. Humanitarian and development context: national policy frameworks and priorities such as the Vision 2025 for Burundi, the PRSF, the national policies and plans for food security, DRM, education, health, nutrition and community development; priorities of UNDAF and other key partners (IMF, World bank, ADB, main NGOs).
- viii. WFP comparative advantages and challenges: large experience based on 41 years of presence and VAM assessments, vs limited timeliness and financial resources.
- ix. Alignment of CS priorities with national priorities (PRSF), UNDAF pillars, and WFP Corporate Strategic Objectives.
- x. Risks which did materialise (failed elections, weak government capacity) and mitigation actions (contingency plan, emergency stocks, development of government capacity, access to non-traditional donors).

3. Notwithstanding the facts that the vision of WFP being “the” catalyst to support the government (§57) was not realistic and that some projects failed to materialise as expected for various reasons<sup>34</sup>, the CS duly reflects the optimistic, forward-looking

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<sup>34</sup> Such as synergies (FFA in §35 of the CS, blanket feeding and HIV in §61-62, school feeding in §65, DRR in §68, watershed management in §69, development of government capacities in §35-36, 79),

vision of development prevailing at the time of drafting.

4. In this context, the 3 defined CS priorities (food and nutrition security, capacity development of government institutions, and humanitarian response action) appear also realistic and relevant. WFP should in particular be commended for insisting on including an emergency response component among its priorities despite the UNDAF initial focusing on development, reconciliation and governance (see sub-questions 1.1.g and 1.3.c below).

5. Among risks, the CS should have identified more clearly the potential medium to longer-term *consequences* of some of the challenges that were correctly listed e.g. in the socio-economic / development context. Such challenges, when combined, now appear as major threats to the future of the country, in particular the fast-growing demography (see chapter 1.2.2). Effects of population growth are worsened by the economy, the lack of arable land that is being eroded by natural disasters<sup>35</sup>, the lack of comprehensive planning to combat erosion country-wide, or the lack of in-depth change of behaviours towards nutrition, itself due to poor quality of education.

6. The logframes attached to the CP and PRROs (annex II) are consistent with the above, and relevant in the context of 2011.

7. The CP logframe reflects a balanced approach between the expected 2<sup>nd</sup> outcome (“communities have equitable access to basic social services and develop self-management capacity”) of the 2<sup>nd</sup> UNDAF strategic priority (support to community recovery) for 2010-14, which is also consistent with axis n°3 of the revised UNDAF for 2012-16, and WFP’s SOs (see below). The UNDAF outcome is consistent with components 1 (school feeding, SO 4) and 2 (nutrition for vulnerable groups, SO 4) of the CP, even though the insertion of UNDAF outcome in the logframe appears rather as a late addition; the UNDAF outcome for local economy is e.g. placed under component 2 (nutrition) rather than component 3 (community recovery). In the logframe, components 3 (community recovery, SO 3) and 4 of the CP (institutional capacity development, SO 5) appear to be linked to WFP’s own policies and not directly to UNDAF, which is wrong for community recovery. Accordingly, the logframe uses UNDAF indicators for outcomes in school feeding, access to nutrition and agricultural income, and WFP corporate indicators for nutrition, community recovery (FFA) and capacity development. Outcome and output indicators are both listed in the logframe under each component. Only the corporate indicators of ‘food consumption score’ and ‘community asset score’ are common for the 2 logframes.

8. The logframe for PRRO 200164 is quite synthetic (1 or 2 indicators per outcome, no outputs). It refers logically to WFP Strategic Objectives 1 (“save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies”) for relief activities<sup>36</sup>, and to SO 3 (“restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods”) in post-crisis contexts for the recovery component.<sup>37</sup> Corporate indicators are used as relevant.

9. The Logframe for the 2<sup>nd</sup> PRRO 200655, published in June 2014, is more elaborate as it reflects the new corporate policies (gender, protection) and is clearly subdivided between outcomes and outputs, to guide SPR reporting. The logframe took into account on the 1<sup>st</sup> page the 3 cross-cutting issues of gender, protection and accountability to affected populations, and partnership, using corporate indicators.

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<sup>35</sup> This very negative link for food security was revealed in the 2008 CFSVA and addressed in objective 1.3 of the CS – although this was undermined by funding shortages

<sup>36</sup> “Stabilize acute malnutrition and improve food consumption for targeted emergency-affected households”.

<sup>37</sup> “Adequate food consumption, increased access”.

Assumptions are also quite relevant, even if they touch upon factors that may be questionable, such as – for gender issues - actions of other actors against limitations of gender empowerment at community and household levels, or knowledge of gender-sensitive policies and strategies down to the community level. The logframe appears as a follow-up of the previous PRRO: the 1<sup>st</sup> outcome under SO1 (‘save lives...’) combines the 2 related outcomes of PRRO 200164 (stabilized or improved food consumption).

10. The relief component of the 2<sup>nd</sup> PRRO introduces also as an outcome the preparedness and response capacities at all levels (national, provincial, humanitarian actors): this entails institutional training (output D), which is arguably a part of longer-term effort towards capacity development under component 4 of the CP. An outcome 1.3 seems to have been deleted from the logframe. Outcomes 2.1 and 2.2 (adequate food consumption, improved access to assets) under the recovery component of the 2<sup>nd</sup> PRRO appear also clearly as a follow up of the corresponding outcomes under the 1<sup>st</sup> PRRO.

11. However, new outcomes 2.3 and 2.4 concern respectively MAM treatment and capacity development to address food insecurity needs (see above), and do not appear fully consistent with the PRRO main objective of assisting the victims of crises. MAM treatment targets e.g. the whole provinces of Rutana and Ruyigi – which had been identified in the DHS of 2010<sup>38</sup>, with scattered assistance through health centres (see...), and not necessarily ‘food-insecure households in communities with high concentration of refugees, migrants, or close to refugee camps’. In addition, in budget revisions n°1 and 2 to the PRRO and following a request from the government, WFP is also targeting the provinces of Makamba and Kirundo, where problems concern general food insecurity and GAM rates and not only those of the displaced<sup>39</sup>.

12. As befits PRRO’s objective, the 2 operations have also engaged into FFA activities concentrated on the 3 provinces of Makamba, Ruyigi and Rutana that received most of the returnees, as well as on the host populations around the refugee camps in Ruyigi, Muyinga, Ngozi and Cankuzo (due to funding shortages, FFA was only implemented in Rutana CHECK). This spreading is consistent with support to the displaced, but not to a country-wide strategic objective of focusing on the areas most at risk from climate changes, nor was this coordinated with DRR activities (support to National platform and IR-EMOP for victims of natural disasters in other –mostly western- provinces).

13. In addition (although this activity is not to be found in the 1<sup>st</sup> PRRO logframe, and only hinted under outcome 2.3 of the 2<sup>nd</sup> PRRO: ‘nutrition for children 6-59, PLW, and school-aged children’, without indicator), the 2 PRROs also introduced school feeding for children among returnees and their host communities. 4 S-E provinces were targeted (Makamba, Bururi, Ruyigi and Rutana) due to the high numbers of displaced, which did not overlap – but did not appear strategically coordinated either with the CP school feeding programme in 3 N-E provinces with highest food insecurity levels, and 3 N-W provinces under Dutch funding. SPR 2014 indicates that ‘the school meals programme attracted many children who enrolled in larger numbers than expected’ (106,982 actual against 100,000 planned under PRRO 200164). The SPR also mentions ‘enthusiastic’ training in school feeding management for the provincial and communal directorates for education, although actual sustainability could not be ascertained, due to high staff turn-over. SPR 2014 states that: ‘resource limitations did

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<sup>38</sup> The Demography and Health Survey of 2010 highlighted that these two provinces had MAM rates above 8 % (Rutana 11.6%, Ruyigi 8.6%). This is the threshold for WFP to implement MAM treatment.

<sup>39</sup> In Aug. 2012 due to increasing numbers of severely malnourished children under therapeutic care, WFP re-established targeted supplementary feeding in almost all provinces. This was not based on MAM rates above 8 % but was done in response to a Government request

not allow for a full coverage...the carryover (between the 2 PPROs) allowed continued implementation in only slightly more than half of the planned schools’.

14. Budget revisions of the 2<sup>nd</sup> PPRO indicate that ‘this activity will be transferred to the CP in order to enhance coordination and synergies with the Government policies’, which is a strategically correct approach (this should have been integrated since the beginning) even if the CP is badly underfunded.

b. Does the portfolio outline the short, medium and long term focus to address chronic food insecurity and chronic malnutrition (stunting and micronutrient deficiencies)?

15. The CS relied on the results of the CFSVA 2008 regarding figures of food insecurity (§13 – 15), GAM, chronic malnutrition and micronutrient deficiencies (§16 – 19). Regional statistics (N-E, N-W, central, S and S-E regions) for food insecurity and malnutrition were also detailed in §22 – 30. As the CS approach is mostly development oriented – in line with the government policy, the strategy refers respectively to (1) the 2009 National Food security policy, valid until 2015, and its 5<sup>th</sup> objective (‘improved nutritional status of the population’), and (2) the 2005 -2015 National health policy and Pronianut (2010 Protocol, no validity deadline) which provide the framework for reducing hunger and under-nutrition among vulnerable groups, with an overall emphasis on micronutrients – in which WFP has been instrumental. The CS is also aligned with MDGs 1 to 7, which were similarly aiming at the deadline of 2015, and with WFP’ Strategic Plan 2008 – 2013. All these deadlines have seriously limited the longer-term vision.

16. In line with these approaches, the CS has defined a vision and priorities that focus on the short and medium term (until 2014, no further dates are mentioned), even if the government’s broad ‘Vision 2025’ evokes the need for longer-term programmes (without details) focusing among others on food security and livelihoods options. Objectives listed under CS priority 1 (food and nutrition security) are also consistent with short and medium –term activities: supporting national food fortification policy, implementing blanket-feeding programme for children under 2 and PLW (§61), and building capacities of Government’s institutions in food security and nutrition assistance (§71). There are however no perspectives of hand-over after food/nutrition security capacity building in the CS. The CS also correctly outlines the risks inherent to Burundi in terms of security, governance and the weak capacity of the government, which may (and do) threaten the validity any longer-term programming.

17. Chronic food insecurity and malnutrition are targeted in the CP, as befits a development perspective. Component 2, outcome 1 of the CP (nutrition assistance to vulnerable groups) focuses on

- i. reaching improved nutritional status of targeted women, including PLW, girls and boys, and children aged 6-59 months suffering from GAM/MAM. A supplementary feeding ration is to be distributed to those women and children who come to the health centres and are acutely malnourished, in coordination with therapeutic feeding centres managed by UNICEF, and deworming by WHO. (2) Chronic malnutrition and stunting – a very wide problem in Burundi – see table... in Annex... on anthropometric data - is to be tackled through blanket feeding for only 12,700 children under 2 years in 3 provinces selected for their particularly poor malnutrition, food insecurity and stunting rates.
- ii. capacity development of nutrition institutions (Pronianut, SUN/REACH),

and support in the formulation of national food fortification and community-level nutrition education policies.

18. As outlined below however (see EQ3...), these measures are partial, scattered, hampered by funding shortages and poor capacity of partners and institutions, and their implementation has been rather inconsistent. They could only aim at short-term results in the absence of broader synergies that would include in particular a thorough gender sensitization.

c. What was the concept of development in the Burundi context in 2011? Did it change?
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19. As stated, the concept of development in 2011 has been encapsulated in the 'Vision 2025' and the corresponding PRSP, revised in 2012 (see 1.2.a).

20. In addition, the key relevant national policies that had been developed after the end of the civil war in 2005 have also been considered in the CS, as follows.

- The 2009-15 National Food Security Programme, aiming at increased and secured agricultural production through enhanced soil fertility, water management, environmental protection and conservation of natural resources.<sup>40</sup>
- The 2007 National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (DRM), which enables the national platform for Civil Protection but also promotes a decentralised approach to DRM/DRR, e.g. in matters of contingency planning and local strategies.
- The Sector Plan for the Development of Education and Technical Training, 2009-2016; 2 of the 12 main strategic priority areas are relevant to WFP; a) to achieve quality universal primary education by 2015/2016; and b) to achieve greater equality in primary education.
- The National Health Policy 2005-15, the Integrated National Nutrition Programme (PRONIANUT) and the National Strategic Framework to fight HIV/AIDS 2007-11 provide the framework for reducing hunger and under-nutrition amongst vulnerable groups, as well as reducing the HIV/AIDS prevalence with an overall emphasis on micronutrients.
- Community development plans that follow priorities defined by local communities down to the "colline" administrative unit.

21. In that context, the 1<sup>st</sup> CS for Burundi was seen as a 'challenge for innovation', to reflect prevailing optimistic perspectives towards development ("tous les espoirs sont permis"), taking into account WFP's advantages.

22. In such a comprehensive framework, Burundi has enjoyed over the CS and CPE period - until the new political deadlock of April 2015 - a period of growing peace and stability as well as moderate economic growth (between 4 and 5% annually<sup>41</sup>). During that period, even stunting rates declined on average from 58 to 48 %, although unequally<sup>42</sup>.

23. Nevertheless, Burundi has remained fragile, one of the poorest countries in the

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<sup>40</sup> The program also aimed at "improved cash revenue for producers to strengthen their capacities, better storage systems, improved nutritional status of the population, and strengthened capacity for monitoring, early warning and rapid reaction to food crises in the regions most at risk".

<sup>41</sup> Real GDP growth was e.g. estimated at 4,3% in 2013 and 4,7% in 2014 (AfDB)

<sup>42</sup> Pictures are very different at provincial level; in some parts, stunting rates deteriorated (USAID/ CRS, IFPRI research).

world, with a very high level of food insecurity (32% in 2014 CFSVA).

24. The ongoing WFP operations are still aligned with government priorities, as outlined in the following key documents (some of them are unchanged):

- i. Vision 2025, in particular pillar 3 (economic growth and fight against poverty);
- ii. Pillars 3 and 4 of PRSP-II
- iii. The new upcoming National Agricultural Investment Programme (2016-2020);
- iv. National Financial Inclusion Strategy (2015-2020), through sub-objectives 2.2., 2.3., and 2.4<sup>43</sup>;
- v. Objective 2 of the National Gender policy (2012-2025) to “support effective mainstreaming of gender in all development programs in Burundi”;
- vi. Objectives 2 and 3 of the National Social Protection policy (“ensure food security and a minimum income to extreme poor people”, and “strengthen risks management at community level”);
- vii. National multispectral strategy to fight against food insecurity and malnutrition;
- viii. Upcoming National Health Policy (2016-2021);
- ix. National strategy on food fortification
- x. Key sectorial national policies, strategies and programmes, related e.g. to anti-erosion fighting and climate change adaptation.

25. However, the contested presidential election of July 2015 and the ensuing political deadlock have seriously affected the cooperation assistance by the international community (SEE UN, EU...) and the corresponding strategic planning. Although this does not fall under the CPE period, it should be noted that the CO was initially planning to formulate a new PRRO and a new five-year CP starting in 2017, in alignment with the new UNDAF and the Government’s new generation PRSP (after 2017). However, the current political context and donors’ suspension of direct financial support to the Government is postponing Burundi’s development agenda. The UNCT has already secured a one-year extension of the UNDAF until the end of 2017, which may be further extended until the end of 2018.

d. What were /are the Burundi humanitarian needs, and how were/are humanitarian principles and protection issues considered?
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26. Humanitarian needs are evoked at the very end of the Vision 2025, under “cross-cutting issues / vulnerable people”. They are listed as “victims of the longstanding crises such as widowers and widows, orphans, repatriated persons, IDPs, the Batwa, the children of the street and the demobilized”. Vulnerable people are to be provided with adequate support and social services in the framework of the related PRSP I. The Vision policy “aims at transforming the victims of disaster into true development stakeholders...”.

27. Accordingly, in the CS it was noted (§8) that “the sudden exit of many

<sup>43</sup> Develop financing mechanisms, approaches and products adapted to rural needs, in particular for agricultural activities; develop approaches and financial products and services for women and youth; develop approaches and financial products and services for micro and small entrepreneurs.

international NGOs in 2006/2007 (OCHA closed its humanitarian coordination office in 2010), accompanied by reduced humanitarian funding created a gap in humanitarian response as the Government was not able to rise up to meet the short-term needs of the population”. The gap still existed in particular in terms of disaster management and mitigation (§21). However, overall the country was firmly in a post-conflict situation, and “Burundi’s social indicators, though daunting, have registered remarkable improvements...”. Improving such indicators, rather than providing more humanitarian aid, was therefore implicitly the way forward, in line and in full cooperation with (and not in parallel to) the Government’s development-oriented priorities. No humanitarian needs, other than emergency response to natural disasters (component 3), were mentioned in the CS. The presence of this component was probably due to the necessary alignment of the CS with WFP’s Strategic Objectives (SO 1 in this case).

28. Nevertheless, in its section on “risks and mitigation actions” (§78), the CS correctly outlined that potentially “failed elections would reverse the gains achieved and might lead to a return to humanitarian assistance”, which may still happen in the current situation (OCHA has returned to Burundi in 2015).

29. The impact of the new political and social crisis that erupted in April 2015 could already be partly measured by WFP (EFSA of April 2016). As stated, this impact must be combined with the increasingly threatening and inter-related challenges of exploding demography, scarcity of lands and parcelling of plots, recurrent climatic shocks and continued gender inequity. As a result, the humanitarian situation in 2015 has not improved for the majority of Burundians, as follows.

30. These challenges have had a strongly negative impact on Burundi’s food security and nutrition indicators. Compared to the 27.8% of food insecurity found by the CFSVA of 2008<sup>44</sup>, the new comprehensive analysis of 2014 has estimated the proportion of food insecure household at 32%<sup>45</sup>. Stunting of -5 children had slightly decreased (from 52.7% in 2008 to 48.8% in 2014) but is still well above the 40 percent WHO threshold countrywide. The increasing pressure on land is putting many women at risk of destitution as the customary laws still prevent them from inheriting land.

31. Furthermore, as emphasised by the EFSA carried out in April 2016, the new crisis seems to have already led to a very significant increase of food insecurity levels, up to 46% (40.1% of moderate and 5.9% of severe food insecurity). Impacts of the crisis were felt in sharply increasing food prices (average of 23% since May 2015), currency depreciation, and insecurity in access to lands. There was also a massive outflow of refugees (258.634) - often from the middle or higher economic classes - with subsequent loss of jobs, and budget cuts in basic services. All these factors are particularly negative for the most vulnerable in rural and urban settings.

32. In that context, humanitarian activities may have to be considered again in the near future, in addition to social safety nets and resilience of communities that need to be strengthened urgently.

33. Humanitarian aid must be guided by the four principles: humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. These principles provide the foundations for humanitarian action. They are central to establishing and maintaining access to affected people, whether in a natural disaster or a complex emergency, such as armed

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<sup>44</sup> CFSVA 2008: 4.8% of severely food insecure households, 23% of moderately food insecure ones.

<sup>45</sup> 7% of households severely food insecure, and 25% moderately.

conflict. The humanitarian principles are derived from the core principles, which have long guided the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross and the national Red Cross/Red Crescent Societies.

34. The four humanitarian principles are explained as follows:

- i. Humanity: human suffering must be addressed wherever it is found. The purpose of humanitarian action is to protect life and health and ensure respect for human beings.
- ii. Neutrality: humanitarian actors must not take sides in hostilities or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature.
- iii. Impartiality: humanitarian action must be carried out on the basis of need alone, giving priority to the most urgent cases of distress and making no distinctions on the basis of nationality, race, gender, religious belief, class or political opinions.
- iv. Independence: humanitarian action must be autonomous from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented

35. The 3 above principles are not mentioned as such in the CS, the CP or the PRROs. The IR-EMOP 200678 of February 2014 focuses rather on consistency with the SO1 of the WFP Strategic Plan: (§5) “immediate WFP food assistance is required to save lives of the affected population and ease the burden of displaced people on their hosts and community».

36. However, the CPE team could find no evidence of lack of compliance with the principles of neutrality, impartiality or independence in the design and implementation of the operations, despite the close relations of cooperation maintained either with the Ministries of Agriculture, Health, Education or Solidarity, nor with government institutions such as PRONIANUT, CNLS, or the DRR platforms. The activities of WFP in Burundi have always been based on technical assessments and focused on technical objectives, and governance issues were never part of the equation until now. IR-EMOP 200678 insists e.g. on maintaining close cooperation with authorities: (§5) “The IR-EMOP will allow WFP to support the government and local authorities in meeting the food and nutrition needs of the flood victims”. This was done in full cooperation with the UNCT: (§7) “...preliminary estimates of food and non-food items requirements (were) done by the United Nations Country Team under WFP leadership as the lead of the Humanitarian task force in Burundi, in collaboration with the Government of Burundi, the Red Cross of Burundi and various non-governmental organizations. A comprehensive assessment by the UN Team and the National DRR/DRM platform will be conducted to refine the level of needs”.

37. When assistance has not been provided to some victims, this was due either to funding shortages or to the lack of capacity of some implementing partner.

38. Regarding the very broad principle of Humanity, which does not target only life-saving activities but encapsulates the much wider factors of human suffering and dignity, its application was never considered in the PRROs. This principle would arguably concern a majority of the Burundi population suffering from food insecurity and malnutrition, and would be even more subject to funding limitations (see also protection for IR-EMOP 200678 below).

39. Humanitarian Protection has first been defined as follows by ICRC and IASC in 1999: “*The concept of protection encompasses all activities aimed at ensuring full respect*

*for the rights of the individual in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law i.e., human rights, international humanitarian law and refugee law”.*

40. In the WFP Protection policy (Feb 2012), the practical application of protection is closely related to the principle of Humanity and has been defined as (§11) “designing and carrying out food and livelihood assistance activities that do not increase the protection risks faced by the crisis-affected populations receiving assistance. Rather, food assistance should contribute to the safety, dignity and integrity of vulnerable people”. The policy update of June 2014 further states that integrating protection into programmes involves i) ensuring that WFP programmes take into consideration the safety, dignity and respect for the rights of beneficiaries; ii) designing programmes that contribute to overall protection outcomes for the people WFP assists; and iii) implementing strategies to improve accountability to the people receiving assistance.

41. This approach is consistent with the protection applied by WFP, which should essentially be seen through food/nutrition and training input that are increasingly needed through multiple activities: social safety nets (see below), communities at risk from shocks, or gender violence.

42. Protection (always combined with accountability to affected populations - AAP) in the SPRs focuses on specific related issues. SPR 2014 for the CP is focusing on women’s control on household food and nutrition assistance. In the PRROs, protection is evoked in references to the national social protection of 2012, as well as cooperation with ONPRA, the Ministry of Solidarity, UNHCR, IOM and the Red Cross regarding refugees from DRC, returnees and IDPs. The SPR 2014 indicates that the target of ensuring safe access by beneficiaries to the delivered assistance has been achieved.

43. In the IR-EMOP 200678, the protection section of the SPR 2014 mentions “...WFP sensitized partners on the importance of ensuring safe distributions and respecting beneficiaries' dignity and integrity”.

e. Is the portfolio addressing social protection adequately?
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44. Social protection was perceived in the CS as an integral part of the country’s development framework, and was only considered through the indirect approach of partnerships and advocacy. It was briefly evoked among other issues in §38 (within axis 3 of Vision 2025), §49 (strategic partnership with the World Bank on school meals as a vehicle for national safety nets), §63 (strategic partnership with the Ministry of Human Rights and Gender), as well as in §72 and 74 (advocacy for a national social safety net program).

45. In that framework, the draft of a national policy on social security for the most vulnerable (civil servants are covered) had been prepared by ILO in April 2010<sup>46</sup>, but it has not yet been finalized. This very ambitious document foresees an overall sickness insurance coverage for ‘at least 50% of the target population in the informal sector and 30% in the rural sector’ in the short-term, i.e. within 5 years - although the resources and their origin are not clear. In the meantime, the very much under-resourced Ministry of Solidarity has been tasked with providing support to the safety net of social institutions.

46. Together with food, cash or voucher transfers to the most vulnerable, FFAs and school feeding are considered by WFP as key instruments for social protection.<sup>47</sup> The

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<sup>46</sup> Projet de document de politique nationale de protection sociale

<sup>47</sup> WFP’s role in social protection and safety nets: a strategic evaluation; Feb 2011

CS can therefore be considered as adequately focused on protection. School feeding is the 2<sup>nd</sup> objective of the 1<sup>st</sup> priority (Food and Nutrition Security). The 2<sup>nd</sup> CS priority (Institutional Capacity Development) accordingly targets the Government's capacities in terms of food security, school meals and solidarity.

47. The corresponding portfolio has duly addressed these issues: the CP includes school feeding (component 1), FFA through cash and vouchers (component 3), and capacity development to help managing school feeding, food security and livelihoods (component 4). PRROs have also implemented cash and vouchers transfers for vulnerable refugees and returnees, as well as FFAs and school feeding in areas with large numbers of displaced.

48. Furthermore, the growing need of supporting safety nets for social protection was outlined in the mid-term CP evaluation<sup>48</sup> – although institutional feeding was not implemented in the CP but in the two PRROs (in the relief component of PRRO 200119 and the recovery component of PRRO 200655).

49. According to the School Feeding policy of WFP, areas of social protection, nutrition, gender and education itself are the main objectives to be achieved in a school feeding program. Thus, school feeding activities, which are being implemented in food insecure areas are considered part of the social protection in Burundi.

50. All contacted social institutions (see EQ3), which receive only some irregular assistance from Ministry of Solidarity and support from charities (many private donors have however fled after the crisis of April 2015), highlight very good cooperation with WFP, responsive, regular deliveries of sufficient and good quality food (except the need of more porridge – 'bouillie' - for young children).

51. Targeting is highly relevant for disabled and orphans, but also for increasing numbers of "enfants des rues" due to crisis and growing poverty. Boys born out of legal marriage are rejected by their family as they can inherit scarce lands. Girls are sent to work in other houses as early as they can (10 years), for a pittance in dreadful conditions; SGBV is widespread (see below). Threatened albinos are also assisted.

f. What were / are the objectives and activities of strategic partners in humanitarian and development efforts?
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52. Three international strategic partners were considered in the CS analysis (§46-52), although their actual roles in the implementation of the strategy and portfolio have appeared rather limited. These partners were only active in development, not humanitarian activities.

i. Under its Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was aiming to support the Burundi government on macro-economic issues such as normalizing relations with external creditors, some components of the PRSP, macroeconomic stabilization, market exchange rate or external financing. This support was giving credit to a return to normalcy.

ii. The portfolio of the 1<sup>st</sup> country Strategy of the World Bank for Burundi (2008) included budgetary support and investments for projects in the sectors of agriculture, education, community development, HIV/AIDS, electricity and water infrastructures. Strategic partnership with WFP was expected in terms of

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<sup>48</sup> §187, « Revue à mi-parcours du programme de pays – Burundi 200119 », Apr 2013

school feeding and national safety net, although such benefits did not materialise.

- iii. The African Development Bank has also defined a Country Strategy Paper for Burundi (2008-2011), which focused on economic governance and the functioning of key government institutions, and increased employment opportunities through developing infrastructure and targeted interventions in agriculture.

53. There is no analysis in the CS about individual strategies and programs by key UN agencies – as these were supposed to be integrated within UNDAF. This is to be regretted, as synergies were found lacking e.g. with UNICEF (MAM, school feeding).

54. National strategic partners (Ministries of Agriculture, Health, Education, Solidarity) are assessed under EQ2; strategies and programs of key donors and implementing partners are detailed under EQ 1.3.

g. What were / are the UNDAF objectives?

55. The UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF) 2010 – 2014 should be seen as the follow-up of the previous post-conflict 2007-2009 strategy, which was an attempt to coordinate national and international programming for returns and reintegration activities. UNDAF 2010-2014 promoted peace consolidation and development with four pillars: (1) strategic planning and coordination; (2) community recovery; (3) peace reconciliation and human rights; and (4) democratic governance. Pillars 1 and 2 were particularly relevant for WFP's contribution to meet hunger and nutrition goals.

56. In 2012, the UNDAF was revised to better align itself on PRSP II and a new framework was put in place, around 3 axes: (1) strengthening of state, good governance and promotion of gender equality; (2) transforming the economy towards sustained growth and job creation; and (3) improving access to basic services and strengthening social protection. WFP activities duly integrated in the new pillar 3.

57. As already stated, the definition of the new UNDAF has been postponed due to the governance crisis of April 2015, which has undermined the current strategy.

h. Is the portfolio focus and modalities still appropriate given the recent evolution of the national context?

58. Some components of the essentially development-oriented focus of the 2011 CS need to be revised in the light of (1) the failure to improve significantly the national indicators for food security and chronic malnutrition, (2) the increasing and inter-related challenges of exploding demography, scarcity of arable land, climatic shocks and gender inequality, and (3) the political deadlock since April 2015.

## **EQ1.2. Extent to which the CS main objectives and related activities have been coherent with the national agenda and policies?**

b. Were the CS, programme documents (PD) and the logframes in the CP and PRRO realistic and relevant to the PRSF (Poverty Reduction Strategic Framework), national agenda, policies and co-ordination frameworks?
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59. As explicitly stated in its vision statement (§58), the CS aimed at being aligned with the national agenda.<sup>49</sup> This compliant approach is confirmed in the analysis of compatibilities with WFP strategic objectives and national agenda documents, as encapsulated in a table under §77 and further developed in the table below.

60. Vision Burundi 2025, drafted in 2011, is a document of national consensus and a roadmap for economic and social development. It is based on 8 connected pillars : Good Governance and Capacity-Building of the State; Human Capital; Economic Growth and the Fight against Poverty; Regional Integration; Demographics; Social Cohesion; Regional Planning and Urbanization; and Partnership.

61. In order to address the challenge of sustainable development, three main objectives have been defined: (i) the installation of good governance within the rule of law; (ii) the development of a strong and competitive economy; (iii) the improvement of the living conditions of the people of Burundi.

62. This approach has guided WFP's CS, in coordination with Strategic Priorities. Interventions were planned in the context of the Vision's main objectives 2 and 3, which include specific sections concerning the reinvigoration of the agriculture sector; the improvement and protection of the environment; an improvement of transport infrastructure; support to the education sector; the health sector; strengthening of social protection; and the reinsertion of the most vulnerable returnees. In addition, provision is also made on the fight against HIV/AIDS and foresees the medical and psycho-social support to PLHIV

63. Predating the 'Vision', the 1<sup>st</sup> Poverty Reduction Strategic Framework was launched in 2006 just after the end of the civil war, and presented the national approach to lead Burundi from post-conflict to sustainable development. There were 4 strategic priorities: (1) improving governance and security, (2) promoting sustainable and equitable economic growth, (3) developing human capital, and (4) fighting HIV/AIDS.

64. In 2012, the approach was followed by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP II), so as to capitalize on lessons learnt and better support the new Vision 2025. Although encouraging results had been achieved in the areas of security, governance, and human capital development, economic growth had been constrained e.g. by weak food crop production, lack of diversification of exports, and under-developed private sector. In terms of access to basic social services, two key reforms – free primary education, and free healthcare for pregnant women and children under age 5 – produced significant gains in education and health.

65. Based on the above, six major development challenges were identified: demographic growth ; inefficient agricultural production ; weak public expenditure execution ; under-investment in the private sector ; persistent electricity deficit ; and

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<sup>49</sup> "WFP will assist the government of Burundi in achieving the Vision 2025, which envisions a Burundi at peace with itself and economically integrated into the East African Community through the formulation of appropriate policies, strategies and programmes that focus on food security and livelihoods options, including disaster preparedness and response capacity. WFP aims for a Burundi that is able to lead and manage food and cash-based programmes that would serve as a social safety net for the vulnerable population".

lack of capacity to manage development.

66. The PRSP II was therefore rooted in the Vision 2025 and based on four strategic pillars: (1) strengthening the rule of law, consolidating good governance, and promoting gender equality; (2) transforming Burundi's economy to generate sustainable, job-creating growth; (3) improving access and quality in basic social services and strengthening the social safety net; and (4) promoting development through sustainable environmental and space management. Most relevant for WFP, pillars 3 and 4 of PRSP II focus on food security for all through transforming the food system from subsistence farming to market-oriented and household agriculture, ensuring a decent income for households while managing natural resources in an integrated and sustainable manner.

67. The linkages are illustrated in the following table of correspondence of strategic priorities (see also table under CS §77).

c. Did the portfolio appropriately combine humanitarian and development approaches?
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68. As stated (See EQ 1.1.c-e and g), in 2011 the CS and portfolio were essentially development-focused. The relief component of both PRROs appropriately targeted reinstallation assistance to returnees and institutional feeding, although in an overall development perspective (to make the beneficiaries actors of development), pending implementation of national policies (social protection). Only the emergency relief component of the CS (IR-EMOP) was clearly focusing on emergency humanitarian assistance, in compliance with WFP Strategic Plans.

69. The mid-term evaluation of CP and final evaluation of PRRO 200164 outlined growing concerns regarding social protection, capacity development, gender protection, sustainability of FFA or nutrition, the lack of exit strategy for refugee camps, as well as shortages of synergies and funding. WFP interventions have gradually increased their focus on safety nets and reduced the objective of handing over activities to the government.

d. Did the portfolio seek to engage the affected populations in identifying needs and priorities, and ways to respond to these?
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70. Direct participation of beneficiaries and AAP were not priorities in the CS.

71. The development-oriented focus relied on the comprehensive administrative structure of Burundi (from groups of 10 households to sous-colline, colline, zone, commune to province and national levels) to reflect local concerns of the population-through WFP's privileged relations with ministries and institutions.

72. Only §67 refers to priority needs of communities (essentially through the decentralization efforts of the government and the setting up of local Community Development committees). Approaches (participatory planning, tools) would be 'reinforced accordingly'.

73. As found during the field visits, the network of WFP country and sub offices (Bujumbura, Ngozi, Gitega, antenna in Cibitoke) is appropriate to maintain good relations with provincial and local authorities (governors, DPAE, DPE, health districts), implementing partners in the field and – mostly through them – with final beneficiaries. The authorities are often assisting WFP in identifying target schools, P4P cooperatives, health centres or communities for assistance (without any registered complaint so far about a lack of independence or impartiality).

74. WFP can also rely on its assessment capacity (VAM, CFSA, EFSA etc) to remain in regular contact with the needs of the affected populations, even though funding shortages tend to limit severely the scope of interventions.

75. SPR 2014 for PRRO 200655 further outlines in its AAP section the consultation and sensitization efforts to explain new modalities to target communities, such as vouchers or market fairs.

76. Transparent participatory approaches were also reported by the Red Cross or Floresta in selecting the beneficiary households, even though other partners reported problems and complaints in identifying those most vulnerable, despite sensitization, among an overwhelmingly vulnerable population.

77. Complaint boards ('tables des plaintes') are provided in refugee camps (trade fairs) and by the Red Cross and WVI (CHECK) after distributions, where beneficiaries can explain their problems to all implementing partners sitting together.

78. Joint assessments and monitoring visits are regular conducted with the partners or by WFP alone, even though the spreading of operations and access problems to remote sites makes the engagement with affected populations difficult.

79. For example, the 3 WFP monitors based in the Gitega field office (assisted by 1 database operator) were not able (performance of 75%) to cover at least once quarterly the numerous sites in 3 provinces: 70 sites for MAM nutrition, 21 social institutions, 2 refugee camps, 41 school canteens, 7 FFAs, 8 returnees communities, and 33 stunting prevention sites.

e. Did the portfolio offer a realistic and appropriate approach to capacity development?
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80. WFP has integrated in the CS and the operations a significant component of capacity development, in line with WFP policy of 2004 (updated in Nov 2009) and the successive Strategic Plans.<sup>50</sup>

81. Objective 2.1 of the CS was duly focused on capacity development of activities most relevant to the other strategy components, i.e. food security and livelihoods analysis, DRR/DRM, nutrition assistance, school meals, logistics and monitoring; in addition, "collaboration" (not capacity development) was envisaged with the Ministry of Solidarity in terms of advocacy for the formulation of a safety nets program. The ultimate objective was to contribute to ownership and sustainability (§71).

82. Capacity development was also fully aligned with Government priorities. In the 2011 Vision, "capacity building of the State" is an integral part of the 1<sup>st</sup> Pillar (Governance): "The implementation of the Vision entails a refocusing of the role of the State and the professionalization of its institutions, in order to take up the challenges of sustainable development by 2025... Burundi will set up a national policy of capacity-building to restore the effectiveness and performance of government ».

83. In PRSP II (2012), it was explicitly stated that "Capacity building is also a high priority for the success of the priority programs identified in the context of the PRSP-II. To this end, the adoption of the national capacity building policy will facilitate rational execution of the missions assigned to the administration... That policy was prepared in four phases, including (ii) drafting of the medium-term National Capacity Building Strategy and definition of the institutional monitoring framework, (iii)

<sup>50</sup> SO 5 of Strategic Plan 2008-13, and SOs 1.3, 2.2, 3.4 and 4.3 of Strategic Plan 2014-17 (capacity development became a cross-cutting issue among the 4 new SOs).

definition of a National Institutional Development Program to ensure consistency of policies and reforms, and (iv) the formulation of priority sector capacity building program”.

84. Handing over was not mentioned in the CS, but well in the Country Program.<sup>51</sup> The CP even foresaw that transfer to the government (structure still to be identified) of transportation, warehousing and contracting functions would begin as from mid-2012.

85. It should be noted that both the CS and the programme documents mentioned synergies with other actors, which have not been optimized so far.

86. In the “sustainability, capacity development and handover” section of the SPRs for CP 200119, no significant activities were recorded in 2011 and 2012 – without explained reasons. In 2013 and 2014, the most relevant activities targeting institutions (in parallel to e.g. training for 900 P4P cooperative farmers and some primary school managements) have been detailed as follows.

- i. In cooperation with the Centre of Excellence based in Brazil, organized study tours were organized in 2013 (Ministries of External Relations and Agriculture) and 2014 for high ranking government officials from five key line ministries (Education, Finance and planning, Health and Agriculture). The major outcome has been the development of a comprehensive action plan that will guide the development of a national school feeding program in Burundi (no outcomes are mentioned for health and agriculture).
- ii. For school feeding, in 2013 WFP trained 104 provincial and communal directorates for education, with the aim of gradually handing over the management of the school feeding program to local institutions. The training resulted in more efficient implementation of the project with less oversight from WFP. In 2014, around 200 key staff in WFP-supported primary schools were trained in program management and food management. Focus was particularly put on introducing school gardens in WFP-supported schools as well as "tippy tanks" for hand washing. Issues of handing over or exit strategies were never discussed. Thus schools, where WFP had to pull out due to financial constraints under the PRRO were not prepared to continue in one way or another school feeding.
- iii. For nutrition, CP efforts focused on the SUN/REACH secretariat. In 2013, WFP and the government shared the costs for the recruitment of an international fund-raising consultant, while UNICEF supported an international facilitator. WFP also provided office space for the SUN/REACH team in addition to the space provided by the Government in the office of the second Vice-Presidency. All SUN/REACH meetings were organized in WFP's office using WFP telecom facilities. In 2014, as the SUN/REACH secretariat started to operationalize the work plan on food security and chronic malnutrition prevention, WFP also strengthened the capacities of key line ministries' technical working groups that were created in this regard. Capacity development at health center level was initially done for health center staff and nutrition focal points. However, due to staff turn-over, this would need to be done regularly. Instead, food monitors are now doing “on the job training” during their time-consuming visits to health centers.
- iv. In the PRRO 200655, nutrition-related activities were more focused on the

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<sup>51</sup> Component 4 has listed the same key sectors as the CS: in §47-48 of the CP project document, handing over responsibilities to the government is targeted for (1) FSMS surveys (food security and vulnerability assessment methodologies and tools are to be transferred to the Ministry of Agriculture, including through provincial structures), and (2) logistics. Component 3 of the CP (§32) furthermore envisages the gradual takeover of nutrition support activities by MoH (which partly took place through health centres for MAM treatment, with strong support from WFP monitors) and takeover of HIV activities. MoH indeed took over HIV with logistical help from WFP, but the approach was hindered by inadequate reporting to the Global Fund.

field. In 2014, 95 staff members from health centers and provincial districts were trained in cooperation with PRONIANUT in supplementary feeding implementation in Ruyigi and Rutana, in order to align activities with the National Protocol for Nutrition and ensure ownership. WFP also conducted training in proper food storage and handling, and in monitoring and reporting.

- v. In the DRR/DRM sector, a training session was organized in October 2014 that brought together 52 participants including 39 government officials from key line ministries, and 19 participants from UN agencies and NGOs. In November, WFP organized a simulation exercise on coordinated response to disasters. It involved a wide range of participants including 44 government officials and 36 UN and NGO staff members. After the exercise, the stakeholders evaluated the degree of preparedness and response of Burundi at 2.2 on a scale going from 0 to 4; rates were often quite low except for WFP-led activities. WFP also engaged in the setting up of a pilot community-based early warning system, to be launched in five communes of three most disaster prone provinces. It should be noted that the same activities were also discussed in the SPR's capacity development section of the PRRO 200655.

87. Synergies envisaged e.g. in the CP 200199 (§29: “UNICEF, UNFPA, UNAIDS, WFP and NGOs will pool resources for capacity development” for nutrition) have been poorly implemented. The conclusion of the 2008 evaluation regarding “the absence of a results framework with clear objectives” was still valid, as no planning of capacity development activities or logframe could be found with inputs, deadlines and expected outcomes. There is no dedicated programme officer within the CO for capacity development; the matter is considered cross-cutting among sectors, but this absence does not allow any RBM-like approach.

f. How gender-disaggregated, gender sensitive was the portfolio?
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88. Gender issues are only mentioned explicitly in 1 paragraph (§63) of the CS, and rather indirectly: reference is made to the creation in 2009 of the new Ministry of Human Rights and Gender, which must be seen as a key strategic partner of WFP in enhancing gender and protection issues in operations.

89. Institutional memories in the CO outline however that gender was always being considered as a cross-cutting issue (even if not explicitly outlined); in 2011, WFP could rely on its rather advanced “8 priorities for gender” (no reference on the web), in the wake of the 4<sup>th</sup> World Conference on Women held in Beijing in 1995.

90. Gender sensitivity is shown under objective 1.1 of the CS, where nutrition assistance is provided to vulnerable groups to improve the nutritional status of targeted women, including pregnant and nursing women (PLW), girls and boys, and children aged 6–59 months.

91. In 2012 – during the implementation of the Gender Policy 2008 – 2013, WFP has started introducing the IASC Gender Marker (levels 0 – 2), although the Burundi CO staff were reportedly trained rather late on this (2014 - 2015). In that context, the CS was ranked at level 1 (insufficiently mainstreamed), but the CP and both PRROs were positively ranked at level 2.

92. Indeed, a holistic gender approach is more explicitly described in the operations. Component 1 of CP 200119 (school feeding) also considers pre-school (Early Childhood Development centres - ECD) to “help alleviate the heavy burden of childcare for women who spend long hours fetching and cooking food”. Management

committees must be gender-balanced. Outcomes of component 2 (nutrition assistance for vulnerable groups) duly targets women including PLW, girls and boys, and children. The gender perspective in nutrition activities is to be reinforced (§31). Under component 3 (FFA), §40 stresses the need to encourage participation of women in interventions “given their traditional authority over household management”, by targeting female-headed households, ensuring equality in committees, and integrating a gender perspective in design and implementation of C&V programs. Logframe indicators and statistics are duly gender-disaggregated. SPR 2014 (section on “progress towards gender equality” confirms that women hold half (FFA) or more (school feeding) leadership positions in the management committees, and that they make decisions on nutrition in more than half of the concerned households.

93. In PRRO 200164, §54 emphasises that contracts with partners will refer to WFP’s policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, that WFP will develop the capacity of staff and partners to adopt a gender perspective, and that gender equality (at least) in management committees will be ensured. Statistics are gender-disaggregated. Effectiveness of these measures were confirmed by the SPR, which also states that gender equality is applied among WFP field monitors. Similarly, PRRO 200655 integrates gender issues both in its contextual description (women living on marginal lands, lower education level, gender roles in nutrition, FFA) and priorities.

94. It should be noted that among lessons learnt in the CP document (§16) “take-home rations distributed to girls reduced the gender gap in WFP-assisted schools and were discontinued in 2009”. This important lesson was not translated in the portfolio 2011-15.

g. Did the portfolio address longer term issues such as chronic under nutrition and resilience? Is the nutrition programming, especially addressing stunting, in line with Government strategy? Does the WFP nutrition program contribute appropriately and adequately to the overall partner contribution?

95. The portfolio has focused appropriately on the crucial issue of chronic under-nutrition in Burundi, particularly in terms of stunting prevention. CFSVAs of 2008 and 2014 have both analysed the issue – recording respectively 52.7% and 48.8% of stunting. This was reflected in the CS (§16-17, regional statistics in §23, 26, 28 and 30, and priority 1 in §61).

96. In 2011, at the beginning of the evaluation period, the Government of Burundi did not have a specific nutrition strategy. Nutrition issues were dealt with under the “Politique Nationale de Santé 2005 – 2015” which was finalised in 2014. Nutrition as a subsector was recognised and population pressure was identified as one of the major causes of malnutrition. Chronic malnutrition was on the rise from 48.1% (UNICEF 1987) to 56,8 % (UNICEF 2000), slightly decreased to 52.7 % in 2008 (CFSVA) and was at 58.0 % in 2010 (UNICEF). However, there was no specific concentration on stunting prevention at that time which is expected as the SUN initiative started worldwide in 2010 only.

97. In the Vision 2025 and the corresponding PRSP I, prevention of chronic malnutrition is not seen from the “humanitarian” perspective from the development one, through agricultural, educational and economic strengthening. PRSP II of 2012 provides some general indicators about chronic malnutrition (table 19, page 105). However, the national Health policy 2005-2015 mentions among its general objectives the need to reduce by one-third the rates of malnutrition and stunting

among children of -5 years (the national Food security programme 2009-2015 also mentions stunting rates collected by UNICEF in 2005 and dedicates its sub-programme V to nutrition. The implementation of the health and nutrition policies were reinforced by the WFP-supported national conference for food security and nutrition in 2011)

98. In 2013, the multi-sectorial platform for Nutrition and Food Security was established and Burundi had also finalised its multi-sectorial roadmap for Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN). This had roadmap provided the basis for a national strategic plan for nutrition. A number of ministries, international organizations, religious groups, research institutes, the private sector and civil society are involved in the platform, however the structure so far mainly operates at national level. These efforts resulted in the formulation of the “Plan Stratégique Multisectoriel de sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle (PSMSAN)” which was published in April 2014.

99. Burundi is also one of the 12 countries in which the REACH approach was rolled out. REACH was jointly launched in 2008 by the FAO, UNICEF, WFP, and the WHO to assist governments of countries with a high burden of child and maternal under-nutrition to accelerate the scale-up of food and nutrition actions. The REACH coordinator is currently on the payroll of UNICEF and plays an important role in terms of support to the SUN secretariat.

100. WFPs engagement in treatment of moderate acute malnutrition (MAM) as well as stunting prevention is in line with the efforts described above. The treatment of MAM follows the national protocol (Protocole nationale de prise en charge intégré de la malnutrition aigue globale) which was released in April 2010 and revised with assistance of WFP and UNICEF in December 2014. The protocol includes the “Continuum of Care” in which UNICEF is in charge of severe acute malnutrition and WFP of moderate acute malnutrition. However, activities and interventions between UNICEF and WFP lack some level of coordination.

101. WFP was asked by the government to further engage in MAM treatment at health centre level up to the time that FARN (initiated by UNICEF at community level) is fully operational WFP has responded to this request in 2012 and 2013 but funding and monitoring were obstacles to continue this almost nationwide approach in 213 out of approximately 900 health centres.

102. In the CP 200119, measures for prevention of chronic malnutrition are detailed as follows under component 2 (§28) “Blanket feeding will be provided for 12,700 children under 2 during the lean seasons to address chronic malnutrition and stunting in Bujumbura Rural, Cibitoke and Karusi provinces. Targeting will be based on stunting rate, food insecurity, poverty, vulnerability and global acute malnutrition levels”. CPE findings about this approach are outlined under EQ3...

103. In the CS, resilience is mentioned only once in §66 (objective 1.3, support to community recovery and development), aiming at building or enhancing communities’ resilience to shocks. This objective was however tackled indirectly in the portfolio, as the FFA inputs to improving food security.

104. The term of resilience (a holistic concept which is not reachable by WFP alone under its mandate but needs to be considered in a synergy perspective) is not mentioned as such in the CP and the PRROs (recovery component). Instead, the rehabilitation of damaged assets, adequate food consumption or improved access to basic services are stated as objectives. Various would-be components of a resilience package are however listed, such as cash / vouchers modalities, and WFP

contribution in partnership to food production, home gardens, livelihoods, anti-erosion forestry or watershed management projects (IFAD's PRODEFI<sup>52</sup>, WVI, FFH). The activities were severely undermined by funding shortages.

**EQ1.3. Extent to which the CS/portfolio main objectives and related activities are coherent and harmonised with those of the partners (UN, multilateral, bilateral and NGOs).**

a. How coherent was the portfolio with the strategies and programmes of the concerned UN agencies (UNICEF, FAO, IFAD, UNHCR...)?

105. As stated, individual strategies and programs of key UN agencies and strategic partners were not detailed in the CS, but were apparently rather seen in the integrated UNDAF framework.

106. Activities of other UN agencies are mentioned as relevant under the various components and objectives of the CP and PRROs, as follows.

i. CP 200119:

- a. under component 1 (school feeding), cooperation with UNICEF for ECDs and school kits (this was not done in every WFP-supported school); with WHO for deworming; with FAO and IFAD for school gardens (not done everywhere) and fuel-efficient stoves (not yet done).
- b. Under component 2 (nutrition assistance): coordination with UNICEF (therapeutic feeding centers – not well coordinated with MAM treatment in health centers) and WHO (deworming, vitamins); capacity development efforts to be pooled with UNICEF, UNFPA, UNAIDS, WHO, FAO.
- c. Component 3 (community recovery and development): cooperation with FAO (IFAD is not mentioned in the CP document).
- d. Component 4 (capacity development): cooperation with UNICEF and WHO for MoH.
- e. Funded by Swiss Development Agency, and being part of a regional effort in the Great Lakes Region, chronic malnutrition is being addressed in Ngozi district by piloting a coordinated multi-stakeholder approach of the four UN agencies UNICEF, WHO, WFP and FAO. Due to WFPs funding shortage, only 1000 households are being covered by WFP as compared to 13 000 (UNICEF and FAO)

ii. PRRO 200164: in the relief component, cooperation with UNHCR for DRC refugee camps

iii. PRRO 200655: in the relief component with UNHCR as above; with UNICEF for targeted supplementary feeding. Under the recovery component, with FAO and IFAD for FFA activities, and with FAO for home-grown school feeding.

107. WFP interventions are also aligned with the revised UNDAF (2012-2017) and programs and activities of other UN agencies, especially FAO, UNICEF and UNDP as well as with the new UNHCR's Revised Burundi Regional Refugee Response Plan.

<sup>52</sup> Programme de Développement des Filières

b. Were there duplications or gaps among UN agencies and key other international actors?

108. As outlined above, the intended cooperation sometimes did not take place, in particular with UNICEF for school feeding and MAM treatment; reasons are not clear, but a better initial identification of strategies, programs and resources may have been relevant. Cooperation with FAO is generally outlined as excellent by both agencies; it did not happen – rarely - due to a lack of clear division of tasks and – more frequently – to a lack of funding. There is no evidence of duplications.

109. A large gap has however been identified in the lack of common approach regarding demography and family planning with UNFPA and UN Women, as both of these agencies still appear to work at the overall policy level in Burundi, rather than being operational in the field. A case in point is the absence of UNFPA and UN Women in the One-UN project implemented in Ngozi by WFP, UNICEF, FAO and WHO against chronic malnutrition. Another gap was found in the missed opportunity so far in collaborating with the performance based system (PBS) implemented by the World Bank and Cordaid in health and education.

c. Was the portfolio effectively integrated into the UNDAF? Extent to which WFP has been involved in UN joint programming and programs in Burundi ?

110. According to ‘institutional memories’ still active in the CO staff, UNDAF discussions between UN agencies’ teams were open and aligned on national vision towards development.

111. Some discrepancies can however be found between CS and UNDAF regarding institutional capacity development (component 2 of the CS, component 4 of the CP, WFP’s own SO 5), and emergency response (component 3 of the CS, SO1), which was translated into the IR-EMOP.

112. These additions to UNDAF should be seen as an added value by WFP, mainly due to the appropriateness of its Strategic Plan 2008-13 to both relief and recovery situations.

d. How coherent was the portfolio with the strategies and programmes of the key concerned donors (US, Netherlands...)

113. Due to the recurrent lack of funding that reflects Burundi’s situation as a forgotten crisis until mid-2015, for a number of reasons (small land-locked country, linguistically isolated, large DRC crisis nearby, supposed to be on the development path), the CO has been very careful to align its activities with the strategies of the main donors, as evidenced below.

114. Nevertheless, funding shortages have had very detrimental consequences on the least supported development-oriented activities (emergency interventions were much better funded), such as HIV, FFA, school feeding in the 3 most food-insecure provinces of the N-E, or capacity development (CHECK FIGURES).

115. At the end of the CPE period, the CO is still coherent with the current strategies of the 2 main donors USA and the Netherlands (respectively funding 50 percent and 7 percent of the portfolio budget): (i) USAID Food security country framework (2014-2019) and the Dutch cooperation in Burundi’ Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (2014-2017). The strategies, programs – and concerns - of the key donors USAID and Netherlands Cooperation over the period of reference can be summarized as follows.

- i. USAID is not funding development in Burundi (and therefore not school feeding as such), only emergencies. In food assistance, the main USAID programme is the “Food for Peace” for emergency aid. The programme increasingly utilises local or regional purchases (80% now, rice from Tanzania and wheat from Uganda).
  - a. In his context, USAID has provided crucial support to the PRRO activities: integration of returnees (with vouchers), feeding DRC refugees in camps, supplementary feeding in 5 provinces, but also FARNs with UNICEF and WVI, mitigation of poverty of host populations around refugee camps, FFAs, and funding for 2 IR-EMOPS to respond to floods.
  - b. Under the 4th budget revision of the PRRO 200164, school feeding activities were started in areas of high numbers of refugees and returnees. These activities were later continued under the new PRRO 200655. In 2015, WFP stopped the school feeding under the PRRO due to budget constraints. The donor community, mainly FFP/ USAID and Norway did not agree to fund it further.
  - c. USAID has also launched the “Amashika” programme (50 million \$ over 5 years) to combat chronic malnutrition, for which the NGO CRS is the main implementing partner. In this context, WFP is subcontracted by CRS for food fortification and resilience in Muyinga, together with IMC ( see FBS).
  - d. The opinion of USAID about WFP is overwhelmingly positive: WFP “knows how to treat donors”, is very responsive and flexible, maintains good relations, welcomes joint visits, and is quite open about financial figures. Key advantages of WFP are the combined expertise in emergency and development; it is also engaged everywhere in food security and nutrition. WFP is often taking the lead and supporting the government, within resource limitations. A key weakness of WFP according to USAID is that lack of donor diversification, relying too much on Food for Peace.
  - e. In 2013, USAID published its new Food for Peace “Food Security Country Framework for Burundi 2014– 2019”, which is targeting areas within provinces with very prevalence of malnutrition and food insecurity (provinces of Gitega, Karusi, Kayanza, Kirundo, Muyinga and Ngozi) – and where other USAID-funded programs are also taking place in complementarity. The geographical spreading mainly corresponds to WFP assessments (CFVS 2014), with some discrepancies regarding e.g. Muramvya for food insecurity or the NW provinces (already targeted by the Netherlands Cooperation) for chronic malnutrition.
  - f. New US food security activities are focused on 3 priorities: to reduce chronic malnutrition among children under 5; to increase household food availability and access through increased productivity; and to increase household incomes to improve household diet diversity. The 1<sup>st</sup> priority is consistent with WFP’s focus on stunting, whilst FFA is already contributing to the other 2 priorities, in synergy with other actors (IFAD, FAO).
  
- ii. The Netherlands Embassy in Burundi has been implementing from 2012 to 2015 a Multi-Annual Strategic Plan (MASP). In this Plan, the food security component (Goal B-2) was to contribute to sustainably increased agricultural production including food production in the three NW provinces (Bujumbura Rural, Bubanza and Cibitoke). Food was to be produced and processed mainly by the poor including women, young people and demobilized ex militants.

- a. The area had been chosen for reasons of good potential for market oriented agricultural production (fertile irrigable plains close to Bujumbura market, possible exports to DRC and Rwanda), but also due to the high level of political violence since 1993.
  - b. In 2013, WFP has adopted this same geographical focus for its P4P-like program in Burundi; this approach may appear slightly opportunistic, as CFSVA 2014 had not retained these provinces for their high levels of food insecurity (contrary to central and eastern regions) nor for chronic malnutrition problems (except Bubanza).  
It was also found that, although WFP took due care to ensure gender balance among members of the selected P4P cooperatives, other criteria included existing assets and development potential rather than a particularly poor or vulnerable membership.
  - c. As from 2013, school feeding (endogenous) was also implemented in the 3 NW provinces with Dutch funding. The SPR 2013 for the CP states that: "In October 2013 a home-grown school meals program linked to a project similar to P4P was launched in three western provinces. These provinces had a huge untapped potential for food production due to the effects of civil war. The inclusion of the western provinces resulted in an increased number of children being assisted."  
Although the Dutch cooperation has agreed to fund this new school feeding activity, which is taking place in their area of focus and utilizes part of the P4P production, it is not clear to what extent this increase of school feeding coverage has been fully consistent with the MASP original strategy and objectives. 60% of the schools are now covered in the 3 provinces, although with targeting, implementation and sustainability problems found by the CPE. The Dutch cooperation has expressed its appreciation of the overall cooperation with WFP, but also a key concern about the lack of current effectiveness of the school gardens for endogenous school feeding. The embassy has also outlined its concern about the lack of cooperation / synergy between WFP, UNICEF, the government, and UNFPA in terms of quality education, school feeding, kitchen gardens, WASH, and family planning in order to change in-depth behaviours.
  - d. The overall objective of the new MASP 2014-2017 is to help improve security and diminish the threat of instability and new violence in Burundi, in an integrated approach linking diplomacy, defense and economic development. The strategy will continue funding food security programs focused on increased, sustainable and climate-smart agricultural productivity concentrated in the same 3 NW provinces most affected by security problems, neighboring DRC and Rwanda – which fits with the current P4P approach.
  - e. There is also a strong program focus on gender and youth issues (to which WFP could be more closely associated within synergies, SEE...) in terms of sexual and reproductive health and rights, such as "more open communication on sex and gender friendly behavior and other measures to combat sexual violence".
- iii. As part of a regional project on Food security and Nutrition, the Swiss cooperation is funding a project which addresses malnutrition by piloting a coordinated multi-stakeholder approach of the four UN agencies UNICEF,

WHO, WFP and FAO together with the Governments of Burundi and Rwanda. The activities will take place in two districts of Rwanda (Nyamagabe and Rutsiro) and one province of Burundi (Ngozi) where food insecurity and poverty are at highest level. The focus is on the reduction of chronic malnutrition addressing the 1000 days window of opportunity. Project funds are focusing on children under five and pregnant and lactating mothers.

**EQ1.4. Extent to which the CS main objectives and related activities have been internally coherent with WFP’s Strategic Plans 2008-13 and 2014-17 and other relevant corporate policies?**

a. What was the level of coherence with Strategic Objectives 1 – 5 of the WFP Strategic Plan 2008-2013?

116. For reminder, the WFP Strategic plan 2008 – 2013 had 5 Strategic Objectives (SO), and 14 corresponding goals. All of the 5 SOs were aligned with the CS priorities.

117. The CS outlined (§56) that “The strategy also reflects the goals enshrined in the WFP Strategic Plan (2008-2013) on the evolving nature of WFP from a food aid to a food assistance agency”. The overall CS coherence was analysed in the table under §77, which described the alignment with national policies (PRSP), UNDAF, CS priorities and interventions, and WFP corporate SOs. This coherence can be summarised as follows.

- i. Under the CP, priority 1 of the CS “food and nutrition security” was aligned with SO2 (prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness and mitigation measures) and SO4 (Reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition) through FFAs, livelihoods actions, blanket feeding, school meals and ART support. Priority 2 “Capacity Development of Government Institutions” was aligned with SO5 (Strengthen the capacities of countries to reduce hunger, including through hand-over strategies and local purchase) through food fortification and multi-sector capacity development.
- ii. Under the PRRO 200164, priority 3 of the CS “Humanitarian response action” was aligned with SO1 (Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies) and SO3 (Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations) through targeted food distribution and early recovery support and training.

b. What was the level of coherence with Strategic Objectives 1 – 4 of the WFP Strategic Plan 2014-2017?

118. The new WFP Strategic Plan 2014–2017 has only four Strategic Objectives (and also 14 goals). The reduced number of SOs is to be explained by the fact that the former SO 5 (capacity development) has become a cross-cutting goal within the 4 new SOs. The new SOs have been aligned as follows with the CS.

- i. In the CP, the new SO 3 (Reduce risk and enable people, communities and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs) and SO 4 (Reduce under-nutrition and break the inter-generational cycle of hunger) are consistent with components 1 (school feeding), 2 (nutrition assistance to vulnerable groups) and 3 (FFAs).
- ii. In the PRRO 200655, the relief component (as well as the 3<sup>rd</sup> CS priority of emergency humanitarian response through IR-EMOPS) is consistent with SO1 (Save lives and protect livelihoods in emergencies) whilst the recovery

component corresponds to SO 2 (Support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies).

c. What was the level of coherence with the relevant WFP policies: gender, nutrition, HIV, C&V, Emergency (incl. humanitarian principles and protection), Food security, school feeding, capacity development, DRR, FFA, resilience and safety nets ?

119. Despite the number of relevant WFP corporate policies, the CO's "institutional memories" outline that all the necessary analyses were made to ensure that the CS provided the necessary coherence. In the sectors of C&V, emergency, protection, food security, capacity development, DRR and FFA, the main policy objectives, expectations and constraints were integrated.

- i. **Cash and vouchers:** while food transfers represent WFP's traditional form of food assistance, vouchers and cash transfers can also be used as complements or alternatives. In line with the Strategic Plan, C&V transfers have allowed WFP to better adapt its toolbox to context and meet identified needs in a more flexible and appropriate manner, while further strengthening local markets, enhancing the productivity of small farmers, and empower beneficiaries – in particular women.
- ii. **Emergencies:** 3 types of emergencies have been identified in the policy: sudden calamities such as earthquakes, floods and similar unforeseen disasters; man-made emergencies like an influx of refugees; and food scarcity conditions owing to drought, crop failures, pests and diseases. All 3 categories apply in Burundi. Exiting an emergency depends however on a range of factors (such as national capacity), and can be achieved either through phasing out or shifting to longer-term programs to protect and improve livelihoods and resilience. The 1<sup>st</sup> modality has been used for returnees, but integration into longer-term programs depends also on available budgets.
- iii. **Capacity development:** the WFP Strategic Plan has positioned WFP among the world's leading humanitarian agencies with a mandate to promote long-term development by addressing the causes of hunger. Under SO5, the CO should develop hand-over strategies to promote nationally owned hunger solutions, and enhance national capacities to design, manage and implement policies, programs and tools to predict and reduce hunger. An evaluation carried out in 2008 identified a number of gaps and limitations; it also brought forward some lessons learnt which do not seem to have been adequately captured by the CS – perhaps due to the lack of dedicated programming resources. One lesson outlined that "most capacity-development approaches involved training only, even though there were sophisticated and promising approaches that combine a number of tools".
- iv. **DRR:** increasing vulnerability in areas prone to disaster needs to be addressed directly through interventions that are preventive in nature. For WFP, simple presence in terms of logistics and food stocks does have a positive effect if a natural disaster occurs, but the diversity of situations faced by poor households in disaster-prone areas and the dynamic nature of natural disasters calls for WFP to include mitigation objectives in both development and recovery activities. This has duly been done in Burundi through support to the DRR platforms for contingency planning, early warning, contribution to prevention projects through FFA, and emergency response.

- v. **Resilience:** a resilience-building approach to programming helps to mitigate the damaging effects of shocks and stress before, during and after crises, thereby minimizing human suffering and economic loss. WFP has some comparative advantages in enhancing resilience through food security and nutrition, but this is still a far cry from an integrated approach to resilience. The approach should respond to the definition proposed in 2013 by UNDP, OCHA and UNISDR which calls for multi-sector synergies: “the ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner”.
- vi. **Safety nets:** the 2012 update of WFP’s 2004 safety net policy showed that WFP plays a critical role in social protection through safety nets as they relate to food assistance for food and nutrition security for the most vulnerable, such as in supporting governments in building systems of safety nets, helping to strengthen institutional mechanisms, and forging strategic partnerships. In particular, lessons in “understanding the context », « building on what works » and « focusing on the most vulnerable » have been duly considered by the CO in its approach to institutional feeding.
- vii. **Gender:** the WFP Gender Policy (2008 – 2013), which is relevant for most of the evaluation period, was evaluated in 2013 and this led to significant changes and the formulation of a new Gender Policy (2015-2020). The new gender policy is taking the escalation in recent years of violence against women and girls into account, which will be an important issue for the formulation of the new Burundi Country Strategy as well. Activities have been aligned to the former Gender Policy, which is not as gender sensitive as the new policy. The CS is mentioning gender issues twice in the document. In the first place in connection with an evaluation of school feeding prior to the evaluation period, which showed that take home rations for girls were effective to close the gender gap in primary schools and was afterwards discontinued. The second time it refers to the establishment of the “Ministry of Human Rights and Gender” which was created in 2009 to promote gender and human rights through decentralized community development facilities.
- viii. **Nutrition:** when comparing the two Strategic Plans, it is obvious that WFP wants to systematically include the prevention of stunting. The CP has included this through a blanket feeding approach of pregnant and lactating mothers and children under 2 years of age. Whilst blanket feeding was always a measure, when acute malnutrition levels rose beyond the emergency threshold, the present approach is meant to complement the activities by other UN partner agencies in preventing chronic malnutrition, addressing the window of opportunity (1000 days, SUN initiative).  
This move is as well reflected in the update of the WFP Nutrition policy which was originally approved in February 2012 and was reviewed and updated in June 2013 at the request of the Board. This was necessary due to the fact that WFP has been involved in: i) expansion of the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement to cover 33 countries; ii) consultations for the post-2015 development agenda; and iii) the new series in *The Lancet* on nutrition to be published by the middle of 2013. The updated policy has four nutrition-specific pillars: i) treatment of moderate acute malnutrition among children under 5, pregnant and lactating women and people living with HIV or receiving treatment for tuberculosis; ii) prevention of acute malnutrition; iii) prevention of stunting during the first 1,000 days; and iv) addressing micronutrient deficiencies. The policy also covers nutrition-sensitive interventions within

school feeding, general food distributions, food for assets, training or work, and other interventions in which nutrition is not the primary goal.

Under priority 1 of the CS (Food and Nutrition Security), the CP and both PRROs have carried out activities. CP 200119 focuses on (1) nutrition assistance for vulnerable groups with the aim of improving the nutritional status of targeted women and children as well as improved treatment success of HIV patients – Blanket feeding to prevent stunting; (2) pre-school and primary school children in food insecure areas. PRRO 200164 intends to provide (1) improved acute malnutrition among the targeted population affected by conflict and natural disaster (refugees and returnees); (2) improved food consumption of targeted emergency affected households; (3) assistance through institutional feeding. PRRO 200655 focuses on (1) targeted supplementary feeding to reduce global acute malnutrition – plus protection rations for respective households (this part was turned off and on); (2) relief rations for Congolese refugees; (3) targeted food distribution to vulnerable households; (3) food assistance for expelled migrants; and (4) institutional feeding and school feeding (to be transferred to upcoming new CP).

Thus the Country Portfolio is considered to be in line with the CS and the WFP nutrition policy. However, whilst the WFP policy is talking about stunting prevention during the first 1000 days in more general terms, the CS is very explicit in linking this approach to blanket feeding, which is considered a direct nutrition intervention.

ix. **HIV/ AIDS:** nutrition support to HIV AIDS patients is part of WFPs nutrition policy, the Burundi Country Strategy, WFPs HIV and AIDS Policy. However, WFP Burundi was not directly implementing the HIV/ AIDS support but was just providing logistical support by managing Global Fund money, providing the logistics to buy store and move the food items for CNLS.

x. **School Feeding:** the CS states under priority 1, objective 2 (address hunger in school-aged children and to support their education): “This should be achieved in provinces experiencing food insecurity and manifesting low school enrolment and high-drop out rates. To ensure that the program does not negatively impact on the quality of education, stricter criteria will be applied to ensure the minimum conditions for adequate infrastructure, water and sanitation facilities, presence of trained teachers and the steady supply of school materials”. In addition, WFP has the objective to reinforce the capacity of Government and the communities to take over the program.

Whilst it is clear that WFP provides substantial support to the formulation of a school feeding policy in Burundi, the hand-over and exit strategy at community level is less clear. According to the School Feeding policy of WFP, areas of social protection, nutrition, gender and education itself are the main objectives to be achieved in a school feeding programme. Performance in education looks at enrolment and completion rates and monitors the gender gaps that may exist in higher classes. The fact that fortified foods are offered to children will have a positive nutritional impact in terms of micronutrient supply.

WFP is seeking to hand over school feeding programmes to national governments. In Burundi, where the government invests a substantial amount of the national budget on school feeding and where a lot of efforts are made in terms of the formulation of a national school feeding policy, the situation can be seen somewhere at stage 2 of the continuum, which is shown below.

**Figure 3 - Situation of school feeding policy**

	Programs rely mostly on external funding and implementation				Programs rely on national funding and implementation
Policy framework for school feeding	Limited	Increased	Strong	Strong	Strong
Government financial capacity	Limited	Moderate	Increased	Strong	Strong
Government institutional capacity	Limited	Limited	Moderate	Increased	Strong

**EQ1.5. Extent to which WFP has been strategic in its alignments and has positioned itself such as to make the biggest difference?**

a. What were the comparative advantages of WFP in Burundi and how clearly did WFP define and recognise them?

120. In the 2011 CS, the CO had adequately analysed the comparative advantages of WFP in Burundi: a wide knowledge of the country’s hunger and nutrition situation – based on the CFSVA 2008 and partners’ reports -, and recognised past contributions in saving lives, stabilising nutritional levels, building assets and improving the quality of human resources through access to education and skills training. WFP had also assisted in policy formulation and capacity development in the management of food assistance programmes. It had the ability and capacity to act as a catalyst in many innovative endeavours such as climate change through FFA. WFP could demonstrate a lead position in assessments through VAM, extensive field presence, logistics capacity, strategic partnership with the Government, donors, strong relationship with sister UN agencies, partnership with national and international NGOs and strong connection to local communities. In addition, WFP has demonstrated its credibility, ability to mobilize funds, strong advocacy skills and flexibility in linking policies and strategies to national priorities.

121. This assessment is still valid today. Stakeholders agree that the CO is competent and well organised; WFP is also widely appreciated for its expertise, policy support, flexibility and transparency. It is perceived as pro-active, leading and influential (interventions in terms of emergency aid, food fortification, organising the 1<sup>st</sup> forum of 2011 on nutrition and food security, school feeding, PNIA), advising on policy formulation, and well engaged in various national platforms (DRR, education, food security, nutrition). WFP is also well positioned to support the implementation of a national social protection program through its experience with cash-based transfers, vulnerability assessment and targeting. Good relations are maintained with other international actors and relevant authorities, due to extensive field presence. Comparative advantages still include the VAM capacity for assessments (CFSA 2014, emergency assessments in 2015 and 2016), timely emergency aid in case of disasters, logistics, and innovative approaches (FFA, P4P, electronic vouchers).

b. How explicit was WFP's strategy about maximising its comparative advantage and making the biggest difference?

122. The CS document states (§56) that WFP's comparative advantages in Burundi were part of the strategy definition. The selected key priorities reflect adequately this approach, as the above-mentioned strong assets were expected to be used in the development-oriented context of 2011 in terms of food and nutrition security, school feeding, development of capacities of the key government partners, but also for emergency response to crises.

c. How realistic was WFP about the constraints on its Burundi portfolio?

123. Challenges in 2011 were also well identified and included timeliness of response, limited scope of financial resources by both WFP and its main partners, and avoiding to create dependency on food aid.

124. Among weaker aspects of the current settings, stakeholders still outline that deliveries are sometimes late, some products may be of poor quality, there is sometimes a lack of communication when interventions are suspended (school feeding, stunting, PLHIV), some interventions lack in consistency (stunting), some activities are uncoordinated or scattered, and the donors' portfolio remains limited.

d. How strategic was WFP in selecting its partners (national and local levels)?

125. This aspect of the CS appears to lack focusing, and may have led to the current lack of synergies (SEE...). Strategic partners and UN agencies have been described in chapters...and.... Regarding NGOs, §51 of the CS indicates merely that "NGOs also play an active role to contribute to food and nutrition security in Burundi. WFP works closely with a range of NGOs – both national and international".

126. The CO's institutional memories and programing staff further outline that partners are chosen for their skills, capacities, but also for either their widespread presence throughout Burundi in order to implement activities, or the recognised high quality of their performance (WHH, Foresta). In the first perspective, agreements have been made with the Red Cross – which is present on every colline of Burundi, Caritas and the large related network of diocese organisations, and government institutions (Ministry of solidarity, PRONIANUT, CNLS, and MoH).

## **Annex G: Analysis of Main EQ 2: Factors of Decision Making**

### **EQ2.1. Extent to which WFP has analysed the national hunger, nutrition and food security issues including gender issues, and appropriately used this analysis to understand the key nutritional and food security challenges in Burundi.**

a. For each of its interventions and with reference to specific target groups, what analysis did WFP undertake in deciding whether and how to intervene? In particular: mapping and use of data; analysis of the food security, nutrition, livelihoods, GFA, FFA, markets and gender contexts.

1. As explicitly mentioned in §13, 14 and 16, the CS analysis on food and nutrition security, vulnerabilities of specific groups, numbers and locations of most food insecure households, effects of climatic shocks and regional focuses (§12 to 30) was mainly based on the CFSVA of June-July 2008. In addition, the CS indicates that the CO commissioned several studies and evaluations to prepare background information. The studies concerned partnerships, strategic collaborations and capacity development actions (as listed under the various priorities); Cash and Voucher (market and traders' information); and a draft resource mobilization and communication strategy.

2. The findings of the CFSVA were also used by the government, e.g. in the national food security program of 2009.

3. Some limitations are nevertheless to be outlined: whilst WFP was very strong in analyzing the national food security situation, less attention was paid to gender issues; food and nutrition security was not analyzed in relation to root causes of gender and behavior change. The DHS (2010) has a separate chapter on gender-based violence with alarming figures. MAM interventions were also not always in line with findings on MAM prevalence rates (threshold > 8%). Stunting rates are in general very high in Burundi. WFP decided to intervene in those districts, where stunting rates are highest. The rates, however, would warrant a nationwide intervention (except Bujumbura Mairie) as all stunting rates are far above the critical threshold of 40 %. Stunting interventions can be seen as pilot activities and WFP is trying to contribute by laying baseline information in the "One UN" project in Kirembe (Ngozi province). End line data will be available end of 2016. In the meantime, other implementing partners have tried to see the impact on stunting prevention measures. IFPRI results have not been published yet; WVI data are available but seem to be of lower data quality. Despite this shortcoming, an impact on stunting cannot be measured after 4 months only.

4. For general information about the political, and socio economic contexts, the CS analysis relied on reports by IMF, UNDP, UNICEF, UNHCR, the World Bank, and government indicators drawn from Vision 2025, corresponding PRSP, and national policies such as Health.

5. It should be outlined that this first CS for Burundi was seen by the CO staff as a challenge for innovation, geared towards development after a protracted conflict and post-conflict period. Themes were consistent with "Vision 2025" and followed in such appeals from the Government, while still keeping an emergency component in compliance with WFP Strategic Plan.

6. A comprehensive consultative process entailed extensive discussions internally and externally, with the Regional Bureau (for guidance), the Government, the United Nations Management Team, national and international NGOs, and donors.

7. A taskforce was set up by the Country director to steer the process. Sub-committees covered logistics, food procurement, and key programmatic areas. On this aspect, 3 joint working groups (food security and rural development; health; and education / school feeding) were led by delegates from 5 technical Ministries (Agriculture, Education, Health, Environment and Solidarity), in a truly participatory approach.

8. National line ministries were similarly leading the discussions during a 3-days retreat in Gitega, which was facilitated by the Ministry of External relations. Areas of interventions were prioritized and this approach led to the definition of the 3 main CS components: food and nutrition security, capacity development, and emergency response. A 1<sup>st</sup> draft of the CS, prepared by the management and heads of program with VAM support was circulated internally, and the outcome was presented to all external stakeholders. Discussions that are described as “dynamic” were held by the CD with the donors.

9. The CS process was also facilitated by a bilingual WFP VAM officer, as the French speaking CO staff was somewhat constrained in its communication with English-speaking HQ and RB.

**EQ2.2. Extent to which WFP has contributed to developing related national or partner policies, programs and strategies and to developing national capacity on these issues?**

a. What specific efforts did WFP make in terms of: Supporting / advocating for national policies on food security, nutrition, livelihoods, DRR, C&V, social safety nets and gender dimensions? Developing national, provincial and communal capacity and ownership for monitoring, analysis and decision-making in the above fields?

10. Efforts of supporting national policies – essentially through capacity development - are detailed below.

11. Before the return of OCHA in 2015, WFP was also the lead agency in the sector of emergency humanitarian aid, and reportedly very effective in that role. WFP promoted e.g. exchange of good practices for emergency food distribution between CRB and OXFAM (public validation of beneficiary lists, organization of distribution sites, complaints mechanisms).

12. Basically, WFP initiated the national forum on food security and nutrition in 2011 to put food security and nutrition on the political agenda. Following that forum, the government of Burundi decided to develop the multi-sectorial strategy to fight against food insecurity and malnutrition and to be active member of the SUN movement, with the support from WFP and other actors (mainly the REACH UN agencies: WFP, UNICEF, FAO, WHO and UNFPA) supported the government. WFP with others UN agencies also helped the government to set up the SUN/REACH Secretariat at a high level (2<sup>nd</sup> Vice president office). Since the setting up of this initiative in Burundi, all SUN movement conferences are organized in the WFP CO by the SUN/REACH Secretariat. WFP also played a critical role in supporting the government to put in place a legal and strategic framework for local food fortification. WFP was also active participant in the review process of the national nutrition protocol.

13. In terms of gender, WFP was not actively trying to influence policy, even though

WFP has been involved in the discussions and formulation of the national policy on gender.

14. The CO's institutional memories and programming staff further outlined that partners are chosen for their skills, capacities, but also for either their widespread presence throughout Burundi in order to implement activities, or the recognized high quality of their performance (Welthungerhilfe, Foresta). In the first perspective, agreements have been made with the Red Cross – which is present on every colline of Burundi, Caritas and the large related network of diocese organizations, and government institutions (Ministry of solidarity, PRONIANUT, CNLS, and MoH).

b. Did WFP: Influence the policy and programs of the Government and/or other partners on these issues? Influence the strategy of the Government and/or other partners on these issues? Strengthen national, provincial and communal capacity and ownership for analysis and decision-making in these fields? Influence UN strategy and planning in these fields? Have the capacity to do the above?

15. Particular influence of WFP can be found in the food fortification strategy (leading to a “décret-loi” by MINAGRIE), and in the school feeding approach in PNIA (Plan National d'Investissement Agricole). The WFP paid a study trip to benchmark Côte d'Ivoire to the Permanent Secretary of the MINAGRIE to that effect.

16. The Government (MoE) is in the process of establishing and maintaining at the national level a school feeding program and policy linked to local agricultural production; this approach has been strongly supported by WFP. Progress is recorded as follows.

- i. The new organigram of the Ministry of Education includes a General Direction of School Feeding.
- ii. A school feeding action plan has already been validated by the Ministry.
- iii. An inter-sector committee of school feeding has been nominated.
- iv. A national policy of school feeding is in the phase of drafting, WFP is providing financial support for a consultant from the Center for Excellence in Brazil to work with the Government on the policy

17. WFP influence was also – and crucially - felt in its “visionary” support to the 1<sup>st</sup> Forum on Food Security and Nutrition in 2011 (instrumental also in this was the ex-Minister of Agriculture). The forum directly or indirectly led to the development of SUN/REACH in Burundi, a significantly increased budget for agriculture (12,3 percent in 2014 CHECK), PNIA, and the kitchen gardens initiative. These efforts were supported by a common approach of WFP, FAO and FIDA in Rome.

### **EQ 2.3. Which internal and external factors have affected WFP's choices in its country strategy and portfolio?**

a. To what extent were the choices in the portfolio influenced by: perceived comparative WFP advantage(s); corporate strategies and change processes; United Nations programming and priorities; WFP's involvement in United Nations joint programming and programmes; previous programming; national policy; resource availability, donor preferences and restrictions; organisational structure and staffing; analysis of context and need; monitoring information; emergencies; other factors?

18. According to the CO “institutional memories” – as this issue is not recorded in the documents - the CS was the result of the combination of three main internal and external factors, which influenced the decisions in the following order (1) WFP's mandate, (2) national policies, and (3) the repositioning of WFP strategy from food aid to more holistic food assistance.

19. In addition, it should be noted that the engagement in stunting prevention through the blanket feeding approach is due to the international focus on this topic – especially under the SUN movement. Whilst it is obvious that the first 1000-days window of opportunity is a crucial period to combat malnutrition, it is not yet fully understood, which interventions would be most efficient and effective. Research is still going on.

b. How explicitly were these factors ranked and compared in strategic decision-making?

20. Ranking and comparison of strategic decision-making factors is not described either in the available documents. The reasons to stop interventions were very often determined by donor decisions - e.g. to stop school feeding under the PRRO, or the Global Fund stopping support to ART due to reporting problems - which cannot be regarded as being priority ranking done by WFP.

c. What resourcing strategy did WFP adopt for each operation and type of activity, and how effective was this strategy?

21. As stated above, and under guidance of the Regional Bureau, a resource mobilization study had been launched in preparation to the CS. As a result, a resourcing strategy is outlined in §80-83, which summarizes past funding levels (2007 – 2009) and estimates respective needs for the 3 CP components over the next 4 years. Out of a total estimated budget of US \$165 million, Food and Nutrition Security should represent 41 percent (US \$72 million); Capacity Development 1.7 percent (US\$3 million), and Humanitarian Response 57.3 percent (US \$90 million).

22. The strategy also concludes rather -too- optimistically that “Given the huge donors interest in and support for WFP’s strategic shift from humanitarian and recovery to a development continuum, the Country Office is well positioned to raise the US\$20 million required annually in support of the newly planned CP”. Even though the required CP annual budget has consistently remained under the \$20 million threshold, funding shortages have ranged from 29 percent to 57 percent over the period 2011 – 2014.

#### **EQ2.4. To what extent was WFP in Burundi able to learn from experience and adapt to changing contexts?**

a. What (systematic or *ad hoc*) efforts did WFP make to learn from experience, including adaptations to the changing context in Burundi (elections...)?

23. The SPRs have been listing the lessons learnt from the CP and the 2 PRROs, until 2014. The most relevant issues that were recorded can be summarized as follows, although some key findings from this CPE (need for synergies, better focusing of activities and better integration of gender issues into programming) do not appear in the list.

- i. Under the CP, it was noted that there is a general need of more sensitization against malnutrition. The particular relevance of activities around disaster risk reduction, community assets rehabilitation and sustainable land management (although the term of resilience has not been used) in a disaster-prone country with the majority of the population dependent on agriculture has also been repeatedly stressed from 2011 until 2013. In 2011, lessons learnt included the positive appreciation of the parents' involvement in the implementation of school feeding (management of stocks, preparation of food, supplements provided in the form of vegetables); this lesson was not evidenced by the field visits of the CPE.

- ii. Under the PRROs, lessons in 2013 and 2014 focused on the success of the voucher transfer modality in refugee camps (to be complemented by fresh food as part of the food purchased was sold to buy vegetables); this was accepted by the refugees (who initially preferred cash) due to continuous communication, encouragement and a commitment to implement a quality program. In 2011, an example of good practice in capacity development was apparently to be found in the cost-effective full coverage of the country (17 provincial Directorates for agriculture) and the total involvement of local institutions during field exercises including rapid assessments and periodical surveys, in the monitoring and analysis of the food security situation. This interesting lesson was however mitigated in 2014 by the other finding that staff from health centers often fail to hand over their training skills when they rotate to another assignment.

b. To what extent did WFP benchmark its plans and performance in Burundi against those of WFP and other organisations elsewhere?

24. There were no benchmarks used in the country strategy CS, but informally – and to the extent that lessons from much more developed countries can be replicated in Burundi – Brazil and Ivory Coast are considered as such for school feeding, as well as Kenya for P4P.

c. How did WFP respond to developments in international practices of livelihoods, food insecurity, nutrition, school feeding etc. (including the development of WFP’s global strategy and policies from food aid to assistance)?

25. Overall, WFP is trying to remain at the forefront of policy thinking and tools (new electronic vouchers, m-VAM, P4P), although more could be done in terms of integrated approach to resilience in Burundi, and guidance for improved capacity development in a difficult environment. The CO is soon going to introduce the (much delayed – this was already planned in 2011) fuel-efficient stoves in schools and households for purposes of protection, reducing adverse impacts on the environment by reducing the consumption of firewood, and promoting the use of alternative fuels and cooking technologies.

26. As stated above, the inclusion of stunting prevention measures are linked to the SUN movement, that took off internationally in 2010 and started in Burundi in 2013. Almost at the same time, WFP generated funds to contribute to stunting prevention in 5 districts, however at a smaller scale.

27. The international move from classical school feeding - which is using imported food aid - to a more home-grown school feeding approach was duly considered by the CO. Home-grown school feeding is almost impossible in areas suffering from high population pressure, food insecurity and land scarcity. The approach used was therefore to combine school feeding with the P4P approach in the N-W provinces where agricultural potential is still significant. This approach should help enhancing agricultural production in areas where land is still available and an intensification of agricultural production feasible.

d. How effectively did WFP adapt its programming to fit within UN/UNDAC frameworks?

28. The successive objectives of UNDAF in 2010 and 2012 are discussed in chapter.... WFP programming was effectively adapted to both the initial and the revised UNDAF frameworks, as these were aiming themselves to adapt to the national PRSP I and II.

29. A team of 3 CO staff members, led by the DCD, was delegated by WFP to the UNDAF workshop discussions, together with teams from other UN agencies: WHO,

UNFPA, UNICEF, UNHCR, FAO. IFAD was not present.

30. Discussions were held in an optimistic spirit of reconstruction and development, “all hopes were allowed”. UNDAF was felt as an “acte d’engagement vis à vis du gouvernement” concentrating on issues, which could change the situation. Environment was not discussed, for unclear reasons.

e. Did WFP (jointly with the Government?) monitoring provide beneficiary feedback mechanisms?

31. WFP is much appreciated among stakeholders for its monitoring capacity, which follows a monthly work plan (essentially post-distribution monitoring) according to the relevant Standard Operating Procedure, and is evaluated for its performance. A point in case can be found in the backstopping provided by the monitors of the Gitega field office to some 70 health centers where MAM treatment is provided.

32. In addition (or rather prior) to monitoring, field visits for survey purposes (CFSA, EFSA, VAM) are regularly carried out jointly and transparently with government officials. Such activities, on top of the reporting from the implementing partners and complaint mechanisms e.g. in refugee camps, appear to provide adequate feedback about beneficiaries needs and attitudes – as most field findings from the CPE had already been duly recorded by the CO.

f. Was beneficiary feedback acted upon constructively?

33. Apart from some comments in the refugee camps about the apparent lack of reaction to the beneficiaries’ complaints, there was evidence that beneficiary feedback was acted upon by the CO, as much as budget, capacities and logistics allowed. Evidence of rapid appraisals by the CO include: CAPAD and price negotiations for P4P, vouchers, quality control for trade fairs in camps, longer-term coverage for IDPs victims of natural disasters, and extension of institutional feeding network.

34. The feedback on food quality from the field does not seem to have received due attention so far. In particular, the beans being provided by WFP to school feeding or refugee camps take at times more than 6 hours to cook which puts an extra burden on firewood scarcity in the region. In fact, firewood scarcity forced some schools to skip school meals.

35. In the nutrition projects, there were complaints about cereal quality and one health center reported, that even plumpy’sup was unacceptable in quality. It led to the fact that stunting prevention was delayed by 6 months.

## **Annex H: Analysis of Nutrition Sector**


### **Part I: Background in Burundi**

1. Burundi has one of the highest chronic malnutrition rates in the world. High levels of poverty remain a key obstacle to development in Burundi which is currently ranking 184th out of 188 on the 2014 Human Development Index. Recent data from International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI, 2014) indicates that Burundi is the country most affected by hunger of all those listed, a situation which is described as “extremely alarming. Close to 90% of the population live in rural areas and depend on agriculture for their own food consumption, making them vulnerable to food insecurity linked to seasonal weather fluctuations. It is difficult for households to provide children with adequate intake of essential nutrients such as vitamins and minerals for optimal immunity, growth and development.
2. Burundi classifies as “extremely alarming” on the Global Hunger Index (GHI). The Index combines three equally weighted indicators into one score: the proportion of people who are undernourished, the proportion of children under five who are underweight, and the under-five child mortality rate.
3. In a report by the UN Secretary-General, Burundi topped the list of countries having made the greatest strides in education, although it remains among the poorest countries in the world. According to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the proportion of children in school increased from 59% in 2005 to 96% in 2011. The fact that Burundi is emerging from war and that its schools were then often targeted makes the progress even more remarkable. The real problem is retention — keeping students in school up to the final year of primary school. Dropout rates from school need to be analyzed from a gender perspective. For long and at a certain age, girls drop out more than boys. The problems multiply at puberty due to the lack of separate sanitation facilities for boys and girls, early marriage and teenage pregnancies.


### **Statistics, Definitions**

4. Stunting, indicated by low height for age, reflects long-term consequences of malnutrition: it results from the fact that many children are not adequately fed (fewer than 10% of children under 5 are consuming a minimum acceptable diet) due to chronic food shortages, and suffer from major childhood illnesses including pneumonia, diarrhea and malaria. In addition, poor hygiene and sanitation conditions of the population contribute to worsen the situation. About 75% of households have access to water (JMP, 2014), only 6% have infrastructures for hand washing with soap, while only 50% (SOWC 2014) have access to adequate sanitation. The graphic below shows clearly, that stunting rates decreased only slightly from 63 to 58 % from 2000 – 2011 and remain unacceptably high. The results from the CSFVA 2014 have found 48.8 % of all children to be stunted with regional variations (see section on stunting prevention later in the document).
5. Underweight, indicated by a low weight for age is a rather unspecific indicator and the high rates are most likely influenced by the already low height for age. The rates have been decreasing from 39 % in 2000 to 29 % in 2011.
6. Wasting rates, indicated by a low weight for height have been decreasing slightly as well, whilst data on child obesity are increasing. This is a worldwide phenomenon and needs to be monitored in all places.

**Figure 4 - Effects of malnutrition, 2000 - 2011**




**Figure 5 - Mapping of malnutrition in Burundi**



7. The under-five mortality rate, which is as well a predictor of the malnutrition situation has been decreasing constantly over the last years as can be seen in the graph below. The maternal mortality (970/100,000) is particularly high, indicating that almost 1 out of 100 women dies during and after delivery.

**Figure 6 - Under-5 mortality rate, 2004 - 2015**



8. Micronutrient deficiency indicators include anemia and iodine deficiency in children at 56% and 61% respectively, anemia in pregnant women at 47%, vitamin A deficiency in pregnant women at 28%, and a 47% risk of zinc deficiency throughout the population.

#### **National policy against malnutrition**

9. The National Forum on Food Security and Nutrition, that took place from 12 to 14 December 2011, under the patronage of the Second Vice-President, led to a series of recommendations, compiled on a “roadmap” aimed at:

- i. Reinforcing the synergy and implementation of multi-sector and transversal strategies designed to address
  - ii. the current and future challenges in food security and nutrition.
  - iii. Summarizing the actions to be followed and new actions to be undertaken in order to contribute to the long-term objective of food and nutritional security.
  - iv. Setting up a multi-sector platform for food security and nutrition (PMSAN) with the goal of ensuring cross-sector initiatives and better coordination in the fight against malnutrition under the leading role of a high level political authority.
10. The quantified results set by the roadmap are the following:
- i. Reduction of chronic malnutrition from 58% to 48% for children under 5
  - ii. Decrease in underweight from 29% to 21%
  - iii. Decrease in people suffering from extreme food insecurity
  - iv. Increase of 10% in agricultural production and animal husbandry
11. The government – in relation to supportive policies - in addition, is highly engaged in the nutrition support and has launched in 2013 a multi-sectorial platform for Nutrition and Food Security. At the same time, Burundi had also finalized its multi-sectorial roadmap for Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN). This had roadmap provided the basis for a national strategic plan for nutrition and the establishment of the multi-sectorial platform. A number of ministries, international organizations, religious

groups, research institutes, the private sector and civil society are involved in the platform, however the structure so far mainly operate at national level.

12. Burundi is also one of the 12 countries in which the REACH approach was rolled out. REACH was jointly launched in 2008 by the FAO, UNICEF, WFP, and the WHO to assist governments of countries with a high burden of child and maternal under-nutrition to accelerate the scale-up of food and nutrition actions.

### **WFP approach; overall WFP Strategic Plans, other corporate documents**

13. For the current CPE evaluation, the Strategic Plan 2008 – 13 as well as the one for 2015 – 2017 needs to be reviewed.

14. In both documents the Strategic Objective 1 (**SO1**) is to save lives and to protect livelihoods in emergencies which includes general and targeted food assistance in both cases. This applies in the Burundi case especially for the support to refugees, returnees and displaced people (EMOP)

**SO2 of the Strategic Plan from 2008-2013** is dedicated to:

- i. “prevent acute hunger and invest in disaster preparedness”,
- ii. The **SO2** in the WFP Strategy 2014-2017 is focusing on
- iii. Support and restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies.
- iv. goal 4 looks at equitable access to and control over food and nutrition assistance for women and men.

15. From the nutrition perspective, **SO4** is relevant in both strategic Plans.

- i. 2008-2013: reduce chronic hunger and under-nutrition;
  - bring under-nutrition below critical levels
  - break the intergenerational cycle of chronic hunger.
  - increase levels of education and basic nutrition and health through food and nutrition assistance
  - meet the food needs of those affected by HIV/ AIDS
- ii. 2014-2017: Reduce under-nutrition and break the intergenerational cycle of hunger
  - prevent stunting and wasting
  - treat moderate malnutrition
  - address micronutrient deficiencies particularly among young children, pregnant and lactating women and people infected with HIV, tuberculosis and malaria by providing access to appropriate food and nutrition assistance
  - increase access to education and health services for children, adolescent girls and families

16. What is obvious when comparing the two documents and especially SO4 is the move towards the prevention of stunting, which was not explicit in the older Strategic Plan. The CP has included this through a blanket feeding approach of pregnant and lactating mothers and children under 2 years of age. Whilst blanket feeding was always a measure, when acute malnutrition levels rose beyond the emergency threshold, the present approach is meant to complement the activities by other Un partner agencies in preventing chronic malnutrition, addressing the window of opportunity (1000 days, SUN initiative)

17. This move is as well reflected in the update of the **WFP Nutrition Policy** which

was originally approved in February 2012 and was reviewed and updated in June 2013 at the request of the Board. This was necessary due to the fact that WFP has been involved in: i) expansion of the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement to cover 33 countries; ii) consultations for the post-2015 development agenda; and iii) the new series in *The Lancet* on nutrition to be published by the middle of 2013.

18. The updated policy has four nutrition-specific pillars:

- i) treatment of moderate acute malnutrition among children under 5, pregnant and lactating women and people living with HIV or receiving treatment for tuberculosis;
- ii) prevention of acute malnutrition;
- iii) prevention of stunting during the first 1,000 days; and
- iv) addressing micronutrient deficiencies.

The policy also covers nutrition-sensitive interventions within school feeding, general food distributions, food for assets, training or work, and other interventions in which nutrition is not the primary goal.

### **Country Strategy for Burundi 2011-15, in Country Program and PRROs**

19. The WFP-Burundi country strategy identifies three priority areas: (i) food and nutrition security; (ii) capacity development of government institutions; and (iii) humanitarian response action. For nutrition interventions, especially priority area one needs to be analyzed:

**Country Program** (200119) focuses on nutrition assistance for vulnerable groups with the aim of improving the nutritional status of targeted women and children as well as improved treatment success of HIV patients – **Blanket feeding to prevent stunting**

**PRRO** (200164) intends to :

- i. improve acute malnutrition among the targeted population affected by conflict and natural disaster (refugees and returnees)
- ii. improved food consumption of targeted emergency affected households
- iii. assistance through institutional feeding

**PRRO** (200655)

- i. **targeted supplementary feeding** to reduce global acute malnutrition – plus protection rations for respective households (this part was turned off and on)
- ii. Relief rations for Congolese refugees
- iii. Targeted food distribution to vulnerable households
- iv. Food assistance for expelled migrants
- v. Institutional feeding and school feeding (to be transferred to upcoming new CP)

### **Partners**

20. The following partners have been cooperating with WFP on various nutrition- and school feeding-related activities.

**Table 6 - List of partners in nutrition and school feeding**

<b>National Strategic Partners</b>	
<b>Ministry of Health</b>	Partnership with WFP in PRONIANUT (Programme National intégré d’Alimentation et de Nutrition) and supplementary feeding programme for HIV victims (CNLS – Conseil National de lutte contre le Sida).
<b>Ministry of Education</b>	Partnership with WFP in school feeding and related activities; decentralised management at provincial level (DPE – Directions provinciales de l’Education)
<b>2<sup>nd</sup> Vice-Presidency</b>	House the Secretariat for global SUN and REACH nutrition initiatives.
<b>International Strategic Partners</b>	
<b>UNICEF</b>	Main UN partner in nutrition, school feeding and pre-school programmes.
<b>Direct Partners</b>	
World Vision International (WVI)	Key implementing partner of WFP for chronic malnutrition (Rutana, Karuzi, Muranvya), and (iii) SUN advocacy.
German Agro Action (Welthungerhilfe)	WFP’s implementing partner in school feeding (Kirundo province) pre-school, kitchen gardens.
CAPAD	Partner for P4P and school feeding in BJM rural, Cibitoke, Bubanza.
<b>Operational beneficiaries</b>	
Provincial Directorates for Education, school directors	Participated in WFP-supported school feeding and capacity development activities in Cibitoke, Bubanza, Bujumbura rural, Muyinga, Ngozi.
School committees, parents (school feeding, school garden)	Participated in WFP-supported school feeding and capacity development activities.
Districts sanitaires (decentralised MoH)	Partners in supplementary nutrition in Ruyigi, Rutana and Ngozi

## Part II: Nutrition Programming in Burundi – Background Analysis on Stunting Prevention

21. The *Lancet Maternal and Child Nutrition Series* (2013) ends its first paper<sup>1</sup> with a reconfirmation of the **focus on “pregnancy and the first 2 years of life, the crucial 1,000 days,”** called for in the previous (2008) series. Based on new evidence, the 2013 paper adds more emphasis to the “nutritional conditions in adolescence, at the time of conception, and during pregnancy as important for maternal health and survival, fetal growth, and subsequent early childhood survival, growth, and development. The 1,000 days between pregnancy and a child's 2<sup>nd</sup> birthday recognized as the most critical time for positive impact on a child's cognitive and physical development. Focusing multi-sector nutrition efforts on evidence-informed interventions targeting this critical window can have lasting implications across the lifecycle.


22. The last statement includes some very important aspects. First of all, **there is as yet not enough evidence** concerning the most important factors that cause stunting and the overall famous UNICEF model can be easily applied to seek reasons in all sectors. Applying interventions in all relevant fields, will most likely have the best impact but given the funding shortages, there needs to be a **region specific analysis** that will help to prioritize resources. Secondly, the Lancet series of 2013 has indicated that the **window of opportunity is most likely bigger than the 1000 days** and that much emphasis needs to be paid on adolescent age.

23. In 2013, when the important Lancet series on child malnutrition was published, Prentice et al. published another article in the *American Journal of Clinical Nutrition* ([Am J Clin Nutr.](#) 2013 May;97(5):911-8. doi: 10.3945/ajcn.112.052332. Epub 2013 Apr 3.) on „Critical Windows for nutritional interventions against stunting. The following paragraph is summarizing the most important points.

24. „An analysis of early growth patterns in children from 54 resource-poor countries in Africa and Southeast Asia shows a rapid falloff in the height-for-age z score during the first 2 y of life and no recovery until  $\geq 5$  y of age. This finding has focused attention on the period -6 to 24 months as a window of opportunity for interventions against stunting and has garnered considerable political backing for investment targeted at the first 1000 days. These important initiatives should not be undermined, but the objective of this study was to counteract the growing impression that interventions outside of this period cannot be effective. We illustrate our arguments using longitudinal data from the Consortium of Health Oriented Research in Transitioning collaboration (Brazil, Guatemala, India, Philippines, and South Africa) and our own cross-sectional and longitudinal growth data from rural Gambia. **We show that substantial height catch-up occurs between 24 months and mid childhood and again between mid childhood and adulthood, even in the absence of any interventions.** Longitudinal growth data from rural Gambia also illustrate that an extended pubertal growth phase allows very considerable height recovery, especially in girls during adolescence. In light of the critical importance of maternal stature to her children's health, **our arguments are a reminder of the importance of the more comprehensive UNICEF/Sub-Committee on Nutrition Through the Life-Cycle approach.** In particular, we argue that **adolescence represents an additional window of opportunity** during which substantial life cycle and intergenerational effects can be accrued. The regulation of such growth is complex and may be affected by nutritional interventions imposed many years previously“.

25. Looking into the life cycle approach the „Female vicious cycle of malnutrition“ which is shown below, indicates that the 1000 days window of opportunity is covering a very small part of the life cycle. In 1997<sup>53</sup>, WFP has convened an expert consultation on where to break this vicious cycle of malnutrition. During this meeting there was a clear understanding that adolescent age would be important to prepare the next generation and have teenage girls in a good nutritional status prior to their first pregnancy. Almost 20 years later, the same issues are being brought up again as very little interventions were geared towards adolescents during the last 20 years.

**Figure 7 - Vicious circle of female malnutrition**




26. The vicious cycle shows as well the importance of social factors, which need to be addressed in order to break the malnutrition cycle. Low status and discrimination of girls, lack of education and family planning as well as poverty need to be taken into account.

27. IFPRI, in 2000, has published a meta-analysis trying to understand the most important factors that contributed to the reduction in child malnutrition. Women’s education and their low social status together contribute with more than 50 % to those improvements. A lot of efforts have been made to increase female education worldwide but enrolment into schools will not automatically change women’s status in the society. Gender issues need to be addressed – not only in Burundi but worldwide.

<sup>53</sup> The consultant was part of this meeting in Rome in 1997 – unfortunately there is no good documentation of this meeting available

**Figure 8 - Major determinants for child nutrition**




Source: L. Smith and L. Haddad, *Overcoming Child Malnutrition in Developing Countries: Past Achievements and Future Choices* (Washington, D.C.: IFPRI, 2000).  
 Note: Malnourished children refers to underweight children.

IFPRI 2020

28. The way, gender issues can be taken into consideration and how they can impact on nutrition is shown in the graph below, which is based on the UNICEF conceptual framework. This framework explains as well all the other issues that need to be tackled if malnutrition can be improved.

**Figure 9 - Impact of gender issues on nutrition**



## Stunting prevention evidence

29. The concern raised in the context of the Burundi WFP Country Portfolio is that, partly due to the fact that WFP has started the activity in 2015 only, there is a yet very little evidence on what are the main reasons and most effective interventions to reduce stunting in Burundi.

30. WFP has published on its homepage the experience with stunting prevention in Malawi. **Anecdotal evidence** indicates that since the program started, fewer children are falling into malnutrition in Ntchisi district. Mothers are also reporting that their children are maintaining good health and experiencing sickness less frequently as they adopt good feeding practices“.

31. A FAO led project in Malawi, improving food security providing nutrition training had measurable results on stunting – researchers from the University of Giessen showed a 0.21 SD increase in the individual Z-Scores <sup>54</sup>of children. It needs to be pointed out that there was no blanket feeding but nutrition education and agricultural support.

## Supplementation during pregnancy

32. A meta-analysis done by Aamer Imdad and Zulfinger A Bhutta (2011) showed that providing females with balanced protein energy supplementation resulted in a significant reduction of 31 % in the risk of giving birth to small for gestational age infants. The impact was especially valid for undernourished pregnant women.

33. This finding is supported by another study from Schmidt et al, dating back to 2002 which was conducted in Indonesia. The researchers found that neonatal weight and length were the strongest positive predictors of weight for age and height for age of the infant’s nutritional status.

34. USAID has recognized in its own statement on stunting prevention that one-third of stunting is manifested as small for gestational age and preterm babies which reflects again the importance of targeting women during pregnancy and the pre-pregnancy period

35. However, IFPRI conducted a study in Burundi on stunting prevention supported by USAID. They published the first report on „Strengthening the PM2A Approach – Burundi Follow up Report“ in 2014. Their main findings were that

- i. There was **no significant impact observed on maternal weight** between intervention and control group. The project had a modest impact on hemoglobin and anemia
- ii. There was a slight **increase in dietary diversity** of pregnant women and children – but the difference was **due to the fortified corn soya blend**
- iii. Data on birth outcome have not been measured or are not available yet.

36. The same research team looked into stunting data but have not yet published the results. During a conference, the research team has presented some of these findings which have to be regarded as being preliminary. They mentioned that **from baseline to end-line, there was no difference in the stunting rates**. However, the control group deteriorated in their nutritional status which can be confirmed in Cankuzo (one of the intervention districts) between 2010 and 2014, where stunting rates rose from 48.3 % to 50.7 %, whilst the national average declined from 58.0 to

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<sup>54</sup> Z-Score, is named as well Standard Deviation Score. A child suffering from chronic malnutrition has a Z-Score below -2SD of the international reference population.

48.8 %. This fact opens the floor for two very important questions:

- i. What were the driving factors from 2010 to 2014 which brought down stunting rates by 9.2 %.
- ii. What was different in Cankuzo, where stunting rates increased during the same time period.

37. It is of utmost important to understand these factors in order to define a stunting prevention program that is able to support these issues. In this context it is important to look at the differences between districts which saw very different rates of improvement – from stagnation to improvements by almost 17 % (like in Ngozi).

**Table 2 - Rates of stunting improvement 2008 – 2014, by province**

	CFSVA 2008			DHS 2010			CFSVA / SMART 2014		
	H/A	W/H	W/A	H/A	W/H	W/A	H/A	W/H	W/A
Bubanza	46.3	8.5	25.2	56.1	5.5	26.1	55.9	4.9	26.6
Buija Marie				27.9	6.0	15.2	22.4	4.3	11.8
Bujumbura	46.2	6.9	22.4	59.8	5.6	23.4	46.5	5.3	19.7
Bururi	50.9	10.7	29.4	49.6	3.0	19.9	48.1	7.3	27.7
Cankuzo	44.9	18.9	26.2	48.3	6.2	27.7	50.7	5.5	28.2
Cibitoke	58.1	11.0	23.9	52.2	7.3	25.7	47.1	5.8	20.1
Gitega	53.2	3.7	23.1	59.7	3.9	29.6	52.9	3.3	24.6
KARUSI	46.8	9.0	22.0	68.1	3.8	30.7	53.9	5.3	31.7
Kavanza	56.7	4.7	23.1	55.4	6.7	31.4	55.7	2.0	31.1
KIRUNDO	51.9	5.5	25.7	60.3	7.6	28.1	47.5	5.0	23.8
MAKAMBA	49.5	9.3	26.9	62.1	6.9	23.7	46.4	4.2	22.7
Muramvya	50.4	9.4	30.2	63.5	4.5	34.9	50.0	6.8	31.0
Muyinga	56.6	10.4	30.5	61.1	2.7	32.9	59.0	4.4	25.5
Mwaru	57.0	8.4	26.5	56.7	5.5	26.0	37.1	6.3	23.3
Ngozi	61.8	4.7	26.1	71.2	5.5	33.7	54.4	8.5	35.3
Rutana	52.9	15.1	32.5	55.6	11.6	33.6	54.3	6.0	24.1
Ruvigi	52.6	9.3	34.5	66.1	8.6	44.5	54.3	8.1	28.9
Total	52.7	8.4	26.6	58.0	6.0	29.0	48.8	5.4	

38. An additional finding of the IFPRI research team was, that addressing the complete window of opportunity – from pregnancy through to 2 years of age – will have the comparatively best results. Having said this, it is clear that the approach by WFP – starting the intervention with children 6 – 18 months only – will not be as effective.

39. Last but not least, there are some more issues that need to be addressed in a stunting prevention program.

40. WHO's Member States have endorsed global targets for improving maternal, infant and young child nutrition and are committed to monitoring progress. Among others they are committed to bring down stunting rates by 40% up to the year 2025. In this context WHO has published a “Stunting Policy Brief” and the following issues are taken from this document:

- i. WHO is of course recognizing that adequate complementary feeding in addition to breastfeeding for children aged 6 – 23 months can help to address wasting and stunting.

- ii. Evidence shows that improved **dietary diversity** and especially **foods from animal sources** are associated with improved linear growth. However, these solutions have not been tried as standalone large scale programmatic interventions
  - iii. Reaching **dietary diversity through nutrition sensitive agriculture and income generation** are likely pathways to reduce stunting.
  - iv. Because stunting results from several households, socio-economic and cultural factors, reduction of stunting **requires that direct nutrition interventions are integrated and implemented in tandem with nutrition sensitive interventions.**
41. The same article is stressing on the importance to assess the **determinants of stunting in a specific geographical and social context** so that interventions can be tailored to address the contextual needs.
42. USAID has identified four high impact interventions to combat stunting and they have recognized the **importance of engaging fathers, grandmothers and other community influencers** only as a sub-point under „promote and support good maternal nutrition during pregnancy and lactation“ as well as “Social and behavior change“.
43. Last but not least, it might be important to look at a presentation from neighboring Rwanda on „**Gender, Families and Prevention of Stunting**“, which was done in February 2014. Some of the key issues were:
- i. Only a limited number of fathers care about food to be given to their children;
  - ii. The presence of men/husbands influences feeding practices in the HH;
  - iii. When women have control on the family funds, they generally spend more on health, nutrition, and education
  - iv. Prolonged absence of husbands from the HH negatively impacts on feeding practices,
  - v. Polygamous relationships in families further affect nutrition status of families -in the northern part - the food basin for Rwanda
  - vi. Families with GBV and conflicts –likely to be more affected with malnutrition
44. The presentation concludes that it is important to design gender-oriented strategies to fight against food insecurity and malnutrition and to help women in increasing their command over HH income and food empowerment.
45. The issue of gender based violence in this context needs to be looked at in the Burundian context. The DHS 2010 has looked into GBV and the following tables demonstrate clearly, that action is needed to improve the situation for women.
46. The DHS surveys worldwide include a chapter on the status of women in the society and off late it includes systematically the view of women on „the right“ of men to beat them up for 5 reasons:
- i. burning food,
  - ii. disputing with him,
  - iii. neglecting children,
  - iv. going out without telling him, and
  - v. refusing sex.
47. As compared to other countries, the figures for Burundi are alarmingly high, as 73 % of the women feel that the husband has this right for at least one of these reasons. As compared to this,“ only“ 43% of men think that they have the right to do so.

However, it is alarming that 55% of the 15 – 19 year old youths feel they have the right, which means, the younger the men, the more they feel they can do it. (see 2 tables at the end).

1. This calls for action, as increasing rates of GBV have been reported even by beneficiary women during the field visit of the evaluation team – they said – „it is like an epidemics“.

## Conclusions

2. From all the statements above it is clear that there is as yet not enough evidence on the blanket feeding approach to combat stunting. Therefore it is highly recommended, in partnership with all concerned actors – in particular the Ministry of Health and UNICEF:
  - i. to pursue the efforts that have just started and **apply consistently WFP's Nutrition guidelines**, while **following also the complete SUN prescription of 1000 days**, if direct nutrition interventions are needed;
  - ii. to apply a **continuum of care services** at health centers and community levels integrating nutrition with access to food; to **combine nutrition specific with nutrition sensitive** interventions
  - iii. to support the development of a **national stunting reduction strategy**, and **continue promoting the SUN initiative**;
  - iv. to **improve M&E analysis** of nutrition outcome data and have a regional or **country/ district specific analysis** trying to identify the key determining factors of stunting as they can obviously vary from region to region;
  - v. to **address gender** issues systematically which means as well to include men in these activities (e.g. nutrition education, child care, health preventive measures, etc. );
  - vi. to work with adolescent **girls and boys** in a very innovative measure. Take the opportunity to give training, provide income earning opportunities, talk about gender issues, family planning HIV/ AIDS prevention etc.

**Table 3 - Opinion of women about gender violence**

Caractéristique sociodémographique et économique	Il est justifié qu'un mari batte sa femme quand elle :					Pourcentage d'accord avec, au moins, une des raisons citées	Effectif
	Brûle la nourriture	Argumente avec lui	Sort sans lui dire	Néglige les enfants	Refuse d'avoir des rapports sexuels avec lui		
<b>Groupe d'âges</b>							
15-19	28,3	32,3	49,9	63,1	41,1	73,9	2 359
20-24	25,6	30,0	49,5	61,9	45,7	72,5	1 832
25-29	22,4	30,0	46,2	61,3	46,3	72,9	1 608
30-34	20,8	28,0	44,5	57,8	45,6	69,0	1 064
35-39	24,1	31,9	48,0	60,4	47,5	72,1	1 067
40-44	24,4	33,2	50,9	61,3	52,5	73,7	745
45-49	26,1	32,8	54,2	65,7	55,4	77,0	714
<b>Emploi (12 derniers mois)</b>							
N'a pas travaillé	23,7	26,9	44,2	60,9	39,4	71,0	1 634
A travaillé et a été rémunérée en argent	24,4	30,7	44,6	57,7	43,3	68,2	1 223
A travaillé mais n'a pas été rémunérée en argent	25,4	32,1	50,6	62,6	48,3	74,3	6 525
<b>Nombre d'enfants vivants</b>							
0	25,7	29,0	47,9	61,0	39,0	71,0	3 386
1-2	25,6	32,6	49,8	62,1	49,7	74,0	2 279
3-4	23,5	32,8	48,2	61,9	48,4	73,6	1 900
5+	24,4	31,0	49,7	62,2	52,5	74,3	1 823
<b>État matrimonial</b>							
Célibataire	25,6	28,7	47,6	61,3	38,1	70,9	3 121
Mariée ou vivant ensemble	23,6	31,3	48,3	61,5	49,1	73,5	5 421
Divorcée/séparée/veuve	31,3	37,9	56,1	64,6	56,7	77,0	847
<b>Résidence</b>							
Urbain	15,1	21,1	38,2	48,2	31,4	56,1	1 002
Rural	26,1	32,2	50,0	63,3	47,9	74,9	8 387
<b>Région</b>							
Bujumbura Mairie	12,1	16,5	33,6	42,1	25,0	49,7	683
Nord	36,0	41,0	53,2	63,9	55,1	78,4	2 700
Centre Est	25,9	30,5	48,4	62,8	44,9	74,1	2 374
Ouest	17,7	24,0	45,3	64,4	43,2	72,0	1 586
Sud	19,2	28,9	51,0	61,9	44,9	72,8	2 046
<b>Niveau d'instruction</b>							
Aucun	28,6	36,2	52,8	65,1	52,6	77,1	4 211
Primaire	24,4	29,7	49,1	62,3	45,5	73,9	4 042
Secondaire ou plus	13,3	17,0	32,3	47,0	24,2	54,0	1 136
<b>Quintiles de bien-être économique</b>							
Le plus pauvre	32,0	39,0	53,9	65,0	53,9	77,5	1 898
Pauvre	27,6	35,0	51,9	64,6	50,3	77,6	1 910
Moyen	24,7	30,9	50,0	64,5	46,4	75,0	1 854
Riche	24,1	28,9	46,7	62,6	45,4	73,1	1 811
Le plus riche	16,4	21,4	41,3	52,0	34,6	61,6	1 916
<b>Ensemble <sup>1</sup></b>	25,0	31,0	48,8	61,7	46,1	72,9	9 389

<sup>1</sup> Y compris 6 femmes pour lesquelles l'information sur l'emploi est manquante.

**Table 4 - Opinion of men about gender violence**

Tableau 16.7.2 Opinion des hommes concernant le fait qu'un mari batte sa femme: Hommes							
Pourcentage de tous les hommes de 15-49 ans qui pensent qu'il est justifié que, pour certaines raisons, un mari batte sa femme, par raison particulière et selon certaines caractéristiques sociodémographiques, Burundi 2010							
Caractéristique sociodémographique	Il est justifié qu'un mari batte sa femme quand elle :					Pourcentage d'accord avec, au moins, une des raisons citées	Effectif
	Brûle la nourriture	Argumente avec lui	Sort sans lui dire	Néglige les enfants	Refuse d'avoir des rapports sexuels avec lui		
<b>Groupe d'âges</b>							
15-19	13,5	24,5	28,2	40,5	29,0	55,8	932
20-24	7,4	18,2	20,8	32,3	20,5	44,0	732
25-29	5,5	17,0	18,7	28,7	16,3	42,3	584
30-34	3,7	13,3	16,9	25,8	13,4	35,6	442
35-39	2,1	16,1	16,5	27,6	13,4	38,2	388
40-44	5,6	13,0	22,2	24,5	17,5	39,0	349
45-49	3,2	15,4	17,4	27,7	16,5	40,3	331
<b>Emploi (12 derniers mois)</b>							
N'a pas travaillé	10,4	21,4	24,9	36,2	23,1	49,2	491
A travaillé et a été rémunéré en argent	5,0	17,5	19,3	28,5	18,8	42,7	1 408
A travaillé mais n'a pas été rémunéré en argent	7,9	17,6	21,7	32,2	19,5	44,0	1 852
<b>Nombre d'enfants vivants</b>							
0	10,2	20,9	23,8	34,8	24,5	48,9	1 781
1-2	5,9	16,7	18,7	29,2	15,5	42,6	730
3-4	3,3	14,3	16,6	27,2	15,2	37,4	620
5+	3,3	15,1	21,4	28,3	15,7	39,7	628
<b>Etat matrimonial</b>							
Célibataire	10,5	20,5	24,2	34,8	24,7	49,0	1 652
Marié ou vivant ensemble	4,3	15,9	18,7	28,5	15,9	40,4	2 057
Divorcé/séparé/veuf	9,1	24,9	30,3	37,6	16,4	48,6	51
<b>Résidence</b>							
Urbain	4,5	12,8	15,9	23,4	14,1	34,2	578
Rural	7,6	19,0	22,2	32,9	20,8	46,1	3 181
<b>Région</b>							
Bujumbura Mairie	4,6	12,2	15,7	23,8	13,7	33,8	430
Nord	10,1	19,2	22,9	36,7	21,3	49,4	1 078
Centre Est	7,0	18,0	21,5	31,8	16,6	43,0	816
Ouest	4,4	12,9	17,0	24,9	18,9	39,6	637
Sud	6,6	23,7	25,1	33,1	24,8	48,0	798
<b>Niveau d'instruction</b>							
Aucun	6,6	18,9	21,9	32,2	21,1	46,4	1 066
Primaire	8,2	20,1	23,4	33,7	22,0	47,2	1 891
Secondaire ou plus	5,2	12,0	15,5	24,9	12,6	34,4	803
<b>Quintiles de bien-être économique</b>							
Le plus pauvre	10,6	22,2	23,6	36,1	21,9	49,7	600
Pauvre	8,6	17,5	20,2	31,3	22,3	44,7	700
Moyen	5,1	20,2	24,6	32,5	22,8	46,8	717
Riche	7,4	19,4	21,6	35,5	18,8	46,6	772
Le plus riche	5,0	13,2	17,8	24,5	15,2	36,8	970
Ensemble 15-49 <sup>1</sup>	7,1	18,0	21,3	31,4	19,8	44,3	3 760
50-59	3,8	16,5	17,7	28,0	15,8	36,9	520
Ensemble 15-59	6,7	17,9	20,8	31,0	19,3	43,4	4 280

<sup>1</sup> Y compris 9 hommes pour lesquels l'information sur l'emploi est manquante.

## **Annex I: Analysis of Food Security and P4P Sectors**

48. The present annex includes a description of food security sector (including modalities such P4P, FFA, C&V) needs, policies and activities, together with an analysis of the findings captured during desk study and fieldwork.

### **I. Background in Burundi**

#### *Context*

49. As already stated in the country context, Burundi has limited resources, low income and suffers from food deficit (below). The country is mainly made up of hills and mountains interspersed with plains. With a population of 10.8 million people<sup>55</sup>, Burundi has the 2nd highest population density in Sub Saharan Africa at an estimated 421 persons/per km<sup>2</sup> in 2014 (314 in 2008). Poverty is widespread with 65.3% of the population living on less than US\$1 a day.

50. The backbone of the Burundian economy is agriculture dominated by subsistence farming which engages 80.6% of the active population. The agricultural sector is hindered by a lack of new investments, limited access to land (compounded by a high population pressure), poor soil fertility, poor water management, weak extension services and a high prevalence of plant disease. Agricultural production is also affected by variable and unpredictable rainfall. Since the 1993-2005 conflict, the contribution from cash crops (namely coffee, tea and cotton) to exports has declined significantly. Coffee now represents the principal cash crop accounting for two-thirds of total exports, remaining the key foreign exchange earner.

51. The global economic recession of 2008, including the crisis for fuel and food prices, has also affected the already fragile economic fabric of Burundi. Between 2007 and 2008, food prices registered an increase of about 28%. The combined effects of high food prices and eroding household purchasing power has resulted in increased vulnerability. The latter was especially evident in urban areas as the lower strata of the poor struggled to meet their immediate basic food needs.

#### *Statistics*

52. Hunger and under-nutrition are key concerns as the country grapples with a myriad of problems confronting the agriculture sector. Burundi was relatively food-secure before the 1993 conflict, but now faces a yearly food deficit of about 401,000 mt<sup>56</sup> in cereal equivalent after commercial imports and food assistance. In 2009, the total food requirement was estimated at 1.7 million metric tons (MT) in cereal equivalent.

53. The 2008 Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Analysis (CFSVA) revealed that 27.8% of Burundian households were affected to some degree by food insecurity. However, there are significant disparities within and between provinces. The most food insecure provinces are in the North-East (Cankuzo, Karusi, Muyinga, Ngozi, and Kirundo), while the highest proportion of poor households is in the North-West (Cibitoke, Bubanza and Bujumbura Rural). Together the two regions account for 51.5% of the country's population and 86.8% of the food insecure. The average food insecure households consume cassava, banana, oil and pulses every day, which

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<sup>55</sup> Population Census Results 2008

<sup>56</sup> CFSAM, 2009B (from February to June. This is the season that is expected to cover 50 percent of the food production.

represents approximately 67% of household income spent on food. For the poor and food-insecure households, income opportunities are focused on smallholder agricultural production. According to the CFSVA, food security is correlated to wealth and asset ownership such as land size for agricultural production and livelihood assets such as farming inputs, as well as demographic factors such as household size (e.g. single elderly) and households headed by women. Furthermore, food-insecure people rarely cultivate cash crops and produce fewer varieties of crops in general.

54. The 2008 CFSVA also revealed that the high population density, high dependency rate and high population growth combined with structural problems in the economy (heavy reliance on limited natural resources) contributes to the population's vulnerability to food insecurity. Food insecurity in Burundi is exacerbated by environmental factors: climate change, erosion/loss of fertile soil and plants, pests and recurrent national disasters in the form of flooding and droughts. As a consequence of the high population density, on average 42.1% of households have access to between 0.25 and 0.5 ha of land for cultivation. Female-headed households are reported to be twice as likely to have 0.25 ha of land or less compared to male-headed households. Poor storage conditions for agricultural produce and the absence of adequate knowledge and means of food preservation techniques and transformation constitutes a lost opportunity for improved food access and income generation. Instead, the majority of vulnerable rural farmers resort to a vicious cycle of selling their produce during the harvest when prices are low, to buying food at high prices during the lean season. High transportation costs and poor road networks constitute a disincentive not only to improved food production, given the high cost of inputs and fuel, but also to food access linked to high food prices. Overall, 26.9% of rural households in Burundi are considered as asset-poor with limited access to resources – land and income -, have no livestock and limited access to water and sanitation facilities. This group of people is therefore trapped in a vicious cycle of poverty.

55. According to FAO, the IPC situation in Burundi from January to June 2013 is shown in figure 1 below; the areas in yellow are 'under pressure', and those in orange are 'in crisis'.

**Figure 10 - Food security situation in regions of Burundi**



## **II. National Food Security policy**

56. As stated in the CS, the 2009 National Food Security Program (NFSP)<sup>57</sup> is a follow up to the 2008 National Agriculture Strategy. The NFSP conforms to the PRSF. The main objectives of the NFSP are the following.

- i. Increased agricultural production;
- ii. secured agricultural production through enhanced soil fertility and water management, environmental protection and conservation of natural resources;
- iii. improved cash revenue of producers;
- iv. improved storage systems, commercialization and manufacturing of agricultural products;
- v. improved nutritional status of the population;
- vi. established and strengthened capacity for monitoring, early warning and rapid reaction to food crises in the regions most at risk and;
- vii. strengthened capacities of producers and their support structures.

57. Objectives n°2, 3, 4 and 7 are particularly relevant for the FFA, P4P and C&V approaches.

58. In addition, the National Forum on Food Security and Nutrition, that took place from 12 to 14 December 2011, under the patronage of the Second Vice-President, led to a series of recommendations, compiled in a “roadmap” aimed at:

- i. reinforcing the synergy and implementation of multi-sector and transversal strategies designed to address the current and future challenges in food security and nutrition;
- ii. summarizing the actions to be followed and new actions to be undertaken in order to contribute to the long-term objective of food and nutritional security;

<sup>57</sup> Programme National de Sécurité Alimentaire, 2009-2015

- iii. setting up a multi-sector platform for food security and nutrition (PMSAN) with the goal of ensuring cross-sector initiatives and better coordination in the fight against malnutrition under the leading role of a high level political authority.

59. The quantified results set by the roadmap –relevant to food security - are the following:

- i. N°3: Decrease in people suffering from extreme food insecurity
- ii. N°4: Increase of 10% in agricultural production and animal husbandry.

### **III. Overall WFP Strategic Plans**

60. CPE evaluation will review the extent to which the CS is aligned with the two Strategic Plans (SP) 2008 – 13 and 2014 – 2017.

61. Strategic Objective (SO)<sub>3</sub> of the Strategic Plan 2008-2013 was particularly relevant to food security: ‘Restore and rebuild lives and livelihoods in post-conflict, post-disaster or transition situations’.

62. The goals for SO<sub>3</sub> were as follows.

- i. To support the return of refugees and IDPs through food and nutrition assistance
- ii. To support the re-establishment of livelihoods and food and nutrition security of communities and families affected by shocks
- iii. To assist in establishing or rebuilding food supply or delivery capacities of countries and communities affected by shocks and help to avoid the resumption of conflict.

63. In the WFP Strategic Plan 2014-2017, two SOs are relevant to food security:

- i. SO<sub>2</sub> : Support or restore food security and nutrition and establish or rebuild livelihoods in fragile settings and following emergencies; and
- ii. SO<sub>3</sub> : Reduce risk and enable people, communities and countries to meet their own food and nutrition needs.

64. The 4 goals of SO<sub>2</sub> are the following.

- i. Support or restore food security and nutrition of people and communities and contribute to stability, resilience and self-reliance
- ii. Assist governments and communities to establish or rebuild livelihoods, connect to markets and manage food systems
- iii. Through food and nutrition assistance, support the safe, voluntary return, reintegration or resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons
- iv. Ensure equitable access to and control over food and nutrition assistance for women and men .

Whereas the 3 goals defined for SO<sub>3</sub> are:

- i. Support people, communities and countries to strengthen resilience to shocks, reduce disaster risks and adapt to climate change through food and nutrition assistance
- ii. Leverage purchasing power to connect smallholder farmers to markets, reduce post-harvest losses, support economic empowerment of women and men and transform food assistance into a productive investment in local communities
- iii. Strengthen the capacity of governments and communities to establish, manage and scale up sustainable, effective and equitable food security and nutrition

institutions, infrastructure and safety-net systems, including systems linked to local agricultural supply chains

65. Food security guidelines were issued by WFP in 2009, complemented by market analysis tools between 2010 and 2014 during the period covered by the CPE.

66. The 2008 WFP C&V policy was updated in 2011 – informed by best practices and a rapidly developing portfolio, which grew from 10 to 140 million US\$ between 2008 and 2010. The number of planned WFP beneficiaries supported with cash or vouchers was 2.5 million in 2009 and 4.2 million in 2010 (mostly in Asia and the Middle-East). By 2010, over 60 percent of the projects had used traditional delivery instruments such as paper vouchers or direct cash transfers. Electronic vouchers were used in seven projects, debit or smart cards in four, and e-money in two. Results were generally positive, but lessons learned indicated that the comparative performance of given C&V instruments depended much on the context (e.g. disrupt food supply chains after natural disaster are not conducive). The policy was evaluated in 2014, which pointed to often unrealistic expected outcomes and lack of monitoring (in particular about efficiency gains), and a certain lack of internal buy-in due to the still existing focus on logistics and food aid delivery.

67. Five WFP FFA modules (resilience, seasonal livelihood, participatory process, practical side, and M&E) were issued in 2011 and updated in 2014. An impact evaluation was also carried out in 2014, which concluded that in the short term, WFP was often effective ('positive but modest' changes) in providing food and employment to people in underserved communities during periods of civil unrest and natural disaster, and built useful assets in the process. However, FFA activities were often underfunded by up to 65%, and funding was variable and unpredictable. In the longer term, overall improvements in food security and dietary diversity were limited, and there were often problems of maintenance of assets.

68. After a 5-year pilot project of Purchase for Progress (P4P) conducted in 20 countries between 2008 and 2013, the 2014 evaluation and 'Reflections on the pilot' were subsequently published in February 2015. The report positively noted 'transformative partnerships' with a whole range of actors (farmers, CSO, private sector, authorities), increased gender empowerment, and increased access to markets. However, P4P is also 'complex, contextual, time-consuming, and operationally challenging'. Further research and analysis are needed. A P4P 'Baseline Sampling Strategy' was also produced, which can be useful as a reference for the Burundi CPE.

#### **IV. WFP Country Strategy for Burundi 2011-2015**

69. The WFP-Burundi Country Strategy (CS) identifies three priority areas: (i) food and nutrition security; (ii) capacity development of government institutions; and (iii) humanitarian response action.

70. More specifically, relevant to food security is the (sub-) objective 1.3 of the CS: 'to reduce vulnerability to acute under-nutrition and rebuild food and nutrition security among households and communities affected by shocks'.

71. The main objectives of the 'Support to Community Recovery and Development' component are to a) build/enhance the communities' resilience to shocks; b) restore, and; c) build the livelihoods of the local communities using the Community Development Plan as a main entry point. The overall goal is to ensure increased agricultural productivity and income for local communities and their access to food.

Support to Sustainable Land Management (SLM) is geared towards addressing soil erosion and soil fertility. WFP, in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture and partners, will explore opportunities to expand where they already exist / or introduce appropriate basic technologies to improve yields. WFP is also collaborating with the ADB in the area of Watershed Management, a partnership that will be broadened, especially in the area of skills development and capacity building.

72. For food security-related interventions, the following activities in the programs will be assessed by the CPE.

- i. Country Program 200119 (2011-2014): component 3 ‘Support for Community Recovery and Development’ is particularly relevant. The intended outcomes of this component are: i) improved access of targeted communities to assets; and ii) improved food consumption. Activities envisaged under the component include FFW, FFT, and C&V, which should promote gender equity.
- ii. PRRO 200164 (2011-2012, extended to 2014): the ‘Early Recovery’ component of the PRRO envisages Livelihood asset protection/rehabilitation through FFW and FFT, and C&V for both the refugee and host populations.
- iii. PRRO 200655 (2014-2016): the ‘Recovery’ component includes FFA that targets vulnerable, agriculture-based and food-insecure populations in provinces hosting refugees and with high concentrations of returnees and expelled migrants. Activities should focus on rehabilitating productive infrastructure, access roads, storage facilities and other assets. Vouchers are also to be distributed after harvests (based on market analysis and the availability of cash contributions), and synergies should take place with FAO and IFAD.

## V. Partners

73. The following partners have been cooperating with WFP on various food security-related activities.

**Table 17 - List of partners in food security**

<b>National Strategic Partners</b>	
<b>Ministry of Agriculture</b>	Line Ministry in charge food security and main counterpart of WFP in the Government.
<b>International Strategic Partners</b>	
<b>FAO</b>	‘Sister agency’, very close collaboration with WFP in Burundi in programs of livelihoods / food security, resilience, nutrition and early warning.
<b>IFAD</b>	Partner for implementing agriculture-related community recovery and development activities
<b>Donors</b>	
<b>USAID</b>	Major partner in food aid (50% of total portfolio funding)

<b>The Netherlands</b>	7% portfolio contribution 2011-15. Integrated approach of school feeding and P4P in Cibitoke and Bubanza (case study for field visits)
<b>Direct Partners</b>	
World Vision International (WVI)	Key implementing partner of WFP for food distribution, C&V (Cankuzo, Karusi) and FFA (Rutana, Karuzi, Cankuzo, Muramvya), cash for assets / resilience (Karuzi)
CARITAS Burundi	Partner for targeted food distribution, vouchers and livelihoods for refugees and IDPs in all provinces
CAPAD	Partner for P4P and school feeding in BJM rural, Cibitoke, Bubanza.
PAIVA-B	Partner until 2014 for FFA / watershed management
<b>Operational beneficiaries</b>	
Agricultural cooperatives	Partners and beneficiaries of the P4P program

## **VI. Context analysis: briefing on the legal framework, food security, overall population movements, major climate disasters**

### *Social protection framework*

74. The National Social Protection Policy was adopted by the Government in 2011. The implementation strategy of this social policy was adopted in January 2015. In this regard, it should be noted that a National Commission for Social Protection, was inaugurated in April 2013 as the inter-ministerial body responsible for coordinating the implementation of the National Social Protection Policy. It is chaired by the President of the Republic, meaning that at the highest state level, strengthening the social security system has become a public policy priority. Other official documents have given direction to policies and programs related to social protection in specific thematic areas. For example, the National Strategy for Socio-Economic Reintegration of Populations Affected by Conflict, adopted in May 2010 (currently being updated) establishes a comprehensive framework for programs supporting the reintegration of refugees, displaced persons and ex- fighters (Ministry of National Solidarity, Human Rights and Gender – in short Ministry of Solidarity, 2010). The National Policy for Orphans and Vulnerable Children, adopted by the Council of Ministers in September 2008, provides an integrated framework for support to vulnerable children (Ministry of Solidarity, 2008).

## **VII. Food security and vulnerability**

### *Share of the agricultural sector in the national budget*

75. It is worth recalling that Burundi is among the states that have adopted the Maputo Declaration on agricultural issues, signed by African leaders at the African Union conference, held from 10 to 12 July 2003 in the Mozambican capital. The declaration represents the commitment of its signatories to increase the national budget for agriculture in order to revitalize the food and agricultural sectors and to ensure prosperity and overall socio-economic well-being. The table<sup>58</sup> below indicates the evolution of the share of national budget allocated to agriculture from 2008 to

<sup>58</sup> Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Élevage «Rapport sur les états généraux de l'agriculture et de l'élevage, Edition 2014», Novembre 2014.

2014:

**Table 28 - Share of national budget for agriculture**

	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
General Budget (national resources)			675,7	697,1	794,9	818,4	813,1
Ministry of Agriculture (national resources)	8,3	16,9	18,0	43,2	46,0	38,8	33,0
Agriculture (%)			2,7%	6,2%	5,8%	4,7%	4,1%
General Budget (+external resources)	520,4	578,7	685,7	1.026,2	1.268,2	1.413,3	1.438,1
Ministry of Agriculture Budget (+external resources)	11,2	64,7	44,0	75,7	143,8	128,0	173,0
Agriculture (%)	2,1%	11,2%	6,4%	7,4%	11,3%	9,1%	12,0%

*Budget in billions (Burundian Francs)*

*Source: finance laws*

76. Given this data, one observes that the budget allocated to agriculture and the financing of the agricultural sector has experienced significant changes over time. According to the Maputo Declaration, the share of the national budget dedicated to agriculture should be 10% each year. Considering only national resources, in Burundi this share has reached a maximum of 6.2% in 2011, trending downward to 4.1% in 2014. However, including external resources (drawings on loans and donations), by 2014, it reached 12%.

77. Although this rate is beyond the minimum proposed by the Maputo Declaration (10%), it should be noted that the sector is still too dependent on external resources, weakening the sector whenever the technical and financial partners' resources are diminished.

### *Food Security*

78. According to the Global Analysis of Food Security, Nutrition and Vulnerability in Burundi, conducted in August 2014, 32% of households were food insecure in 2014, including 7% who were severely food insecure and 25% who were moderately food insecure. This equates to more than 600 000 households that are food insecure, slightly less than 3 million people. 37% of households experience marginal or limited food security, and are vulnerable to food insecurity, while 31% are food secure. Compared to 2008, the situation seems to be improving in relative terms, however, with the rampant population increase, the number of food insecure people is on the rise.

79. In 2008, food insecurity has hit the provinces of North and East of Burundi much more because of recurrent droughts in the area starting in 2003. In 2014, the most affected provinces were in the center of the country, like Muramvya where the food insecurity rate is 56.7%, 46.9% in Karusi, and 41.8% in Kayanza. The households most vulnerable to food insecurity are: small households who are often single-parent or single-person (the elderly living alone) households, households headed by women (the situation has improved in recent years but female-headed households remain more vulnerable than those headed by men) and landless agricultural households or those that have only a small growing area at their disposal.

80. In this regard, it is worth remembering that, as a consequence to the high population density, the CFSVA in Burundi, conducted in 2008, revealed limited access to land and a precarious food security situation for the rural population. According to the data of this study, on average, 42.21% of households have access to an area of arable land between 0.25 and 0.5 ha. Access remains very difficult in the provinces of Kayanza, Ngozi, Bubanza and Rural Bujumbura, where the following percentages of

the population: 23.1%, 40.6%, 39.5%; 31.8%; 25.8% respectively dispose of an average area of 0.25 ha or less.

81. Given that 90% of the Burundian population lives of agriculture, the causes of food insecurity can mostly be attributed to agricultural issues. According to community discussions, food insecurity in Burundi is mainly due to five factors: the limited availability of land coupled with rapid population growth, climate change and weather, the lack of means to improve the harvest yield, land degradation, purchasing power in view of increases in food prices and overall social vulnerability.

#### *Causes of Vulnerability: risk and negative impact*

82. The negative impacts that have most seriously affected households over the last 12 months preceding the survey (February 2013-February 2014) are: disease, violent winds/ hail, severe water shortages as well as flooding. Insecurity has also been mentioned in some areas of Bujumbura (Mairie) and other urban centers. In 2008 the main shocks were drought, rising prices, hail and insects. All provinces of Burundi are exposed to some form of risk that could affect food security such as drought, floods, landslides, heavy rain, hail, or topsoil degradation. Regarding drought, an analysis of precipitation data for the last 15 years has shown that cases of moderate and severe droughts were frequent (more than 5 times) in several municipalities, such as Bubanza, Rural Bujumbura, Gitega, Muramvya and Mwaro. Floods affected mainly the areas around Bujumbura. Soil degradation is acute in the dry plateaus of the East. Faced with these shocks, the resilience of the population most affected by the severe water deficits, is still low. Any additional issues are likely to cause them to move out of the province or out of the country, to neighboring provinces in Rwanda and Tanzania.

#### *Market and Prices*

83. Over the past five years, the Food Security Global Analysis on Nutrition and Vulnerability in Burundi, conducted in August 2014, indicated that Burundi has experienced relatively high annual inflation (average 10.6%). After 2008, prices increased substantially following the global grain crisis, which represented an additional inflationary pressure for the country in 2012 with an inflation rate of 18.1%. Two features significantly contributed to inflation: Food and housing prices, as well as heating and lighting costs. Food prices were again on the rise on world markets, in turn affecting national prices, while national agricultural production actually fell by 30% in the first quarter of 2012. On the other side, household purchasing power did not follow suit, even during the harvesting season. More than half of household spending goes to food during lean seasons, sometimes reaching over 70%.

### **VIII. Population movements in Burundi**


84. Population movements in Burundi are manifold. Given the specificity of the mission, this part focuses on the following categories: (Mainly) Congolese refugees from the DRC fleeing insecurity in eastern DRC, climate disaster-related IDPs, and Burundians expelled from Tanzania.

#### *Congolese refugees from DRC*

85. UNHCR-Burundi was providing protection and assistance to 53,136 refugees (51.49% female, 49.51% male) and 3,021 asylum seekers on April 30, 2016. About 61% of the refugees are spread over 4 open camps, two in the north of Burundi (Ngozi and Muyinga): Musasa camp (12%) and Kinama (15%), and two in the East (Ruyigi and Cankuzo), Bwagiriza camp (17%), and Kavumu (17%). The rest of the refugees (39%) are urban refugees residing mainly in Bujumbura. The number of asylum seekers has

similarly increased as shown in the graphs below.

**Figure 211 - Numbers of refugees and asylum-seekers, 2011 - 2016**



**Figure 312 - Percentage of refugees per location**



**Notes**

Au 30 avril 2016, la population totale de réfugiés enregistrés au Burundi est de 53,130 composée à 51,49% de femmes et à 49,51% d'hommes.

39% de cette population vit en milieu urbain et 61% est reparti dans 04 camps.

Ces réfugiés sont à 99% originaires du Congo RDC, majoritairement du Sud Kivu d'où provient 89% de cette population.

86. The 1<sup>st</sup> graph shows the number of Congolese refugees (in blue) increasing from 2011 to the present day. It also shows (in red) departures recorded through the resettlement program for Congolese refugees, foreseeing resettlement of 18,000 Congolese refugees (effect catalyst / speculation).

87. The outlook for 2016 and beyond is not optimistic: the number of Congolese refugees is still likely to worsen with the uncertainty surrounding the postponement of the presidential elections that were considered in October 2016. In addition, deadly clashes armed vis-à-vis groups civilians continue in parts of eastern notably in the Beni territory in north Kivu.

### *Return of Burundian returnees*

88. During the period under review (2011-2015), the UNHCR, in collaboration with the Burundian Government through the Repatriation and Reintegration Support Program (PARESI), facilitates the reintegration of returnees in the various provinces of the country as shown in the table below:

**Table 3 - Distribution of returnees by province from 2011 to 31 December 2015**

	PROVINCE	EFFECTIFS					TOTAL	%
		AN 2011	AN 2012	AN 2013	AN 2014	AN 2015		
<b>1</b>	<b>BUBANZA</b>	477	325	186	96	2	<b>1086</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>BUJA MAIRIE</b>	331	396	130	100	17	<b>974</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>3</b>	<b>BUJA RURAL</b>	499	568	157	88	4	<b>1316</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>4</b>	<b>BURURI</b>	533	3738	315	88	4	<b>4678</b>	<b>11</b>
<b>5</b>	<b>CANKUZO</b>	1	1163	5	9	0	<b>1178</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>CIBITOKÉ</b>	2102	401	542	470	6	<b>3521</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>7</b>	<b>GITEGA</b>	23	1037	32	48	1	<b>1141</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>8</b>	<b>KARUZI</b>	14	1400	27	24	1	<b>1466</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>9</b>	<b>KAYANZA</b>	56	270	95	9	0	<b>430</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>10</b>	<b>KIRUNDO</b>	30	413	63	44	0	<b>550</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>11</b>	<b>MURAMVYA</b>	12	234	32	16	0	<b>294</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>12</b>	<b>MUYINGA</b>	37	1222	38	158	0	<b>1455</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>13</b>	<b>MWARO</b>	4	43	10	0	1	<b>58</b>	<b>0</b>
<b>14</b>	<b>MAKAMBA</b>	251	14794	320	73	1	<b>15439</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>15</b>	<b>NGOZI</b>	20	618	121	85	0	<b>844</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>16</b>	<b>RUTANA</b>	13	5244	29	3	2	<b>5291</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>17</b>	<b>RUYIGI</b>	7	3782	15	68	1	<b>3873</b>	<b>9</b>
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>4410</b>	<b>35648</b>	<b>2117</b>	<b>1379</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>43594</b>	<b>100,00</b>

Source: PARESI 2016

89. Regarding the return of returnees and their reintegration in their areas of origin, shown in the table and graph above, the areas that have recorded significant numbers of returnees include: Makamba (35%), Rutana (12%), Bururi (11 %) and Ruyigi (9%) and Cibitoke (8%).

90. Regarding the 2016 outlook and beyond, the refugee crisis on account of the current socio-political crisis in the country, could potentially give rise to a massive number of returnees if the crisis talks currently underway between government and opposition be successful.

### *Burundians expelled from Tanzania*

91. The current problem of Burundians being expelled from Tanzania originates in border migration flows that took place decades ago. Political events in 1965, 1972, 1988 and 1993 gave rise to a significant number of people fleeing Burundi in the direction of Tanzania. Some exiles chose to live in camps, receiving refugee status with all the benefits (assistance and protection), and drawbacks (addiction, confinement, lack of economic activity). Others preferred to join long-established Burundian communities in Tanzania, gradually becoming integrated in Tanzanian villages. This group has no

refugee status, either because the people involved did not apply, or due to the fact that, because they fled Burundi out of economic or social grounds, they were not able to apply for the status of (political) refugee. Estimates as to the size of this group are hard to come by due to the clandestine nature of this form of migration.

92. A final category represents people who migrate seasonally to sell goods or to find work as a laborer in Tanzania. Their number varies depending on the food or economic situation in Burundi. Sparsely populated lands and unexploited regions of Kagera, Kigoma and Kibondo in Tanzania have always attracted Burundian farmers, settling there indefinitely, or working as seasonal hands (especially during the lean season). Sporadic evictions have been reported in recent years, but from May 2006 evictions became more systematic. Contrary to returnees who are automatically supported by UNHCR, these returnees faced a dire humanitarian situation given that they don't fall under the mandate of UNHCR. Meanwhile the Burundi Red Cross and its partners have started a sizeable advocacy effort at the behest of this category, after which the issue also became a concern of several United Nations agencies. UNICEF (Emergency Section) had been identified as the focal point at that time. Currently, the Government, IOM, and other humanitarian agencies support the efforts of the Burundi National Red Cross in reintegrating these expelled Burundians. Given the time coverage of this evaluation, only the statistics covering the period from 2011 to 2015 have been identified and interpreted.

**Table 3 - Distribution of expelled people by province in January 2011 to December 2015 (source IOM)**

	RETURN PROVINCE	EFFECTIFS					TOTAL	%
		2011	2012	2013	2014	2015		
1	BUBANZA			15	6		21	0
2	BUJA MAIRIE			27	8		35	0
3	BUJA RURAL			14	297		311	1
4	BURURI			64	20		84	1
5	CANKUZO			308	35		343	1
6	CIBITOKÉ			47	29		76	0
7	GITEGA			2 269	388		2657	6
8	KARUZI			463	57		520	1
9	KAYANZA			259	12		271	1
10	KIRUNDO			1 101	45		1 146	3
11	MURAMVYA			117	7		124	0
12	MUYINGA			705	161		866	2
13	MWARO			152	5		157	0
14	MAKAMBA			785	187		972	2
15	NGOZI			895	41		936	2
16	RUTANA			26 286	2883		29169	64
17	RUYIGI			5 620	1053		6673	15
18	UNK <sup>59</sup>			892	221		1113	2
19	TANZANIE			52	1		53	0
20	RWANDA			6			6	0

<sup>59</sup> UNK (Unknown) : This is applicable to all individuals who were not able upon arrival to identify their native hills.

	<b>TOTAL</b>	-	-	<b>40 077</b>	<b>5 456</b>	-	<b>45 533</b>	<b>100</b>
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93. Regarding the sporadic evictions, it should be noted that during the period under review, there were no recorded evictions during the years 2011, 2012 and 2015. Regarding the return areas, the Rutana province recorded the highest percentage (64%), and Ruyigi the second-highest (15%). It should also be noted that among the expelled, there were some Rwandans as well. Compounding the issue are those deportees who, after spending longer periods in Tanzania, can no longer identify the hills from which they originated (2%). In this case, it is the administration that must find a resettlement location.

## **IX. Climate disasters between 2011 and 2015**

94. During last three years, Burundi has experienced climate-related disasters such as landslides, mud flows, floods, etc., resulting in population movements and loss of human life as well as material losses in different parts of the country, including the province of Rural Bujumbura, Rumonge, Bubanza and Cibitoke. In terms of climate-related disasters, it should be emphasized that the El Niño weather phenomenon had a substantial impact. During the September 2015 - March 2016 period, across 14 provinces there were 80 dead, 145 injured, 4,127 houses destroyed, 400 damaged houses, 112 damaged classrooms, 10,335 ha destroyed fields, 145 ha of flooded crops, 50 destroyed or damaged bridges, two small dams and one large electric dam damaged. In Bubanza, 62 cases of cholera were reported and 19 in Rumonge. Cases of malaria increased with 3,435,000 illnesses and 1,678 deaths reported across the 14 provinces considered most impacted by the phenomenon. In short, the El Niño phenomenon is a compounding factor, growing the ranks of an already vulnerable population facing poverty and instability. The list of registered disasters over the CPE period is as follows:

- i. 25-26 March 2013: Muyebe to Musigati: landslide
- ii. 9-10 February 2014 Gatunguru: landslides, flooding
- iii. March 2014 Camakombe Rugazi: landslide
- iv. March-April 2015: Nyaruhongoka: landslide, mud slides
- v. 31 march 2015: Rutunga Nyaruhongoka: landslide, rock and mud slides

95. From a larger perspective (2006 – 2015), the table below with the list of the 10 major natural disasters in Burundi and numbers of affected people, shows that the period covered by the evaluation has been relatively quiet. There was only 1 major flood in early 2014, to which WFP responded with the IR-EMOP 200678.

**Table 9 - Top 10 natural disasters 2006 – 2015**

Disaster	Date	Total Affected
Drought	déc-09	180.000
Drought	sept-08	82.500
Flood	01/01/2007	23.000
Flood	19/02/2014	12.682
Flood	12/04/2009	8.000
Flood	17/05/2006	5.000
Flood	déc-06	4.105

Flood	20/09/2008	2.775
Flood	15/10/2007	2.701
Flood	18/05/2006	2.000

## **X. Relevance of the choice of WFP intervention areas**

96. In terms of the intervention area, in addition to consultations with the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, WFP have based their choice on data from commissioned studies and needs assessments indicating the priority areas. For example, regarding priority 1 "Nutrition and Food Security," a study conducted in 2008 revealed that food insecurity was much more acute in the northeastern and eastern provinces because of recurrent droughts in the area since 2003, which explains the concentration of its activities in the northeast of the country.

97. However, one should note the lack of flexibility to adapt the program in view of the current trends in the course of the program's implementation. The same survey conducted in 2014 showed that the most affected provinces were those in the center of the country like Muramvya where food insecurity rates were 56.7%, and Kayanza with 41.8%.

98. As for Priority 3 "Response to humanitarian action", it should be noted that the areas with the highest number of returnees are the Makamba and Rutana provinces, while Rutana and Ruyigi have received more deportees. WFP interventions have targeted the Rutana province among others, with their implementing partner the Burundi Red Cross and World Vision Burundi. Rural Bujumbura is also part of WFP's intervention area on account of the impact of the landslides that have occurred there, on the population. Ruyigi province, second in terms of receiving expelled Burundians, and 4th in terms of receiving the repatriated, has not benefited from this specific program.

## **XI. General observations**

99. The evaluation of the WFP 2011- 2015 portfolio took place in a context where the country still faces various shocks threatening livelihoods. In addition to political disturbances, with communities increasingly competing for increasingly scarce resources, one should highlight the following elements: climate-related disasters, deterioration of soil fertility and plant diseases, price fluctuations, either of cash or subsistence crops, represent additional risks to livelihoods. Household vulnerability rises during the lean season before the harvest (Burundi alternates three agricultural seasons). The impact of disease seriously threatens livelihoods in a country where most health services are private and health insurance covers only a small proportion of the population.

100. In terms of the strategic direction of the program, it should be noted that the policy documents and strategies used as a reference for the development of the 2010-2014 country strategy, remain valid.

101. However, the strategy for the implementation of social protection, adopted in January 2015, provides additional social protection in terms of the coverage of social security. The Burundian state's approach to the subject aims to be more holistic and sustainable in reducing various vulnerabilities in order to further strengthen community resilience. The new WFP strategy would be well-advised to take this into account.

## **XII. Purchase for Progress (P4P)**

### *General context*

102. The initiative “Purchase for Progress” (P4P) is the largest pilot initiative implemented by WFP. It was initially tested in 20 countries for the period 2008-2013 and was then extended for one year. A comprehensive evaluation of the program was carried out and evidenced both a fine alignment of the program with WFP 2008–2013 Strategic Plan as well as the relevance to the wider international development agenda which regain attention to the role of smallholding agriculture as a effective strategy for poverty reduction<sup>60</sup>.

103. The implementation of the pilot phase has followed a sharp learning curve and enabled identification of responses to address the main challenges faced during the implementation. Countries offices are backed by a full-fledged unit which capitalise knowledge, ensure global M&E and designed guidelines and other methodological support to disseminate lessons-learnt.

### *Specific context to Burundi*

104. Towards the end of 2013, WFP initiated a four-year « P4P-like » initiative with the aim of supporting agricultural production of smallholder farmers by providing them reliable market opportunities. The rationale is to increase in-country commercialization of food commodities and therefore increase financial resources of low-income farmers. While not foreseen in initial Country Program Document (CP 200119), a budget revision approved by the board in November 2013 enabled WFP Burundi CP to roll out this activity aligned with Component 3 « Support for community recovery and development.

105. The formulation of this added component revolves around Goal 2 « Leverage purchasing power to connect smallholder farmers to markets, reduce post-harvest losses, support economic empowerment of women and men and transform food assistance into a productive investment in local communities » with a desired outcome of « Increased marketing opportunities for agricultural products and food at the regional, national and local levels ». In this respect, WFP made a commitment to supply maize, rice and beans to meet the needs of school feeding activities largely through local purchases.

106. The logical framework provided clear indicators and targets related to the tonnage of food procured locally through local and regional purchase (20,000 MT), tonnage of food purchased locally from smallholder associations (6,000 MT) and number of smallholder farmers trained in market access and post-harvest handling skills (500).

107. This action was designed to boost synergies with other WFP activities (home-grown school feeding - HGSC- and food fortification) as well as to strengthen complementarity with FAO and IFAD, in particular FAO farmers’ field schools<sup>61</sup>.

108. This shift was furthermore very much aligned to the Burundian Government’s strategic line of reinforcing agricultural production and was therefore much welcomed by the Government counterpart which co-funded it by supporting distribution of

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<sup>60</sup> P4P Evaluation.

<sup>61</sup> CP 200119 Budget revision

farming inputs (fertilizers).<sup>62</sup>

### *Implementation of P4P*

109. While initiated in the end of 2013, a P4P pilot was rolled out from 2014 with funding from the Dutch Cooperation worth USD 12 million in the three North western Provinces of Bubanza, Bujumbura Rural and Cibitoke, chosen for their high agricultural potential and therefore supported the extension of school-feeding activities in additional locations. WFP fundraised additional resources from Canada (USD 4,35 million) and the Cartier Foundation and Principauté de Monaco (USD 1 million). These grants enabled extension of activities to other Provinces Kirundo and Ngozi (Canada) and Muyinga (Cartier).

110. Since 2014, WFP has been working with 3 main partners: Confederation des Associations des Producteurs Agricoles pour le Développement (CAPAD), Organisation Diocésaine pour l'Entraide et le Développement Integral de Muyinga (ODEDIM) and ZOA dealing with the largest number of farmers. To date, 33 organisations have been supported by the P4P-like initiative out of which 24 cooperatives achieved to sell food commodities to WFP for a total amount of USD 4.75 million (FBU 7,315,397,280).<sup>63</sup>

**Table 5 - P4P main implementing partner and chart with geographical breakdown**

<b>WFP Partner</b>	<b>Number of cooperatives</b>	<b>Men</b>	<b>Women</b>	<b>Total members</b>
CAPAD	13	3 052	2 390	5 442
ODEDIM	9	1 063	938	2 010
ZOA	4	1 239	826	2 065
DPAE	3	914	807	1 721
unknown	1	677	403	1 080
PAIOSA	1	47	63	110
CAPAD/PAIOSA	1	28	62	90
HELP CHANNEL	1	14	4	18
<b>Total</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>7034</b>	<b>5493</b>	<b>12536</b>

*Source: compiled from procurement data of CO*

111. It is noteworthy to mention that P4P-like activities derive from usual procurement and require WFP to procure food commodities at a cost exceeding international market prices. Such derogation requires the CO to submit comprehensive annual local food procurement plans to obtain a waiver from the Food Procurement Service (OFSP). Once formal authorization is granted, they enable the CO to undertake « non-competitive transactions » (Procurement Plan 2014). Procurement plans 2014

<sup>62</sup> 2013 PRRO 200 678 Standard Project Report

<sup>63</sup> database by WFP CO Burundi

and 2015 provide elaborate details on WFP methodology to set commodity price for local purchase and confirmed the CO intention to comply with internal guidelines and in cooperation with the Ministry of Agriculture.

112. In 2015, building up on the experience of first P4P season, WFP recognized that the limited capacities of cooperatives did not offer the expected conditions to effectively face competitive procurement after two direct contracts as it had initially anticipated. The CO quickly reacted to this situation and adjusted its Procurement Plan 2015 to extend the waiver over the set limitation of two contracts. To address this challenge it also strengthened its capacity-building component on marketing and tendering.

113. Post-harvest management was the main focus of capacity development in the first season, while cooperatives' institutional and organizational capacities remained weak. In its procurement plan 2015, WFP acknowledge this weakness and indicate that in spite of situation having improved, cooperatives remained unable to compete with private traders.

114. Analysis of the main project documents for the 3 main partners highlighted that while P4P requires long-term capacity building (normally rolled out over several years), projects were usually implemented for a period of 12 months or less and budget allocated remained limited.

115. CAPAD benefited of the first project rolled out from March 2014 and partnered with WFP until the end of 2015. The NGO implemented a first phase with a total budget of US\$228,131. This was co-funded by different organizations – including Dutch funding through Oxfam Novib – and WFP contributed to a level of 20% (US\$81,620 in 2014). An extension of US\$47,718 was granted in 2015. The partnership was however discontinued in 2016 due to a number of outstanding issues between CAPAD and WFP. CAPAD identified and supported 22 cooperatives out of which 13 have been registered as WFP vendors.

116. ODEDIM initiated a partnership with WFP from the end of 2014 for a total amount of US\$21,795 to which WFP contributed to 89%, the remaining balance being funded through a contribution of the implementing partner. While ODEDIM identified and supported 15 organizations, only 9 have been registered as WFP vendors. ODEDIM project was renewed for 12 months up to the end of 2016 with additional budget of US\$21,302.

117. The Dutch organization ZOA also became WFP partner in 2015 and implemented a project worth US\$73,431.

118. Review of project proposals indicated that most activities focused on capacity building in post-harvest handling (PHH) (threshing, husking, bagging, storage), provision of PHH equipment, as well as human and organizational skills of cooperatives' leaders (support in registering as WFP vendor, contract and price negotiation, honoring contracts). CAPAD and Bureau Diocésain de Développement de Bubanza (BDDDB) also included support to increase agricultural production by the cooperatives. Overall, with the exception of ZOA, project proposals appeared ambitious in light of available means and design was weak (absence of logical framework, SMART indicators). Projects lack specific detail about methodology, and operational implementation of activities and work plans to follow up activities after training delivery.


119. The case of CAPAD project is striking as the project sets two targets related to increase of production and increase of income by 5% providing baseline data.

Reporting by the organization did not enable to verify the achievement of these targets, most likely due to the lack of M&E system and data collection.

120. On a more positive note the feasibility of ZOA project appeared higher due to its more limited ambition, clear problem analysis and focused objectives. Activities were geared toward enhancing storage capacities (construction of a community warehouse), strengthening knowledge of good stock-keeping practices and developing drying areas in the vicinity of existing stores funding through previous project co-financed by WFP. ZOA also promoted knowledge among cooperative members about the importance of supplying quality inputs and established a linkage with a recognized seed center.

121. Overall, projects remain focused on outputs and quantitative figures (number of people trained) rather on outcomes, impact and developmental / behavior change. In this respect, report do not provide evidence that transfer of knowledge and new practices taught to farmers and cooperative leaders has been well mastered and adequately applied by the end of training. Reported high number of participants in trainings does not seem conducive to ensure personalized feedback and short length of training sessions undermines the quality in enhancing understanding of complex issues such as cooperative governance and management. This later weakness is confirmed in CAPAD annual report 2015.

**Figure 4 - Breakdown by partner and region**



### Main Findings

122. In spite of the above-mentioned weaknesses, interviews have evidenced actual satisfaction by project beneficiaries and a real enthusiasm in the market opportunity offered by WFP. Cooperatives were chosen based on their pre-existing capacities to supply WFP and rely on a large base of producers. The choice by WFP and the Dutch cooperation of piloting the P4P-like program in the 3 North western regions of Burundi, which have great agricultural potential, was a sound decision. This enabled WFP to exceed the targets set in the budget revision and to learn from hands-on experience before enlarging the program to other regions.

*Indicator 1: "20,000MT of food procured locally through local and regional purchase".* Data provided by the Procurement office in Bujumbura reveal that in 2015 CO had procured 21,455 MT of food through local and regional purchase in 2015.

**Table 10 - Quantities of commodities purchased locally by WFP Burundi (2011-2015)**


Year	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	Total
Traders	0	0	1,202	2,780	11,804	<b>15,786</b>
Cooperatives	0	0	4	1,410	4,255	<b>5,669</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>1,206</b>	<b>4,190</b>	<b>16,059</b>	<b>21,455</b>

Source: Burundi CO – Procurement data (data from 2015)

123. The above table further evidences that purchases from cooperatives now accounts for over a quarter of total local purchase (26.4%) and this rapid transition happened in just 2 years. In the meantime, the share of cooperatives in local purchase increased from less than 1% of local and regional sales. This remarkable trend demonstrates WFP commitment to push forward local and regional procurement in Burundi and locally supply food for the school-feeding activity.

124. The figure below highlights the significant increase of local purchases and provide a geographical breakdown. Figures for 2016 represent the level of sales at the time of the evaluation but are not reflecting the final level expected for this year. The farming season is still ongoing and most of the procurement remains pending until harvesting time.

**Figure 513 - Evolution of sales per year and province (USD)**



*Indicator 2: “At least 6,000 MT of food procured locally”.* Updated figures indicated that in 2016, the target of 6,000MT procured locally has also been exceeded since the overall tonnage supplied through P4P reached over 8,000 MT as evidenced in table 3 and figure 2.


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**Table 711 - Overall tonnage of sold produces per commodity and region**

Province	Maize (MT)	Rice (MT)	Beans (MT)	Total
Bubanza	1891	1760	2000	5651
Bujumbura rural	410	500	0	910
Cibitoke	280	215	0	495
Muyinga	469	0	556,398	1025,398
<b>Total</b>	<b>3 050,00</b>	<b>2 475,00</b>	<b>2 556,40</b>	<b>8 081,40</b>

Source: compiled from procurement data of WFP CO

**Figure 614 - Overall tonnage of sold produces per commodity and region**



*Indicator 3: “500 farmers trained in market access and post-harvest handling”.* With the quick roll out of P4P-like activities, and enthusiasm of local producers enabled WFP to provide training in production and post-harvest management to 900 cooperative members from the first year of implementation <sup>64</sup>.

### Incomes

125. In terms of incomes, the tonnage sold by cooperatives has generated a significant amount of cash in local economies. Indeed, data from procurement office indicate that to date WFP procured a total amount of USD 4.75 million (table 8).

<sup>64</sup> 2014 SPR CP 200119

**Table 8 - Amount of sales by cooperatives in FBU and US\$ to WFP by cooperatives**

<b>WFP partner</b>	<b>Number of vendors</b>	<b>Total number of farmers concerned</b>	<b>Total income derived from contract (FBU)</b>	<b>Total income derived from cooperative sales to WFP (USD)</b>
CAPAD	10	2 676	6 053 930 000	3 931 123
ODEDIM	9	2 010	706 717 280	458 907
CAPAD/PAIOSA	1	90	285 000 000	185 065
DPAE	1	121	195 000 000	126 623
ZOA	2	1 280	56 000 000	36 364
PAIOSA	1	110	18 750 000	12 175
<b>Total I</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>6 287</b>	<b>7 315 397 280</b>	<b>4 750 258</b>

Source: compiled from procurement data of WFP CO

126. The success of P4P can be measured by the financial impact of P4P at household level. For this purpose the average income by group member was calculated based on the 24 groups (representing 6,287 farmers) which have yet sold commodities to WFP. It was found out that farmers which cooperatives participated in the supply of food crop raised an income ranging from US\$35 to 6,241 with an average of US\$1 148. However, this figure remains mainly indicative as not all farmers within one cooperative supply to WFP and as there are currently no records available to measure income more precisely.

127. This issue is also closely connected to the net profit made by farmers when they sell their produce. While all the implementing partners delivered trainings in administration and management of cooperatives, there is limited evidence that cooperative leaders were trained effectively in cost - benefit analysis. These skills are critical to enable them to make best the decisions for the choice of crops that they intend to grow and supply to WFP. In this respect, only CAPAD reported having calculated production costs for the 3 main commodities and provided an interesting analysis. Although production cost are different to each group, the result of their analysis is striking: Maize was found to be the crop with the lowest potential and may induce a loss to farmers since it would cost 635 FBU/kg to produce while market price offered by WFP ranged from 500 - 620 FBU. The situation is better for beans (production 755 FBU/kg for a market price around 900). Rice appears more profitable as production costs around FBU 760 and buying price has ranged from FBU 1100 - 1265 during project implementation. However, some farmers reported during interviews having made productive investment with the additional income (goats).

128. The limited evidences with regard to production costs and net profit undermine the impact of the project. WFP will have to assess this situation closely and make sure partners are trained to transfer this knowledge to cooperatives.

### *Geographical bias*

129. In the planning process of the second phase of P4P in Burundi (2016-2018) and the identification of new cooperatives, WFP conducted an analysis of the outcomes of the first phase in the three North western Provinces targeted with support of the

Netherlands. WFP identified a bias in coverage and geographical repartition of selected cooperatives. Cooperatives from Bubanza province outnumbered those in the two other provinces and this trend was also reflected in the tonnage purchased since over 75% of purchased commodities was realized in Bubanza.

130. Furthermore, WFP evidenced that the trend was in contradiction with the agricultural survey 2013-2014 that had evidenced Bujumbura has the highest production potential (“note sur l’identification des nouvelles cooperatives”). In order to address this bias, WFP has taken measures to review the identification process of cooperatives and to strengthen cooperation with the Provincial departments of Agriculture and Livestock. WFP further developed a new selection procedure for registration of cooperatives as local suppliers. This procedure further aims to carry out a comprehensive assessment of each group and detect potential frauds such as established traders intending to by-pass WFP competitive tendering and benefit from market opportunities offered by P4P to smallholding farmers (note on the identification of new cooperatives).

#### *Implementation challenges*

131. The implementation of P4P has revealed several bottlenecks affecting a smooth running of the program. While usual production challenges (unavailability of quality inputs, inefficient agronomic practices) WFP has also underestimated the time needed to build strong cooperatives ready to face competition. Governance within cooperatives remain low, so as their ability to position themselves on markets. WFP needs to adjust its operation to longer-term project duration in development which enables sufficient time for capacity building. Coordination with FAO Burundi in all areas pertaining to agricultural production would be necessary.

132. At the same time, partners have also expressed the difficulty of dealing with WFP and the inconsistent position they obtain on matter. Pricing and contracting have been the major issues of contention during the implementation.

133. The announce of the P4P seemed to rise much expectations among farmers about high prices. WFP also contributed to maintain this level of expectations by insisting on the high quality of produce they intended to procure. Farmers expected their extra efforts in post-harvest handling to be compensated with much higher prices. This further raised the question of contracting of farmers. In spite of WFP efforts and good intentions, well evidenced in the procurement plans, the negotiation of contract appeared to be difficult. This point also revealed inadequate communication between WFP Program and Procurement department and the specific constraints to procure food commodities outside of normal procedures.

Cooperatives and partners supporting their efforts mainly regretted the absence of generalized forward contracting which would provide farmers a guaranteed market outlet at a negotiated price. However, WFP mainly implemented direct contract signed after the cultivation season. Delays in procuring basic drying equipment resulted in additional cost for cooperatives which were not compensated by WFP. In this respect, all partners mentioned the necessity for both parties to be subject to penalties for breaching contract provisions, including delayed payment. CAPAD capitalization’s report rightly highlighted the consequences of delayed payments for smallholders which are often cash-strapped and cannot afford to wait for their remuneration, the consequences. It further evidenced that by doing so, the system gave preference to less vulnerable producers and created tension between cooperatives’ leaders and members. CAPAD highlighted in its annual report that, recent insecurity was reported by several

farmers as a reason for them not to be able to wait for WFP payments and preferred to sale at farm gate with immediate payment. A comprehensive SWOT analysis is detailed in the Table 9 below.



**Table 9 - P4P SWOT Analysis**

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Strengths</b>	<b>Weaknesses</b>	<b>Opportunities</b>	<b>Threats</b>
<b>Targeting</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- relevant as smallholders were targeted</li> <li>- sound decision of choosing of selecting existing producers' groups in the pilot to see result and learn lessons specific to context</li> <li>- high agricultural potential in the 3 Provinces where P4P is currently implemented</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- requirement by the Netherlands to confine the project in 3 North western Provinces of Burundi</li> <li>- limited relevance of the School feeding activities as these regions are less needy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- identify funding options to continue production in the area while lobbying the donor (Dutch Republic) to enable distribution of grains procured by the project in other Provinces of Burundi</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- increasing the number of partnerships with new cooperatives in the North West region would increase tough competition and is likely to result in market saturation considering lower needs in the area.</li> </ul>

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Strengths</b>	<b>Weaknesses</b>	<b>Opportunities</b>	<b>Threats</b>
<b>Volume produced</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- contributed to increase farm output</li> <li>- tangible motivation of farmers to gear their production to WFP needs (rice, beans and maize)</li> <li>- potential to further increase production</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- production is limited by access to farm inputs, tools and rural productive infrastructure (irrigation, terraces) in particular for rice production</li> <li>- limited existing data information about production (inputs, labor, outputs) among cooperatives members</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- opportunity to gain in volumes by further increasing productivity.</li> <li>- specific focus needed on sustainable land and water management</li> <li>- establish long-term partnership with FAO to boost agricultural production and increase farm outputs with sustainable farming practices, in particular:               <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) to identify alternative varieties of crops (nerica or uplands rice) more resistant to dry spells</li> <li>2) to explore suitability of alternative production practices (System of Rice Intensification) which does not require flooding paddy fields.</li> </ol> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- strong land erosion and soil degradation</li> <li>- sensitive situation in case of non-purchase from WFP or returns (for quality reasons)</li> </ul>

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Strengths</b>	<b>Weaknesses</b>	<b>Opportunities</b>	<b>Threats</b>
<b>Producers capacity development</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- contributed to increase capacities of cooperatives (trainings in crop production, post-harvest management - PHM)</li> <li>- limited returns related to the quality of grains evidences good understanding of PHM practices</li> <li>- partners have promoted exchange of good practices (study visits)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Capacity building requires sufficient time and resource</li> <li>- Short duration of WFP contracts (average of 12 months) is short to ensure effective capacity development (development project that include participatory approaches and capacity building are normally run over several years with greater financial predictability)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- establish long-term partnership with FAO to develop capacities in terms of production and marketing (e.g. implementation of farmer field schools aligned to FAO well-elaborated methodology)</li> <li>- WFP is preparing a undertaking a comprehensive data collection exercise to be able to track producers</li> <li>- strengthen farmer groups' capacity to carry out cost/benefit analysis</li> <li>- promote produce quality and develop a client-oriented approaches within farmer groups</li> <li>- intensify exchange of good practices</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- timing for training and predictability of financial resources is required for in-depth quality work</li> </ul>
<b>Equipment / infrastructure</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- provision of inputs (in particular for PHM – tarpaulin, moisture meters, sewing machines, threshers, husking machines)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- storage capacities remain a limiting factor to further increase production and sales</li> <li>- overall limited availability of small equipment distributed for drying, hulling, etc.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- (further) develop small-scale irrigation schemes, promotion of contour farming/terracing (FFA)</li> <li>- strengthen capacity in collective assets' management and develop self-reliance to maintain, repair or replace assets distributed</li> <li>- share good practices (exchange visits)</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- assets management: limited evidence about the sustainability of groups' practices regarding assets maintenance and anticipation (planning) to replace them without WFP input</li> </ul>

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Strengths</b>	<b>Weaknesses</b>	<b>Opportunities</b>	<b>Threats</b>
<b>Access to financial services</b>	- WFP initiated a warrantee system (small scale)	- Remains limited to small micro-credit establishments - expensive interest rates	- WFP to negotiate access to fair interest rates for P4P farmers (e.g. Ugandan model with Housing Finance Bank) with recognized banking institutions - encourage farmer groups to open bank accounts - further explore and mainstream warranty system (in which potential farm output before harvest can used as a guarantee for the bank to provide micro-loans) - explore opportunity for introducing Saving and Loans Associations with farmer groups to inject cash at HH level for input procurement, cooperative membership fee...	- Limiting factor on production as some producers may be discouraged and reduce /discontinue producing relevant crops (rice, beans, maize) in sufficient quantities
<b>Marketing</b>	- farmers have become more business-oriented - producers groups have demonstrated higher negotiation power (with private traders)	- limited information available on crop sales and actual cost-effectiveness at producer's level	- new market opportunities for producers including external to WFP - promote alternative crops (soja bean) which can be beneficial for food fortification and soil regeneration (crop rotation)	

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Strengths</b>	<b>Weaknesses</b>	<b>Opportunities</b>	<b>Threats</b>
<b>Procurement procedure</b>	- high demand from WFP guarantee procurement in large quantities	- inadequate flexibility of prices in signed contract - WFP procedures not yet adapted to the reality of the costs for smallholders and relative inflexibility about market prices from the donor - delays in procurement and payments from WFP adversely impacted cooperatives and induced additional cost - penalties usually unilaterally applied in favor of WFP.	- roll out forward purchase in Burundi to increase predictability - penalties should be applied equally to both parties to the contract - knowledge exist within WFP to adjust procurement rules to the need of small farm-holders - develop market price information systems (by SMS or display boards)	- lack of predictability may discourage producers to sell to WFP - risk for cooperatives to market their produce to other private buyers and create local pipeline disruption
<b>Purchase price</b>	- several groups reported to have an opportunity to sell at higher prices	- cost of processing requires price premium while price proposed by WFP is often slightly above market price -limited information available on net profit for farmers (and <i>in fine</i> profit per capita)	- forward contracts with a fair price range, including a lower threshold ensuring a minimal guaranteed price	- local market price are sometimes higher than regional / international prices which constitute benchmark for WFP => producers may fail to meet contractual commitment and sell their production to other buyers

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Strengths</b>	<b>Weaknesses</b>	<b>Opportunities</b>	<b>Threats</b>
<b>M&amp;E</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- WFP has taken measure to strengthen M&amp;E requirements and data collection</li> </ul>	Limited data available in country for precisely assessing scale and quality of implementation, measuring relevance and impact of the program.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- WFP partners need guidance to strengthen their M&amp;E systems</li> <li>- Existing global monitoring system which can be rolled out in Burundi</li> </ul>	- Sufficient time (resources) allocated to WFP M&E team (and for implementing partners)
<b>Gender</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- WFP paid great attention to ensure gender balance within producer groups</li> <li>- Empowerment feeling among women involved in P4P</li> </ul>	Women farmers tend to have lower output than men		- Land access and land use remain sources of tensions within the society
<b>Coordination with stakeholders</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Good cooperation of WFP and its partners with authorities (Direction Provinciale de l'Agriculture et de l'Elevage - DPAAE)</li> <li>- their involvement in the selection phase allowed WFP to work with the most suitable cooperatives.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- limited capacity and resources within provincial authorities to track implementation and increase program ownership</li> <li>- limited technical cooperation on relevant aspect linked to FAO core mandate</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- support further capacity building for officials and agents of Burundian authorities</li> <li>- Implement more activities through the local authorities</li> </ul>	High staff turn-over undermines impact of capacity strengthening

<b>Criteria</b>	<b>Strengths</b>	<b>Weaknesses</b>	<b>Opportunities</b>	<b>Threats</b>
<b>Program effectiveness</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Local purchases is aligned to Government's strategy for boosting agricultural production</li> <li>- reported improvement in food security and nutrition</li> <li>- reported increased revenues</li> <li>- synergy between local purchase and home grown school feeding</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- limited impact</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- roll out a full P4P program (no longer P4P-like)</li> <li>- potential to attract new institutional or private donors</li> </ul>	

## **Annex J: Efficiency**

To illustrate the efficiency of WFP's portfolio in Burundi, this annex includes 4 sections, which present respectively information on

- J.1. Overall cost-efficiency ( Table 1)
- J.2. Resourcing, donor contributions and budget shortages (Tables 2 to 9);
- J.3. Details of food purchases from local, developing countries, and other international sources, per year, in metric tons (Tables 10 to 18).
- J.4. Narrative aspects of efficiencies in terms of institutional capacity development, school feeding delivery, MAM treatment, and gender equality among CO staff.

## J.1. Overall cost-efficiency

**Table 1 - Cost-efficiency per operation (source: SPRs 2011 – 2014)**

Operation	Component	Budget requirement (direct and indirect costs) until last BR and/or end 2014	Planned n° of benef. (average per year, until end 2014)	N° of benef (SPR 2011)		N° of benef (SPR 2012)		N° of benef (SPR 2013)		n° of benef. (SPR 2014)		Total actual n° of benef. (until end 2014)	Average cost / beneficiary with full budget	Average cost with funding shortages	
				planned	actual	planned	actual	planned	actual	planned	actual				
CP 200119	School feeding		200,000	200,000	189,912	200,000	186,86	200,000	211,298	240,000	250,634	838,713			
	Stunting child.									27,000	56,862	129,144			
	Prev. acute maln. Child<24mths?		16,885	23,700	19,500	24,048	28,974	10,600	23,808						
	Stunting PLW?		12,763							23,009	450	450			
	HIV		3,125	3,125	3,110	3,125	3,010	3,125	2,141	10,000	1,970	10,231			
	MAM		32,773	5,600	2,530	5,885	3,777	5,290	4,369			10,676			
	FFA/FFT		100,000	20,000	11,397	20,000	15,708	20,000	5,200	22,000	8,530	40,835			
	C&V			12,000	0	12,000	0	10,000	0	16,000	42,650	42,650			
	Capacity dvlpt														
	<b>TOTAL</b>		\$51,152,276										1,072,699	\$47,69	\$28,83
PRRO 200164	Targeted food distributions		184,000	248,250	343,800	102,000	92,904	105,800	24,199	144,038	74,095	534,998			
	Refugees		20,250	20,250	21,667	23,000	25,723	37,000	27,919	37,000	28,838	104,147			
	IDPs									7,800	0				
	Returnees		67,000	44,000	6,790	23,000	35,000	35,000	55,787	50,000	29,509	127,086			
	Children 6-59m					38,190	38,966	43,000	34,347	21,800	4,105	77,418			
	School feeding							95,000	104,525	100,000	106,982	211,507			
	Instit. Feeding		4,000												
	MAM					13,140	27,270	8,333	7,151	12,500	2,073	36,494			
	C&V			2,000	0	28,000	3,500	54,000	26,445	87,000	27,884	57,829			
	FFA/FFT/FFW			272,000	41,680	33,666	53,400	44,469	53,600	34,084	30,000	28,915	141,134		
<b>TOTAL</b>		\$98,480,619 (BR 5)	547,000									1,290,613	\$76.31	\$34.91	
PRRO 200655	Targeted food distributions		20,000							85,000	69,387	69,387			

	Refugees		40,000						40,000	30,916	30,916		
	Returnees		22,000						22,000	1,511	1,511		
	TSF: PLW		6,300						6,300	3,875	3,875		
	TSF: -5 yrs		12,000						12,000	9,138	9,138		
	TSF: protection		35,000						35,000				
	Instit. Feeding		3,000						3,000				
	School feeding		110,000						110,000	82,811	82,811		
	FFA: food		70,000						20,000	19,261	19,261		
	FFA: C&V		30,000						70,000	64,809	64,809		
	<b>TOTAL</b>	\$19,348,118 (2014)	348,300								281,708	\$68.68	\$39.80
EMOP 200678		\$1,361,213							20,000	22,160	22,160	\$61.43	

i. Remark: categorisation of nutrition activities (stunting, MAM, children, women) in successive SPRs is confused (hence ? marks in CP for MAM, stunting) and varies from year

## J.2. Funding Trends (source: WFP)

**Table 2 - Budget planned by year (2011 – 2016) for CP 200119**

Budget lines	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Total
Food Transfers MT	11.198,75	10.911,25	10.472,25	13.360,22	17.809,92	19.571,46	<b>83.323,85</b>
Food Transfers Value	\$5.450.287	\$5.301.317	\$5.083.978	\$7.886.152	\$13.444.028	\$15.090.545	<b>\$52.256.306</b>
External Transport	\$945.979	\$880.360	\$901.934	\$853.385	\$701.913	\$783.472	<b>\$5.067.043</b>
LTSH	\$2.702.488	\$2.633.110	\$3.001.215	\$4.054.753	\$5.446.063	\$5.803.759	<b>\$23.641.389</b>
ODOC	\$602.352	\$395.533	\$126.991	\$395.589	\$685.048	\$758.322	<b>\$2.963.833</b>
C&V Transfers	\$81.243	\$81.243	\$81.243	\$405.012	\$1.214.970	\$1.215.000	<b>\$3.078.711</b>
C&V Related Costs			\$7.888	\$103.248	\$192.097	\$247.127	<b>\$550.361</b>
CD&A			\$171.200	\$434.711	\$449.430	\$450.691	<b>\$1.506.032</b>
<b>Total DOC</b>	<b>\$9.782.348</b>	<b>\$9.291.562</b>	<b>\$9.374.448</b>	<b>\$14.132.849</b>	<b>\$22.133.549</b>	<b>\$24.348.917</b>	<b>\$89.063.674</b>
DSC	\$1.090.605	\$1.048.518	\$1.030.430	\$2.055.105	\$1.913.665	\$2.271.352	<b>\$9.409.675</b>
<b>Total Directed Costs</b>	<b>\$10.872.953</b>	<b>\$10.340.080</b>	<b>\$10.404.878</b>	<b>\$16.187.954</b>	<b>\$24.047.214</b>	<b>\$26.620.270</b>	<b>\$98.473.349</b>
ISC	\$761.106	\$723.806	\$728.341	\$1.133.157	\$1.683.305	\$1.863.419	<b>\$6.893.135</b>
<b>Total WFP Costs</b>	<b>\$11.634.059</b>	<b>\$11.063.886</b>	<b>\$11.133.220</b>	<b>\$17.321.111</b>	<b>\$25.730.519</b>	<b>\$28.483.689</b>	<b>\$105.366.484</b>

**Table 3 - Resourcing situation of CP 200119, 2011 – 2015**

Donor	Year 2011	Year 2012	Year 2013	Year 2014	Year 2015
MULTILATERAL(SRAC)	\$3.873.687	\$2.119.560	\$3.800.003	\$900.365	\$2.049.999
BURUNDI	\$2.430.263	\$2.129.163	\$1.931.738	\$1.916.607	\$1.926.782
SWITZERLAND	\$0	\$517.598	\$537.634	\$0	\$28.520
NETHERLANDS	\$0	\$0	\$931.664	\$2.552.620	\$6.906.664
EU/PROPAO	\$0	\$0	\$569.347	\$0	\$0
SWITZERLAND(MAPF)	\$0	\$0	\$179.707	\$439.984	\$311.584

Fondation Cartier	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$359.083	\$366.889
Canada	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$2.323.087	\$2.323.087
Germany/Nutrition	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$1.509.149	\$0
Germany/FFA	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$1.905.972	\$524.142
Principaute de Monaco	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$77.434
Japan	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$670.492
<b>Total funding</b>	<b>\$6.303.950</b>	<b>\$4.766.321</b>	<b>\$7.950.093</b>	<b>\$11.906.867</b>	<b>\$15.185.593</b>
Project's requirements	\$11.634.060	\$11.063.886	\$11.133.220	\$17.321.110	\$25.467.227
% resourced	<b>54%</b>	<b>43%</b>	<b>71%</b>	<b>69%</b>	<b>60%</b>

**Table 412 - Budget planned by year (2011 – 2014) for PRRO 200164**

	2011	2012	2013	2014	Total
<i>Food Transfers MT</i>	19.824,85	18.496,66	26.743,00	12.710,73	77.775,24
<b>Food Transfers Value</b>	9.449.190	10.099.559	15.880.491	6.696.867	<b>42.126.106</b>
<b>External Transport</b>	1.421.737	1.362.954	2.174.707	1.219.687	<b>6.179.085</b>
<b>LTSH</b>	3.564.582	3.558.831	7.784.105	3.699.712	<b>18.607.230</b>
<b>ODOC</b>	882.160	2.015.579	510.746	528.101	<b>3.936.586</b>
<b>C&amp;V Transfers</b>	81.153	2.213.265	738.359	3.247.500	<b>6.280.277</b>
<b>C&amp;V Related Costs</b>			81.158	351.744	<b>432.902</b>
<b>CD&amp;A</b>			323.000	325.445	<b>648.445</b>
<b>Total DOC</b>	<b>15.398.822</b>	<b>19.250.187</b>	<b>27.492.566</b>	<b>16.069.056</b>	<b>78.210.631</b>
<b>DSC</b>	3.235.328	3.878.116	4.119.401	2.594.486	<b>13.827.331</b>
<b>Total Directed Costs</b>	<b>18.634.150</b>	<b>23.128.303</b>	<b>31.611.966</b>	<b>18.663.542</b>	<b>92.037.962</b>
<b>ISC</b>	1.304.391	1.618.981	2.212.838	1.306.448	<b>6.442.657</b>
<b>Total WFP Costs</b>	<b>19.938.541</b>	<b>24.747.284</b>	<b>33.824.804</b>	<b>19.969.990</b>	<b>98.480.619</b>

**Table 5 - Resourcing situation of PRRO 200164, 2011 – 2014**

Donor	Year 2011	Year 2012	Year 2013	Year 2014	Total
U.S.A.	\$7.556.688	\$7.611.062	\$10.000.000	\$10.995.777	\$36.163.527
UNION EUROPEENNE	\$1.430.615	\$2.129.163	\$636.605	\$0	\$4.196.383
MULTILATERAL(SRAC)	\$0	\$2.052.720	\$3.891.285	\$0	\$5.944.005
JAPAN	\$1.000.000	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$1.000.000
CANADA	\$0,00	\$1.504.000	\$500.000	\$897.666	\$2.901.666
UN CERF	\$1.299.780	\$800.000	\$2.149.261	\$0	\$4.249.041
SWITZERLAND	\$537.634	\$270.613	\$0	\$277.000	\$1.085.247
FRANCE	\$517.711	\$363.000	\$0	\$0	\$880.711
BRAZIL	\$0,00	\$975.000	\$0	\$0	\$975.000
<b>Total Resourced</b>	<b>\$12.342.428</b>	<b>\$15.705.558</b>	<b>\$17.177.151</b>	<b>\$12.170.443</b>	<b>\$57.395.580</b>
Requirement	\$19.938.541	\$24.747.284	\$33.824.805	\$19.969.990	\$98.480.620
<b>% resourced</b>	<b>62%</b>	<b>63%</b>	<b>51%</b>	<b>61%</b>	<b>58,3%</b>

**Table 6 - Budget planned by year (2014 – 2016) for PRRO 200655**

Budget lines	2014	2015	2016	Total
<b>Food Transfers MT</b>	<b>10.575,09</b>	<b>16.264,28</b>	<b>10.131,99</b>	<b>36.971</b>
<b>Food Transfers Value</b>	\$6.115.063	\$9.168.399	\$5.181.971	<b>\$20.465.433</b>
<b>External Transport</b>	\$785.895	\$873.229	\$472.413	<b>\$2.131.537</b>
<b>LTSH</b>	\$3.364.741	\$5.174.907	\$3.223.757	<b>\$11.763.405</b>
<b>ODOC</b>	\$508.012	\$965.266	\$486.764	<b>\$1.960.042</b>

<b>C&amp;V Transfers</b>	\$3.365.500	\$7.685.000	\$3.365.500	<b>\$14.416.000</b>
<b>C&amp;V Related Costs</b>	\$110.618	\$540.131	\$415.275	<b>\$1.066.024</b>
<b>CD&amp;A</b>	\$235.750	\$382.500	\$184.250	<b>\$802.500</b>
<b>Total DOC</b>	<b>\$14.485.579</b>	<b>\$24.789.432</b>	<b>\$13.329.930</b>	<b>\$52.604.941</b>
<b>DSC</b>	\$3.596.775	\$5.877.950	\$3.110.107	<b>\$12.584.832</b>
<b>Total Directed Costs</b>	<b>\$18.082.354</b>	<b>\$30.667.382</b>	<b>\$16.440.037</b>	<b>\$65.189.773</b>
<b>ISC</b>	\$1.265.765	\$2.146.717	\$1.150.803	<b>\$4.563.285</b>
<b>Total WFP Costs</b>	<b>\$19.348.119</b>	<b>\$32.814.099</b>	<b>\$17.590.840</b>	<b>\$69.753.058</b>

**Table 7 - Resourcing situation of PRRO 200655, 2014 – 2016**

<b>Donor</b>	<b>Year 2014</b>	<b>Year 2015</b>	<b>Year 2016</b>
MULTILATERAL(SRAC)	\$1.800.000	\$2.750.000	\$2.200.000
ECHO	\$1.169.959	\$539.417	
USAID	\$8.241.878	\$1.032.713	\$3.400.000
SWITZERLAND	\$0	\$263.184	
CERF	\$0	\$950.593	
NORWAY	\$0	\$613.033	
France	\$0	\$562.429	
Belgium	\$0	\$562.429	
Japan	\$0	\$0	\$2.650.000
<b>Total Funding</b>	<b>\$11.211.837</b>	<b>\$7.273.798</b>	<b>\$8.250.000</b>
Requirement	\$19.348.118	\$32.814.099	\$17.590.840
<b>% funding</b>	<b>57,9%</b>	<b>22,2%</b>	<b>46,9%</b>

**Table 813 - Funding shortages (source: SPRs 2011 – 2014)**

Operation	Component	2011			2012			2013			2014			Main donors	Remarks in SPRs about fund shortages	
		Budget (\$)	Actual funds (\$)	Short-age	Budget (\$)	Actual funds (\$)	Short-age	Budget (\$)	Actual funds (\$)	Short-age	Budget (\$)	Actual funds (\$)	Short-age			
CP 200119	School feed													Multi-lateral NL (P4P, SF) Burundi (SF), Canada, Germany	2012-13-14: less in 3 north provinces	
	Suppl feed														2011: less for -5 yrs	
	Blanket feed														2011: incomplete food basket 2014: stunting reduced to 1000 HHs only + WVI	
	HIV														2014: n°, ration, time reduced	
	Vuln nutr.															
	FFA															2011-12: no FFT or C&V 2013: no C&V 2014: C&V only, no FFT
	Cap dvlpt															
	<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>11,634,060</b>	<b>6,303,950</b>	<b>46%</b>	<b>11,063,886</b>	<b>4,766,321</b>	<b>57%</b>	<b>11,133,220</b>	<b>7,950,093</b>	<b>29%</b>	<b>17,321,110</b>	<b>11,906,867</b>	<b>31%</b>			
PRRO 200164	Target. food distrib (TFD)													USA, multi-lateral, EU, CERF, Canada, Burundi (FFA)	2014: less GFD	
	Refugees															
	Returnees															
	Inst. Feed														2013-4: less suppl feed to children and PLW (2013: 1 province out of 11 targeted) 2013: less rations in social inst.	
	FFA														2011: FFT, C&V reduced 2012: FFA reduced 2013: FFA in 1 prov, less FFT 2013-4: no vouchers in FFA (but well funded in ref. camps)	
	<b>TOTAL</b>				<b>24,747,284</b>	<b>15,705,558</b>	<b>37%</b>	<b>33,824,805</b>	<b>17,177,151</b>	<b>49%</b>	<b>19,969,990</b>	<b>12,170,443</b>	<b>39%</b>			
PRRO 200655	TFD															
	Refugees															

Returnees														USA, multi- lateral EU, CERF, Norway		
TSF: PLW																
TSF: -5 yrs																
TSF: protect																
Inst. Feed																
School feed																2014: carryover from 200164 possible only in 50% of schools
FFA: food																
FFA: C&V															2014: stopped in Nov	
<b>TOTAL</b>																<b>19,348,118</b> <b>11,211,837</b> <b>42,1%</b>

**Table 14 - Resourcing situation by component, 2011 – 2015 (source: WFP)**

Year	C1: School feeding programme			C2: Nutrition			C3: Community development			Grand total		
	planned	funding	% funding	Planned	funding	% funding	planned	funding	% funding	planned	funding	% funding
2011	\$7.222.236	\$4.298.869	60%	\$2.062.228	\$917.688	44%	\$2.349.596	\$1.087.393	46%	\$11.634.059	\$6.303.950	54%
2012	\$7.052.040	\$3.666.905	52%	\$1.793.844	\$615.670	34%	\$2.218.002	\$483.746	22%	\$11.063.885	\$4.766.321	43%
2013	\$7.277.387	\$5.074.615	70%	\$1.573.453	\$1.019.271	65%	\$2.282.381	\$1.286.860	56%	\$11.133.220	\$7.380.746	66%
2014	\$9.752.717	\$7.355.568	75%	\$4.535.057	\$2.445.327	54%	\$3.033.337	\$2.105.972	69%	\$17.321.111	\$11.906.867	69%
2015	\$10.796.132	\$12.271.348	114%	\$12.218.328	\$1.940.103	16%	\$2.716.059	\$974.142	36%	\$25.730.519	\$15.185.593	59%

### J.3. Efficiency data about quantities of food delivered (source: SPRs)

**Table 1015 - Country Program 200119, 2011**

Commodity	Local Purchases (mt)	Triangular Purchases (mt)	Other International Purchases (mt)
Beans	0	1,141	0
Corn-Soya Blend	0	600	0
Iodised Salt	0	136	0
Maize	0	2,553	0
Maize Meal	0	0	1,896
Rice	0	225	0
Sugar	0	50	0
Vegetable Oil	0	166	0
<b>Total:</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4,870</b>	<b>1,896</b>

**Table 1116 - Country Program 200119, 2012**

Commodity	Local Purchases (mt)	Triangular Purchases (mt)	Other International Purchases (mt)
Beans	0	635	0

Corn Soya Blend	0	0	113
Iodised Salt	0	60	0
Maize	0	3,737	0
Sugar	0	0	46
Vegetable Oil	0	241	0
<b>Total:</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4,673</b>	<b>159</b>

**Table 12 - Country program 200119, 2013**

<b>Commodity</b>	<b>Local Purchases (mt)</b>	<b>Triangular Purchases (mt)</b>	<b>Other International Purchases (mt)</b>
Beans	281	263	0
Corn Soya Blend	0	198	0
Iodised Salt	0	30	0
Maize	977	450	0
Rice	4	0	156
Sugar	0	0	46
<b>Total:</b>	<b>1,263</b>	<b>941</b>	<b>202</b>

**Table 13 - Country Program 200119, 2014**

Commodity	Local Purchases (mt)	Developing Country Purchases (mt)	Other International Purchases (mt)	FPF Purchases (mt)
Beans	584	0	0	
Corn Soya Blend				200
Iodised Salt	0	60	0	
Maize	789	0	0	1,840
Ready To Use Supplementary Food	0	17	118	292
Rice	799	0	0	
Sugar				35
Vegetable Oil				298
<b>Sum:</b>	<b>2,172</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>2,665</b>

**Table 14 - PRRO 200164, 2011**

Commodity	Local Purchases (mt)	Triangular Purchases (mt)	Other International Purchases (mt)
Beans	150	405	0
Corn-Soya Blend	0	130	500
Iodised Salt	0	65	0

Maize	0	1,777	0
Maize Meal	0	0	6,075
Split Peas	0	0	1,519
Vegetable Oil	0	200	0
<b>Total:</b>	<b>150</b>	<b>2,577</b>	<b>8,094</b>

**Table 15 - PRRO 200164, 2012**

Commodity	Local Purchases (mt)	Triangular Purchases (mt)	Other International Purchases (mt)
Beans	0	296	0
Corn Soya Blend	0	0	1,079
Iodised Salt	0	146	0
Maize	0	3,872	0
Maize Meal	0	0	3,234
Split Peas	0	0	826
Sugar	0	0	69
Vegetable Oil	0	315	240
<b>Total:</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>4,629</b>	<b>5,448</b>

**Table 16 - PRRO 200164, 2013**

Commodity	Local Purchases (mt)	Triangular Purchases (mt)	Other International Purchases (mt)
Beans	383	341	809
Corn Soya Blend	0	217	687
High Energy Biscuits	0	29	0
Iodised Salt	0	30	0
Maize	225	0	0
Maize Meal	0	0	3,119
Peas	0	0	20
Rice	0	0	2,979
Sugar	0	0	69
Vegetable Oil	0	0	570
<b>Total:</b>	<b>607</b>	<b>617</b>	<b>8,253</b>

**Table 17 - PRRO 200164, 2014**

Commodity	Local Purchases (mt)	Developing Country Purchases (mt)	Other International Purchases (mt)	FPF Purchases (mt)
Beans	363	0	700	
Corn Soya Blend	407	0	1,120	

Iodised Salt	0	60	0	
Maize	0	0	0	2,023
Maize Meal	0	0	3,152	
Split Peas	0	0	0	39
Vegetable Oil	99	0	350	
<b>Sum:</b>	<b>870</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>5,322</b>	<b>2,062</b>

**Table 1817 - PRRO 200655, 2014**

<b>Commodity</b>	<b>Local Purchases (mt)</b>	<b>Developing Country Purchases (mt)</b>	<b>Other International Purchases (mt)</b>	<b>FPF Purchases (mt)</b>
Beans	215	0	0	
Iodised Salt	0	30	0	
Maize	708	0	0	666
Vegetable Oil				243
<b>Sum:</b>	<b>923</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>909</b>

## **J.4. Narrative information about specific aspects of efficiency**

### **134. Institutional capacity development.**

1. With government partners, synergies – and potential sustainability – depends to a significant extent on capacity development, as resources and skills are generally poor. In 2013 and 2014, the most relevant activities have targeted school feeding, nutrition (SUN/REACH Secretariat), PRONIANUT, and a simulation exercise for the National DRR Platform. Efficiency issues and results are detailed below.

- i. In cooperation with the Centre of Excellence based in Brazil, organized study tours were organized in 2013 (Ministries of External Relations and Agriculture) and 2014 for high-ranking government officials from five key line ministries (Education, Finance and planning, Health and Agriculture). The major outcome has been the development of a comprehensive action plan that will guide the development of a national school feeding program in Burundi (no outcomes are mentioned for health and agriculture).
- ii. For school feeding, in 2013 WFP trained 104 provincial and communal directorates for education, with the aim of gradually handing over the management of the school feeding program to local institutions. The training resulted in more efficient implementation of the project with less oversight from WFP. In 2014, around 200 key staff in WFP-supported primary schools were trained in program management and food management. Focus was particularly put on introducing school gardens in WFP-supported schools as well as "tippy tanks" for hand washing. Issues of handing over or exit strategies were never discussed. Thus schools, from which WFP had to pull out due to financial constraints under the PRROs, were not prepared to continue school feeding in one way or another.
- iii. For nutrition, CP efforts focused on the SUN/REACH secretariat. In 2013, WFP and the government shared the costs for the recruitment of an international fund-raising consultant, while UNICEF supported an international facilitator. WFP also provided office space for the SUN/REACH team in addition to the space provided by the Government in the office of the second Vice-Presidency. All SUN/REACH meetings were organized in WFP's office using WFP telecom facilities. In 2014, as the SUN/REACH secretariat started to operationalize the work plan on food security and chronic malnutrition prevention, WFP also strengthened the capacities of key line ministries' technical working groups that were created in this regard. Capacity development at health center level was initially done for health center staff and nutrition focal points. However, due to staff turn-over, this would need to be done regularly. Instead, food monitors are now doing "on the job training" during their time-consuming visits to health centers.
- iv. In the PRRO 200655, nutrition-related activities were more focused on the

- field. In 2014, 95 staff members from health centers and provincial districts were trained in cooperation with PRONIANUT in supplementary feeding implementation in Ruyigi and Rutana, in order to align activities with the National Protocol for Nutrition and ensure ownership. WFP also conducted training in proper food storage and handling, and in monitoring and reporting.
- v. In the DRR/DRM sector, a training session was organized in October 2014 that brought together 52 participants including 39 government officials from key line ministries, and 19 participants from United Nations agencies and NGOs. In November, WFP organized a simulation exercise on coordinated response to disasters. It involved a wide range of participants including 44 government officials and 36 United Nations and NGO staff members. After the exercise, the stakeholders evaluated the degree of preparedness and response of Burundi at 2.2 on a scale going from 0 to 4; rates were often quite low except for WFP-led activities (VAM, logistics). WFP also engaged in the setting up of a pilot community-based early warning system, to be launched in five communes of three most disaster prone provinces. It should be noted that the same activities were also discussed in the SPR's capacity development section of PRRO 200655.

### ***135. Implementation problems of school feeding***

2. The 3 provinces in the North (Ngozi, Muyinga, Kirundo) with identified high levels of food insecurity, chronic malnutrition and low enrolment rates were served with standard school feeding with daily hot meal from imported or local food. Repeated pipeline breaks due to funding shortages (no US funds for school feeding, Dutch funds apply only in the N-W) impacted negatively on deliveries and dropouts. A number of critical issues related to efficiency have been identified, as follows.

- i. Some problems were frequently mentioned by the schools: firewood shortage, lack of energy saving stoves, some beans take 6 hours to cook, sometimes pipeline break, sometimes low food quality, not all stores well protected against insects, classrooms being transformed into stores, continuing population pressure.
- ii. Class sizes increased substantially in beneficiary schools. Whilst it is true that classes will increase due to population increase, it is questionable as well, whether these kids are from the relevant community or from neighboring schools which are not benefitting from the project. Class sizes have increased substantially due to higher enrolment and attendance rates – more than 80 kids were found in one class, which leaves the question of education quality unanswered.
- iii. The level of school performance depends heavily on the implementing partner. In one very positive case, the schools showed a very high level of engagement, kitchen and school gardens were very well maintained, and the project offered nutrition education at school as well as in the communities.

- iv. “Generation Monotony”: The same food day-in day-out was reported by some of the schools as being too monotonous. There is a need to work on strategies with the communities to bring the necessary variety by perhaps community involvement.
- v. Some schools are enrolled as well under the pilot Performance Based System (PBS) project which looks at performance and provides surplus finance to schools if the performance is good. One head teacher aptly described the difference as follows: “The PBS looks into education quality and teachers go out to attract kids to attend school in their area, as the enrolment and attendance rates are one of the indicators in the system. In contrast, school feeding programs are the incentive and children attend school, whether education quality is good or not; the food is the pull factor and the reason for attending school is not education but food”.

### ***136. Efficiency issues in MAM treatment***

3. As compared with the international recommendations and the latest WFP nutrition policy guidelines, MAM activities should take place if the moderate acute malnutrition rate lies between 10 to 15%, or is above 8% with aggravating conditions.

4. In 2011, MAM activities took place in Bubanza, Karuzi, Rutana, Bururi and Ngozi and the selection of these districts is not really corresponding to these guidelines. The table below illustrates efficiency issues in targeting provinces. As a result, discrepancies can be found between targeted provinces, CFSVA 2008 and DHS 2010.

**Table 19 - Discrepancies with MAM guidelines**

	CFSVA 2008			DHS 2010		
	H/A	W/H	W/A	H/A	W/H	W/A
<b>Bubanza</b>	46.3	8.5	25.2	56.1	5.5	26.1
<b>Buia Marie</b>				27.9	6.0	15.2
<b>Bujumbura</b>	46.2	6.9	22.4	59.8	5.6	23.4
<b>Bururi</b>	50.9	10.7	29.4	49.6	3.0	19.9
<b>Cankuzo</b>	44.9	18.9	26.2	48.3	6.2	27.7
<b>Cibitoke</b>	58.1	11.0	23.9	52.2	7.3	25.7
<b>Gitega</b>	53.2	3.7	23.1	59.7	3.9	29.6
<b>KARUSI</b>	46.8	9.0	22.0	68.1	3.8	30.7
<b>Kavanza</b>	56.7	4.7	23.1	55.4	6.7	31.4
<b>KIRUNDO</b>	51.9	5.5	25.7	60.3	7.6	28.1
<b>MAKAMBA</b>	49.5	9.3	26.9	62.1	6.9	23.7
<b>Muramvya</b>	50.4	9.4	30.2	63.5	4.5	34.9
<b>Muyinga</b>	56.6	10.4	30.5	61.1	2.7	32.9
<b>Mwaru</b>	57.0	8.4	26.5	56.7	5.5	26.0
<b>Ngozi</b>	61.8	4.7	26.1	71.2	5.5	33.7
<b>Rutana</b>	52.9	15.1	32.5	55.6	11.6	33.6
<b>Ruyigi</b>	52.6	9.3	34.5	66.1	8.6	44.5
<b>Total</b>	52.7	8.4	26.6	58.0	6.0	29.0

5. If WFP would have based the selection on data from the CFSVA 2008, Cankuzo as well as Cibitoke and Muyinga should have been amongst the targeted provinces with prevalence rates above 10%. In fact, Cankuzo was leading the Severity table with 18.5%, which would have warranted even a blanket feeding approach to prevent further deterioration. If WFP would have based the selection on the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) from 2010, neither Bubanza, Bururi, Karusi nor Ngozi should have been targeted, but rather Ruyigi.

6. In 2012 and 2013, WFP decided to intervene in all provinces except Bujumbura Mairie due to the request by the Burundi Government to introduce Target Supplementary Feeding Program. The main reasons are summarized in paragraphs 6, 12 and 13 of budget revision 3 to PRRO 200164 -BR3. The government saw the intervention by WFP as a temporary instrument to bridge the time that is needed to roll out the FARN approach to all communities. Due to the impossibility to manage and monitor these activities appropriately, WFP stopped the universal approach and restricted interventions in 2014 to Rutana and Ruyigi, which was in line with the DHS data from 2010. The CFSVA 2014 results indicated an aggravating problem in Ngozi

(8.5%) which led to the fact that MAM interventions were extended to this district. The improvement in Rutana (6%) did not lead to closing down the intervention in this province.

7. Due to the reinforced monitoring support, technical procedures at health center level were clear, and entitlements generally known by staff and beneficiaries. However, there were some observations which determine the effectiveness as well. The information below is based on the visits of a limited number of health centers and might not be representative for all of them.

- i. The products provided by WFP varied and depended on food availability. They sometimes provided plumpy'sup and a protection ration, sometimes only fortified flour, sometimes with oil and sugar - and sometimes without.
- ii. There was no nutrition education material at the health center level and beneficiaries confirmed that there is no training, except on how to store and use WFP food. Health staff stated that women are visiting the health center mainly if they have an entitlement to collect food. The FARN<sup>65</sup> approach is not yet systematic in all areas. Only a very few beneficiaries benefit from nutrition education at the community level. A key nutrition message from the "Agents de Santé" is: "eat more vegetables, pulses and fish". Beneficiaries try to implement it but do not have the means. Issues on GBV<sup>66</sup> and land entitlements came up in discussions with women who want to see men being involved in nutrition education as well.
- iii. Women, and in one case men, stated that they have to share the food amongst everybody but in general they will give a little preference to the targeted person. If need be, they will sell part of the food as well.
- iv. There are occasionally some additional interventions for beneficiaries, trying to improve the overall situation in the household, (an NGO implementing CFW activities for MAM beneficiary families, but not all beneficiaries are included). In this context, women would like to be supported in e.g. women's groups (starting a tree nursery; receiving perhaps fertilizer and small livestock to support their living). It was evident that MAM beneficiaries needed some additional support to make sure that they can sustainably get out of malnutrition.
- v. Government PBF (performance based finance) policy of 2010 in the Health sector is not applied to nutrition, which leads to the fact that nutrition is not considered as important at health center level. In times of shortage and high turn-over of staff, training needs are underestimated and led to the above-mentioned high monitoring/ in service training needs. The extra workload was

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<sup>65</sup> FARN might not be working with poor mothers who must e.g. contribute food for cooking demonstration. before taking part. This could however be the entry point for WFP support for these poor mothers.

<sup>66</sup> Women have no access to land, and report as follows about gender-based violence in the East of Burundi: "Men are beating wives and then go to Tanzania; this is like an epidemics in this region".


acknowledged and an overhead of 7% has been paid to the sanitary districts, to be shared among staff. However, there is no clear guidance on how to share and use the extra funds.

### **137. Gender equality in the CO.**

8. Efficiency is most crucially related to staff. The disaggregated HR figures and statistics for staff repartition by gender within the CO over the period 2011--2015 show the following trends.

- i. International staff: until 2014, only international professional staff were employed by the CO, in limited numbers; as from 2015, they were assisted by some junior professional staff. Whereas until 2012 HR statistics indicate an equal proportion (50 percent each) of male and female international staff, these figures were reduced to 1 female for 2 male staff in 2013 and 2014, probably due to the overall staff reduction. In 2015, the proportion became again equal with the addition of junior staff (2 female and 1 male). International consultants were also used in 2015, again in equal gender proportion (3 female, 3 male).
- ii. National staff: HR statistics indicate a consistent disproportion between genders over the period for national staff, on the average 30 percent female and 70 percent male. Figures vary only very slightly, from 27 percent of female staff in 2012 to 29 percent in 2015. Such variations do not appear significant nor do they seem to translate meaningful results in trying to recruit more national female staff. This situation seems to reflect the overall gender imbalance that still prevails in Burundi in terms of education and access to professional work for women, but also the core and traditionally male-dominated activities of WFP in transportation and logistics.
- iii. At the various seniority levels and among sectors, differences also appear consistently – even considering a number of vacant positions.
  - a. Management: only the Deputy CD is female. It should be noted that in 2016 a new (female) international staff has been recruited as head of the Ngozi Field Office.
  - b. Programming: the proportion is almost equal (3 female, 5 male) among program policy officers, but much less so at the lowest level of program associates: 4 male and 1 female staff.
  - c. Whilst the 3 staff in the procurement section are all female, logistics still appear as overwhelmingly male (11, against 4 female staff).

**Annex K: Updated Theory of Change (based on Country Strategy and discussion at CO)**



## **Annex L: Detailed Recommendations**

1. A maximum of 10 recommendations are allowed in the main body of the CPE report; 9 of them are included in the Chapter 3.3. However, in order to best contribute to the further enhancement of the WFP cooperation with Burundi, the CPE developed a detailed set of recommendations.
2. Subject to stabilization of the governance situation and adequate funding, and in line with WFP Strategic Objectives, the Government's stated policy objectives towards development, the main donors' strategies as well as Sustainable Development Goal n°2 of "ending hunger, achieving food security and improved nutrition and promoting sustainable agriculture", the following is recommended.
3. To maintain the same 3 main CS priorities, although with due refocusing and strengthening of some components in order to better respond to identified crucial challenges; in particular:
  - i. more focus on protection and safety nets for food security (new component 1.1);
  - ii. aiming at education quality through school feeding (now 1.3);
  - iii. explicit focus on resilience (now 1.4);
  - iv. in line with WFP SOs, consider Capacity development as cross-cutting theme.
  - v. better integrate cross-cutting themes of synergies/ institutional advocacy, and gender.
4. Overall, WFP needs also to reduce the current scattering of activities and focus geographically (based on updated M&E, CFSVA and EFSA data about areas with highest rates of food insecurity, malnutrition and climatic shocks) and per sector, on better integrated and more effective projects.

### **I. Food and nutrition security**

#### *Food Security*

*a. Protection:* in cooperation with the Ministry of Solidarity, to strengthen mapping and extend GFD and targeted food distribution for humanitarian purposes (principle of Humanity) through safety nets for the benefit of the most vulnerable hit by crisis in social institutions such as street children (with adapted food for the youngest), IDPs who have lost their assets from natural disasters, most food insecure households during lean season, and Batwas. A programming officer should be designated for cover protection and safety nets. Considering the increasing politization of the new crisis, it may be relevant to list explicitly the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence in the updated or new PRROs and IR-EMOPs, and assess their application in the SPRs.

*b. P4P:* to continue and expand this successful approach, tackle issues of fair prices and timing, enhance training, use products for school feeding or GFD in other areas of Burundi, aim at reaching catalytic effect for cooperatives and attract new investors, promote synergies with FAO, other actors (e.g. PAIOSA), and investors, and partnerships with the private sector.

*c. CBT:* to continue and expand; vouchers are beneficial for local economy, gender protection and household nutrition. Cash modality should only be used if gender protection is ensured.

*d. DRC refugees in camps:* to continue current approach until the end of UNHCR reinstallation program, and re-evaluate; to improve QC in trade fairs and apply flexibility to better align vouchers' values with market prices (e.g. DPAE data); to implement FFA around camps (trees, access roads).

### *Nutrition security*

*a. Chronic malnutrition:* in partnership with all concerned actors and in particular the Ministry of health and UNICEF, to enhance the CO's role in nutrition through i) consistent application of WFP Nutrition guidelines and ii) a continuum of care services at health centers and community levels integrating nutrition with access to food; ii) support to the development of national stunting reduction strategy, and iii) improving M&E analysis of nutrition outcome data.

It is also advisable to analyze the results of the IFPRI analysis as well as the end-line survey of the One-UN project as soon as these are available. In addition, it is recommended to look into provinces where stunting has improved or deteriorated between 2010 and 2014 - to identify the main drivers of change and help prioritizing interventions.

For consistency purposes, WFP should better contribute to SUN/ REACH and address systematically the complete window of opportunity of 1000 days (from pregnant women to lactating mothers and children 6 – 23 months).

In addition, given the high population pressure and issues of gender-based violence, there is need to work on root causes. Complementary interventions should be focused on engaging youths - male and female - in the prevention of malnutrition by providing IGA in combination with education on family planning, gender, nutrition and HIV prevention. The next generation needs to be well informed about the importance of above issues, and to have the means to put effective nutrition into practice, so that there will hopefully be no need to provide supplements in the window of opportunity.

*b. Acute malnutrition:* MAM treatment is needed only in provinces with MAM rates above 8 percent - the current data from 2016 (using the MUAC measurement) should be verified together with mapping of activities and actors to avoid scattered interventions; there is a need for better supported and integrated MAM treatment, in health centers with synergies; the current monitoring issue must be solved. FARN should be supported; criticism that it does not work well should encourage WFP to support it so that it works well.

*c. Prioritize support to HIV/AIDS patients under ART, with the Red Cross as implementing partner if relations between Global Fund and MoH do not improve.*

### *School feeding*

Criteria for school selection should be reviewed, in particular existing gardens and access to water. Beyond standard school feeding objectives for WFP, in Burundi the ultimate objective of this activity (in log frames and theories of change) should be to contribute to improving the quality of education, as a key driver for change. School feeding should therefore be coordinated with quality-based initiatives, such as e.g. the performance based system (PBS) in education. Better commodities (avoid poor quality beans), energy saving stoves, closer integration with P4P and delivery modalities (take home rations in some case) should be considered. The development of the school feeding policy should take the above mentioned points into consideration.

### *Resilience*

To focus on resilience of affected communities by integrating FFA into a comprehensive resilience package adapted to Burundi, in synergy with other actors. As relevant and feasible, to apply FFA in compliance with the new anti-erosion Protocol. For sustainability purposes, to allow as needed small care and maintenance costs in the budget, and ensure longer-term local presence of the partners.

## **II. Capacity development**

Capacity development efforts should be focused on Ministries and institutions that can best contribute to the effectiveness of interventions.

- Increased support to National DRR Platform through more regular and practical simulation exercises, in synergy with other concerned international and regional Civil Protection actors.
- Increased support to Ministry of Solidarity for enhanced protection to the safety network of social institutions and other most vulnerable groups.
- Increased support to Ministry of Health to improve response to MAM, to solve shortcomings of health centers and monitoring, and for ART.

- Continued support to MINAGRIE together with FAO and IFAD.
- Continued support to policy definition of school feeding with Ministry of Education.

To be effective, capacity development should be better structured internally (Program Officer, results-based framework for actions), and integrate corporate lessons learnt about successful toolbox.

### III. Humanitarian Response

DRR/DRM efforts should be strengthened. In addition to enhanced capacity development of the national platform (above) and institutional advocacy (below), there are urgent needs to continue supporting early warning (m-VAM) and to integrate strategically FFA activities with national DRR platform. Returns resulting from the outflow of refugees since May 2015 may be expected and should be included in the contingency plans; buffer stocks by the Red cross should be supported.

### IV. Cross-cutting issues

- 4.1. The systematic and pro-active search for *synergies* with other actors (in particular key UN agencies such as FAO, IFAD, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UN Women) needs to be complemented by institutional advocacy. The following issues should in particular be targeted: gender-based violence and gender inequality; more civil-society oriented DRR Platform, more authority for the Platform; faster reinstatement of IDPs victims of disasters by Ministry of Solidarity; Ministry of Health for better support to MAM treatment in health centers and sensitization; concerned Ministries to adopt a policy in favor of P4P.
- 4.2. *Gender inequality*: to accompany WFP activities with high-quality gender-transformative sensitization that effectively reduces popular support for gender inequality in the beneficiary community, especially among men. To enhance dedicated support to women in all activities (information, education, vouchers or food parcels, access to fertilizers, livestock, IGA); to focus sensitization about gender violence, family planning and reproductive health on youths (both male and female); to support platform with synergies for increased sensitization in gender rights, GBV, chronic malnutrition, family planning against demographic challenge (focused e.g. on children rights and related costs); to apply gender markers systematically. In the new Dutch

cooperation program, there is also a strong focus on gender and youth issues, to which WFP could cooperate more closely.

## **V. Efficiency issues**

- 5.1. Funding shortages have been a big constraint over the period: the CO could hire a short-term specialized consultant to redefine the resourcing strategy.
- 5.2. The field office of Gitega should get more operational autonomy considering the large area and portfolio. As for Ngozi, an international professional staff should be assigned without delay.
- 5.3. In case of sudden interruption of a program, WFP should take due care to inform stakeholders and mitigate effects or help defining exit strategies.
- 5.4. Resource constraints for surveys, weak documentation by implementing partners, and insufficient human resources constrained the ability of the CO to conduct outcome data analyses and capacity development.

**Table 1 – Detailed Recommendations**

No.	Issue	Recommendation	Rationale	Responsibility and timing
1	Strategic alignment and positioning	<p>For a new CSP, maintain the two CS priorities (1) Food and Nutrition Security and (2) Emergency Preparedness and Response, in a two-pronged strategic approach. Include readiness<sup>67</sup> to respond more effectively to current challenges. Capacity Development should be mainstreamed in the new CSP and operations as a cross-cutting theme.</p> <p>Externally, strengthen synergies with national strategic partners (Ministries of Agriculture, Health, Education, and Solidarity) and UN partners; complemented by institutional advocacy for synergies on key food security issues.</p>	<p>Country Strategy is still aligned with population needs, government priorities, and coherent with UNDAF, donors and WFP SOs; the three key priorities are still relevant, but face some crucial challenges given the need to balance possible emergency and long term development needs.</p> <p>Synergies in practice were weak across the board; activities often lacked coordination and harmonization with other partners.</p>	CO, with RBN and HQ support; 2016-17
2	Targeting and integration	Internally, strengthen geographic and program integration through better-targeted multi-sectoral operational planning. Strengthen coordination with government and non-government implementing partners.	Activities were scattered across the country and lacked consistency of objectives, focussed and integrated approach; and with some varying application of the targeting criteria.	CO, with RBN and HQ support; 2016-17

<sup>67</sup> Strategic prepositioning and contingency planning for disaster preparedness and response, while addressing long term development challenges

No.	Issue	Recommendation	Rationale	Responsibility and timing
3	Gender	<p>Enhance women’s economic empowerment through gender-sensitive Income Generating Activities, and forming partnerships with other actors in gender and family planning. Programming should focus on male and female youth using national nutrition platform to support gender empowerment and applying gender markers systematically.</p> <p>Strengthen programming of WFP activities with high-quality gender-transformative sensitization that effectively reduces popular support for gender inequality in target communities.</p>	<p>Population pressure on land, lack of sensitization and instability have been resulting in a widespread and increasing gender-based violence and gender inequalities. These issues are major contributing factors to food insecurity in Burundi.</p>	<p>CO, with RBN and HQ support; 2016-17</p>

No.	Issue	Recommendation	Rationale	Responsibility and timing
4	Social Protection, Humanitarian and Protection Principles	<p>In partnership with the Ministry in charge of National Solidarity, expand carefully-designed safety nets for social protection programming to respond to population needs arising from the crisis and adhering to humanitarian and protection principles;</p> <p>Apply systematically do-no-harm approaches;</p> <p>Strengthen DRR/DRM efforts, early warning (m-VAM), and targeting of social institutions for protection purposes; and</p> <p>Explicitly include the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence, as well as protection in WFP strategic and programme documents.</p> <p>Improve Quality Control GFA in trade fairs and apply flexibility to better align vouchers' values with market prices.</p> <p>Conduct a systematic feasibility analysis of CBTs and expand appropriately CBT modality of food assistance</p>	<p>Given the growing consequences of crises and increased needs for safety nets for the most vulnerable, there is a need to strengthen mapping and to locate GFA within the social protection framework;</p> <p>The role of social institutions has become highly relevant and problem is growing; and</p> <p>Risks remain high although WFP interventions have been consistent with humanitarian principles and protection policy despite close cooperation with government authorities.</p> <p>Large price differences were regularly found between what can be bought with vouchers during trade fairs in refugee camps and market prices outside.</p> <p>Vouchers are beneficial for local economy, gender protection and household nutrition. Opinions on preferences varied among stakeholders.</p>	CO, with RBN and HQ support; 2016-17

No.	Issue	Recommendation	Rationale	Responsibility and timing
5	Nutrition	<p>In partnership with the Ministry of Health and Unicef, enhance CO's role in nutrition through i) consistent application of WFP Nutrition guidelines and ii) a continuum of care services at health centers and community levels integrating nutrition with access to food; iii) support to the development of national stunting reduction strategy, while continuing promoting the SUN initiative, iv) improving M&amp;E analysis of nutrition outcome data and v) advocate engaging youths in prevention of malnutrition.</p> <p>Explore provinces where stunting has improved or deteriorated between 2010 and 2014 - to identify the main drivers of change and inform prioritizing interventions and programming. Capture the results of the IFPRI analysis as well as the end-line survey of the One-UN project to assess effectiveness.</p> <p>Prioritize support to patients under ART, possibly with competent partners in this area including the Red Cross as partner.</p>	<p>Reinforced presence of WFP field monitors has mitigated lack of trained staff in health centers and allowed MAM treatment to follow National Protocol. However, combining MAM treatment with nutrition education and gender empowerment could contribute to optimize results. Consistent and systematic application of stunting prevention guidelines and the SUN window of opportunity for young children could reinforce CO efforts to prevent stunting through a pilot blanket feeding which just started in 2015.</p> <p>There is no proof as yet that the blanket feeding approach is effective.</p> <p>Support during the first 6 months of ART is important for HIV patients to cope with side effects of medication, and to encourage voluntary testing.</p>	CO, with RBN and HQ support; 2016-17

No.	Issue	Recommendation	Rationale	Responsibility and timing
6	School Feeding	<p>Support the development of national school feeding programs with more focus on education quality working in partnership with Ministry of Education and Unicef; and through gap analysis and mapping. Internally, strengthen linkages with P4P in order to deliver standard package to targeted schools.</p> <p>Review delivery modalities (take-home rations in some cases) and include results in the school feeding policy and strategy.</p> <p>Upgrade selection criteria; quality of commodities and energy saving stoves</p> <p>Expand the enrollment of targeted schools well under the pilot Performance Based Financing (PBF).</p>	<p>School feeding has contributed to increased enrolment, attendance, and gender balance. However, School feeding also has attracted much larger class sizes which affected education quality. This is a crucial driver of change in Burundi. More clarity of School selection process and working with UN partners in addressing education quality would boost educational outcomes.</p>	CO, with RBN and HQ support; 2016-17
7	Resilience <sup>68</sup>	<p>In collaboration with Ministry of Agriculture, FAO and IFAD, support communities by integrating comprehensive and sustainable FFA packages into community development plans.</p> <p>Integrate strategically FFA activities with national DRR platform.</p> <p>Systematically apply FFA in compliance with the new anti-erosion Protocol.</p> <p>Consider including small care and maintenance costs in the budget, and ensure longer-term local presence of the partners.</p>	<p>Within a framework of a comprehensive approach to resilience, WFP can contribute towards mitigating against climate shocks. Since early 2016, the Ministry of Agriculture has introduced a new anti-erosion policy. There are lessons learnt from collaboration with IFAD.</p>	CO, with RBN and HQ support; 2016-17

<sup>68</sup> Since the second half of 2015 the CO has started repositioning its resilience response towards more integrated packages for better quality FFA interventions, implemented for several years in the same localities and in synergy with other activities.

<b>No.</b>	<b>Issue</b>	<b>Recommendation</b>	<b>Rationale</b>	<b>Responsibility and timing</b>
8	Resource mobilization	Update CO resource mobilization strategy and advocate for more flexibility in donor funding, allowing multi-year resource commitments.	Funding shortfalls, earmarking and short programming cycles of donors were major problems for portfolio performance and results.	CO; with RBN and HQ support; 2016-17
9	Outcome monitoring and analysis	Enhance consistency of outcome data monitoring and analysis.	Corporate outcome indicators were not consistently collected over the period; SPRs point to resource constraints for surveys or lack of recording by implementing partners.	CO, with RBN and HQ support; 2016-17
10	P4P	Expand P4P while tackle issues of fair prices, timing and enhance training.  Optimize the use of P4P in combination with school feeding or other activities throughout Burundi  Support cooperatives to reach threshold where can access banks, start attracting new investors; promote synergies and partnerships.	P4P activities have stimulated the local economy by generating substantial amount cash. More revenues could help cooperatives reaching a threshold with catalytic effect for own sustainability and development	CO, with RBN and HQ support; 2016-17
11	Capacity Development	As a cross-cutting approach, Strengthen capacity of national partners that can best contribute to the effectiveness and sustainability of results of WFP CO interventions:  Structured internally to clearly assign an officer in charge of integrate corporate lessons learnt about successful capacity development of national institutions to plan and implement food security policies and programs	Institutional capacity development is a condition for sustainability but institutions still lack resources.	
12	Communication with Beneficiaries	Review current system of communicating with beneficiaries and devise strategies to ensure that ultimate beneficiaries are informed o timely basis.	Gaps in communication with direct beneficiaries in the case of some sudden stop of interventions undermined smooth exist strategies.	



## Annex M: Overall Timetable

March 2016	<b>BURUNDI COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION (CPE)</b>	<b>By whom</b>	<b>Key Dates (deadlines)</b>	<b>Comments</b>
<b>Phase 1 - Preparation</b>				
	Desk review. Draft TOR + clearance for sharing to WFP	EM	Aug 2015	
	Review draft TOR considering WFP feedback + seek OEV approval	EM	Sept/Oct 2015	
	Final TOR and Team selection & contracting	EM	End Oct 2015	
<b>Phase 2 - Inception</b>				
	Inception Briefing between OEV and CPE Team	EM/ Team	Dec 9, 2015	
	Inception Briefing at WFP stakeholders (WFP Rome)	EM / Team	Jan 12-13	
	Inception mission in Burundi - 5 days	EM + TL	1-5 Feb	
	Submit Draft Inception Report (IR) to OEV (after company's quality check)	TL	26 Feb	
	OEV quality assurance and feedback	EM	24 Feb & 05 Mar	
	Submit revised inception report (IR)	TL	25 Mar	
	Circulate final IR to WFP key stakeholders for their information + post a copy on intranet	EM	8 April	
<b>Phase 3 - Evaluation Mission - Fieldwork in Burundi</b>				
	Field work (3 weeks) in Burundi. Exit debrief/ Internal debriefing with the CO, RB (and OEV virtually) presenting initial findings.	Team	14 Apr - 03 May	
	Consolidation of preliminary findings/Aide Memoire (PPT) sent to OEV	TL	16-May	

March 2016	<b>BURUNDI COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION (CPE)</b>	<b>By whom</b>	<b>Key Dates (deadlines)</b>	<b>Comments</b>
	Debriefing via teleconference with the CO, RB and HQ Rome staff. Preliminary findings and recommendations (PPT) presented by the TL.	EM & TL	20-May	
<b>Phase 4 - Evaluation Report (ER) – high quality report from draft 0 onwards</b>				
Draft 0	Submit draft Evaluation Report (ER) (Do) to OEV (after internal company's quality check and review)	TL	8 June	
	OEV quality feedback sent to the team	EM	13 June	
Draft 1	Submit revised draft ER (D1) to OEV	TL	19 June	
	OEV reviews ER (D1) and seeks D/OEV's clearance for circulating the ER (D1) to WFP stakeholders for comments (2 weeks)	EM	24 June	
	OEV consolidates all WFP's comments (matrix) and share them with the team	EM	8 July	
	Proposed stakeholders' workshop in-country (2 days max.): Team Leader presents the preliminary findings of the CPE to CO + major stakeholders	TL	12-13 July	
	OEV consolidates all WFP's comments (matrix) and share them with the team	EM	15 July	
Draft 2	Submit revised draft ER to OEV based on WFP's comments and team's comments on the matrix.	TL	19 July	
	Submit draft SER to OEV	TL	19-July	
	OEV reviews ER (D2), draft SER & matrix (clarification with the team if needed)	EM	21-July	
	Seek OEV Director's clearance for SER circulation to EMG for	EM	22-July	
	DIR/2nd Lev Sep. clear SER for circulation		16 August	
	OEV reviews EMG comments on the SER/ revisions with team	EM & TL	26 August	

March 2016	<b>BURUNDI COUNTRY PORTFOLIO EVALUATION (CPE)</b>	<b>By whom</b>	<b>Key Dates (deadlines)</b>	<b>Comments</b>
	EM consolidates EMG comments and send them to team for revision	EM	26 August	
Draft 3	Submit final draft ER (with the revised SER) to OEV	TL	31 August	
	Seek Final Approval by OEV Director. Clarify last points/issues with the team if necessary	EM & TL	31 August	
	Final approval by OEV/Dir. Last clarification by team if necessary.	EM & TL	1 September	
<b>Phase 5 Executive Board (EB) and follow-up</b>				
	Submit SER to EB Secretariat for editing & translation + SER recommendation to RMP for management response	EM	2 September	
	Tail end actions, including Ev. Brief, OEV websites posting, EB Round Table, etc.	EM	Sep/Oct	
	Presentation of Summary Evaluation Report to the EB2/2016	D/OEV	Nov 2016	
	Presentation of management response to the EB2/2016	D/RMP	Nov 2016	

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